

Nichtheroy.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE HARBOR OF RIO DE JANEIRO.

The Detroit escorted the vessel from the lower harbor up to the docks at the right in the cut. The vessels snown indicate substantially the position of the insurgent warships.









Coleção Documentos 42









# A 2.ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA AMERICANA

VOLUME II (NOVEMBRO 1893-MARÇO 1894)

**RETO MONICO** 

### A 2ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA AMERICANA

Volume II (novembro de 1893- março de 1894)





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### **Reto Monico**

### A 2ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA AMERICANA

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Reto Monico nasceu em 1953 na Suíça italiana. Em 1977, licenciou-se em História na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Genebra. Doutorou-se em 2003 com a tese *Suisse-Portugal: regards croisés (1890-1930)*, publicada em 2005. Nos seus trabalhos, analisa sobretudo a imagem dada pela imprensa internacional e pela diplomacia suíça sobre aspectos e acontecimentos da História contemporânea de Portugal e do Brasil. Nesta coleção, publicou em 2020 uma trilogia sobre o Golpe de Deodoro da Fonseca em novembro de 1891 visto pela imprensa internacional. (Cf. nºs 27, 28 e 36)



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### Apresentação do 2º volume

Este livro reproduz os artigos publicados sobre o Brasil pela imprensa norte-americana de 12 de novembro de 1893 até 25 de março do ano seguinte. Como no tomo I, escolhemos essencialmente os comentários e as análises dos jornalistas americanos sobre esta guerra civil no Brasil, além de algumas pequenas notas cómico-satíricas, relativamente frequentes nos órgãos de informação dos Estados Unidos.

A esmagadora maioria dos editorialistas critica os revoltosos, tratados, por vezes de piratas irresponsáveis e de corsários, que não podem exigir obter o estatuto de beligerante, acusados de quererem restaurar a monarquia. Muitos afirmam que as potências europeias, e nomeadamente a Grã-Bretanha, apoiam mais ou menos diretamente os insurretos, com o claro objetivo de poder derrubar, à curto prazo, o regime republicano no Rio de Janeiro. Alguns jornalistas — e isso pode surpreender o historiador do século XXI — acreditam mesmo que o neto de D. Pedro II já esteja no Brasil ou, pelo menos, preparando a sua partida para o país que o viu nascer.

É neste contexto que podemos ler inúmeras referências à célebre Doutrina Monroe que, do ponto de vista dos analistas aqui citados, tem como objetivo de impedir que uma potência de um outro continente possa intervir para impor a sua vontade a um país americano. Estes jornalistas afirmam também que, no caso do Brasil, os Estados Unidos não têm de apoiar Peixoto

contra os rebeldes, mas devem impedir que as potências europeias possam, com as ajudas dadas aos rebeldes, desestabilizar o Governo do Rio de Janeiro.

Alguns, cansados pelo facto da situação militar não ter sofrido alterações significativas durante muitas semanas. Também preocupados pelos grandes prejuízos sofridos pelo comércio internacional por causa do bloqueio imposto por de Melo ao porto carioca, preconizam uma ação conjunta das grandes potências para pôr um ponto final a esta paródia de guerra, chata e aborrecida. Os mesmos admitem, todavia, que isto não seria desejável, porque são os brasileiros que devem resolver os seus assuntos internos e não os outros países, incluindo os próprios americanos.

A falta de informações fiáveis é posta em evidência por muitos observadores norte-americanos que sublinham as contradições entre os vários despachos. O exemplo do paradeiro de Custódio de Melo é significativo: devia estar em seis lugares diferentes ao mesmo tempo! Estas grandes lacunas nas fontes podem explicar, pelo menos em parte, algumas notícias que dão uma vantagem significativa para os revoltosos que, na opinião de certos jornais, estariam quase a triunfar.

Floriano Peixoto tem o apoio de quase todos os periódicos aqui analisados. É neste contexto que os jornalistas apoiam a aquisição de uma nova frota de guerra aos Estados Unidos por parte do executivo do Rio de Janeiro. Estes analistas esperam que, com a chegada dos novos navios de guerra, se saia deste impasse e que Custódio de Melo e Saldanha da Gama sejam definitivamente derrotados. Só uma pequena minoria coloca a questão da

neutralidade dos Estados Unidos neste conflito, tendo em conta que os navios são transformados no porto de Nova Iorque. Alguns raríssimos comentários aludem à fraca qualidade destes navios, corroborando, dessa forma, a futura expressão «frota de papelão», atribuída posteriormente a esta frota.

O acontecimento que suscita mais comentários é a enérgica intervenção do Almirante americano Benham que, a 29 de janeiro, protege um navio mercante americano dos rebeldes e ameaça Saldanha da Gama de um ataque fatal se este continuar a bloquear a atividade comercial no porto da cidade. Todos felicitam o comandante da Esquadra americana que fez o que tinha de fazer para defender os interesses do seu país, sem pôr em causa a neutralidade do governo de Washington.

Na opinião dos editorialistas— segundo os quais os americanos deviam ter agido mais cedo — esta ação prova, por um lado, que a doutrina Monroe não é uma frase sem significado e, por outro lado, que é essencial para os Estados Unidos ter uma frota poderosa e eficaz. Os jornalistas acusam Saldanha da Gama de ter tido uma atitude arrogante e de ter provocado este confronto, apesar dos avisos do almirante americano. Muitos supõem que esta sua atitude foi uma espécie de farsa, de encenação, para poder render-se à esquadra americana e salvar assim a pele.

Porém, esta grave humiliação sofrida pelo comandante dos revoltosos não tem como imediata consequência o fim desta guerra civil, como afirmam vários observadores norte-americanos, que consideram a causa dos insurretos como quase perdida. Será preciso esperar mais seis semanas, para que, na baía do Rio de Janeiro, se possa assistir à rendição da frota rebelde.

Com o fim do conflito, vários analistas interrogam-se sobre esta revolta, irritante, intermitente, estúpida, flutuante, para citar alguns dos qualificativos utilizados pelos editorialistas. O modo como esta contenda terminou — com o chefe e os oficiais fugindo, abandonando os seus homens, refugiando-se num navio português e pedindo asilo — muitos observadores perguntam porque esta tinha começado a 6 de setembro do ano anterior. Os jornalistas encontram só duas respostas que lhes parecem viáveis: a desmedida ambição de Custódio de Melo, por um lado; o claro objetivo de repor os Bragança no trono, do outro, como o provam as ajudas e os apoios dados, segundo eles, pelos monárquicos europeus.

Todos congratulam-se pela vitória da República brasileira que conseguiu defender as suas instituições. Neste resultado, o papel dos Estados Unidos foi determinante, admitem vários analistas. Estes felicitam-se pelo facto de os americanos estarem, agora, numa posição muito melhor do que a Grã-Bretanha e, também, porque o comércio com o Brasil pode retomar o ritmo habitual, que corresponde melhor à importância do país. Sugerem a Floriano Peixoto para não cair no círculo vicioso da vingança e desejam que, com novo presidente eleito, a 1 de março o Brasil possa virar a página, apesar da luta continuar no Rio Grande do Sul. Porém, essa afeta só muito marginalmente, na opinião da imprensa americana, os interesses das potências mundiais.

Mas isso não vai acontecer de um dia para o outro, como nota o *San Francisco Chronicle*, a 15 de março de 1894, a propósito de um dos símbolos do Brasil: «Quando chegou a notícia da derrota da revolta, o preço diminuiu vários pontos no mercado de Nova Iorque, mas é sensato prever que vai levar ainda muito tempo antes que o café a retalho possa ser tão barato como antes do início da grande briga no Brasil».

### Breve cronologia

(novembro 1893-maio1894)

- **22 de novembro**: obuses de São João ferem de morte o monitor-couraçado *Javari*.
- **30 de novembro**: parte da esquadra rebelde, sob o comando de Custódio de Melo, deixa o Rio de Janeiro em direção a Santa Catarina, sede do governo reprovisório da revolução.
- **2 de dezembro**: a tensão aumenta, com a divisão de opiniões quanto ao levantamento de trincheiras na Ilha das Cobras.
- **4 de dezembro**: Saldanha da Gama assume o comando da esquadra revolucionária, vindo a ameaçar que faria fogo sobre a cidade, ao primeiro tiro que viesse de terra.
- **25 de dezembro**: os comandantes estrangeiros redigem uma nota enérgica de resposta ao chefe rebelde, no sentido de conter a anunciada hostilidade.
- **31 de dezembro**: os diplomatas estrangeiros acordam com o governo a continuidade dos preceitos acordados.
- **2 de janeiro**: os diplomatas estrangeiros consideram que o governo rompeu acordo de 5 de outubro, e cessam a intervenção.
- 12 e 16 de janeiro: consolida-se a cooperação americana com o governo brasileiro, através do reforço das forças navais em operação na costa brasileira;

nos dias seguintes, a esquadra norte-americana ameaça os navios rebeldes brasileiros, recebendo Saldanha da Gama correspondência de comandante norte-americano com um verdadeiro ultimato, restringindo-lhe ainda mais as ações; o chefe dos insurretos lavra um solene mas inútil protesto.

29 de janeiro: Benham, o comandante da frota americana no Rio, protege um navio mercante, ameaçado pelos revoltosos. Depois de uma troca de tiros simbólicos, da Gama tem de se render perante uma força muito superior.

**9 de fevereiro** – Saldanha reúne 500 homens e lança-os contra as defesas da Armação.

11 de fevereiro: após renhido combate, diante da resistência das forças governistas, Saldanha dá ordem de retirada, com as tropas legalistas reforçando o ataque.

21 de fevereiro: forças legalistas tomam Magé, no litoral fluminense, causando um m duro golpe aos rebeldes, desalojando-os de seu ponto de apoio no continente; enquanto isso, na Bahia, uma esquadra governamental era armada para dar combate aos rebeldes; Saldanha da Gama continua a esperar os possíveis reforços vindos do Sul, que não se confirmam.

**23 de fevereiro**: o único navio bem artilhado dos rebeldes foi posto a pique; Saldanha estava isolado no Rio de Janeiro.

10 de março: chegada da esquadra governamental no Rio de Janeiro.

11 de março: o governo informa o corpo diplomático de que, findas 48 horas, começariam as operações na cidade contra os insurgentes. Saldanha promove

uma reunião com os seus oficiais, expondo a gravidade da situação; começam as negociações com o comandante português Augusto de Castilho para a obtenção de asilo.

- 13 de março: apesar da oposição de Floriano, os rebeldes começam a embarcar na corveta portuguesa.
- **15 de março**: o governo brasileiro em nota à Legação de Portugal reclama a entrega dos «criminosos» refugiados; a diplomacia lusa apela para o direito internacional e nega a devolução.
- **2 e 16 de abril**: a diplomacia lusitana reforça a garantia de que os rebeldes exilados não teriam acesso a território estrangeiro, o que não se confirmaria, pois parte dos revolucionários desembarcou na região platina, e muitos deles reforçaram as forças federalista no Rio Grande do Sul.
  - -13 de maio: rutura das relações diplomáticas entre o Brasil e Portugal.

# **211**. «Magpies and Jackdaws», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 12 de novembro

Na primeira parte, o articulista pergunta-se o que faziam os soldados ingleses no depósito de pólvora dos insurretos que explodiu poucos dias antes? Compara a seguir os revoltosos às gralhas e os oficiais ingleses ao charneco apanhado com um bando de gralhas numa fábula de Esopo. Põe assim em evidência a simpatia de Londres para a causa defendida por Custódio de Melo.

Com a chegada dos novos navios comprados nos Estados Unidos ao porto da capital brasileira, tanto os revoltosos, quanto as ideias de restauração monárquica, irão desaparecer, e logo depois do primeiro combate, garante o jornal do Minnesota.

When the insurgent powder magazine, containing 200 tons of powder, blew up the other day, the list of the dead included three British officers and five seamen from flagship of the British squadron in the harbor. The question is, What were these British officers and seamen doing at the fort and powder magazine of the insurgents?

The United States government discharged Rear Admiral Stanton, of the United States navy, for simply exchanging salutations with the insurgents. The recognition of the insurgents by any foreign state is a *casus belli* which justifies a declaration of war by the parent state. But the officers of the British flagship were not only on speaking terms with the insurgent fleet, but were guests within the insurgent fort and powder magazine. And so, by significant coincidence, the list of insurgent dead after the explosion included eight officers and seamen from the flagship of the British squadron.

The situation recalls the fable of the magpie which was captured in the flock of jackdaws. The magpie's neck was wrung on the ground that if he was not a jackdaw, he was in jackdaw company and engaged in jackdaw capers, which was just as bad. In the case of the death of British officers among the insurgent crew, the Brazilian government is probably wasting no tears. It doubtless entertains sentiments quite similar to the man who captured the magpie in the same net with the jackdaws.

The sympathy of European powers with the insurgents is no secret. The secretary of Compte d'Eu — Dom Pedro's son-in-law and Melo's candidate of the Brazilian throne — has been in Brazil among the insurgents during the past few weeks, working up the imperial cause and laying plans for the overthrow of the republic. The family's political advisor announces that the imperial family is ready to take up the reins of government any time they are called upon. The family is now resident in Paris, but watches the progress of the insurrection with great interest.

When the *Cid, Britannia, Feisen* and *Destroyer*, the new Brazilian fleet recently purchased in this country by the republic, reaches the waters of Rio, which will be now in a few days, the imperial family will have more definitive knowledge of their political prospects. If the submarine gun on the *Destroyer*, the pneumatic dynamite gun on the *Cid*, and the torpedo guns on board of the other vessels named do the work for which they were planned, there will not be much of insurgency or of imperialist prospect left in Rio's waters after the first engagement.

#### **212.** *The Daily American*, 12 de novembro

É preciso que o governo americano esteja atento «aos manipuladores estrangeiros no Brasil», escreve o quotidiano que fala também dos problemas que pode levantar a preparação da nova frota brasileira em Nova Iorque.

Unless the Brazilian combatants soon settle their little difference there is a prospect that other nations may be involved. Circumstances exist which have a tendency to draw other South American countries into the trouble, but there is a graver aspect than that. It seems clear that Admiral Melo favors restoration of the monarchy in Brazil, whether be fully determined to attempt restoration in the event of his success or not. And the indications are that certain European nations are conniving at his success with a view to the overthrow of the republic. Our Government is extremely jealous of any infraction of the Monroe doctrine either in letter or in spirit, and should it uncover sufficient evidence to establish foreign interference in Brazil, it will unquestionably call a halt whatever may be the prospective consequence. It is not likely that any combination of European powers would defy the demands of our Governments under ordinary circumstances, yet there are facts in the present case which may have an irritating influence. The main element of this character is the preparations made at New York by PEIXOTO for naval warfare and the alleged enlistment of Americans there to aid him. Foreign powers may seize upon this, whatever may be the legal aspects of the case, under international law, as a plea for interference upon their part. While the probabilities are that there will be no outcome of actual hostilities involving the United States, we believe that sufficient grounds exist to justify claim the earnest attention of our Government to the subject, and the indication are that the authorities at Washington are closely scrutinizing foreign manipulators at Rio, and taking precautionary measures to protect American cherished policy in such matters.

#### **213**. *The Sioux-City Journal*, 12 de novembro

Os Estados Unidos não reconheceram o estatuto de beligerante dos rebeldes brasileiros. Podem, por conseguinte, vender armas e navios ao governo de Peixoto, afirma o jornal.

There seems to be no rational ground on which the United States authorities can prevent or in any way interfere with the sale of munitions of war, or even of armed ships, to government of Brazil. The government has not recognized the Brazilian insurgents as a belligerent, and until it does there can be no ground for neutrality. It has been the policy of the United States not to precipitate in recognizing insurrections. Its experience in the civil war was a most pointed lesson in this respect. But there is no prophesying what the present administration may do in international affairs.

#### **214.** *The Evening Star*, 13 de novembro

It is lucky for the Monroe Doctrine that Mr. Monroe was President so long ago that no political or personal capital can now be gained by a reversal of his policy and opinions.

[...]

Brazil's prospective naval fight is advertised as having all the modern improvement.

### **215.** «Brazil and Our Neutrality Line», *The Daily American*, 14 de novembro

O jornal de Nashville também se pronuncia sobre o tema da neutralidade americana neste conflito interno brasileiro. Visto que Washington «não reconheceu o estatuo de beligerante a Custódio de Melo», é perfeitamente legal recrutar tropas para o Brasil, porque «não existe guerra naguele país», explica o editorialista.

The question has been raised whether the manning and equipment of ships in this country in behalf of President Peixoto, of Brazil, is a violation of our neutrality laws. Section 5282 of Revised Statutes provides that:

Every person who, within the jurisdiction of the United States, enlists or enters himself or hires or retains another to enlist or enter himself to go beyond the limits of jurisdiction of the Unites States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, entered in the service of any foreign Province, State, Colony, district or people, as a soldier or

marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque or privateer, shall be deemed guilty of high misdemeanor and shall be fined not more than \$1,000 and imprisoned not more than three days.

A naval officer who has made a study of question of this kind was asked for an expression of opinion on this point, and he replied as follows:

Section 5282, Revised Statutes, is a part of the neutrality chapter. The purpose of the neutrality chapter is to provide for maintaining the neutrality of the United States when two foreign powers are at war. The neutrality chapter contemplates the existence of a state of war, and has no application in time of peace. It prohibits enlisting in the service of any foreign prince or State with whom the United States are at peace.

The attention which this naval officer has given to the question renders his opinion of decided interest.

At the same time, the construction of the statue, in the absence of a clear adjudication by the Supreme Court upon the subjects, seems open to debate.

There is no ground to doubt that the proper authorities would prevent or persecute any sets deemed, after a careful consideration of the subject, a violation of the neutrality laws. In the views of the naval officer above referred to are correct, there would be no offense in enlisting troops for Brazil, as no war exists in that country in contemplation of law, our Government having failed to accord belligerent rights to Admiral Melo.

Whatever may be the outcome it will not get us into any trouble. Our only guide is our own stature and a proper sense of international obligations.

#### **216**. «Brazilian Affairs», *The Times Democrat*, 15 de novembro

Nada de relevante acontece no porto da capital brasileira, nota o jornal que desmente duas notícias; uma sobre um desembarque das tropas de Custódio de Melo em Niterói e outra sobre a conquista de Desterro por parte das tropas fiéis a Peixoto.

Na segunda parte, debruça-se sobre a nova frota que está no porto de Nova Iorque, prestes a partir para o Brasil. O jornalista concentra a sua análise sobre a nova arma inventada por Zalinski que está pessoalmente a bordo de El Cid. Quando chegarem ao destino, poderemos verificar se o torpedo com dinamite irá explodir no próprio navio ou se irá aniquilar os navios rebeldes, conclui o jornal da Luisiana.

There has apparently been more than the usual activity among the forces both of the revolutionists and of the loyalists in Brazil during the past three of four days. There has been no practical result from it, however, so far as can be discerned at this distance, the same status obtaining now as obtained a month and two months ago. Rumors of losses here and gains there are reported in abundance, but the rumors are never, even by accident, borne out by later and more accurate information.

It was rumored, for example, that, at the beginning of the week, the insurgents had effected a landing in considerable force at Niteroi, against which their guns are said to have been blazing away almost without interruption since the commencement of hostilities. Niteroi is the capital of the State of Rio de Janeiro, and is situated on the bay five miles from Rio. It is not occupied, at latest accounts, by the insurgents; so that if they did succeed

in effecting a landing — which is extremely doubtful — they were either soon drive, or thought it better to retire, from it.

Another rumor, [...], was to the effect that a loyalist General had made an unexpected descent on the province of Santa Catarina and had captured Desterro, where the insurgents but three weeks ago has established their headquarters on land. This story also has much of the nebulousness about it that characterizes almost every one of the loyalist stories of victory telegraphed from the capital. The State of Santa Catarina is quite an insurgent State; and Peixoto has not enough soldiers in that region of the republic to make it even moderately safe for him to invade a hostile territory from attack, more owing of its enemies' weakness than to its friends' strength.

It is still evident, therefore, that no fighting, not to say of a decisive character but not even much worth mention, is likely to take place at the scene of hostilities before the arrival of the new fleet which has been acquired in New York. That fleet will soon be ready to weigh anchor. The *El Cid* and the *Britannia*, the two big boats of the flotilla, have been practically «converted» into men-of-war. Their guns, ammunition and stores are mostly on board; and little remains to be done but to take in coal, and to ship their crews.

The crews for all the vessels are not yet made up, but it is stated that about 320 men, mostly experienced men-of-war's men, have been engaged for service on the *El Cid* and the *Britannia*. A full complement of officers appears to have been obtained, the great majority of them being recent graduates from

Annapolis<sup>1</sup>. Capt. E. L. Zalinski<sup>2</sup>, moreover, left San Francisco at the end of last week to go to New York to take charge of the 15-inch dynamite gun now on the *El Cid*. Capt. Zalinski has the reputation of knowing, and probably does know, more about dynamite firing than any other ordnance officer in the United States; and one of the most interesting things to watch in connection with the expedition after it reaches the scene of action, will be the behavior of the huge dynamite under his control. It is hardly necessary to remark that the firing of huge projectiles of high explosive power from guns is practically a new experiment; and whether, in Capt. Zalinski's hands, the *El Cid*'s gun will burst and blow to atoms the vessel herself and everybody and everything in her vicinity, or whether the projectile will reach the enemy and annihilate them, will be alternatives of a decidedly interesting character.

The fleet is almost certain to sail at the end of this or the beginning of next week; and then in due time we may expect to hear something that will relieve the monotony and inactivity that have hitherto characterized this civil warfare in the great South American republic.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A Academia Naval de Annapolis, na capital do Maryland, é fundada em 1845.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Edmond Louis Grey Zalinski (1849-1909), militar e inventor, nascido na Polónia, emigra com os pais em 1853. Participa na Guerra de Secessão em 1864 até ao fim. Inventou, entre outras coisas, a pistola-torpedeira pneumática a dinamite («pneumatic dynamite torpedogun»).

#### 217. «Brazil and Monarchy», The Daily Picayune, 15 de novembro

Parece cada vez mais evidente que a revolta toma um carácter filomonárquico, sublinha o jornal da Nova Orleães, segundo o qual isto vai permitir aos revoltosos obter apoios por parte dos monárquicos brasileiros e, igualmente, de potências europeias. O jornalista fala mesmo de ataques mais violentos por parte dos rebeldes, ao corrente das aquisições de navios por parte de Peixoto que, na sua opinião, parece estar numa situação «menos favorável».

The recent news from Brazil, published by the *Picayune*, which by the way has been uncommonly interesting and complete, points to the probability that the revolution is likely, after all, to assume the character of an attempt to restore the imperial dynasty. The advices from Rio de Janeiro report that at a recent meeting of the revolutionary chiefs, at which Admiral Custodio de Melo presided, it was decided to hoist the imperial standard in the near future.

This course would give to the revolution a much more formidable character than it has hitherto assumed. Such a course would assure to the revolutionists a practically unlimited supply of money, and the secret, if not the active, support of several of the European powers. It is also known that the monarchists have numerous adherents all over Brazil, and the promise of a restoration of the empire would bring to the revolutionary standard many who have hitherto held aloof from it.

It appears that the rebel Admiral, spurred on by the knowledge that President Peixoto is purchasing warships abroad, has inaugurated a more aggressive policy at Rio. The fighting has accordingly become more vigorous, and the latest accounts claim the rebels are gradually securing a foothold ashore. The possession of funds and supplies which the declaration in favor of the monarchy will assure makes the situation look less favorable for the present Government than it did a shirt time back.

The possible secret assistance from European powers, and the influence that they would thus gain in Brazil in the event of the success of the revolution, makes the situation in Rio worth close watching by the United States.

### **218.** «Flying the Imperial Flag», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 15 de novembro

Artigo muito crítico para com a administração americana, muito lenta em enviar navios ao porto da capital brasileira e com o Grover Cleveland, suspeito de ter simpatia pelos monarcas, como demonstrou no caso na crise das Ilhas Havai.

The Rio de Janeiro correspondent of the London *Times* confirms a report that the insurgent navy has hoisted the imperial standard, the flag of the late emperor Dom Pedro. The rapid progress of the rebellion against the lawful government of Brazil is largely owing to the supineness of the administration in Washington. They were needless delays in dispatching American warships to Rio, and in the meantime the vessels of foreign governments gave active aid and comfort to the rebel admiral by permitting him to seize supplies from

merchantmen entering the harbor. Our minister at Rio was involved in a partial agreement for foreign intervention to the detriment of the existing government. How far the president himself was involved in the ignoble business may not soon be known. But the admiral of the fleet who sailed, presumably with full knowledge of the views of the administration, saluted the rebel admiral and paid him a friendly visit on arriving in the harbor of Rio. Then the administration was obliged to turn a sharp corner, probably to preserve diplomatic relations whit Brazil. Admiral Stanton was hastily recalled and friendship for the republic was shown.

The president then turned his attention to setting up a monarchy in the Hawaiian Islands, and is still in the business. As a patriotic American he is thoroughly discredited.

#### **219**. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 15 de novembro

Não se pode comparar a situação atual no Brasil com a do Havai onde os Estados Unidos foram utilizados como «o joguete de aventureiros sem escrúpulos».

A partisan journal points out that the Administration has an opportunity in Brazil to "restore another monarchy". It the United States had driven Dom Pedro from throne it might be an honor bound to restore him. There is a vast difference between the Brazilian case and that of Hawaii, where Uncle Samuel was used as the catspaw of a gang of unscrupulous adventurers. Our Uncle has

quite enough to do to attend to his own affairs without interfering with other powers, be they week or strong.

#### **220**. *The Daily Picayune*, 15 de novembro

Admiral Melo does not crave a monarchical government of Brazil. He has a softer thing for himself in view. He wants a Melo government.

### **221**. «Brazil's Farcy-Comedy», *Saint Paul Daily Globe*, 16 de novembro

Houve pouquíssimos mortos, o bombardeamento foi muito fraco, o bloqueio do porto não funciona e a vida quotidiana na capital desenrola-se quase normalmente, escreve o jornal que considera a rebelião como uma «paródia da querra».

Chegou a hora de acabar com esta farsa, exclama o jornalista do Minnesota, que pede uma intervenção das grandes potências, para que ponham um ponto final à ação de Custódio de Melo, «um destruidor irresponsável» que «não merece nem consideração, nem reconhecimento». Além disso, o comandante da insurreição não dá nenhuma razão séria que explique a «sua oposição ao governo legal e não define a sua política em caso de vitória».

The alleged bombardment of Rio de Janeiro, had degenerated into a ridiculous farce. Recent advises from that city state that the firing, never very heavy, has become so ineffective as to cause no perceptible hindrance to

business. Trade, though not brisk, is improving, and all social functions are occurring precisely as if nothing usual was in the wind.

The farcical character of the bombardment and blockade of the port having become apparent, the senior commanding officers of the foreign fleet anchored in the harbor have notified Admiral Melo that they would protest the landing of all cargoes in lighters of any nationality, the flag of the nation discharging such cargo to be hoisted in the bow of the lighter. Melo protested, but has not since attempted to interfere with commerce, and the alleged blockade has utterly failed. The entire rebellion is a travesty upon the name of war. Not a dozen persons have been killed since its inauguration; the business of the city runs in its ordinary channels; the theatres are open nightly and are well patronized, and citizens sleep as peacefully and pursue their customary avocations as serenely as if there was no hostile fleet in the offing belching forth a storm of tire and iron. It had no existence in fact. A bombardment by skyrockets and Roman candle would have been quite as destructive and far more ornamental.

It is about time that there should be interference by foreign nations in the affairs of Brazil. Great Britain, the United States and Spain are most concerned, in a commercial sense, in the matter. The business of all these nations is crippled by the existing order of things. The rebel commander vouchsafes no reason for his opposition to the legally constituted government, and outlines no policy of his own in case of success in deposing President Peixoto. His grievance is simply the fact that he and his partisans did not receive that recognition from the administration they thought themselves entitled to. He denies that he is acting in the interest of the monarchy. In the absence of sufficient motive for his conduct, he is placed in the attitude of anarchism. He is a wanton destroyer, and, as a such, is deserving of neither recognition nor consideration.

Affairs have reached the point at which forbearance on the part of foreign government ceases do be a virtue. It was long ago decided by international law and usage that a blockade, in order to be respected, must be effectual. A mere sentinel to warn ships away from a port is not sufficient to consider a legal or binding blockade. The blockade of Rio is not a sufficient one — it does not fill the requirements, and, having been officially so declared, should be removed entirely by the concurrence of all powers in interest. It is time that this opera bouffe war was ended.

#### 222. «Melo's Blockade», San Francisco Chronicle, 16 de novembro

Até agora, nenhuma nação reconheceu a Melo o estatuto de beligerante, explica o jornal. Ele é só «um rebelde, em revolta contra o governo legal e reconhecido do Brasil». Por conseguinte, ele não tem o direito de bloquear o porto do Rio de Janeiro e de impedir os navios de comercio de entrar, de descarregar e de carregar a mercadoria.

Se o fizer, terá de enfrentar não uma nação só, mas todas, que «agirão em concerto e harmonia», não para intervir na guerra civil, mas para proteger o comércio internacional.

The Secretary of the Navy has received a dispatch from Captain Picking, in command of the ships of the United States navy in Rio Janeiro harbor, saying that the commanding officers of the naval vessels of the various nations represented at Rio had informed Admiral Melo that they would protect the landing of all cargoes in lighters of any nationality. Melo was very angry, but, however, has since abstained from interfering further with commerce.

This action, which may seem strange, proceeds upon the theory that a blockade can be maintained only by those to whom belligerent rights have been accorded. In others words, if a number of men should secure possession of a steamer in this city, arm and equip her, declare war against the United States, and cruise between the Farallones and the entrance to the Golden Gate under the guise of blockading the port of San Francisco, no nation on earth would recognize the blockade. More than that, it this supposititious cruiser were to attempt to interfere with the commerce of a maritime power, like England or France or Germany, she would probably be blown out of water, especially if she ventured outside the marine league from shore.

In contemplation of law, Mello is simply a rebel, in revolt against the recognized and lawful Government of Brazil. If he can succeed his party may become the dominant party and represent the Government, but until then he has no international standing whatever, and will not be permitted to interrupt commerce between foreign nations and Brazil. Neutral nations will take no active part in the struggle, but they will not permit Melo to injure their material interests or cut off their trade.

This view of the case will explain why the foreign squadrons laid down the law to Melo. He may bombard Rio Janeiro and the Brazilian forts, for that is a matter between the Brazilians and himself, but if the undertakes to prevent the landing of freight on Brazilian soil he will find that he will have to deal with every commercial nation in the world, and that not with each singly, but with all acting in concert and harmony.

The latest news is that Admiral Melo has declared himself for the Empire and has proclaimed monarchy in Brazil, but that does not alter the legal aspect of the case. Whether he be fighting for the restoration of the Empire or to advance his own personal aims and ends, he is not entitled to maintain a blockade until he has been formally recognized by foreign nations as entitles to the rights of a belligerent. We do not see that his espousal of the Bourbon cause can help him in any way.

### **223**. «The *Picayune* Latin-American News», *The Daily Picayune*, 16 de novembro

Pequeno artigo no qual a redação do jornal da Nova Orleães se autofelicita pela rapidez e pela qualidade das informações publicadas sobre os acontecimentos na América Latina em geral, no Brasil e Cuba em particular. Nomeadamente, vangloria-se do facto de ter sido muitas vezes mais rápido do que os seus colegas a dar as importantes notícias vindas do Rio de Janeiro. Ever since the commencement of the revolution in Brazil the news columns of the *Picayune* have contained the latest available information from Rio de Janeiro and from other centers of news likely to be able to afford any information a sot the progress of events in the disturbed Latin-American republic.

Every important movement which has taken placed during the civil war in Brazil has been faithfully recorded in the *Picayune*, and this paper has been able to place before its readers this information in advance of all other Southern contemporaries. Important occurrences in any Latin-American countries are of great interest to the people of the United States, and events in Brazil are watched with even more interest that attaches to the affairs of the other Central and South American countries, because of the large trade that United States enjoys with that country.

Appreciating the interest that is felt in the progress of events in Brazil, the *Picayune* has spared no pains to secure the latest information, and we have been able to place before our readers the latest news obtainable, and many of the more stirring events this paper has published in advance of all competitors.

The *Picayune* has also been able to give the latest news from Cuba, and the details of the recent revolutionary outbreak in that island were furnished our readers in more complete and detailed form than they appeared in any other paper published in this section.

As accurate information from all of the Latin-American countries is rather difficult to obtain, the *Picayune* takes special pride in the success of its efforts in this direction.

### **224**. «The War Ship and the Ram», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 16 de novembro

Quando a nova frota chegar ao Rio, vai ser complicado para Melo, avisa o jornal que, no entanto, não parece apreciar as novas tecnologias do combate naval e que desejaria ver os brasileiros ocupados em tarefas mais «humanas e úteis».

Peixoto new fleet, consisting of the *Britannia*, *Destroyer* and *El Cid*, are expected to leave this week for Rio Janeiro.

If these ships do not meet the warlike ram before they arrive there, things will be decidedly warm for Melo. He cannot get his newly purchases ships in Europe over in time, and must face the *El Cid* with her terrible dynamite gun if he cannot destroy her, Victoria fashion, on the way.

Admiral Melo has a very powerful ship in reserve, the *Republica*, which he is trying to get to sea in time to intercept the new fleet. What else he may have lying secretly in wait for the three ships and accompanying tugs after they leave New York is chiefly a matter of speculation.

Ramming a hostile ship does not always mean success to the assailant. In the first place not only is resistance equal to momentum, but the ship rammed sometimes gets in fatal upper cut that sends the rammer to the bottom

A modest little schooner was rammed by a bullying big screw ship on Long Island sound a few years ago, and bounding back under the quarter of the giant she sent, as it were, a dagger to her heart. The big one reeled and sank to the bottom in a few moments, while the featherweight kept right on as if it had been only a little scuffle.

The best advice for the whole array of combatants in Brazil is to give up the business of ramming, shooting off dynamite and planting torpedoes under water, and get back to some humane and useful occupation.

# **225.** «European Monarchists Aiding Melo», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 16 de novembro

O articulista acusa, por um lado, os monárquicos europeus de financiar a revolta no Brasil e, por outro lado, o presidente Cleveland de facilitar a restauração do antigo regime no Havai, perdendo assim toda a credibilidade o seu eventual protesto contra «uma intervenção estrangeira para derrubar a república do Brasil».

Espera, no entanto, que os novos navios comprados nos Estados Unidos possam «apreender as munições de contrabando enviadas pelos apoiantes europeus da insurreição» e, a seguir, «dispersar a frota que içou a bandeira imperial no porto» carioca.

The London correspondent of *The New York Times* learns that the rebellion of Admiral Melo against the lawful government of Brazil is supported

by the contributions of the duke of Montpensier and the Prados, the latter the representatives of the family of Dom Pedro in Paris. It is stated that the duke of Montpensier has contributed £1,000,000 to aid the rebellion of the Brazilian admiral. Although no foreign government has formally engaged to assist the restoration of the monarchy in Brazil, the sinews of war come from Europe. Under these circumstances our government cannot do more than afford the republic such aid as had been permitted to go from the city of New York. The vessels purchased by Brazil and soon to sail from that port may be able to seize the contraband munitions sent out by the European supporters of the rebellion.

President Cleveland has put himself in a most embarrassing position by undertaking the restoration of a monarchy on his own responsibility, and any diplomatic protest he might make against foreign intervention to overthrow the republic of Brazil would be unheeded. He has reversed all of the precedents of our history and enrolled himself with the kingmakers of Europe.

It is to be hoped that the armed ships which will soon sail from New York will succeed in scattering the fleet which has raised the imperial flag in the harbor of Rio, and prevent the calamity which threatens Brazil.

### **226.** « A Fighting Commodore for Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 17 de novembro

Pequeno artigo dedicado ao Contra-Almirante James H. Gillis (1831-1910).

It is possible that a fighting commodore of the United States navy will command the fleet purchased in New York by the Brazilian government. Commodore James H. Gillis, who was recently retired, because he had reached the age of 62 years, has offered his service to President Peixoto, and it is probable that they will be accepted. Although Commodore Gillis has passed the age for retirement he is yet hale and vigorous. Besides, he served with distinction during the war of the rebellion and knows how to fight from actual experience. He sunk the rebel privateer *Petrel* in 1861; in 1865 his vessel, the *Milwaukee*, was sunk by a rebel torpedo. During his service he rescued his command on shore duty from great peril on several occasion.

As the commander of South Atlantic squadron, the commodore made the acquaintance of President Peixoto and is likely to be welcomed by him. If there is any dangerous duty to perform Commodore Gillis will not shrink from it, and he may be instrumental in defeating the enemies of the republic.

#### **227**. *The Morning Call*, 17 de novembro

Nota irónica sobre pedidos de oficiais da marinha e do exército americanos que querem ir fazer a guerra no Brasil.

The navy and army departments are said to have numerous applications from officers not in active service to go out to Brazil on one side or the other. These combatants out of work resemble the free lances of the middle ages who passed from country to country quite indifferent about the merits of the quarrel

so that they could enjoy free quarters, liberal pay and their fill of fighting. They do not want leave of absence, however, without security for their retiring allowance, and those who dispense with official sanction may have occasion to regret their action. It is not desirable that they should be encouraged either to go to de Melo's or Peixoto's assistance for the sake of learning a few tricks in the complex art of war or the indulgence of vanity. But a few able men might be deputed to watch the progress of the fighting for the sake of professional information.

### **228**. *The Daily Picayune*, 17 de novembro

It may be that the Monroe doctrine will settle the coffee-ground troubles at Brazil which is making the business world sick.

#### **229**. «In Brazil», *The Times Democrats*, 18 de novembro

Nada de novo no Brasil, escreve o jornalista, que critica duramente a inação de Custódio de Melo, que promete e fala muito, mas que não fez grande coisa até agora!

Fala a seguir de duas notícias: a tomada de Desterro por parte das tropas governativas e a «captura», por parte dos rebeldes, do cônsul americano na mesma cidade. Como é possível, interroga-se o jornal, que os revoltosos tenham podido capturar o cônsul, numa cidade ocupada pelos soldados legalistas?

A única coisa que aconteceu nesta semana é a resolução tomada pelos comandantes dos navios das grandes potências de proteger qualquer navio comercial que entre no porto do Rio de Janeiro. Esta decisão, sublinha o editorialista, é favorável ao governo e negativa para de Melo, que está muito zangado, mas que, até agora, nada fez para se opor às intenções das frotas estrangeiras.

Finalmente, o jornal da Luisiana espera que com a «entrada no cenário» dos novos navios comprados por de Peixoto, se possa sair desta fase de inatividade militar e de aborrecimento total.

There is nothing much that is new to chronicle with respect of affairs as between the contending parties in Brazil, since we wrote on the subject at the beginning of the week<sup>3</sup> in these columns.

Admiral Melo, leader of the insurgents, vented a great big threat on Monday or Tuesday that on Wednesday he would commence such a furious bombardment of Rio as would make all previous pyrotechnic attentions to that city from the revolutionist fleet pale into insignificance and as would either destroy the city or compel the citizens to open their gates to him.

The bombardment of Wednesday, like its predecessors, did not amount to much in spite of the blare of trumpets with which it was heralded. Melo mistakes talk for action; and if he keeps on with the policy of masterly inactivity which he has successfully conducted since the opening of the so-called hostilities, his insurrection is bound after a little while longer to fall to pieces or sheer inanition. The leader of an insurrection, from the very nature of the case, must always be on the move forward; hanging-back is but a shade less disastrous from him that retreat. Mello has done nothing but hang back for

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Cf. Texto 216.

more than two months —nothing, that is to say, but feed his followers with high-falutin' announcements of what he was going to do but did not.

There was a rumor at the beginning of the week - to those nebulousness The Times Democrats took occasion at the time top refer – that the loyalist party had achieved a decided advantage over the insurgents by capturing the City of Desterro, in the province of Santa Catarina, the newly-created capital of the insurgent government. No confirmation of the rumored capture has so far been received; and as, in the interim, a member of Peixoto's Ministry has discussed the situation as it stands, and has made no claim or even reference to the alleged capture, the rumor, like so many other rumors from the same source and through the same channel, must be pronounced baseless. It was faked, no doubt, wither by or for the New York World, and through that medium disseminated throughout the country. The "capture" by the revolutionists of United States Consul Grant, stationed at Desterro, and his transference to a revolutionary man-of-war in neighboring waters, is about the sum total of military action that has taken place at the new insurgent capital; and, as that "capture" of the American occurred since the capture of Desterro by the New York World and the loyalists, it would be interesting to know how the revolutionists came to get their hands on him, in a city occupied by the enemy.

The only thing, indeed, of any real importance that appears to have taken place during the week is the action described in Com. Picking's dispatch to the State Department, which we published on Tuesday:

Rio Janeiro. Nov. 13. — The senior commanding officers having informed Admiral Melo that they would protect the landing of all cargoes in lighters of any nationality, the flag of the nation discharging such cargo to be hoisted in the bow of the lighter. Melo was very angry. He promised to answer, but as yet has made none. It is noticeable that commerce has not been disturbed since, however. The firing upon the city continues daily with small arms and machine guns. Both sides appear to be blame.

"PICKING"

That action of the foreign captains was undoubtedly of detriment to the revolutionists. For it would increase the loyalist chances of obtaining supplies, and corresponding lessen the chances of supplies to the revolutionists, who could no longer look to that source for them.

But the week has been, so far as regards the real progress of hostilities, the usual dull week; and, unless the new fleet of Peixoto hurry up and get on the scene to put life into the affair, the monotony of the inactivity will rob the "war" of the little interest it has.

### **230**. «Did Not Favor Mello», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 18 de novembro

Neste comentário um pouco irónico, fala-se da detenção, por parte das tropas de Melo, do cônsul americano em Desterro porque este não aclamou um desfile rebelde. O articulista acusa a administração americana de querer, como no Havai, apoiar a restauração da monarquia. Afinal, nota sarcástico o editorialista, Custódio de Melo queria fazer um favor ao governo americano!

According to dispatches from Brazil, ROBERT GRANT, consular Agent of the United States at Desterro, is under arrest and confined on one of Melo's vessels. The only crime that he has committed, according to the correspondent, is his neglect to throw up his hat and shout for the revolutionists.

Consul Grant has made a grave mistake. He was appointed by President CLEVELAND during the latter's first term, and has remained in office. The administration's policy is to restore royalty in Hawaii. Admiral Melo is fighting for royalty in Brazil. If consul Grant has not heard news from Washington, he may be pardoned for his seeming indifference to the cause of the empire. Indeed, under ordinary conditions he might be commended for thinking he was doing a patriotic thing in not espousing the theories of the revolutionists. But Melo seems to have understood the Cleveland politic and to have acted on it. Of course, if the President could connive at the restoration of the Queen at Honolulu, the logical conclusion is that he would indorse the restoration of the Brazil empire. This being the case, Melo simply took matters into his own hands and by the arrest of Consul Grant no doubt thought that he was doing the administration at Washington a good turn.

It is not at all unlikely that the people of the United States will dissent from Admiral's Melo's course and demand an apology, if nothing more, just as they are demanding that the Democratic administration shall take hands off the provisional government at Honolulu.

## **231**. «Navy Officer of the Future», *The Washington Post,* 18 de novembro

Artigo cheio de ironia e de segundos sentidos — nomeadamente quando compara a atuação do Almirante John Irwin no Havai e do Almirante Stanton no porto do Rio —, no qual o jornalista da capital americana enumera as numerosas competências e qualidades que devia ter um moderno oficial da marinha militar americana.

When Admiral Stanton hears the latest news as to our international performances he will have something to think about. He will find himself as thoroughly engrossed as he ever was by Pigs in Clover<sup>4</sup>, or any other puzzle of repute and ingenuity. Ordered home in disgrace for having merely "recognized" the opposition to a de facto government in Brazil, he will find Admiral Irwin<sup>5</sup> applauded, sustained, perhaps laureled, for having helped to overthrow entirely a *de facto* government in Hawaii, and for having been in truth, its only opponent of consequence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Jogo de destreza inventado em 1889 por Charles Martin Crandall (1833-1905).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> O Contra-Almirante John Irwin (1832-1901), que combateu nomeadamente durante toda a Guerra de Secessão, chega a Honolulu a 6 de novembro de 1893 num momento de grande tensão entre o governo provisório do arquipélago e os Estados Unidos. Com efeito, Cleveland queria restaurar a monarquia da rainha Lili'uokalani (1838-1917) deposta a 17 de janeiro do mesmo ano. Esteve-se à beira duma guerra entre os dois países. Irwin torna-se então o chefe da Esquadra do Pacífico.

This, verily, are days in which the United States naval officer will need to be not only master of his actual profession, but statesman, Mugwump<sup>6</sup>, lawyer, courtier, poet, and clairvoyant in addition. He must know not merely how to sail a ship and work a battery, but he must have at his fingers' ends the relation of the moon to our diplomacy, and the profoundest secrets of the mind reader's occult art. He must cast a horoscope and squeeze the secret out of ultimate astrology, as handily as he takes his bearings or reads his cart. He must be able to tell, the moment he looks at a situation, just how Dom Quixote, or the Duke of Barataria<sup>7</sup>, or any other knight-errant of the days of song and story would have acted under the circumstances. He must know alike the raptures and the pangs of poetry, have romance in his veins, and feel by intuition just what languishing maidens and melancholy Mugwumps long for at the Nation's hands. The days of his ease are over. The sun of his luxurious sloth has set. Henceforth he must have within himself the science of Columbus, the skill of Metternich, the valor of Bonaparte, the tenderness of Tennyson<sup>8</sup>, and the magic

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Os *mugwumps* foram membros do Partido Republicano que apoiaram o democrata Cleveland nas eleições de 1884. A partir de aí, esta palavra toma um sentido mais geral para definir alquém que não apoia a linha do próprio partido.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The Gondolers ou The King of Barataria é uma opereta do compositor britânico Arthur Sullivan (1842-1900) e do libretista William S. Gilbert (1836-1911) que se estreiou a 7 de dezembro de 1889.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Alfred Tennyson (1809-1992) é um poeta inglês.

of Balsamo<sup>9</sup>. Let him fail in one of these ingredients, and he will be as dust on which the rain has fallen heavily, and his name be changed to Mud.

Things have changed since Stanton sailed for Rio, and the good old days, when Navy officers could see a day ahead of them without especial inspiration have joined the great majority.

### **232.** «The case of Consul Grant», *The Washington Post,* 18 de novembro

O Agente consular Robert Grant, capturado pelos rebeldes, tem de ser libertado imediatamente, exige o jornal segundo o qual o governo americano tem de tomar medidas imediatas para o conseguir.

The arrest of Robert Grant, the consular agent of the United States at Desterro, Brazil, which is the capital of the provisional government, and his confinement as a prisoner on one of the insurgent steamers near that place has the appearance of a high-handed act that demands prompt and vigorous action on the part of our government.

It does not appear for what offense Grant was placed in custody, nor is it of material consequence. He is an American citizen, and not only that, but an official representative of the United States. It is no unlikely that he made himself obnoxious to the revolutionists through want of sympathy whit their

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Trata-se de Giuseppe Balsamo, conde de Cagliostro (1743-1795), personagem controversa que tinha fama de ter poderes sobrenaturais.

cause, or possibly by open and imprudent criticism of it, but that does not mend the matter at all.

An assault upon his personal liberty is in the nature of an insult to the government which he represents and will necessitate reparation. It is clearly out of the power of the Brazilian government, however, which is primarily responsible for his safety, to effect his immediate release. The insurgent navy is still in the hands of the insurgents and beyond the reach of the legitimate authorities.

The question then arises, that Peixoto government being for the present unable to comply with any demand that may be made by the United States in Grant's behalf, how long must we wait before addressing such demand to the admiral of the rebel fleet?

Upon the face of it the case would seem to admit of no longer delay. All that it should be necessary to ascertain is whether our consular agent is actually a prisoner or not. The details of the incident have not come fully to hand, but if the report is verified, it follows that the prisoner must be released. If Brazil cannot make the proper redress, the Brazilian insurgents should be called on to do so.

### 233. «The Brazilian Trouble», The Daily American, 18 de novembro

Parece que Peixoto tem mais possibilidades de vencer, mas, sublinha o articulista, nunca se sabe porque os brasileiros são volúveis.

While the naval preparations of PEIXOTO in various quarters, and which are nearing completion, seem to be getting MELO into a jug on water, the latter, if reports are true, is getting his inning on the land. A London press telegram says that information has been received that the Governor of the State of Pernambuco, Brazil, has ordered all telegraphic communication between Pernambuco and Rio Janeiro to be stopped. This is regarded as proof that Pernambuco has declares against Peixoto. In looking over the present situation and contemplating the quick changes which occur in South American affairs, it would not be surprising at any time to hear that MELO has shifted his base of operations to the land and PEIXOTO had transferred his to the sea. In any view, the situation in Brazil has come to a very interesting stage, and radical changes may be looked for soon. The chances look strongly in favor of PEIXOTO, possessing as he does the Capital — although by a scratch — and the great bulk of Brazilian territory, and now a pretty good navy. But the Brazilians are fickle and one victory for Melo might turn the tide in his favor and lead to the overthrow of Peixoto. It is a subject though upon which predictions are not safe.

# **234.** «An Attempt to Restore the Brazilian Monarchy, *The Daily Picayune,* 18 de novembro

Mesmo este jornal da Luisiana acredita nesta viagem — que, como sabemos, é puramente imaginária<sup>10</sup> — do neto de D. Pedro II ao Brasil para retomar o trono perdido pelo avó quatro anos antes.

It is reported from Rio de Janeiro that Admiral de Melo, the chief of the insurgent forces now operating in the Bay of Rio de Janeiro, has proclaimed Prince Pedro de Alcantara, grandson of the late Emperor Dom Pedro, Emperor of Brazil.

Prince Pedro is the eldest son of the Princess Isabella, heiress of Dom Pedro, and the Conde D'Eu, a prince of the Orleans family. It is believed that the young Prince, who recently has been serving as an officer in the Austrian army, is now on his way to Brazil, if he has not already arrived there.

This move on the part of the insurgents is unquestionably a wise one from their standpoint, as it will bring to their support a large element in Brazil, as well as practically unlimited assistance and supplies. Prince Pedro is related to nearly all the reigning families in Europe, and, consequently, will be able to command covert aid to almost any extent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Cf. *A 2ª Revolta da Marinha na imprensa francesa.* Textos 35 e 36.

### **235**. «A Death-Blow to Melo», *Saint-Paul Daily Globe*, 19 de novembro

O jornal, que se refere ao seu artigo de dia 16, no qual pedia a intervenção das grandes potências para que cessasse o bombardeamento da capital carioca, congratula-se que tal «proposta» tenha sido posta em prática pelos comandantes dos navios estrangeiros.

Fala a seguir da famosa «chegada» do neto de D. Pedro, que teria sido proclamado presidente pelos revoltosos! Finalmente, critica o Almirante de Melo: este agiu praticamente como um pirata cuja causa parece perdida. Ainda bem, ironiza o editorialista, que não se aplica a pena máxima aos «revolucionários» do subcontinente, pois dado a quantidade destas revoltas, estes países estariam totalmente despovoados.

In obedience to the suggestion of the *Globe<sup>11</sup>*, the commanders of the foreign squadrons at the mouth of the Amazon have united in a formal demand that Admiral Melo cease his farcical bombardment of the city of Rio de Janeiro. Naval representatives of eight nations, including our own, have come to the conclusion that the only effect of the bombardment will be the injury of legitimate commerce; and as the firing has thus far, though long protracted, been barren of political results, it must cease.

The wisdom of this course cannot be questioned. If Admiral Melo's rebellion had developed into a popular movement — even into an insurrection of respectable proportions — he might with some show of reason expect the rights commonly accorded to belligerents. But the rebellion is little short of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Cf. Texto 221.

piracy. The admiral stole the vessels he commands and turned their guns upon their rightful owners in order to accomplish his own ambitions. It is probable that under a strict construction of maritime law his acts would be pronounced as piracy, and he and his sailors would pay the penalty of their crime at the yardarm. But there has been a tendency of late years to construe all these laws in such a manner as to lean towards liberality, or, at any rate, mercy. In fact, it has been necessary to be liberal in this regard in order to save the populations of Central and South America from extermination, for the insurrections in those countries are in perennial bloom. The nation in those regions that cannot boast a revolution at least with each change in the seasons is of small account. If each band of freebooters, therefore, were to be accorded belligerents rights by the nations of the world, there would be no end to the international complications that would arise, and the relations of the powers towards each other would be so complex as to defy adjudication.

The *Globe* judgment is also vindicated by the announcement that comes from Paris to the effect that the Spanish foreign office has proclaimed the son of the Count d'Eu president [sic!] of Brazil. The youth, scarcely in his teens, is the grandson of the late emperor, Dom Pedro. But even this proclamation does not give the insurgent force any standing as to a belligerent. Has the boy been proclaimed the emperor instead of president, the case might have been different. As emperor he would have a legal status, but as president he has none, for in a republic such as Brazil pretends to be the president is elected, no

proclaimed, and he who is proclaimed president is simply a usurper, nothing more.

It seems probable that the Melo insurrection has seen its best days. None of its days have been very bright, for it never had a ghost of a chance of success. It never had the countenance of any foreign power; now that the nations have pronounced it practical piracy, it will soon cease to exist at all. Before another month shall have passed, Melo will have taken refuse in some asylum for broken-down revolutionists, and his followers will have been abandoned to their fate. He may cut a swell in New York society for a brief time, but will soon be forgotten unless he has taken the precaution to line his pocket well with gold, as Barrios did.

The ways of South American revolutionists are devious, and their careers are almost invariably short. Melo will find the truth of this to his sorrow.

#### **236.** «Hand Off in Brazil», *The Times*, 19 de novembro

Melo, até agora, não conseguiu nenhum objetivo, nota o jornal, e é por isso que quer apoiar-se nos nostálgicos do antigo regime. Os Estados Unidos, acrescenta o quotidiano, não se metem nos assuntos internos de outros países, mas com uma condição: que não haja interferências de outros países para mudar de regime político no Rio de Janeiro, conclui o articulista. Este lamenta que o seu governo não tenha seguido a mesma política no que diz respeitos às Ilhas Havai.

Admiral Melo's reported proclamation the young Prince Pierre D'Alcantara Emperor of Brazil indicates that the admiral's insurrection is reaching its last stage. Hitherto he has claimed in some obscure way to represent the actual government of Brazil. Failing to establish even the shadow of authority, except on his blockade fleet, he now attaches himself to the shadow of the late Empire and undertakes to become the representative of a more or less obsolete idea.

It will not be denied that under the benign rule of the late DOM PEDRO, Brazil enjoyed a more secure and stable constitutional government that has yet been attained under the name of Republic. The sudden uprising at Rio by which he was expelled did not at the time command universal acquiescence and it is probable that there are a good many Brazilians even now, especially in the outlying States, who would look kindly upon the restoration of his grandson. It is to this sentiment that Melo appeals.

The inconsistency of his course lies in the fact that it was the navy that led in the revolt against Dom Pedro and that the Admiral Melo himself accepted the nominal Republic as an accomplished fact until he found his own interests opposed to those of President Peixoto. He thus makes himself now the leader of a home party favorable to the crown, but rather the leader of a foreign party proposing to bring in a new ruler from abroad, an enterprise likely to be resisted by Brazilians in general and certain to be opposed by the moral and material influence of the United States.

If there had ever been any doubt as to our own present policy toward Brazil, it would be quite removed by these events. The change in the form of government in Brazil, whether for better or for worse, was accomplished entirely without outside interference or influence. Our own representatives stood by and saw it done and acknowledged the result when completed, but they took care neither to help not to hinder. They obeyed the American policy in "Brazil to Brazilians".

If this policy has been observed in Hawaii, we should have been saved much trouble. We should simply have had to wait and see what king of government Hawaii wanted or was able to maintain, and whatever it was we should have defended it from foreign aggression. In Brazil we have no perplexity. We have kept hands off the internal affairs of the nation, but we are ready to defend it from intervention from abroad. Admiral Melo has been hitherto a mere insurgent. If he is going to set up as a king-maker we shall know now to say to him, also, "Hands off." And that is the great advantage of keeping our own hands off the domestic affairs of other people.

## **237.** «Brazil must continue a Republic», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 20 de novembro

Este também artigo se baseia sobre uma notícia completamente falsa, a saber a presença do neto de D. Pedro no navio almirante dos revoltosos. Para o articulista, isto é a prova que por trás da revolta há mão das monarquias europeias e nomeadamente da Grã-Bretanha «que visa atacar tanto a supremacia americana nos mercados brasileiros, quanto o governo

republicano» e, naturalmente, o tratado de reciprocidade entre o Rio e Washington.

Por conseguinte, os Estados Unidos têm, por um lado, de avisar «os conspiradores monárquicos para se afastarem do Brasil» e, por outro lado, de fornecer a Peixoto toda a ajuda possível.

News comes from Madrid that Admiral Melo has proclaimed a grandson of Dom Pedro, emperor of Brazil. It is assumed in European capitals that the proclamation is in favor of Prince Pierre, eldest son of Count d'Eu. *The Westminster Gazette* states that the prince is undoubtedly on board Admiral Melo's flagship at the present time. The declaration of a monarchy by the rebel admiral is in the line of information from Europe that heavy contributions have been made by the relatives of the late emperor to support the rebellion. As these relatives include the Orleans princes, vast sums of money will be at their command. If a throne can be set up in Brazil occupation will be afforded for several pretenders who are now out of business.

The duty of our government is plain in the premises. Plotters for a monarchy must be warned off the soil of Brazil, as they were warned to keep out of Mexico.

Every facility consonant with our laws and the precedents of the republic should be afforded the government of Brazil in the conflict with the restorers of monarchy. The rebellion of Admiral Melo is aimed at the supremacy of the United States in the markets of Brazil as well as at the republican government. The support he has received from the commander of

foreign fleets in the harbor of Rio shows the desire of Great Britain, especially, to destroy the effects of reciprocity and break the league of American republics. If this can be prevented by the government and people of the United States, Brazil will have added cause for encouraging our commerce and relying on our friendship.

### **238.** The Boston Daily Globe, 20 de novembro

It is easy for Melo to "proclaim" an empire in Brazil or any other country. The rub comes when he tries to establish it.

#### **239.** «In Brazil», *The Times-Democrats*, 22 de novembro

O jornal da Luisiana comenta essencialmente dois temas. O primeiro tem a ver com uma carta de Peixoto dirigida ao New York Herald e publicada na véspera, na qual o chefe do executivo brasileiro fala da fraqueza da frota de Melo. O jornalista pergunta-se então porque Peixoto, que dispõe de dois bons navios, por una lado, não ataca o rival e, por outro lado, considerando a debilidade do inimigo, foi comprar uma frota nos Estados Unidos. Por conseguinte, as afirmações do Presidente não parecem corresponder à realidade.

O outro tema é o da vinda do neto de D. Pedro ao Brasil. O editorialista — que, no entanto, sublinha que a única fonte para esta notícia provém é de um porteiro de uma estação francesa de caminho de ferro<sup>12</sup> — não sabe se

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> «Estrada de Ferro», no Brasil.

acreditar ou não<sup>13</sup>. De qualquer forma, é só com a chegada da nova frota que vai haver um combate decisivo, conclui o quotidiano da Nova Orleães.

Readers of *The Times-Democrats* who try to keep themselves au courant of the state of affairs in the Brazilian republic will have read President Peixoto's letter through his "Minister of Foreign Affairs» to the *New York Herald*, which we published yesterday.

There was nothing very particular in the letter, beyond the one fact that it effectually disposed of the capture of Desterro, as published ten days ago by the *New York World*. Desterro has not been captured; and, although Peixoto tells the nations of the earth that the line of the loyal army in the south are rapidly converging on the rebel's headquarters, there is no forecasting when they will get there, or what fate they will meet with should they make an attempt in force to capture it. The city stands on an island and is said to be well-fortified and strongly guarded, so that to anticipate its capture is a good deal easier than to effect it.

Peixoto, in his letter, dealt a good deal more with the impoverished and weakened condition of this opponents than with the prosperous advance he himself has made and is making in the matter of crushing the insurrection. We

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Sabemos que as pessoas que foram tomadas por membros da família real brasileira, eram de facto dois negociantes cubanos que estavam a iniciar a viagem de regresso à casa com as suas famílias.

O quiproquó é devido ao facto de um dos dois chamar-se Pedro (como o neto do último imperador) e de ter escrito o nome dele nas malas. Cf. *A Segunda Revolta da Armada na Imprensa francesa*. Textos 35 e 36.

have heard for a number of months that the insurgents have no money and no provisions and no ammunitions; and we are now told on Peixoto's authority that they have only two ships, that they are completely hemmed in Rio Bay like rats in a trap, and that they cannot escape thence by reason of the annihilating fire of the loyal forts. If all of which, oft reiterated, be so, then what hinders Peixoto from leading out the two or three men-of-war that he has in the harbor of Rio under shelter of his forts, and making short work of Melo and his crippled ships. Peixoto doesn't see apparently that if his account of his adversary's fleet be anywhere in the vicinity of accuracy, it does not say very much for the condition of his own fleet that it doesn't proceed to finish them off. It there are only the Republica and the converted merchantman Meteoro there, especially it they are short of ammunition, what hinders his turret-ship, Bahia, and his magnificent cruiser, Tiradentes, both on the ground, from sailing in and polishing off the two insurgent vessels without more ado? Why send to New York to buy a whole fleet to effect what two powerful and well-equipped men-of-war, like the Bahia and Tiradentes, could without assistance accomplish?

Peixoto story of the insurgents' condition does not hang together will with his movement to crush them. The insurgents are obviously not by long odds in the crippled and helpless condition in which it pleases Peixoto to represent them as being. And we must, therefore, greatly discount Peixoto's story.

There is another story floating around in the Brazilian connection which it is equally difficult to know what to do with, whether to accept it or to reject it — the story to wit that Admiral Melo has proclaimed Dom Pedro's grandson, the Prince Pierre d'Alcantara, Emperor. We published a cablegram yesterday from Paris in which it was set forth, in painfully halting style, that the prince had started from St. Nazaire, near Nantes, on his way to Brazil. The information seemed, however, to have no better source than the railroad porters, who were sure that it was the prince, and who added the very convincing details that there were "five ladies" in the crowd, which numbered altogether twenty. What a magnificent force of filibusterers anyway that was with which to enter upon the invasion and conquest of a great empire, quite an improvement on the "Seven Men of Moidart" who a century and a half ago invaded an expected to conquer Great Britain!

The story of the proclamation of young Pedro as Emperor has been made and repeated with so much positiveness on the one side, and on the other side has been denied so categorically and with so much apparent sincerity that, as we have said, there is no knowing what to believe with regard to it. It must be set down in the usual list of "Brazilian rumors", about which it is impossible to form a reliable judgment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Trata-se de um episódio da segunda grande rebelião jacobita de 1745 na futura Grã-Bretanha, com Carlos Stuart (1720-1788), pretendente ao trono, que, a 2 de agosto, desembarca nas Ilhas Hébridas, sem soldados e sem munições.

This much is still predicable with regard to this extraordinary "war", that nothing is being gone and that noting will be done to bring on a crisis until the new fleet, mustering on our east coast, shall arrive on the scene of so-called hostilities. Then we shall be able to appraise the chances of the revolutionists and of the loyalists, but not until then. And that will be two weeks at least from now.

### **240**. Mello Finds a Funny Champion», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 22 de novembro

Contrariamente ao que afirma o «divertido capitão» do vapor Rosse que acaba de chegar aos cais de Brooklyn, a situação de Custódio de Melo não é nada brilhante, sustém o jornal: «não tem dinheiro ou abastecimentos, não pode sair da ratoeira onde ele próprio se meteu e não está em condições para se defender».

Ele «não é um beligerante e nem sequer um rebelde; o seu estatuto é um pouco melhor de que o de um pirata», declara o articulista que acrescenta: se o Almirante começar a fuzilar os prisioneiros que eventualmente terá capturado, então será considerado um «verdadeiro pirata». De qualquer forma, conclui ironicamente o articulista, os tiros dele serão, como sempre foram, de longo alcance.

A very amusing skipper arrived at one of the Brooklyn wharves the other day in command of the freight steamer *Rosse*, bringing fresh news from Brazil. This funny skipper says everybody in Rio de Janeiro is in favor of Melo, but he does not explain why these revolutionary Brazilians keep so quiet about it when Melo has so much need of them. But perhaps the most surprising bit of

information gleaned from this humorous skipper was the assertion that Admiral Melo knew just when *Niteroi* sailed and ail about her, although at the time the *Niteroi* had not yet sailed but quietly at anchor outside of Sandy Hook. Of course, Melo's ship will be lying in wait of one of the capes ready to knock the *Niteroi* to splinters and "every man who goes out on Peixoto's ships, if captured, will be shot".

Opposed to the roseate view of the skipper of the *Rosse* is the actual condition of affairs. Melo's squadron is confined to the harbor of Rio and there is no reason to believe that even the *Aquidaban* could successfully pass the loyal forts. Even Melo's long range vision, which enables him to know the movement of Peixoto's ships as far away as New York, will not render him any great advantage under such circumstances. The whole truth in regard to the situation seems to be that Admiral Melo is utterly without sympathy, without money or supplies, without the power to get out of the trap in which he allowed himself to be caught and without a leg to stand on.

Certainly, it would be a very sorry day for Admiral Melo when he began shooting the accredited servants of the recognized government of Brazil should he succeed in capturing some of them. Up to the present time he is not a belligerent — not even a rebel; his status is little better than that of a pirate. In his feeble condition to begin shooting his captives would place him entirely beyond the pale of civilized warfare and constitute him an absolute pirate. But there is no occasion of alarm. Melo's shooting will continue to be, as it always has been at long range.

### **241**. «The *Niteroi's* Mission», *The Sioux City Journal*, 22 de novembro

Os Estados Unidos sempre estarão do lado do governo do Brasil e tudo farão para evitar que uma monarquia volte a reinar num país onde foi deposta.

The sympathy of the people of the United States is with the government of Brazil in the unpleasantness which exists in that country and along its shore. It has been asserted that the strife grew out of the personal ambitions of two men, both of whom wanted to be president. Be this as it may, the situation is now one of rebellion. Admiral Melo has not only placed himself and his followers in the position of active traitors to their government, but he has proclaimed the intention to reinstate the deposed dynasty of Dom Pedro.

Not only the sentimental, but the active sympathy of Americans will always be with the sister republics. As the United States has watched with gratification and expressed encouragement the growth of the republican idea, it never will help, or tolerate if it can help it, the reimposition of a monarchy where one has been destroyed.

It is for this reason that the *Niteroi* has sailed from New York harbor for Rio de Janeiro, manned by a crew almost entirely made up of citizen of the United States. These men are volunteers, but they have the moral approval of the United States. It is no questionable act, even weighed in the most delicate scale of international relations. American citizens have the disposition and the

right to aid in the maintenance of the republican form of government wherever it has been established on this hemisphere, and the government will put no stones in their pathway. The national eye will be on the *Niteroi*, and the expected battle will be watched with great interest. It is said that Melo's fleet, anticipating the sailing of the remodeled vessel, will come north to meet her, and a real modern naval battle is expected. Admiral Melo, although in this case he may be equipped with somewhat superior ships, will have a chance to see what real American blood can do when it flows in the veins of trained sailors and soldiers.

#### No mesmo número, encontra-se esta pequena nota:

The Pedro whom the insurgent Melo has proclaimed emperor of Brazil is the eldest son of the Count d'Eu, and is a grandson of the late Dom Pedro. This step of the admiral is taken as a confirmation of the assertion that he has been furnished money by the royalists to carry on war against the government of Brazil.

### **242.** «*The Post's* Advice to Prince Pierre», *The Washington Post*, 22 de novembro

O quotidiano – que não parece acreditar na viagem do neto de D. Pedro ao Brasil — dá-lhe dois conselhos: por um lado, o jovem devia informarse sobre o que é a doutrina Monroe; por outro lado, era melhor para ele ler a história de Maximiliano, «vitima da infeliz intriga, que tentou restabelecer um império no México».

Statements are conflicting with regard to the proclamation of an empire in Brazil by the insurgent Admiral Melo. The Spanish Minister of foreign affairs at Madrid denies that any such proclamation has been issued, while the Paris *Débats* goes so far as to announce that Prince Pierre, the young man who is mentioned in connection with imperial honors under certain more or less improbable contingences, has already embarked for Brazil from St. Nazaire, with a suite of twenty-five people.

On the other hand, the chamberlain of the household of the Count and Countess d'Eu pronounces the story a humbug, pure and simple, the police inspector at St. Nazaire says the same thing, and Admiral Melo brother-in-law, who resides in Paris, denies the reported departure of the prince as a fabrication. But there may be diplomatic reasons for all this.

Whatever may be the desires or intention of Prince Pierre, however, it would probably be safe to say that discretion will be decidedly the better part of ambition in his case, and if he has friends and relatives with intelligence enough to comprehend the situation they will do well to disabuse the boy of any aspirations to a throne on the western continent.

Prince Pierre is said to be amiable and clever and a great favorite with his instructors at the Neustadt Military School, but utterly uninformed not only as to the course of events in Brazil but as to politics in general. His equipment for imperial responsibilities would therefore seem to be somewhat limited, even should an opportunity present, itself through the success of the revolutionists for investing him therewith.

It would be wise for the grandson of Dom Pedro while awaiting the issues of the pending contention to cultivate a closer acquaintance with the American policy in regard to monarchical establishments and foreign encroachments, and especially with its formal enunciation some years ago by President Monroe. It would also be prudent for him to read the story of another would-be Emperor and his melancholy fate as the victim of an ill-starred intrigue, which south to re-establish an imperial fabric in Mexico.

#### 243. «Melo and his cause», The New York Times, 22 de novembro

O jornal não sabe se Melo — que, ao mesmo tempo, celebrou o aniversário da proclamação da república — proclamou imperador o neto de D. Pedro. De qualquer forma, o que é importante, na sua opinião, é que as autoridades americanas não tenham dado o estatuto de beligerante aos revoltosos brasileiros. Estes, nota o quotidiano, ficaram prejudicados pela proibição, por parte das grandes potências, de desembarcar munições.

Mixed and contradictory news about Brazil has become so familiar of late that any fresh instance of incongruity of that sort ought not, perhaps, to occasion much wonder or concern. Yet it certainly was a little puzzling when tidings came the other day that Admiral Melo had proclaimed as Emperor of Brazil a grandson of old Dom Pedro, Prince Pierre d'Alcantara Louis Philippe,

and nevertheless that his squadron had dressed ship in honor of the anniversary of the establishment of the republic.

It now appears that the former statement was incorrect, and yet the continually reiterated statements of Melo's leanings towards imperialism must make it still more a matter of congratulation that ever that our Government has refused to recognize the insurgents as a belligerent power, although they have a foothold on land, trough the revolt in the extreme south-west, and have even set up some sort of a provisional Government at Desterro on the island of Santa Catarina. It is true that the attitude of our Government was not based on the theory that Melo would advocate monarchy, but the chances that he might to so, and the recent doubt as to whether he had already done so, must have increased the satisfaction of the Washington authorities over the attitude they had taken.

Meanwhile some recent news has not favored Melo's plans. The agreement on the foreign naval representatives at Rio not to permit munitions of war to be landed there would seem to work chiefly against the insurgent cause, though the decision is reached presumably in the interests of foreign commerce.

### **244.** The Boston Daily Globe, 22 de novembro

It the war in Brazil keeps on many months longer some men will be sure to be killed.

[...]

Admiral Melo seems to be little nervous over an introduction to the *Cid*'s terrific projectile, which even if it explode 500 feet away from a ship would "rattle" even the most experienced crew.

### 245. «Matters in Brazil», San Francisco Chronicle, 23 de novembro

Nesta guerra que não foi verdadeira, Custódio de Melo não fez grande coisa, sublinha o jornal californiano, além de destruir uma parte da cidade e de ocupar o porto. Mas com a chegada do cruzador Niterói e dos outros navios, perante o risco que ver a frota rebelde «estilhaçada em fragmentos», o Almirante «vai provavelmente levantar os braços e desistir.»

From present appearances Admiral Melo is getting near to the end of his rope. His appeal to the people of Brazil to revolt against President Peixoto and the Republican Government has not met with the response he expected, nor has he gained any ground outside of the range of the guns on his fleet.

There is some doubt as to whether he has declared for the restoration of the empire or not, but in any event he has accomplished nothing except the destruction of a portion of the city of Rio Janeiro and an occupation of the harbor. This latter runs a strong chance of being disputed before long, for the dynamite cruiser *Niteroi* has sailed from New York, and if the Zalinski gun works as well as expected Melo's ships may be shattered into fragments.

The Brazilian war, after all, has not been much of a war. There has been no schedule furnished of the loss of life or destruction of property but both are

very slight. Melo tried to bluff Peixoto into giving up the reins of government, but failed, and since then everything has gone along in a dilatory and perfunctory sort of way. If a real attack be made upon Melo by the *Niteroi* and other Government vessels he will probably throw up his hand and drop out.

#### **246.** «Be Calm», St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 23 de novembro

O quotidiano do Missuri critica os que querem uma intervenção militar imediata de Washington em favor de Peixoto e pede calma. Na sua opinião, Peixoto está «a trabalhar bem» e não corre perigo imediato. Além disso, acrescenta o jornal, os Estados Unidos não podem interferir na política interna brasileira, sem violar os seus princípios. Relembra, como muitos outros colegas, que a Doutrina Monroe só se aplica no caso em que nações europeias ajudem a repor o monarca no trono.

The harsh notes of the jingo organs are again heard demanding the interference of the United States in favor of President Peixoto of Brazil. One of these unmusical instruments cries out that "If Benjamin Harrison were President now and Blain were Secretary of State<sup>15</sup> the United States navy would be in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro in short order, and that imperial flag would have to be hauled down".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Refere-se à administração anterior. Benjamin Harrison (1833-1902) foi presidente de março de 1889 a março de 1893; James Blaine (1830-1893), favorável a uma expansão americana no mundo, foi secretário de Estado de março de 1889 a julho de 1892. Em 1884, perdeu por muito poucos votos a eleição presidencial contra Grover Cleveland. Presidiu ao primeiro congresso pan-americano em outubro de 1889.

Much virtue in that "if". Let us all be thankful for it.

So far as can be learned President Peixoto is doing very well and Melo is not making much impression either on the Government forts or on the temper of the civilized world. Rumor asserts that he represents the Imperialists and is kept going with funds supplied by members of the Bourbon family, who want to place the young Count d'Eu on the throne, but as long as the present Government is able to take care of itself, there is no good reason for getting up an excitement over the rumor in this country.

Besides, if the Brazilians really want the empire, we have no right to object. We cannot force a republic upon them without violating our own principles, and the maxim which have always governed American policy. We can only interfere if it is discovered that some European Government or governments are trying to control Brazilian affairs. Then and then only may we proceed according to the much overworked "Monroe doctrine" and send fleets and armies to the plague-stricken port».

### 247. The Boston Daily Globe, 23 de novembro

There were over 16 deaths from football in Great Britain last year in six months. Football in England is much more dangerous than war in Brazil.

### **248.** «The Significant Feature of the War in Brazil», *The Sun* (N. Y.), 24 de novembro

Afinal, escreve o articulista, Melo está isolado no seu combate contra o Governo. O Almirante, realça o artigo, pretende ser o representante do povo contra o «usurpador e tirano» Peixoto, mas não houve nenhuma revolta popular e nenhum dos vinte Estados está ao seu lado na sua luta contra o poder central. Mesmo os rebeldes do Rio Grande do Sul não se juntaram a ele.

Visto que esta revolta da marinha não tem o apoio popular, prossegue o diário nova-iorquino, a única solução é «a captura ou a destruição da frota comandada» por ele. Porém, é difícil prever como e quando terminará esta querra civil.

To an observer of the war in Brazil, the thing of chief interest and significance is that the naval revolt has never obtained any support from any rebellious force on the land. For very nearly three months the insurgent Admiral has carried on hostilities against the Government: yet there has not, during that time, been a popular uprising against it, or in his favor, in any of the twenty States of the vast republic. He has turned the guns to his fleet upon Rio de Janeiro; he has made spoliatory excursions to various places along the seaboard; he has striven to stir up insurrection southward in Parana, and northward in Pernambuco; he has tried to get the aid of malcontents in Rio Grande do Sul; he has seized the unprotected little city of Desterro, declared it to be the seat of his Government, and asked the help of the inhabitants of the State in which it is situated; yet, not in a single instance, has he got any backing whatever from anybody of the people in any part of the country.

There is another fact o curious significance bearing upon this point. It is that the rebellion which broke out last year against President Peixoto in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, and which was in progress up the time of Admiral Melo's revolt, came to an end almost as soon as that revolt was declared at the opening of September. The rebels who had so long been under arms there, instead of joining with Melo to overthrow the Government, laid down their arms, and have refrained from any further disturbance of the public peace. Had they remained in the field and kept up the war, there is every probability that Peixoto's power would have been broken by this time. It has become evident that, though they were dissatisfied with the policy of the Administration, they did not desire to bring about a revolution.

A comprehension of these facts is essential to a proper understanding of the situation in Brazil.

All this time, the insurgent Admiral has pretended that the people of Brazil were on his side; that he was the representative of their cause; and that he was contending for popular rights against a usurping and tyrannical President. How false and foolish is such a pretense, has been made known by the events of the past three months. All Brazil has refused to take part in Melo's revolt. Every State, with a single exception, declared its loyalty to the Government on the 15<sup>th</sup> of this month, when the fourth anniversary of the proclamation of the republic was celebrated; and the one State which failed to make this declaration, was Santa Catarina, whose capital, Desterro, has just been seized by Mello's fleet.

Since, then, the naval revolt has not any support from the Brazilian people or army, it would seem that the only thing needed for the restoration of peace is the capture or destruction of the fleet under Melo's command. Whether there is a good prospect that this result will be brought about to the full by the Brazilian batteries or by the power of the fighting ships which the Brazilian Government has purchased in this country or in Europe, we are unable to say. We cannot foretell what will happen in case the *Aquidaban* and her consorts come into conflict with the *Niteroi* and her consorts. If Melo should be able to dispose of his several adversaries, and if he could procure means needed for the support of his fleet in revolt, the war might be prolonged and circumstances might turn in his favor. It his flagship should be seized or should be sunk as the monitor *Javary* has been, the chances are that the revolt would be brought to an end at once, and that President Peixoto would be elected to office for another term.

We wish for the freedom, the peace, the prosperity, and the happiness of the republic of Brazil. Long life to it!

### **249.** «Mello and Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 24 de novembro

Revista de imprensa

- South Americans continue to give a good imitation of an international church choir. (*Evening Star*, Washington)

- The United States consul at Rio Janeiro feels, doubtless, that his salary is hardly up to the right figure these days. (*The Chicago Daily Tribune*)
- Rio de Janeiro means January river, and it looks as though it also meant a cold day of somebody later on. (*The Times*, Filadélfia)
- It is now said that Admiral Melo is soon to begin operations in earnest. It is to be presumed that all that went before war merely gun practice. (*The Philadelphia Inquirer*)
- Americans who enlist for the Brazilian army and navy should remember the lack of affection with which Hessians are still regarded in this country. (*The Cedar Rapids Gazette*, Iowa)
- Peixoto is trying to purchase a balloon from which to drop dynamite on Melo's fleet. He wants to heap coals of fire, as it were, on the head of the enemy. (*The Philadelphia Press*)
- If President Peixoto's gunners are no better marksmen than Admiral Melo's the insurgents need not fear *El Cid*'s dynamite guns. A first-class navy is not formidable unless it is handled by first-class men. (*St. Louis Post Dispatch*)
- If the United States government could find no other ground to justify its action in permitting *El Cid* to be fitted out in its territory the plea may be set up that the ship was not expected to inflict damage upon the rebels. Its dynamite guns will be manned by Brazilian gunners. (*The Evening World*, Nova Iorque)

- The anniversary of the establishment of the Republic of Brazil, which took place yesterday four years ago, was significantly and appropriately commemorated in our waters by the rebaptism of *El Cid*, which ship will in future be known as the *Niteroi*, the name of a suburb of Rio de Janeiro. (*New York Recorder*)
- The United States may take an active interest in Brazilian affairs on receipt of official confirmation of the special cable that our consular agent at Desterro has been arrested by the revolutionists and imprisoned on board on one of their warship. The insurgents may find it dangerous to interfere with the diplomatic representative of foreign countries to Brazil. (New York Herald)

#### **250**. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 24 de novembro

If Benjamin Harrison were President the American people would know whether or not European monarchists were plotting to smuggle a king into Brazil under cover of the performances of the rebel admiral. But if Benjamin Harrison were President the whole country would not be filled with the distress caused by the shadow of coming free trade.

#### **251**. «The News from Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 25 de novembro

«Os eventos estão a avançar rapidamente» nota o jornal que, no entanto, lamenta a censura que impede às redações de poder avaliar a situação. Não acredita, por exemplo, que toda a equipagem do Javari tenha desaparecido e, também, que o República tenha sido capturado pelas tropas governativas.

O que é importante, sublinha o quotidiano, é que as legações foram transferidas para Petrópolis. Isso significa que, com o aproximar da nova frota comprada por Peixoto, Melo vai «fazer uma nova tentativa para bombardear Rio até a rendição».

Events are apparently moving more rapidly in Brazil, and we may soon expect to hear of development calculated to give a decisive advantage to one side or the other in the struggle. Unfortunately, the telegraphic communication with Rio is controlled entirely by the Government, hence nothing is permitted to reach the outside world but such matter as is favorable to the Government's cause. Thus, rebel successes are heard of only in a roundabout way, while Government gains are promptly reported and magnified to the utmost extent.

The dispatches yesterday all agreed in reporting the sinking of the rebel ironclad *Javari*, one of the most powerful ships in the fleet of Admiral Melo. The *Javari* was destroyed, it is reported, by a shell fired from one of the batteries at Niteroi. Some dispatches report that the crew all perished, but this is improbable, with other ships of the rebel squadron in close proximity.

The dispatches yesterday also reported the capture of the rebel cruiser *Republica*, and the destruction of an armed vessel belonging to the rebel fleet in Rio Grande do Sul. This report is entirely improbable, because President Peixoto has no vessel in the waters referred to capable of giving battle to the *Republica*, much less being able to capture her. Unless, therefore, the *Republica* met with an accident, by running aground or breaking down, her capture does

### MELLO'S SERIOUS LOSS

The Big Cruiser Javary Sunk by a Shot From a Fort.

THE CREW ALL WENT DOWN

A Serious Loss to the Insurgent Commander—Mello Will Try to Get Out of the Harbor to Fight the New Government Warships.

### LOST ONE SHIP.

Admiral Mello Is Out of Luck.

HIS MONITOR GOES UNDER.

She Was the Most Formidable Fighter in the Fleet.

SUNK BY THE SHORE BATTERIES.

It is Said That Peixoto Has Plenty of Money to Carry on the War.

Fig. 22: Democrat and Chronicle

Fig. 23: The Morning Call

Manchetes de 24 de novembro sobre a afundamento do Javari.

not seem plausible, and will have to be confirmed before any importance can be attached to the report.

The most important news from Rio recently has been the statement that the diplomatic corps has removed from that capital to Petropolis, a distant suburb. This is tantamount to abandoning all attempts to prevent the bombardment of Rio; in fact, it has been announced that the foreign representatives deemed it best for all interests to permit the belligerents a free hand to work their will, this course promising to bring the struggle to an end the sooner.

This course of the foreign Ministers, coupled with the reports that the ships purchased by Peixoto in this country have started on their voyage south, will urge Admiral Melo to make fresh exertions to bombard Rio into submission.

# **252.** «Melo not Recognized. Therefore Peixoto May Purchase as Many Ships as He Can Pay For», *The Washington Post*, 25 de novembro

Visto que nenhuma potência reconheceu os revoltosos como beligerantes, o jornal não vê nenhum problema ao facto de Peixoto comprar navios nos Estados Unidos. Quanto ao recrutamento, a lei proíbe tal prática, mas tem de haver denúncia para que a justiça americana possa agir. No action has been taken by the President upon the application by Messrs. Guerin and Devlin, acting in Admiral Melo's interest, to have the steamer *America* prevented from sailing under the Brazilian flag to join Peixoto's forces, and to have the government stop further recruiting in this country for the Brazilian navy.

It is difficult to see how the government can take any action in the matter, as it now stands. As Melo has not been recognizes as belligerent there is no official knowledge of war in Brazil, and as a consequence there is nothing in the law to prevent Peixoto or his agents from purchasing as many vessels in this country as he is disposed to pays for. As to the matter of recruiting in the United States for service in Brazil, the law does prohibit such a practice, but it is not for the President to act directly in such cases. Any person can make complaint to the proper judicial officers of a violation of the law and secure its enforcement, but as far as is known here, Peixoto's agents in New York have been particularly careful to conform to the letter of the law, and no formal engagements of men have been made in this country.

#### **253.** *The Times-Democrat*, 25 de novembro

Enquanto nenhuma potência europeia estiver a interferir no política interna brasileira, os Estados Unidos têm de manter uma estrita neutralidade.

There is no signs that any European power is interfering in the quarrel in Brazil, and until such interference is manifest The United States has no interest in Melo's revolt, even though he succeed in destroying the Brazilian republic and restoring the monarchy. (*The Republican*, Springfields, Massachussets)

## **254.** «Some Important Results», *The Daily Picayune*, 26 de novembro

Esta guerra provou a importância de certas armas e permitiu progressos no campo da medicina.

The war in Brazil, if it benefits the human race in no other way, is likely to yield some important results in its contributions to scientific warfare. For one thing it will give practical demonstration of the usefulness, or otherwise, of the dynamite gun, with which the *Niteroi* is armed. For another it will demonstrate a number of newly contrived appliances for surgical work on shipboard. It is said that no ship was ever no perfectly equipped for surgical word. Dr. J. A. Tonner, the surgeon of the ship, and his assistant, Dr. Armour, have had a free and practically unlimited hand in equipping the ship's hospital. Nothing has been neglected. Not only has Dr. Tonner secured two electric bullet probes, but it is known that the surgeons of the fleet have been personally instructed in the use of the wonderful instrument by the inventor,

Dr. John H. Girdner<sup>16</sup>. For the first time in history of electricity a current of electricity is taken from a man's body to trace the location of a bullet.

#### **255.** *The New York Times*, 27 de novembro

Afinal, o Contra-Almirante Stanton só receberá uma reprimenda, nota o jornal, favorável a uma formação mais completa dos oficiais da marinha, «confrontados com frequência com situações que requerem conhecimento da lei, tato e bom senso».

For some reason an impression seems to prevail in various quarters that when Commodore Stanton arrives in this country from Brazil he can count on rather a cordial reception at the Navy Department, and may even be assigned promptly to another high command. This view further appears to imply that the most that will be given to him in the way of censure in an admonition not to do so again. That is rater a queer surmise. The saluting of Melo's flag either was or was not a grave discourtesy to the recognized Government of Brazil. In the one case his recall was fully justified, while in the other so summary a removal from command seems strange. In any case he should be heard of course, in his own defense. Taking together recent occurrences in Brazil and those in Hawaii, the law of nations seems to be a study that merits a very

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> John Harvey Girdner (1856-1933), estuda medicina em Nova Iorque. É um dos quatro médicos que assiste o Presidente Garfield (1831-1881), depois do atentado de 2 de julho de 1881. É o inventor do detetor telefónico de balas no corpo humano e dos fórceps. Foi o primeiro que conseguiu fazer com sucesso um transplante de pele de um morto para um homem vivo.

prominent place in the education of our naval officers, so often are they put in position requiring a knowledge of that law, as well as the exercise of tact and good judgment.

#### **256.** San Francisco Chronicle, 27 de novembro


Não é uma boa notícia para os rebeldes, mas a lei não impede Peixoto de comprar navios de querra nos Estados Unidos.

The attempt to detain the vessels which Peixoto o Brazil has purchased in the United States failed for obvious reasons. De Melo is not recognized as a belligerent. It is perfectly open for Peixoto to acquire the navy of the United States if this country is willing to sell, and to purchase a few warships in an ordinary transaction — just as permissible as buying a cargo of wheat. It may be bad for de Melo, but is only international law.

#### 257. «The Brazilian Strife», The Times Democrat, 29 de novembro

Na opinião do editorialista, os rebeldes parecem agora mais ativos, tendo resistido, no forte de Villegagnon e continuam a bombardear Niterói, com o objetivo de poder desembarcar.

No entanto, é só com chegada da «frota adicional», comprada pelo governo nos Estados Unidos, que teremos o confronto final para que esta «querra» acabe de vez.



**Fig. 24 e 25 :** Manchetes que anunciam a saída do *América* e do *Destroyer*, rumo ao porto carioca (*The Evening World*, 24 e 27 novembro).

There have been some more signs of life, or, perhaps, it would be more accurate to say, there have been some signs of life, about the hostilities in Brazil during the last few days.

The insurgent fort of Villegagnon, for example, has been assiduous in shelling Peixoto's shore batteries; and, in spite of the well-directed and destructive fire that the pluck little fort has sustained from the loyal and larger forts in the bay, it has not only held its own, but it has silenced many of their guns. The statement is made that it is only a question of a few days more when it will have to surrender; but that information comes from the notoriously unreliable loyalist side, and the chances are, as well as is the hope, that it will hold out to be in at the death — to take a part in the ultimate settlement of the internecine if listless strife.

And not only has Fort Villegagnon been doing some appreciable work, but the ships of the insurgents also, it appears, have been moved to unusual energy, probably by reason of the great loss the insurgents cause sustained in the destruction of the *Javari* by the loyalist fire. Their shells, causally aimed at Rio, have done little if any damage in the capital; but hey have been very effective in Niteroi, where, according to a London *Times'* telegram, they killed 200 of Peixoto's soldiers. What the exact reason may be for the insurgents" persistence attentions to the suburban village of Niteroi, is not known; it may be, however, that they take that point to be the most accessible and safest for a landing, and that they are engaged in clearing it out before attempting to get a foothold on shore.

The news has also come that Para, the northernmost and one to the most important Provinces in the republic, has gone over to the insurgents, who are in consequence exulting that the revolution prevails, not only in the vicinity of Rio de Janeiro, but also in the south in Santa Catarina and in the north in Para.

Altogether, the situation, as it stands today, in spite of the loss of the *Javari* this day week, is distinctly in favor of the insurgents, who are developing more aggressive activity that they have hitherto done. But his spasmodic display of energy notwithstanding, it is as apparent as it ever was that the so-called "war" will never terminate until some more genuine life has been injected into it from the outside. And, with a view thereto, the impatience will be general until Peixoto's additional fleet, raised and equipped in New York, has arrived on the scene of hostilities to blow Melo's vessels out of the water, or to be themselves summarily disposed of by the torpedo boats which the insurgent Admiral is rumored to have in reserve against their advent.

Anything, so that the hang-fire of the strife may be put an end to, and that the nearly ruined industries of the country may be allowed to resume their natural flow.

# **258.** «The Progress of the Brazilian Revolution», *The Daily Picayune*, 29 de novembro

Os rebeldes, apesar de terem bombardeado os arredores do Rio, não fizeram progressos na baía da capital, nota o jornal que assinala progressos no Rio Grande do Sul, em Para e Pernambuco.

Na segunda parte do artigo, fala do cruzador República que está em Pará, à espera da nova frota de Peixoto que está a sair do porto de Nova Iorque.

Instead of improving, affairs are going from bad to worse in Brazil. The fleet of Admiral Melo continues to operate in the harbor of Rio, and although much damage has been inflicted upon the suburbs of the city, no actual progress has been made, as the forts at the entrance to the harbor still hold out stubbornly. Owing to the firm stand taken by the foreign powers, it has been found impossible to establish a blockade, so that the revenues of the Government, while in some measure diminished, owing to the effect of the war upon trade, have not been stopped.

Outside the harbor of Rio, the insurrection is apparently making headway. The revolutionists are gaining ground in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, while in the northern States of Para and Pernambuco it is said that everything is ripe for rebellion.

According to the latest dispatches, the rebel cruiser *Republica*, one of the most powerful ships in Admiral Melo's navy, has put in an appearance at Para, the most northerly port in Brazil, and her presence at that point indicates that she is on the lookout for the ships coming from New York. The *Republica* would be more than a match for both the *Niteroi* and *America*, and if either of those vessels fails to reach Para before being overhauled by the rebel cruiser, she is likely to play no further part in the present war.

#### **259.** *The Sun* (N.Y.), 29 de novembro

O jornal compara a simpatia para com os rebeldes brasileiros do atual correspondente no Rio de The Times, de Londres, com a dos correspondentes do mesmo jornal para com os estados sulistas durante a Guerra de Secessão.

In reading the dispatches sent to London from Brazil, and transmitted to this country, it is proper to bear in mind that the leading English papers have been as unfriendly to the Brazilian republic during the war now raging as they were thirty years ago to the American Union in its war against the rebellion. The Rio correspondent of the London *Times* is as unfair to the cause represented by President Peixoto as the Washington-New York-Bull Run correspondent of the same paper used to be toward the cause represented by President Abraham Lincoln. In the Rio correspondent's dispatches all things are colored to the disadvantage of the republican Government. Yet these dispatches are so useful to us that their transmission from London to us is desirable.

#### **260**. *The Morning Call*, 30 de novembro

À espera da batalha naval decisiva...

A London dispatch describes de Melo as having left the harbor of Rio in order to intercept the vessels from New York with which Peixoto hopes to achieve wonders. It is very likely another dispatch will contradict this rumor.

Peixoto could make good use of the opportunity to close Rio harbor against further insurgent visits, but he would perhaps carefully avoid blowing up the *Aquidaban* in the hope that it may yet serve the republic of Brazil. In a week or two there should be definite news of some decisive results tending to end the war.

#### **261.** «In Brazil», *The Times-Democrat*, 1 de dezembro.

Depois de um período de inação, nestes últimos dez dias, os rebeldes repeliram o ataque a Desterro e ocuparam a cidade do Pará, felicita o jornal, ansioso por ver os combatentes brasileiros saírem da letargia.

O jornal pergunta-se a seguir se o Contra-Almirante Melo – que conseguiu sair da baia do Rio – foi para norte ou para Sul. Na primeira hipótese, seria para travar a viagem da nova frota de Peixoto; na segunda, o aparecimento da frota no Sul seria uma oportunidade de convencer as províncias costeiras de aderirem à revolta contra Peixoto.

Two days ago<sup>17</sup>, writing on the subject of the civil strife in Brazil, we took occasion to point out that, although the hostilities between loyalists and insurgents were still being carried on with a degree of inactivity which threatened a collapse of the revolution through sheer inanition, during the last week or ten days the insurgents had beyond any dispute the best of it. For not only had Fort Villegagnon and the batteries of the insurgent ships in the bay held their own, and in fact more than haled their own, with the forts and batteries on shore, some of which they had silenced, but the rebels had easily

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Cf. Texto 257.

beaten off the attacks of the loyalists on their headquarters at Desterro, in the southern province of Santa Catarina; and in addition, they had captured the rich and important city of Para, in the very north of the republic.

Over and above these successes —so far as they can be called successes — we published telegrams yesterday to the effect that the insurgent General, Saraiva, had captured Curitiba, the most important city of the provinces of Parana, in the south of the republic, and had secured twenty-three Krupp guns and many shells at the same time. This capture indicates that the insurgents are making headway by land as well at sea; and, taken in conjunction with (what happens to be) the well-grounded rumor that the Brazilian Minister, Assis, had called upon the agents of the revolutionary party in Montevideo, Uruguay, and discussed matters looking to a rapprochement between the contending parties, it has very considerable significance. It looks as if, in spite of their purchase of a ready-made fleet of men-of-war in New York, the loyalists had not the confidence of victory which they profess loudly to have.

But the most striking piece of news which has just arrived is the announced departure of Admiral Melo with some of the best of his ships from Rio — bound north, according to one story to intercept President Peixoto's New York fleet and come to an issue with it before it ever reaches the scene of hostilities; but bound south, according to another story, for what purpose or destination the authors of the story do not pretend to know.

The fact of Melo's departure out of Rio Bay may, however, we presume, be accepted; and the simple fact is of consequence. For the telegrams coming

from Rio have so persistently represented Melo as unable to get his men-of-war out of the bay, if he wanted to do so, past the fire of the loyalist forts, and they have so assiduously reiterated the statement that the rebel Admiral was held there completely as in a trap, that many people began really to believe that it must be so. Now the announcement of his departure, unharmed, and without so much as saying to the fort "by 'r live", dissipate the trap story into impalpable air. And all Peixoto's brag about having the insurgent ships at his mercy is proved to be the usual wind in which he has indulged so copiously since the outbreak of the "war".

Whether Admiral Melo has come north or has gone south with his ships will, of course, soon be known. If he has come north, it can only be with the intention of meeting Peixoto's new fleet on the way, and trying conclusions with it. In which case a naval engagement of some consequence may take place in ten days or two weeks, if the two fleets can, as Scotsmen say, "forgather". But, forgathering on the broad bosom of the Atlantic, in that wide ocean tract south of the West Indies, is perhaps a good dealer easier to avoid than to accomplish. If Melo has gone north<sup>18</sup>, the movement means, presumably, that advantage will accrue to the insurgent cause by the appearance of the fleet in southern waters, where the seaboard provinces appear, as we have seen, to be inclining to throw in their lot with the rebels.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Trata-se de uma gralha. Temos de ler «*south*».

But, in either case, there is a prospect of hearing more stirring news soon from Brazil than we have yet heard since the commencement of the "war".

#### **262.** *The Times*, 1 de dezembro

People who complain of hard times in this blessed country should cast their eyes upon unhappy Brazil. - *Baltimore American* 

#### **263.** «A duel in prospect», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 2 de dezembro

Para este jornal, não há dúvidas: Melo foi para o norte com o claro objetivo de enfrentar a nova frota do governo brasileiro. E o jornalista, ansioso que o combate se realize, imagina os vários cenários possíveis.

At last there is a prospect of a little exhibition of modern naval warfare in the Brazilian squabble. News comes front Rio this morning that Melo has sailed the Aquidaban out of the harbor of The Brazilian capital and is now on the high seas with the prow of his good ship pointed toward the north and a wild desire in his warlike bosom to meet the *Niteroi* and such other vessels as may be on their way to Brazilian waters to uphold the cause of Peixoto on the seas. A British gunboat is in the wake of the *Aquidaban* to protect England's commerce and incidentally to give the officers and crew the benefit of an object lesson in fighting with the new fanged fixin's. If the *Niteroi*, and the *Aquidaban* meet here will be a duel worth witnessing. Experts declare that the

# MELLO ESGAPES From Rio Harbor

He Gains a Passage of the Forts
After Some Desperate
Fighting.

The Rebel Admiral Starts Out to Intercept Peixoto's New Vessels.

Anxious to Get His Guns Pointed at the Dynamite Thrower.

### MELLO HAS GONE.

Sailed Away to Meet the Fleet.

HE MADE A HARD FIGHT.

How the Rebel Warships Passed the Forts.

PEIXOTO FAR FROM DEAD YET.

He Is Making Every Preparation to Carry on the War With Vigor.

Fig. 26: The Philadelphia Inquirer

**Fig. 27:** *The Morning Call* 

Duas manchetes sobre a saída Custódio de Melo da baía do Rio (2 de dezembro).


chances of either boats being sunk are about equal. If the *Niteroi* gets a fair crack at her adversary with her torpedos, goodbye *Aquidaban*. But the *Aquidaban* has several chances to sink the *Niteroi* with her heavy guns before the latter can approach near enough to work her torpedo tubes to advantage. The *Niteroi* is swift; the *Aquidaban* very slow. Perhaps Peixoto's new boat may elect to run away from the monster, beat her back to Rio and wipe out a few of Melo's weaker craft before the *Aquidaban* can get home to protect them. At any rate, events seem to be shaping themselves for a scrimmage and that is what the world is impatiently waiting for.


#### **264**. *The Daily Picayune*, 3 de dezembro

Battles in Brazil may be carried on by telegraph.

#### **265.** «Brazil» *The Sun*, (N.Y.), 4 de dezembro

Na opinião do editorialista nova-iorquino, Peixoto — que agiu como um ditador, que violou a constituição e que é detestado pela Marinha — não é o homem indicado para o cargo de presidente que será eleito em março. O jornal pensa que o próximo chefe de Estado deveria ser um civil e propõe Salvador de Mendonça, diplomata brasileiro em Washington desde 1875, homem de honra, «um verdadeiro republicano», experiente e competente. «Um homem a quem o Brasil deve muito» e que, «durante a sua longa estadia nos Estados Unidos tem sido um observador atento de como funciona uma república pacífica e bem-sucedida».





**Fig. 28 e 29 :** a 3 de dezembro, *The Los Angeles Times* insere um desenho da « Frota improvisada do Presidente Peixoto » e *El Cid* (Niterói) já transformado em navio de guerra

In three months from this time there will be an election of a new President of Brazil. The present incumbent of the office, Peixoto, has been laying pipes for another term ever since he rose from the Vice-Presidency to the Presidency, two years ago. It the rebellion shall be suppressed before the election, Peixoto may be able to carry the country. But he is not the best man for the place. He has offended a great part of the people by his violation of the Constitution. His Government has been very like a military dictatorship. As a Marshal of the army he is detested by the navy, three of the Admirals of which have risen in revolt against him. If he is reelected, the quarrel between the two branches of the service will be kept up, and the interests of the country must suffer through his ambition. With both of the soldiers who have held the Presidential office in Brazil since the fall of Dom Pedro there has been endless trouble.

The President of the Brazilian republic should be a civilian, a man of affairs, a statesman. There is not a man of eminence of that kind among the candidates for the office of President.

There has been in this country for the past ten years a very distinguished Brazilian diplomatist and statesman, a man of experience in affairs, a genuine republican, who has rendered high services to the great republic of South America. We refer to Senhor Salvador de Mendonça, who is now the Minister of Brazil at Washington. Only those who have had the opportunity of knowing what his accomplished publicist has done to thwart the schemes of foreign Government in Brazil, or how he brought his influence to bear upon our

Government this year at a time of peril to his country, or of the prodigious energy he has recently displayed in procuring ships and munitions for the Brazilian service, can understand the character of the man. Brazil is greatly indebted to him. He is a civilian of fine temper. During his long resident in the United States, he has been a close observer of the workings of a peaceful and successful republican government. He has never taken any part in the rivalries of the quarrels of the Brazilian leader, or of the army with the navy. He is a man of honor.

If the Brazilians shall be pleased to consider the claims of Mendonça, the statesman, as against those of the competing Marshals and Admirals; if they shall turn their eyes to him as the best and fittest man for the office of President, we believe that they will thus give proof of the soundness of their judgment, and their political perspicacity.

#### **266.** «Melo and the Monarchy», *The Sun* (N.Y.), 5 de dezembro.

Peixoto acusa os rebeldes de serem monárquicos e de quererem restaurar o antigo regime, mas Custódio de Melo recusa estas alegações, resume o jornal. O positivo, na opinião do jornalista é que os dois lados rejeitam a ideia de um regresso dos Bragança ao Brasil. Afinal, nota ironicamente The Sun, este país está numa situação melhor do que o Havai. Neste arquipélago, onde derrubaram a monarquia, adverte o quotidiano, corre-se o risco que uma força estrangeira, apoiada pelos Estados Unidos, restabeleça os antigos governantes.

There is something suggestive in the vigor with which Admiral Melo and all his friends deny that he is trying to restore the empire in Brazil. Rui Barbosa, who ought to be good authority, says that the insurgent cause is true to the republic – truer to it than Peixoto's Government is. Melo, who is even better authority, now protests that he has never contemplated an act so repugnant as bringing back monarchy to Brazil. It is a weak invention of the enemy, declare the insurgents designed to injure them there and elsewhere.

Hardly less significant is the persistency with which President Peixoto's supporters renew these charges. At one time the rumor was spread that the Prince Pierre, old Dom Pedro's grandson, was actually aboard the *Aquidaban*, so that he might lose no time in being overthrown. Directly on the heels of Melo's indignant protest at being called a monarchist, it is declared that his departure from the harbor of Rio is with a view to stir up and increase an existing sentiment in favor o the empire, in Bahia and Pernambuco.

So, whether Melo is or is not a monarchist, he and his opponents seem to agree that it would injure his cause to have him thought one. In other words, the people of Brazil, having once got rid of their throne, do not propose to have it brought back.

If so, Brazil is not wholly unhappy, even in the midst of her misfortunes. She might be worst off. She is not like poor Hawaii, which, having overthrown monarchy, may now have it set up again by foreign force, supplied from our free republic.

#### **267**. *The Sun* (N.Y.), 10 de dezembro

O artigo analisa a resposta do ministro brasileiro em Washington depois de The Sun ter escrito<sup>19</sup> que o diplomata era a pessoa ideal para o cargo. O jornal aprecia a «grande dignidade ou magnanimidade das palavras» utilizadas na carta de Mendonça que, evidentemente, exclui qualquer ambição política da sua parte, além de defender Floriano Peixoto.

No entanto, o editorialista nova-iorquino não muda de ideias e continua a pensar que o ministro brasileiro seria um excelente presidente da República.

It was a most graceful and unassuming letter which Minister Mendonça sent to *The Sun* after he had been here spoken of as the most fitting candidate for the great office of President of Brazil. In the most generous way he lauded a number of eminent Brazilians whom he regards as worthy candidates for the office, and he protested that he himself must not be regarded as the rival of any of them. He also declared his belief that the conduct of President Peixoto in office has been constitutional, and at the same time gave us the information that Peixoto has no ambition to be elected for a second term.

It would not have been possible for Minister Mendonça to choose words of greater dignity or magnanimity than those which he employed in his letter, or to exhibit a finer spirit of diffidence than that which pervade his language. We feel sure that his letter will be perused with pleasure by all the distinguished Brazilians of whom he spoke so highly.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Ct. Texto 265.

It has not convinced us, however, that he would not be the very best and fittest man for the office of President in succession to PEIXOTO. It has rather convinced us of his superior qualifications for the place. It was a letter worthy of a statesman. And it is a statesman whom the people of Brazil ought to elect as President of the republic on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March next.

#### **268.** «Gama and Cleveland, *The Sun* (N.Y.), 11 de dezembro

Artigo polémico do quotidiano nova-iorquino que compara a situação do Brasil, onde o almirante Saldanha da Gama quer restaurar o antigo regime no Rio de Janeiro, com a simpatia do Presidente Cleveland pela causa monárquica nas Ilhas Havai, derrubada no início do ano.

President CLEVELAND and Secretary Gresham should have a fellow feeling for Admiral Saldanha da Gama. Admiral Gama announces that the he is favor of setting up again the throne of Dom Pedro. "It is only just," he said, "To restore by force of arms the Government which, in a moment of national stupefaction and surprise, was overthrown on Nov. 15, 1889, by military sedition. Of this sedition the present Government was the outcome." The Government thus overthrown four years ago was a monarchy, and the Admiral's words and ideas follow so closely those of Mr. Cleveland and Mr. Gresham in relation of the restoration of royalty in Hawaii that he might almost be accused of plagiarism.

But the palm for zeal is this business must go to CLEVELAND and GRESHAM. It took GAMA four years to decide for setting up a throne in Brazil, and only four

months for Cleveland and Gresham to adopt a similar policy for Hawaii. Gama concerns himself only with his own country, while Gresham and Cleveland propose to force monarchy in another and a distant nation. Gama adopts this conclusion while civil war is raging in Brazil and the ability to the existing Government to maintain itself is in doubt, whereas Cleveland and Gresham's move for monarchy is made when Hawaii is at peace, with the power of the Provisional Government unquestioned. Finally, there is no similarity between the upright, enlightened Dom Pedro, whose family Gama would like to restore, and the odious licentious, despotic, idolatrous Liliuokalani<sup>20</sup> whom Cleveland and Gresham so warmly champion.

As throne restorers and devotees of broken-down monarchy, Admiral Gama and his associates are not in the same class with Gresham, Cleveland, and Bount<sup>21</sup>.

#### **269.** «The Troubles in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 13 de dezembro

Na opinião do jornal, a situação militar parece muito favorável para os revoltosos: Saldanha da Gama aderiu ao movimento; a frota em Montevideu parece querer fazer o mesmo; Custódio de Melo estaria prestes a conquistar o porto de Santos. No caso de uma derrota do governo brasileiro, adverte o jornalista, a posição dos Estados Unidos ficará muito mais fraca, como a que

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Lili'uokalani (1838-1917), foi a última rainha do arquipélago de janeiro 1891 a janeiro de 1893.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> James Henderson (1837-1903), membro do Congresso americano pela Georgia de 1873 até 1893, é um notório porta-vos dos supremacistas brancos. Em 1893, opõe-se à anexação do arquipélago no seu relatório apresentado no Congresso a 17 de julho.

tem agora no Chile, por ter abertamente simpatizado com Balmaceda. Com efeito, a nova frota de Peixoto foi preparada em Nova Iorque, sem esquecer que houve «um manifesto recrutamento de oficiais e marinheiros» americanos para estes novos navios de querra.

If all accounts received are to be believed, the revolution in Brazil has suddenly become a much more serous affair than the Brazilian officials were disposed to admit at first. Even the Brazilian Minister at Washington is reported to have expressed himself as feeling serious concern at the recent course of events

The principal event which has led up to the present serious state of affairs is said to be the acquisition by the insurgents of Admiral da Gama. That officer is now in command of the operations at Rio de Janeiro, having been assigned that post by Admiral Melo when the latter ran the blockade of the ports a week ago and sailed southward. Da Gama is said to be the most popular officer in the Brazilian navy, and likely to carry over with him to the side of Melo all the officers and ships of the navy that have hitherto held aloof from the rebellion. He is also known as an ardent monarchist, and in his recent manifesto he states that it is his intention, if successful, to afford the people of Brazil an opportunity of expressing their wishes as to the restoration of the Government deposed in the "ill-advised" revolution of 1889.

It is evident that the defection of Admiral da Gama has been a severe blow to President Peixoto, as the course of that officer is likely to influence a larger number of people. His adhesion to the rebellion is made still more serious by the rumor that Admiral Gonzalez<sup>22</sup>, who commands the loyal fleet at Montevideo, is also about to join the insurgents. Should this last report prove true, President Peixoto will probably lose the only important ships of the Brazilian navy which have remained loyal to him up to the present. With the *Baia* and *Tiradentes* in his possession, Admiral Melo would be free to devote his entire attention to crush the vessels bought abroad by President Peixoto. These ships, being unable to cope with armored vessels like the *Republica*, *Aquidaban* and *Bahia* would become an easy prey.

The news from Brazil has, therefore, assumed a very threatening character. The success of the revolutionists would not prove the most advantageous thing that could happen for the interests of the United States. The fitting out of a fleet in New York and the open recruiting of officers and men there are facts which will doubtless embitter the insurgent leaders against the United States, and the result will be that we will occupy much the same position in Brazil which we now occupy in Chile, as a consequence of the too open sympathy of the American Government for Balmaceda.

Evidently affairs are rapidly approaching a crisis in Brazil and some stirring events, both ashore and afloat, may soon be expected. The latest reports described Admiral Melo as being about to attempt the capture of Santos. That point is the most important in Brazil, after Rio, as the revenue

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Trata-te do Almirante Gerônimo Gonçalves (1835-1903).

from the custom-house there is very large. Its loss prove a crushing blow to the Government.

## **270**. «Cleveland and Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 13 de dezembro

Também este artigo, depois de ter recordado os princípios fundamentais da doutrina Monroe, se interroga sobre o Presidente americano que, no Havai, está do lado da rainha destronada. O que é que ele quer para o Brasil, visto que há uma pretendente, agora apoiada por Saldanha da Gama, pergunta o jornalista que, ironicamente, convida Cleveland a ter um pouco de coerência. Porém, o jornal californiano pensa que o presidente americano vai «utilizar todo o poder dos Estados Unidos» para ajudar a rainha Lili'uokalani e vai ignorar completamente a princesa Isabel, filha de D. Pedro II.

If Mr. Cleveland really wants to display his Americanism, the declaration of Admiral Gama that he is in arms for the restoration of the monarchy in Brazil gives him a chance to invoke what is at least a permissible construction of the Monroe doctrine. That doctrine, as formulated, is a protest against the extension of European sovereignty over any part of the Western hemisphere, but it is not difficult to connect the aspiration of the Bourbon Count d'Eu with the monarchies of Europe, especially as he is said to be backed by the throne of Spain in his efforts to overturn the Brazilian republic.

Manifestly there is no appreciable difference between Spain extending her authority over Brazil and a Spanish Bourbon ruling the country by virtue of his wife's claim to the throne, especially as that wife is a devotee who would leave the conduct of all mundane affairs entirely to her husband. Indeed, it may be questioned whether the Monroe doctrine does not contemplate in effect the extinction of monarchy in America, or, at least, the prevention of its resumption after it has once been done away with.

So far Mr. Cleveland is concerned, however, if his action in the case of Hawaii is to be taken as a precedent, he is not unlikely to declare that the revolution which resulted in the formation of the Brazilian republic was an unauthorized act, ant that the interests of justice demand that the United States assist in restoring the daughter of Dom Pedro to the throne of her fathers. Surely the claim of the Countess d'Eu to the throne of Brazil is as good as the claim of ex-Oueen Liliuokalani to the Throne of Hawaii.

It is not supposed that the President will take any such action, but he certainly should if he makes any pretensions of consistency. There are two deeply injured women, according to Cleveland's ideas, and it seems hardly fair to use the whole power of the United States, including James H. l, in favor of the one, and ignore the other entirely.

#### **271**. *The Record-Union*, 13 de dezembro

Apesar das declarações de Saldanha da Gama, o Brasil vai manter o regime republicano.

Since Admiral da Gama has gone over to the Brazilian rebels it is no longer attempted to conceal the fact that da Gama is an imperialist, and that he

### AN EMPIRE FOR BRAZIL

WEALTHIEST NOBLE HOUSES IN ÉU-ROPE FAVOR THE REBELS.

THEY WILL SUPPLY MONEY.

Brazilian Navy Practically a Unit in Rebellion—Admiral Gama's Powerful Following — Danger Line Drawn for Vessels—Shipping Will Be Very Much Disturbed.

### EMPIRE FOR BRAZIL?

Further Evidence That Admiral Mello's Aim is to Restore the Monarchy.

AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT AIDING HIM.

These in Authority Say, Should the Revolution be Successful One of the Hapsburg Family Will be Placed on the 1hrone—Firing on Bio Jameiro.

**Fig. 30 e 31 :** « Um Império para o Brasil »; manchetes sobre as supostas ajudas fornecidas pelas monarquias europeias aos rebeldes brasileiros (*St. Paul Daily Globe*, 12 de dezembro; *The Buffalo Commercial*, 16 de dezembro)

took his position as a rebel for the express purpose of restoring monarchial rule in Brazil. It is safe to predict that, no matter what may happen to the Peixoto Government, the empire will not again set up. The people of Brazil are not in sympathy with any such movement, and the contending factions under Peixoto will unite for the purpose of preventing the overthrow of the republic, even if they have to fight over their own ambitions thereafter.

#### **272**. *The Daily Picayune*, 13 de dezembro

The coffee-pot trouble in Brazil is not near being settled. [...]

They are very badly behaved gents, those insurgents of Brazil.

#### **273**. *The Pittsburg Post*, 14 de dezembro

The temperature of the revolution in Brazil continues about normal.

## **274**. «The Blockade of Rio and Santos, *The Daily Picayune*, 16 de dezembro

Se os dois portos do Rio e de Santos forem bloqueados pelos revoltosos, o governo brasileiro, sem o dinheiro proveniente das alfandegárias cobradas sobre as exportações do café, estaria numa situação muito complicada, escreve o jornalista, bastante preocupado pelas futuras dificuldades criadas ao abastecimento desta matéria prima no seu país e na Europa.

Should the news that the Brazilian insurgents have blockaded the important cities of Rio and Santos prove correct, the coffee interests of the United States would be seriously inconvenienced. The vast bulk of the coffee consumed in the United States comes from these two ports, and, should the shipments be stopped by the blockade, the coffee supplies of this country, as well as of Europe, would be seriously impaired for a time a least.

There may be precedents which would justify foreign powers, and particularly the United States, in interfering to prevent international trade from suffering to the extent that would result from the reported blockade; but such interference would be so palpable an attempt to save the Government of President Peixoto from overthrow that it is doubtful of any foreign power, even the United States, would venture upon such a course.

Should Rio de Janeiro and Santos be blockaded, the cause of President Peixoto would be seriously damaged, as his main source of revenue would be cut off. The customhouses at Rio and Santos are the main revenue producers in Brazil, hence, with their producing power destroyed, the Government would be sadly crippled.

### **275.** «Melo's Suit against Americans», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 17 de dezembro

Custódio de Melo quer apresentar queixa às autoridades americanas contra cidadãos que querem participar na constituição da nova armada de Peixoto, e do governo americano, porque os Estados Unidos autorizaram a compra e a preparação desses navios, revela o jornal. Este, no entanto, afirma que a lei americana proíbe a venda de armas a nações em guerra, mas, visto que ao «Rebelde Melo» não foi reconhecido o estatuto de beligerante, o governo brasileiro pode comprar armas onde ele quiser.

It is reported from New York that Melo, the insurgent leader in Brazil, has retained United Stated attorneys to bring suit against United States citizens for fitting out cruisers of the Brazilian government. Melo also maintains that the United States government is deeply in the wrong for permitting its citizens to fit out war vessels to be used in the Brazilian hostilities. Melo's attorney, a Mr. Angell. Is interviewed by the *New York, Herald* and states that the statute under which suit is to be brought against American citizens is section 5,283 of the United States Revised Statues, as follows:

Every person who, without the limits of the United States, fits out, arms, or attempts to fit out or arm, or procures to be fitted out or armed, or knowingly is concerned in the fitting out or furnishing, or arming of any vessel with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district or people to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens or property of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district or people with whom the United States are at peace, or who issues or delivers a commission within the jurisdiction of the United States for any vessel to the intent that she may be so employed, shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor, and shall be punished by a fine of not more than \$10,000 and imprisonment for a term of three years and confiscation of the property.

If this statute applied of the case the situation would be interesting. The United States would be placed in about as serious and ridiculous a predicament

as in the Hawaiian farce. But the above statute, it happens, has been construed by the United States supreme court in numerous cases, as applying only to a state of war between two foreign powers recognized as such by the United States. Melo is not recognized as a sovereign, and his attack upon the Brazilian government is not given the status of war between two powers. His standing is that simply of a pirate and insurgent. He has no international standing.

According to the principles and precedents of international custom, any government has the privilege not only of selling the Brazilian government arms and vessels for putting down the insurrection, but of lending direct aid. Mr. Insurgent Melo has been pampered by European princes and those interested in the insurrection of the deposed monarchy, until he looks upon himself as a live prince and potentate. Uncle Sam does not size up Insurgent Melo that way.

### **276.** «Leanings toward Monarchy». *Democrat and Chronicle*, 18 de dezembro

Outro ataque à administração americana e ao Presidente pela sua posição tomada na crise das ilhas Havai. Ainda bem, sublinha o jornal, que o governo do Rio conseguiu exercer alguma pressão sobre Cleveland, conseguindo dessa forma conter as suas tendências filo-monárquicas.

Unless the administration in Washington is greatly belied, its sympathies are strongly for the success of Admiral Melo. The fact that no inquiry has been ordered in the case of Admiral Stanton, who returned to the United States some time ago, would indicate that he was sacrificed to prevent a break with the Brazilian government; and that the administration, not Stanton, was at fault. The sinister attitude of the administration is further shown by a Washington dispatch, stating the hopes of Minister Mendonça that the navy now assembling will crush the rebellion. The dispatch says as follows:

Quite an opposite view of the situation prevails in administration circles here, based on official information received from Brazil. It is asserted that the Brazilian government's chances for final victory are growing less every day. Official advices have been received every here of the movement of a large land force under an insurgent general, bent on capturing Rio Janeiro

It is well if the monarchical tendencies of President Cleveland are somewhat restrained by the pressure of the Brazilian government. Such tendencies have been unrestrained in relation to Hawaii. Congress ignored and nothing prevents a restoration of monarchy in the distant islands but the courage of the people of Honolulu who stand armed behind hastily constructed entrenchments.

#### 277. «Hated for Her Humanity», The Daily Picayune, 18 de dezembro

D. Isabel é impopular no Brasil, porque aboliu a escravatura, sem compensar os antigos proprietários dos escravos, afirma o diário americano.

The talk of restoring the monarchy in Brazil has turned public attention to the unpopularity in that country of the Countess d'Eu, who is in the direct

line of succession from the late emperor, and has brought out the fact that whatever reason may have been alleged for it, the real cause of Brazil's dislike was the royal lady's humanity. She was one of the principal advocates of the emancipation of the slaves in that country, and being regent at the time when the decree was passed, insisted that it should go into effect immediately, instead of giving a period of six years, as many desired to do, to allow the slave-holders time to prepare for the change. This made her very unpopular, and a plot was on foot to place Prince Pedro, a son-in-law of the emperor, on the throne, when the revolution arose and swept the throne away.

### **278**. *The Sioux-City Journal*, 18 de dezembro

The little revolution in Brazil is lasting longer than usual. Unless it comes to a head soon Secretary Herbert will have to pass on Admiral Stanton's case without knowing whether he saluted the flag of the government or the last government.

## **279**. *The Daily Picayune*, 18 de dezembro

Brazil is liable to become so irregular that people living there will not know who are the insurgents, nor which is the regular government.

## 280. «Brazilian Movement», The Times Democrats, 20 de dezembro

Não se passa quase nada no Rio, lamenta o jornal, que não conhece o paradeiro de Custódio de Melo. Nas próximas semanas, contudo, as coisas irão mudar, anuncia o quotidiano, que menciona também um pequeno motim a bordo do Niterói.

The movements of the last few days in the so-called "war" in Brazil have been confined almost entirely, as far as exact news had reached this country, to the southward journey of the loyalist fleet purchased in New York, and to the incidents happening on board those vessels.

The insurgent Admiral dos not appear to have been heard from, unless we accept as intelligence of his whereabouts the rumor sent from Rio through loyalist channels that the *Aquidaban* had made an attempt to re-enter Rioharbor and had been disabled in the attempt. The rumor has not much likelihood in it; and Melo, it may be taken for granted, is veiling his whereabouts to the best of his ability, that he may be in a position either to fight or to flee from the *Niteroi*, as he may deem best, when that cruiser with her formidable gun makes her debut in southern Brazilian waters.

There has been a good deal of trouble, it seems, on board of the *Niteroi* about the terms of reshipment of the crew engaged in New York, and engaged only for the voyage south with the option of reshipment. Reaching Pernambuco on Wednesday last, but only transferred to the Brazilian government on Saturdays, the entire crew of officers and men refused to reship, unless they

were given a large increase of wages. The officers, with the exception of Capt. Baker, who was replaced by Capt. Alvaro Nunes, a Brazilian, were re-engaged on their own terms — \$5000 each for three months' service, but the crew were not so lucky; they wanted \$800 each for three months, but were offered only \$400.

The *America*, which was disabled, is still in the West Indies making good the injury which her machinery sustained; and the *Destroyer*, now known as the *Piratius*, was spoken two days ago also among the *West India Islands*.

It is expected that the *Niteroi* will leave Pernamuco today or tomorrow and make for Rio, touching only at Bahia. The fun, however, commence next week.

## 281. The Daily Picayune, 21 de dezembro

If admiral Melo and other fellow would meet in a 24-four footing ring and settle their rebellion dispute in Brazil, they would save much time, many livers and valuable property. But that plan would not possibly please those who wish to restore a played-out dynasty.

#### **282**. «The Brazilian Situation», *The Record Union*, 22 de dezembro

O conflito parece ter entrado na fase final, anuncia o jornal, que recorda os pontos principais da doutrina Monroe.

The dispatches indicate that the end of the difficulties in Brazil is near at hand. Each party is now about prepared to make the final grand effort.

There is an unofficial statement that our own Government, without taking sides with either Melo or Peixoto, will assume an attitude antagonistic to any interference by European or other foreign power with a view to aiding the establishment of a monarchy on Brazilian soil.

If this story shall prove to be true it will gratify the American people generally. We have no warrant for interference ourselves, and should back a protest with vigor against the interposition of others—especially when such interference is intended to assist in the restoration of monarchy without expression of the will of the Brazilian people on that question.

## **283.** «More ships for Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 22 de dezembro

É urgente enviar mais navios de guerra para proteger os comerciantes americanos, e isso devia ter sido feito «há alguns meses», proclama o jornal, segundo o qual Custódio de Melo «tem um rancor especial contra» os Estados Unidos «por causa da ajuda dada ao Presidente Peixoto».

It is high time for decisive action by our government to protect American commerce with Brazil. German and British ships are protected by war ships

and unload in peace, while Captain Picking<sup>23</sup>, commanding our fleet at Rio, neglects to giver aid to our merchantmen. This neglect will surely turn Brazilian commerce over to our rivals. Admiral Melo can not be regarded in any other light than a pirate and he should be so treated.

It is reported that the monitor *Miantonomah* and the cruiser *New York* will be sent to Rio. Ordinary foresight would have prompted the sending of the monitor some months ago. Our vessels at Rio are unarmored cruisers and cannot well meet the two great ships of the insurgents. Our fleet should be strong enough to destroy if necessary, the insurgent ironclads and end the embargo put on American commerce. It is presumed that Admiral Melo has a special grudge against us because of aid furnished to President Peixoto.

#### **284.** *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 22 de dezembro

If Mr. Cleveland is really afraid that Great Britain is about to attempt the reinstatement of the monarchy in Brazil, why doesn't he send Paramount Blount<sup>24</sup> down to look into the matter?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Trata-se de Henry Forry Picking (1840-1899).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Cf. nota 21. Em 1893, depois da queda da monarquia no Havai, Cleveland envia Blount para investigar sobre o assunto. No seu relatório recusa a anexação do arquipélago por parte dos Estados Unidos.

## **285.** «Stanton Rebuked», San Francisco Chronicle, 23 de dezembro

O secretário da Marinha restabeleceu o Contra-Almirante Stanton nas suas funções, mas puxou-lhe as orelhas, e com razão, nota o jornal. Segundo este, seria útil «compilar um manual de instruções» para os oficiais da marinha para eles saberem que não podem reconhecer os rebeldes que lutam contra um governo legalmente constituído.

Secretary of the Navy Herbert has restored Commodore Stanton to duty, he having been suspended for saluting the insurgent Admiral Melo, but in so doing the Secretary rebukes him. The concluding portion of the Secretary's letter says:

The department never for a moment considered that you were intentionally guilty of any wrong in the matter, but only that you committed a grave error of judgment. For this reason, and to satisfy the authorities of Brazil, who were offended at your action, you were detached from the command.

A naval officer must, on many occasions, exercise his individual judgment, for he cannot communicate with the Navy Department, and must act on the spur of the moment. Like everyone else who is charged with responsibility, he must abide the consequences of his acts. To say to an officer of Commodore Stanton's rank and standing in the service that he has committed a grave error of judgment is a pretty sharp rebuke, and yet the facts of the case warrant it.

Admiral Melo, at the time of his recognition by Commodore Stanton, was, as he still is, a rebel against the legitimate government of Brazil. His rebellion

may be righteous or unrighteous — that has nothing to do with the case. The only government of Brazil which Commodore Stanton had a right of recognize officially was the Peixoto government, that is the Brazilian republic, and whatever may have been his personal views regarding Melo, he had no right to accord him official recognition.

In these days of small caliber revolutions, it would be well for some competent authority to compile a handbook of instructions of the use of the American navy, explaining that the officer in charge can know no Government but the one which is at peace and friendly to the United States. This is hornbook learning it is true, but here have been several cases where our naval officers have seemed to lean very strongly towards the side of rebellion. They may and should use all the power at their command to protect the lives and property of American citizens, but there is a wide distinction between that and extending an official recognition to rebels and insurgents who have not even been accorded belligerent rights.

## **286.** «Non-Interference in Brazil», *The Times*, 23 de dezembro.

O jornal aprova as medidas tomadas em relação ao Contra-Almirante Stanton: na altura, foi necessário demiti-lo do comando; agora, é também justo restabelecêê-lo nas suas funções.

Esta rápida reação por parte do governo americano, que reprovou sem equívocos o comportamento do seu alto oficial, é um sinal dado às grandes potências: os Estados Unidos nunca irão tolerar uma qualquer ingerência nos assuntos internos do Brasil.

The exoneration of Admiral Stanton by the Secretary of Navy and his restoration to duty may seem at first an acknowledgement that the Secretary was mistaken in recalling him from Brazil as a condemnation of his error in saluting the flag of Admiral Melo. But Secretary did right in removing Admiral Stanton as he does now right in restoring him to command. The mistake that he made reflected upon his political judgment, not upon his military character. The one thing which it is especially needful at this time to impress upon the military as well as the diplomatic representatives of the United States abroad is their duty to abstain from interference with the politics of the country where they may find themselves.

The Government of Brazil exists of did then exist at Rio in fact as well as by the diplomatic recognition of the world. Against this government Admiral Melo was a proclaimed insurgent. Though he might fly the flag of Brazil, he had no right to represent it, and the formal salute of this flag by the American admiral could not be regarded by Brazilians otherwise that as a recognition of Melo and his provisional government, akin to the premature recognition of the provisional government of Hawaii by our representative there.

It was therefore necessary to make the disavowal of his act as emphatic as possible, in order to uphold the cardinal doctrine of non-intervention which it has been the firm policy of the United States to enforce upon this continent and the adjacent islands. A mere written disavowal would not have sufficed. Admiral Stanton had by a public act committed the United States to a

recognition of Melo's pretensions, and the disavowal must be by an equally public act, which would serve as a notice not only to our naval officers, but to representatives of other powers as well, that the United States would tolerate no form of meddling in the affairs of Brazil.

That having been accomplished, and the Admiral Stanton having satisfied the department of his innocence of unlawful purpose, he is properly restored to a command proportionate to his rank. Thus, without injustice to anyone this government has kept its record to clear and its American policy unimpaired. If Melo should gain recognition by actual conquest or the acknowledgment of the people of Brazil, it will be time enough to salute his flag, but we have had enough of premature and compromising intervention.

#### **287.** «Situation in Brazil», *The Pittsburg Post*, 24 de dezembro

Comentário extremamente favorável para os rebeldes. No fundo, julga o autor do artigo, tudo vai-se decidir com a chegada dos navios comprados nos Estados Unidos e na possibilidade de serem travados e/ou aniquilados pelos navios de Custódio de Melo. O jornalista de Pittsburgh parece apostar na vitória dos revoltosos.

The reports that Rio Janeiro has been captured by the Brazilian rebels and that President Peixoto is either a prisoner or a fugitive lack confirmation, but there is no doubt the regular government is in a bad way, and if the successes of the rebels continue, they will have earned the right to be recognized as belligerents, if in reality they do not soon constitute the *de facto* 

government. Since Admiral Melo has been joined by Admiral DA GAMA the course of events has been against the government. It seems to lack popular support, while on the other hand the insurgents are making progress. Not long since they gained an important victory in Rio Grande do Sul over General Isodoro. More recently they have inflicted a severe defeat upon a force under General Tellos that attempted to retake Governador island, capturing 1,000 men. Admiral DA GAMA manages with vigor at Rio, and DE Melo is free to watch with the *Aquidaban* and *Esperança* for the *Niteroi*, *America* and *Pirating*, the vessels bought by Peixoto in the United States. Naval men assume that the latter vessels have an excellent prospect of being captured or blown out of the water. It is very probable that the fate of the insurrection and the government will rest upon the success or failure of what may be called the American expedition.

Should the insurgents succeed it is regarded as highly probable that the family of Dom Pedro will be recalled to Brazil and the empire re-established.

#### **288.** «The troubles of Brazil» *The New York Times*, 25 de dezembro

Uma vitória dos revoltosos «seria um desastre nacional», afirma o quotidiano, preocupado pela total falta de estabilidade no Brasil, e «a melhor cura contra esta doença incipiente seria o derrube de Custódio de Melo pelas forças governamentais»

O jornal critica severamente a atitude inglesa, nomeadamente dos comandantes dos navios e a imprensa, que manifesta muita simpatia pelos revoltosos o que não é do interesse dos Estados Unidos. No entanto, salienta o editorialista, não é por isso que os americanos têm de apoiar militarmente Peixoto.

Se de Melo e Saldanha de Gama conseguirem chegar ao poder e restabelecer a monarquia, os Estados Unidos terão de admitir que os europeus terão conseguido reduzir a doutrina Monroe à expressão mínima, lamenta o jornal, na opinião do qual, as repúblicas sul-americanas não podem pedir a intervenção da Grande República do Norte: têm de se unir elas mesmas e defender-se contra «as usurpações e as interferências vindas do outro lado do oceano.»

The triumph of the insurgents under Melo and DA GAMA would be a national disaster of the Brazilians, not merely because the restoration of monarchical rule over a people that have had a republican form of government is a backward step, but also and chiefly because their success would firmly fasten the revolutionary habit upon the country. The particular form a government may take is less important than its stability, for it is notorious that the native tendency of our fellow-American of the Spanish republics to overturn their Governments at frequent intervals, substituting the arbitrary rule of dictators, military chieftains, usurping Presidents, and other precarious despots for the constitutional sway of lawfully-elected Chief Magistrates, has much impeded their social and material progress. Undoubtedly it would have been better for Brazil to continue under the benignant reign of easy-going old Dom Pedro and of his heirs and successors than by deposing and deporting him to betake herself to the turbulence of a revolutionary career under a disorderly procession of da Fonsecas, Peixotos, and Melos, or Augustus Leopolds.

The best cure for this incipient malady would be the downing of Melo by the Government forces. That accomplished, the coming elections would place in control of the executive and the legislative power a Government much more likely to be wise and stable than any which Melo would be able to set up, and certainly that any monarchy to which he might assign the fruits of his successful insurrection. Pursuing its traditional policy, our Government has maintained its friendly relations with the Peixoto Government giving the insurgents no encouragements or sympathy. We even expressly disclaimed any friendly interests in Melo's undertaking by rebuking a naval officer who had through an error of judgment saluted his ship in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. There are reasons in abundance why the people and the Government of the United States should desire the insurrection to fail, for it is plain that its success would re-establish the monarchy, and it hardly requires an argument to show that such a change would not be favorable to our future trade relations whit Brazil. We might infer this, if we had no other reasons for apprehending if, from the open and eager sympathy of the English with the insurgents. Every news report that comes to us from English sources is either strongly pictured with sympathy for the cause of Melo, or is brazenly invented to create an impression of his speedy triumph. What the English so ardently desire in Brazilian internal politics is pretty sure not to be favorable to our interests, commercial or otherwise.

The active partisanships of English ship Captains, English newspapers, and the English people generally, gives us, however, no pretext for a correlative

partisanship as a Government on the other side nor prompts us to any act of intervention in defense of the Monroe doctrine. That venerable declaration of American policy was directed against the attempts of European powers to extend their monarchical system to any portion of this hemisphere. For the purposes of international law, ship Captains and newspapers are not powers.

It cannot be denied, however, if Melo and DA GAMA, by dint of much powder and ball paid for with funds provided out of European purses for the purpose of aiding in putting a European Prince on the throne of Brazil, should capture Rio de Janeiro; and if, then, by reason of the active monarchist propaganda that has been carried on in the capital and in other cities by European agents, they should find a popular sentiment existing that rendered if feasible to overthrow the republic and set up the monarchy, that we should be compelled to admit that Europe had discovered a clever way of reducing our Monroe doctrine to the shrunken proportion of a "barren ideality." The "powers " will probably say that if private funds and private emissaries may do in our sister republics does not arouse us out of a complacent neutrality, or stir us even to such protests as we made when Napoleon put Maximilian on a throne in Mexico, then we are welcome to the consolations of our "doctrine"; and the London Times, which, in 1862, thanked Louis Napoleon for doing a great political service in "extinguishing the Monroe doctrine" will overflow with gratitude to Melo and the unrevealed backers of his enterprise.

This might cause us some natural chagrin, but as we have more than once given our South American sisters a friendly warning that the United States was not to be looked on as an ally always to be called on in their civil wars and insurrections it would be hard to suggest, and perhaps still harder to provide, a remedy of our own. The Spanish republics can themselves erect a sure defense against these encroachments and interferences from across the ocean, and it is natural and easy for us to counsel them to set about the work. The cultivation of a firmer and more unselfish patriotism that some of them have yet developed, the love of order, submission to authority, more business and less politics — The Anglo-Saxon civic virtues in short — supplemented by a union of interests among them against any European meddling would more powerfully promote their progress and prosperity than any possible application of our Monroe doctrine.

## 289. «The American Policy», The Times, 26 de dezembro

Para o jornal de Filadélfia não há dúvidas: os europeus, e nomeadamente os ingleses, estão do lado da insurreição. Porém, os Estados Unidos não devem fazer a mesma coisa, apoiando militarmente Peixoto. O governo de Washington quer manter a sua neutralidade, sublinha o diário. São os brasileiros, que têm de decidir sobre a sua política interna. Os Estados Unidos, como prova o exemplo que deram no caso da queda da rainha no Havai, têm de impedir que haja interferências de outras potências que impeçam o executivo brasileiro de agir.

The civil war in Brazil is already at a point where we are able to appreciate the advantages of the American policy of "hands off." While Admiral Melo still professes his adherence to the Republic, his associate, DA GAMA, has

avowed his preference for a restoration of the monarchy. In any case these enterprising naval officers are operating from the outside, with the purpose of imposing upon Brazil a government of their own selection, and the sympathy of some of the European powers, and especially of the English, with their plans is scarcely disguised.

Now the interest of the United States in Brazil is that the Brazilians shall be free from outside interference of every king and allowed to settle their own affairs in their own way. Whatever the merits or demerits of Peixoto, he represents a government established by the consent of the majority of the people, and apparently commanding their general allegiance and support, with the recognition of our own and other governments. It is none of our business to help Peixoto, but it is our business to insist that no foreign power shall do anything to hinder or embarrass him in his task of building up a stable government that shall guarantee security and peace.

We should not have been able to do this had we allowed our own diplomatic record to remain clouded by the same sort of interference in Hawaii that we object in Brazil. Whether the government of the committee of safety was better or worse that of the "profligate Queen" is no concerns of ours. The Queen represented the lawfully established government, to which we had engaged ourselves by treaties and under which all our legitimate interests in Hawaii were abundantly protected. With her personal character we have no more to do than we have with the personal character of PEIXOTO. If the Hawaiians choose to acquiesce in her overthrow, that is their affair; for us to

assist in her overthrow, by superior military force, was simply to give our permission to the English, the French, the Portuguese or anybody else having real or supposed interests in Brazil, to render aid and comfort to Melo and DA Gama and the grandson of the late Emperor.

Happily, the present administration has had a foresight to disavow this officious intermeddling and it has done this so distinctly that every European government, as well as every government in South America, understands exactly the attitude of the United States and may be looked to to respect it. The English commercial interests at Rio are almost as influential as the American interests at Honolulu, but they will understand that they must keep out of the fight. There will be no foreign interference in Brazil, because the United States will enforce the policy of "hands of".

## **290**. «Christmas in Brazil», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 26 de dezembro

Mesmo no dia de Natal, as duas partes em conflito não ficaram paradas, nota o jornal que avalia os pontos fortes e fracos dos couraçados por um lado, e, por outro lado, dos cruzadores a dinamite, mais rápidos, mas, ao mesmo tempo, mais frágeis.

O jornalista, que, como quase todos os seus colegas, está impaciente para que ocorra o confronto decisivo, considera que se «a dinamite ganhar» vai tornar «inúteis todos os couraçados do mundo», sendo, desse modo, uma «grande pacificadora».

It is to be feared that the day of peace, goodwill toward men was not becomingly observed in Brazil yesterday. Rio was under blockade and bombardment, and war had possession of the situation at most Brazilian ports. All day Sunday the government dynamite cruisers, the *America* and *Niteroi*, were coaling and arming for the final fray with the insurgent fleet. The insurgent battleships, *Aquidaban* and *Republica*, spent the Sunday and Christmas eve in steaming for Pernambuco, where the dynamite cruisers lay. It is possible that Christmas was celebrated in Brazil by a meeting between the insurgent ironclads and the celebrated dynamite greyhounds. Both sides were eager and ready for the fray and, armed with the most deadly missiles of which man has been able to conceive, were steaming each in the other's direction.

The Aquidaban and Republica, the insurgent battleships, are two of the most formidable ironclads afloat. They are typical representatives of the heavily armed and heavily armored modern ironclads. Although cumbersome and more or less unwieldy, they are powerful engine of destruction and would be formidable affairs to meet for any vessel which was not swift enough of foot to escape, or possessed of a still more destructive armament. The dynamite vessels are equipped with a view to superiority in both of these particulars, being of remarkable speed and agility of movement, and fitted out with guns whose dynamite projectiles are supposed to be fatal to any mark which gets within range. But the dynamite vessels are untried and no one knows whether or not they will fulfill the predictions of their builders. The insurgents, apparently, are convinced that the new-fangled cruisers are fakes and will

prove eggshells for the big guns and rams of the *Republica* and *Aquidaban*. On the other hand, the crews on board the dynamite cruisers seem confident of the prowess and resources of their ingenious and mysterious fighting machines.

If there was a meeting between the two fleets yesterday it is not improbable that one of them does not float the high seas today. If the dynamite guns did the work for which they were devised, the insurgent battleships were bubbles for the great dynamite projectiles of the *Niteroi*. If the big 15-inch bore dynamite gun failed of its mission when in the heat of the engagement and within the comparatively close range required for its heavy charges, there is every probability that the thin side of the light dynamite cruisers were paper to be punctured by the long range rifles of the insurgent ironclads. The engagement, whichever way might go the fortunes of war, is likely to be a fight to a finish.

It is the custom of the Latin races, and indeed of the southern half of the United States, to celebrate Christmas with fireworks. The engines of war in the hands of the Brazilians may have celebrated the day with fireworks enough to represent the entire Brazilian people during yesterday's holyday hours. It is possible, too, that one side put such a quietus on the other that henceforth there will be profound peace, at least temporarily, in Brazil. If dynamite won in the contest, there will be a reign of peace among every European power which depends for power upon gunpowder. The victory of dynamite would render silent and useless most of the ironclad floating fortresses of the earth.

Dynamite might prove to be a great peacemaker, and yesterday may have proved to be the inauguration of dynamite's reign of peace.

# **291.** «The Expected Naval Encountrer in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 27 de dezembro

Muitos jornais falam de uma batalha iminente e até alguns escrevem que o Niterói está a perseguir o Aquidabã e o República perto de Pernambuco, mas nada disso corresponde à verdade, realça o jornalista, na opinião do qual, «as únicas operações navais que estão a decorrer têm a ver com os rebeldes». Com efeito, estes estão a bloquear alguns importantes portos e a bombardear os arredores do Rio.

For some time past the press dispatches have teemed with predictions of an approaching naval battle in Brazil waters. The new Brazilian cruiser *Niteroi*, formerly the *El Cid* or the Morgan line, was reported to be anxiously awaiting the appearance of the insurgent cruisers *Aquidaban* and *Republica*, to give them battle, at the port of Pernambuco, in northern Brazil.

In yesterday's dispatches it was reported that the two rebel cruisers had passed Pernambuco, going north, and that the *Niteroi* had started in pursuit of them, but had afterwards returned to Pernambuco, having failed to find the enemy.

Now all this may make up readable correspondence, but no one can be expected to accept any of the gossip seriously. In the first place, recent advices from South America reported the two rebel cruisers spoken of repairing at

Desterro, many miles south of Rio de Janeiro. In the next place, it is impossible to suppose that any naval officer, much less a Brazilian naval officer such as the present captain of the *Niteroi*, would be foolhardy enough to attack two formidable armored ships of war like the *Republica* and the *Aquidaban* with ships temporarily converted into cruiser, like the *Niteroi*, whose only reliance in action would be her bi dynamite gun, the efficacy of which is seriously doubted by many naval men.

It is, therefore, probable that the *Niteroi* will remain quietly in Pernambuco as long as the rebel cruisers are believed to be in that vicinity. President Peixoto has several much more formidable ships at Montevideo, notably the *Tiradentes* and *Bahia*; but these vessels are apparently unwilling to venture out of the neutral foreign ports as long as there is danger of a possible encounter with the rebel cruisers.

The only active naval operations now in progress are on the side of the rebels. Their ships patrol the coast of Brazil, blockading some of the leading ports and keeping up an incessant fire on the suburbs of Rio. The only ships possessed by President Peixoto remain safe in neutral ports, or at the far port of Pernambuco, which has so far escaped a visit from the active rebel cruisers. Unless, therefore, Admiral Melo is willing to send a few of his vessels to attack Pernambuco, there is little likelihood of an exciting naval fight in the near future.

## **292**. «Begins to Look Warm», *The Times Democrats*, 28 de dezembro

O editorialista nova-iorquino, que se interroga sobre o paradeiro do comandante da rebelião, começa por afirmar que as notícias vindas de Pernambuco são muitas vezes falsas, mas, todavia, parece acreditar num iminente confronto, perto dessa cidade, entre os dois couraçados de Custódio de Melo e o cruzador Niterói. A última frase do artigo ilustra esta aparente contradição do diário norte-americano : «Mas estamos na véspera de uma interessante batalha naval a não ser que as últimas notícias sejam uma pura mentira».

The news which we publish today from Brazil in referenced to the movement of the hostile fleets has more of the ring of business about it than anything which we have yet had from the seat of "war". It is perhaps ought to be noted, however, that the news came from Pernambuco; and that the news which has hitherto come from that city has been far oftener false than true. It occupies, in this matter of erroneous dispatches, about the same position among South American cities as Constantinople among the cities of Europe.

But he news, in spite of its Pernambuco origin, had a distinct air of vraisemblance about it. It looked lively at least.

The supposition has been, until now, that Admiral Mello would "lay" for the Brazilian fleet from New York at a short distance north of Rio, at Ilha Grande or its vicinity, although there has always been a good deal of mystery about his movements since he emerged from Rio harbor. A week or ten days ago, when he disappeared from Ilha Grande, it was announced with positiveness that he had gone south, and that his immediate objective point was Santos, the revenues of which flourishing city he intended, as he needed, to collect. And it was pretty generally accepted as a fact that, for some reason or other, he had sailed south, leaving to Peixoto's fleet an unopposed entrance into Rio harbor.

But the narrative which comes today that he had not taken a southerly direction with his two crack men-of-war, the *Aquidaban* and the *Republic*, but on the contrary that he had sailed due north, as if to meet and join issue with the *Niteroi* at or near Pernambuco, in the extreme northeast of Brazil, has not only a more likely, it has a much more healthy appearance about it. Had Melo sneaked south with his fleet, he would have been set down as afraid to meet the *Niteroi*, and in fact as showing the white feather, and his chances of ultimate success would have sunk to zero. Now, if the Pernambuco narrative be true, he is not only not skulking away, he has run close to the enemy's lines and is courting a trial of strength.

If, therefore, Melo be at Bahia, as the dispatch from Pernambuco says he is, and if the *Niteroi* should start from Pernambuco to attack him there, then we to hear of some lively work in a day or two. It should be a duel to the death when the fighting does occur. For, as *The Times-Democrat* has pointed out before, the *Niteroi*, with her terrible dynamite gun, will either blow Melo and his two men-of-war out of the water, or she herself will suffer certain destruction.

If she could get within a mile range of Melo's vessels the chances are that she make an of them both. But it is somewhat questionable, we thing, whether she will ever get near enough to the *Aquidaban* and the *República* to make one of her dynamite projectiles reach them. For their heavy guns have an easy three or four miles range; and then it has to be remembered that she is neither armored nor even protected, and a stray shot from one of Melo's big gun would pierce her as if she were an eggshell.

But we are on the eve of an interesting sea fight unless the latest news be a mere Pernambuco yarn.

## 293. «America for Americans», The Pittsburg Post, 28 de dezembro

É preciso «uma forte concentração de navios americanos nas águas brasileiras», exige o jornal da Pensilvânia, segundo o qual os Estados Unidos têm de estar preparados no caso de uma ingerência militar das potências europeias em favor do restabelecimento de «manequins coroados» na América do Sul.

There promises to be a large concentration of American war vessels in Brazilian waters, and mainly in the harbor of Rio Janeiro, within a few weeks. The new battleship *New York* has been ordered there, and the American Admiral will soon have at his disposal a larger fleet that any of the European powers. There is some talk of President Cleveland's jingoism in Brazilian matters, but we think it can be very easily explained in the light of the traditional policy of our government.

The naval revolt of Admiral Melo in Brazil against the constitutional republic of Peixoto, there is little doubt, has for its purpose the reestablishment of the imperial dynasty of Dom Pedro on the throne of Brazil by proclaiming his daughter or son-in-law chief of state. If the Brazilians choose to regulate their government in this was the United States will have nothing to say. It might be the best thing for Brazil, especially if a ruler was obtainable of the good sense and moderation of the late emperor. But certain European powers are said to be interested in the re-establishment of the empire, and are prepared to throw their influence, and possibly their military and naval power, in that direction. The house of Braganza, of which Dom Pedro's family is part, is noted for its close relations with the royal families of the continent.

Unless the Monroe doctrine is a meaning less preamble, with no effect beyond a Fourth July oration, the interference of any European powers to reestablish the imperial family on the throne of Brazil would be ample cause for the prompt intervention of the United States. It would be our duty to resist such European intervention and sustain the republican form of government in Brazil, of which President Peixoto is the representative.

We want nothing to do with European system in North or South America. Those that have obtained a foothold are at liberty to remain so long as they keep the peace and behave themselves, but the attempt of any European government to upset existing republics and establish on their ruins imperial or monarchical institutions in sympathy with the crowned manikins of Europe would call for the prompt resistance of the United States. We have no idea such

an attempt will be made, but it is well enough to be prepared for all contingences, and that, we apprehend, is the cause of the concentration of the large naval force in South American waters.

#### **294**. *The Times*, 28 de dezembro

If Brazil and Hawaii keep at it long enough, we may find out what the navy is for – *Chicago Times* 

Some of the reports that come to this country about the war in Brazil do not seem to have even a speaking acquaintance with truth. *Baltimore American* 

## **295.** «The Drift of Brazilian Affairs», *The Daily Picayune*, 31 de dezembro

Parece que as coisas começam a mexer-se no Brasil, nota o jornal, que assinala igualmente uma situação menos favorável para os rebeldes, falando mesmo de «uma causa à beira do colapso». Por outro lado, reconhece que Peixoto ainda não conseguiu concentrar «a sua pequena frota no Rio».

Continua-se a ignorar o paradeiro de Custódio de Melo e o Neterói está sempre em Pernambuco: parece ter receio de sair daquele porto, constata o jornal. Pode-se definir esta situação como «calma antes da tempestade», conclui o articulista da Nova Orleães e cada um está-se a preparar ao combate final

The past week has been more devoid of interesting incidents in connection with the Brazilian revolution that any period since the commencement of the struggle. There have, it is true, been rumors of a sanguinary engagement in the interior of the country, but here has been no definite information on the subject.

The times has apparently been spent by both sides in preparing for the final crisis which, it is generally felt, is fast approaching, President Peixoto has built additional batteries on the water front of the city of Rio, and Admiral Gama, who now command the insurgent forces in the bay of Rio during the absence of Admiral Melo, has notified the foreign diplomatic corps that he will open fire on the city should the new batteries fire upon his ships. On their part, the foreign diplomats have notified the insurgent Admiral that forty-eight hours' notice of his intention to open fire must be given.

Thus matters stand in Rio, with the addition that, according to reports, the situation of the rebels is now less favorable, and, unless some prompt blow struck, their cause must soon collapse. On the other hand, President Peixoto has been unable to concentrate his small fleet of warships at Rio. The *Niteroi*, the dynamite cruiser of which so much is expected, is still at Pernambuco, apparently afraid to venture out of that port. The *America*, the other cruiser purchased in New York, is on her way to Brazil, while *Tiradentes* and *Bahia* are inactive in the harbor of Montevideo.

The greatest mystery prevails as to the whereabouts of Admiral Melo, with his powerful cruisers *Aquidaban* and *Republica*. Some accounts state that

he is still at Desterro, while others report that he has sailed northward to intercept the two dynamite cruisers. Still other accounts report that a vast land force of rebels is collecting at Desterro, and that Admiral Melo is prepared to convey a large number of men to Rio by sea, so as to be able to cooperate in a joint land and sea attack upon the Brazilian capital.

Whatever may be the actual position of the various belligerents, it is felt in all quarters that he present inactivity is calm before the storm, and that the crisis is close at hand.

#### **296**. *The Times*, 31 de dezembro

Europe may have standing armies, but none ever stood like Brazil's. They're not making a move at all.

## **297.** «Foreign Affairs» *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 1 de janeiro

Na tradicional síntese do ano que acaba de terminar, não podia faltar um pequeno resumo sobre os acontecimentos em terras brasileiras.

[...] In the American Republics south of us there have been the usual numerous troubles, but the only one of importance was in Brazil, where the rebellion of most of the navy against the military dictatorship of President Peixoto has brought about a civil war of considerable proportions. Thus far there has been no decided gain on either side. Peixoto has made a show of

getting naval reinforcements in this country, but so far they have accomplished nothing. A desultory bombardment of Rio de Janeiro has been kept up for months, but there has been little damage done except to commerce. With the characteristic lassitude of South American generals, the war has been pressed with little vigor on either side and the casualties have been few. The reports of the present state of affairs are conflicting, as most of them are subject to censorship.

#### **298.** San Francisco Chronicle, 2 de janeiro

O projeto de Melo está a falhar, nota com alivio o jornalista, sugerindo ao almirante que saia do Brasil para salvar a vida.

The news from Brazil indicates that the revolutionary cause is growing more and more shaky, and we may look for the flight of Melo at an early day. When he sees failure staring him in the face he will no doubt flee to some country where Peixoto cannot lay hold of him, for if he ever fell into the hands of the Brazilian President his life would not be worth a farthing. Americans as a rule will sympathize with the success of the regularly established Government, because they believe, in spite of protestations to the contrary, that the object of Mello's uprising was to restore the monarchy in Brazil.

## **299**. *The Times Picayune*, 2 de janeiro

Old man Admiral Saldanha da Gama, who is making all the fuss in Brazil, now wants the people to vote on the question of restoring monarchy to the land he has afflicted by firing guns at sea. That is what is the matter with Saldanha.

## **300**. «The Brazilian situation», San Francisco Chronicle, 3 de janeiro

A situação militar continua na mesma, nota o articulista, que define este conflito como «insignificante»: é «como uma tempestade num copo de água». Melo não conseguiu mais consenso e, sublinha o jornal, não é possível triunfar, sem uma grande base de apoio. Por outro lado, a população é indiferente perante este conflito, muito mais político do que militar.

It is not well to assume too hastily that the rebuke to Commodore Stanton by the Secretary of Navy is to be construed as an implied assertion of the Monroe doctrine, or that the nations of Europe so regarded it. Stanton made a grave mistake in recognizing Admiral Melo officially, and the United States Government could do no less than disclaim his action and recall him to answer for his mistake.

In general, judging from the best information that ben be obtained, it may< be said that the insurgents under Melo are making no real headway. They shell a town or a fortress once in a while and obtain seemingly a temporary success, but their cause obtains no new adherents on shore, and the power and influence of President Peixoto is not sensibly weakened. A revolution cannot

succeed unless it be backed up by at least a considerable weight of public sentiment, and that sentiment Melo does not appear to have gained in Brazil.

There might be a brilliant naval engagement, resulting in Melo's favor, which should turn the tide of public opinion, but such a thing is not likely. Peixoto has picked up several ships of war here and there which are quite as well officered and manned as Melo's ships, and in case of a fight Melo certainly would not have things all his own way.

After all, the so-called war is a very insignificant affair, a good deal like a tempest in a teapot. One side is on shore and one on sea, and neither manifests any overpowering desire to come to close quarters. The people of Brazil, outside of the immediate sphere of influence of Peixoto's army and Melo's navy, do not seem specially interested in the outcome. They probably know that though the government be republican in form they will have but little to say in its administration, and therefore are indifferent to the result of a struggle which is largely, if not entirely, political, in a partisan sense.

## **301**. «Probable Fair Play in Brazil», *The Morning Call*, 4 de janeiro

Este artigo põe os pontos nos ii no que diz respeito a eventual intervenção europeia no Brasil. O jornalista escreve, e com razão, que as grandes potências do Velho Continente têm outras prioridades e problemas maiores com que se preocupar.

The probability of European interference in the affairs of Brazil at no time imminent and Gladstone answer in the House of Commons sets rumor at rest as far as England is concerned. Germany comes next to England in her commercial interests, but the likelihood of Germany taking a hand in the row is remote. Portugal has no money, Austria cannot stir in a foreign intrigue requiring a navy, and Italy, although she has more subjects in Brazil than any other European power, has many other things to think about. France would give no thought to a restoration of monarchy. If the grandson of Dom Pedro is to ascend the throne he must to so by his own efforts, aided by family money, but not assisted out of any nation's taxes. The European monarchs have quite enough to do to keep their own position secure. The utmost any of them would attempt would be to secure satisfaction for any unwarrantable outrage committed by the combatants. But it is well that a sufficient American fleet is on guard to see that there is a fair play in the fighting.

## **302.** «Bad Times for Throne Builders», *The Sun* (N. Y.), 4 de janeiro

Saldanha da Gama acaba de publicar um novo manifesto no qual explica que ele não quer restaurar a monarquia no Brasil. O quotidiano não sabe se o almirante é sincero ou oportunista. O que interessa, sublinha o jornal da metrópole americana — que faz um paralelismo com a situação no Havai — é que nenhum povo que destronou um monarca aceita que se volte atrás.

The soundness of public sentiment in Brazil is indicated by the fact that Admiral DA GAMA has come out with a second manifesto, declaring that his first one war never meant in favor of monarchy.

It had been altered, he protests, then printed copies making him say what he never wrote. It represented him as desiring to restore the empire, when all that he sought was to know what sort of republic the people of Brazil wanted. He aimed to tear down the Government of Peixoto, but not to set up a throne in its place.

Whether that explanation is sincere of is trumped up as an afterthought, is of less important than the demonstration that Brazil wants no King or Emperor to rule over her. The tidings from Rio de Janeiro declare that the original manifesto imputed to Admiral da Gama cost the insurgent cause many friends, and greatly injured its prospects of success. Where popular sovereignty has once been set up, the popular will sustains it, and it can be overthrown only by trickery or force.

We have seen, of late, quite as remarkable a change of front in the attempt to restore a discarded Queen in Hawaii. The original zeal of Messrs. CLEVELAND and GRESHAM in that enterprise has perceptibly abated. They too, have had to make an explanation, like Admirals Melo and DA GAMA, and it is that they are not going forward with their plan, because the Queen will not accept their conditions. Compared with that, the statement of the Brazilians, if sincere, is honorable and creditable; but the point to note, here and there, is the

stirring up of public indignation against any project to set up a throne where it has once been cast down.

Years hence, when Hawaii has become a member of this Union, Americans will read with wonder and disgust of the effort to force her back under the yoke of monarchy, and with pride of the outburst of public sentiment which put an end to that project.

#### **303**. *The Pittsburg Post*, 4 de janeiro

According to the news from the seat of the opera bouffe war in Brazil, Peixoto is reduced to the last extremity, and Melo is on the point of surrendering. It is thus plainly of evidence that both will win.

#### **304**. *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 5 de janeiro

Resumo de um artigo do londrino Times, o qual alerta para uma situação financeira catastrófica do Brasil, à beira da bancarrota.

The Rio correspondent of the London *Times* writes very discouragingly of the financial situation of Brazil. The national indebtedness is heavy. He gives figures, but admits they are open to great doubt as to approximate accuracy. The annual deficits are large for several years past, and that for the current year must far exceed the official estimate, as the calculation was made prior to the war. The import trade of the country, on which the government

depends for the greater part of its revenues, has been hampered badly and in some lines absolutely stopped by the hostilities. The export trade has been maintained well, an excellent crop of coffee selling at good prices, but little or no revenue is derived from export duties. The correspondent says the facts warrant the assertion that a complete reorganization of administrative and financial methods is an absolute necessity if the country is to be saved from bankruptcy. He adds that Marshal Peixoto is credited with having illegally issued 125 million milreis, or 25 million dollars, in Treasury bank notes during the last twelve months.

#### **305**. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 5 de janeiro

Pernambuco promises to be the scene of the naval battle in Brazil between the regular Government vessels and the insurgent fleet, in such an engagement ever takes place. It is not probable, however, that Melo will give battle, as he fears the guns of the *Niteroi*. Besides, were he defeated the revolution would collapse, as without the menace of the *Aquidaban's* guns the rebels could not hold any of their positions.

# **306.** «Treatment of Americans in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 6 de janeiro

Desventura de um americano perante as vigarices burocráticas no Rio de Janeiro.

The Rio News of recent date publishes the following as a fair sample of the treatment that American are subjected to in Brazil. An American citizen, resident in Rio, went to the police station for a safe conduct, as he wished to leave the city of a few days. He was first informed that he must secure a requisition and was directed to a man downstairs, presumably a broker. This man merely wrote an application for the safe conduct and signed it, refusing, however, to include all the places in it which the American wished to visit. He then charged \$500 for his service. The gentleman demurred, but was competed to submit to the robbery or give up the trip. His passport was treated with contempt, and with the observation that it was worthless — which seems to be the case. Taking his requisition upstairs he was surprised with a further announcement that it could not be given him until 2 p.m., or four hours later. At 2 p.m. he was compelled to wait half an hour more, and then he received a printed form containing seven or eight written words, and authorizing him to visit but one of the places mentioned by him to the broker.

## 307. «The Troubles in Brazil», The Daily Picayune, 7 de janeiro

O jornal da Luisiana relata um incidente entre os rebeldes e navios de comércio americanos que necessitou a intervenção do capitão Picking. Satisfeito com a reação do comandante dos navios americanos no porto do Rio, o editorialista propõe dar aos rebeldes o estatuto de beligerantes. Isso, na sua opinião, permitiria aos dois rivais resolverem o conflito com mais

rapidez, facilitando, dessa forma, uma retoma da atividade comercial, muito afetada pelo conflito entre Peixoto e Melo.

The Picayune published yesterday morning a report from Washington to the effect that the insurgent vessels operating in Rio harbor had had a clash with the American warships stationed there to protect American interests. It appears that the insurgent Admiral, Da Gama, had forbidden the loading of certain cargoes being transported by lighters in the harbor, and used force to stop the work. Captain Picking, the senior officer at Rio, finding that a protest did not avail, displayed then American flag on the lighters and defied the insurgents to interfere further. This courageous course on the part of the American commander put an end to the trouble, although it has left the situation somewhat strained as between the American warships and the insurgent vessels.

There can be no question but that prompt action of Captain Picking was the proper course under the circumstances. The United States Government having refused to recognize the insurgents as belligerents, it cannot for a moment be admitted that their ships have the right to interfere with foreign trade, or prevent American vessels from loading cargoes in Brazilian ports.

As to the wisdom of refusing to recognize the insurgents as belligerents there may be some questions. They are to all intents and purposes belligerents, having control of several of the States of Brazil, possessing a provisional government and almost complete control of the naval resources of the country.

It has only been possible to keep up foreign commerce by the actual intervention of foreign warships, a very unsatisfactory process at best. Ships, fearful of delays, are avoiding Brazilian ports, and trade there is practically stagnant.

It might be much better to accord belligerent rights at once, and permit the opposing factions in Brazil to fight the matter out as speedily as possible, without outside intervention of any kind. It that ways the war would likely be brought to a close much earlier, and trade be permitted to resume its normal condition that much sooner.

#### **308.** The Philadelphia Inquirer, 7 de janeiro

Both sides appeared to be on the top in Brazil yesterday, but the interference is that they are both engaged in their usual occupation of firing a shot and running off to watch the effect.

#### **309.** «The Trouble in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 10 de janeiro

Aparentemente, nada de novo no porto do Rio de Janeiro, mas dos dois lados está-se a preparar o confronto final.

The reports from the seat of war in Brazil have lacked interest recently, no events of stirring character having apparently occurred. Admiral da Gama still remains in command of the rebel ships in Rio harbor, and apparently no

important advantage has been gained on either side at that point. The whereabouts of Admiral Melo remains somewhat a mystery, although it is generally believed that his powerful ships, the *Republica* and *Aquidaban*, are refitting with a view of being in trim to meet President Peixoto's fleet, which now apparently has orders to rendezvous at Montevideo.

The cruisers bought by President Peixoto in New York, namely the *Niteroi* and *America*, are still at Pernambuco; but it is reported that they are preparing to proceed south. The Brazililiab Government has two cruisers and two converted merchant-men in Montevideo, and it is also reported that the cruisers *Riachuelo* and *Benjamin Constant* now repairing in Europe, have been ordered to sail for Brazil as speedily as possible.

Recently the revolutionists have met with a number of successes in Rio Grande do Sul, and it is generally believed that the leaders are preparing a considerable land force for a campaign against Rio de Janeiro. This movement is given frequently as the cause of Admiral Melo's long absence from the Brazilian capital and the secrecy now envelops his movements.

From all indications it is now apparent that a crisis in the affairs of Brazil is near at hand. Both sides are evidently preparing to strike a decisive blow, and on the outcome of this effort will likely depend the success or failure of the revolution.

# **310.** «Plotters to restore Empire», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 10 de janeiro

Depois de ter citado um editorial de um jornal conservador inglês, no qual se acusa os Estados Unidos de querer intervir para «prevenir a restauração da monarquia» no Brasil, o jornal de Boston reitera os princípios da doutrina Monroe afirmando que os americanos tudo farão para «defender as instituições republicanas» no seu continente.

Judging from some of the remarks in which the European press have seen fit to indulge regarding Brazilian affairs the danger of a plot to force an empire upon the people of Brazil is something more that a figment of imagination.

The Dec 23 number of *England and the Union*, an organ of the British conservative party, contains the following editorial:

The United States government has sent a powerful cruiser, the *San Francisco* (4080 tons) to join the *Charleston* (4040 tons), the *Newark* (4080 tons), and the *Detroit* (2000 tons), which are already at Rio. It is said the United States government is prepared to intervene to prevent the restoration of the monarchy. This would be a scandalous interference with the independence of Brazil and the right of peoples to settle their own destinies.

In view of such action, it is certainly the duty of the British government to increase the British squadron at Rio, which is at present very weak. It consists of on second-class cruiser, the *Sirius*, of 3600 tons, and two sloops, the *Beagle* (1170 tons) and the *Racer* (970 tons). Every decent and honest citizen in Brazil longs for the restoration of the empire.

Tory champions of monarchial or imperial rule may as well make up their minds now as later that the Monroe doctrine means something. If it is ever menaced by England or any other power the people of this republic will rally as one man to the defense of republican institutions of this continent, and pledge every resource at their command to the support of the glorious cause of liberty.

#### Pequena nota no mesmo jornal:

Both sides in Brazil are again victorious and both are again defeated, as usual.

## **311**. «The Embargo on Brazilian Trade», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 11 de janeiro

Um grande importador de café de Nova Iorque, que trata Melo de pirata e de traidor, queixa-se do bloqueio nos portos brasileiros. Se isso tivesse acontecido na Europa, afirma este comerciante, as grandes potências teriam já agido para acabar com a revolta. No entanto, o jornal apoia a política de não intervenção nos assuntos internos do Brasil

One of the largest coffee importers of New York, whose business has brought him into intimate personal contact with men and things in Brazil, calls Melo, the insurgent leader, a pirate, a traitor and other hard names. He declares that the rebel magnate is disturbing the commerce of the world, and ought to be taken care of by the great powers.

Suppose the theater of action transferred from Brazil to some Mediterranean country, and that some disaffected Melo from Spain or Portugal was bombarding a European port with which every other country was trading. How long, this merchant might well ask, would such disturbance of trade last before the six great powers of Europe would put a quick and decisive stop to it?

It is no wonder that the great coffee merchants and others who import from Rio are getting very tired of this endless blocking of trade. Who can blame them?

Nevertheless, since there are warm champions as well as eager decriers of Melo, it obvious that the policy of non-interference in Brazil's political affairs — save only to defeat monarchical intrigue or to protect the rights of American residents — has great and manifold advantages. Everybody will hope that the contest will speedily be settled in one way or the other, and that trade and commerce, as well as peace and prosperity, may soon be established anew in the republic of Brazil.

# **312.** «Peixoto and his Balloon», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 11 de janeiro

Pequeno artigo que fala do balão que Peixoto pensa usara para largar bombas sobre a frota rebelde e do possível desembarque das tropas de Melo.

Vice President Peixoto of Brazil has not resigned. Instead of preparing to retire he is preparing to send up a balloon loaded with dynamite bombs, which he intends to drop upon the rebel fleet. His balloon has a ruder and he may be able to steer it more successfully that he has steered his government. The

fighting is going on a little more hotly than for some weeks. The siege of Bagé is still in progress and the rebels are receiving supplies of ammunition. Admiral Melo has returned to the Rio harbor and proposes to attack the city by land and by sea. The latest cable dispatch announces that important events are expected soon. Those who sympathize with the insurgents should not become impatient. A government cannot often be overthrown in a day. Four months is not too much of a nation as large as Brazil and it is not longer that that since the navy rebelled.

### **313.** «The Troubles in Latina-America», *The Daily Picayune*, 11 de janeiro

Dois parágrafos dedicados ao Brasil, num artigo que se debruça sobretudo sobre a crise no Honduras.

[...]

The news from Brazil is still indefinite, although rumors have been reported to the effect that Admiral Melo has again appeared at Rio and has captured some of the islands held by the Government. It is also rumored that he is preparing for the landing of a large force of men at Niteroi preparatory to a land attack upon the city of Rio itself.

These rumors from Brazil lack confirmation as yet, but there is no great improbability about them, as it has been known for some time that both the contending factions have been actively preparing for a final effort.

#### **314.** St. Paul Daily Globe, 11 de janeiro

O jornal do Minnesota acredita sem hesitar na notícia da demissão de Peixoto e pensa que isso pode provocar o fim das hostilidades.

A rumor is current that President Peixoto, of Brazil, has resigned. His incumbency of the office was the only ostensible ground of the rebellion so long in progress in the republic, and, this cause of complaint being removed, we may look for a speedy cessation of hostilities unless some other motive underlies the action of the rebels

#### **315**. *The Morning Call*, 12 de janeiro

O jornal californiano não parece nada convencido da eficácia do balão que Peixoto quer utilizar para bombardear com dinamite os navios rebeldes.

The President of Brazil is said to have a war balloon ready to plump dynamite down on the decks of de Melo's ships. The new engine of war is partly dirigible. If it can be guided off the wind a few points of the compass deadly execution by more than luck is possible, but under the most favorable circumstances de Melo would not be at the mercy of the balloon. With steam up he could easily move out of its way by cutting across the direction of the wind. But he might be caught napping at night, and in that event his nap might know no awaking. A balloon which could let fall on a vessel 100 or 200 pounds of dynamite might not sink her, but the explosion would pay terrible havoc with

the decks, the guns and the engines. True aim could easily be taken by a rope swung over the side of the car, provided the height and the travelling rate are well calculated. Probably de Melo will not be scared out of his wits when he sees a balloon sail aloft.

## **316**. «Republicanism in Brazil», *The Sioux-City Journal*, 13 de janeiro

O jornal do Utah, que sublinha a importância para os Estados Unidos do Brasil ter proclamado a república, fica preocupado com as crises que o país tem vivido desde 1889 e interroga-se sobre as possibilidades de um regresso ao poder. da família Braganca.

A resposta baseia-se sobretudo nas declarações do ministro brasileiro em Washington: o regime republicano vai ser defendido e não vai ser derrubado. No entanto, o problema, na opinião do articulista, é que há pouco espírito republicano no país, como o prova o papel demasiado importante tido pelos militares em detrimento dos civis.

The people of the United States have always taken a sentimental if not an active interest in the spread of the republican form of government. Themselves having instituted the first modern republics, at least in their present form, the have seen the experiment prove a success in their own case and have watched the limitation of it grow until every independent country on the new continent has adopted it and it has effected a seemingly permanent lodgment on the old. Not only has there been this direct copying, but they have seen the principles of representative and popular government modify the old

monarchies until there is not a civilized country in the world, except Russia, which is not governed by the consent of the governed and according to their wishes. The shell and framework of European nations may be one of monarchy and privileges, but the substance is republican. It has been a source of gratification for Americans to behold this process. It has been soothing to their pride and in accordance with that large spirit which, when you have a good thing, leads to the wish that others may share it. Therefore, it was pleasing to the United States a few years ago when the people of Brazil concluded that they could go it alone and invited their aged emperor to go back to Portugal. It was the banishment of the last lingering remnant of monarchy from the new world which Columbus gave to mankind and the United States sent its most cordial congratulations. Because of this sentimental interest in the growth of republicanism the people of this, the oldest of republics, has read with sorrow the troubles which have come upon its new sister, and the question has often been asked whether it forebodes the re-establishment of a monarchy. Salvador de Mendonça, the Brazilian minister to the United States, in the North American Review, attempts to give an answer to this question. His words are of good cheer. He boldly asserts that even if Brazilian republic was as bad as its worst enemies have painted it, it would still be preferable to any monarchy which could be set up on its ruins. He declares that no restoration is now possible in Brazil. "The efforts to effect it would undoubtedly excite a civil war whose bitterness would be intense and duration indefinite, but whose result no republican can doubt." While it is altogether improbable that the minister from Brazil, no matter what his private opinions may be, would refuse publicity to

admit that the government whose credential he holds is ephemeral, and this detracts in a measure from the weight of this positiveness, yet from other information it appears that he is right. Early in the present civil war manifestoes were issued by the insurrectionists hinting at a restoration of the family of Dom Pedro, but they were coldly received. The revolting admiral was compelled to disavow them and publicly to assure the Brazilian people that no such move was intended. Since then Admiral Melo's chief lieutenant, Admiral Gama, has made declarations in the same tenor, and it seems, no matter which side triumphs, that the republic will endure. Indeed, the trouble with Brazil seems not too much republicanism, but too little of it, as is implied in the undue aggrandizement of the military at the expense of the civil power. This is in keeping with the spirit of a monarchy, but not with that of a republic. It is contrary to its essence ad abhorrent to the principles from which it proceeds. But, as it stated by Sig. Mendonça, the republic "will be defended at all hazards, leaving whatever defects they may have to be remedied by wisdom after the safety of these institutions has been assured," there is abundant ground for hope for the future of Brazil.

#### **317**. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 13 de janeiro

If Peixoto resigns why shouldn't Melo follow suit and let Brazil elect as president a better man that either?

### **318**. *The Sun* (N.Y.), 14 de janeiro

In reply to a question in the House of Commons about the policy of the British Government toward Brazil, the Parliamentary Secretary of the Foreign Office said that her Majesty's Minister at Rio would not take any step which could be regarded as an infringement upon the principle of neutrality. This is satisfactory to us. At one time, soon after the war broke out in Brazil, the British Minister at Rio took several steps which deviated from the straight line of neutrality.

#### **319.** *The Daily Picayune*, 14 de janeiro

The rebels of Brazil make a hit with themselves when they capture towns that make no defense. They shout victory and get square meals.

#### **320**. *The Morning Call*, 15 de janeiro

O jornal não fica surpreendido com as queixas dos americanos que fazem parte da tripulação do Niterói. Que esta má experiencia sirva de lição para eles e para os que queiram embarcar nesta aventura.

It need not excite surprise in any special degree that the American who formed a portion of the crew of eh Brazilian cruiser *Niteroi* are in a very dissatisfied state at their treatment. This is not the first time that Brazil has

been prolific of promises and has left those to whom they were made in the lurch. The men should have looked well ahead in regard to their pay and other equivalents of service. When engaged by the Brazilian Government was in such desperate straits that it would almost have promised a province for a few good resolute men such as abound in America. It the men depend upon litigation to settle their grievances they are trusting to a broken reed. They have, at least, the comfort of being free from any more adventures, and their treatment may operate as a warning to others not to interfere. There are still a large number of American on board the *Niteroi*, and Lieutenant Conway says that if the vessel does down in action it will be with colors flying.

#### **321.** *The Daily Picayune,* 15 de janeiro

The da Gama and Melo combination, playing around Brazil, might have known they could not establish a monarchy there. There are too many ambitious men about wanting to hold office to allow any hereditary imbecile to come in and fix himself for file after the people have had a taste of liberty and the art of voting.

#### **322.** «The Brazilian Revolution», *The Daily Picayune*, 16 de janeiro

Parece que os rebeldes estão a perder força e terreno, escreve o jornal que, porém, está consciente da pouca fiabilidade das informações recebidas. O que é certo, acrescenta o editorialista, é que o conflito dura há muitas

semanas e isso está a esgotar os combatentes dos dois lados. Por conseguinte, prevê o diário de Luisiana, vai acontecer alguma coisa a breve prazo: com efeito, quer Peixoto, quer da Gama querem lançar um ataque decisivo para pôr um ponto final neste luta fratricida.

The reports which have been received from the scene of the troubles in Brazil during the past few days have been anything but favorable to the revolutionists. Unfortunately the information which has reached the outside world as to the progress of affairs in Brazil since the revolution stated has been so utterly unreliable that it would be imprudent to conclude that the cause of the revolutionists is now hopeless because the reports have within a few days been unfavorable.

It is stated that the rebel ships still in the harbor of Rio have become weakened in number of men they have available for service, that they are shirt of supplies, and theirs crews are disheartened by the non-arrival of reenforcements from the State of Santa Catarina. President Peixoto is reported to have gradually extended his lines of fortifications and mounted a number of heavy guns.

In the State of Rio Grande do Sul the rebels have, according to recent accounts, lost ground, but it is remarkable that all the reports lack detail. It is also stated that Admiral Custodio de Melo is sick aboard of the *Republica* at Desterro, and that his unavoidable absence from the scene of active operations has had a disheartening effect upon the revolutionists.

Whether the reports received are true or not, there is little doubt that the long drown-out contest is gradually straining the resources of the revolutionists as well as those of the Government, so that sheer necessity will be likely to soon force a final and decisive attempt to terminate the struggle. Whether the rebels will make an attack upon Rio in force, or whether the Government seeks to assail the rebel fleet with the vessels being assembled at Pernambuco, remains to be seen, but that something will soon be done one way or the other is practically certain.

#### **323.** The Sioux-City Journal, 16 de janeiro

The contest in Brazil resembles nothing so much as a fight between a whale and an elephant. Mello cannot get at Peixoto nor Peixoto get at Melo.

[...]

The insurgents of Brazil are said to be losing hope. They have not yet lost their lives.

### **324**. *The Morning Call*, 17 de janeiro

O jornal duvida que os rebeldes tenham perpetrados um massacre e deseja que esta «querra miserável» acabe.

The war in Brazil is becoming active, if the telegrams are reliable, but that is hardly to be expected. One particularly horrible report should not be accepted without confirmation. It is that after a skirmish in which they were successful the rebels butchered their prisoners. Warfare is grim enough, but it is supposed to be civilized and merciful when the vanquished are captured. De Melo has got to work again in Rio harbor, but nothing decisive has been accomplished by either side. When will the miserable war be over? Only the foreigner seems to be impressed with the fact that it is ruinous to the country.

#### **325.** The Boston Daily Globe, 17 de janeiro

Dom Pedro's grandson is said to be in Brazil, conducting a still hunt for his grandfather's throne. This is not a good year for royalty.

#### 326. «The Brazilian Skirmish», The Daily Picayune, 20 de janeiro

Afinal, e contrariamente ao que afirmam as notícias vindas do Governo brasileiro, os rebeldes não estão prestes a capitular, sublinha o quotidiano da nova Orleães, muito crítico em relação aos despachos recebidos do Brasil. Dá como exemplo, o paradeiro de Custódio de Melo que devia estar em seis lugares ao mesmo tempo!

Entretanto, a guerra civil continua longe do fim provocando sérios prejuízos ao comércio externo.

The Brazilian revolutionists who, according to accounts from Government sources in Rio de Janeiro, received some days ago, were in an exceedingly bad way, and on the point of going to pieces, have suddenly demonstrated that they are still far from suppressed. Within a couple of days they have captured a Government stronghold, repulsed a vigorous attack upon one of their own posts with heavy losses to the troops of Peixoto, captured an important place in Rio Grande do Sul, succeeded in getting re-enforcements and supplies of arms and ammunition into Rio harbor, and are making things in general decidedly unpleasant for the loyalist.

Admiral Melo, the insurgent commander, has apparently assumed the character of a veritable "Will o' the Wisp». The greatest uncertainty exists as to his whereabouts. The daily dispatches report him in half a dozen different places, thousands of miles apart, at the same time. Thus, one day this week, he was reported in Rio harbor, at Desterro, at a point off the coast of Rio Grande do Sul, on his ways from Santa Catarina to Rio, and, lastly sick on board the *Republica* at some undetermined point on the coast.

It is evident from all this that information as to the actual condition of things in Brazil is hard to obtain, and, therefore, decidedly unreliable. Moreover, all the cable telegrams which reach the outside world contain only such matter as is satisfactory to the Brazilian Government. It is evident, however, that the rebels are by no means at the end of their resources, and aside from the sinking of the monitor *Javari*, which event is now known to have been accidental, the rebels have met with no serious reverses.

An enormous amount of powder and shot has apparently been wasted in this revolution with but small results. More men are ordinarily killed in a trifling skirmish in veritable wars that have been killed during the entire progress of the revolution in Brazil, and unless one side or the other resorts to more energetic and deadly measures, the civil strife stands a good chance of continuing indefinitely. In the meantime, however, foreign trade interests are suffering seriously.

#### **327.** «Arbitration in Brazil», *The Washington Post*, 20 de janeiro

Todo o editorial debruça-se sobre uma eventual possibilidade de chegar a um compromisso e pôr um ponto final nesta luta entre o fraco Peixoto e o almirante Melo, que, por motivos sentimentais, não pode destruir a sua cidade e matar os seus concidadãos. O articulista, que trata o chefe de Estado de «imbecil» e Melo de «filantropo», não exclui que esta «guerra ilusória» continue ainda por muito tempo.

It is easy to believe that the combatants in Brazil are thoroughly tired of the war and would be glad to have done with it. The fact is that we have been convinced of the truth of this, so far as concerns the *de facto* government, ever since

Mr. Peixoto began to explain himself to the *New York Herald*. We are not so positive as to Melo, but, as we say, can easily believe that he, too, has had enough of war for the present.

Upon the whole, it has not been a very impressive conflict, certainly not on the part of the government. Mr. Peixoto has been cooped up in Rio Janeiro, powerless to do anything except to shoot a few suspects now and then, and occasionally report to the *Herald* that he was on the point of crushing the rebellion. On his part, Melo, while physically able at any time to destroy the city and drive Peixoto out, has been restrained by moral considerations which he found equally powerful. He could not commit the barbarity of shelling Rio and slaughtering his own countrymen. Thus Peixoto, incapable trough weakness, and Melo, disarmed by sentiment, have waged this Bermecide war for long months, achieving small advantages one day and encountering petty set-backs the next, until not only they but he whole world may well be weary of it.

We have by no means of knowing how much truth there may be in the press reports of Friday morning, which tell us that the government and the insurgent leaders have agreed to invoke arbitration as a means of settling their dispute. We hear from Rio direct only that which the government whishes us to hear, and have found on several occasions in the past that alleged information from that point did not by any means enjoy the sanction and concurrence of Admiral Melo. It is altogether probable, however, that Mr. Peixoto is something more than willing to change the war into a debate, notwithstanding the fact that he assured us only three days ago that the rebellion was on its last legs and that he was about to administer the coup de grace. Mr. Peixoto seems to be much more competent as a writer for the newspapers than as a crusher of armed forces. It is therefore highly probable that the press report from Rio

accurately reflects his personal whishes in the matter and that if Melo can be induced to agree to the arrangement the war will shortly cease and the controversy be referred to the peaceful tribunal of arbitration.

Meanwhile, and pending an authentic statement from the admiral, it will no doubt occur to all intelligent and humane persons to hope that the revolutionary leaders will assent to the enlightened solution that has been suggested. Of course, nobody will believe that Mr. Peixoto would have proposed it if he had the very smallest reason to think that he could prevail by force. That gentleman has not impressed himself upon the generation as a lover of his adversaries and an advocate of purely intellectual methods in politics. Still, it may be the best way out of it. The same scruples that have kept Melo from using his strength against the city of Rio will be just as potent two months hence as they are today, and so, what with Peixoto's imbecility and Melo's philanthropy, the war may go on forever.

#### **328.** The Boston Daily Globe, 20 de janeiro

The war in Brazil has not been fought according to the latest modern methods, but it is settled by arbitration as it is now proposed, it will furnish an example for all modern nations to copy.

#### **329.** St. Paul Daily Globe, 21 de janeiro

There is an excellent prospect that the difficulties in Brazil will soon be settled by a resort to arbitration. Both parties are anxious for a termination of the present state of war, and are reported to have agreed to submit their dispute to an international court, of which President Cleveland is to be a member. This is, no doubt, the best plan yet suggested for a solution of the difficulties.

#### **330**. *New York Tribune*, 24 de janeiro

Prudente, o diário espera pela confirmação desta proposta de mediação.

It is an interesting report which comes from Rio Janeiro that peace is about to be proclaimed in Brazil, as President Peixoto and Admiral da Gama have consented to submit all matters in dispute to the arbitration of the United States. The rumor cannot be accepted, however, until positive confirmation is received. One of the objects of the Pan-American Conference, four years ago, was to secure the settlement of all international disputes on this hemisphere by arbitration. It will be a step in advance of what was hoped by the promoters of that Conference if a prolonged civil war is finally ended in the same manner. Of course, the United States will gladly do all in its power to bring about such result.

#### **331.** *The Morning Call*, 24 de janeiro

Comentário demasiado otimista sobre uma possível negociação para acabar com esta «guerra sem finalidade», que prejudica os países que têm relações comerciais com a América do Sul.

The combatants in Brazil are tired of fighting, but there are scarcely more tired of the miserable purposeless war that the countries which have commercial relations with South America. It is said that both sides show an inclination to get the United Stated to act as arbitrator. If both sides are in earnest about it, this country would probably cordially undertake the task of smoothing down the ruffled front of war. An amnesty would be requisite, and a fresh election would settle the political differences.

# **332.** «How to Settle the Trouble», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 25 de janeiro

Duríssima crítica aos correspondentes na América do Sul que enviam despachos totalmente contraditórios. Por conseguinte, torna-se impossível saber o que se passa realmente no Brasil.

If the press agents of the South American fight desired to keep interest in the battle alive, they could not have succeeded better. But they are in danger of overdoing the matter. The power of the human mind to endure suspense is limited, and when the limit is reached it becomes unable to concentrate its attention longer upon the undecided subject. The press agent of the Florida fight has understood low to prevent the sporting public from forgetting Mitchell<sup>25</sup> or Corbett<sup>26</sup>. He began at the right time, and will continue his operations until there is no longer any use for him. The contradictory reports from Brazil are of the kind to make us wonder what is happening there. It was said that the trouble between Vice President Peixoto and his navy would be settled by arbitration and that the Admiral Benham<sup>27</sup> would be the arbitrator. Then we were told that Admiral Benham would not act and that the fight will continue. On one day Peixoto is near victory and is just about to extinguish the insurrection. The next day Admiral da Gama is winning victories and Peixoto is about to resign. The latest reports is that da Gama is shirt of provisions and that he can not hold out many days longer, and that Peixoto has ordered his fleet to sail from Pernambuco to sink the rebellious ships in the harbor to Rio de Janeiro.

A few New York policemen and a half a dozen *Eagle* reporters could settle the trouble in a short time. The row is not much more serious that an election riot. It is certainly no worse that the Gravesend battles on election day, no worse in the spirit which has caused it. Whether the provoker of the trouble is Peixoto or the navy the guilty man would soon be arrested by the police and

<sup>25</sup> Charles Mitchell (1861-1918) foi um pugilista inglês que perdeu contra Corbett em 1894.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> James John Corbett (1866-1933) foi um pugilista americano, campeão mundial dos pesos pesados entre 1892 e 1897.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Andrew E.K. Benham (1832-1905) comandava na altura os três cruzadores americanos no porto do Rio de Janeiro.

the *Eagle* reporters would tell the public all about it with their accustomed skill. Their dispatches would be graphic and accurate and the suspense which is rapidly becoming burdensome would cease.

# **333.** «Arbitration of the Brazilian Difficulties», *The Daily Picayune*, 25 de janeiro

O jornal é da opinião que uma mediação americana seria muito problemática. Aliás, escreve o diário da Nova Orleães, este tipo de solução nunca funcionou na América Latina. Por conseguinte, neste caso, seria preferível que resolvessem o problema pela via militar.

According to the recent dispatches in the *Picayune* from Brazil, there appears to be a rumor that an effort has been made to arbitrate the troubles existing in that country. One dispatch says that the United States Government is to be appealed to, while still another reports that Admiral da Gama, the insurgent commander at Rio, was recently closeted with Admiral Benham, the commander of the American squadron at the Brazilian capital, the conference being presumably to secure the good offices of the American officer for the purpose of opening negotiations with President Peixoto.

Past history has shown that all attempts to mediate disputes in South American affairs have signally failed, and there is nothing to indicate that the present case will differ from its predecessors. There is, as yet, no definite information to show that the good offices of the United States have been asked, but it may be assumed as certain that the experience this country passed through the Chilean civil war, some years ago, will make our Government cautious about accepting the office of peacemaker.

While a prompt restoration of peace would certainly be beneficial to the people of Brazil, and would be a welcome relief to all interests concerned in the Brazilian trade, it is questionable if such an event could be brought about by mediation on the part of any outside power, more especially the United States. The insurgents have all along suspected Americans of sympathy with Peixoto, and in the event that a decision of a disputed point should be rendered in favor of the President of Brazil, the cry would at once be raised that the insurgents has not been fairly treated. On the whole, therefore, it might be better to permit the contending factions to fight the matter out, as a more lasting peace would probably be brought about in that way.

### **334.** St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 25 de janeiro

The latest news that has come from Brazil is the intimation that the contending factions in that unhappy country are willing to submit their differences to arbitration. Neither side seems strong enough to finish the fight and there is a prospect of a most disastrous and cruel continuation of fraternal strife. Arbitration is the best way out. It would be a blessing to Brazil.

#### **335.** «Brazilian news», San Francisco Chronicle, 26 de janeiro

O diário de San Francisco lamenta a parcialidade das informações recebidas do Brasil e isso deve-se ao facto que se trata de um conflito mais político do que militar. Na opinião do jornal — que verbera o conde de Eu o Presidente Cleveland — tudo podia ser resolvido com uma intervenção das grandes potências. Porém, isso não é desejável, realça o jornal, porque são os brasileiros que têm de resolver os seus problemas.

Any place in the world from which it seems impossible to get any exact and accurate news is Brazil. It would really be an interesting study to parallel the stories that have come from there, it the subject were worth it. One day President Peixoto has everything his own way and Admiral Mello is on his last legs. The next day Admiral Melo appears in the role of a conqueror, and Peixoto, deserted by his army, is fleeing for his life.

About all that can be gathering from these continued contradictory reports is that the war is being prosecuted with nothing resembling vigor, and that the end will come not after a great battle, but when on side or the other has exhausted its money and its credit, and must retire from sheer inability to pay its soldiers or sailors. In the meantime, nobody seems to know what the people of Brazil thing or whether they have taken sides or not. There is more politics than anything else in the Brazilian war, and that is the reason why the news we get is always partisan and distorted.

The count d'Eu, the son-in-law of Dom Pedro, seems to have dropped out of sight of late. He was depicted as being behind Admiral Melo, and as supplying him with money to carry on his campaign, but recently nothing has been said about him. Melo has had money from some source, and it is not unlikely that it came from the Count d'Eu or his European friends and allies, but if so he and they must want a better return on their investment that they have had thus far.

If there were any way for the great powers to intervene the trouble could be settled in a very short time, but there is none. The Brazilian must work out their own political and social problems, and it is none of our business how they do it. The only wonder is that Grover Cleveland has not assumed to arbitrate for them without being asked so to do.

### **336.** The Daily Picayune, 26 de janeiro

If Peixoto and Melo would meet in a prize ring and settle their personal disputes it would be a grand good thing for the suffering people of Brazil, who have had a war thrust upon them for no reason beyond the ambition of a few who would rule or ruin.

## **337**. «Possibility of a Battle», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 27 de janeiro

Atos de crueldades dos dois lados, durante pequenos confrontos.

There seems to be some prospect of a battle between the land forces of the government and the insurgents in Brazil. It will probably be in the neighborhood of Rio de Janeiro, though the dispatch is not very definite upon this point. The rebels have already taken the border of San Juan Bautista<sup>28</sup> with 6,000 troops. The inhabitants fled, so they had an easy victory. Charges of cruelty try have been made against the rebels, but they have not been more inhuman than the government troops.

The latter met a company of eighty-five men on their way to join the General Tavares, who commands the forces at San Juan Bautista, and instead of making prisoners of them, they killed them all. Most of the fighting which has been done thus far has been between small forces, and but little has been accomplished by either side. It looks as if each party was afraid of the other, or as if they were waiting for something to turn up.

#### **338.** «Arbitration vs. War», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 28 de janeiro

Também este diário, à espera de uma confirmação, comenta a notícia de possíveis negociações para chegar ao fim da guerra civil no Rio. Cita alguns exemplos de arbitragem entre nações que conseguiram evitar conflitos, mas está consciente que não se encontram na história casos onde uma intervenção pacificadora externa tenha conseguido pôr termo à uma querra civil.

Porém, não consegue esconder o seu entusiasmo e escreve que «a realização do Contra-Almirante Benham pode constituir o início de uma nova

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Trata-se da Fortaleza São João Baptista.

era — a era da arbitragem e da paz». Isso é fortemente desejável, acrescenta o articulista, tendo em conta que as armas são cada vez mais poderosas, perigosas e muito onerosas para as nações.

The *Tribune's* Associated Press dispatches this morning bring the surprising news that the Brazilian revolution has been brought to a close by arbitration. It is stated — and with such circumstantial detail as to inspire belief that — Rear Admiral Benham, United States Navy, has successfully arbitrated the difference between President Peixoto and the insurgents and that a treaty of peace will soon be executed in accordance with its findings.

A confirmation of this report will be cause of rejoicing among those who believe that the trend of events is towards universal peace among the nations of Christendom and the settlement of international and internal disputes by arbitration. It will be, if confirmed, the first instance in history of the suppression of an actual war of any consequence by the verdict of an umpire. All the most remarkable in this case by the reason of the fact that one man was entrusted with the settlement of this strife which involved a nation of 13,000,000 people and a republic whose resources of soil, mines and forests are equal to those of the United States and will in time be productive of as great wealth and support as great a population.

Arbitration of disputes between civilized nations is no new thing. History records numerous instances of the successful application of this principle in international differences which might otherwise have been submitted to the "dread arbitrament of war". Notable modern instances are the

arbitration of the Portendic<sup>29</sup> claims between Great Britain and France in 1843, the "Gen. Armstrong" privateering case between United States and Portugal, and the most notable of all, the Geneva convention of 1872, caused the reference of the Alabama claims to a board of arbitrator and the settlement of that dangerous dispute in that way. Fresh in the memory of every reader of the daily press is the arbitration of the Bering sea dispute between the United States and Great Britain.

Thus, it appears that arbitration as a preventive of possible war is not a novelty by any means. The term "as a preventive of possible war" is warranted by the facts, for differences less serious than the cases cited have resulted in actual hostilities. But it will be difficult to find a precedent for the cessation of actual warfare as a result of a reference of the disputed points to arbitration. Civil and international wars of small importance have been suppressed by coercion by nations more powerful that the contestants, but it will be difficult to find the slightest precedent for the case in point. After hostilities have once begun the dispute is usually "fought out".

To be sure the civil war in Brazil has been a smaller affair, if we gauge its importance by number of men under arms, the lists of killed and wounded, the strategic moves and the plans of campaign. There has been no carnage, for the forces of the insurgents have been all at sea and the forces of the government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> Em 1883 o governador francês do Senegal boqueia durante seios meses o acesso a Portendic, feitoria na costa da atual Mauritânia, provocando protestos por parte da Inglaterra. A sentencia arbitral da Prússia de 1843 põe um ponto final a estas queixas.

all on land. Peixoto's improvised navy, purchased in the United States, has not yet been tested in conflict with the national navy controlled by insurgents, and on the other hand the insurgents have not succeeded in gathering a sufficiently formidable land following to engage Peixoto's army. Nevertheless, the ports of the country, notable the capital, have been in a state of siege and commerce has been as completely prostrated as if the bloodiest battles of history had marked the progress of the revolution.

In the light of all the fact and conditions, then, Rear Admiral Benham's achievement may mark the beginning of an era — the era of arbitration and peace. From this beginning may date the final realization of Bentham's<sup>30</sup> dream of a universal international congress, which shall determine disputes between nations, with authority to enforce its decrees against any dissenting state by the combined power of the rest.

With a codification of the law of nations and an international court or congress for the settlement of disputes, the burdensome armies and navies of nations in time of peace and drench the soil with the life blood of the best and bravest in time of war. Commerce and industry would be undisturbed by fears of armed strife and "peace on earth, good will to men" would cease to be a dream.

If individuals can form themselves into communities, make laws, enforce them and preserve the public peace, why cannot nations do the same?

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Refere-se ao filosofo iluminista Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).

Ordnance is daily becoming more formidable, and armor is keeping pace with it. War would be a tenfold more dreadful thing now than 30 years ago and armed peace is an hundred fold more costly. Commerce and industry have a far more potent voice in affairs of state than they had when this century dawned, and they are asserting themselves more and more emphatically every day. Commerce and industry always counsel peace and as their power increases so will the era of international arbitration be hastened.

#### **339.** *The Indianapolis Journal,* 28 de janeiro

Também este jornal considera como quase certa a notícia de mediação por parte do comandante dos navios americanos no porto do Rio de Janeiro.

The rumor that Rear Admiral Benham, of the United States navy, had been requested to act as mediator between the contending parties in Brazil seem to have been well founded, and latest advices say his efforts are likely to result in peace. The war, if it should be dignified by that name, had had no redeeming feature in the shape of principle involved, and should have been brought to an end long ago. It has been a serious interruption to commerce and has compelled this government to maintain a large fleet at Rio de Janeiro for several months. If it be true, as stated, the commander of our fleet there has succeeded in arranging satisfactory terms of peace he will deserve and receive much credit.

### **340.** The Daily Picayune, 28 de janeiro

The great battle of Brazil now is one of expectation.

### **341.** «Arbitration in Brazil», *The Pittsburg Post*, 29 de janeiro

Outro artigo sobre uma "negociação" para pôr um termo à guerra civil no Brasil. «A guerra está a durar há muito tempo. que qualquer coisa que possa conduzir a um desfecho, é recebida como uma boa notícia», escreve o jornal.

The civil war in Brazil has been dragging on so interminably and indecisively that anything indicating a conclusion or settlement will be received as good news, not only by the Brazilians themselves, but by the world at large, and by traders and merchants particularly. While the war has not been so bloody as it might have been, considering its length and the amount of ammunitions consumed, still it has been serious enough in other ways.

It the dispatches from Rio are correct an arbitration movement has begun that may result in terminating the trouble. Admiral da Gama, of the insurgents, notified the American Admiral Benham, that the rebels were willing to accept his services as a mediator. Benham then notified President Peixoto of the offer, and the latter sent his secretary to represent him in a preliminary conference. While nothing was accomplished, and while DA GAMA made

demands that the government is not willing to grant, yet the mere fact that each side has shown willingness to recognize arbitration is a good sign.

Arbitration has been doing wonders in the past few years in the adjustment of differences between capital and labor, between political parties, and factions, and, most important of all, between nations. The most notable international example was given only a few months ago, when the United States and Great Britain settled amicably a question much greater than others that have caused costly wars in former years<sup>31</sup>. Only a few weeks ago a big railroad strike in Pennsylvania was ended by arbitration. Instances might be multiplied to show that the peace-making disposition is growing throughout the world and is doing effectual work.

If the mediation of Admiral Benham should end the internecine contest in Brazil a great victory will have been gained for the cause of peace and goodwill on earth. The fact that an American officer has been appealed to is significant of a strong sentiment of confidence in the United States. Uncle Sam always tries to see fair play, even by men like Minister Stevens<sup>32</sup>, of Hawaii and Maine, who prove unfaithful to the trusts confided to them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Trata-se do conflito à volta do direito de pesca no mar de Bering, no qual os Estados Unidos queriam ter a exclusividade.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> John L. Stevens (1820-1895), ministro dos Estados Unidos nos Havaí de 1889 a 1893, foi acusado de ter conspirado contra a rainha Liliuokalani. Fundou o Partido Republicano no Maine.

#### **342**. *The Daily Picayune*, 29 de janeiro

Admiral Melo is said to be getting the worst of it in his war. He is not. Brazil is getting the worst of it. Melo has nothing to lose.

# **343.** «A sensational Turn of Events in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune,* 31 de janeiro

O jornal resume os acontecimentos de dia 29, quando o almirante da Gama teve de se render perante a força militar superior, depois de um pequeno confronto simbólico. Dá três versões do sucedido e espera, dadas as circunstâncias, uma confirmação.

Tenta interpretar a atitude do Almirante brasileiro e sugere que este, já enfraquecido, aproveitou a ocasião para se render ao comandante da frota americana no Rio, garantindo dessa forma o asilo político para ele e para os seus homens. Neste caso, os Estados Unidos estariam numa situação um pouco incómoda perante o governo de Floriano Peixoto, sublinha o quotidiano da Luisiana.

The action of Admiral Benham, the commander of the American squadron in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, in making a demonstration on Monday by escorting an American vessel to a wharf within the line of fire, and notifying the rebel Admiral that any attempt to interfere with the movements of the vessel would meet with prompt retaliation, has apparently led to surprising results. According to the reports which have been received from Rio, an acute crisis has been precipitated there, and it is even stated that Admiral da Gama has surrendered.

The first impression conveyed by the report of the surrender was that the rebel commander had yielded to President Peixoto. This is apparently not the case, however, as later advices indicate that if Admiral da Gama surrendered at all, it was to Admiral Benham that he yielded. So unexpected an outcome of the troubles in Rio cannot be accepted as true until more detailed reports are received. One account, for instance, claimed that Admiral da Gama, after making a formal show of resistance to Admiral Benham's movement in escorting the American merchant ship to her wharf, desired to surrender, but was persuaded not to do so by his officers. The same account states that while the American merchantman was being escorted to her landing a marine from one of the rebel ships fired a musket shot at her, evidently doing so as a formal protest. The United States warship *Detroit* replied, also by a rifle shot, so that there was actually an outward show of hostilities, the rebels making the point of yielding to superior force.

It has recently been reported that Admiral da Gama has been hard pressed, owing to the lack of supplies and ammunition, and it is barely possible that he may have seized upon a favorable opportunity to surrender to the American Admiral, thus securing for himself and followers the right of asylum under the protection of the United States flag. Such a turn of events would entail grave responsibility upon the United States, which would certainly not be relished, as, beyond a doubt, complications would arise with the Brazilian Government through demands for the surrender of the prisoners.

The surrender of Admiral da Gama with his fleet at Rio, would, of course, be the deathblow of the revolution, as Admiral Melo has with him in the south only the powerful cruiser *Republica* and a few nondescript gunboats. It is evident, from the failure of Admiral Melo to return do Rio with reinforcements, that he has failed in his efforts to secure adherents to his cause in sufficient number.

Although President Peixoto has gained no actual advantage over the rebels in Rio harbor, Admiral da Gama has gradually depleted his resources both in men and munitions of war, and for some time has been in rather a bad way. But recently he made overtures to the Government, looking to a settlement of the revolution, but without success, and it is entirely possible that he has resolved to surrender to Admiral Benham as a last resort.

Owing to the conflicting character of the reports from Rio, official information will be awaited with keen interest.

### **344.** «Our Flag in Brazil», *The Times*, 31 de janeiro

O articulista faz uma ligação entre o que se passou nas ilhas Havai e os recentes acontecimentos no Rio. A nova administração americana recusou a proposta de anexação do arquipélago, dando o sinal que os Estados Unidos não querem interferir na política interna de outros estados. Além disso, destituíram o Almirante Stanton depois deste ter conferenciado com Melo na baia da capital.

A partir desse momento, sublinha o jornal, todas a grandes potências presentes no porto do Rio «puseram-se virtualmente sob a direção dos

representantes dos Estados Unidos», e Benham tornou-se o «senhor da situação».

«A autoridade dos Estados Unidos não deve servir para destituir ou para impor uma forma de governo ao Brasil, mas unicamente para garantir aos brasileiros a liberdade de resolver os seus assuntos, sem que haja a possibilidade de uma intervenção externa», conclui o jornal, segundo o qual a «provocação» de Saldanha da Gama só serviu para «simplificar a situação».

Admiral Benham's decisive action in the harbor of Rio is a fresh declaration of the established American policy, that while this government will not interfere with the internal conflicts of neighboring nations, it will protect to the utmost the legitimate rights of its own citizens everywhere.

There is no doubt that the administration, in its prompt disavowal of Mr. Stevens' protectorate in Hawaii, and its desire to restore the *status quo*, had in view not merely an act of abstract right, but a broad principle of international policy upon which it was necessary that the United States should keep their record clear. It is an open secret that the insurrection in Brazil received early encouragement from Europe, and there were reasons to believe that the United States might be called upon at any time to asset and enforce the doctrine of non-intervention there.

The European powers understood the position of the administration toward Hawaii more clearly than it was generally understood, or pretended to understood, at home. They interpreted it so exactly, indeed, that from that time all indications of foreign intervention in Brazil absolutely ceased, and both the diplomatic and the naval representatives placed themselves virtually under the

direction of the representatives of the United States. The diplomatic corps at Rio has consulted constantly with Mr. Thompson, and the naval officers have in every case waited for the initiative of the American admiral.

The friendly disposition was intensified by the recall of Admiral Stanton after his unauthorized exchange of civilities with the insurgent fleet, an act that was intended not to discredit Stanton, but to emphasize the attitude of neutrality which this government intended to enforce. The result has been to make the American admiral now at Rio actually master of the situation, and he has been looked to by common consent to bring the disturbance to an end.

Whether the insurgent admiral has recklessly or purposely provoked him into a display of force, it has changed the situation only by simplifying it, and hastening the conclusion. The authority of the United States will not be employed to pull down or set up particular government or form of government in Brazil, but only to secure the Brazilian people freedom to settle their own affairs without the possibility of foreign intervention. This is the true American policy, steadfastly maintained by every true American administration.

## **345.** «American Commerce is Safe», *The Brookly Daily Eagle*, 31 de janeiro

Muito satisfeito com a atuação da sua frota e do seu comandante, o jornal — que dá um relato pormenorizado da intimidação entre os rebeldes e a frota americana — constata que agora «os navios mercantes americanos já não serão molestados no porto» da capital brasileira.

Whatever may be the result of the insurrection in Brazil, it is now certain that the United States merchant vessels will not be molested in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. Rear Admiral Benham's action yesterday settled that question decisively when he sent a shell into the rebel ship Guanabara. Admiral da Gama knew that the United States did not propose to have their commerce interfered with. When the insurgents asked that they be recognized as belligerents several weeks ago Secretary Gresham replied that this government would grand them no such rights, because as belligerents the rebels could blockade the ports of Brazil and the United States did not propose at this stage at the conflict to surrender their privilege of free access to the wharves of Rio de Janeiro. Admiral da Gama does not seem to have remembered what Secretary Gresham said. He did not even last week when he fired on the American bark Julia Rollins and the American schooner Millie J. H. At that time the American admiral told da Gama that he proposed to protect United States vessels in any part of the harbor. Yesterday the rebel admiral tried to prevent three United States vessels from landing at the Saude piers, after having been told that the whole fleet would be used if necessary to protect them. When his fire was returned by a shell from the *Detroit* he hastily asked for mercy, and the commerce of the United States with Brazil proceeded without further interruption. The American flag floats proudly in the South Atlantic and every citizen is glad that our rights have been maintained.

The dispatches indicate the possibility of another conflict between the rebel ships and Admiral Benham. Admiral da Gama is reported to have said that it would be better to be conquered by a foreign power now than to yield later to Peixoto, so it is suggested that he will fire another shot at the *Detroit* and surrender to the United States admiral when his fire is returned. In such an event the rebel ships would fall to us along with the prisoners, and our navy would be strengthened at a slight cost. But whatever might be the apparent meaning of a surrender of the rebels to us, it is probable that it would really be nothing more than a step toward the settlement of the disagreements between Vice President Peixoto and his navy. There will be time enough to discuss this situation when it arises. At present we are satisfied with the vigorous and decisive action of our fleet.

### **346.** «The Clash at Rio», St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 31 de janeiro

Saldanha da Gama é o responsável pelo que se passou no porto do Rio, afirma o jornal, que define a atitude do comandante dos rebeldes— que não teve em conta o aviso do almirante Benham— como «um ato de loucura incrível». Talvez haja uma explicação: para da Gama seria muito melhor entregar-se à marinha americana do que a Peixoto.

Until the facts and circumstances connected with the clash of Admiral Benham and the insurgent force under Admiral da Gama in the harbor of Rio are known it is impossible to form an accurate judgment of the incident. The information so far obtained fairly justifies Admiral Benham's conduct. He seems to have acted with discretion, within his authority and with the prompt energy and courage which are the traditional characteristics of the American navy.

It would be hard to find any warrant in international law or practice for Admiral Benham's alleged threat to treat Admiral da Gama as a pirate. No court in Christendom would hold an insurgent force fighting for peace guilty of piracy. But Admiral Benham was undoubtedly justified in protecting merchant vessels of the United States of damage by the insurgent fleet, and after giving notice of his intention to protect them to make that protection good at any cost. The Brazilian insurgents have not been recognized as belligerents and have no rights of war except such as may be conceded to them on the ground of humanity and courtesy. They had declared no blockade of the port of Rio and were incapable of doing so. Admiral Benham's notice was therefore a matter of discretion and its validity depended upon his power to enforce it. He was bound in honor to enforce it and Admiral da Gama's disregard of it made a conflict imperative.


The responsibility, therefore, for the clash rests wholly upon da Gama. He assumed all consequences when he disregarded Admiral Benham's notice and fired upon the *Detroit*. It must be credited to the prudence of the American Admiral that a serious engagement which would have brought fatal disaster to the insurgent cause did not follow.

For the insurgent fleet to become involved in hostilities with the United States seems such an act of incredible folly that some ulterior purpose must be sought to explain it. It is possible that Admiral da Gama finding his cause hopeless preferred surrender to Admiral Benham to ultimate defeat by Peixoto in order to secure American protection and intervention. Further developments must be awaited for the explanation and outcome. The incident may bring some unpleasant complications, but hardly serious trouble for our Government. If it is the means of terminating poor Brazil's unfortunate strife it will be a blessing to all concerned.

## **347.** «Startling news from Rio», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 31 de janeiro

Este episódio na baia da capital brasileira, onde o almirante Benham fez o que tinha de fazer para defender os interesses americanos, prova a importância para os Estados Unidos de terem uma «frota suficientemente poderosa para impor respeito», afirma o jornal californiano. Na opinião da mesma fonte, a «rendição» de Saldanha da Gama prova que, por um lado, «a causa dos insurretos é desprovida de esperança», e, por outro lado, que o almirante preferiu entregar-se ao comandante da esquadra americana do que a Peixoto.

Yesterday morning dispatches from Rio Janeiro, relating the story of the convoying of the American bark *Amy* to the docks of the city by the American squadron under Admiral Benham, were supplemented last evening by London dispatches asserting that there had been a naval battle between the American fleet and the insurgent fleet under Admiral da Gama, and that the latter has surrendered to Admiral Benham and was a prisoner on board the flagship.



**Fig. 32 :** « Combate ou obedece! ». *The Examiner* dedica toda a primeira página de dia 31 de janeiro à intervenção do Almirante Benham no porto do Rio de Janeiro.

Telegraph news from Brazil must always be received with a certain degree of caution, but we thing is fair to assume that da Gama made a show of resistance to the American fleet, that a few shots were possibly exchanged and that da Gama then surrendered to Admiral Benham as the best and easiest way out of a position which he had found untenable. He did not care to take any chances on the tender mercies of President Peixoto and preferred to make a virtue of necessity and deliver himself up to the American Admiral.

Assuming this news to be correct, it means the utter collapse of the revolution in Brazil. Da Gama has been Melo's right-hand man, and his second in command, and his surrender must indicate the hopeless of the insurgent cause, and the return of peace to Brazil.

The lesson in this affair is that it will pay the United States to build and maintain an efficient navy. There being no blockade of Rio Janeiro, commercial privileges were not suspended and American vessels were entitled to land their cargoes, as in time of peace. When da Gama ventured to dispute this right, Admiral Benham put the *New York, San Francisco, Detroit* and other vessels under his command into line, beat to quarters and told da Gama, in effect, that he has reached the limit, and the result was da Gama's surrender.

Events like this are likely to occur at any time and at any place, and the only way to protect American interests is to have a fleet of war-ships powerful enough to command respect, and, if necessary, to uphold American rights by force of arms. Admiral Benham seems to have been the right man at the right

place, the honor of this Nation having suffered no detriment or diminution at his hands.

# **348.** «And Now the Brazilian question», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 31 de janeiro

Saldanha da Gama foi arrogante e ignorou os avisos do comandante Benham, escreve o jornal, mas a atitude do chefe da revolta mudou radicalmente, depois de ter sido alvo de alguns tiros através da proa do navio almirante, constata com satisfação o jornalista. Este recorda no fim do artigo «a todas as nações da terra» que a «doutrina Monroe não é uma frase sem significado».

There is now doubt that the United States authorities have taken a hand in the Brazilian contest, so far as least as to asset this country's rights against all assailants.

While there is no confirmation at hand of the wild reports in circulation yesterday declaring that da Gama had surrendered to the American admiral, it is clear enough that serious business has been done at Rio — trouble which claimed the close attention of the president and his cabinet.

One thing appears certain — Admiral Benham, who is the commander of our squadron in Brazilian waters, has the true blue American spirit.

Dispatches from Rio de Janeiro show that he gave a very forcible reminder to the insurgent Admiral da Gama, when the latter persisted in ordering cannonading to continue without the slightest consideration for the safety of the American vessels. Da Gama seems to have taken the hint conveyed by the firing of several American shot across the bows of the insurgent flagship. At all events his insolent disregard of Admiral Benham's remonstrances ceased very suddenly.

It is to be hopes that no critical Brazilian question will arise from the present condition of affairs. Nevertheless, the honor and dignity of this republic must be maintained at all hazards.

The nations of the earth must realize, too, should necessity arise for the defeat of European plots against Brazil, that the Monroe doctrine is no meaningless phrase, but an essential part of that political creed which claims the assent of every patriotic American.

# **349.** «Admiral Benham Means Business» *The Philadelphia Inquirer,* 31 de janeiro

O articulista louva a atitude do comandante americano e tem a certeza que, a partir de agora, já ninguém se vai intrometer nos negócios americanos. No entanto, pergunta-se porque a administração em Washington não apoiou o seu ministro nas ilhas Havai que tinha defendido, tal como Benham no Rio, os interesses do seu país.

Admiral Benham means business. He intends that American vessels in Brazilian waters shall be protected and has as given such impressive publicity to his intentions that it is not probable that there will be any more interference whit American interests.

Admiral Benham seems to be a man of the right stamp. There is no squeamishness about him, and he has got a fleet under his command sufficient to support any action he may see fit to take. The news so far received sustains him that he has done.

### 350. «In a Tight Place», The Morning Call, 31 de janeiro

O quotidiano de San Francisco apoia a ação do almirante Benham que interpreta também como algo que irritou os ingleses.

It the report is true that Rear-Admiral Benham has taken Admiral da Gama prisoner, the courage of this American admiral will be applauded in all parts of the country. It is not that so much courage was needed to face this Brazilian fleet, but that so bold a step should be taken without orders from Washington. The belief is quite general that British sympathies are with the insurgents, and there has been as yet no indication of a desire of Mr. Cleveland's part to antagonize British policies. The right or wrong of the action of Admiral Benham cannot be determined until we have a better understanding of the conditions under which he acted. While the right of revolution cannot be called in question, revolutionists who fail to secure recognition as belligerents within a reasonable time are required to be more considerate of the rights of neutrals than in cases of recognized warfare. But the American people will give Benham the benefit of a doubt. If he is not clearly wrong it will be held he is right. The fact that British sympathies may be somewhat ruffled by this action

of the American admiral will not hurt his standing with the American people outside the administration circles.

### **351**. *The Pittsburgh Post*, 31 de janeiro

O que se passou dois dias antes no porto do Rio prova que «a revolta está a chegar ao fim», afirma o jornalista de Pittsburgh que faz a mesma reflexão que os seus colegas: Saldanha da Gama preferiu render-se aos americanos do que ser fuzilado pelas tropas de Peixoto.

The reports from Rio Janeiro of a collision between the American squadron under Admiral Benham and the insurgent fleet commanded by Admiral DA GAMA are not at all improbable. In prosecuting the blockade of Rio many occasions have arisen when there has been interference with American merchant vessels by the insurgents. There was an illustration of this in the news of yesterday morning, showing decided action by admiral Benham in defense of the rights of American ships owners in prosecuting their trade. Other occasions of a similar character have very probably arisen, requiring on the part of the American admiral more aggressive measures. The indications are that the insurrection is on its last leg, and the Brazilian admiral very naturally would prefer to surrender to the Americans that the Brazilians, by whom he would be dealt with summarily, and very likely shot as a traitor. They do this in South America with great promptness. The sympathies of the American people and of our government, so far as it was proper to manifest then, have been with the established republican government of Brazil,

especially as the insurrection is believed to have been encouraged and aided from Europa, with the intent of restoring the empire and making the son-in-law of the late Dom Pedro the head of the imperial government.

### **352.** The Morning Call, 31 de janeiro

Benham fez o que tinha de fazer para proteger os interesses comerciais do seu país, e dar assim uma lição aos rebeldes, escreve o diário californiano, segundo o qual muitas outras nações desejam que acabe esta luta, «que durou demasiado tempo» e que «degenerou numa farsa». No entanto, o jornalista não tem ilusões quanto à duração da paz: «O espírito ditatorial vai voltar para manchar as instituições republicanas».

Admiral Benham's firmness at Rio was the right policy to teach the Brazilians manners. Any displays of supineness after a refusal on the part of da Gama to cease firing over American merchantmen in the harbor would have been interpreted as an acknowledgment of superiority in the Brazilian rebel forces, and have led to conduct even more outrageous and contemptuous. By cleaning his ships for action Admiral Benham made it evident that he was prepared to clear the rebel cruisers out of the Rio waters or under them, and the lesson thus given is wholesome. The war in Brazil, as far as the fighting goes, has lasted long enough, and has degenerated into a farce, without a single atom of principle at stake on the part of de Melo. As far as good or bad government can be secured, one side is about as trustworthy and capable as the other, and other countries are mainly interested in seeing a cessation of the strife. It is

probable hopeless to expect that peace will be permanent. The dictatorship spirit will arise again to tarnish the name of republican institutions.

## **353.** «Admiral Benham Did Just Right», *The Sun* (N.Y.), 1 de fevereiro

Enfim houve uma reação americana, sublinha com satisfação o quotidiano de Nova Iorque, que aprova e admira o que Benham fez no porto do Rio para garantir a liberdade de comércio e «para defender o honra da bandeira americana», nomeadamente depois «do desastroso fiasco no Havai». Agora, praticamente, o bloqueio dos rebeldes já acabou completamente e as outras grandes potências vão fazer a mesma coisa que os Estados Unidos em relação à frota rebelde.

Quando a Saldanha da Gama, o jornal supõe que fez isso porque queria entregar-se aos americanos e salvar desse modo a sua vida.

The action taken by Admiral Benham, in forbidding the war ships commanded by the rebel Admiral DA GAMA to molest American merchant vessels, is entirely justified by international laws. It should have been taken long ago, and it will probably be followed by similar action on the part of the naval representatives o of other foreign powers. The practical result will be to raise the blockade, which the Brazilian rebels have illegally established, and the ultimate effect of this may be the collapse of the rebel cause. In such eventual consequences we are not directly concerned; what does concern us is the enforcement of the right of our merchant vessels to traverse at will the bay

of Rio de Janeiro, so long as we are on friendly terms with the only Brazilian Government which has been recognized by foreign nations.

The Brazilian rebels, who were at first headed by Admiral Melo, and who have since been commanded by Admiral DA GAMA, have never been recognized as belligerents by any foreign power. They have been proclaimed pirates by President Peixoto. The proclamation did not make them so in the full meaning of the word; but international law permits them to be treated as pirates by any foreign power, when the lives and property of its citizens are assailed, for those men are accused by their own Government of piracy. Every shot fired by the rebels at a merchant vessel of a foreign power; every refusal to permit such a vessel to traverse the bay of Rio de Janeiro and proceed to its customary anchorage, was an act of piracy for which immediate punishment might lawfully have been inflicted by the naval representatives of the flag which had been insulted.

Our national ensign, the Star and Stripes, has been repeatedly subjected to this indignity since the outbreak or the rebellion. At one juncture our own Government must be said to have connived at the molestation and humiliation of which our merchant vessels were victims. We refer to the incidents that followed President Peixoto order that all merchant vessels docked along the city front should retire to appoint some distance above the town. With that order, issued by the regular Brazilian Government, it was the duty of our vessels to comply, and they were properly directed by our Navy Department to do so. It turned out, however, that, by this proceeding, the city front has been

uncovered and exposed to the rebel gun; and, accordingly, President Peixoto rescinded his original order, and directed merchant vessels to resume their former quarters. The Brazilian Government has as much right to put forth this second order as it had to issued that which is superseded; nevertheless, our Navy Department ordered our merchant vessels to disobey the second order, to discharge their cargoes by lighters, and thus to leave the city front at the mercy of the rebel cannon. Through an ill-judged and ill-times eagerness to avoid even the semblance of a departure from neutrality, our Navy Department practically favored the cause of the insurgents by declining to defer to the lawful and reasonable wishes of the only recognized Brazilian authorities.

The natural effect of the attitude taken by our Navy Department at this juncture was to give DA GAMA and his coadjutors an inflated idea of their own importance, and a contemptuous opinion of the American fleet. These feelings were presently disclosed in a series of ungracious acts, strongly contrasted with the studied courtesy shown to the naval representatives of other foreign powers. In ultimately became manifest to our Navy Department that a mistake had been made, and accordingly, Admiral Benham was invested with discretionary authority in the matter of protecting American commercial interests. To him exclusively belongs the credit for the use he has made of his discretion. He entirely reversed the policy which had been enjoined upon his predecessor, and forthwith notified the rebel Admiral that he would no longer recognize the semblance of blockade which the insurgents had attempted to enforce, and that henceforth American merchant vessels would exercise their

lawful right of proceeding at will to any part of the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. A blustering attempt on the part of one of the rebel warships to stop one of our merchantmen was met by an admonitory shot from our cruiser, the *Detroit*, and DA GAMA, promptly concluded that the better part of valor was submission. He might have made the firing of the shot a pretext for surrendering his ships to the American naval force, and thus escaping the fate which threatens him at the hands of President Peixoto. But this step, though he seems to have had it for a time in contemplation, had not, at the last advices, been taken.

We do not believe that there is any foundation for the report that the British Foreign Office has determined to recognize the Brazilian rebels as belligerents. Such an act, performed at this time, would be a gross affront to this country; and although England seldom misses an opportunity of doing us ill turn, it is evident that in this instance self-interest would point another way. It is more probable that Great Britain and all the other foreign powers which have naval representatives in Brazilian waters will follow the example set by the United States, in notifying the insurgents that their merchantmen must hereafter have absolute freedom of access to the city of Rio de Janeiro. Such measures will, of course, be tantamount to an abolition of the unlawful blockade, by which the insurgent under Melo and DA GAMA planned to cut off the customs receipts, which constitute the chief financial resources of the regular Brazilian Government.

We repeat, that to Admiral Benham the hearty thanks of his countrymen are due for an act which will signally enhance the prestige of the American

navy and materially promote the interests of American commerce in Brazil. After the disgraceful fiasco in Hawaii we needed some impressive proof of this kind, that our naval officers, at all events, can be trusted to uphold the honor of the American flag.

### **354.** «The colapse in Brazil», *The New York Times*, 1 de fevereiro

The New York Times considera que o que aconteceu foi uma espécie de farsa, de encenação do «bucaneiro» Saldanha da Gama, para ele se entregar ao comandante americano e evitar dessa forma que ele e os seus cúmplices sejam garrotados por Peixoto.

The story of the behavior of the Brazilian insurgents in the face of the United States squadron at Rio reads much like the libretto of a new opera bouffe. It is no be borne in mind that the insurgents have not, and have not had, any belligerent footing whatsoever. That is to say, they have never undisputed possession of any Brazilian territory. Their "home is on the deep", and when they are driven on shore to refit or to provision themselves they have no land that they can fairly call their own. Now, a "power" that has to keep the sea in order to evade arrest and to visit the shore by stealth is not only a power to which belligerent rights cannot be accorded; it fulfills very accurately the definition of a piratical power. We must go back to the time of the buccaneers in order to find a parallel to the status of Admiral da Gama. When the Spaniards caught the buccaneers they put them to death without remonstrance on the

part of any other nation. If the Brazilian were to capture the insurgents they could not be remonstrated with for pursuing the same course.

This is the fact that made a purely naval insurrection, without a foothold on shore, hopeless from the outset. The Brazilian insurgents are quite hopeless now. It is the manner in which their hopelessness has been evinced that gives the comic touch to a transaction that might very well be tragic. The circumstances of the "naval conflict" between Admiral da Gama and Admiral Benham make it entirely ridiculous. The insurgent Admiral evidently desired to pick a quarrel with some strong power that could protect him against falling into the hands of his own countrymen. He chose the United States for this purpose, and sent word to the American Admiral that he would fire on American merchantmen if those merchantmen, pursuing their lawful vocations, went to a particular place. Of course, the American Admiral, whose entire business was the protection of American commerce, could not stand that, as the insurgent Admiral well knew. It is clear that the insurgent Admiral, having picked a quarrel with him for that very purpose in order to secure an asylum for himself and his officers. But the tenuity of his pretext made it very ludicrous. He endeavored to surrender after a battle in which one shot was fired across the bow of one of his vessels, and another of six pounds lodged in the sternpost. That was enough for him, but it was not enough for the greener among his officers, who perhaps insisted that at least three shots should be lodged in an insurgents man-of-war before the whole insurgent fleets should strike its colors.

Whatever the difference may be between the Admiral and his merry men, it is plain that the "insurrection" has collapsed. No insurrection could continue, even among people with a minimum of the sense of the ridiculous, when the insurgent leader gravely proposes to "yield to superior force" when he has had one shot fired across his bow and another imbedded in his sternpost. That the insurgents should yield to American fleet and received an asylum in the same is perhaps the best fate that could be hoped for so comic insurrection. If they yielded to Peixoto, he would be compelled, with whatever reluctance, to garrote a lot of them as examples. If they yield to Admiral Benham, they will be at liberty to make their way to Paris, where the good North American goes after he dies, and the good South American, if he be an unsuccessful but intelligent revolutionist, goes before he dies. It is to be hoped that Admiral Benham will be instructed accordingly, and that the next time the insurgents pick a quarrel with him he will shoot as many shots into their ships as will be required by the younger and more ferocious of them as a justification for surrender, being duly careful not to do any permanent damage to their ships and, of course, no to injure any of them.

### **355.** «The Incident at Rio», *The Morning Call*, 1 de fevereiro

O jornal californiano narra como, antes do breve tiroteio, o Almirante Benham tinha claramente dito a da Gama que este não tinha nenhum direito de bloquear o porto e os navios de comércio. Relata a seguir o que aconteceu no dia 29 e explica porque o comandante americano tinha todo o direito de proteger o navio americano ameaçado pelos rebeldes: na realidade, estes são considerados como piratas e não como combatentes.

No fim, interroga-se sobre o porquê desta atitude por parte de Saldanha da Gama e chega à mesma conclusão que os seus colegas: os chefes dos insurretos queriam entregar-se aos americanos para evitar «a humiliação e a capitulação perante o próprio governo».

The stories from Rio do not exactly tally, and it may be well to suspend judgment on what has happened until official advices see the light. Some of the dispatches reveal an attempt to supply a lack for information by a flight of fancy.

Some days ago, a rumor gained currency that Peixoto and Admiral da Gama has agreed to submit their differences to the arbitration of Admiral Benham. The agreement was said to have been submitted on January 19. The story was discredited at Washington; at the Navy Department reporters were informed that Admiral Benham could not have assumed the office of arbitrator without the sanction of his Government, and that no dispatch asking for such sanction had been received. At the same time it was understood at that time, say January 20, that Admiral Benham was in daily intercourse whit Admiral da Gama, the American flagship *New York* lying in close proximity to the Brazilian insurgent flagship *Aquidaban*. The status in the harbor of Rio was not as well defined as it might have been. Da Gama claimed the right of blockade, and under that claim he asserted that he could and would prevent foreign merchantmen from trying up at the wharves. Admiral Benham denied the right. It is this which led to the incident of the 29<sup>th</sup>.

An American vessel, after due notice to the insurgent fleet, proceeded toward the wharf at which she was to moor. Da Gama, from his flagship, fired a shot across her bows, a signal to proceed no further; on the *Detroit*, which, under Benham's order, had cleared for action early that morning, replied with a shell, which struck the stern post of the insurgent vessel. The latter then fired a gun to leeward to signify that he would fight no more, and the affair ended. Other accounts imply that several vessels and a number of shots exchanged, involving loss of life, but this stories need confirmation, as also does the tale of the surrender of da Gama to the American admiral. They may, however prove true, in which case the United States will find itself involved in the civil war in Brazil, and competed by the necessities of the case to bring it to a close.

The point involved is one of the obscure problems of the international law of blockade. During the war of the rebellion The Union navy blockaded the entire southern coast, from Cape Henry to the Rio Grande. At first, the blockade was a paper blockade, but as the war progressed it became effectual, and foreign merchantmen attempting to effect a landing at Norfolk, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile or Galveston were captured and sold as prizes, without protest by the nations whose flag they floated. In these cases, the blockade war enforced by an established nation with recognized maritime rights. The squadron under da Gama, which now claims to be blockading Rio, carries no national flag of its own, but only the flag of the nation whose ports it is trying to blockade. It represents a body of insurgents who have not been recognized as belligerents by any power. In public law it occupies no higher

position that that of maritime freebooters or pirates. As such, neutral cannot concede to it any right to interfere with her commerce. It is no part of the business of neutrals to interfere in the strife against the recognized Government of Brazil; but nothing has happened which has deprived neutrals of the right of protecting their own vessels against molestation by its armed ships.

If, at the outset of the War and the Rebellion, before the rebels had been recognized as belligerents, a vessel bearing their flag of the Confederacy had fired upon an English ship entering in the port of New York under the pretense that that port was blockaded by the Secession Government the case would have been parallel to the act of Admiral da Gama on January 29. What the result would have been need not here be explained. Indeed, the conduct of the Brazilian insurgents is so inexplicable that it almost seems to imply a purpose to provoke a collision which would lead to a surrender to the American squadron, in order to evade the humiliation of a capitulation to their own Government.

### **356.** *Democrat and Chronicle*, 1 de fevereiro

O almirante Benham fez o seu trabalho em favor do comércio americano, mas não para a maioria democrática na Câmara dos Representantes, que são piores do que «os piratas brasileiros», proclama o jornal.

In the harbor of Rio Janeiro, Admiral Benham is using the ships under his command to prevent the destruction of American commerce with the capital of Brazil. Everybody praises him, and up to date, we believe, the president has not decided to punish him for his timely vigor. But while the gallant admiral is aiding our commerce, the Democratic majority in the house of representatives is legislating to destroy that commerce by overthrowing deliberately the treaty of reciprocity with Brazil. The reciprocity clauses of the McKinley<sup>33</sup> law have been repealed by the action of the house on the Wilson<sup>34</sup> bill. The American admiral is doing his duty, but congress is acting in a more reprehensible manner that the Brazilian pirates.

### **357.** The Daily Picayune, 1 de fevereiro

Something like a climax is coming on in Brazil [...]

Da Gama must have been outclassed. He was knocked out in the first round.

[...] Every American should drink the health of Admiral Benham in a good cup of Rio coffee.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> William McKinley (1843-1901), foi eleito para o Congresso em 1876 e tornou-se um especialista em taxas alfandegárias. Foi o 25º presidente dos Estados Unidos de 1897 até ao assassinato em setembro de 1901.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> William W. Wilson (1843-1900) é eleito deputado pela Virgínia Ocidental de 1883 até 1895. Contribuiu para a diminuição das tarifas alfandegárias.

# SHOTS FIRED ON INSURGENTS BY OUR CRUISER

Admiral Benham Protects American Vessels and the Detroit Fires a Warning Gun.

The Rebels Take the Hint and Da Gama Wants to Surrender.

An Exciting Time in Rio de Janeiro Harbor—Sensational Reports of a Broadside and De Gama's Surrender Which Prove to Be False.

# RIO'S BLOCKADE NOW BROKEN

FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS RUSHING TO THE WHARVES.

THE FIRING HAS CEASED

**Fig. 33 e 34 :** manchete sobre a confontação de dia 29 e outra que anuncia o fim do bloqueio do porto da capital brasileira. (*The Philadelphia Enquirer*, 31 de janeiro ; *The Times*, 1 de fevereiro)

### **358.** The Boston Daily Globe, 1 de fevereiro

Admiral da Gama got the worst of the game in that little exhibition in the harbor of Rio. This episode ought to be the beginning of the end of the tedious business in Brazil.

### **359.** The Sioux City Journal, 1 de fevereiro

Brazil is just about practiced size for our new navy.

Da Gama, like spinster rapidly becoming aged, is hunting a chance to surrender.

### **360.** «Manœuvres at Rio» New York Tribune, 2 de fevereiro

O que se passou entre os rebeldes brasileiros e os navios americanos foi «uma troca de protestos e de avisos de acordo com o protocolo da Marinha», sintetiza o quotidiano de Nova Iorque, segundo o qual se a frota americana no Rio tivesse atuado cedo, a guerra e o bloqueio já teriam acabado há mais tempo. O jornal interroga-se sobre as eventuais consequências desta reação do almirante Benham, no caso duma vitória dos homens de Saldanha da Gama.

The official dispatch from Admiral Benham to the Navy Department, with Minister Thompson's running commentary, gives a fairly intelligible commentary upon the maneuvers in Rio Harbor.

There was no naval engagement, but merely an exchange of protest and warning under nautical forms. Admiral Benham, having informed Admiral da Gama of his intention of protecting the American merchant ships while they were discharging their cargoes, cleared his decks for action. No serious attempt was made to resist the enforcement of the Admiral's orders. One of the insurgent vessels fired upon a boat carrying a line from one of the merchantmen. When the *Detroit* responded with a warning gun a second shop was fired over the merchant ship and one or more guns to leeward. The *Detroit* answered with a second warning, and, hailing the insurgent ship. Threatened to sink her if another gun was fired. This ended the exchange of menaces and naval formalities. The merchantmen discharged their cargoes and the paper blockade was broken through.

The action of Admiral da Gama may properly be interpreted as a naval protest against Admiral Benham's course. That is what the firing of a gun over a ship and another to leeward clearly indicates. He gave notice in a formal way that he held the United States Government responsible for the action of its fleet in allowing ships containing presumably munitions of war to land their cargoes. If the insurgents succeed in overthrowing the Peixoto Government that protest will be made the basis of a claim against the United States for indemnity. They contented themselves with this formality, and made no

serious attempt to oppose Admiral Benham's action, which, if we may judge from Secretary Herbert's dispatch, was grounded upon instructions received from Washington.

What this claim would be worth if the insurgents should win in Brazil, as they did in Chile, it would be premature for us to consider. Il will not be the only claim for indemnity in the event of the successful revolution, for New York Harbor has been made a base of naval operations against the insurgent fleet, and the fitting out of three vessels of war would also enter into the bill for the damages. These are risks which Governments have to face when they are compelled to deal with revolutionists abroad. We do not believe that there would be any difficulty in justifying the Administration's course of Admiral da Gama, as now appears improbable, should succeed in capturing Rio and overturning the existing Government. Indeed, our only ground of criticism of the Administration's action is that it has been taken tardily. If there had been a speedier defense of American merchantmen, the commercial blockade would have been broken and the rebellion brought to an end long ago.

## **361.** «Da Gama and his British Friends», *The New York Times*, 2 de fevereiro

O quotidiano nota que o londrino Times ficou um pouco incomodado com a pronta reação do comandante da frota americana no porto do Rio de janeiro e pergunta-se se tem o aval do seu governo. O New York Times — que acusa diretamente o jornal conservador de Londres e nomeadamente o seu correspondente na capital do Brasil, de ter manifestado muita simpatia para com os revoltosos, envia um recado ao seu colega britânico: a decisão de Benham de manter aberto o porto do Rio de Janeiro vai favorecer o Governo de Floriano Peixoto.

The disturbance which Admiral Benham's conduct at Rio has caused in the British bosom finds natural expression through its organ, The London *Times*. Our British contemporary, it seems, has been greatly puzzled by our relations, naval and diplomatic, to the monarchical insurrection against Peixoto's Government. It declares that the conduct of our government has been «vacillating," and when it sees Admiral Benham taking a course of action somewhat more aggressive that way pursued by Capt. Picking, it declares that the Brazilian question is "obscured", because Picking also seemed to be acting with the approval of the Washington authorities. The British mind, it seems, is still disturbed with doubts as to "how far Admiral Benham has the sanction of his official superiors". Secretary Herbert's dispatch to the Admiral, approving everything he has done, transmitted yesterday will clear up these doubts and obscurities.

The London *Times* and that class of English people for which it speaks have pursued precisely the same course toward the States which took up arms against the United States Government thirty years ago. *The Times* itself has greedily swallowed every news report that the audacity of its correspondent on board da Gama's flagship has ventured to concoct, and its tone has been one of sympathy and comfort for the insurgents and the monarchical party which is behind them. A great house engaged in the manufacture of war material in

England has refused to furnish the goods it manufactures to Peixoto's Government, but British "neutrality" did not prevent two naval officers in Rio harbor from engaging in the work of manufacturing torpedoes for the insurgents. This business was discovered by the loyal forces, who promptly and very properly dropped a shell and blew them up at their work. This is only one of numerous instances where subjects of Great Britain have passed quite beyond the neutral line, but the Republic of Brazil will probably ask for a reckoning of these scores when the insurrection has been quelled.

Admiral Benham's course makes da Gama's blockade wholly ineffective. He will not be allowed, of course, to interfere in any manner with American ships, even those carrying what is ordinarily considered contraband of war. This point seems to have occurred to Minister Thompson, who has just waked up and come down from Petropolis, and has made himself manifest by sending a dispatch to the State Department. Our Admiral's determination to maintain an open port by the use of musketry and one pounders, if necessary, is, of course, a decided advantage for the Brazilian Government, and even The London *Times* will be able to see that this advantage is likely to become decisive now that the action which confers it has the express approval of the Federal Government at Washington.

### **362.** «The Brazilian Disturbances», *The Times*, 2 de fevereiro

O articulista proclama que «a insurreição no Brasil foi única na história internacional», porque, apesar de só controlar a frota na baía do Rio, conseguiu bloquear o porto durante algum tempo.

Agora, com a intervenção de Benham e o fim do «embargo sobre o comércio», o movimento revolucionário fica com quase nada, nota o jornal que destaca também o papel de líder dos Estados Unidos nesta crise.

The insurrection in Brazil has been entirely unique in international history. It is primarily, if not entirely, a naval insurrection. The regular government remains in control of the capital, and apparently in control of the greater part of the country. There is no insurrectionary government of any kind that can claim even belligerent rights, unless it be that set up by Admiral Melo on board a warship, and even Admiral Melo has now sailed away out of sight, and no one seems to know just where he is.

There has remained nothing but the fleet in the harbor of Rio commanded by Admiral DA GAMA. This cannot be said to represent a government in any sense. Yet the blockade of the port which it has maintained was a real blockade, and it was the only thing that gave to the insurgents even the semblance of belligerent rights. Thus the rules regarding the recognition of a blockade which have grown up in international usage could have no force in this case. It presented really a new problem to which precedents did not apply.

Whatever may have been the sympathies of the several European powers, they have prudently left to the United States to suggest the appropriate

course of action. This has now been through the blundering of DA GAMA himself, who has simply furnished the occasion for Admiral Benham to declare that the lawless embargo upon commerce has gone on long enough. The shot from the *Detroit* put an end to the blockade. It declared that American vessels should be allowed to enter the port of Rio unimpeded, and the right thus asserted for the vessels of one nation must, of course, be claimed by all.

Without the blockade at Rio, it is hard to say what remains of the insurrectionary movement, but this is a question that must be left for time to settle. The interesting feature of the whole affair is the practical recognition by all the leading powers that a in dealing with disturbances upon the American continent the rights of initiative rests with the government of the United States, and the evidence that this government is ready and able to all times to maintain its just influence with dignity and discretion.

## **363.** «Echos of Admiral Benham's Shot», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 2 de fevereiro

A intervenção da marinha americana de dia 29 de janeiro não foi um ato de apoio a Peixoto, mas sim de defesa do comércio americano, explica o diário de Brooklyn, que recusa a interpretação dada por um jornal de Berlim, o qual fala de um ato de ingerência americana nos assuntos internos do Brasil. Se tivesse sido Peixoto a ameaçar o navio de comércio americano, acrescenta The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, a reação dos navios americanos teria sido a mesma.

Vice President Peixoto is mistaken if he thinks that Admiral Benham's shot, fired at the rebel ships in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, indicates that United States sympathize with the government. There was no question of sympathy involved. An attempt was made to interfere with United States commerce and it was frustrated. It is probable that Peixoto understands this as well as anyone, but he seems disposed to use the incident for political effect. This is natural and perhaps prudent. If he can make the soldiers believe that the United States are in sympathy with him he will prevent them for deserting and going over to the insurgents and he will dishearten the marines who are fighting against him. The German comment on the situation is not so easy to understand. The statement of a Berlin newspaper that we have interfered with the internal affairs of Brazil can be explained only on the assumption that the German editor did not understand the subject about which he was writing. If Peixoto himself should fire on United States merchant ships he would very soon hear shots from the fleet in the harbor. Then the wise German critics might say that we had decided to support da Gama. Our fleet is in the Southern Atlantic to look after the interests of American citizens and it is accomplishing its mission successfully. Secretary Herbert's dispatch to Admiral Benham that he relied upon him for the continued exercise of his discretion, expressed the sentiment of the American citizens. The right man is in charge, and we will be engaged in no needless or foolish controversy.

### **364.** *The Cincinnati Inquirer*, 2 de fevereiro

The State Department has wired Rear Admiral Benham that he did just the right thing in Brazil. And it is dollars to cents that neither the State Department nor anyone else knows just what he did do.

### **365.** The Boston Daily Globe, 2 de fevereiro

Admiral Benham seems to have done the right thing down in Brazil, "where the nuts come from".

### **366.** «The Situation at Rio», San Francisco Chronicle, 3 de fevereiro

O que se passou no Rio é muito simples de explicar, nota o quotidiano. Não houve nenhuma batalha entre os insurgentes e os americanos, mas o almirante Benham fez o que tinha de fazer: defendeu os interesses comerciais do seu país, sem, no entanto, tomar partido pelo presidente Peixoto.

It should take but a very view words to explain the situation at Rio Janeiro, so far as Admiral Benham and his care of American interests are concerned. When Admiral da Gama protested against being permitted to bombard the city, alleging that it had been fortified by President Peixoto and therefore under the rules of modern warfare, was a legitimate object of attack. Benham did not dispute that position, but told da Gama that inasmuch as the

insurgents had not been awarded belligerent rights he, da Gama, must not interfere with American commerce, and that it he did so it would be at his own peril.

This corresponds with Admiral Benham's action of a few days ago, which the very confused and uncertain dispatches received from Rio magnified into a naval engagement between the United States squadron and the fleet under the command of da Gama. All the *Detroit* was called upon to do was to protect and facilitate the docking of one or more American merchant vessels, and when da Gama found that Benham was in earnest, he fired a gun to leeward, as a signal of compliance with Benham's demands, and allowed the vessels to be docked.

There need be no difficulty in understanding the situation in Brazil so far as this country is concerned. Da Gama, who seems to have superseded Melo, is in command of the insurgent fleet, which seeks to revolutionize Brazil and overthrow President Peixoto. This county, while it observes perfect neutrality between the contending elements, has not accorded belligerent rights to the insurgents, and therefore cannot permit them to interfere with American commerce with a friendly country. We do not protect Brazil and Peixoto from the assaults of da Gama's fleet, but we do protect our own vessels from attack at any and all times.

The action of Admiral Benham is to be commended for its dignity, its coolness and its conservatism. He simply did what he was sent to Rio Janeiro to do, protected and guarded American interests, and the way in which he did entitles him to praise from the American people.

### **367.** *The Sun* (N.Y.), 3 de fevereiro

Um navio da «esquadra de papelão» só conseguiu chegar até Pernambuco. E o jornal estranha que o «atento ministro Mendonça» não soubesse que a marinha americana tinha considerado esta navio não estava nas melhores condições para prestar serviço.

The Brazilian Government must have made a bad bargain her with the owner of the submarine torpedo boat, the name of which, the *Distroyer*, was changed to the *Pirating*. It turned out after the boat had gone to sea, that the machinery was ill-conditioned, that the air pipes leaked that the joints were not properly packed, and that she could not be used in service against the enemy. She had to stay for patching at several points in the West Indies; she has never got any further than Pernambuco; her officers dare not take her to Rio. The failure has caused disappointment in Brazil, as great things were expected to take place when the submarine dynamite Zalinski gun should be brought into action against the rebel navy. We have a report that he Brazilian Government has refused to pay for the boat, and there cannot be any surprise at the report. We believe, however, that a part of the purchase money was paid before she left our shores.

If it be true that the boat and her equipment were "always held in contempt at the Navy Department," we must trust that the department did not conceal its contempt from the Brazilian purchasers. The watchful Minister Mendonça ought to have known it.

### **368.** The Sioux-City Journal, 3 de fevereiro

Now that fuller reports from Brazil have been received, it seems that the United States can hold its own in bloodless warfare with the best of them.

## 369. «Will Not Go the Brazil, The Daily Picayune, 4 de fevereiro

Captain Zalinski, the great dynamite gun expert, has been found incapacitated for active service, and been put on indefinite sick leave, until there is a vacancy for him on the unlimited retired list. His orders, however, do not permit him to leave the country, and hence he will not go to Brazil, as it is said he wanted to do, to superintend the management of his gun in the suppression of the rebellion there. Captain Zalinski's disability follows a partial stroke of paralysis, which he suffered some three years ago.

## **370.** *The Boston Daily Globe*, 5 de fevereiro

Every alleged insurgent victory in Brazil is like the traditional flea — now you see it and now you don't.

#### **371.** «In Brazil", *The Times Democrats*, 6 de fevereiro

Não é porque da Gama foi repreendido pelo almirante americano que os rebeldes estão a renunciar à luta, adverte o jornal nova-iorquino, na opinião do qual estes estão numa melhor situação do que Peixoto.

O editorialista explica os motivos de tal afirmação: o presidente comprou uma frota que não vale quase nada, boa para a sucata, «a mais inútil e a mais impotente frota de navios que jamais se juntou», escreve o diário. Além disso, o sul do país é contra este governo; o navio Itapu foi capturado por Melo; finalmente, Peixoto seria uma marioneta nas mãos do círculo militar à volta dele.

Tudo isto prova que o governo está, tal como os rebeldes, à beira da rendição, conclui o quotidiano que tempera um pouco o seu ponto de vista inicial.

In spite of the great "blow" that the loyalist made at the calling-down of Admiral da Gama by Admiral Benham at the beginning of last week, and their confident assertions that the discouragement of it worked among the insurgent crews would mean a speedy surrender of da Gama and the insurrectionist party, there is, so far, no more indication of that surrender that there was a month or two months ago.

The insurgents, in fact, as far as the actual state of things can be learned with regard to the contending parties, appear to be in much the healthier condition of the two. Melo, it is true, has effected a very puzzling disappearance for the last month or six weeks, nobody seeming to know where or how he is, whether he is afloat or ashore, in health or seriously wounded, alive or dead. The latest news that was heard of him was at the end of last week, when a telegram from Montevideo brought the intelligence that he was at Paranagua, organizing a provisional government there, and that he had for this fleet the cruiser *Republica* and the transports *Iris, Uranus* and *Esperance*. If the loyalists were as strong as they keep vaunting themselves to be they would hardly allow

the insurgents to be thus consolidating the whole of the republic south of Rio against the existing government, as they are doing. In fact, at the present moment, the whole of Brazil to the south of the capital is under the control of the revolutionaries with the single exception of Santos and the district immediately surrounding it.

Everything is, or appears to be, going in favor of the insurgents. It was only last Saturday the news reached this country that the armed transport *Itapu*, which left Montevideo recently with Admiral Gonçalves on board, had been captured by Melo's *Republica*. Gonçalves had been ordered to join Peixoto's squadron, and was bound there when the *Republica* ran him down and made the capture.

Then Peixoto's New York fleet is apparently the most hopeless and the most helpless flotilla of war vessels that ever was got together. The dynamite gun is obviously more of a terror to its friends than to its foes. It has never been tried, as far as we can understand, since it was tried in the West Indies two months ago; and the nearest that it came then to hitting the mark was, when at a range of 1000 yards that it missed the mark by over 300 yards. The *Niteroi* without her dynamite gun would not of course amount to much, for her battery otherwise consists only of a few rapid-fire guns and a number of four and six pounders. She is moreover neither armored nor protected; so that, with her dynamite gun not available, she would not have much of a chance against a vessel of the *Aquidaban* type.

The *Niterol's* mate, known at first as the *Britannia*, then as the *America* and now as the *Andrada*, appears to have gone all to pieces. Her boilers and her tubes are all cracked and burst; she is unable to move out of Pernambuco, and will probably have to be sold soon for old junk. The *Destroyer* is in the same paralytic condition as the *Andrada*, and altogether never did a wheezier flotilla put to sea to engage an enemy. They are more engaged, however, in hugging the harbor than in going to meet the enemy; and, for all the brag and hurrah with which they left this country, they might as well be here now for all the good they have done of are likely to do.

But what above all else shows that the cause of the insurgents is healthier than that of the government is the statement which is repeated with painful iteration that Peixoto would not dare to resign the Presidency for fear of his life. The fact that such a statement is finding expression from Peixoto's own side is clear proof that the question of his stepping down and out has been broached among his own partisans. It is an open secret, indeed, that the terms on which the insurgents will go into arbitration are that Peixoto shall retire; that military rule shall be abolished, and that the government shall be delivered into the hands of a civil junta to administer affairs pending the election — the President henceforth to be a civilian. And it said that the only thing which prevents these terms or demands, which are certainly not exacting, from being made the basis of a treaty of arbitration is the certainty that if Peixoto were to even openly consider them, he would be killed by the

military ring of which he appears to be to a great extent the puppet, and which will on no account loose its bold on the government.

But everything goes to show that the government is at least as near to surrendering as are the insurgents.

## **372.** «The Troubles in Latin America», *The Daily Picayune*, 6 de fevereiro

Nada de interessante nas notícias vindas do Brasil, lamenta o jornal da Luisiana, que constata a inatividade do governo devido à fraqueza ou à falta de dinheiro por causa do bloqueio do porto.

Na segunda parte do artigo, depois de ter excluído que Benham possa servir de mediador entre as duas partes em conflito, o jornal propõe de dar aos rebeldes o estatuto de beligerantes: «isso ajudaria a acabar o conflito mais rapidamente».

The recent reports from Brazil have been of the most uninteresting character. About the only item of consequence which has reached the outside world has been the reported capture of the Government Admiral in trusted with the task of bringing to Rio the fleet the most of which President Peixoto has assembled at Bahia and Pernambuco

There is but little doubt that whatever advantage has been gained recently has been on the side of the rebels, and the inactivity of the Government argues either weakness or a lamentable exhaustion of money through the checks to the inflow of revenue which the blockade of commerce has occasioned

There has been renewed talk within the past few days of efforts on the part of Admiral Benham to arbitrate the troubles. This rumor is probably without foundation, as it is more than likely that since the demonstration made against the insurgents by the American Admiral, a week ago, he is no longer in a position to prove an acceptable arbitrator to the rebels.

There have been reports to the effect that most of the foreign representatives in Rio favor giving the insurgents belligerent rights. This would certainly be a good move, as it would promptly settle their right to blockade ports and otherwise impede the commerce of the country. The rebels now hold all the States south of Rio, with the exception of one. This fact, together with the further fact that they have established a provisional government, fix their right to be considered belligerents. Such a course on the part of the foreign Governments would help to terminate the struggle more speedily.

#### **373.** «The Outlook in Brazil», *The New York Tribune*, 7 de fevereiro

Constitucionalmente, Peixoto não pode ser eleito Presidente, afirma o jornal. Este, no entanto, não tem nenhuma confiança nos dois chefes da revolta que, se forem presidentes, tanto um como o outro, favoreceriam a marinha em prejuízo do exército. Na opinião do articulista, de Melo devia ter esperado e apresentado a sua candidatura, em vez de «procurar derrubar um governo militar com o poderio dos seus navios».

De qualquer forma, a coisa melhor seria um falhanço desta revolta, mas sem uma reeleição do atual chefe do executivo, «que encheu as prisões de inimigos e governou a capital com uma mão de ferro».

The Brazilian Minister's account of the civil war in his country published in The North American Review contains a distinct statement that President Peixoto is not eligible to re-election. Admiral Melo, when he raised the signal for naval revolt in September 5, 1893, issued a manifesto charging the President with violating the Constitution and specifying his conduct in vetoing a bill in relation to Presidential elections. It has been generally assumed that President Peixoto, while he had the constitutional right to veto the measure, acted from personal motives, since the legislation was designed to render a Vice-President who had served as President ineligible for re-election. The Brazilian Minister declares that, while the bill was unconstitutional, the President's conduct was not open to suspicion, since his ineligibility was already established and did not depend upon the enactment of vetoes measure. Referring to the Brazilian Constitution, we find direct confirmation of the Minister's statement in Article XLIII, Section I; "The Vice-President who shall fill the Presidency during the last year of the Presidential term shall not be eligible to the Presidency for the next term of that office."

It is evident that Admiral Melo exaggerated in his manifesto the importance of the veto, and that he and his followers instead of attempting to overthrow military government by naval violence ought to have waited until the President, by proclaiming himself to be a candidate for re-election, should

convict himself of unconstitutional action and expose himself to impeachment. It is also clear that in the elections which are to be held next month. President Peixoto, by withdrawing his name as a candidate in obedience to the Constitution, can restore peace to the distracted country. The election of a new President – and no better candidate could be named than Salvador de Mendonça, the distinguished Minister to the United States – would open a new era of constitutional Republicanism in Brazil.

President Peixoto has filled the prisons with political enemies and governed the capital with an iron hand since the opening of the civil war; but the crisis involved a suspension of the Constitution and the proclamation of martial law. When Admiral Melo trained the *Aquidaban*'s guns upon the city Congress authorized the President to declare a state of siege and to defend the country against treason and revolt. Throughout the civil war he has been the responsible agent of the National Legislature and has been supported by the States of the Federal Union. His overthrow would impair the stability of existing institutions, even if it were not followed by reactionary attempts to restore the Empire. On that account the speedy collapse of the naval revolt is to be earnestly desired by all who have the best interests of the new Republic at heart. Nevertheless, it would be a grave misfortune if the defeat of the insurgents were to be followed by President Peixoto's re-election in defiance of the Constitution, and by any increase in the resources of military government.

An insurgent navy with Congress and the educated classes behind it, as in Chile during the civil war, is something very different from a rebellious fleet with Congress and all the States against it, as in Brazil. Admiral Melo while he was one of President Peixoto's Ministers approved of the removal of Governors of States and of reorganization of the Government of Rio Grande do Sul; and these were the chief political blunders and crimes of the existing Administration. Admiral Saldanha da Gama, with his well-known monarchist preferences, can offer no guarantees which the friends of the new order of political institutions will respect. Either Admirals if elected President would be predisposed to place more dependence upon the navy than upon the army, and thereby to excite jealousies and resentment among officers. A navy committed to a policy of revolt, violence and usurpation is not one whit better than an army employed to coerce citizens at the voting places. Constitutional safeguards with public opinion behind them are indispensable to the operation of republican institutions; and these cannot be established through the lawlessness of naval officers acting in utter disregard of the constituted authority.

## **374**. *The Morning Call*, 7 de fevereiro

O jornal interroga-se sobre as intenções de da Gama que ameaça bombardear a cidade, mesmo depois de ter sido obrigado a submeter-se ao almirante Benham.

The situation at Rio is becoming quite interesting, owing to the fresh move which da Gama has taken. The rebel admiral has given notice of intention to bombard Rio at the expiration of forty-eight hours, and he expects all foreigners to clear out of the way or take the consequences. This is somewhat cool procedure, especially after Admiral Benham's action in protecting American vessel discharging cargoes. Da Gama is not a belligerent recognized by the powers, and consequently any threat to blockade and seize neutral ships or hinder them in any way within the harbor may be resented by the war vessels of the flag affected. Were he recognized as belligerent he would have a standing to overhaul neutral craft and uphold a blockade, but as Brazil is at peace with all foreign powers the harbor is open to commerce. Perhaps, da Gama has hopes that he and his fleet may be taken care of by Admiral Benham. A surrender would end the war.

## **375.** *The Sun* (N. Y.), 7 de fevereiro

Nota sobre as eleições presidenciais e a notícia da eventual demissão de Peixoto.

The election for President of Brazil ought to be held on the first of next month; but President Peixoto does not seem to take any interest in the fact, and, unless the rebellion is brought to an end very soon, it will be impossible to hold the election in all the states at the appointed time. We have had a United Press dispatch that the rebel Admiral has offered terms of reconciliation, one of which is that Peixoto shall surrender office for the brief period in which is entitled to hold it and permit the Presidency to fall into the hands of his

constitutional successor. This dispatch comes soon after we received the information that PEIXOTO is desirous of resigning; and if he be possessed of this desire, we do not see why he and DA GAMA cannot reach an agreement in accordance with it. It is true that such an ending of the war would not be glorious for either side; but that is a thing of no account, as neither side has won any glory in the course of the war.

## **376.** «Ballots Instead of Bullets», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 8 de fevereiro

Sobre as eleições presidenciais.

The holding of a presidential election in Brazil on March1 should be followed by peace. The insurgent object to Peixoto and his management of the government. They revolted because he vetoed a bill affecting the presidential election and they protested against what they believed to be a violation of the constitution. According to law he election for president, vice president and members of congress is to be held on March 1. Vice president Peixoto has issued a decree under the law calling for the election. Whatever he may have done in the past, he is now actin in obedience to the constitution. He is not a candidate for re-election, and could not be without disregarding the law. The candidate of the government is, Dr. Prudente de Moraes, president of the senate, and Dr. Vitorino Pereira is a candidate for the vice-presidential nomination. It is possible that these men will be satisfactory to all parties. The

dispatches do not agree on this point. News from two sources is contradictory. One dispatch says that no opposition to these men is probable, and other announces the belief in Rio de Janeiro that the extreme republicans will nominate Rui Barbosa. But whether Barbosa is nominated or not, the election should settle all differences. The people of Brazil will express their choice, and it would be folly for da Gama or Peixoto to contend for the will of the minority. Each side now claims the sympathy of the country. After the election they will know what the people thing of them.

#### **377.** *The Sioux-City Journal*, 8 de fevereiro.

How can the insurgents of Brazil expect the rights of belligerent when they are clearly not belligerents.

#### **378.** «In Brazil», *The Times-Democrats*, 9 de fevereiro

Agora que Peixoto vai deixar o poder, porque o seu mandato chegou ao fim, a principal exigência dos revoltosos será atendida, escreve o jornal. Este considera que a sua recusa em assinar o decreto que declarava que o presidente e o vice-presidente inelegíveis par um segundo mandato, como a causa principal da revolta. O diário nova-iorquino espera num rápido regresso à paz, «para grande satisfação de todos os que tem relações comerciais com a grande República Sul Americana. » O Times Democrat insiste sobre um outro ponto: no futuro, os militares têm de deixar o lugar aos civis.

It begins to look as if the President of Brazil were likely to terminate the civil war now going forward in that country, not by crushing the rebels nor being crushed by them, nor even by direct arbitration, but by granting indirectly what the rebels have demanded and have been fighting for.

We saw, writing on the subject several days ago<sup>35</sup>, that the terms on which the insurgents were willing to go into arbitration were (1) that Peixoto should retire; (2) that the government should be delivered into the hands of a civil junta to administer affairs pending the election; and (3) that military rule in Brazil should be abolished — the President henceforth to be a civilian.

Now if the dispatch which we published yesterday from Rio Janeiro be true, in which it is stated that Peixoto had issued a decree calling for general elections on March 1, when a President, Vice-President and members of Congress should be chosen, and determine the state of siege on Feb. 25, it will be seen that the principal demand of the insurgents are to be agreed to. President Peixoto will, it is true, not retire; but as his presidential term will expire on March, and as he no longer seeks re-election, his relinquishment of office will be secured, even if not by the retirement route on which the insurgents have been insisting. Nor will there be any need for the government to be placed in the hands of a civil junta to administer affairs pending election; for, martial law being lifted a week prior to the date of the election, the election

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Cf. Texto 371.

will no doubt be conducted on March 1 in accordance with the usual methods, and without prejudice to either party to the present dispute.

Peixoto, having been brought to see the absolute necessity of voluntarily yielding up the Presidency, will not interfere, we may be sure, to force upon the country at the point of the bayonet high officials not approved by the people. It was Peixoto's obstinacy in refusing to sign a bill declaring the ineligibility of President and Vice President of the republic of re-election, coupled with his disposition to at all times rely on the military, instead of the civil, arm for support when any trouble was afoot, that was the original and only cause of the insurrection; and his voluntary surrender of the Presidency at the stated term and his withdrawal of the state of siege indicate that he has "repented him" of his perverseness and dictatorial attitude, and that he will allow republican methods to prevail.

Dr. Morales [sic!], who is mentioned as the favorite candidate for the Presidency, is President of Senate, a civilian, neutral in the existing dispute, and thoroughly trusted on both sides. His election to the highest office in the republic would indicate that Peixotoism had been abandoned, and that there existed no further grievance on the part of the insurgents to fight for.

If, therefore, contrary to the usual mendacious tenor of dispatches from Brazil, yesterday's dispatch from Rio should prove to be in a line with fact, the war will certainly come to an end (if a thing which never had properly any beginning may under any circumstances be properly said to have an end) — to the great delight of all people who have business dealings with the big South

American republic, albeit to the grievous disappointment of that more "select circle" of people whose one interest in the contest for the last three months has been to ascertain for certain, by trial in actual warfare, whether the dynamite gun is a success or a fraud.

#### **379.** New York Tribune, 9 de fevereiro

Prudente de Morais é um candidato civil e a sua eleição seria um sinal positivo.

Dr. Prudente de Moraes is named in dispatches from Brazil as a possible if not probable successor of President Peixoto. He was one of the leading revolutionist who overthrew the Imperial government in Sao Paulo when news was received of the uprising in Rio de Janeiro in November 1899. As the leaders of the Provisional Government of that State, which ranks highest for intelligence and industry in the Federal Union, he exerted great influence in Republican councils; and as President of the Senate he stands today, under the letter of the Constitution, as the next in the line of succession to the Presidency. He is unquestionably one of the ablest and most progressive men in Brazilian public life, and as a civilian, without military or naval affiliations, his election to the Presidency would be a sign of promise in that distracted country.

#### **380.** San Francisco Chronicle, 9 de fevereiro

Esta «guerra chata» está a durar demasiado tempo porque, nem dum lado, nem do outro, há bons atiradores!

When the noisy war in Brazil is over it would be a good think for the Government do establish a school of gunnery and import some foreign experts as teachers of the art. Thousands of dollars worth of good powder have been burned in Rio harbor, but very little damage has been inflicted upon either side by cannonading. In the same number of shot had been fired by American, French or English gunners there would have been nothing left of either side. In fact, the war would have ended months ago it the insurgents or the Government forces had had good marksman in forts or war vessels.

#### **381.** The Boston Daily Globe, 9 de fevereiro

If by resigning his presidency in favor of Moraes the warlike Peixoto can restore peace to Brazil the present chief of the regular government in that distracted country has a glorious opportunity to play the patriot's part.

## **382.** «The Latin American Wars», *The Daily Picayune*, 10 de fevereiro

Este artigo dedicado também à situação nas Honduras e no Chile, apresenta uma situação demasiado favorável aos rebeldes brasileiros.

[...] In Brazil the situation has not apparently changed to any extent. All the successes recently reported have been accredited to the rebels, and President Peixoto has receded from is former position and agreed to call an election for President in March, he himself not being a candidate. The long-promised attack upon the rebels by the Government fleet has not yet materialized, and, according to last accounts, the vessels were still at Bahia and Pernambuco. The rebels are reported to be preparing to make an attack upon Santos, the second most important port of Brazil. The loss of Santos would be a crushing blow to the Government, as it would occasion the loss of a large part of the revenues, the custom-house at Santos being a prolific provider. [...]

#### **383**. *The Times Democrat*, 10 de fevereiro

Não pode haver interferências nas políticas internas dos outros estados.

It is the right and the business of the people of Hawaii, as it is of the people of Brazil, Chile and every other foreign country, to settle their own quarrels, establish their own governments and choose their own rulers. That is a cardinal principle of national sovereignty and independence which we claim for ourselves and must concede to every foreign power, however weak it may be. Strict adherence to it is essential to the peace of the United States by keeping the country free from mischievous foreign complications which may

lead to war. Congress should announce this as the policy of the nation and then let Hawaii alone *New York Herald* 

### 384. St. Paul Daily Globe, 10 de fevereiro

Brazil is to hold a presidential election on the first of the month. Admiral da Gama, although a leader of one of the parties, will not vote, owing to the difficulty he would have in effecting a landing for that purpose.

## **385.** *The Daily Picayune*, 11 de fevereiro

As Italy, Great Britain and the United States have failed to recognize the insurgents of Brazil as belligerents, those sea-and-land gentlemen at Rio might as well stop their fighting.

## 386. The Sioux City Journal, 11 de fevereiro

President Peixoto seems to manifest a desire to let go in Brazil.

#### **387.** «Barbosa Furioso», *The New York Times*, 12 de fevereiro

Longo artigo que ironiza sobre o papel de Rui Barbosa que defende os revoltosos e acusa Peixoto de crimes, desde o seu confortável exílio na

capital argentina. O articulista desmantela todos os argumentos expostos pelo ex-ministro da Fazenda, nomeadamente sobre o republicanismo de Saldanha da Gama e reitera a importância de nenhuma grande potência ter reconhecido o estatuto de beligerante aos revoltosos.

Os conservadores ingleses —para os quais a «restauração da monarquia no Brasil teria sido um motivo de regozijo», teriam concedido este estatuto. «Agora é demasiado tarde»: com efeito, afirma o jornalista, depois da reação firme do marechal Benham a 29 de janeiro, a aventura de Saldanha da Gama parece mesmo sem saída, aniquilando as últimas esperanças dos monárquicos europeus.

None of the literature of the Brazilian insurrection has been more diverting than that portion of it contributed by Rui Barbosa. The personal courage of Barbosa has been questioned, but his prowess with the pen makes up for is want of it with the sword. Night or day, this warrior stands ready to imbrue his hands in ink for the furtherance of the insurgent cause. So just at this moment, when da Gama has sorest need of him, Barbosa rushes, not into the field, but into print, with a terrible swaggering dispatch or manifesto to *The Herald*. According to him, the insurgents have now thousands of troops in Rio Grande do Sul, a prodigious quantity of Krupp artillery, the aid and sympathy of an overwhelming insurgent sentiment in San Paulo, and of an organized revolution in Santa Catarina and Parana. They are accordingly about to venture upon a "decisive battle which will soon rescue South Brazil from the dictator's grasp".

In his own country Rui Barbosa is considered an accomplished liar, and the assertions of his dispatch bear testimony to the diligence with which he has cultivated the faculty of large, free-handed mendacity. The insurgent thousands, the Krupp artillery, the organized movement, and the contemplated battle are, of course, invented for the United States market. They will find ready credence wherever the moon is still held to be of cheese-factory origin.

The portion of Barbosa's dispatch is intended to sustain his claim that "the insurgents have attained the right of belligerents in South Brazil." He pronounces this claim to be "indisputable", but, well knowing that it will be disputed, no to say laughed at, he proceeds to make an appeal ad misericordiam, declaring that Peixoto is persecuting citizens suspected of insurgents sympathies with a cruelty that grows every day more ferocious and unbridled. Moreover, this flagrant despot is issuing clandestine and unauthorized paper money, which he shamelessly employs in the attempts to uphold the Government. As to the paper money and the shooting of insurgents and traitors, Peixoto would probably reply in the language of Secretary Seward<sup>36</sup> in respect of the Queens's<sup>37</sup> proclamation recognizing the belligerency of the Confederate States that "No nation animated by loyal sentiments and inspired by a generous ambition can ever suffer itself to debate with parties within or without a policy of self-preservation".

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> William Henry Seward (1801-1872), foi Secretário de Estado durante as presidências de Abraham Lincoln e Andrew Johnson (1861-1869) e, por conseguinte, durante a Guerra de Secessão.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Trata-se da rainha Vitória.

To extol yourself and decry your enemy is always safe tactics. Accordingly, Barbosa declares that "the monarchical tendencies imputed to da Gama and Melo are sheer nonsense," their innocent and laudable intention being merely to restore the laws of a republic; while the elections ordered for March 1 by the bloodthirsty despot, Peixoto, "will prove to be a farce that will be carried out to deceive foreigners». It is clear that Rui Barbosa puts a high estimate on the capacity of foreigners to be deceived. The "foreigners" of this country at least have not forgotten da Gama's manifesto of Dec. 9, in which he declared that "the logic as well as the justice of events would authorize the restoration by the force of arms" of the Brazilian Empire. This indiscreet public avowal was not the first, nor is it the most conclusive, of the many evidences that re-establishment of the monarchy, and not the maintenance of the laws of the republic, was the ambition that led da Gama into a treasonable and futile project.

From his remote post of observation in Buenos Aires, advantageous for the security of his person, but not so for the accuracy of his information, Barbosa sends this argument and appeal some days too late for it to do any good. The fate of da Gama, his cause having long been apparently hopeless, was decided when the *Detroit* sent a one-pound shot into the stern of one of his war ships and Admiral Benham declared that, with force if necessary, he should maintain for American merchant vessels free access to the wharves of Rio. And Admiral Benham's action and declaration have been approved by his Government. The policy we have pursued toward the insurgents will most

likely prove to be decisive, since it must prevent their recognition as belligerents by any commercial power. It is highly improbable that, be recognizing da Gama's belligerency, either Great Britain, Germany or France will blind themselves to respect his cobweb blockade, leaving the United States trading with Rio. Da Gama cannot justify his blockade lawfully, since he was no lawful status, and he cannot make it efficient in fact.

No doubt England, or at least a powerful party in England, would have welcomed any reasonable pretext for according belligerent rights. There is a good reason to believe that the restoration of the monarchy in Brazil would be a cause of rejoicing in the England Foreign Office. It is now too late for that. Present conditions are likely to continue until the election of Moraes on March 1 puts an end to the foolish business by giving da Gama a decent excuse for scuttling out to save his neck.

# **388.** «Brazil and Hawaii — A Contrast», *The Cincinnati Inquirer*, 13 de fevereiro

Nenhum país reconheceu aos rebeldes brasileiros o estatuto de beligerante. Por conseguinte, têm de ser tratados como piratas, como fez o almirante Benham, cuja ação foi aprovada pelo presidente americano. Por conseguinte, as grandes potências têm de intervir contra eles, para proteger a liberdade de navegação e de comércio, afirma o jornal.

No Havai, denuncia o jornalista, Cleveland age de maneira totalmente diferente. contra o governo legal, para repor a rainha no trono. Inspirando-se na pequena comédia onde uma das personagens foi apanhada com as cascas dos ovos roubados nas algibeiras, aconselha um futuro candidato à presidência a não negar as evidências.

There is a rebellion in Brazil. It is strong enough to make that Government considerable trouble. It has made other nations considerable trouble by vexing their commerce in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro, and yet it has not assumed such proportions as to secure any recognition of belligerent rights at the hands of a single foreign Government. When we speak of a belligerent, we mean a military organization entitled to certain rights which are accorded by neutral nations to each party in a public war. All recognized nations become belligerents when they make war or have war made upon them. Their rights as belligerents cannot be denied them. But when a rebellious faction in a nation attempts to overthrow of Government, international law gives it no recognition. If its power reaches such proportions as, in the judgment of foreign nations, enables it to maintain itself in war, such nations accord to it the rights of belligerents and assume toward it the obligation of neutrals. No nation has at yet deemed the rebellious organization in Brazil worthy of recognition as a belligerent. It is merely an insurrection and not a public war. Any interference with commerce by its vessels is, by the law of nations, an act of piracy. The legal status of Admiral DA GAMA is that of a pirate chief. Admiral BENHAM's resolute conduct in so treating him is being applauded throughout the world, and British commercial interests are complaining because they have not been protected in Brazilian waters in like manner. With most commendable promptness President CLEVELAND, through his Secretary of the Navy, has approved the course of Admiral Benham. That brave officer has liberated the commerce of the world from the dangers and inconveniences with which it has been beset in the waters of Brazil.

How different the conditions at Honolulu! There there is a stable Government, which has maintained itself for more than a year, and against which there exist no rebellion. There is no pretended Government in Hawaii in opposition to one recognized by the United States, in common with other nations. The monarchy which was overthrown in January, 1893, makes no sign. It is as much a thing of the past as the Stuart dynasty in England or the Bourbon family. In Hawaii there are many Kanakas who would be glad to see the restoration of Liliuokalani. The ex-Queen would herself be well pleased to be reinvested with royal power, as would the heir apparent of the STUARTS in England and the Bourbon in France. But no attempt is being made, either in England, France or Hawaii to overthrow the existing Government. The President of the United States has been engaged since the 18<sup>th</sup> of last October in active, energetic efforts to instigate rebellion in Hawaii against the existing Government and for the restoration of the monarchy, but he has utterly failed. The United States Minister, Mr. Willis<sup>38</sup>, is the only known rebel against the Hawaiian Government. Unless the President shall recognize Mr. WILLIS as a belligerent of the little nation are likely to go on smoothly. The latest accounts received from there say that general tranquility prevails

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Albert Shelby Willis (1843-1897) é ministro dos Estados Unidos no Arquipélago de novembro de 1893 a janeiro de 1897.

Old playgoers will remember the little comedy of the "Jubilee House". In it there is a boy's school containing, as usual, some very bad boys. Of these the ringleader was Bob Nettles, while the fag was Waddilove. Predatory excursions were frequently made to a neighboring farm for the stealing of eggs. The boys sucked the eggs and made Waddilove put the shells in his pocket. One day the farmer came angrily to the schoolmaster for redress. Having made his complaint, each boy stoutly denied any knowledge of the offense and submitted to a search. When it came Waddilove's turn he whimpered out. "Please, sir, what is a egg" and the next instant his pockets were turned inside out and the broken shells of the stolen eggs fell upon the floor.

*Moral*: If ever you should become President of the United States let the case of Weddlove be a warning to you. Never get Congress to say that you have not interfered with the domestic affairs of Hawaii when there is a telltale message of jour own on the files showing that you have so interfered.

### **389**. *The Daily Picayune*, 13 de fevereiro

The last battle lie from Brazil announces the killing of seven hundred men. There is a hope that the disturbers of the peace will be wasted in due time, and that the country will be populated with more peaceful and better people.

## **390.** «The Brazilian Revolution», *The Daily Picayune*, 14 de fevereiro

O artigo narra, não sem exagero, que os rebeldes obtiveram recentemente vários sucessos militares, quer na zona do Rio, quer no sul do país e que Custódio de Melo está a preparar um ataque ao porto de Santos e, a seguir, à capital.

Por outro lado, acrescenta o jornal, Peixoto só estaria a fortalecer a zona do Rio de Janeiro, sem se preocupar com um eventual ataque terrestre. Além disso, sublinha e com razão o jornalista, os navios comprados nos Estados Unidos não têm condições para combater contra a frota rebelde.

Por conseguinte, avisa o editorialista, ou o governo toma medidas fortes ou a revolução vai triunfar.

According to recent advices from South America, the long period of inactivity shown by the contending factions in Brazil has given place to a more rapid march of events. The rebel fleet in Rio harbor has been very active recently. Several additional islands commanding the Government fortifications at Niteroi have been occupied, and on Friday last the rebels landed in force in the neighborhood of the town of Niteroi, and, after a short conflict, succeeded in destroying the Government batteries. Although the insurgent forces were eventually forced to retire and re-embark on board their ships, they met with great success in destroying the Government batteries and killed large numbers of the loyal troops.

In this battle in the neighborhood of Niteroi the Brazilian displayed a greater degree of bravery and dash that has yet been shown since the commencement of hostilities. It appears that Admiral da Gama led the assault in person and paid the penalty of his imprudence and excess of zeal by getting

himself severely wounded. Should his injuries prove fatal, the cause of the insurgents would be given a severe blow.

In the southern part of Brazil the insurgents have recently made great progress. They have now complete control of the States of Santa Catarina and Parana, and in Rio Grande do Sul the Government forces are being steadily driven back

Admiral Melo is conducting operation in person along the southern coast of Brazil, and, at last accounts, he was preparing to attack Santos. The insurgent leader's plan is evidently to push a large land force northward, through Sao Paulo, to attack Rio de Janeiro by land, the war vessels cooperating from the sea. Such a force is known to be mustering, and, as far as is reported, President Peixoto, aside from fortifying Rio, is making no preparations to meet a hostile advance by land.

The formidable fleet of war vessels, so frequently reported as having been ordered to the scene of hostilities by President Peixoto, has not yet put in an appearance, and it now looks as if theses vessels are considered too weak to cope with the insurgent ships. The Government evidently distrusts the loyalty of the crews of these vessels, and has recently removed all the commanding officers of the vessels gathered at Montevideo.

It would, therefore, seem that the Government of President Peixoto is gradually losing ground, and that unless more energetic steps are soon taken to meet the rebels by both land and sea, it will be too late to prevent the complete success of the revolution.

## **391.** «"The Terrible war in Brazil"», *The Daily Picayune*, 17 de fevereiro

As notícias telegráficas que chegam do Brasil são pouco fiáveis, lamenta o jornal da Luisiana: alguns comunicam que Saldanha da Gama está gravemente ferido, outros, pelo contrário, que se encontra de boa saúde; quanto a Custódio de Melo, ele estaria «em vários lugares ao mesmo tempo». O jornalista critica também o relato sensacionalista dado por muitos correspondentes da intervenção do Almirante Benham, no dia 29 de janeiro. Na realidade, os americanos deram só «um tiro de advertência» e não houve combate naval.

Nesta guerra civil, gasta-se muita pólvora, mas há poucas perdas. No entanto, ironiza o diário da Nova Orleães, os muitos relatos dos correspondentes de guerra fariam ficar verde de inveja até o «imortal Archibald Forbes<sup>39</sup>».

Finalmente, conclui o editorialista, as únicas informações dignas de confiança são aquelas provenientes das capitais argentina uruguaia ou britânica, também favoráveis aos revoltosos.

One of the most ludicrous features connected with the civil war in progress in Brazil is the character of the telegraphic information emanating from Rio de Janeiro, purporting to describe the course of events there. The special correspondence from Rio daily contains items of the most sensational

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Archibald Forbes, é um célebre correspondente de guerra escocês.

character, many of which are utterly absurd on their face, others still are absolutely untrue, being afterwards flatly contradicted.

No later than the present week the world has been informed daily that Admiral da Gama has been suffering from a wound<sup>40</sup> received during the fight in the neighborhood of Niteroi, Friday last, and some dispatches reported that his life was despaired of. In yesterday morning's dispatches it was stated in one place that the Admiral was at the point of death, and in another was a complete denial that the Admiral had been wounded at all, and a statement that he was in his usual good health.

The report concerning the whereabouts of Admiral Melo have been ludicrous in the extreme. Almost daily the dispatches report him to be in several different places at once, so that it is practically impossible to form the faintest idea as to where the insurgent leader actually is. In describing the demonstration made by Admiral Benham in Rio harbor, some weeks ago, the dispatches described a most wonderful succession of events, varying all the way from a battle with numbers of killed and wounded to the final surrender of the insurgent fleet into the hands of the American Admiral. It has since been demonstrated that only one shot was actually fired by the Americans, and that was a warning shot across the bows of the rebel flagship, and, as for surrender, no such course was even dreamt of by the rebel Admiral.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> O próprio *Daily Picayune* reproduz esta informação no seu comentário de dia 14. Cf. Texto 390.

The civil war in Brazil, with its vast waste of powder and few casualties, is funny enough in itself; but the way in which the special war correspondents are working up the event for the benefit of the American reading public would make the immortal Archibald Forbes himself turn green of envy. It is very much to be hoped that nobody is paying cable tolls for all these special Rio dispatches, because better and more reliable reports could be prepared at home at no expense at all.

The only reliable news received of the events which have transpired in Brazil have been the dispatches coming via Montevideo and Buenos Aires, or via London. According to these accounts the rebels are making steady, though slow, progress, and they have the best chance of ultimate success.

## **392.** *The Sun* (N.Y.), 18 de fevereiro

The Sun reitera o que escreveu em dezembro: o ministro do Brasil na capital americana seria um presidente ideal.

We agree with the *Tribune's*<sup>41</sup> remark that "no better candidate for President of Brazil could be named than Salvador DE Mendonça, the distinguished Minister to the United States, whose election would open a new era of constitutional republicanism in Brazil". This very able diplomatist and statesman, whom *The Sun* spoke a month ago<sup>42</sup> as the right man for President

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> Cf. Texto 373.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> Trata-se de dois artigos publicados a 4 e a 10 de dezembro. (cf. Textos 265 e 267)

of Brazil, is peculiarly fitted to fill the office at this critical time. He is a friend of Gen. Peixoto, the President in service, and friend of Admiral DA GAMA, the leader of the rebellion; he is in favor both with the army and the navy; he is a civilian, and the great body of the Brazilian people are desirous that the President shall be a civilian; he has not taken any part in the quarrel of political leaders or rival parties by which Brazil has been distracted for years past; he is a conciliator, a stanch republican, and a patriot.

By the dispatch from Rio printed on Thursday we learned that the Presidential election is to be held on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, at the time appointed in the Constitution, and that the only candidate yet named is Senator DE MORAES, who took the place of PEIXOTO as President of the Senate. We do not believe that this shuffling politician and sharper would stand any chance of election to the great office if Dr. DE MENDONÇA, who is the ardent friend of the United States, were put in nomination.

## **393.** «The Progress of Affairs in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 19 de fevereiro

O jornal da Luisiana, depois de ter sublinhado como a febre amarela fez muito mais mortos do que a guerra civil, escreve que os rebeldes obtiveram algumas vitórias importantes. Fala mesmo de um ataque sobre São Paulo que podia, em caso de sucesso, ameaçar a própria capital. Do outro lado, Peixoto não tem confiança nas tripulações dos seus navios, constata o editorialista que prevê uma guerra ainda longa com uma possível derrota do governo.

According to the dispatches from South America of the past few days, the yellow fever has worked more damage and excited more alarm in Rio de Janeiro that the existing civil strife. While the rebel warships have been inactive,

"Yellow Jack" has claimed an increasing number of victims daily, and the dread disease has even attacked the foreign warships in the harbor. As yet it has not been authoritatively announced that the disease has appeared on any of the United States war vessels, but Admiral Benham has evidently considered the danger of infection imminent, as he has ordered all the vessels but one, the flagship *San Francisco*, to leave Rio for neighboring stations, whence they could be promptly summoned if needed.

It is greatly to be regretted that so many of our warships should be exposed to the danger of infection from such a disease as yellow fever, but it is absolutely necessary that adequate force should be maintained in the neighborhood of Rio to protect American interests, no matter what the risk may be that the officers and men of the naval service are exposed to. Admiral Benham is wisely distributing his force so that the ships, while exposed as little as possible to infection, may be readily available in case of need.

While operations are apparently at a standstill at Rio, events are moving rapidly elsewhere in Brazil. The insurgents have made great progress in Rio Grande do Sul, and, in addition to the State of Santa Catarina, they also now hold the State of Panama. This latter State was attacked by a force led by Admiral Melo, and the Government forces were driven out completely. Flushed

with victory, the rebels have also invaded the State of Sao Paulo, and have already won several engagements there. Should Sao Paulo fall into the hands of the regels, as now seems likely, the State of Rio de Janeiro and the capital itself would be seriously menaced.

With the southern States of Brazil partially or entirely hostile to the Government, and with several of the more northerly provinces disaffected, the position of the Brazilian Government is becoming serious. The fleet of President Peixoto appears to be entirely useless, as, owing to the doubtful loyalty of the officers of the ships, the President is afraid to allow any of them to quit the ports where they are now stationed. Recently the crews of the Government monitor *Bahia* were dismissed and their places supplied by soldiers. This angered to officers of the vessel, and they have refused to serve unless the old crew, whose loyalty is under suspicion, is returned to duty.

Despite the hope so frequently expressed in official circles in this country that the trouble in Brazil would soon and by the total defeat of the rebels, the prospect now appears to be that the rebellion may prove successful eventually, but than the war must be continued for some time.

# **394.** «An Ill-considered Criticism», *The Washington Post*, 19 de fevereiro

O Washington Post cita um comentário publicado pelo londrino Statist que, embora aceite a legitimidade da ação do marechal Benham para defender os interesses comerciais do seu país, espera que não haja interferência americana no Brasil. O editorialista recorda ao seu colega inglês os princípios da doutrina Monroe: os Estados Unidos não vão intervir neste conflito interno, mas «nunca vão tolerar a restauração da monarquia no Brasil através de intrigas estrangeiras ou pela importação de Portugal ou de qualquer outro país europeu».

The London *Statist*<sup>43</sup> is greatly concerned. It had hoped better things of President Cleveland than that he should authorize Admiral Benham to interfere in Rio, "not merely to protect American shipping, but also do defeat a monarchical restoration". It says further:

Every government, of course, must decide for itself whether it will recognize insurgents in a foreign country as belligerents, and every government also has the right to decide for itself how far it will go and how much it will use in protecting its own subjects abroad. So far, then, as the protection of American citizens is concerned, we have nothing to object to the action of Admiral Benham. But, we did hope that the bad old practice of governments interfering in foreign countries to uphold or restore any particular regime was abandoned.

By what authority does our London contemporary assert or assume that President Cleveland is indulging in a "bad old practice" or interfering to uphold or restore any particular regime?

It is the general opinion of the British ship-owners and shipmasters that Admiral Benham's course at Rio was highly commendable; that it recognized a commercial necessity; that it was the exercise of a just and patriotic duty. What is the secret of the *Statist*'s uneasiness in this matter? But it gives away the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Semanário publicado em Londres entre 1878 e 1894.

whole point of its contention when it says that whether the government of Brazil should be republican or monarchical is "something for the Brazilian themselves to settle, not for foreigners".

That is exactly the line with the policy of the United States. This government has taken no action —has indicates no action — to justify even the suspicion that it proposes to dictate what sort of government shall follow the revolution. It simply insists that American merchant ships, engaged in legitimate trade, shall not be barred from landing and discharging their cargoes by the menace of the guns of a non-belligerent power.

The Statist will do well to remember, however, that the United States will never countenance the restoration of a monarchy in Brazil trough foreign intrigue or by the importation from Portugal or any other European country of an imperial regime that has once been banished from the western hemisphere. The Monroe doctrine contemplates no meddling with the domestic affairs of no nation on the continent. It is merely a warning to foreign powers to keep hands off.

#### **395.** «Ready to Fight», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 19 de fevereiro

Segundo o jornal de Brooklyn, a guerra civil está perto do fim: o Niterói deve entrar em ação e desferir o derradeiro golpe aos rebeldes. Por outro lado, Peixoto retirou-se das eleições presidenciais, «removendo desse modo a causa principal deste conflito».

It begins to look as if there would soon be a battle between the rebel fleet in the harbor at Rio de Janeiro and the dynamite cruiser Niteroi, which Vice President bought and had fitted out at this port. The *Niteroi* has arrived at the entrance of the harbor and is ready to fire on any vessel which come out. The intention of the government when this vessel was bought was to pin the rebel fleet in the harbor with the aid of the loyal forts at the entrance. The Aquidaban soon showed now easily it could pass the forts, and the plan was abandoned for a time. It was suspected that the man in command of the fortifications was not loyal, and he was removed. Now, with a new man in charge on land and the Niteroi at sea, an attempt will doubtless be made to carry out the original program. The rebel fort Villegagnon is to be attacked and reduced by the dynamite gun on board of the *Niteroi*. Then the vessel will fire upon the rebel fleet from the shelter of the ruined walls of the fort. Admiral da Gama was seriously wounded in a recent attempt to land some of his forces, and his men are discouraged. The present opportunity is a good one for the government. Peixoto's friends have nominated a civilian for the presidency, thus removing the case which led to the revolt. There is no longer danger that Peixoto will violate the constitution. There should be peace in Brazil in a few days.

#### **396.** *The Boston Daily Globe*, 19 de fevereiro

Yellow Jack may yet call a halt to those warring factions in Brazil. He is more potent that the heaviest gun afloat, and no armor, however thick, can bar the way to his coming. Our cruisers will do well to give the fever the widest possible berth.

# **397.** «The Troubles in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 22 de fevereiro

O articulista, que dá uma imagem demasiado otimista sobre a situação militar dos rebeldes, não tem a certeza que as eleições presidenciais de dia 1 de março possam pôr um ponto final no conflito.

Events appear to be now moving more rapidly in Brazil, although, from all indications, the civil war is by no means nearing an end. The fact is now leaking out that the fight at Armação, near Niteroi, ten days ago, was as much more serious as well as brilliant affair than was at first supposed. In the engagement the Government forces lost more than 700 men, while the insurgent loss was more than 200. The rebels destroyed the batteries at Armação, and burned the arsenals, and although they were unable to hold the captured position, owing to insufficient numbers, they accomplished the purpose of attack.

The recent dispatches declare that the insurgents are now in full possession of the State of Parana and Santa Catarina, in addition to possessing a firm foothold in Rio Grande do Sul, and are rapidly advancing through the State of Sao Paulo in the direction of Santos. Several important engagements have been fought, but the progress of the rebels has apparently not been checked. The important port of Santos is now blockaded from the sea by a rebel

fleet, which will probably make an attack upon the town as soon as the land forces invest it

The loss of Santos would prove a serious blow to the Government, hence every effort is being made to re-enforce the garrison there. The dynamite cruiser *Niteroi*, which has been so long idle at Bahia and Pernambuco, has at length put an appearance outside of Rio, and, having taken on troops, has sailed for Santos. Yesterday's dispatches reported that the *Aquidaban* and *Republica*, the most powerful of the rebel ships, had gone in search of the *Niteroy*. The latter vessel is not capable of coping with either of the two powerful insurgent ships, hence her sole dependence is her ability to keep out of their way.

The Presidential elections will take place in Brazil in March, and some people claim that the election of the Government candidate by an overwhelming majority will put an end to the rebellion. It is to be hoped that this will prove the case, but how it can be expected to alter matters in any way is not very apparent to the outside world.

### 398. «In the Right Place», The Morning Call, 23 de fevereiro

There may be a difference of opinion in regard to the legal justification of Admiral Benham's act of relief to an English merchant vessel in the Rio harbor, but most Americans will be interested in the outcome. It will tend to bring out the true relations which exist between the British Government and the

Brazilian insurgents. It has been suspected that the insurrection was favored by England, and the ground of such favoritism has been found in the American reciprocity treaty which have injured English trade in Brazil.

#### **399.** «Da Gama's Position», San Francisco Chronicle, 24 de fevereiro

O diário californiano parece dar crédito a uma notícia que acusa Saldanha da Gama de duplicidade em relação a Peixoto e acusa Londres de ajudar financeiramente os revoltosos. No caso duma vitória destes, escreve o jornal, «o Brasil tornar-se-ia uma província tributaria da Grã-Bretanha».

The Rio correspondent of the New York *World* writes that there are many people in Rio de Janeiro who believe that Saldanha da Gama is the Benedict Arnold<sup>44</sup> of Brazil. They declare that he led Peixoto to believe that his hostility was only a blind to deceive Melo, and promises that if Peixoto would give him guns and ammunition he would burn powder at the shrine of the republic.

Peixoto gave him guns and ammunition, and with Government money and supplies da Gama made Cobras islands impregnable, and then turned his guns on Peixoto, the friend whom he had deceived and betrayed. He managed to practically supersede Melo in the command of the insurgent fleet and to assume le leadership of the rebellion. In this it is asserted that he has been aided by the English, two big English companies supplying him with money

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Durante a Guerra de Independência americana, Benedict Arnold (1841-1801), desertou para o Exército britânico.

and ammunition in return for valuable concessions and land grants which have been promised in the event of the success of the insurgents.

This may be only a canard, but certainly there has been a great deal of mystery about the source of supply of money and munitions of war for the rebel fleet. There has never appeared to ben any scarcity of money, and it has been recognized universally that the sinews of war must come from some outside source, since Melo and da Gama and their followers had no money of their own and could not draw on Brazil. The very fact that the insurgent fleet has been kept together so long in a state of efficiency would indicate the possibility, at least, of this English story being true.

Should the rebellion succeed by the aid of British sold and influence, The Brazilian republic would become tributary province of Great Britain. What the effect of such a thing would be is not easy to say. England tried something of the same sort in Argentine, and the result was disastrous to everybody concerned. Whether the Lombard street would be willing to repeat the experiment no one can venture to say, but we presume that the hope of profits and the high rate of interest would induce England capital to embark extensively in Brazil, even though the security should be very questionable.

#### **400**. *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 24 de fevereiro

The closing of the Port of Bahia should be followed by more accurate news from Brazil, because it will compel the correspondents to rely wholly on their own imagination. Now they have to trust to the imagination of the insurgents and the imagination of the government. The two fictions are often contradictory and the public mind is confused. If we have but one picture then we may believe it in peace and will be saved much worry over the state of affairs in South America.

#### **401.** The Daily Picayune, 24 de fevereiro

It is hoped the good rebels of Brazil will fast and pray until they are too weak to fight.

# **402.** «The Turning Point in the Brazilian Revolution», *The Daily Picayune*, 25 de fevereiro

Segundo este artigo, os rebeldes estão numa situação militar extremamente favorável. O articulista fala mesmo de uma possível queda de Santos — o que seria problemático para Floriano Peixoto — e interroga-se se, depois da vitória da «revolução», o Brasil conservará o regime republicano.

The latest reports from South America indicate that events in Brazil are rapidly shaping themselves for an important crisis which, while it may not definitely decide the fate in the existing struggle, will at least so a long way towards accomplishing an end. The reports in question indicate that the revolutionary army is moving rapidly through the State of Sao Paulo and

driving the Government troops before it with driving resistance. The great port of Santos is now menaced, and within a few days will undoubtedly be closely beset both by land and sea.

Should Santos fall, the cause of the revolution would be given a great impetus. The revenue derived by the Government at Santos forms a very important part of the resources upon which President Peixoto relies. The capture of that place would place these revenues in the hands of the rebels and greatly cripple the Government. Such being the case, it is probable that a determined struggle will take place at Santos, and the Government has, no doubt, already hurried all available reinforcements to that point.

With Santos in their possession, as well as the whole of southern Brazil, and with a formidable fleet in the bay of Rio menacing the capital, it would be difficult for foreign powers to longer refuse to accord the rebels belligerent rights, as it would be impossible to hold the Brazilian Government responsible for the conduct of the affairs in that part of Brazil in which its rule will have practically ceased to exist, should Santos be lost.

Should the reports of rebel success be confirmed, it will become interesting to speculate upon what is likely to follow the possible overthrow of the present Government. Will the republic be perpetuated, or will the monarchy be restored? These will then become pregnant questions. Admiral da Gama is known to be an ardent monarchist, and without doubt he will throw the weight of his influence if favor of the restoration of the old regime. On the other hand, it is claimed that Admiral Melo is a consistent republican, and

would not consent to the return of the exiled imperial family. It is, therefore, probable that the triumph of the revolution would lead to the agitations of some very troublesome problems.

#### **403**. *The Morning Call*, 26 de fevereiro

Segundo as informações sobre o que aconteceu a 29 de janeiro, no porto do Rio de Janeiro, a frota americana estava prestes a combater, se os rebeldes tivessem continuado a luta, escreve o jornal, na opinião do qual. Na sua opiniõa este episódio não contribuiu para acelerar o fim do conflito, antes pelo contrário: os rebeldes parecem estar muito «ativos em outras partes do Brasil»

The fuller details which have come of Admiral Benham's belligerent attitude in the harbor of Rio show that the American squadron took no half measures, but was prepared for war work. The various ships had their orders for definite action in tackling the rebel cruisers, and while temper on both sides was up the slightest contretemps might have precipitated broadsides in hot earnest. The commander of the *Detroit*, with much cool forethought, sang out to the insurgents to be careful about their lock lines, as if any firing took place he would not regard it as accidental.

This display of firmness secured all the results that were wanted. The rebels was that they had either to leave American merchantmen alone of fight the American squadron. It is unfortunate that this checkmating of da Gama has had no perceptible effect in shortening the war. The rebels appear to have got a

fresh lease of life and are active in other parts of Brazil besides Rio. It is quite time something decisive happened to terminate suspense and reopen Brazil to the normal course of trade.

#### **404**. *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 1 de março

This election day in Brazil, and, according to the latest reports, it will be celebrated in the harbor do Rio de Janeiro by a naval battle. It will not be prudent to believe this report until authentic news of the battle has been received. There should be no surprise, however, if there is fighting after the election. The people have never voted of a president until this year, and the two parties are bitterly opposed. It is not probable that either will be satisfied with the announced results of the balloting. Each will fight to place its candidate in the executive chair.

#### **405**. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 1 de março

It is reported that both parties have agreed to peace in Brazil pending the national election. In this country affairs are ordered differently. Here both parties agree to peace, except during the national election.

#### **406**. *The Sioux City Journal*, 1 de março

Brazil will stop long enough today in the prosecution of its friendly war to hold a national election.

# 407. «A Peaceable Election», The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 2 de março

Agora que as eleições ocorreram duma maneira pacífica e que o país tem um civil como presidente, não há razão para que o Brasil não alcance finalmente a paz.

There was an election in Brazil yesterday, when the people for the first time voted for president and vice president. The reports are meager, but it is said that Prudente Moraes and Manuel Pereira, the candidates of the government, were choses president and vice president respectively. The voting was light, not more than one-fifth of the electors registered having appeared at the polls. An explanation for the smallest of the vote may be made later, but it is surprising. It was natural to suppose that the people would have been anxious to express their choice. The first president, da Fonseca, was elected by congress under the provisions of the constitution of 1891. He resigned before his term expired and Vice President Peixoto succeeded him. The election yesterday was held as provided by the constitution and the man choses will take office on November 15 and remain in office for four years from that date. The President is elected by a direct vote of the people and must have an

absolute majority of all the votes cast. There were only two candidates this year, so this provision will not provoke contention. The choice when no candidate has a majority is left with congress. All citizens 21 years old and registered may vote, with the exception of beggar, those ignorant of the letters of the alphabet, soldiers receiving pay and members of monastic orders, companies or communities subject to vows of obedience which imply the surrender of individual liberty. The president himself must be a native of Brazil and he cannot serve two successive terms.

The election was peaceable, so far as known here. It has removed whatever excuse the insurgents had for taking arms. Peixoto has obeyed the constitution and a civilian has been chosen to succeed him. The danger of a military despotism which Admiral da Gama feared has passed and there should be peace.

# **408.** The Pittsburg Daily Post, 2 de março

The election over in Brazil, Melo and Peixoto can continue their harmless diversion of whipping each other every day on paper.

## **409**. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 3 de março

Como muito dos seus colegas, o jornal de Indianápolis espera que a eleição de um civil possa pôr um ponto final na contenda.

The presidential election in Brazil has resulted in the choice of Dr. Moraes, present Vice President of the Senate. This was almost a foregone conclusion, as he was the official candidate, and under the constitution of Brazil the government has almost unlimited power in the way of influencing elections. Senhor Moraes, however, is a man of proved ability, high character and large experience in public affairs. He is an ardent republican, and his election was legal and regular it ought to put an end to the pending revolution and restore peace in Brazil.

#### **410.** The Boston Daily Globe, 3 de março

The yellow fever in Brazil is far more deadly that the Brazilian war.

The election passed off quietly in Brazil and no more disturbance was caused by the Brazilian election that has been caused by the Brazilian war. [...]

Pres. Elect Moraes of Brazil may well take as his motto the memorable saying of Gen. Grant: "Let us have peace,"

## **411**. *The Daily Picayune*, 4 de março

The unarmed watercraft of all nations are glad to find protection in the rear of an American gunboat at Brazil.

#### **412.** The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 4 de março

They had a peaceful election in Brazil and President Peixoto has issued a call for more troops, so that he may be assured that peace will continue, even if he is forced to fight for it.

#### **413**. «The Brazilian Election», *The New York Times*, 5 de março

Agora, depois da eleição do novo presidente, os rebeldes já não têm nenhum motivo para continuar a luta, explica o jornal. Aos revoltosos só lhes restam duas possibilidades: ou fogem para salvar a pele, ou restauram a monarquia. Todavia, sublinha o jornalista nova-iorquino, só a primeira parece realizável.

O New York Times — que dá uma imagem muito positiva do novo Presidente — sugere que seria melhor que Prudente tomasse posse só depois da derrota da insurreição. O editorialista pensa que é agora o momento de acabar com a revolta, que está enfraquecida, também porque os Estados Unidos já manifestaram abertamente a sua simpatia pelo governo legal. E admira-se disso já não ter acontecido há mais tempo.

The peaceful election of Prudente de Moraes to the Presidency of the Brazilian Republic at once changes the political and moral status of the insurgents. They have professed to be patriots taking up arms against the unlawful and oppressive acts of Peixoto. They have disclaimed any other purpose than the maintenance of the laws and the Constitution of the republic. The laws and the Constitution of which they manifested so much solicitude have just been exhibited in orderly and tranquil operation. Peixoto, refusing to

let his own name go before the people as a candidate, has allowed the elector to choose a civilian to succeed him, which is very supine behavior of an oppressor. This strips the insurgents of their last pretext for continuing their resistance to lawful authority, deprives them of every vestige of claim to the title of patriots, and reduces them to the level of pirates or guerrillas on the sea. Two purposes, and only two, can now engage their attention or awaken sympathy for them in any part of the civilized world. One is to escape with their lives, an undertaking that humanity always watches with interests; the other is the restoration of the monarchy, their real object from the beginning. They may save their necks by flight. They cannot hope to set up an Emperor in Rio.

To Peixoto, amid his harassing anxiety and perils, the peaceable and unopposed election of de Moraes must bring infinite relief as a great deliverance. Himself a military, and highly esteemed by the army, he was yet sufficiently unselfish as a patriot and farsighted as a politician to perceive that the election as his successor of a popular civilian like de Moraes would be the most effectual way of ending the insurrection which he has vainly tried to put down by force of arms. To exhibit the civil mechanism of the republic in peaceful working, and to offer to the suffrages of the Brazilians a Presidential candidate against whom no patriotic Republican could offer a word of objection, was to invoke the people themselves to denounce the warfare of da Gama and Melo as unjustified a treasonable. It was a great stroke of politics, not without its obvious risks, and it was entirely successful.

President-elect de Moraes is perhaps the fittest man in Brazil to succeed to the Chief Magistracy in the present emergency. He was educated for the law in the law college of Sao Paulo, and there practiced his profession, serving one term as Governor of the State. The profits from a small coffee plantation were added to his professional gains, but he is, as has been stated, a man of large wealth. In 1874 he was elected to the lower house of the Imperial Parliament as a Republican. Two other Republicans sat with him in that Parliament. He was a complete and conscientious believer in the republican form of government, occupying in Brazilian political as position analogous to that of John Morley<sup>45</sup> in English politics, though carrying his convictions to a more punctilious extreme, since he refused always to vote for the civil list, which included the appropriation for the imperial establishment. He once accomplished the probably unprecedented feat as an opposition of one of defeating the Government on a measure providing for the dotation of the Princess, the Ministry being convinced and the Emperor admitting that his argument attacking the regularity of the bill was unanswerable.

When Dom Pedro was driven from the throne, in 1889, and Brazil was about to organize as a republic, de Moraes was elected to the Constituent Assembly, and that body made him its President during its labors in drawing up the Constitution. Elected to the Senate of the first Congress, he was chosen to be President of its sittings, and has continued in that office.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Lord John Morley (1838-1923), político e escritor britânico.

De Morais was put in nomination as a candidate of the Republican Party by a caucus of the Senator's, three from each State. He received a unanimous nomination, fifty-seven Senators voting for him, three Senators being absent, and the three Senators from Minas abstaining from voting on account of their loyal preference for Pena. The Senators themselves, unlike our own, are chosen by a popular vote, so that the representative character of the nominating body cannot be questioned. Nor car there be any doubt of his entire acceptability to the Brazilian people. His rise, step by step, to the supreme place in the republic has come through the recognition of his native ability and his civic virtues.

De Moraes is a man of unusually gentle disposition, but he is withal a statesman of good judgment and keen insight. It has been foreshadowed in the dispatches that Peixoto would resign in favor of de Moraes immediately after the election and devote himself to the task of crushing da Gama. It seems to us more probable, however, that de Moraes will pursue the wiser policy of postponing his inauguration until the force of the popular verdict against the insurgents shall have time to exert its disintegrating influence on their cause. De Moraes is a civilian, Pexioto is a General, and the army is loyal to him; da Gama is an Admiral and has the navy, and Brazil is not in all respects like longestablished powers. May not the President-elect shrewdly reason that if he allows the army and the navy to settle their quarrel, as they are now in the was of doing with some present speed, he may then take the oath of office in a time of peace, escaping some perplexities for himself and some perils for the republic that his immediate accession to office would involve?

Meanwhile, it is plain that Peixoto must now use all diligence to make an end to the insurgents. Their force is so contemptibly small that is amazing they have not sooner been destroyed. They have of late been losing instead of gaining, and now that our own attitude of sympathy for the Government has been made manifest in so many ways and so unmistakably that no other power ventures openly to give them aid and comfort, their final rout ought not to be long delayed.

#### 414. «News from Brazil», San Francsco Chronicle, 5 de março

Depois desta eleição, com Peixoto afastado do poder, séria ótimo para o Brasil que os dois chefes da revolta abandonassem a luta, nota o jornalista. Segundo este, trata-se de uma boa oportunidade para verificar a sinceridade das afirmações de Custódio de Melo, que sempre disse lutar unicamente contra o Marechal de Ferro.

«Nunca houve provas de uma ligação entre Melo e o partido imperialista, embora as suspeitas tenham sido muito fortes», escreve o jornal. De qualquer forma, ao chefe da revolta da marinha «nunca faltou o dinheiro», nota o diário de San Francisco: parece que tinha o apoio dos capitalistas monárquicos ingleses que agora «ficarão gravemente prejudicados no caso da administração de Morais conseguir restabelecer a paz».

Out of the mass of conflicting and contradictory rumors which have been dignified with the name of news from Brazil since the revolt of Melo began, we are enabled to pick out one item as last and put it down as a fact, namely, that an election was held in Brazil on Thursday, at which Senor Prudent de Moraes

was elected President of the Republic, and Manuel Vitorino Pereira Vice-President.

The interesting feature of this election was the fact that more than double the number of votes usually cast were polled at his election, and that in Rio Janeiro there was practically no opposition to Moraes. Peixoto, the present President, received more than 1000 votes for Vice-President, so it would seem that he did not oppose Moraes. It is asserted, too, that the opponents of the Peixoto Administration accept the result of the election in apparent good faith, and if this be so there should be a period put to the civil war very soon.

Melo has always declared that he was making war on Peixoto alone and now there will be a chance to test the sincerity of his assertions. There has never been any positive proof of Melo's alliance with the Imperialist party, though the suspicions of such a thing have been very strong. It seems that he had the backing of royalists or English capital, since he has never shown any lack of money with which to carry on his operations. If the latter be the case the English money lenders will be badly duped should the Moraes Administration succeed in restoring peace and retiring Melo from the scene of action.

It is certainly to be hoped that a lasting peace may follow the election, for Brazil is ill calculated to stand the stress and strain of a civil war, even though it be no more of a war than Melo has been able to stir up. It will be good news indeed if we learn that Melo and da Gama have given up the contest and returned to their allegiance to their country and to the Government of the republic of Brazil.

#### 415. St.Louis Post Dispatch, 5 de março

The announcement that the war in Brazil will soon be over is a reminder that the war has not yet begun.

#### **416.** «Affairs in Brazil», *St. Paul Daily Globe*, 6 de março

O jornal do Minnesota considera que a eleição de Prudente de Morais vai contribuir a acelerar o fim desta guerra «ridícula e sem motivos», provocada unicamente pela fação formada por oficias da marinha. Com este voto, sublinha o diário da cidade de St. Paul, os eleitores manifestaram claramente o seu desejo de continuar com o sistema republicano e puseram no lugar de presidente um homem «cujo sentido de estado e habilidade são inquestionáveis». O novo chefe de Estado vai «iniciar uma vigorosa campanha, seja na terra, seja no mar», para acabar com a rebelião, afirma o editorialista.

It is probable that the presidential election which was held in Brazil last week will mark the end of the revolution in that country.

Probably no public disturbance in any country was more causeless than this Brazilian affair. The people generally were prosperous and contented under the rule of President Peixoto's government. The business interests of the country were cared for. But a certain faction, previously the recipients of official favors, had been practically ignored by the president. Naval officers were not taken into the confidence of the administration, and as consequence they sought its overthrow. They had no following in army circles, and but little among civilians. But they had possession of the ships belonging to the government, and they turned their guns upon the capital. The bombardment of Rio de Janeiro has been maintained spasmodically for six months pas, but little harm has been done except to impede the progress of business. A few land engagements have taken place, invariably resulting in the discomfiture of the rebels. Many tons of powder have been wasted to no purpose.

There has been apparently well-grounded suspicion that the rebellion was sustained in the interests of the monarchical party. Where else than from this source the sinews of war were procured has been a mystery. The desire of the grandson of the late emperor to regain "his own", as the phrase goes, would induce him and his sympathizers in Spain and Portugal to lend aid and encouragement to any movement having for its purpose the overthrow of the existing order of things. These have probably furnished munitions of war; for payment of their services the revolutionists have relied upon the success of their undertaking, just as a shyster lawyer sometimes relies upon his success in a desperate lawsuit for his compensation.

The change in the Brazilian government brought about by the recent election knocks whatever claim the revolutionists may have had upon public sympathy from under them. By an almost unanimous vote the people have decided in favor of the maintenance of the republic, and have placed at its head

a man whose statesmanship and ability are unquestioned, and who has been connected with neither faction in recent political contentions. He is, however, a man of courage and resources, and will not be content, as Peixoto has been, to remain on the defensive against the public enemy. He will inaugurate a vigorous campaign both on land and water, and with the resources at his command will have little difficulty in sweeping the rebels from existence.

There will be reason for general satisfaction when this farcical and causeless revolution shall have ended. There have been few tragedies connected with it; the opera bouffe element has been predominant; yet it has caused a considerable interference with trade and commerce, and has been tolerated by other nations too long. The courses of the new administration will be watched with considerable interest.

#### **417**. «In Brazil», *The Times-Democrat*, 8 de março

Agora, com a eleição de Prudente de Morais, aconteceu o que os rebeldes pediam: a saída de Peixoto e o fim do governo militar. Por conseguinte, nota o jornal nova-iorquino, a revolta «não vai ser combatida por mar ou por terra, mas vai esvaziar-se sozinha», e acabar «ignominiosamente atrofiada».

It would seem now as if the Brazilian insurrection were not to be fought out, by sea or land, but were to peter out.

To begin with, yellow fever has for several week been making pretty extensive inroads among both parties to the hostilities — the soldiers cooped up in the close and unhealthy barracks and forts of the city and the sailors still more closely confined in the vessels of the insurgents. It is causing especial damage to the insurgents, whose men-of-war in Rio Bay find difficulty in getting provisions as they are regarded rather in the light of pest-houses.

Then the result of the general elections on Thursday last, March 1, when de Moraes was returned to the presidential chair by an immense majority over his opponent was about the last nail in the coffin of the insurgents' cause. To be sure, de Moraes has not yet qualified, and Peixoto still holds the reins of government; but the mere fact that Peixoto with his militarism is a back number must necessarily numb the hands of the party or the faction whose sole raison d'être was the existence of a military government.

President-elect de Moraes was educated for the legal profession in the law schools of the State of Sao Paulo, and after practicing his profession for several years there became Governor of the State. He is a coffee planter as well as a lawyer, and between the two businesses he has accumulated a very large fortune, by thoroughly honorable methods. Twenty years ago, when republicanism was not yet in vogue in Brazil, de Moraes was returned to the lower House of the Brazilian Parliament as a Republican, when there were only two other Republicans to keep him company. When Dom Pedro abdicated in 1889, de Moraes became President of the Constituent Assembly, and he was largely instrumental in drawing up the present Constitution of the country. He

has been President of the Senate ever since the first Congress of the republic met; and he is not only a man of great intellectual and administrative ability, but he is at the same time a man of very high character and of immense popularity.

We have given this brief sketch of President-elect de Moraes to show how his elevation to the presidential chair must act as a solvent to insurgent politics. The leading ground of complaint against Peixoto was that he was a military tyrant; and readers of *The Times-Democrat* will remember that, at the New Year, when there was a talk of arbitration were (1) that Peixoto should resign, and (2) that militarism in government should be abolished. There two demands being practically accomplished facts, it is difficult to see what the insurgents should any longer keep up the opera-bouffe hostilities for; and the chances are that, as soon as de Morais takes hold, a raccommodement will be arrived at to let the insurgents down gently, and the war will be over.

We are not going to have that dynamite gun test now, it is certain, of which there beamed up quite a good prospect a week or ten days ago when the *Niteroi*, originally *El Cid*, found herself in the neighborhood of Rio harbor, and the *Aquidaban*, went out presumably to give her an opportunity of showing what she could do. There will be no test of the dynamite gun, for the *Niteroi* has for some unannounced reason or other retraced her steps to Bahia, and she will no doubt hug that harbor until fighting has been declared off. There has been less life in this Brazilian war, if that be possible, for the last two weeks that there ever was during the same length of time before; and, unless the new

President hurry up and declare it finished by consent, it will certainly come to an ignominious end through atrophy.

# **418.** «President Moraes and His Opportunity», *The Sun* (Baltimore), 8 de março

O jornal de Baltimore — que acusa Peixoto de estar na origem do conflito — diverge da maioria dos seus colegas: a eleição de Morais, cheia de irregularidades e falsificações, não vai permitir pôr um ponto final na guerra civil.

No entanto, o novo presidente, terá de resolver a situação. O editorialista sugere o estabelecimento de uma trégua de seis meses e a realização de novas eleições. Desse modo, será restabelecida a confiança, porque os eleitores terão tido a possibilidade de escolher o tipo de regime.

It is not yet certain that the election of Prudente Morais to the presidency of the Brazilian republic will materially improve the prospect of an early peace. The new President is a civilian, and a man of character, ability and long experience of public affairs, but he will probably be regarded by the insurgents as Peixoto's creature. There is, in fact, no indication so far that Peixoto intends to retire to private life. Having brought on civil war by violation of the letter and spirit of the constitution, and having refused to resign last September, when his resignation would have prevented hostilities, he is not a patriot of the self-sacrificing or sternly virtuous kind. The recent election was not held under circumstances that justify a belief that public opinion obtained fair expression. In the States of Northern and Eastern Brazil the Peixoto

government dominated the polls. Opposition candidates incurred the risk of arrest as traitors. Opposition voters were in many cases in prison. Not a few were in exile. In the southern States of Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina, Parana and Sao Paulo there were as a rule no elections at all. Such as there were had for their object the choice of candidates in the insurgent interest. The presidential election, then, whatever its result, will fail to command respect as a genuine expression of the popular will.

Still, President Moraes, if he will assert himself, has it in his power to bring the civil war to a close in a manner creditable to both parties. The insurgents have all along said that their object is merely to secure constitutional government. Here is President Morais' opportunity. The new President can initiate a truce and negotiations for peace on the basis of the maintenance of the status in quo, while the public will is being consulted in a new election of President and Congressmen. As a partisan of Peixoto's, he would, of course, reject such a proposition, but if he desires most of all the restoration of an era of peace and good feeling, he must adopt some line of conduct that will place the government on a solid basis. No one thinks the government now in power fairly chosen. It is tainted throughout -in the legislative as well as the executive and judicial branches —with the absolutism against which the civil war is a protest. A truce of six months, with new elections, would result in a situation that would command general confidence. To the people of Brazil desire a continuance of autocratic rule under republican forms? Do they like anarchy such rule has inaugurated? Or do they prefer the orderly, if stupid, imperial regime which da Fonseca in 1889 set aside without consulting the people? President Moraes, if the patriot he is represented to be, will doubtless have in view the benefits of a policy of loyalty to actual facts. To win victories will not be his only care. His true purpose will be to displace militarism from Brazilian politics.

# 419. The Sioux-City Journal, 8 de março

About 84 per cent. of the people of Brazil can neither read nor write. It is not strange that it proves difficult, with such material to establish a well ordered government based on popular suffrage.

#### **420**. «How they do it in Brazil», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 10 de março

O Brasil tem dois «venenos» que causam a sua ruína: os jogos de azar e a política, com as frequentes revoluções. E o país vai ter de ainda muito caminho para a frente antes que tudo isso se endireite, nota o jornalista de Boston que se baseia na opinião de Benjamin Stone.

Sir Benjamin Stone<sup>46</sup> was a member of the expedition to Brazil to observe the late eclipse of the sun. Being a scientist, whose views are wholly divorced from politics, and quite impartial, he was requested by the British foreign

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> John Benjamin Stone (1838-1914) foi um político conservador e um fotógrafo britânico que visitou o Brasil em 1893 na ocasião do eclipse solar. Deixou mais de 250 chapas. Cf. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-29341013

office, in a sort of unofficial way, to gather all the facts he could relating to the revolutions which so frequently occur in that country.

Sir Benjamin reports that the two "great banes" of Brazil are «politics and gambling". To "fire out the governor" in the Inland towns and provinces by way of a local uprising, is not unfrequently the pastime of an evening.

But the Brazilian politicians do not stop to "fire out" with the ballot. They form their combinations stealthily until a local revolution is in pickle. Then, with the aid of such soldiers as have quietly been induces to join the revolution, a raid is made upon the official sought to be ousted, and the affair may last a day, a week, a month, or longer, according to the amount of resistance evolved.

Sir Benjamin amusingly relates that the British consul was aroused from sleep one morning by a terrible commotion. On inquiring the cause he was told that it was a revolution. "O, is that all", said he; "I was afraid it was my men out on strike", and he went to sleep again. Upwards of 160 people were killed in this particular revolution, however, which occurred on Sunday, the great day of such affairs.

With gambling as popular and universal as revolution Brazil would seem to have a long course of political and moral training ahead of her before things will become permanently straightened out.

#### **421.** The Boston Daily Globe, 10 de março

President-elect Moraes of Brazil is a coffee-planter. It remains to be seen how well he is fitted for the everlasting grind of statecraft.

#### **422.** The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 11 de março

All advices from Brazil indicate the steady gain of those how are called the insurgents upon the presidential government of the country. The history of nearly every South American revolution shows that when the naval forces are opposed to the land forces the former win because they can cut off access to the country and egress from it and can move at will from point to point on exterior lines in a manner to strike the enemy where he is weakest and to deceive him where he is strongest. It has been so in Chile and Peru, and it is getting to be so in Brazil.

## **423**. *The Daily Picayune*, 11 de março

Esta nota tem de ser lida no segundo grau.

Bombarding is going on as usual at Brazil. Several hundred rebels are killed every time a couple of corporals and their guards meet on the skirmish line

#### **424**. *The Pittsburg Post*, 11 de março

It looks as if da Gama believe the game of rebellion in Brazil is up.

# 425. «The War in Brazil», The Daily Picayune, 11 de março

O jornal da Luisiana que, no entanto, continua a desconfiar das notícias recebidas do Brasil, ainda prevê um combate naval no porto do Rio. No fundo, espera que haja algo que possa mudar radicalmente esta lentidão das operações militares. A guerra civil tem de acabar para que as operações comerciais possam de novo funcionar normalmente.

According to the recent reports from Brazil the long looked for Government fleet has at last arrived in Rio harbor and is said to be prepared to give battle the insurgents ships. It is also reported that the insurgents are disposed to arbitrate the differences existing between themselves and the Government, and have applied to the United States to act as arbitrator.

There have been so many unreliable reports from Brazil that it is unsafe to place too much reliance on the rumors that are telegraphed to this country as facts. There is little reason to question the accuracy of the reported arrival of the Government ships, but the proposition to arbitrate is one to very serious doubt, and it is far more probable that a naval fight will soon take place.

It is rather remarkable that for several weeks past there has been practically a cessation of hostilities at Rio, the insurgents having discontinued their attack upon the land batteries, and the Government forts having ceased to bombard the ships. The insurgents having probably discontinued active operations through a desire to spare their ammunition for a final crisis, also do save their men, now reduced through causalities to a very limited number.

The two most powerful of the insurgent war vessels are still absent from Rio, and should the naval fight take place at any early date the insurgents will feel the loss of their formidable ships. The Government fleet consists in the cruisers *Niteroi*, *America*, *Tiradentes* and Bahia together with five or six torpedo boats. With the *Aquidaban* and *Republica* in the harbor the Government vessels would not be able to venture from under the protection of the guns of the forts, as none of them could cope for a moment with the heavy rebel vessels.

The Government plan appears to be for the dynamite cruiser *Niteroi* to endeavor to destroy Fort Villegagnon with her dynamite shells, and that accomplished for the Government fleet to attack the rebel squadron from behind the shelter afforded by the captured forts. Unless, therefore, arbitration proceeding intervene, which is improbable enough, there is likely to be a fight between the naval vessels in the near future.

It is also reported from Brazil that the insurgents have made little progress of late in the southern provinces, and that one of their prominent generals in Rio Grande do Sul had abandoned the rebel cause. Whether these reports are true or not further developments can also determine, but here is no denying that events have moved with surprising slowness in Brazil at late.

All the foreign countries having trade relations with Brazil are heartily disgusted with the long drawn out civil strife, and will welcome any crisis which promises to put a speedy end to the struggle.

#### **426.** San Francisco Chronicle, 12 de março

It is to be hoped that there will be some good gunnery in the fight in the Rio bay. If a naval battle must take place all those who enjoy a good fight will desire to see the combatants test their new guns and armor. Heretofore every engagement between the rival naval forces of Brazil has been an awful spectacle of waste of ammunition.

#### **427.** «Peace with Safety», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 13 de março

A revolta acabou, escreve o jornal, Saldanha da Gama pediu primeiro asilo à frota americana que recusou meter-se nos assuntos internos do Brasil, e depois fez o mesmo com um navio luso. Afinal, afirma o editorialista, este confronto foi «mais uma curiosidade que um facto bélico», pois não houve nenhum confronto decisivo no porto da capital. «Considerando como a revolta terminou, o resto do mundo pode perguntar por que motivo começaram a querra».

The Brazilian Revolt, again reported to be substantially ended, will go into history, not as a warlike achievement, but rather as a curiosity. Admiral Saldanha has already tried to surrender. He endeavored to strike his flag to a vessel of the United States in order to avoid striking it to the government against which he has rebelled. But the American representatives declined to interfere even in this acquiescent fashion. Da Gama has at last induced the commander of a Portuguese war ship to interpose at least so far as to act as a messenger to President Peixoto. The message embodied a proposal to surrender on the single condition of a quarantee of personal safety of the admiral and his followers. Further explanation of this will be in order. Protection from the immediate peril of war can scarcely be sought, for there appeared to be few or none of these when hostilities were alleged to be at their height. As the guns of the rebellious vessels threatened more danger to the merchantmen in the harbor belonging to friendly powers that to the works of the enemy on shore, so the artillery of the government at its armed positions brought less terror to the soul of da Gama than the imaginative visions of the coasting vessel brought in New York, and hastily transformed into a ship of war, standing on and off outside port, but keeping at a respectful distance. It has been announced from time to time that Brazil was moving to a foremost position among maritime powers and it is comparatively a short time since the United States could point out to a craft worthy to be compared with the Aquidaban, the South American representative sent to New York with celebrative intent. Yet when the new republic found itself face to face with war it has no available navy. The ships and sailors were in the hands of the

insurgents, but the latter either did not know how or were afraid to use these instrumentalities. So, it is easy do believe that, when American cruisers arrived Admiral Benham transferred his flag to the *Charleston* so that the *New York* and San Francisco might get away briefly to avoid, not the wild shooting of the Brazilians, but the yellow fever, which is apt to assert itself after a time. What da Gama seeks safety against is probably not customary force and arms, but the political vengeance and taking off which is apt to follow the bloodless contentions of our remote southern friends. Perhaps Brazil will forego this after piece of the travesty tragedy, as the admiral is reported to have betaken himself to the Portuguese vessel as an asylum. The rest of the world may wonder what, since so soon done for, the war was begun for?

#### **428**. San Francisco Chronicle, 13 de março

A guerra terminou e agora que da Gama está num navio português, Peixoto poderia mostrar-se magnânimo, dando dessa forma uma imagem positiva das jovens repúblicas da América do Sul, sugere o jornal californiano.

The rebellion in Brazil is over. The new naval vessels purchased by Peixoto have won a victory without firing a gun. As soon as da Gama got wind of their arrival in the harbor of Rio he took steps to secure himself from harm by offering to surrender to the President of Brazil, provided he and his followers were guaranteed protection against punishment. As da Gama has taken refuge on a Portuguese war vessel, he is, for the present at least, out of

the reach of Peixoto, and the latter will probably make a virtue of necessity and treat the fallen rebel with a show of magnanimity. If it does his action will go far toward convincing the outside world that South American republics are becoming wiser as they grow stronger and more numerous, for after all precious little is gained by treating rebels with rigor. Clemency is as effective in most cases as the rope or any other method of punishment hitherto in vogue in South American for punishing traitors.

# **429.** «Near the End in Brazil», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 14 de março

Agora que Prudente de Moraes foi eleito, as causas que, na opinião dos rebeldes, provocaram esta revolta — «irritante», «estúpida» e «sem objetivo» — já não existem, afirma o quotidiano que dá uma imagem muito positiva do novo presidente.

De qualquer forma, se o almirante não se tivesse rendido, os Estados Unidos ou uma outra potência teriam reagido porque a situação para o comercio estava-se a tornar insuportável, conclui o jornal de Chicago.

The Brazilian naval revolt against Peixoto's alleged military tyranny broke out the 6<sup>th</sup> of last September. For over six months the City of Rio Janeiro has been in a state of siege, the harbor has been partially blockaded, bombarding from forts and vessels has been kept up at intervals, and has it not been for the firmness of the American Admiral Benham foreign commerce would have been ruined. No special damage has occurred and but very few persons on either side have been killed, except on two occasions when vessels

were sunk. Now, however, the naval revolt seems to be on its last legs. Admiral da Gama has offered to surrender to the President of Brazil, providing he and his followers are guaranteed against punishment, and meanwhile he has sought asylum on a Portuguese war vessel.

Undoubtedly, therefore, the final settlement of this irritating revolt is near at hand. Indeed, the political situation now is such that peace is the only logical outcome. The cause of the revolution inaugurated by Admiral Melo and his naval associates was alleged to be the military tyranny of President Peixoto. It was set forth publicity that if Peixoto would resign and government militarism were abandoned there would be an end to the revolt. The conditions demanded by the insurgents are now satisfied. In the recent general election Señor de Moraes was chosen President by a large majority. No question has been made of the fairness of his election of that he is the choice of the large majority of the Brazilian people. Señor de Moraes is a civilian and a lawyer by profession. He never has been associated with the army. He has been a member of the Senate. After the abdication of Dom Pedro, he was President of the Constitutional Assembly and the present excellent Constitution of the republic is largely due to him. By virtue of his high personal character, his legal and political ability, and his strict honesty he is a great favorite with all classes and all his instincts are in the line of peace. Under such circumstances as these there is apparently no reason why the silly and irritating Brazilian naval revolution should not come to an end at once. Every pretext upon which it was

supported is removed. As soon as de Moraes is inaugurated there will be no longer a military government.

It does not so much matter that revolution is rampant in distant Brazilian provinces. Revolution is a chronic ailment in those localities and a matter of unconcern to outsiders; but the state of siege in Rio Janeiro and the constant danger of interference with foreign commerce in its harbor had reached a pass where it could no longer be endured with patience. If the insurgent Admiral had not himself surrendered it would have been in order for the United States or some other power to call off this silly revolution which Melo and da Gama have been running so long and so aimlessly.

#### **430.** «Peace in Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 14 de março

Agora que esta revolta «intermitente» de seis meses acabou, o jornal debruça-se sobre as decisões que Peixoto vai tomar para punir os rebeldes. Na sua opinião, o «mundo civilizado pode lamentar as eventuais penas capitais», mas nenhuma potência pode intervir no assunto: «o Brasil tem o direito de resolver os seus problemas de uma forma que lhe convém». E o diário de Brooklyn acrescenta: «Que Melo viva ou morra isso não vai mudar as nossas relações com o Brasil». De qualquer forma, os que tomam a decisão de se revoltar contra um governo, devem saber que, no caso de uma derrota, correm o risco de serem condenado à morte.

The rebellion in Brazil has ended after a fitful life of about six months. The rebel officers have surrendered and are at the mercy of the government. When Admiral da Gama found that there was no hope, he offered to give up his ships on the condition that all the naval officers now in prison should be liberated and that a general amnesty should be granted to all the sailors and petty officers on the ships and that the superior officers should be allowed to go to Europe under promise never again to teak up arms against Brazil. These propositions were considered by President Peixoto and he concluded that he would not make terms with the rebels. He demanded an unconditional surrender, and when it was refused, he opened fire upon the rebel forts and rebel ships in the harbor. Not a shot was fired in reply. After the bombardment has continued for two or three hours the rebel flags were hauled down. Admiral da Gama is supposed to be on a Portuguese ship, where he had fled for safety. He doubtless will try to escape from South America. He may be on his way to Europe now. Admiral Melo is somewhere in the South and when he hears of the events in the harbor at Rio de Janeiro if he is wise he will also attempt to find a place of safety.

If the leaders in the rebellion are put to death the civilized world will regret that President Peixoto should consider such a course necessary. But no nation would be justified in interfering. Brazil has a right to settle her own troubles in a way to suit herself. The rebels take the risk of defeat when they take up arms against a government. Traitors are usually punished with death. Admiral Melo knew this when he attempted to overthrow the government. If he had succeeded it is probable that the friends of the government would have suffered. There is a great difference between successful and unsuccessful rebellion. Before taking up arms against a government, men should decide

whether their grievance is serious enough to make them willing to die if they fail to get it removed. Yesterday's events have taken the controversy almost entirely out of international affairs. Other nations are interested now only as the defeated rebels seek asylum with them. President Peixoto and his courts can deal with the men who remain in Brazil and they do not need outside assistance. The United States are not called upon to decide whether Peixoto should rule or whether the government should be in the hands of Melo, nor will it be necessary to send a special commissioner to South America to gather information for the state department. Whether Melo lives or dies our relation with Brazil will not be changed. Our flag is respected in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro and there is no occasion for action which would cause the Brazilian to think less of the courage and decision of our naval officers.

### **431.** «The Situation in Brazil», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 14 de março

O editorialista não está com meias medidas: «foi uma revolução flutuante, sem nenhuma autoridade, a não ser a de uma frota de corsários. Não conseguiu nada e não pôde conseguir nada porque foi comandada por oficiais sem experiência e servida por homens incompetentes». Apesar disso, lamenta o jornalista, «as potências navais europeias foram excessivamente brandas» com esta bando de corsários e de piratas. Só o almirante Benham foi duro com eles.

Até agora, ninguém percebeu quais foram as causas da revolta, sublinha o diário, além de servir «as ambições pessoais do almirante Melo» que agora está no Sul do país, onde teve um certo papel «em alargar a revolta do Rio Grande do Sul aos Estados do Paraná e Santa Catarina».

A conclusão no artigo é impiedosa para com os «revolucionários» brasileiros»: não são nem verdadeiros combatentes, nem corajosos, nem talentosos e combatem sem um verdadeiro objetivo.

The revolt of the Brazilian navy, which practically came to an end with Admiral DA GAMA's abandonment of his ships in Rio harbor, is perhaps the most extraordinary event of its kind in history. It was essentially a floating revolution, without any authority except that which belongs to a fleet of corsairs. It accomplished nothing and could accomplish nothing, because it was commanded by officers without experience and served by men without skill. The so-called bombardments of Rio de Janeiro only served to promote the gaiety of nations. But in spite of the grotesque character of the "revolution" the insurgents were permitted to play their farce out as if they were actual belligerents. The great naval powers of Europe were exceedingly tender in their treatment of these Brazilian corsairs, only the American fleet under Admiral BENHAM showing a firm hand in dealing with revolutionists who had all the attributes of Captain Kidda accept his courage.

What causes the revolt or what it was intended to accomplish nobody hay yet explained. At the outset it probably had no other object than to serve the ambitious purposes of Admiral Melo. How far he was concerned in the schemes that followed for the restoration of the monarchy it is as yet impossible to say, but it certainly was the expectation of such a result that gave

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> William Kidd (1645-1701), célebre corsário escocês que trabalhou para a Inglaterra e que a seguir se tornou pirata. Foi preso em setembro de 1699 e enforcado em maio de 1701.

him the immunity of a belligerent when he as, in fact, only a pirate. When Melo at last despaired of accomplishing anything at Rio he turned the greater part of the insurgent fleet in the harbor over to DA GAMA and with the two most powerful vessels in the Brazilian navy, the *Aquidaban* and the *Republica*, endeavored to aid the chronic revolution in Rio Grande do Sul, which for years had gone neither forward nor backward. Melo's presence in the South has undoubtedly had some effect in extending the revolt in Rio Grande do Sul to the States of Parana and Santa Catarina, and now that the war in Rio harbor is practically over this Southern warfare is all that is left of the revolution in Brazil.

It the Brazilians were fighters it is probable that the future efforts of the revolutionists would be directed towards a division of the republic. But possessing neither the skill nor courage necessary to actual warfare, it is likely the chronic revolt of Rio Grande do Sul will go on as before, without any definite purpose, but upon a somewhat more extended field. It is characteristic of South American revolutions to be purposeless, and it is scarcely possible that the DA GAMA fiasco in Rio harbor will bring Melo to terms or the desultory fighting in the Southern States to an end.

### **432**. *The New York Times,* 14 de março

O editorialista fica muito espantado com o que aconteceu nas últimas quarenta e oito horas no porto da capital brasileira e afirma que ninguém, «quer do lado das tropas fiéis ao governo, quer do lado dos revoltosos sabe o que tem de fazer agora». Acrescenta que «o mundo desnorteado não teria ficado mais surpreendido» se Peixoto tivesse ido beber um copo com Saldanha da Gama, «deixando o passado para trás».

Mas parece que da Gama abandonou a luta, «que a revolta fracassou e que podemos felicitar a república brasileira de não ter sido derrubada em benefício de uma restauração imperial, com tão pequena perda de sangue e de riquezas».

No que diz respeito aos dois chefes da revolta, Peixoto pode enviá-los para o exílio em Portugal, a menos que da Gama e Melo tomem a decisão de se enforcar, conclui ironicamente o diário nova-iorquino.

Nobody really knows what has happened in Rio Bay during the last fortyeight hours except the parties in interest immediately present, and we doubt whether they have more than a dim and shadowy notion of what has been going on. But that is not the worst of it. The wonder is how any Brazilian, insurgent or loyal, can possibly know what to do next. When the boiling Achilles, in that melodious composition that tells to modern ears the immortal story of the beautiful Helen, remarks that he doesn't feel well, the sympathetic Calchas promptly replies that he doesn't either —such was the tie that bound in union sweet Achaian minds. So when Admiral Saldanha da Gama, deserting his fleet - if he did desert it -ducked his head between the decks of a Portuguese man-of-war — if he did so duck — sent word to President Peixoto that he would call the fight "off" if the President would, the bewildered world could not have been further amazed had the Chief Magistrate of the republic rowed out in a dory to da Gama's ship of refuge to open a bottle with him and let bygones be bygones. When the vanquished behaves as da Gama behaved, there is no telling what the victor will do, for precedents are wanting and the

imagination is completely baffled. Speaking under reserve, and subject to the possible corrections due to later information, it appears that the insurgent chief has run away, that the insurrection has collapsed, and that the republic of Brazil is to be congratulated on having escaped from the peril of overthrow and imperial succession with so slight loss of blood and treasure. On the whole, President Peixoto can afford to make generous terms with the rebels. But he should insist that da Gama e Melo betake themselves to Lisbon for the remainder of their natural lives. If they elect hanging as more merciful, the world will not be able to assert that they did not choose their own punishment.

#### **433.** «The Surrender of da Gama», *The Daily Picayune*, 14 de março

A rendição de Saldanha da Gama surpreende também o diário da Luisiana, segundo o qual os rebeldes «devem estar numa situação desesperada» o que, no entanto, «não justifica que o almirante tenha abandonado os seus homens». Faltam provavelmente informações, para se ter uma explicação mais completa dos acontecimentos, salienta o jornalista. Este recorda que Custódio de Melo continua a luta, mesmo que enfraquecido e desanimado pela perda dos navios no porto do Rio.

The report, made public yesterday, that Admiral da Gama, the Brazilian rebel commander at Rio, had sought asylum on board a Portuguese man-of-war, and offered to surrender to President Peixoto if amnesty were granted to the rebel soldiers and sailors, and himself and officers were permitted to retire to a foreign country, has been confirmed through several different sources. The Brazilian Government, however, has refused to accept anything but

unconditional surrender, and has opened fire from its batteries upon the rebel ships.

The offer of da Gama to surrender without making a fight, or, at least, an attempt to escape from Rio harbor, is somewhat surprising when the spirited attacks which he has made from time to time on the Government defenses are remembered. The rebels must have been reduced to desperate circumstances, indeed, to have induced da Gama to offer surrender; but even such a condition of things would scarcely have warranted him in practically deserting his men and seeking an asylum on board a foreign warship.


While there would appear to be no further reason to doubt the fact that an offer of surrender has been made, there are some of the reported circumstances connected with the event which need further explanation before they can be accepted as accurate.

The surrender of da Gama, if it actually takes place, as now seems probable enough, would not immediately terminate the rebellion, as Admiral de Melo, the real leader of the insurrection, still has the two most powerful of the warships with him; but the loss of the ships at Rio would undoubtedly terribly dishearten the insurgents in the south, and their subjugation would in all likelihood soon follow.

### **434.** The Pittsburg Post, 14 de março

A insurreição acabou e «os responsáveis podem ficar contentes se conseguirem salvar a pele», afirma o jornal, segundo o qual não se trata de uma sublevação popular, mas de uma revolta, financiada por monárquicos europeus, para defender ambições e interesses pessoais. O jornal considera que o espírito republicano deste país, cheio de recursos naturais, pode sair reforçado desta prova.

The rebellion in Brazil seems to have petered out, and the originators of it will have reason to be thankful if they save their necks. It was not a popular outbreak at any time founded on well-grounded reasons, but was incited, like most South American revolutions, by men of rank and influence, mainly of the navy, and for personal interests. There is little doubt that at the basis of it was a purpose to put back on the imperial throne the family of the late Dom Pedro, and as it happens to be connected with European royalties, the financial supplies that kept the revolution going for so long a time no doubt came from the pretenders and their friends. Our own government, while preserving a neutrality, never recognized the insurgents as belligerents, and let it be known that its sympathies were with Peixoto or constitutional government. This was an indirect and quiet application of the Monroe doctrine. It is a possibility that Brazil will emerge from the trial of the past year greatly strengthened in its republican tendencies. The president-elect, DE MORAES, who does not take office until fall, is said to be an ardent republican in principle, and his accession will doubtless bring peace and prosperity to all parts of the country. Brazil in its natural and undeveloped resources is one of the richest countries in the world.



**Fig. 35 :** «O porto do Rio, a scena da rendição dos insurretos» (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 de março)

### THE END NEAR.

Admiral Da Gama Offers to Surrender.

Protection Asked for Himself and Followers.

He Seeks an Asylum on a Portuguese Man-of-War.

An Immense Amount of Powder Burned.

Short Account of the Rebellion from Its Commencement,

Lives Lost Comparatively Few-Death

Blow to Monarchy.

# WHERE'S DA GAMA

He Has Either Fled or Is on His Flagship Waiting for the End.

### PEIXOTO REFUSED HIS TERMS.

Admiral Benham Cables the Rebel Is Not With the Portuguese.

### LOYAL GUNS OPENED AT NOON.

No Reply Came From Either the Insurgent Forts or Ships.

AT SUNDOWN THE WAR WAS OVER

**Fig. 36 e 37 :** «Quase no fim» (*The Times-Democrats*, 13 de março); «Onde está da Gama?» (*The Pittsburg Post*, 14 de março)

Its area is equal to that of the United States, while its population is only about 16,000,000, or one-fouth that of this county

### **435.** «Downfall of da Gama», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 14 de março

Saldanha da Gama agiu, de uma maneira vergonhosa, abandonando os seus homens. Isso prova que não tem estofo de herói, escreve o jornal nova-iorquino,

que se congratula pelo regresso à paz, «extremamente agradável» para os Estados Unidos.

President Peixoto has in effect said to the insurgents that his only terms are unconditional surrender.

Admiral da Gama offered to surrender on condition that he and his officers be permitted to leave the country and that the lives of the insurgent soldiers and sailors be spared. The reply was a bombardment of the rebel fleet at noon yesterday, in accordance with a previous notification given by the government. Da Gama's forces seem to have taken their punishment very meekly. They did not fire in return, but took their warships to a quarter occupied by merchant vessels, evidently realizing that resistance would be futile.

The revolution seems to have ended in an ignominious manner. The insurgents in the interior may yet make some trouble, but it is probable that their fighting fever will cool with the downfall of their naval forces. The

dispatches published this morning intimate that da Gama has taken measures for his personal safety, leaving his subordinates to such fate as may overtake them. This seems to show that the stuff of which heroes are made is not in him.

If the war is really over, if peace is to be restored, and if republican government in Brazil is to be established on a firm and enduring bases, the outcome of the struggle will be exceedingly gratifying to the United States.

#### **436.** «The war Ended», San Francisco Chronicle, 14 de março

A guerra acabou e não se sabe onde está da Gama, nota o jornal. Este debruça-se sobre o que vai acontecer aos cabecilhas, caso Peixoto ponha a mão neles. Com certeza, eles não vão ser tratados com clemência, como acontece aos traidores na América do Sul.

The war in Brazil is at an end. Although da Gama attempted to make terms before surrendering, he failed, and the insurgent vessels and the forts controlled by them have fallen into the hands of Peixoto. At this writing the whereabouts

of da Gama is unknown, but as Peixoto refused to accede to his condition, that he be permitted to go unpunished, he will probably avoid Brazil for some time to come.

It is evident from Peixoto's refusal, to grant terms to the rebels that he proposes to inflict punishment on the ringleaders in he can lay hands on them.

It is not the custom in South America to treat those who rise against the government with leniency if they prove unsuccessful and are caught. The theory that the infliction of heavy penalties on traitors has a deterrent effect is still maintained in that section of the world. It does not occur to the average South American that the putting to death of a lot of rebels is a process which produces results similar to that described in the ancient fable of the sowing of the dragon's teeth.

### 437. Times Democrats, 14 de março

Como a reputação e a imagem de um almirante pode mudar em função dos resultados das operações militares.

The question whether Admiral Melo, of Brazil, is a patriot or a traitor is about to be settled according to the approved and intelligence principles of modern statecraft. If a dynamite shell from the *Niteroi* strikes the *Aquidaban*, the treason of the rebellious Melo will be so thoroughly established that his name will ever be held in execration by his countrymen. If, on the other hand, the hired American gunners on the dynamite cruiser fail to get the range properly and their craft goes to pieces before Melo's eight-inch rifles, then will the Admiral be a great patriot and stand an excellent chance of becoming the George Washington of Brazil. — *Chicago Times*, Dem.

### **438.** The Philadephia Inquirer, 14 de março

The main weakness of ADMIRAL DA GAMA's campaign was that he was kept so busy threatening to fight that he had no time to do any fighting.

### **439.** «Our Service to the Brazilian Republic», *The New York Times*, 15 de março

Este longo editorial critica em primeiro lugar, a revolta de Melo e da Gama, com as suas mentiras, «os falsos pretextos». Diziam que queriam lutar contra «o Presidente usurpador», mas de facto, a finalidade deste combate era «derrubar o governo republicano e restabelecer o império». O jornal novaiorquino indica uma série de factos que provam os objetivos claramente filomonárquicos dos revoltosos, como, por exemplo, as ajudas financeiras recebidas, o apoio de todos os monárquicos brasileiros, a manipulação da informação em favor dos insurretos, «a súbita agitação da família Bragança em Lisboa e em Paris».

O editorialista nota que Saldanha da Gama não tomou em devida conta o que aconteceu em 29 de janeiro e o aviso dado pela frota americana no porto do Rio de Janeiro. Evidentemente, escreve o editorialista, seria um exagero dizer que os rebeldes foram derrotados em Washington e não no Rio, embora todos sabiam que os americanos apoiavam claramente o regime republicano brasileiro e «não desejavam a restauração do império».

O jornalista admite a simpatia do governo americano pela causa defendida por Peixoto, e afirma que não se pode criticar a atitude dos Estados Unidos: « a orientação do Presidente e do Departamento da Marinha foi sensata, prudente e meritória desde o início». Na opinião do New York Times, o seu país atuou com vigor, mas também com muita inteligência e discrição».

Saldanha da Gama was never a dashing rebel, and his escapade ends fittingly in his desertion of his own flagship to seek safe asylum on board a foreign man-of-war. "Don't shoot; I'll come down", exclaimed Capt. Scott's 'coon. Da Gama's caution surpassed that of the 'coon', for he came down, not into the hands of his enemy, but upon neutral ground, and from that refuge proceeded to treat for the integrity of his precious neck. It would perhaps have been a wiser policy for Peixoto to grant a general amnesty. A little hanging or lopping off of heads among the leaders of the insurrection would be salutary and of good example, no doubt. They have all been guilty of high treason and have done their country serious harm. It is to be remembered, moreover, that the lesson of our own leniency with the chiefs of the Confederation States is not pertinent to the case of the Brazilian insurgents, since we were really treating with a nation which had declared itself independent of us and which we had conquered, while da Gama and his followers are at best but a shabby lot of schemers and rebels of no similar standing. Still, in civil wars, the less blood spilt the better.

The insurrection of Melo and da Gama has been an affair of lying and false pretense from its beginning last September. Professing to lead a revolt against a usurping President, they have actually been engaged in an attempt to overthrow a republican form of government in Brazil and to re-establish the empire. Trough inadvertence or in bravado, da Gama revealed his true purpose in the unlucky manifesto he put forth last November. But the universal and well-grounded suspicion with which the insurgent enterprise has been

regarded hardly needed the official confirmation furnished by this manifesto. The flimsiness of the charges brought against Peixoto; the open sympathy with the revolt of all the Brazilian monarchists; the ardent partisanship of the British mercantile and shipping interests in Rio; the sudden flutter in the Braganza coterie in Lisbon and Paris; the abundant supply of funds which enables the insurgents to keep up their warfare — which certainly did not come out of the pockets of da Gama and Melo or of the Imperialists remaining in Brazil, and must have been supplied from a foreign and interested source; the persistent falsifying of all news from Rio which reached this country through Lisbon or London channels, in such wise as to make it seem that the insurgents were uniformly triumphant and Peixoto always on the verge of downfall, and, finally, certain international procedures, half revealed and half left in mystery — all of those circumstances and many significant incidents not here set forth have made the restoration of the empire seem to be the only plausible or possible motive of the insurrection.

But if the reason for its beginning has been hidden from the world, we apprehend that da Gama has not yet got clearly into his head the efficient cause of its disastrous ending. At some stage or other, mystery and concealment usually becloud the wars of men, and this little Brazilian war has had perhaps its due proportion. Shut up abroad his flagship, da Gama is little likely to have a right understanding of the current of fate that have set him this way and that. The turning point of his hapless undertaking was reached when, on Jan. 29, the *Detroit's* gunner sent a shot of warning across the *Trajano's* bow,

and Capt. Brownson shouted; "Trajano, ahoy! If you fire again, I will return the fire, and if you persist, I will sink you". Admiral Benham had undertaken to see to it that American merchant ships should have free access to the wharves of Rio. He did see to it.

Presumably Admiral da Gama may have believed that the vigorous course of the commander of the United States fleet was prompted purely by solicitude for our immediate commercial interests in Rio Harbor. But he certainly could not fail to perceive that that course, if persisted in, must make an end of the insurrection. In his protest of Jan. 30 he admitted that he must thereafter permit American vessels to land at the wharves of the city and must accord the same facilities to all other foreign vessels frequenting that port, since the foreign fleet commanders could not be expected to respect the blockade and so give us a monopoly of trade in Rio. What, then, it may be asked, became of this blockade? This question might naturally enough have occurred to da Gama, and in seeking its answer he might have been led into a train of reasoning which would have brought a great light to his mind. For a full appreciation of his situation and its perils, however, it would have been necessary for him to know more accurately than he could have known just what was going on in Washington. It would be going much too far to say that the insurgents were really put down in Washington, and not in Rio. The most punctilious international lawyer and no-foreign-entanglement patriot may safely be defied to point to any act of our Government in this affair that was not usual, that was not justified by abundant precedent and by our own material interests, or that would have given da Gama or da Gama's imperial master, in the event of a triumph for the insurgents, any just ground whatever for a claim against us based upon alleged violation of neutrality.

It was known to all the world, we suppose, that the sympathies of our Government were with the established republic in Brazil. We desired its perpetuation, and we distinctly did not desire the restoration, openly made or supported by any European Government, would have been looked upon by us as an unfriendly act. Fortunately, there was no such attempt, and it did not become necessary to invoke our venerable Monroe doctrine. Of the covert support which the insurrection derived from European sources, of the intrigues in da Gama's behalf, and of the secret aid and encouragement he may have received from private individuals or even from the chiefs of Foreign Offices across the ocean, it is sufficient to say that quite incidentally, of course, Admiral Benham thwarted the intrigues and made the aid and encouragement futile when he cleared the way to a Rio wharf to the Yankee bark Amy. Could any self-respecting Government grant belligerent rights to an insurgent chief having no standing on shore who, with practically the entire navy of his country in his possession, was yet unable to maintain an effective blockade in its chief port? Was any prudent Government likely to take the responsibility of such a recognition after we had so plainly showed our attitude? And without recognized rights of belligerency what headway could da Gama expect to make either in acquiring a status abroad or an establishment at home? More than all this, it was currently reported and believed that a high officer of the Government at Washington, in a moment of unofficial freedom, had declared that if a further attempt were made to blockade the port of Rio our fleet would cut its way through with solid shot. This remark, if by chance it were reported at Rio and found its way to the ear of da Gama, was not, it must be confessed, of a nature to lift the shadows of black care from his mind.

But the part which our Government has played in this matter may be left to the future historian of the incident and to the commentator on the diplomatic aspects of the affair, should they ever come into possession of the fact. The historian and the commentator will scarcely misinterpret the series of events that unmistakably denoted our sympathy with the republic. When Rear Admiral Stanton salutes the insurgent flag, we recalled him instantly. We increased our naval forces at Rio until our fleet was the strongest in the harbor. Our Government took pains to keep itself thoroughly informed through the dispatches from Capt. Picking and Admiral Benham and from Minister Thompson. It promptly approved the Admirals' feat of blockade-smashing. It was on terms of open and public cordiality with Minister Mendonça, one of the gifted and patriotic of Brazilians, whose services to his country during this crisis have been of a character and value entitling him to the highest reward it can bestow. In short, by every act and profession of friendship, and by every service it could properly render, the Government at Washington exhibited its desire for the triumph of the Brazilian Republic over the disloyal insurgents. The President's course and the course of the Department of the Navy have been wise, prudent, and praiseworthy from the beginning.

If we have acted with vigor, we have also acted with full intelligence and discretion, and to have assisted, while maintaining the rights of our citizens and upholding the interests of our commerce, in repelling an unjustified assault upon the friendly republic of Brazil, and to that extent have aided in defeating an effort to establish once more an empire in the New World, is an achievement so conspicuously creditable and wholesome that it instantly dwarfs the petty Hawaiian imbroglio and leaves the balance writ in figures of comfortable dimension on the favorable side.

### **440.** «Mercy for the Private», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 15 de março

Os soldados e os marinheiros rebeldes foram amnistiados por Peixoto, e isso era previsível, escreve o jornal. Os oficiais vão ser tratados com severidade perante uma corte marcial e isso é lógico, comenta o articulista que também fala dos dois chefes da revolta, e nomeadamente de Melo.

O jornalista, depois de ter sugerido a hipótese dos oficiais de Melo refugiados no Uruguai poderem ser contratados por outros países do subcontinente, afirma que esta derrota da insurreição vai reforçar o atual executivo brasileiro.

President Peixoto's proclamation decreeing amnesty to the rebel soldiers and sailors, who surrendered unconditionally on Monday, was expected. It is not customary in civilized nations to gather all the soldiers in a defeated army in one place and shoot them. The officers only receive severe treatment. They are regarded as the responsible parties, while the privates are only the

unreasoning agents who fight because they are ordered to fight. The fate of Admirals Melo and da Gama is practically sealed — that is if President Peixoto can catch them. While the decree grants pardon to the privates it announces the determination of the government to subject the officers to court martial. But one verdict could follow such a trial. These men have taken up arms against their government. Under the universal law of nations such men are declared worthy of death. This law was not enforced in the United States at the close of the rebellion, but this exception surprised the other nations of the world.

It was at first reported that Admiral Melo<sup>48</sup> had taken refuge on a Portuguese ship. According to the latest dispatches he went on board the French cruiser *Magnon*. It is believed that he and his officers have been taken to Montevideo, a neutral port in Uruguay, where they will be joined by Admiral Melo. If this report is true it will be a long time before the sentence of any court martial can be executed upon them. They may go to Europe or they may remain in South America and stir up discord in Brazil. They are capable officers and some of the South American government may give them commissions in their navies. Then they would have the protection of their new country and could sail into the harbor of Rio de Janeiro with impunity, so long as they did not go ashore. While on their ships they would not be within the territory of Brazil. The incident of the unsuccessful rebellion will be closed in a few weeks and the representative government will be stronger because of it. It has proved that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> Erro do jornalista: trata-se de Saldanha da Gama.

event while there was an armed force opposing the present administration, it was possible to hold a peaceable election, and to choose a president by such a large majority that there can be no dispute as to his title to the office.

### **441**. «The End of the Revolution at Rio», *The Daily Picayune*, 15 de março

O articulista, depois de ter explicado as fraquezas estruturais dos rebeldes, felicita-se pelo fim da guerra civil. Agora, o comércio com o Brasil pode retomar um ritmo que corresponde melhor à importância do pais, principal exportador de café, realça o jornal da Luisiana.

After a practical blockade lasting nearly six months, the city of Rio de Janeiro was yesterday freed in its harbor by the surrender of the insurgent squadron to the loyal forces. With the rebel ships, also surrendered the various forts and batteries which the rebels has secured and defended. As far as Rio is concerned, the insurrection has been quelled, and as, with the loss of most of their fleet, the rebels have been terribly weakened, it is likely that the entire trouble will soon be at an end.

Admiral da Gama, who has been in charge of the rebel forces at Rio since the departure of Admiral Melo in the *Aquidaban*, succeeded in escaping on board of a French vessel, and is now supposed to be on his way to Montevideo. What has become of Admiral Melo, the prime mover in the revolutionary movement, is not known, but it is presumed that he is at Desterro, the seat of the revolutionary government.

The revolution has lasted a little more than six months, but although a vast amount of gunpowder has been wasted, the war has been without brilliant achievements on either side. For a long time, the rebels displayed about the only energy shown, but their resources were inadequate from the start, and their activity for some time past has apparently been due to scarcity of provisions, ammunition and men available for duty.

The crushing of the rebellion will remove all obstacles which have existed for many months past to foreign commerce with Brazilian ports. This will be a source of great satisfaction in many quarters, as there is a very extensive foreign commerce conducted with Brazil by nearly all the great commercial nations. Brazil being, in fact, the great source of the world's coffee supply. It is to be hoped that the disastrous ending of the revolutionary movement of de Melo will load to a more tranquil state of things in Brazil that has existed in that country since the advent of the republic.

### **442.** «Peace in Brazil», *New York Tribune*, 15 de março

O quotidiano escreve que o fim da revolta é uma «consequência da eleição do novo presidente do Brasil.» O jornalista, segundo o qual Peixoto será magnânimo com os chefes da insurreição, alegra-se da rendição, evitando desse modo o sangrento combate entre as duas frotas. «A marinha já não é uma força desestabilizadora» e agora, com o novo presidente civil, acrescenta, o país pode voltar à paz.

Admiral da Gama's abandonment of the insurgent cause is the sequel of the election of a new President of Brazil. The terms of surrender are still to be arranged, and Admiral Melo remains in Southern waters with two powerful ships of war; but the civil war has practically been brought to a close. Notwithstanding the hostile demonstrations with which the offer to surrender was received at first, it is probable that President Peixoto will be magnanimous in treating with the insurgent admirals and their officers.

It is fortunate that the conflict between the two fleets in the harbor has been averted by this surrender. The city of Rio would inevitably have suffered severely from a bombardment which would have been invited by destructive fire from Peixoto's new batteries on shore. Admiral da Gama's ships would undoubtedly have been sunk, especially as the *Aquidaban* and the *Republica* were not in the harbor to support them. A wasteful and unjustifiable sacrifice of life and property has been avoided by his acceptance of defeat in advance. With Peixoto's approaching retirement and the peaceful election of a civilian as his successor the civil war had become a barren and inglorious struggle. The people of Brazil are to be heartily congratulated upon the general result. Peace will be restored under conditions which can hardly fail to promote the stability of political institutions. The navy has ceased to be a disturbing force. The army under the control of a civilian President ought also to become less conspicuous than it has been in political affairs.

### **443**. «Peace in Sight in Brazil», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 15 de março

A insurreição, que foi iniciada «sem uma causa válida e que foi prolongada sem nenhum motivo», fracassou, felicita-se o jornal de Boston, que reitera a satisfação dos americanos pela vitória de Peixoto.

The surrender of the insurgent ships near Rio de Janeiro and the reported flight of Admiral da Gama to a French man-of-war for refuge, can scarcely mean anything but collapse of the rebellion in Brazil.

General satisfaction will be felt over the close of a contest that seems to have been entered upon without good cause, and prolonged without semblance of reason. The sympathies of Americans have unquestionably been with Peixoto in the struggle; for, whatever may have been said by the partisans of Melo, it is an indubitable fact that most, it not all the hopes of a return of imperialism rested upon the success of the insurgent cause.

Now, that order is to be restored and an honored civilian is to be Brazil's chief magistrate, there ought to be in store for the country a long season of peace and prosperity.

### **444.** San Francisco Chronicle, 15 de março

O preço do café, que aumentou logo depois do início da revolta, começa agora a baixar, mas vai levar ainda muito tempo antes que seja tão barato como era em agosto de 1893.

The one tangible result of the rebellion in Brazil noticed by most Americans was the appreciation in the prices of coffee as soon as the insurgents commenced operations. The United States is the chief customer of the Brazilian coffee-planters, and when a diminution of the supply of the berry from that country was threatened, the price of coffee was promptly advanced. On the news of the collapse of the rebellion the price declined several points in New York, but it is a safe prediction to make that it will be a long time before coffee can be bought at retail as cheaply as before the Brazilian row commenced.

### **445**. *The Times*, 15 de março

The revolt in Brazil has collapsed more suddenly and completely than was at first supposed. Da Gama and his forces have disappeared — melted away into the mist. It is true that Melo has been located at last, but he can scarcely hope to hold out alone very much longer, and the people at Rio are apparently justified in their rejoicing that the war is over. Though in some of its features it has narrowly escaped burlesque, it has been a serious affair enough for them, and even comparative peace must be very welcome.

### **446**. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 16 de março

Saldanha da Gama era um brilhante oficial da marinha brasileira, mas a sua ambição desmedida fez-lhe escolher este caminho «louco» que acabou em desastre. No seu exílio, nota o articulista, terá muito tempo para meditar sobre isso, sugere o jornal.

The lottery business is the commonly accepted type of uncertainly in human affairs, but South American revolutions would be a better. Admiral da Gama, who is now an exile from his native country and a fugitive on the face of the earth, will have time enough to reflect on the uncertainty of human affairs and to lament his folly in joining the insurgents and undertaking to overthrow the established government in Brazil. Before he committed this stupendous blunder he bore a high reputation as an officer of the Brazilian navy, and if he had been content to do his duty and remain loyal to the constitution and the government he could doubtless have held his position in the navy for life, or might, at some future time, have been elected President. But ambition and jealousy undid him. He thought he could lead the revolution to success and thereby greatly advance his own fortunes, so he turned traitor and embarked in a course which was to end in his ruin. When the collapse came he took refuge on a Portuguese battle ship, thereby showing that he knew he had committed a heinous crime against the government, and that, if captured, he could not expect any mercy. In his exile he will have ample time to repent his folly.

### **447.** The Chicago Daily Tribune, 16 de março

Revista da imprensa

The Washington Post. Admiral da Gama, undoubtedly exhausted himself in his efforts to avoid a fight

The Times (Filadélfia): While there is still a great deal of trouble ahead, it seems certain now that the Republic of Brazil has come to stay.

The Philadelphia Inquirer. The main weakness of Admiral da Gama's campaign was that he was kept so busy threatening top fight that he had no time to do anything.

New York Press: There never will be another attempt to reestablish a throne in that country. Kings and Emperors have left the soil of America never to return.

New York Herald. Brazil's first duty now is to forget and forgive as soon as possible. She needs to put all her energies into building up her overthrown industries and revivifying her paralyzed trade. The less force expended in reprisals and punishment the better it will be for her future.

The Philadelphia Press: The real danger to which Brazil is exposed is that its vast bulk split asunder. The one objection always urged in the past against a republic for Brazil has been that nothing but an empire could hold the country together. If Brazil survives the present insurrection, as now appears likely, the republic is secure.

The Boston Journal: The unfortunate sailors who have bravely followed the fortunes of the rebel leaders and must now share their fate should be commiserated, but Melo and da Gama themselves deserve no pity. They took their lives in their hands when they drew their swords against the flag of the republic. Now let them meet the consequences of their infatuation.

The Kansas City Times: Beyond a few holes in the houses of Rio and a number of men lost — some by staying too long on board a sinking ship and others from fever — it might have ended months ago and no one been the looser. The men fought like lotus-eaters and the officers commanded like dummies. It has been a most peculiar and exasperation play of war all around.

New York World: The revolt against the Republic of Brazil is over. It was a senseless effort from the first, and the war, if it can be dignified by that term, was carried on in a manner that bordered closely an opera bouffe. The outbreak against the regular established Government of Brazil originated in Melo's ambition to supplant Peixoto. The conflict was personal not patriotic.

The Evening Telegraph (Filadélfia): If they are ever to became capable of self-government; if they are to escape being plundered by a succession of military and political brigands and desperadoes, as nearly all the Spanish-American communities have been, they will have to show higher qualities, more sturdy common sense, more resolute pluck and better judgment and discretion than have been exhibited in this naval fiasco on either side.

Public Ledger (Filadélfia): Whatever the ground of this revolt, real or pretended, may have been, the injury which Brazil has suffered by the suspension of business, by the impairment of its credit, by the stock to its financial interests, by the public alarm and the direct cost of its desultory

warfare has been far greater that any damage which Peixoto could have inflicted upon his country during the residue of his Presidential term.

## **448.** «The United States and Brazil», *The Sioux-City Journal*, 17 de março

O articulista defende a política americana no Brasil, onde Washington sempre esteve do lado do governo do Rio. Agora, com a derrota da insurreição, os Estados Unidos estão numa posição muito melhor do que a Grã-Bretanha, acusada pelo jornal, de ter apoiado a frota rebelde, cujo objetivo era, no fundo, restaurar a monarquia deposta em novembro de 1889.

The United States government has struck to the traditional policy of refusing to recognize rebels until they have clearly established sufficient strength. The result has been entirely satisfactory with reference to Brazil, and if the government shall crush the remnant of the rebellion, as it probably will, the United States will be left in an advantageous position. The revolt of the Brazilian navy, led by de Melo and da Gama, had for pretext President Peixoto's violations of the constitution. Very likely there was ground for the charges which were made by the revolting admirals. But it is probably true that the constitution was as well observed by Peixoto as it would have been by the leaders of the revolt to overthrow him — as well observed as it is likely to be by any government for the time being. The rebellion in fact took the shape of purpose to overthrow utterly the constitution. It was promoted by the family of the deposed emperor Dom Pedro and their powerful connections both in Brazil

and in Europe. They supplied funds for the rebels and co-operate with them in every possible way. It was not long till this fact became publicly conspicuous, and it powerfully influenced public opinion in Brazil against the rebellion. Da Gama went so far as to issue a proclamation to the effect that the house of Braganza was to be restored – a declaration which instantly arrayed republican sentiment against the rebellion and strengthened Peixoto. Although the rebel leaders soon saw the fatal blunder and attempted to correct it by proclaiming that the people should decide what kind of government they desire, it was too late. From the moment the rebellion assumed the aspect of a royalist movement it declined. But it is beyond question that the European governments were anxious to have the rebellion succeed, and equally anxious for restoration of the monarchy. Great Britain has been exceedingly jealous of the intimacy between the Brazilian republic and the United States, and hostile to the advances which our trade has made in Brazil, which has been a rich field for British commerce. British commercial interests guite largely have yearned for the success of the rebellion, and doubtless have done what they could to promote it. And the British government has pursued a course which seems to be influenced by these interests. Brazilians naturally resent this attitude. The United States government, while adhering to its traditional policy, has avoided this result. Its policy necessarily inured to the disadvantage of the rebels. The suppression of the rebellion therefore can hardly fail to promote American interests.

### 449. «Our Policy in Brazil» The Washington Post, 17 de março

Como o seu colega de Sioux-City<sup>49</sup>, o jornal da capital americana é da opinião que a revolta começou a perder terreno quando da Gama publicou em dezembro o seu manifesto em favor do regresso da monarquia, provocando uma reação dos republicanos, e, indiretamente também, dos americanos.

O Washington Post acusa as nações europeias, e nomeadamente a Inglaterra e a Alemanha, de terem favorecido a frota rebelde contra Peixoto, a tal ponto de nem sequer terem defendido os comerciantes dos seus países na baia do Rio.

A conclusão do artigo não podia ser mais clara: «Neste momento, foi sem dúvida a atitude enérgica e determinada dos Estados Unidos que salvou Peixoto».

It cannot, in our opinion, be successfully denied that the downfall of the Brazilian insurrection is referable, largely, if no wholly, to the significant attitude and resolute action of the United States. From the day on which Admiral Benham interposed this country's mighty arm between the insurgents and their absurd and arrogant pretensions, the cause of Melo and da Gama has been steadily declining.

No doubt that the interposition was inspired chiefly by da Gama's imprudent and perhaps unwarranted intimation that the success of the insurrection might lead to a restoration of the empire. In all probability Mr. Cleveland felt that, in such an emergency and with such an alternative confronting him, he was called upon to defend free institutions and forbid the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Cf. Texto 448.

resurrection of monarchy on the American continent. It was not only his duty, but, presumably, it was his pleasure to do this. The possibility of his entertaining any other thought is inconceivable. And also, da Gama's announcement was the signal for da Gama's destruction. The first glance of the insurgent leaders in the direction of the exiled royal family branded their enterprise with failure and confusion.

There has been little if any doubt from the beginning that the European powers represented at Rio Janeiro sympathized with the insurrection. The complaisant manner in which they permitted the rudest and most arbitrary interference with their merchant vessels leaves us without an excuse for thinking otherwise. When England and Germany wink at any obstruction of their commerce, one need not be supernaturally wise to draw the conclusion that some very powerful motive lies at the bottom of such forbearance. And it was at all time quite as plain as day that, so far as Europa was concerned, da Gama and Melo were at liberty to paralyze the commerce of Brazil, if in that way they could crush Peixoto and attain their ends. English and German merchant captains protested in vain. They were left to the tyranny of the insurgent officials without even a show of interference by the representatives of their respective flags. Every indication pointed to a deliberate conspiracy against Peixoto and the Brazilian republic.

The forcible and determined attitude of the United States at this juncture unquestionably saved Peixoto. In default of that the insurgents would have cut off his supplies from the outside world, and, by the slow process of starvation,

destroyed his government. Whether that result would have led to the reestablishment of the empire is perhaps doubtful; but da Gama committed the blunder of intimating that it would, and so provoked a vigorous and potent manifestation of our traditional policy.

#### 450. «Affairs in Brazil», San Francisco Chronicle, 17 de março

O quotidiano da cidade californiana acusa os ingleses de terem ajudado financiado os revoltosos e os oficiais da frota britânica presente no Rio de terem tido uma atitude extremamente favorável para com Saldanha da Gama.

Por outro lado, o quotidiano congratula o seu país e nomeadamente o almirante Benham de ter protegido os interesses comerciais dos Estados Unidos, sem pôr em causa a «perfeita neutralidade», deixando supor que isso terá consequências positivas a médio prazo.

Esta guerra acaba com poucos mortos e destruições, constata o jornalista que se regozija da vitória das ideias republicanas contra as duma restauração monárquica.

It would seem that the war in Brazil, if it be proper to call it a war, is at an end. Admiral da Gama and many of his officers have made their escape, their vessels have been turned over to the Government, and the insurgent forts have surrendered and are now garrisoned by Peixoto's forces. Some doubt exists as to the precise whereabouts of Admiral Melo, but he is not likely to make serious trouble in view of the defection of da Gama.

The next object of inquiry will naturally be, who was behind Melo and da Gama? It is perfectly obvious that they must have had backing from some quarter to enable them to last as long as they did, and there seems to be an impression in Rio Janeiro that it was British capital which supplied the sinews of war. This impression was strengthened, no doubt, by the conduct of the officers commanding of the British ships-of-war in the harbor, all of whom were manifestly well disposed toward da Gama and the cause of the insurgents.

Our own country is to be congratulated on the stand taken by Admiral Benham in protecting the commercial interests of the United States and at the same time preserving perfect neutrality. President Peixoto has recognized this explicitly, and, no doubt, when matters have resumed their normal condition, there will be something said or done bay the Brazilian Congress which will supplement this declaration of President Peixoto.

It is fortunate for Brazil that his war has terminated with so little bloodshed and so little destruction of property. Brazil needs peace and a settled government in order to develop her resources and built up her prosperity. The victory of the Government over da Gama and Melo is worth an incalculable amount to Brazil, for it shows the strength of the republican and its ability to defend itself against domestic strife and dissension. If the rule of Morais, President-elect be prudent and yet progressive, we shall hear no more of the restoration of monarchy in Brazil.

### **451**. *The Sioux-City Journal*, 20 de março

Eighty-four percent of the people of Brazil can neither read nor write, but they are pretty well educated in the dangers of shot and gunpowder.

### **452.** San Francisco Chronicle, 21 de março

A atuação militar dos rebeldes foi um desastre, constata o jornal, segundo o qual a principal atividade deles foi enviar despachos cheios de mentiras «para influenciar os mercados europeus.»

It was characteristic of the Brazilian insurgents to brag about the plot to upset the Peixoto Government before a blow had been dealt. These fellows had much the same advantage that the Confederates enjoyed at the outbreak of the Rebellion, and they also had the moral support of a large number o conservative people who objected to the dictatorial rule of the President. With the best part of the navy and with large means at their command they might easily have won or at least have given the Government a hard fight. As it was they showed poor generalship and utter lack of concentration of forces. Their main dependence seemed to be upon lying cable dispatches to influence the European markets.

### **453.** «War Ends in Brazil», *The Morning Call*, 21 de março

O jornal faz um resumo, embora nem sempre fiel, dos acontecimentos: o início da revolta com Melo que não consegue nenhum apoio interno, além duma parte importante da frota; os primeiros sucessos da insurreição; a resposta de Peixoto que compra navios em Nova Iorque; «o golpe mortal administrado ao movimento rebelde» pela intervenção americana de janeiro; a eleição de Prudente de Moraes.

Agora tudo acabou ou quase. Com efeito, nota o diário californiano, no Rio Grande do Sul a guerra continua, mas isso «não vai interferir com as plantações de café e com o comércio no Rio». Agora, «no que diz respeito ao resto do mundo, a guerra terminou», conclui o articulista.

The story of the naval civil war in Brazil, which has happily been brought to a practical close by the flight of da Gama, will not occupy much space in History. The rebellion lasted just six months. On September 5, 1893, Admiral Melo, in command of the Brazilian fleet at Rio, demanded the resignation of President Peixoto, on the ground that he was not satisfactory to the nation. No specific charge was made against him, but he was accused of having vetoed certain measures which had been passed by Congress; he was held accountable for the financial distress; he was blamed for not having put down the rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul; the rump or the Royalist or Imperialist party were, of course, opposed to him on general principles. It was apparently Melo's idea that when the navy declared against Peixoto, the army and the people would follow suit, and that he would have to step down and out.

It seems that he miscalculated Peixoto's hold on popular confidence, and that he underrated the common sense of the Brazilian people. Instead of following the lead of the navy, the army stood faithfully by the Government and garrisoned the forts in Rio harbor with battle in their eye. In the same spirit, the people showed no disposition to mutiny; on the contrary they furnished the President with arms and supplies. No word of comfort reached the insurgents from foreign ports.

Notwithstanding these disappointments, Melo gathered his fleet, which included the formidable *Aquidaban, Republica, Trajano* and *Tamandare*, and proceeded to bombard the city of Rio. The operation was repeated on one or two subsequent occasions, leading to some destruction of life and property. Admiral da Gama joined the insurgents and took command. The coffee port of Santos was blockaded and one of the harbor forts went over to the rebels, giving them a pied a terre in the vicinity of Rio. Thus far events were favorable to the insurgents. But Peixoto was not idle. He purchased two powerful vessels in New York, which he christened the *Neteroi* and the *America*, and armed them with dynamite guns and rapid-firing cannon. To these he added an Ericsson torpedo boat. With these, and his own *Tiradentes* and *Bahia*, which had refused to join the rebellion, he prepared to give battle to da Gama's fleet.

But the most deadly blow administered to the insurgent movement was dealt by Admiral Benham. Da Gama insisted that he has established an effective blockade of Rio. Benham denied this, and notified the rebels that American vessels, under the protection of his gun, would sail to the wharves, and load and discharge cargo. He showed that he meant what he said by opening fire from the *Detroit* when da Gama attempted to enforce his blockade.

This, when it became evident that no cooperation could be expected from the shore, made the rebellion hopeless. Admiral Melo thought so, for he took flight in the *Aquidaban*, which ship, with the *Republica* steamed out to sea<sup>50</sup>, leaving da Gama to his fate. The latter had already met the President in the cabin of the *San Francisco*, and the two combatants, Peixoto and da Gama, then and there agreed to run Moraes for President on March 1. The selection of Moraes appears to have been regarded as a compromise in the nature of a victory for both sides. Da Gama was satisfied with any one so long as he got rid of Peixoto, and Peixoto was pleased to be succeeded by his personal adherent, and a leading member of his party. Thus, when the election took place and Moraes was unanimously elected, hostilities ceased. It is said that da Gama left the country in a Portuguese ship of war<sup>51</sup>. The foreign fleets all weighed anchor, their officers being satisfied that their services would be needed no longer.

The mining districts in Rio Grande do Sul are still in insurrection, and Moraes may find it necessary to continue the campaign in that part of the republic. But fighting fills no mouths, and the miners must, by this time, be on short commons. In any event, the disturbance in that part of the country will not interfere with the coffee plantations or with the trade of Rio. So far as the foreign world is concerned, the war is at an end.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Custódio de Melo já tinha saído da baia do Rio em novembro.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> Este relato de um encontro entre Peixoto e da Gama é pura invenção do jornalista californiano.

## **454.** «Washington Gossip» *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 21 de março

Segundo o antigo ministro americano no Rio, o falhanço da revolta da marinha é devido às divisões entre o filo-monárquico da Gama e Custódio de Melo.

Representative "Bertie" Adams, of Philadelphia, has followed with great interest the history of the attempted revolution in Brazil which has just come to such an ignominious failure. As an ex-Minister to Brazil<sup>52</sup> whose diplomatic career in that country witnessed the overthrow of the House of Braganza and the substitution of the republic of the empire, Mr. Adams' opinion of the failure of the effort to overthrow Peixoto is of both interest and value.

It is very difficult for people in this country who have never been to South America, said Mr. Adams, at the Metropolitan Club last evening, to understand the overwhelming importance of the army and navy in Brazilian politics. They are, in truth, the controlling forces. Under the empire the navy was the ruling factor in the government while the army succeeded to power under the republic. The collapse of the revolution against Peixoto is, in my opinion, largely due to disagreements between the elements in the navy represented, respectively, By Melo and da Gama. One of these elements was closely affiliated with the empire and was reasonably suspected of a desire to restore Dom Pedro and his heir. In fact, such a declaration was made, but, as you will remember, afterwards modified. The continuance of the republic seems assured, because of the election of the successor to Peixoto, who is a moderate man and who will carry out the constitution. This constitution was framed during my residence at Rio de Janeiro, and I had the honor of being

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> Robert Adams Jr. (1849-1906) foi ministro americano no Brasil de julho de 1889 a março de 1890. De 1893 até à morte, foi deputado pelo Partido Republicano no Congresso americano, representando o segundo Distrito da Pensilvânia.

consulted as to some of its provisions. It is framed in a general way upon the Constitution of the United States, although, of course, it differs greatly in details.

### **455.** *The Sun,* (N. Y.), 21 de março

As potências europeias, escreve o jornal, tinham um plano de intervenção para o Brasil, o que teria sido catastrófico. Foi a atitude firme e inequívoca dos Estados Unidos que os convenceu a fazer marcha atrás.

We had good evidence last January that a number of the representatives of European powers at Rio were ready for intervention in the affairs of Brazil to the detriment of its Government. It was then that they heard from this country the words of warning. "Hands off Brazil!" The words were not official, nor from the State Department; yet not the less did express the sentiment of the American people, and receive the support of the country. Very soon thereafter the foreign powers concluded to postpone the day of intervention. They restrained their hand. They knew that the voice which reaches them from this country was authoritative, even though it had not been raised in Washington. It was well for them that they gave heed to it. Meanwhile, the Brazilian Government, strengthened by the assurance of American friendship, applied its power to the suppression of the revolt, and gained successes which soon relieved it from all danger of foreign intervention, and rendered it unnecessary for the friend of Brazil here to repeat the admonition. "Hand off!" in the hearing of the representatives of the European powers at Rio. There is no doubt that, if

the projected intervention had been executed last January, its results would have been calamitous to Brazil, and not alone to her.

#### **456.** «Allies of Rebellion», San Francisco Chronicle, 23 de março

A notícia de Peixoto ter documentos que provam a ajuda que certos navios europeus deram aos revoltosos, é utilizada pelo jornal californiano para atacar os ingleses — e nomeadamente a frota britânica no porto carioca, «muito branda em defender os navios mercantes» do seu país dos ataques vindos dos rebeldes — e, em parte, a portuguesa.

Agora, conclui o jornal, a república brasileira, que conseguiu vencer, tem de virar página e promulgar uma amnistia geral.

President Peixoto of the Republic of Brazil is said to have come into possession of important documents which show beyond a doubt that certain European vessels systematically gave aid do the insurgents. If this be true, it bids fair to open an exceedingly interesting chapter in history. It was seen very soon after the revolt began that Melo and da Gama must be receiving substantial aid from some source, and speculation was rife as to who their backers were.

If it were foreign vessels in the harbor of Rio Janeiro that were the source of supply, it will not take long to locate them. We may be sure that American vessels were not implicated in such a breach of neutrality, and while we need make no charges, we may assay that in all probability the matter may form a proper subject of inquiry in the House of Commons. It will be

remembered, no doubt, that the direct charge was made some weeks ago that da Gama has promised vast concessions in Brazil to certain British capitalists in the event of his success, and that about that time the British fleet was very lukewarm in defending British merchant ships from the shot and shell of the rebel fleet.

Portugal, too, may come in for her share of the just resentment of Brazil, though all the talk about war between Brazil and Portugal can be nothing but the merest moonshine. It will be a paper war, if any, and paper bullets are not deadly where an ocean rolls between the combatants.

The best thing Brazil can do is to settle down as soon as possible, granting amnesty to all the insurgents who will give evidence of an intention to abstain from revolt in the future. The republic cannot afford to be bloodthirsty, since it has succeeded in maintaining its authority.

# Lista dos periódicos

Akron Bacon and Republican, The (Akron, Ohio)

Asheville Daily Citizen (Asheville, Carolina do Norte)

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Brooklyn Daily Eagle, The (Brooklyn, Nova Iorque)

Brooklyn Daily Citizen, The (Brooklyn, Nova Iorque)

Buffalo Commercial, The (Buffalo, Nova Iorque)

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Cherokee County Republican (Baxter Springs, Kansas

Chicago Daily Tribune, The (Chicago, Illinois)

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Democrat and Chronicle (Rochester, Nova Iorque)

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Minneapolis Tribune, The (Mineapolis, Minesota)

Morning Call, The (San Francisco, Califórnia)

Nebraska State Journal, The (Lincoln, Nebrasca)

New York Times, The (Nova Iorque)

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Oakland Tribune (Oakland, Califórnia)

Omaha Daily Bee, The (Omaha, Nebrasca)

Philadelphia Inquireer, The (Filadélfia, Pensilvânia)

Pittsburg Post, The (Pittsburg, Pensilvânia)

Pittsburg Press, The (Pittsburg, Pensilvânia)

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St. Louis Globe-Democrat (St. Louis, Missuri)

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Sioux City Journal, The (Sioux City, Iowa)

Standard Union, The (Brooklyn, Nova Iorque)

Sun, The (Baltimore, Maryland)

Sun, The (Nova Iorque)

Times, The (Filadélfia, Pensilvânia)

Times-Democrat, The (Nova Orleães, Luisiana)

Wall Street Journal (Nova Iorque)

Washington Post, The (Washington D.C.)

Weekly Times-Democrat (Nova Orleães, Luisiana)

Wichita Daily Eagle, The (Wichita, Kansas)

York Daily, The (York, Pensilvânia)

# Résumé en français<sup>53</sup>

Le 6 septembre 1893 éclate, dans le port de Rio, une révolte de la marine brésilienne aux ordres de Custódio de Melo, contre le gouvernement du maréchal Peixoto qui a le soutien de l'Armée. Cette guerre civile qui va durer six mois se trouvera bientôt dans une impasse, aucun des deux rivaux n'ayant les moyens de l'emporter sur l'autre. Fin janvier, la flotte américaine réussit à neutraliser le blocus de la baie de Rio de Janeiro, un coup presque fatal pour les insurgés qui attendent en vain les renforts du Sud du pays. Six semaines plus tard, la flotte rebelle, acculée et épuisée, capitulera ; Saldanha da Gama — qui en était devenu le commandant en décembre — et ses officiers se réfugient à bord d'un navire portugais<sup>54</sup>.

Dans ces deux volumes, nous avons choisi de retranscrire les commentaires et analyses écrits par une cinquantaine de journaux américains

Dans ce texte, nous nous bornons à indiquer les principaux événements traités par la presse états-unienne. Dans un volume à paraître en 2022 dans cette même collection (*Olhares francófonos sobre a Segunda Revolta da Armada*), nous allons rédiger une synthèse plus approfondie des regards portés par la presse anglophone et francophone sur ces six mois de l'histoire du Brésil contemporain.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> Cet épisode est à l'origine de la rupture des relations diplomatiques entre Rio de Janeiro et Lisbonne deux mois plus tard. Cf. Francisco das Neves Alves & Reto Monico, *A ruptura diplomática luso-brasileira na imprensa internacional e sul-rio-grandense*, Lisbonne-Rio Grande, Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2018.

qui se penchent sur ces mois très agités de l'histoire du plus grand pays de l'Amérique du Sud. La presse états-unienne, en plus des nombreux télégrammes et des résumés des agences de presse, n'hésite pas à donner son avis sur ce qui se passe dans la Baie de Rio. En outre, chaque événement important a le droit à un titre important en première page<sup>55</sup>.

Comme dans la presse britannique et française<sup>56</sup>, le coup de force de Custódio de Melo suscite de nombreuses réactions de la part des journalistes de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique. Lors des premières semaines, une majorité d'entre eux critiquent le nouveau régime républicain, le poids des militaires dans la vie politique brésilienne, constatent que le peuple n'est pas préparé à vivre sous une république et semblent sympathiser avec les insurgés. Plusieurs analystes écrivent que le pays vivait dans de bien meilleures conditions à l'époque de D. Pedro II. Pour tous cependant, il est incompréhensible que la Marine puisse bombarder sa capitale.

Personne n'arrive à comprendre les vraies raisons qui ont poussé Custódio de Melo à se révolter. Cette guerre civile est souvent présentée comme une lutte entre les deux branches des Forces Armées et/ou un conflit personnel entre Floriano Peixoto et Custódio de Melo. D'un côté, celui-ci, appuyé par la

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> À l'époque, les premières pages des journaux américains étaient divisées en six ou sept colonnes. Trois ou quatre d'entre elles avaient un titre plus grand.

Deux autres ouvrages sont prévus à brève échéance: A Segunda Revolta da Armada na imprensa britânica; A Segunda Revolta da Armada na imprensa francesa.

Marine et les forces conservatrices et réactionnaires ; de l'autre, le Président avec l'Armée de terre et les républicains.

Cependant, cette relative bienveillance à l'égard des marins révoltés fait petit à petit place à des articles qui expriment une préoccupation présente en toile de fond pendant toute cette période : les révoltés auraient comme objectif de restaurer la dynastie des Bragance à Rio de Janeiro, et ceci avec l'aide des monarchistes européens. Dans plusieurs articles, on traite les marins de pirates et de corsaires qui n'ont aucune raison de revendiquer le statut de belligérants.

Une écrasante majorité des éditorialistes reprennent le même refrain, en rappelant les principes de la doctrine Monroe: aucune puissance d'un autre continent ne peut intervenir dans la politique interne d'un pays du Nouveau Monde. Selon ces analystes, les Etats-Unis ne doivent pas appuyer Peixoto contre la Marine en révolte et jouer ainsi le rôle du policier en Amérique Latine, mais ils doivent empêcher que d'autres, et notamment les monarchies européennes, imposent un régime politique aux Brésiliens. Presque tous les journalistes accusent les pays du vieux continent —notamment la Grande Bretagne et dans une moindre mesure l'Espagne— d'aider plus ou moins directement les insurgés dans le but de renverser le régime installé à Rio de Janeiro depuis novembre 1889.

Sauf pendant les premières semaines, l'écrasante majorité de la presse américaine appuie Floriano Peixoto, tout en constatant que la situation militaire est bloquée: les révoltés ne sont pas à même d'organiser un débarquement de troupes pour déloger Peixoto; celui-ci ne dispose pas de flotte pour chasser les rebelles du port de Rio de Janeiro. C'est pour cette raison que le gouvernement brésilien achète des navires aux Etats-Unis.

Les éditorialistes d'Outre-Atlantique se penchent sur cette situation en analysant cette acquisition tant du point de vue militaire que du point de vue politique. Une majorité estime que, étant donné que les révoltés ne sont pas des belligérants et que par conséquent, il n'a y pas de guerre au Brésil, cette vente est tout à fait légale. Certains se posent toutefois la question du statut de neutralité de leur pays, vu qu'on prépare cette nouvelle flotte de guerre dans le port de New York. Une petite minorité admet que ces navires n'ont de loin pas les qualités requises et que donc leur pays a fait une bonne affaire en les vendant!

Tout le monde est conscient que les nouvelles qui arrivent du Brésil sont souvent difficiles à vérifier, partisanes et contradictoires. On cite le cas de Custódio de Melo qui aurait dû être à six endroits en même temps! Certains quotidiens accusent même Londres de manipuler l'information pour porter préjudice à l'exécutif brésilien. Cette situation peut sans doute expliquer pourquoi, dans un certain nombre de commentaires, on présente une situation militaire extrêmement favorable aux insurgés qui seraient même, selon ces sources, sur le point de l'emporter.

La plupart des observateurs réclament une plus forte présence de leur pays dans la baie de Rio de Janeiro qui, au début de ce conflit, était purement symbolique, nettement inférieure à celle des grandes puissances européennes. Le renforcement de la flotte états-unienne, dans le but de défendre les intérêts américains, se concrétise dans le courant de l'automne. Cette puissance navale ne pouvait pas ne pas avoir de conséquences sur la suite des événements.

Le nouveau commandant, l'amiral Benham, fait clairement comprendre à da Gama qu'il a l'intention de défendre la liberté de commerce des navires de son pays. Le 29 janvier 1894, il protège un navire marchand qui doit décharger sa marchandise. Devant la menace des rebelles qui veulent l'en empêcher, le commandant américain réagit avec vigueur en disant à da Gama qu'il pourrait ne pas se borner à des tirs d'avertissement. Le chef de l'escadre rebelle ne peut que capituler.

Cette attitude ferme et énergique de l'amiral Benham est approuvée sans réserve par les journalistes de son pays, satisfaits de cette intervention. Beaucoup d'entre eux écrivent que, après cette démonstration de force, plus personne, dans le port de Rio, ne va mettre le bâton dans les roues des Américains. Certains affirment que c'est l'arrogant amiral brésilien qui a provoqué cet incident, afin de pouvoir se rendre aux navires américains et sauver ainsi sa peau.

Tous croient que la révolte est à bout et qu'elle est sans issue. Cependant, il faudra attendre encore six semaines avant la reddition des marins rebelles. Le 13 mars, Saldanha da Gama et ses officiers se réfugient à bord d'un navire portugais en abandonnant leurs hommes. La presse américaine met en évidence l'attitude peu courageuse du chef de la rébellion qui aurait dû mieux tenir compte de l'avertissement donné par Benham fin janvier.

À l'heure des bilans de cette guerre civile, les journalistes défendent la politique de Washington qui, à leurs yeux, a été à la fois sensée, discrète, mais également vigoureuse et déterminée. Même si l'on ne peut pas affirmer que les rebelles ont été vaincus par les Américains, ces analystes reconnaissent le rôle clé joué par leur pays dans le succès de Peixoto. Ils constatent avec une grande satisfaction que, à présent, la position de leur pays est nettement meilleure que celle de la Grande-Bretagne.

En même temps, ils censurent la révolte de Custódio de Melo et de Saldanha da Gama, leur faux prétexte et la faiblesse de leurs arguments pour déclarer la guerre à leur gouvernement. Les deux chefs insurgés disaient que leur but était de renverser un président usurpateur, mais en réalité, leur objectif était de rétablir l'empire, soulignent avec force plusieurs éditorialistes.

Tous les commentaires journalistiques notent avec soulagement que, même si la guerre se poursuit au Rio Grande do Sul, cette victoire de l'exécutif brésilien permet une reprise du commerce international avec la jeune république, Toutefois, cela ne se fera pas en quelques jours, comme l'écrit le San Francisco le 15 mars 1894 à propos d'un des symboles du Brésil :

Quand est arrivée la nouvelle de la défaite des insurgés, le prix a diminué de plusieurs points sur le marché de New York. Il est toutefois raisonnable de penser qu'il faudra encore beaucoup de temps, pour que le prix du café au détail soit aussi bon marché qu'avant le début des désordres au Brésil. ••



Nichtheroy.

GENERAL VIEW OF THE HARBOR OF, RIO DE JANEIRO.

The Detroit essented the vessel from the lower harbor up to the docks at the right in the cut. The vessels shown indicate substitution of the insurgent warships.











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