

CRISIS IN BRAZIL MARTIAL LAW PROCLAIMED.

[REUTER'S TELEGRAMS.]

RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 4.
Congress has been dissolved, martial law has
been proclaimed, and a dictatorship re-established.

SECOND EDITION.

FOREIGN TELEGRAMS.

MANCHESTER, THURSDAY MORNING, Nov. 5.

(REUTER'S TELEGRAMS.)

COUP D'ETAT IN BRAZIL.

PROCLAMATION OF A DICTATORSHIP.

RIO DE JANEIRO, WEDNESDAY.

Congress has been dissolved.

Martial law has been proclaimed, and a dictator-
ship established.

MARTIAL LAW IN BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO, Wednesday. — The Congress has
been dissolved. Martial law has been proclaimed,
and a dictatorship established.

THE REVOLT IN BRAZIL.

DOWNFALL OF MARSHAL
FONSECA.

RIOTING IN RIO DE JANEIRO.

INSURRECTION AT RIO DE
JANEIRO.

DOWNFALL OF MARSHAL
FONSECA.



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GOLPE E QUEDA DE DEODORO NA IMPRENSA BRITÂNICA

(NOVEMBRO DE 1891)

RETO MONICO



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**GOLPE E QUEDA DE DEODORO
NA IMPRENSA BRITÂNICA
(NOVEMBRO DE 1891)**





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VICE-PRESIDENTE – PEDRO ALBERTO TÁVORA BRASIL
DIRETOR DE ACERVO – MAURO PÓVOAS
1º SECRETÁRIO – LUIZ HENRIQUE TORRES
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Reto Monico

GOLPE E QUEDA DE DEODORO NA IMPRENSA BRITÂNICA (NOVEMBRO DE 1891)



- 36 -



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Apresentação

Em dois precedentes volumes, analisámos os olhares da imprensa francófona europeia¹ e norte-americana² sobre a tentativa autoritária do primeiro presidente da República do Brasil em novembro de 1891. Este livro apresenta o que 15 jornais britânicos publicam sobre os mesmos acontecimentos na então jovem república sul-americana.

Estes órgãos de imprensa parecem surpreendidos pelo golpe do chefe do executivo brasileiro, como em novembro de 1889, quando depuseram o imperador. Nos primeiros dias depois da proclamação do estado de sítio, focam as suas análises em dois pontos principais. Por um lado, os jornalistas britânicos estudam os aspetos jurídicos para tentar explicar quais são os poderes do Parlamento e os do Presidente. Por outro lado, muitos artigos são dedicados à crise financeira, à emissão de notas muito além do permitido e à inflação galopante.

Embora alguns pareçam ventilar um regresso dos Bragança, a maioria dos observadores não acredita que isso seja possível: constataam que um povo que nem sequer mexeu um dedo para defender D. Pedro II, nada vai fazer para

¹ MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa francófona*. Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020. (Coleção documentos, nº 27)

² MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa norte-americana*. Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020. (Coleção documentos, nº 28)

apoiar o seu neto. Todos concordam em afirmar que esta viragem autoritária é muito negativa para a imagem do Brasil, para as cotações nas bolsas, para as exportações brasileiras e para o comércio, nomeadamente para os comerciantes ingleses.

Os quotidianos britânicos criticam duramente a falta de informação, os métodos repressivos de Deodoro que só quer defender os seus interesses. Sublinham que os telegramas são contraditórios e ironizam sobre o papel da censura num país, onde, segundo as fontes oficiais, tudo está tranquilo. Realçam também o facto da população ser pouco instruída e, por conseguinte, ser facilmente manipulada.

Muitos artigos debruçam-se sobre a revolta em alguns estados e nomeadamente no Rio Grande do Sul. Segundo eles, trata-se da província mais rica e mais desenvolvida do país. Se alguns diários acreditam num provável desmembramento do Brasil, outros, como *The Times*, escrevem que isso nunca acontecerá e preferem falar de autonomia.

Apesar dos numerosos ataques da imprensa norte-americana contra os ingleses acusados de quererem boicotar o Tratado comercial entre os Estados Unidos e o Brasil, a imprensa britânica praticamente não aborda o assunto. Encontrámos uma única pequena alusão a esta problemática: a 20 de novembro, *The Manchester Guardian* nota que, com este Tratado, o Brasil perde muito mais do que ganha.

Todos constataam que a queda do Marechal ocorreu sem derramamento de sangue e com relativamente poucos distúrbios. Deodoro, que não controlava nada, não foi morto e isso é motivo de satisfação geral. Esta derrota de Fonseca é muito positiva, realçam alguns editorialistas, na opinião dos quais os ditadores não tem futuro na América Latina.

No entanto, quase todos constataam que os problemas ficam. Uma parte dos jornalistas nota que o Brasil está à beira da falência e numa situação confusa; um editorialista prevê mesmo uma guerra civil. Outros, mais otimistas, observam que os títulos brasileiros recuperam parte do terreno perdido e esperam que as relações comerciais retomem um novo ritmo. Todos lamentam a falta de uma classe dirigente à altura, fundamental também para os europeus que investiram no Brasil.

Quanto a Floriano Peixoto, os jornais notam que prometeu muito, mas, tal como os seus colegas do outro lado do Atlântico, preferem esperar para ver o que realmente será capaz de realizar³.

³ Um agradecimento muito especial para o Francisco Matta que corrigiu todos os textos em português desta trilogia sobre a tentativa autoritária de Deodoro da Fonseca em novembro de 1891.

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Capítulo 1

O Golpe

1. *The Times*, 5 de novembro

A notícia do golpe foi um choque, «uma dolorosa surpresa», na City de Londres, afirma o jornal, que tenta encontrar as causas dos recentes acontecimentos, mas nenhuma delas parece justificar, na opinião do editorialista, as severas medidas tomadas por Deodoro.

Sejam quais foram os motivos, o facto de não se saber o que está por trás desta viragem autoritária, é péssimo para a imagem do Brasil, para a dívida e os títulos brasileiros já em dificuldade depois da recente crise financeira.

Some consternation was caused yesterday in the City by the news that the Brazilian Congress had been dissolved, martial law proclaimed, and a dictatorship established by the President DEODORO DA FONSECA. There is a provoking brevity and lack of details about the announcement, the Government having seized the telegraph with that autocratic promptitude which seems to be fostered by democratic institutions of the most advanced type. When time can be found to draw up a plausible account we shall, no doubt, learn exactly what the Dictator desires us to believe, but in the meantime we can only conjecture, with the aid of such a meagre hints as have escaped the censorship, the nature of the trouble between the PRESIDENT and the Congress. It is barely two years that Brazil astonished the world by abolishing the Monarchy and carrying out a revolution with less excitement and disturbance than the most commonplace Irish election is certain to produce. DOM PEDRO and his family were shipped on board a steamer and despatched to Europe at a few hours' notice as coolly as if they had been bales of coffee, and, although the Monarch

was supposed to enjoy unbounded popularity, nobody lifted a finger or uttered a word of energetic protest. The Provisional Government, with FONSECA at its head, could be dimly seen, subsequently, to be having a little trouble with its subjects. But the usual precautions were taken to prevent discussion of Brazilian affairs in foreign parts, and recalcitrant subjects were promptly taught that their new ruler did not confine himself to the mild methods; which made DOM PEDRO loved rather than respected. Every possible means of reassuring the European investor was resorted to by the astute Finance minister of the new Government, which promise to regularize its position with all possible speed by ordering a general election. That election was held in due course, and if we may believe the assurances of the PRESIDENT'S friends was honourably distinguished by the complete abstention of the Government from interference. The resulting Congress was rewarded this singular virtue by acquiescing in Fonseca's occupancy of the Presidential chair, and, as every one desired to see order re-established in Brazil, it was quickly assumed that the revolution had in fact made no difference to commercial and social stability. Since then Brazil has approximated to the beatitude of the nation that has no history; hence it was with a shock of painful surprise that the City yesterday heard of what is really another revolution. Its impressions are registered in a heavy fall in Brazilian securities.

It seems that things have not been altogether pleasant for some time past between the PRESIDENT and the Congress. He shares with some worthy people in this country the belief that when money is scarce the remedy is to

create more circulating medium, a belief which men in his position may hold with more excuse than others since they at least can always profit by inflation. He has accordingly been very anxious to obtain the emission of a large quantity of notes without any pedantic regard to the precautions required to insure their convertibility. Congress, however, has not shown itself sufficiently pliable and complaisant on this question, and the result has been considerable friction. It is not probable that so astute a man as the PRESIDENT would have dissolved the Congress on this ground alone, but we may perhaps assume, without doing him serious injustice, that the dispute made him very willing to seize upon any mere plausible pretext that events might furnish. Such a pretext seems to have been found in a Bill relating to the mode of removing unsatisfactory Presidents, a subject in which he may be excused for taking a peculiar interest. It was not quite clear whether the Congress passed some Bill of this nature in spite of this veto, or whether he took alarm at the direction discussion was taking, but in any case he protected his Presidential position by the most decisive measures at his command. He dissolved Congress, proclaimed himself Dictator, and established martial law. There have been vague rumours of a possible attempt to bring about a restoration not of DOM PEDRO, but of the monarchy in the person of his infant grandson. It is a little difficult to understand how, in a country which witnessed DOM PEDRO'S exile with complete indifference, any real enthusiasm can have sprung up for the infant child of a detested Bourbon, and a Princess whose efforts for the abolition of slavery could not win her forgiveness for her subservience to the priests. An alleged restoration project might in certain circumstances have furnished a useful pretext for a *coup*

d'État, but as the pretext has been found elsewhere we shall probably hear no more, for the present at any rate, of the infant pretender.

It is, of course, officially affirmed that the whole affair is greatly exaggerated, but in that case one does not readily find an explanation for the rigorous censorship of the telegraph established by the Government. Assuming the PRESIDENT to have snatched at absolute power, his position closely resembles that recently occupied by BALMACEDA. Like that ill-fated usurper, he has embarked upon a constitutional quarrel, under cover of which he has abused the executive powers intrusted to him. Either the Congress has a right to pass a Bill notwithstanding the Presidential veto, or its pretence of doing so is mere idle vapouring. In neither case would its alleged action justify the dissolution of Congress and the assumption of uncontrolled power. In neither case, it may be added, is it likely that such a measure would have been resorted to unless the PRESIDENT had other less avowable motives. But, whatever may be his real or ostensible motives, the effect of his proceedings upon Brazilian credit must be disastrous. Brazil has been recovering slowly from the shock of the revolution and from the more recent set-back of the Baring troubles⁴. This convulsion will seriously dislocate her international arrangements, especially as the country has to struggle with the effects of a large amount of unsound speculation. The strong suspicion that the root of the matter is in financial schemes which must aggravate all existing evils cannot but seriously damage Brazilian interests of all kinds. The country is already in sufficiently grave,

⁴ Refere-se à falência do Banco Baring em novembro de 1890 e à crise financeira de 1890-1891.

though probably temporary, embarrassment. Brazilian' stocks had been showing weakness for some time before this blow fell, and the Brazilian exchanges had reached an exceedingly low point. This, however, may be explained, at least in part, by the fact that the coffee crop is heavy, and consequently late. Until it can be placed upon the market, Brazil is prevented from sign a valuable asset. She cannot draw bills upon Europe for the liquidation of her debts, and must pay in gold. This difficulty would have righted itself, but, unless President can put a better face upon his action that it wears at present, it will prove a more serious and enduring disaster.

2. «The Crises in Brazil», *The Daily News*, 5 de novembro

O diário londrino compara a crise constitucional no Brasil com a do Chile: em ambos os casos, o presidente «queria mais poder do que aquele que o Parlamento estava disposto a dar.» E «em ambos os casos, a Constituição foi feita a partir do modelo norte-americano.» Para o Brasil, o sistema francês teria sido muito melhor.

Na última parte do artigo, fala-se em termos muito elogiosos de Benjamin Constant. O editorialista lamenta o seu falecimento no início do ano: ele teria defendido o Parlamento e aconselhado moderação aos militares.

The anticipation of something wrong in Brazil, which is to be found in our Money Article, is confirmed by the telegrams that have come to hand since it was written. There has been a *coup d'état* at Rio, and Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA has turned the Congress out of doors, and made himself Dictator. Both Lisbon and New York have received reports from Rio to this effect, and the

tampering with telegrams from Brazil, mentioned in our Money Article, is evidence of the strict censorship of news to which these reports refer. The Congress seems to have been elaborating a Constitution, on the basis, no doubt, of the draft scheme drawn up eighteen months ago, and to have come do the delicate question of the manner in which the PRESIDENT should be impeached in the event of misconduct. The Congress was for impeaching him in one way, and the Marshal PRESIDENT for impeaching him in another. The latter seems to have exercised his veto against a law on the subject which did not meet his views. Congressed passes the law over his veto – whether constitutionally or not we have at present no means of knowing – and the President at once retaliated by dissolving Parliament, establishing martial law, and issuing a manifesto to the people in his own defence. It is a quarrel, identical form, thought not exactly in its causes, with that which, in Chile, led to civil war. In each case there is, or was, a President claiming more power than the Congress is disposed to allow him. In each case, too, the Constitution was founded on the American model, which gives what Europeans would consider excessive power to President. In one respect, the Brazilian President may be even more absolute than his great exemplar at Washington, for, under the draft of the Constitution, he was to rule for six instead of four years. The American system presupposes a settled government, a highly intelligent people, and a general respect for laws, and attachment to the Constitution. The French scheme would be better adapted to a people in a state of transition. The French have no difficulty in

bringing an offended Chief of State to reason, and they got rid of M. GRÉVY with the greatest ease. Their President is certainly irresponsible⁵, except in case of high treason; but, when he commits that crime, they have a regular machinery for bringing him to trial before the Senate sitting as a court of justice. Poor BENJAMIN CONSTANT DE MAGALHÃES, the Positivist founder of the Brazilian Republic, should have been living now. He died last January, all too soon to complete the work which owed everything to his devotion and to his character. He was professor of mathematics at the Military College, and he eked out his slender earnings by giving private lessons, while devoting his nights, and what he could spare of his days, to organizing the movement against the Imperial Government. When the Republic was proclaimed, he declined all honours and all rewards. The post of Minister of War was forced upon him, and he died at his word of reorganizing the army. It is certain that his counsels to his military colleague who has effected the *coup d'état* would have been all on the side of moderation and of respect for the will of Parliament.

3. «Politics and Society», *The Leeds Mercury*, 5 de novembro

Embora as causas sejam diferentes, os resultados são os mesmos que na recente guerra civil chilena: «nomeadamente, um conflito entre o Presidente e o Congresso», nota o quotidiano de Leeds, segundo o qual o marechal só poderá vencer se conseguir o apoio do exército e da marinha.

⁵ Inimputável, que tem a imunidade.

It is two years this month since the revolution in Brazil deposed Dom Pedro II, and sent him and his family to Europe. Today we published news of the fresh crisis in the affairs of what are now The United States of Brazil. The President of the two-year-old Republic, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, who was only elected in February last, has suddenly dissolved Congress, proclaimed martial law, and established a dictatorship. The causes of the crisis in Brazil are no doubt different from the causes of the recent civil war as Chile, but the result appears to be the same –namely, a conflict between the President and the Congress. Whether Brazil is to be scourged by civil war as Chile was we have at present no means of judging. All that we know is that Congress has passed a bill depriving the President of his right to veto legislation, and that Marshal da Fonseca has used the power vested in him of dissolving the Congress at any time. The President holds supreme command of the army and navy, but it does not follow that these will support his cause. If they do, da Fonseca will have a better chance of enforcing his wishes than ex-President Balmaceda had.

4. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 5 de novembro

Com a queda de D. Pedro, houve uma certa agitação na City de Londres, mas, durante algum tempo, tudo voltou à normalidade. Agora, como acontece com frequência da América do Sul, o país está em ditadura.

How history repeats itself in South America! Revolutions and dictatorship in different Republics there follow each other with the regularity of the months. It is barely two short years since Brazil with exceeding little ceremony shipped its Emperor to Europe, and announced to the world that it had done with he baubles and burdens of royalty. There was a flutter in City circles for a time, but assurances were quickly forthcoming, and the Republic entered on what seemed to be an era of peace and prosperity. Now the Congress and President Fonseca have come to loggerheads, and the country is once more in the throes of a national crises. Particulars are wanting; but the statement that attributes the main cause of the trouble do Congress having approved a bill which tended to deprive the President of his right to veto legislation is probably true. How the staid and studious Dom Pedro must be chuckling in exile!

No mesmo número, há também um comentário sobre o Brasil na página financeira⁶. Reparar-se-á que, em dois anos, a moeda brasileira perdeu mais do metade do seu valor e que o jornal denuncia a especulação e «a ampla emissão de notas».

Is Brazil going to follow the lead of Chile, and Fonseca that of Balmaceda? There is certain similarity in the chapter of events at any rate. Marshal Fonseca having dissolved Congress, established martial law, and assumed the role of Dictator, The vigorous censorship which has been exercised has kept back the news, but it has been feared for several days that something had gone wrong.

⁶ «City Notes. The Dictatorship in Brazil»

The exchange has persistently falls until it is now down to 12 $\frac{3}{4}$ *d.*, whereas at the time of the deposition of Dom Pedro two years ago the Brazilian *milreis* was worth 27 $\frac{3}{4}$ *d.* Apart from politics Brazilian affairs have not been satisfactory, financial speculation having been carried to an insane extent, and the currency having been depreciated by extensive issues of paper. Hopes were built on the large coffee crop this year, but so long as the uncertainly lasts there can be no improvement. Brazilian bonds are now lower than they have been for years, the 4,5 % bonds being down to 66, and the 4 % to 60.

5. «A Dictatorship in Brazil», *The Freeman's Journal*, 5 de novembro

O quotidiano irlandês, segundo o qual os brasileiros têm «meios muitos primitivos de resolver os conflitos internos», fica muito surpreendido com os acontecimentos que interpreta como sendo um golpe fatal para o novo regime. O editorialista não acredita que esta «revolução» tenha sido sem derramamento de sangue.

News of an alarming character comes from Brazil. There is another political upheaval in that rather distracted country. The Republic, which set up in such a summary matter a short time ago, is likely, it seems, to be as abruptly swept away. This is rendered all the more startling owing to not even the slightest premonition of the approaching cataclysm having been given to dweller in these climes. Undoubtedly the Brazilians have a rough and ready mode of settling internal differences. The telegrams reporting the affair are

vague, and as brief as they are obscure. Congress and the President came to loggerheads, with the result that a Dictatorship is now established. Martial law, with all attendant horrors, reigns throughout Brazil. So far, happily, there is no account of bloodshed having accompanied the revolution. As, however, a rigid censorship over all despatches is being exercised, it is but too probable that the unexpected occurrence may not have been altogether of an unsanguinary nature.

6. *The Morning Post*, 5 de novembro

O editorialista, preocupado com a enorme dívida brasileira, analisa a história do Brasil dos dois últimos anos, nomeadamente a queda de D. Pedro e a elaboração da Constituição, que dá muito poder ao chefe de Estado. Relata também o conflito entre o executivo e o legislativo, na origem formal do golpe, que, por enquanto, recusa-se a julgar.

Within two years of the abolition of the Brazilian Monarchy, the former Empire of DOM PEDRO is again plunged into confusion. According to the telegrams which we publish today, it will be seen that the President General DA FONSECA, has dismissed Congress, and cause a Dictatorship under martial law to be proclaimed. Upon this bare statement, which it may be even yet necessary to accept with reserve, it is impossible to base more than a tentative estimate of what has actually occurred, but the gravity of any situation which involves further uncertainty as to the Government of Brazil there cannot be two opinions. The trouble in Chile and Argentine Republic are a source of

considerable uneasiness to the European Bourses, and in one case at least, involve an indirect menace to the peace of the world; but they can scarcely equal the disturbing effects certain to result from the presence of anarchy in the far larger State of Brazil. The Brazilians have not only a very large trade, but they have, in proportion to their resources, a very large foreign debt, and the agitation likely to be produced in financial circles by another revolutionary movement may be easily reckoned by a reference to the events of November, 1889, when the Imperial Family were conveyed to Portugal by the orders of General DA FONSECA and the Provisional Ministry. Moreover, the news of these recent quarrels is all the more disappointing and vexations to politicians and financiers inasmuch as the United States of Brazil, as the former Empire is now styled, appeared to have successfully overcome the ills of their first infancy. The revolution of two years ago was chiefly remarkable for its short, sharp, and decisive character. Within forty-eight hours of the first open symptoms of rebellion, the EMPEROR and his family had been conducted on board the vessel destined to convey them to Lisbon, and the victorious Republican Party contrives to impose their will on the country for the next three months at least with very little effort on their own part, and without any attempt at organised resistance from the partisans of the old *régime*, who were naturally enough powerless to oppose a movement which was supported by the Army. The resignation of the Ministry and the formation of a Provisional Government, and on the 19th of November the first general outline of the new Constitution were made public.

After the proclamation of a Republic, and the announcement that the Brazilian Provinces would be treated as a Federation State, the document put forward by the Provisional Government added the more immediately needful regulations for carrying on the new order of things. Each State was bidden to form its own local Government and the various Governors were to devise temporary means for preserving law and order. Each state was also to send a representative to the Congress, which has to be convened in order to give a final decision on the proceedings of the Provisional Government, who would in the meantime take upon themselves the charge of the nation's affairs both foreign and domestic. When this comprehensive programme was proclaimed, it certainly did little to allay the general anxiety felt in most civilised countries as to the future of Brazil. Constitution-making is a task at once gigantic in scope, and requiring a rare combination of force and delicacy for its successful accomplishment, and there was little in the antecedents of Provisional Government to suggest any special attitude in this direction. For some time Brazil was plunged into a turmoil, and grave fears were entertained by the European Powers that this would be followed by a repudiation of debt or an involuntary failure on the part of the Provisional Government to meet its liability. These apprehensions were increased in the February of last year, when the presence of serious dissensions among the members of the Ministry became apparent. Senhor RIBEIRO, Minister of Commerce, and Senhor LOBO, Minister of Agriculture, resigned their offices, after which more harmonious councils prevailed, until in June last year a draft of the projected Constitution was promulgated by Ministerial decree. This was naturally modelled in many

particulars upon the Constitution of the United States of America. It provided for the election of a Senate by the State Legislature every nine years, and a Chamber of Deputies elected by popular vote every three years. Universal suffrage was proclaimed, but as this excluded illiterates who are said to form eighty-four per cent of the population, its practical limitations must have been considerable. It is chiefly necessary at this moment, however, to observe the relations to each other of the PRESIDENT, the Cabinet, and the Legislative Chambers. The responsibility of the President and the Cabinet before the law was duly affirmed. The Ministers were replaced by Secretaries of State responsible to the PRESIDENT alone, while the PRESIDENT in his turn was solely responsible to the nation. The powers of the two Chambers were to be purely legislative and moderating, so that an adverse vote in either House would not necessarily upset the Ministry for the time being. This scheme was submitted to the Constituent Assembly elected in September, and was duly ratified.

From the points thus briefly indicated it will be seen that under the shelter of Democratic forms General DA FONSECA aimed at making the Constitution a kind of disguised autocracy. The position of the Senate was evidently strong as compared with that of the Chamber of Deputies, whose career occupied only one-third of the time elapsing before the re-election of the Second Chamber. Again, the Presidential veto was evidently intended to control Parliamentary proceedings with a strong hand, and the removal of the Secretaries of State from any Parliamentary control defined "legislative and moderate functions" within very narrow limits compared with the power

exercised by the Representative Chambers of Great Britain, France and United States. Apparently the Deputies and Senators have already discovered that General DA FONSECA bestowed on them only the shadow of Democratic institutions, while strengthening under Republican title the powers of personal rule formerly vested in the Emperor. At least it is difficult on any other hypothesis to account for the sudden development of cross purposes which has arisen between Congress and the PRESIDENT. According to report Congress has approved a Bill tending to deprive the PRESIDENT of his right to veto legislation. In other words, the Senators and Deputies have gone to the roots of the new Constitution and legislated on their own behalf in order to obtain the extensive and almost Sovereign rights which General DA FONSECA had carefully reserved for himself. If so they have clearly exceeded the *plébiscite* expressed through the Constituent Assembly by which they were called into existence, and by which General DA FONSECA is clearly entitled to veto the proposal for his own reduction to a mere figurehead of State. Whether he was justified in peremptorily dismissing the Congress is a delicate question which we are not called upon to decide. Aided by the power of the army, he called this body into existence upon certain conditions declared to be formally ratified by the people of Brazil. Directly they were settled down, they endeavoured to remodel the Constitution in their own favour. The intervals of victorious might with uncertain right are not sufficient frequent in Europe to have created many precedents by which to judge this case. Clearly, however, General DA FONSECA had to choose between another appeal to the country and his own practical

effacement. He has preferred the active course, and its results remain do be seen.

7. *The Standard*, 5 de novembro

Depois da Revolução de 1889, «obra de alguns aventureiros egoístas», houve um período de relativa calma que até surpreendeu os observadores europeus. Com a eleição do novo legislativo, surgiram os conflitos entre os deputados e o marechal que se tornou ditador. Deodoro vai poder ficar só se continuar a ter o apoio do Exército, afirma o quotidiano londrino que, na última parte, fala de certas realidades geográficas, sociais, políticas e culturais que tornam difícil o estabelecimento de um regime democrático-republicano no país.

If the telegrams from Brazil are to be fully credited, that unhappy country is in the throes of a fresh Revolution. Congress has been dissolved, martial law proclaimed, and the Dictatorship of General DA FONSECA re-established. This sudden end to the experiment of free government in the Empire so long under the peaceful rule of DOM PEDRO is unfortunate for all concern. But no one acquainted with the elements out of which it was attempted to reconstruct a Republican government in a country which, of all the South American States, was the least fitted for such an experiment, will be in any way surprised. Under the rule of DOM PEDRO the country was prosperous and contented. The revolution was entirely the work of a few self-seeking adventurers, who utilised the popularity of an ambitious General with the Army to oust the Sovereign against whom no worse charge than that of amiability was ever brought, in

order to seat themselves and their friends at his place. For a time the change seemed, if not for the better, nothing for the worst, and the unwonted peace which reigned, in spite of a few street riot and reports *émeutes* in the Provinces, astonished many who, while wishing well to Brazil, had a familiar acquaintance with the Brazilians. The so-called counter-revolution scarcely deserved the name, and the elections in August a year ago passed off so quietly than in Europe the fact of their having taken place was not generally known. It seems, however, that this quietness was illusive. The new Congress has proved less tractable than was expected. A statute having been passed laying down the procedure of an impeachment of the President, Marshal DA FONSECA has promptly dissolved the Assembly and proclaimed martial laws, with himself in his old capacity of Dictator. If he has still the Army at his back, the chances are that he will continue so; if not, he may have to share the fate of DOM PEDRO. The truth is that Brazil is too large, too uncivilized, too little fitted for self-government to long remain united under any such theoretical scheme as that drafted in the paper Constitution of a year ago. Vast areas are covered by primeval jungles, with only white or half-castle settlements here and there, the greater number of the citizen being either negroes only recently manumitted, or wild Indians, owning no allegiance to the Rio authorities. Under such conditions, every Provincial Governor is more or less independent, and is disposed to play Dictator on his own account.

8. *The Northern Echo*, 5 de novembro

Brazil has been distinguishing itself again, the latest shuffle of the political cards of that country having been made by the president Deodoro da Fonseca, who, according to brief telegrams which have reached this country, has dismissed the Congress, proclaimed martial law, and established a dictatorship. The information which has reached this country is brief, because the self-appointed dictator, in his anxiety, that no misleading accounts should reach Europa, has seized the telegraph and forbidden the transmission of codex. It is not so long ago – barely two years – since Brazil took upon herself to amend her Constitution by abolishing the monarchy and shipping off Dom Pedro and his family at a few hours' notice.

9. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 6 de novembro

Notwithstanding the constitutional crisis in Brazil, a telegram states that “perfect tranquillity prevails,” Information regarding events in that country, however, at present is of a very meagre kind.

10. *The Liverpool Mercury*, 6 de novembro

O jornalista não sabe se, nesta contenda entre o Parlamento e Deodoro, o legislativo ultrapassou as suas prerrogativas e se o presidente tinha efetivamente o direito de mandar os deputados para casa. Porém, agora, se o marechal não decretar novas eleições, o Brasil arrisca-se a viver uma «luta fratricida» como foi o caso do Chile.

The new republic of Brazil seems to have met with a serious shock, for the news which is allowed to reach Europe intimates that the President has turned the Congress out of doors and declared a dictatorship. As far as we can learn, the crisis was reached through the determination of Congress, in the course of its task of building up a constitution for the country, to take precautions against presidential despotism. South American States have had a rueful experience of dictatorship, and it is not to be wondered at that the elected representatives of Brazil should devise safeguarding measures. But President da Fonseca did not fall in with their views. He placed his veto upon the obnoxious provisions. Congress refuses to acknowledge the validity of his action, and he retorted by decreeing a dissolution and a reign of martial law. We are not sufficiently informed to judge whether the Parliament made demands beyond its legitimate power, or, on the other hand, what amount of authority was invested in President da Fonseca on his appointment. But his obvious duty, if he means to respect the right of the people, is to issue writs for a fresh election, and leave public opinion to decide the controversial question. It is open to doubt, indeed, if the power of dissolution rested with him under the

circumstances. There were many who held, when the Constituent Assembly was created in France after the war of 1870, that it could not be dissolved except by its own vote; and possibly the President of Brazil possesses no legal jurisdiction which would warrant the step he has taken. If he does not appeal to the people in a constitutional manner we may hear of a fratricidal strife like in Chile, the political and commercial effects of which would be felt for years afterwards.

**11. «City Notes: The Political and Financial Crisis en Brazil»,
The Pall Mall Gazette, 6 de novembro**

Este pequeno artigo debruça-se sobre a crise financeira brasileira e, nomeadamente, sobre a especulação e o excesso de emissão de notas no Brasil. As divergências entre o Congresso e Deodoro no que diz respeito a este aspeto é uma das causas do golpe, realça o jornal.

Before the present political crisis came upon to Brazil it was suffering from financial crisis. A committee was appointed by the Chamber of Deputies to report upon the measures needed for improving the financial condition of the country, and the committee report that excessive issues of paper money had promoted Stock Exchange gambling, that capital had in consequence been withdrawn for legitimate enterprises, and that the currency had been seriously depreciated. The recently-constituted Banco da República had promoted this speculation by the large advances which it had made to individuals, banks, and companies, and the committee recommended that this institution should be

called upon to reduce its advances, and that its notes issue should be limited to its present amount of 45 millions sterling; that all notes under two dollars should be withdrawn, and their place filled by silver coins; and that the Government should replace in the Treasury the gold deposited by issuing banks to secure their circulation, but which has been used by the Government for other purposes. The Minister of Finance opposed these measures, and proposed an increase of the note issue to 60 millions sterling, with the Banco da República as the sole bank of issue. In his opinion no gold reserves are necessary, as the credit of the State should be sufficient to guarantee the conversion of the notes. The Chamber of Deputies, however, did not take this view, and passed a bill restricting the issue of paper money. The details of this measure are not yet known in this country, but they point to determination on the part of the Brazilian to avoid the mistakes of Argentina. Also, unlike that country, Brazil, has carried on her speculations more with her own money than that of a foreigner, and she has not borrowed to anything like the same extent. On May 31, of the present year the total national debt of Brazil stood as follows :

Foreign debt	£30,049,500
Internal funded debt	60,395,046
Internal floating debt	15,571,701
	<hr/>
Total	£106,015,247

The depreciation of the currency must have told severely upon the national revenue, for all attempts to collect the customs and taxes in gold appear to have failed. This question is believed to be mixed up with the political coup. As the telegraph wires are still held by the President no further news has reached Europe.

12. *The Glasgow Herald*, 6 de novembro

The dispute in Brazil between Congress and President had reached a deadlock. Many feared that the President would proclaim himself a dictator, and to prevent this Congress introduced a measure determining the process by which the President of the Republic might be impeached. The President vetoed the proposal, but his veto was overruled, and he thereupon dissolved Congress. The dissolution may, it is said, result in the choice of another President.

13. *The Times*, 7 de novembro

O editorialista, que põe em evidência a péssima situação das finanças do Brasil, não acredita no otimismo dos despachos oficiais e mantém uma visão crítica dos acontecimentos, sem se deixar influenciar pelas declarações dos ministros brasileiros em Washington e em Paris.

O jornal não tem nada contra o marechal, do qual desconhece os objectivos e as possibilidades de sucesso, e gostaria que o Brasil tivesse um governo à altura que soubesse garantir ao país ordem, uma boa administração e uma gestão eficaz dos recursos financeiros.

De qualquer forma, enquanto houver «uma minoria ativa de intrigantes ambiciosos» e que o exército e a marinha forem utilizados para finalidades políticas, deixando a esmagadora maioria da população na ignorância e na inércia, nada poderá mudar, nem com uma ditadura, nem com uma monarquia, nem com uma república.

That all is for the best under the best of all possible dictatorships, and that the dictatorship is simply the evolution of the highest form of free and popular government, is the *mot d'ordre* transmitted from Rio de Janeiro to the Agents of the Brazilian Republic in other countries. This, at least, is the interpretation in plain English of the high-flown phrases produced by the Minister of Brazil in Paris in an interview with our Correspondent. It is difficult to affirm that this optimistic view is false, for MARSHAL FONSECA and his friends are in possession not only of the forces of the State and of the administration machinery, but of the main channels by which information reaches the outer world. Still, it is not quite clear that everything is as roseate as the official communications would have us believe. What had exactly the same sort of assurances a couple of years ago when the Empire was overturned and the Republic established by the very same sort of *coup d'État* that has now set up MARSHAL FONSECA'S Dictatorship. It is, therefore, excusable to be a little sceptical about the advantages of this latest of revolutions, though, to be sure, it is not easy to see how Brazil can be worse off under a new constitutional system, by whatever name it may be called, than under the late Republican Ministry. The financial troubles in which the Republic has been plunged, the charges of incapacity, jobbery, and even fraud levelled against one another by men who

came into power with the noblest professions of purity and patriotism, the fatal and ever-renewed conflict between the Executive and the Legislature, have disenchanted all save the zealots of Republicanism and thoroughly disgusted men of business. If we allude to this last point, we suppose we shall incur the censure of the Brazilian Minister in Washington, who has cautioned the American against putting faith in any reports coming by way of England, and apparently is in the state of mind in which the French were when they attributed all their troubles to the “gold of PITT⁷.»

We have not the least desire that British influence should be «thrown to the scale against PRESIDENT FONSECA», for we know nothing whatever about his real objects or chances of permanent success. The Brazilian Minister in Paris, taking the same line as his colleague in Washington, has assured our Correspondent that the apparent rupture in the continuity of the Government at Rio is really in the interest of the Republic, which is to emerge from its trials phoenix-like after the promised appeal to the constituent bodies and the return of a majority in favour of the PRESIDENT. On the other hand, our especial Correspondent in Santiago tells us that in one at least of the main divisions of Brazil, the Rio Grande Province, *the coup d'État* is regarded as favourable to the prospect of an Imperialist party both in the Northern and in the Southern Provinces, while the Centre, influenced by the restlessness of the capital, is predominantly Republican. The suggestion has been made that the EMPEROR'S grandson, who, though in the eye of the law an infant, is approaching manhood,

⁷ Trata-se de uma mina lendária.

should be restored as Sovereign under a Regency of three eminent citizens representing the North, Centre and South respectively. But whether PRESIDENT FONSECA is likely to enter into these views is a subject on which, in spite of the vehement declarations of M de PIZA⁸, nothing can be confidently affirmed. For it is clear that the President, who is said by the Brazilian Minister in Paris to be in broken health, had his hand forced by the chiefs of the army and navy. When we hear of Imperialist sympathies being prevalent here and Republican convictions dominant there, we must take those phrases with a good many qualifications. The number of Brazilians who have education, enough to think in the most elementary way about politics is exceedingly small. There is a small minority, partly composed of fanatic and partly of interested intriguers, and there are two great instruments of government, the military and naval forces of the State. The rest of the population are clay in the hand of potter. There would be no indisposition in this country to give favourable consideration to any Government in Brazil, of whatever origin, if only it would bestow on the country the benefits of honest financial administration and the security of order. Indeed the price of Brazilian stock, which fell heavily on the first news that the Congress at Rio had been forcibly dissolved and martial law proclaimed, has recovered to some extent, not so much on the faith of assurances that MARSHAL FONSECA is loyal to the abstract idea of a Republic, as in the belief that his Government could not manage the finances worse without a Congress than with one.

⁸ Gabriel da Piza era o ministro brasileiro em Paris.

It is to be feared, however, that the elements of disturbance we have indicated are not to be easily removed, whether by a Dictatorship, a Monarchical restoration, or a further plunge into democracy. So long as a pliant mass of popular ignorance and inertness co-exists with an active minority of ambitious intriguers and with an Army and Navy always willing to be used for political purposes, there can be little hope of permanent improvement. The tradition of the *pronunciamiento* has fatally eaten into the constitutional life of the South American States of Spanish and Portuguese origin. Revolution after revolution has created a craving for the unwholesome stimulants of violent political change. Chile, owing to its peculiarity of position and, perhaps, to something in the blood of its people, owing, also, to the comparatively cultivated and thoughtful tone of opinion, has taken the fever in a milder form than any of its neighbours. The curse of the Peruvian war plunged the Chileans into that dangerous militarism of which BALMACEDA was the outcome. With the election of SEÑOR MONTT⁹ to the presidency, Chile, we may hope, has returned to the better path. The new PRESIDENT, who has been elected in the most satisfactory and promising way by the unanimous vote of the Convention at Santiago, bears a name that is honoured in the political history of his country, being associated with the Administration that gave the State a peaceful, orderly, and cautiously progressive Government from 1850 to 1860.

⁹ Jorge Montt Álvares (1845-1922) foi presidente do Chile de 1891 a 1896.

14. «The Crises in Brazil», *The Dundee Courier*, 7 de novembro

No primeiro parágrafo, o jornal escocês defende a atitude do Congresso brasileiro contra Deodoro; no segundo, insiste sobre a delicada situação financeira na qual se encontra a República brasileira cujos orçamentos são largamente deficitários. «Afinal a monarquia tem muitas virtudes», conclui o articulista.

Recent experiences in Chile and Brazil indicate that a Republican form of Government has decided drawbacks. In the former country it has been necessary to dethrone a President, after a sever and costly struggle, and it would appear that drastic measure of a similar description will yet have to be adopted in Brazil. The causes of the present disturbances in Brazilian territory are not as yet very clear, but it is evident that the President (Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca) has been acting in an unconstitutional manner, and that his conduct has been resented by a considerable section of his countrymen. It seems that some time ago the Brazilian Congress appointed a Joint Committee of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate to consider the question of the depreciation of the currency, and directed the attention of the Committee specially to the proposal to make fresh issues of paper money. In their report this committee condemned the proposal, and subsequently the Congress passed a decree forbidding further issues of paper money. Instead of giving effect to the decree, Marshal da Fonseca dissolved Congress, and, it is said, proceeded to appoint himself Dictator. He also vetoed a Bill passed by Congress declaring it to be unlawful for one man to hold certain administration and

political function as the same time. In spite of his veto, the Bill was voted a second time by the Senate, and had it been passed by a two-third majority would have been immediately put into force. The actual figures were 29 for and 15 against the Bill, so that the two-third majority was lost by only one vote. In the minority, however, there was included the name of the President's brother, Colonel Olmo da Fonseca, Governor of the States of the Brazilian Confederation, who would have been personally affected by the operation of the Bill. By the Constitution any Deputy or Senator personally interested in a measure is prohibited from voting upon it, and it was therefore agreed by a large majority that Colonel Fonseca's vote should be cancelled. In this way the absolute majority was obtained and the Presidential veto invalidated. Yet, with extraordinary boldness, the President refused to recognise the action of the Senate, and declared the Congress dissolved, although, under the Constitution of 1890, he had no power to do so before the expiry of the term of four years for which the members were elected.

Naturally a good deal of excitement has been occasioned throughout Europe by these events. In commercial circles a panic has not yet resulted, but much anxiety prevails. On Wednesday¹⁰ a somewhat pessimistic view of the situation was taken on the Exchanges, but since then the fluctuations in the prices of representative Brazilian stocks have been within narrow limits. Apparently a strong hope is entertained that Congress, which has acted legally throughout, will win in the end. Besides, it is known that the Republic is in a

¹⁰ 4 de novembro.

sound financial position, that it has large balances amounting to several millions sterling lying at its command in London, and that it has the support of the Rothschild family. On the other hand, it is asserted in some quarters that though it has been pretended that the economic situation in Brazil is better than it has ever been, the real state of matters is that the bullion reserve which figures in the public account exists only upon paper, and that the Banco da Republica is in a very shaky condition. It would also appear that the Government has of late years been drawing heavily upon its reserve. Thus in the Budget of 1891 the Finance Minister estimated a deficit of £ 2,782,995, which he expected to reduce to £ 1,515,908 by a profit on the sale of gold. In the budget for 1892 the deficit anticipated amounted to £ 7,000,000, but it was again expected that after meeting that deficit there would still be a balance in the Treasury. These constant deficits, added to the political troubles that are at present agitating the Republic, show that affairs in Brazil are far from satisfactory. Indeed, from a telegram we are able to give this morning, it would appear that the country is in a condition that can only be described as deplorable. In that telegram it is stated that eighteen distressed emigrants from Brazil have been landed at Southampton, and that they have related pitiable tales of their sufferings in the Republic. Perhaps the story of their trials is exaggerated, but enough remains in the reliable accounts of recent occurrences in Brazil to cause international alarm, and to warrant British people in believing that after all there is much virtue in monarchy.

15. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 7 de novembro

O Golpe não tem nada a ver com uma tentativa de restauração monárquica.

It cannot be said that the further and fuller telegrams published this morning throw much fresh light on the crisis in Brazil. Marshal Fonseca's action is in some quarters considered to be preliminary to a restoration of the Empire. But this is doubtful, and the Brazilian Minister in Paris told M. Blowitz¹¹ yesterday that such an idea was altogether out of the question. Moreover, according to M. De Piza, martial law had been proclaimed solely in an anticipation of a possible attempt in that direction. Meantime, all authorities agree that both the army and navy support Fonseca, and so long as this is the case he has pretty much of a free hand.

16. «Foreign», *The Manchester Guardian*, 7 de novembro

Este pequeno comentário cita um despacho enviado pelo correspondente do Times em Santiago que fala de uma hipotética divisão do Brasil com três regentes, no Norte, no Centro e no Sul sob a chefia do neto de D. Pedro II, para manter a unidade do país.

The official telegrams report that order reigns in Brazil. The rumour that the *coup d'état* was a step towards the restoration of the Empire is discredited

¹¹ Henri Opper de Blowitz (1825-1903) era correspondente do *Times* em Paris.

at the capital, but a telegram to the *Times* from a correspondent in Brazil says that personal observation last year “induced a suspicion that the accidental change from the Empire to the Republic was only a cloak to cover the personal ambition of certain demagogues, and was not the desire of the nation. The history of folly, jobbery, eve public robbery which has occurred since, and the lowering of the exchange from 26d. to 13d., has engendered universal discontent as the precursor of the present cataclysm.” Northern Brazil (say the correspondent) is decidedly in favour of the EMPEROR, and also a majority in southern Brazil where Senhor SILVEIRA MARTINS possesses great influence, and in Central Brazil only, in the municipal State of Rio de Janeiro, is republicanism popular. All this does not assure a restoration of the Empire, but it may lead to an arrangement acceptable to the majority of Brazilians that the EMPEROR’S grandson shall become the chief of the State under a Regency of three eminent citizens representing the Northern, Central, and Southern provinces, ensuring the unity of Brazil, which is now gravely endangered.

17. *The Leeds Mercury*, 7 de novembro

Também para este jornal é a divergência entre o Congresso e Deodoro sobre o direito de veto que está na origem do golpe de Estado. Enquanto tiver o apoio do Exército e da Marinha, o Marechal ficará no poder.

Brazil having passed from a Monarchy to a Republic, is now under Dictatorship, and subject to martial law. The present crisis had its origin in a

conflict between the Legislative and the President over the question of the right of veto. Feeling that what he considered his prerogatives were being interfered with, the President (Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca) dissolved the Legislature and issued a manifesto explaining his conduct. This was followed by the proclamation of martial law. How the trouble will end it is impossible to say. Everything will depend on the attitude of the army and the navy. If these forces remain loyal to the President, Da Fonseca may for a time do very much as he pleases; but any military defections on their part will tell in favour of the Legislature, and Brazil may, therefore, be on the verge of such a revolution as that from which Chile has emerged.

18. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 7 de novembro

Confirmação do Golpe de Fonseca, «prelúdio a uma restauração da monarquia», afirma o diário escocês.

Particulars are coming slowly to hand regarding the constitutional changes in Brazil. There is now full confirmation of the fact that Marshal Fonseca has become Dictator, and that martial law is proclaimed. It is stated from one quarter that both the army and the navy compelled Fonseca to do this, and in other quarters the action is considered to be preliminary to the restoration of the monarchy, as several of the province of Brazil are in favour of this, and only Rio de Janeiro in favour of the Republic. It is thought possible that the ex-Emperor's grandson may become Chief of State under a regency.

19. *The Glasgow Herald*, 7 de novembro

Telegrams received from Rio Grande, in Brazil, state that Marshal Fonseca has assumed dictatorship at Rio de Janeiro, where a state of siege has been declared. Great agitation prevails in the province of Rio Grande, where Marshal Fonseca's action is considered to be preliminary to a restoration of the Empire.

20. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 9 de novembro

O Brasil, como outros países da América do Sul, apanhou a febre revolucionária e agora a doença vai evoluir mais ou menos como na Argentina e no Chile. Há, no entanto, um perigo suplementar, nota o editorialista: para uma «completa recuperação», talvez seja preciso uma «amputação ou um desmembramento».

Neste artigo, critica-se também a opinião do ministro brasileiro em Paris que justifica as medidas tomadas pelo presidente. censura igualmente a atitude de Deodoro «que organizou o golpe para ele», e apresenta-se a hipótese de uma eventual restauração da monarquia, embora, reconhece o editorialista, falem elementos para ter uma análise completa e satisfatória da situação.

O que parece certo é que o governo irá ganhar as eleições, mas o Brasil está longe de ter recuperado a confiança dos mercados financeiros

History repeats itself with curious exactitude in the several South American States which have lately been smitten with the revolutionary fever. There is in each and all a more or less prolonged period of incubation, followed by financial and commercial depression. After the cold stage comes a hot stage,

accompanied by more or less delirium, for which the political and military doctors usually prescribe bloodletting, and the first ends with a paralytic stroke or *coup d'état*. So far, the experience of Brazil is a tolerably close reproduction of the experiences of Argentina and Chile, and it looks as though the subsequent developments of the malady would proceed on very similar lines until the convalescent stage is reached. There appears to be some danger, however, in the case of Brazil, that complete recovery will only be possible through amputation or dismemberment, as the component provinces are reported to be at issue on the fundamental question of the form of government or constitution. The Republic, in the judgment of a large section of the people, it is stated, has been tried and found wanting. The Brazilian Minister in Paris, M. GABRIEL DA PIZA, naturally takes a more hopeful view of the situation. Indeed, according to the information which he has communicated to the Paris correspondent of the *Times*, the worst is already over. There has been, he declares, no revolution, and there is no dictatorship. All that has happened is that the President, finding Congress bent on revolution, has dissolved it, and, with the assistance of the army and navy, has assumed the responsibility of government pending the election of a new Congress. What occurred, he declares, is this: On the fall of Dom PEDRO a Congress was summoned to construct a Constitution. As the Constitution was voted some months ago, the Congress, according to M. DA PIZA was bound by it as much as the President, and could not alter or modify it. That seems a strange arbitrary proposition. In constitutional countries the power of Parliament is supposed to be supreme, and if the Congress can make, it is difficult to understand why it cannot

unmake a constitution. In Brazil, however, the army and the navy support the President in affirming that the Constitution, once voted, cannot be revoked or modified, and the Congress was not justified in suppression the President's right of veto, which is the bone of contention between the two parties. In the view of the Brazilian Minister, it is the Congress who is unconstitutional, whilst the President, assisted by the army and navy, is the champion of constitutional government. Therefore, Marshal DA FONSECA is not a dictator, mas a "saviour of society." The reasoning is ingenious, if not convincing; but something more than this will be needed, we suspect, to restore public confidence, and to overcome the bad effect of the recent news from Brazil on the European money markets. One thing is clear from M. DA PIZA statement, which is that if President has decreed a dictatorship it is in the interest of himself and of no one else. According to earlier telegrams, President DA FONSECA has dismissed the Congress in the interest of Empire. But this report was based on a misapprehension of the issues. As the nominee of the army and the navy, da Fonseca is evidently Republican in principle, however absolutist in practice; and if there is any Imperial reaction in Brazil it is in the northern and southern parts of the country, in the latter of which senor SILVEIRA MARTINS is the recognised champion of Dom PEDRO'S cause. There is no question of restoring Dom PEDRO himself; but if the army and navy could be left out of account it is believed that a large majority of the people would vote for the election of the Emperor's grandson under a Regency. News travels slowly in Brazil, and some time must probably elapse before public opinion in the remoter parts of this unwieldy State crystalizes into definite shape. The principal fear of the friends

of Brazil is that the northern and southern section may attempt to separate from the Republican centre, which would probably involve a civil war as long and disastrous as that which has recently taken place in Chile. What the upshot will be would be useless to speculate without more intimate local knowledge of Brazil than we possess in this country; but we are afraid that even under the most favourable conditions a long period must elapse before Brazil can recover the commercial credit, tranquillity, and comparative prosperity which she enjoyed up to the time of Dom PEDRO'S deposition. A new Congress, we understand, is to be convoked without delay, for the purpose of revising the Constitution, or, in other words, of doing the very thing which the late Congress is blamed for attempting. But then, "circumstances alter cases", and president DA FONSECA is prepared to endorse in advance any alteration which may be decreed by the new Congress, because he hopes to be able to control the elections. Such, at least, is the only construction we can put upon the significant smile with which M DA PIZA assured the *Times* correspondent that there need be no fear about Republicanism of the next Congress, because "the elections will turn in favour of the Government."

21. *The Daily News*, 9 de novembro

O editoralista critica Deodoro que compara com o general inglês Monck; parece interpretar este golpe como sendo filo-monárquica.

There is plenty of room for conjecture in the affaires of Brazil. It may be the highhanded act a Republican patriot beset by monarchical intriguers. New York seems disposed to take that view, and New York ought to be pretty well informed. It may be the proceeding of a new general MONK¹², whose ultimate aim is to bring the King into his own again. Dom PEDRO may be suspected of some leaning to this opinion, from his confidences to a reporter of the Paris *Figaro*. The good old Emperor is loud in his protestations of readiness to serve Brazil, and one more to act as the father of his people. He openly claims the attachment of one of the alleged leaders of the movement. He is quite evidently not without hope, though as yet he is not to be credited or discredited with intentions. Marshal DA FONSECA'S only justification will be perfect success in interpreting the wishes of the country. He has incurred the heaviest responsibility in merely seeming to betray a national trust, for he has done that which has been more frequently done by the villains in history than by its honest men. The Marshal seems to feel that his first necessity is to fill the coffers of the State, and that he cannot afford to be too particular as to the means. His decree for the farming out of the railways is a measure that would discount the prosperity of Brazil for more than a generation to come.

¹² Em 1660, o general George Monck (1608-1670) pôe Carlos II no trono da Inglaterra.

22. *The Liverpool Mercury*, 9 de novembro

Telegrams respecting the crisis in Brazil throw but little light on the state of affairs in that region. Marshal Fonseca has issued a manifesto explaining the causes of the revolution, and Dom Pedro, the ex-Emperor of Brazil, has been interviewed in Paris. The latter has expressed his willingness to return do Brazil if appealed to.

23. *The Morning Post*, 11 de novembro

The Morning Post interroga o chefe dos liberais ingleses que, em dezembro de 1889 pronunciou um «imprudente» discurso muito favorável à Revolução Republicana no Brasil. Depois de ter criticado a ditadura do marechal e a sua política monetária, o editorialista explica a situação particular da província do Rio Grande do Sul, que se opõe à ditadura de Deodoro. O jornal londrino espera então que Gladstone – que tanto se felicitou com a mudança no Brasil dos anos antes, quando um regime constitucional foi derrubado por um golpe de Estado militar – no seu próximo discurso, diga algumas palavras de simpatia em favor da causa dos sul-rio-grandenses.

The present condition of Brazil has many points of interest for Englishmen. It is one of the greatest of the American communities in extend and natural resources. It has for years past attracted the energies of some of the most enterprising of our people; end, moreover, its position just now is a valuable object lesson in Radical methods and Radical teaching. When DOM PEDRO was deposed by a military conspiracy, whilst he and his family were still

upon the ocean, a great English leader of opinion hastened to explain to the amazed public that “the sympathies of the whole American Continent were unfavourable to Royalty.” This fact seemed to Mr. GLADSTONE¹³ in 1889 the natural explanation of the deposition of DOM PEDRO, and if he had suggested it as an inference from events contributing, we well say, to that useful publication the *Annual Register*, there could be no ground of objection to this exercise of his historical instincts, but this generalisation was accompanied by the most extravagant language of thanksgiving that a length the only region in America subject to Royalty except the Dominion of Canada has become Republican. Today news from Brazil shows that this latest addition to the roll of South American Republics is rapidly following the example of her elder sisters. Revolts are announced both South and North. The important province of [Rio] Grande do Sul has, we are told, declared itself independent of the United State of Brazil. Enjoying one of the best climates in Brazil, this Province has always possessed an importance greater than the number of its population would suggest. It is there that we find the most prosperous of the settlements made in those wide regions during the present century. In the reports published some time ago by the Foreign Office on emigration do Brazil a great exception to the general story of deception or disaster was the German settlements. German immigration, our Consuls pointed out, was not a mere wild adventure of helpless people wandering into a foreign land in search of mean of subsistence,

¹³ William Ewart Gladstone (1809-1898), chefe do Partido Liberal, foi quatro vezes Primeiro ministro do Reino Unido.

but a natural recruiting of the German Colonies already formed within the old Brazilian dominion. German immigrants found in [Rio] Grande do Sul settlement of their own people speaking their own language and engaged in the local administration, they were safe from the misunderstanding which ignorance of Portuguese and of the local institutions produced, and were protected, too, from the corruption of the ordinary Brazilian official. It is in this great Province that the people are arming, resolved to resist the Dictatorship of MARSHAL DA FONSECA, and their resistance would no doubt be a formidable matter, for not only does the Province boast a vigorous and well-organized population, but it abounds in military traditions. It was in this region adjacent to the Banda Oriental that the great struggle between Brazil and the Spanish settlers on the Rio Plate was fought out in past years. Although the products of the soil are not so rich as in the northern parts of Brazil, the salubrity of the climate, and the appropriateness of the country for wheat-growing, make this Province one of the great import to the resources of the Dominion, whether it be Empire or Republic.

Whether the German settlements become an independent country or are reconciled to the dominion of MARSHAL DA FONSECA, there can be no question that their present movement must attract general sympathy. Like all despotism, military or otherwise, the supremacy of MARSHAL DA FONSECA has had a certain run of success, but when it comes to the question of settling accounts between them and his confederates difficulties arise. As long as paper money could be issued without restraint, all went well. Prices rose and

the indolent Brazilian who liked DOM PEDRO but was not prepared to risk any conflict with the troop of the MARSHAL was delighted to find how well he was doing on paper. This happy time, however, has been coming to an end, and the nominee Chamber of Representatives from the United States of Brazil found it necessary to object to the issue of any more paper money. Presto, the United States of Brazil becomes again a Dictatorship under Marshal DA FONSECA, and we have the most industrious portion of the population taking steps to found an independent nationality.

Perhaps Mr GLADSTONE will find the future Republic of Rio Grande do Sul a topic for his next hymn of thanksgiving. We are not all sure that, taking into account a remote future, a German Republic in this region may not be a good thing in the abstract for the people of the country, but it can hardly be an advantage just now to Brazil, and the point of view from which men are asked to regard great political movements is always the main consideration. It was not for Rio Grande do Sul but for Brazil that Mr. GLADSTONE asked our good wishes when speaking in Manchester a few days after the Brazilian Revolution he said:

«Still, the progress of mankind may be a reality. I am going to illustrate that statement by quoting what may seem to you a subject very foreign to the occasion on which we are met – I mean the late Revolution in Brazil; but, unless I am much mistaken, taking it as it is [...] It is a remarkable indication of the advance that, in certain important respects mankind has made [...] It is a matter of humble thankfulness that such a change should have been effected in a manner so entirely abstracted from the horrible incidents that have been usually attendant on great changes of Government.

It is a sight which tends to inspire hope in those who feel interested in the welfare of their fellow-creature.»

This example of how contemporary history is taught by the highest authority of the Gladstonian Party is worthy of some attention. Here we have the whole congregation of the Faithful asked to rejoice because Royalty is chased out of South America without any one to defend it. An old Constitutional Government disappears in twenty-four hours, and it succeeded by a military despotism, but Gladstonians are bid to be thankful because the usurping power calls itself a Republic. It is lonely fair to Mr. GLADSTONE to recall the fact that when he made this most reckless speech about the Brazilian Revolution at Manchester on December 4 the arrangements for his celebrated interview with Mr. PARNELL¹⁴ within the next fortnight were probably complete, and anything in the shape of a revolution naturally had for him special attractions, but in all fairness to Rio Grande do Sul he ought to say a word for this new development of human energy when he next addresses his followers. It is to be hoped that no discontent with his Parnellite experiences will deprive the struggle for existence in the Brazilian Provinces of that sympathy which Mr. GLADSTONE is so prompt to offer to opponents of Royalty when he is speaking on behalf of “all interested in the welfare of their fellows creatures.”

¹⁴ Charles Stewart Parnell (1846-1891) político e nacionalista irlandês.

24. «City News. The rumoured Revolt of Brazilian Provinces»,
The Mall Gazette, 11 de novembro

At the time of the deposition of Dom Pedro it was feared by some that there would be a cleavage between the northern and southern States of Brazil. The reports now to hand indicate that there is disaffection at both extremes as well as in the heart of the Republic. Rio Grande du Sul is at the extreme south, Para is right in the north, and Bahia is the central province. Rio Grande has an extensive coast line, and is conterminous both with Uruguay and the Argentina Republic. It has a population of about 650,000; Para, 410,000; Bahia, 1,825,000—the total population of Brazil being reckoned at something over 14,000,000. The foreign trade of the three provinces is not very large as compared with the total, Rio de Janeiro, which is the seat of the Government, absorbing about 45 per cent of the whole foreign land interprovincial trade of Brazil. India rubber is the great export from Para, 15,635 tons having been shipped in 1889. The export of hides from Rio Grande is considerable. The following are the figures for the year 1888 :

	Imports.	Exports.
Rio de Janeiro	£14,779,000	£10,772,000
São Paulo	3,572,000	5,763,000
Pernambuco	3,204,000	1,683,000
Bahia	2,949,000	1,061,000
Para	1,126,000	1,437,000
Rio Grande do Sul	1,817,000	355,000
Brazil-total	29,362,000	23,917,000

A good deal of smuggling appears to have been carried on in Rio Grande do Sul, and last year a special corps of Customs police was established to put a stop to the contraband trade on Argentine and Uruguayan frontiers. The consequences was that the receipt in the three Custom houses in Rio Grande do Sul, which were in 1889 £271,000, rose in 1890 to £527,000, or almost double in amount.

25. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 12 de novembro

Artigo dedicado principalmente às revoltas nas províncias, nomeadamente no Rio Grande do Sul, no Pará e na Baía, os protestos no Rio e às consequências do golpe nas importações e nas exportações do Brasil.

The apprehension we expressed the other day on the report of President da Fonseca's *coup d'état*, that it might lead to the dismemberment of Brazil, seems to be already in a fair way to be justified. Of the six [*sic!*] States

composing the Republic, two have already revolted against the Dictatorship and declared their independence, and a third State is represented to be wavering. Rio Grande do Sul, which is the southernmost State, with an extensive coast line, and a frontier coterminous with Uruguay and the Argentine Republic, was the first to announce its secession, and it was followed in a few days, by Grão Para, in the extreme north of the Republic, which is traversed by the waters of the Amazon. It is now reported that the central province of Bahia is about to pursue the same course; but until the declaration is formally made of course it would be premature to count upon so important an accession to the rank of the seceders. There can be no question, however, that in all the provinces of the State there is a good deal of dissatisfaction at the sudden conversion of a constitutional Republican Government into a Dictatorship, and that this discontent is not confined to one political party. In Rio Grande, for instance, it is the Republicans who have protested against the outrage. In the north it is the Imperialists or reactionaries who find a pretext for secession in the new departure at the Rio de Janeiro government. What is really passing in Brazil just now can be only guessed at in the absence of authentic information from the capital, for the dictator has suppressed all the papers which are opposed to his regime, and threatened all persons intriguing against the Government with bitter pains and penalties. Moreover, all telegrams from Rio, and apparently from the other principal ports of Brazil, are subject to a rigid censorship, and nothing is allowed to pass that appears to reflect upon the wisdom of justice, or to injure the credit of the absolutist Government. That special correspondent of *The Times* at Santiago, which is

still in telegraphic correspondence with Brazil, states that according to news received there the manager of an important English bank in Rio has been compelled to seek refuge in the British Consulate from the official persecution to which he has been subjected by the Government owing to his alleged efforts to lower the exchange. In other words, we suppose, the bank manager in question has been too candid in his communication with London, and has refused to prop up the credit of the Government by representing the exchange as better than it really is. The Brazilian Minister at Washington, we observe, casts doubt upon the reported revolt of Rio Grande do Sul, and it may be that the agitation in that province has not actually taken the form of secession or revolution; but a fact that a war vessel has been despatched by the Government to Rio Grande seems to indicate that the situation there is considered serious. Even in the capital the maintenance of the state of siege, and the proclamation of new severities against political opponents, are difficult to reconcile with the alleged popularity of the Dictatorship. It appears, moreover, that one of the Republican leaders, admiral Melho [*sic*], has delivered a strong protest against the *coup d'état*, and that a part of the Brazilian navy is supporting him. Meanwhile, the external trade of the Republic is practically paralysed, which means the closing to the world of a market of the value of nearly 30 millions sterling per annum. The capital province, Rio de Janeiro, is of course the great emporium of the commerce of the State, its imports reaching nearly fifteen millions yearly, as against something less than eleven millions of exports. The three disaffected provinces cannot compare either in population or commerce with Rio de Janeiro, but they represent collectively a large area, and their

secession, if unchecked, would probably be followed by that of other and more important States. Before that consummation is reached, however, the country may be subjected to the horrors of a civil war, from which it would probably not emerge so satisfactorily as Chile has lately done.

26. *The Times*, 13 de novembro

O diário londrino analisa a problemática das revoltas nas províncias, apesar das informações serem lacunares e controladas em larga medida pelo regime. Não acredita que se chegue a proclamações de independência e uma melhor autonomia seria provavelmente uma opção mais realista. Para acalmar a situação, o poder central no Rio devia atuar da outra maneira e seguir o recente exemplo do Chile com a eleição de Montt, mas, em vez disso, o governo de Deodoro pratica uma política de repressão contra os membros da oposição.

It is still extremely difficult to make out what is the real position of affairs in Brazil. The confident assurances of the Brazilian Minister in Paris, on which we commented a few days ago, have been quickly followed by the news, even though filtered through official channel, of disturbances culminating in revolts. The Government of MARSHAL FONSECA has telegraphed to the Brazilian Legation here that at Rio de Janeiro absolute tranquillity and unshaken confidence prevail; but it is now admitted that grave troubles have arisen in the province of Rio Grande do Sul, owing, we are vaguely told, to local conflicts, which the central executive power is taking measures to suppress. It has been known for some time that the disturbances, at last acknowledged by the

Government at Rio, had assumed serious proportions; and, though direct communications were either damned up or perverted by the authorities, the intelligence that came to Europe in a roundabout way through Chile was by no means reassuring as that officially transmitted from the capital. Therefore, when it is now asserted that the revolt against the government is confined to Rio Grande do Sul, we have to bear in mind that in a day or two there may be a reluctant acknowledgment that similar complication have broken out in the neighbouring provinces. Of that we have already information from Santiago, where it is believed that the garrisons in San Paulo, Minas Gerais and Santa Catarina have pronounced against the Dictatorship. We learn from the same source that the soldiery in Rio Grande do Sul, of whom there are many, as is natural in a frontier province, have sided with the insurgents, while the attitude of the naval squadron in that quarter is also said to be favourable to them. It is even alleged that the insurrection has met with no resistance whatever, that the expedition from Rio to restore the authority of the Dictator has been neither seen or heard of, and that the GOVERNOR, the MARSHAL'S creature, has gone over to the winning side. If there be any foundation for these statements, the confidence expressed by the organs to the Fonseca Government in the success of the measure adopted for the suppression of the revolt in Rio Grande do Sul seems to repose upon a slight basis. No doubt it is difficult to sift information that has to be smuggled, so to speak, through devious ways, but the Dictator and his advisers have to blame themselves for the discredit attaching to the direct news from Rio de Janeiro.

It may be observed that, though the optimistic opinions current at Rio de Janeiro are obviously untrustworthy, it is unnecessary to take a very gloom view of Brazilian affairs because there is discontent or even insurrection in some of the outlying provinces of that vast land disjointed dominion. There is a tradition of hostility to the central power and a tendency to strive after independence, especially in the Southern provinces. Rio Grande do Sul is, by its physical character and its history, connected rather with Uruguay and the Argentine province of Entre-Rios than with Central and Northern Brazil, and the separation has been accentuated by the influx of European immigrants, largely German, who now form a strong community hardly approaching to incorporation with the more or less negro or Indian stock, who form the two branches of the Brazilians proper. Down to 1845, the inhabitants of this part of the empire were engaged in a long and obstinate struggle against the Government at Rio, and the old spirit of rebellion has been whetted by grievances of various kind, especially those originating in jealousy of the central administration and finances. If Sao Paulo and the neighbouring States of Minas Gerais and Santa Catarina have followed the example of Rio Grande do Sul, it is a more serious matter. Sao Paulo is a wealthy province, and the "Paulists" are, compared with the rest of Brazilians, a vigorous and determined race who have no small opinion on their own dignity and rights. These four provinces contain more than one-third of the whole population of the Republic, and if they were to break off and set up for themselves, together or separately, the loss would be grave indeed. There are, however, practical reasons which make it improbable that the disaffected provinces will go far in the direction of

separation. These countries all stand in need of foreign capital, and what they want cannot be obtained, except in ruinous terms, unless the credit of a great central Government is preserved. Brazilian credit has inevitably suffered during recent convulsions, but it stands far higher even now than the credit of a small State such as an independent Rio Grande do Sul or even South Brazilian Confederacy. Brazil has, at present, no settled constitution, and, no doubt, many questions affecting the outlying provinces cropped up during the debates in Congress on the draft constitution which were cut short by the *coup d'État*. It is probable that a larger measure of autonomy rather than complete independence is what the malcontents are really aiming at. If Southern Provinces were to be emancipated from the supremacy of the politicians at Rio, and, perhaps, were to get a larger share of any good things that may be going in the way of grants for railways, harbours, and other things of that sort, we doubt if much would be heard of Separatism.

The Government of MARSHAL FONSECA and the politicians in Rio may defeat the operation of these favourable influences by pursuing an iniquitous and ill-advised policy. We have their own assurances that they are actuated by the noblest motives, that they are showing the most praiseworthy tolerance and equity, and that liberty, property, and order are perfectly safe in their hands, even though the chief of the Executive has taken it upon him to suspend constitutional rights and to dismiss the Legislature. It is to be hoped that the practice of the Dictator's Government will turn out to be in harmony with its professions. At present it is more than usually difficult to get at the truth about

affairs in Brazil, for the transmission of news is as far removed from freedom as it is in Russia. We know, however, that the partisans of the President and those of the Congress have been pelting on another with charges of all kind, and we received a couple of day ago information by way of Lisbon alleging that the recent *coup d'État* had originated, not in any political motives, but in the embarrassments of financial intrigues. However that may be, it does not appear that a devotion to the principle either of Republicanism or of Monarchy is the determining factor in the existing state of Brazil, though the army and the navy, the real arbiters of the situation, may declare, as events are developed, for the one cause or the other, or, as is now rumoured, for the permanent autocracy of the Marshal. The Government at Rio, while professing to extend toleration to all political opposition that does not take the form of open resistance, is suspected of designs against its enemies, of whom not only several avowed Monarchists, but members of the majority of the lately dissolved Congress, have either escaped from the country or have taken refuge in some of the foreign Legations. Chile, though still disturbed by the ground-swell of recent revolution, presents in this respect a favourable contrast to Brazil. The Chileans are not the most peaceable of mankind. They have shown, however, that they possess sound political sense, and, in spite of a hitch in the formation of the Ministry, they appear to be settling down quietly, under the Presidency of SEÑOR MONTT, in the old gloves of orderly government. It is well that this should be so, in view of the excitement stirred up for electioneering purposes in the

United States. They cry for vengeance which was the work of that accomplished diplomatist MR. PATRICK EGAN¹⁵ had died out since the elections in Ohio and New York were decided, and the Chileans ought to refrain studiously from doing anything that could be twisted into a excuse for its revival.

27. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 13 de novembro

É difícil saber o que se passa quando os vários despachos recebidos nas redações dos jornais contêm informações tão contraditórias.

The plot thickens in Brazil. While Fonseca had the unanimous support of the naval and military forces he was in a sense secure, but if it be true that several garrisons have risen against his dictatorship, and that San Paulo, Minas Gerais, and Las Catalinas¹⁶ are to join Rio Grande in the revolt against the Central Government, then the outlook is ominous indeed. The humour of the situation in the eye of Europe is of course to be found in the completely contradictory stories cable day after day to this side. "All up with the President, fresh provinces joining the revolt," say the insurgent messages; "perfect peace in the country, and confidence to the Government," say the official despatches. To reconcile these is impossible, and the wise plan is not to attach too much

¹⁵ De origem irlandesa, Patrick Egan (1841-1919) é ministro americano no Chile de 1889 a 1893.

¹⁶ Santa Catarina.

importance to what is at present forwarded by either the one side or the other. As Bismarck once said, "Nothing lies like a telegram!"

28. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 13 de novembro

As a consequence of the revolutionary outbreaks in Brazil, it is reported that a number of members of the Brazilian Congress have sought asylum in different Legations at Rio Janeiro. The Uruguayan Government, alarmed at the position of affairs, has massed troops on the frontier of Buenos Aires. It appears that the revolt began on the 9th inst. in Rio Grande, the greater part of which is occupied by rebels. The garrison of Yoguaro and two other garrisons have joined the rebels. Marshal da Fonseca has despatched troops and war vessels to assist the Governor of Rio Grande. The chiefs of the revolution are said to be Visconde de Pelotas, Baron Jijuk[sic!], and Generals Asropillo[sic!] and Fravares [sic!].

29. *The Liverpool Mercury*, 13 de novembro

News comes from New York and Lisbon of a revolt in Rio Grande, but whether this will have a serious bearing on the crisis in Brazil the telegrams are too vague to determine.

30. *The Liverpool Mercury*, 14 de novembro

Fonseca tinha prometido eleições, mas até agora o que se pode constatar é que há uma forte repressão na capital. Além disso rebentou a revolta no Rio Grande do Sul com cada vez mais voluntários, enquanto o governo precisa de recrutadores para encher as fileiras das suas tropas. Segundo o jornal, da Fonseca tem as «cofes cheios» que lhes permitem de ter uma certa vantagem, mas nunca se sabe como as coisas evoluem nas repúblicas sul-americanas.

It is always a delicate and dangerous matter to create constitutional crises where the people are passionate and settled government is only in slow process of evolution. When President Fonseca dismissed the Brazilian Congress he was incurring a serious risk, and the only prospect that appeared to make for peace was the immediate issue of writs for new elections, with a guarantee that the people should have perfect freedom of voting. But, although the elections were promised within a period of two months, the Executive showed no disposition to conciliate or inspire confidence. Martial law was not only proclaimed, but enforced with what appears to be excessive vigour. The slightest pretext has apparently sufficed to cause arrests on charges of sedition, and several members of the Chamber have fled to refuge to foreign legations. But the most formidable sign of disaffection is given by the province of Rio Grande do Sul. There is no more loosely-knit country in the world than the United States of Brazil. The area of territory is vast, and the hold of the central power never secure in times of disturbance. Feeling in Rio Grande – probably owing to the intrigue of political leaders – quickly showed hostility to

the dictatorship, and might conceivable lead to an attempted secession. Official despatches to the European legation of Brazil represent the troubles in Rio Grande as purely local, and about to be effectually quelled. But information from other sources points to an insurrection already supported by 5000 troops, to whose ranks volunteers are constantly offering themselves; whereas in Rio de Janeiro the President has to recruit his forces by the press gang. For the moment there would seem to be on the side of the President the advantage of a fairly full treasury, which will give him strength at home, and enable him to meet engagement abroad. However, one can hardly ever anticipate the developments of civil commotion in the republics of South America.

31. *The Leeds Mercury*, 14 de novembro

Matters are not improving in Brazil. Two or more of the provinces have declared their independence, and there is a feeling of great uneasiness throughout the country. Only newspapers favourable to the Dictator are allowed to be published in Rio de Janeiro. A censorship appears also to have been established over telegrams, a decree has been issued to the effect that persons showing hostility to the new order of things will be expelled, and all attempts to bring the dissolved Chambers together are stopped by force.

32. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 14 de novembro

According to latest accounts peer the New York Press, the revolt in Brazil is spreading, but the officials of the Government still maintain that order everywhere prevails except in Rio Grande do Sul, where the disturbances are said to be of a purely local character.

33. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 16 de novembro

Dificuldade de encontrar o fio da meada no «novelo emaranhado» de notícias que chegam do Brasil

It is very difficult to keep clear the threads in the tangled skein of rumours and reports from Brazil. According to one account there are been fighting at Rio do Sul, which ended in a defeat of the Government troops, Fonseca's forces having fallen back, followed by the insurgent cavalry. Then, not only has several Government gunboats gone over to the rebels, but troops in large numbers are said to be doing the same thing, and there is even talk of preparation to march on Rio de Janeiro. This latter statement, like some others, may probably be an exaggeration, although there seems no doubt whatever that the moment against the Central Government is gathering force daily. Yet Government official telegrams claim that the change which has been accomplished in the Government of Rio [Grande] do Sul is a compromise not

unfavourable to Fonseca, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs actually telegraphs to his representative at Washington, "We are in perfect peace».

34. *The Manchester Guardian*, 17 de novembro

Desde a proclamação da República os problemas económicos e financeiros do Brasil continuam a degradar-se.

The serious news which has been received from Brazil respecting the revolt against Marshal DA FONSECA'S dictatorship will scarcely surprise anyone. It may be that the accounts which have come by way of New York may prove to be exaggerated, and the statement issued in London encourages this opinion. But, on the other hand, the financial and economic condition of the country contrasts so unfavourably with the position before the Imperial Government was overthrown that a new revolt is only to likely to find support in general discontent with the existing condition of things and alarm for the future. There can be no doubts that since the Republic was declared Brazil has been travelling very rapidly along the path pursued by the Argentine Republic. In the latter years of the EMPEROR'S reign exchange steadily recovered after a period of long-continued depression, and seemed not unlikely to remain about par—27d., — a rate which, indeed it several times reached and even exceeded. At he time of the EMPEROR'S dethronement is fluctuated between 23d. and 24d., by no means unsatisfactory rate for the paper currency of Brazil. Since the first few months of the Republic, however, it has almost continually declined, and has

lately been quoted at only about half the last-named rate. This means that gold now stands at a premium of about 125 per cent in the paper currency. The depreciation is not only to some extent an expression of want of confidence on the part of European countries in the financial soundness of Brazil, as well as of other South American Republics, but also a direct consequence of recklessly extensive issues of paper money authorised by the Government, wild speculation in new banks and other joint-stock companies, and general financial confusion. So serious has the situation been considered that recently a committee of the Chamber of Deputies was appointed to inquire into the subject, and in its report it directly blamed the Government for the over-issue of currency and the looseness of the regulations governing its issue. Meanwhile the Treasury issued a report which practically recommended an increase of the already excessive issue by another \$ 150,000,000. That there should be a general tendency to loss of confidence in the men who have brought about so unsound a position is not surprising. Trade, again, has been continually harassed, and with the fall of exchange consumers have been forced to pay higher prices. At some of the ports, notably Santos, grave complaints of a general block of trade in consequence of the apathy and neglect of the Administration have been made; and, finally, an outbreak of yellow fever is threatened. In short, matters seem to have continually from bad to worst under the Government which promised prosperity on every hand.

35. *The Glasgow Herald*, 17 de novembro

The Junta in Rio-Grande has declared against Marshal da Fonseca, and called on all the cities of the State to enlist and arm men. The Junta favours impartial government in Brazil, opposes dictatorship, and calls for the election of a constitutional President. A number of the troops have joined the insurgents.

36. *The Times*, 18 de novembro

Os despachos oficiais dizem que tudo funciona normalmente no país, mas o editorialista, tal como a City de Londres, não acredita nesta versão dos acontecimentos: sublinha que a moeda brasileira continua a perder valor e que no Rio Grande do Sul a revolta toma força.

A seguir, aborda a problemática do secessionismo, utilizando principalmente duas cartas escritas por dois brasileiros que falam da mudança de regime em 1889 e da revolta sul-rio-grandense. O jornal londrino, que não poupa duras críticas ao governo do marechal, está convencido que esta província nunca chegará à independência, principalmente por razões financeiras e comerciais.

Finalmente, exprime um mero voto piedoso: que o Brasil seja governado não por intrigantes e militares incompetentes, mas por patriotas talentosos e que o povo acorde e tome consciência dos seus deveres cívicos.

No change of any great importance is to be recorded in the intelligence from Brazil, and this is scarcely surprising if it be true, as is reported – no doubt in a somewhat circuitous way – from Rio, that Marshal Fonseca intercepts all telegrams having any bearing upon the alleged revolts in Rio

Grande do Sul. The suppression of all news, except official assurances that everything is going on in the most satisfactory manner, has not, however, convinced many shrewd observers, especially in the City, that Brazilian affairs are being successfully and prudently managed under the present Dictatorship. The exchange value of the *milreis* in paper, which stood at par, or 2s. 3d., before the Empire fell, rapidly declined after the proclamation of the Republic, went down with a run when the effect of the currency ventures of Banco da Republica and its political backers became fully known, and has finally experienced the depressing effect of MARSHAL FONSECA'S *coup d'Etat*. From 27 d. it had fallen on Monday to 11 ½ d., and yesterday it went down to 11d. This has happened in spite of the reiterated assertions of the agents of the Brazilian Government that the troubles in the province of Rio Grande do Sul and the alarming rumours from other provinces of even greater importance really mean nothing at all. It is quite natural that persons interested in the commercial business or the financial affairs of Brazil should look persistently at the bright side of the things, but the public at large has a right to examine for itself into the facts and the probabilities of the case without reposing absolute faith in optimistic theories. Unfortunately, the supply of the former is somewhat scanty. We published information from Santiago, from Buenos Aires, from New York, and other places for what it is worth, and that furnished by our own Correspondents at any rate is honest and represents the local opinions of well-informed people. But we admit that while the Government of the Dictator persists in damming up the sources of news and in denying one day what is acknowledged to be the truth the next day, it is not easy to be sure that he

capitals of other South-American States are in possession of authentic information about what may be happening in the provinces of Brazil.

That there has been a local revolution in the province of Rio Grande do Sul, or, at least, a sudden and irregular change in the local Government, is no longer contested even by the Government of the Dictatorship, but beyond this all is confused and obscure. If it be true, as we are assured by the writer of a letter we publish today, that the majority of the officers as well as the troops in the army come from the Rio Grande do Sul – which would not be strange, as the southern provinces have always furnished the better fighting men – the undoubted defection of some of the soldiery and the doubts cast on the fidelity of others may be regarded as ominous. The navy, which is relatively strong, appears to be mainly on the side of MARSHAL FONSECA, but the insurgents are said to have with them as few small vessels at Porto Alegre, while other ships hostile to them command the upper waters of the Uruguay river. To add to the confusion, there are evidently dissensions among the members of the Junta which has supplanted MARSHAL FONSECA'S Governor in the Rio Grande, though it is impossible to decide whether these dissensions arise out of personal ambitions and conflicts or out of want of confidence, as is assumed in some quarters, between Republicans and Monarchists. We are still inclined to believe that an abstract preference of Republicanism or Monarchy has very little to do with the matter, and we are confirmed in this opinion by two letters representing opposite views of Brazilian affairs, from MR. ALBERT HARGREAVES and "V.-C." MR. HARGREAVES, who is, as he tells us, a Brazilian, in spite of his

English name, scoffs at the notion that the province of Rio Grande do Sul could think of setting up as an independent State, and "V.C.", with more moderation as well as more force, enumerates the potent reasons that exist to prevent any of these States from seceding. We pointed out some of those reasons the other day, and we expressed an opinion that if Rio Grande and other outlying provinces were granted a more liberal measure of local self-government, and possibly a large share in "the spoils", they would never seek for independence. That is substantially the effect of a speech delivered less than a year ago by SENHOR BRAZIL at the close of last year said plainly that the people of Rio Grande, having no wrongs to complain of under the Monarchy, "had welcomed the Republic only because she promised us a larger autonomy for our provinces; if that autonomy is impossible under the Republic, my province has only to secede." When a Republican and a man of mark can thus revive the secessionist doctrines he taught years ago in his history, it is evident that MR. HARGREAVES goes a good deal too far when he pronounces any movement for separation to be out of the question. The argument against separation are undoubtedly strong in Rio Grande do Sul; they are even stronger in prosperous provinces like Sao Paulo and Bahia, where agitation is at work, though it does not seem to have led as yet to an open rupture, and the political situation is reported to be "very threatening". What, then, are the forces that are operating on the other side?

There is a wide difference of opinion between the writers of the two letters to which we have referred on the subject of the Revolution

of November, 1889. MR. HARGREAVES is full of admiration for that "grave and orderly proceeding», while "V.C." treats it as the work of an intrigue, organized by Fonseca and a military club through which he controlled the army and sprung a surprise upon the country. The Revolution was bloodless, it is true, but that was because the EMPEROR, who "might have made a fight of it", was unwilling to risk the loss of life in a struggle for his crown, while "the people, who had nothing to do with the movement, were powerless to prevent it." When the Sovereign held so lightly by his throne and the people by their Sovereign, the organizers of the *pronunciamento* had a fair field for their experiments in the art of governing. What use have they made of their opportunities? It is interesting to observe that MR. HARGREAVES though he defends and extols the Revolution, says nothing about the conduct of the revolutionary Government. With a good deal of *naïveté* he suggests that the inhabitants of the Rio Grande do Sul are "sensible people who have enjoyed the estimable benefit of 35 years of peace", and are not likely, therefore, to follow the will-o'-the-wisp of secession. But what is the "inestimable benefit" that Rio Grande and all other provinces of Brazil have enjoyed since the "grave and orderly proceeding" MR. HARGREAVES so much admires places power in the hand of MARSHAL FONSECA and the military club and their creature? In the letter of "V.C." there will be found a concise and sufficient answer. There has been scandalous misgovernment, which all the solemn forms and high-flown phrases of Republicanism have not been able to conceal. There has been muddling in finance and muddling in diplomacy, tampering with the currency so reckless that it has brought the exchange to its present level, inflicting a loss estimated

at 40 millions sterling on the Brazilians, and, to crown the whole, the violation by military force of a brand-new constitutional system. The result has been civil war, which may be confined within narrow limits or even extinguished, but must in any case give a serious shock to the confidence in the continuance of those 35 years of peace. The troubles have arisen, not through conflicts between Republicans and Monarchists, between Centralists and Federalists, but, according to "V.C.", because there has been "wanton interference with the citizens' rights and property", in consequence of the ignorance and incapacity of the Government. We are quite ready to accept the view urged by "V.C." that the secessionist movement would die out under the quiet pressure of forces, in favour of union, operating through financial and commercial consideration; nor can we doubt that, putting aside all questions as to forms of government, Brazil possesses many public men of ability and patriotism who might combine for the purpose of rescuing their country from its present plight. SENHOR SARAIVA, SENHOR ANTONIO PRADO, SENHOR SUAREZ DE SOUZA, and SENHOR LAFAYETTE PEREIRA RODRIGUES are among those named by "V.C." who, with others trained in the same school, would be competent to form a coalition Ministry, strong both in administrative capacity and in debating power. But how is this machinery to be set in motion? The masses of the people are acknowledged to be utterly wanting in political initiative. The army and navy really hold the key of government, and they are dominated either by MARSHAL FONSECA and his military trade unionists or by some rival intriguers. The former, if they keep the upper hand, are not likely to recognize their own incapacity. It is improbable that the latter, should they triumph, partially or completely, will be a decided

improvement on their predecessors. If Brazil is to be restored to a career of peace and prosperity, the Brazilian people, and not the politicians only, must wake up to a sense of their public duty.

37. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 20 de novembro

O articulista ironiza sobre a imagem paradisíaca do Brasil que o ditador, copiando Balmaceda, graças ao controle sobre a imprensa e o telégrafo, quer dar no interior e sobretudo no exterior. No entanto, a revolta no Rio Grande do Sul toma força. O jornal de Birmingham nota, e com razão, que se o país voltar a ter um governo constitucional, os sul-rio-grandenses irão parar a luta.

Finalmente, o editorialista lamenta o «mal irreparável feito ao comercio e ao crédito brasileiros», o que implica também fortes perdas para «comerciantes e capitalistas britânicos», tudo isto por causa de um punhado de militares aventureiros, irresponsáveis e incompetentes.

The family likeness, between the revolutionary movement in Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, to which we drew attention the other day, seems to grow with the development of events in the last mentioned State, where Marshal DA FONSECA, nothing daunted by the fate of BALMACEDA, is evidently modelling himself as closely as possible upon that unlucky Dictator. Like BALMACEDA, he is keeping the people of the capital in a fool's paradise by suppressing all news that is in any way unfavourable to his dictatorship, whilst, at the same time, he endeavours to throw dust in the eyes of other nations by the most bombastic proclamations and the most absurdly optimistic messages. Brazil, according to the Dictator, is in the enjoyment of profound peace and unmeasured prosperity,

the only exception or qualification to his view being suggested by a trivial local disturbance in the Rio Grande, which is in course of settlement. Public opinion, we are assured, entirely approves of the President's patriotism and energy in proclaiming himself dictator, and the number of congratulatory letters and telegrams which are poured in upon him from abroad shows that on this question the public of other countries is quite in accord with that of Brazil. Nevertheless the Dictator evidently deems it desirable, as a measure of prudence, to establish a rather rigorous censorship over the telegraphic communications which the joyous Brazilians are sending their friends abroad, so that his modesty may not be put to the blush by the handsome things which are said about him. At the same time he is not prepared to deny that a little ready cash would be very useful to his Government, and he has accordingly issued a decree opening a special credit of 13 millions *milreis* for munitions of war and military equipments, presumably for festive or ceremonial purpose only. The amount may appear large, but that is due mainly to the great depreciation of the Brazilian currency caused by the enemies and detractors of the Republic, who have succeeded by their slanders in reducing the value of the *milreis* from 2s. 3d., at which it stood before the deposition of Dom PEDRO, to something under 10d., or say one-third. Marshal DA FONSECA may be congratulated on the success with which he has muzzled the press and the telegraph department at Rio; but, fortunately for the cause of historic truth, other parts of the Republic are not so completely under official control, and the fact which have leaked out from the Rio Grande, Sao Paulo, and other places forbid us to accept as gospel the comforting reports which emanate from Rio.

From independent telegrams, mostly transmitted by way of Chile and New York, it is tolerably certain that the revolutionary movement in the South has already attained formidable proportions, and that DA FONSECA must presently decide between civil war and surrender. The Junta which has been established in Rio Grande is evidently the outcome of a genuine popular movement, and it has already secured the adhesion of nearly all the troops in that part of the country, as well as of a considerable part of the navy. The personal differences lately reported between the heads of the revolutionary movement are said to be now arranged; and the Junta, though composed of men of various shades of politics, are united in opposing the pretensions of Marshal DA FONSECA and his colleagues to set aside the Constitution and the Congress, and to govern the country according to their own arbitrary wills. Number of National Guard and volunteers in Rio Grande are reported to have joined the revolutionary movement, which now commands a force of over 40,000 men and five gunboats. The nucleus of the army consists of five regiments of cavalry, three of infantry, and ten battalions of National Guards, and ample funds are being poured into the coffers of the Junta by the provincial banks and private patriots. The mouth of the Rio Grande is blocked and defended with heavy artillery, and the Junta is considered to be now in a position to successfully resist any force which the Dictator may send against them, if not to carry the war into the country of the latter. A march overland would, of course, be impossible, owing to the enormous distance and the impracticable character of the country; but the insurgents are possibly counting on the adhesion of a material part of the navy. The political issue involved are not very clear at

present. All that is know is that the revolution is not reactionary or monarchical, though it includes many monarchists; and it is to be presumed that the cry for secession would cease if the Dictator and his friends could be got rid of, and the country brought back to the path of constitutional government. Meanwhile, irreparable mischief is being done to Brazilian trade and credit, and we regret to add that large numbers of British traders and capitalists are involved in the suffering brought about by the reckless and ill-directed ambition of a handful of incompetent military adventurers.

38. *The Manchester Guardian*, 20 de novembro

Na primeira parte, o editorialista relata a crise constitucional entre o marechal e o Parlamento sem, no entanto, dar a própria opinião, principalmente por falta de informações fidedignas. Mas, acrescenta, a «contenda constitucional» é pouca coisa comparando-a com as consequências da «péssima política financeira» e económica do executivo, com a forte desvalorização da moeda: o Brasil é um «país extremamente rico mas muito mal governado».

O quotidiano liberal, – que emite uma pequena crítica ao Tratado comercial entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos –tem só duas certezas: o sistema republicano vai perdurar e vai haver «uma grande crise financeira que vai provavelmente atingir alguns investidores de Paris com a mesma força que a crise do Banco Baring» em 1890.

The present Dictator of Brazil is almost more successful than the late Dictator of Chile at keeping the European public in the dark. Brazil is the largest State in South America. It the total area of Russia in Europe,

Austria-Hungary, Germany, France, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Italy and Greece could be laid down upon the surface of Brazilian soil, they would fail to carpet the whole floor. This is no small area to hide from the observation of public which takes a lively interest in the money affair of the insulated area. Yet the English Stock Exchange, whose interest in Brazil is keen, though not so keen as that of the Paris bourse, knows little more than that affairs are thoroughly unsettled. Of the steps that led up to the crisis it is true that we know something. The paper currency has been extravagantly increased since the fall of the Empire. The country, finding the pressure of foreign obligations growing in consequence, and the prices of foreign imported goods growing too, was highly dissatisfied. Congress gave expression to this feeling in a Bill forbidding the further issue of paper, and laying it down that for the future the banks should keep a reserve of gold to extent of a third of the value of their current notes. The Bill was passed by the Houses, but the Government found means for its destruction. There does not seem to be any actual record of a veto put upon it – as would have been quite legal – by the PRESIDENT. At all events, it was contrived that the Bill should not become an enforced law, and the next step of Congress was to put a severer bit in the mouth of the PRESIDENT than the Constitution of 1890 has provided. But here again we are without details of the exact restrictions proposed. We only know that the PRESIDENT resented them as unconstitutional, dissolved Congress, and proclaimed martial law, either literally or virtually, in Rio de Janeiro, and has been ruling the country as a Dictator from that time to this. The political crisis in the capital has been immediately followed by an outbreak in Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost of

the United States of Brazil, and the one which has most often been mentioned as a possible for probable seceder from the federation.

These are, in brief, all the facts before us. They are not enough to yield data for a confident opinion on the merit of the constitutional quarrel. Above all should care be taken to draw no unconscious analogy between the Chilean and the Brazilian crises. The former was from the first a clear instant of encroachment, on ground constitutionally forbidden to him, on the part of a strong and unscrupulous political fighting for his own hand. About Marshal FONSECA we have no grounds for saying as much. When the crisis took place which changed the Empire to a Republic, at the close of the year 1889, FONSECA struck at least one intelligent foreign critic as a well-meaning reformer who had tried, in the reasonable interests of his profession, to upset a Ministry which he disliked, and who then found to his horror that he has upset a throne to which he was devoted, and has placed himself in a position where he had to accept the headship of the Republic or else to leave the Government in confusion. Others dispute this view of the PRESIDENT'S conduct, but everybody who has written on the crises from personal experience of Brazil appears to agree that his intentions at least are honest. His view of the action taken by Congress may be correct or the reverse. If he denies *in toto* the right of Congress do take in hand the amendment of the Constitution, he flies in the face of the 85th article of the Constitution of 1890, which provides that under certain conditions "The Constitution may be amended through the initiative of the National Congress or of the Legislature of the States." On the other hand, it

is possible that the PRESIDENT may have charged Congress with disregarding one or other of the detailed conditions. Here again we are pulled up by want of information. The telegrams tell us nothing of what can be said, by the light of the written Constitution, that it is either a distinctly adequate or a distinctly inadequate excuse for the *coup d'état*. The Congress were justified in passing its original measure for regulation of paper money seems evident, the 33rd article of the Constitution giving to its special car the direction of the currency and the control of the banks of issue. But the PRESIDENT is equally justifies in vetoing any such measure by the 35th article of the same document, in which he is empowered to send back not merely Bills that he considers unconstitutional, but also that he believes to be "contrary to the interests of the nation." It will be seen that the Constitution gives plenty of principle for the adjudication of the point in dispute. But the points themselves are not yet expounded, and to adjudicate is therefore impossible. Even in Rio de Janeiro there seems to be much cross division of opinion, some holding that Congress was right in its financial policy, but that it strained the Constitution in carrying it out; other that the Congress was in the right throughout, and that the PRESIDENT had broken through the constitutional checks devised for his special restraint.

Apart of the question of constitutional rights and wrongs, it may fairly be assumed that as a matter of public expediency Marshal FONSECA's financial policy has been a bad one. It has brought down the value of the paper *milrei* from 2s. 3d. to 1s. in two years, inflicting on Brazil a loss that is put by one

well-informed writer at forty millions sterling. It has included a Customs convention with the United States by which Brazil gains less than she gives. The general opinion of it entertained on the European Exchanges is shown by the steadily continuing fall of Brazilian securities in spite of the enormous natural assets of the country. It is stated that the coffee crops from the two ports of Rio and Santos will bring in this season over £24,000,000 sterling, and that the average crops from Rio and Santos for the immediate future may be put at seven million bags per annum. The letter written the other day to the *Times* by "A Twenty Years' Resident in Brazil" shows that most Englishmen have a little idea of the wealth of the country as they have of its size. It is an enormously rich country extremely badly managed. Its currency is in disorder. Its industry is full of ill-advised speculations and extravagant experiments, and the more one hears of the present crisis the more does it appear that, compared to the financial questions involved, the constitutional questions are small. Rio Grande do Sul has apparently little genuine wish to secede, but a very great and genuine objection to suffering for the economic mistake of the politicians at Rio de Janeiro. Of the possibility of a Monarchical revival it is difficult to speak seriously. The decease of the Monarchy was universally expected long before it arrived, and the very absence of all opposition accounted for the peacefulness of change. The Brazilian may or may not come to blows over the present issue, but at any rate two things seem to be certain – that a part of the final settlement of affairs will be a great financial crisis in which some Paris financiers may probably be as hard hit as the BARINGS in Argentina, and that the

government of the country will at the close remain a Republic – perhaps cleaned and mended, but a Republic still.

39. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 21 de novembro

Further despatches from Brazil confirm the statement that the province of Rio Grande is armed against the Dictator. Fonseca's generals have arrived at Montevideo, but no troops or gunboats have reaches there. A telegram was sent in name of the Dictator to the Provisional Governor of Rio Grande offering to recognise any local Government the people of the province might prefer, but the reply of the Junta was that they insisted on the resignation of the Dictator.

Capítulo 2

A Queda

1. «The Row in Brazil», *Reynolds Newspaper*, 22 de novembro

Quando as notícias do golpe de Deodoro chegaram a Europa, os monárquicos ficaram muito entusiasmados, pensando que os brasileiros já estavam cansados da República e que queriam o regresso de D. Pedro, comenta, trocista, o editorialista, segundo o qual os defensores da causa dos Bragança estavam bem enganados: o marechal não quer restaurar a monarquia, antes pelo contrário.

A luta que se trava agora é entre Deodoro e os que se opõem com força à ditadura. Estes têm razão, afirma o jornalista que escreve: «Se isso tivesse acontecido quando Luís Napoleão se transformou em Imperador, a França não teria sofrido as terríveis desgraças que ocorreram depois disso.»

We know little concerning the recent rising in Brazil. It is, however, pretty certain, that its end and object was not the restoration of monarchy, under any change of circumstances. When the intelligent reached Europe that an insurrection had taken place, the monarchists everywhere rejoiced. We were assured that Brazilian were tired of the Republic, and hankering after their deposed Emperor and a restoration of the Empire. Even the old gentleman, Dom Pedro, who, in this way, is not a bad kind of man, was quite prepared, he said, to reply in the affirmative to the supplications of his subjects, and return home in his palace and his throne. His trunks were packed ready for the occasion, and steps were taken for his immediate departure from the Riviera. There he has been cadging on the generosity of his friends: the Brazilian very wisely let him go without, so to say, a farthing in his pockets. His dreams of again becoming the Sovereign of that enormous country, Brazil, were, however, speedily dispelled, and his trunks repacked for a longer sojourn in exile.

Monarchical aspirations and anticipations were dissipated, for Marshal Fonseca declared that he assumed a dictatorship for the express purpose of thwarting the designs of a few members of Parliament, who were royalists at heart. Moreover, finding that anything in the shape of dictatorship, or an attempt to obtain supremacy in all governing matters, was dangerous in the extreme, as shown by the fate of Balmaceda in an adjacent nation, Fonseca summoned a fresh Parliament, and his later proclamations are more liberal and less high-handed than his former ones.

There is no doubt that some of the provinces have protested against dictatorship of any kind, either Imperial or Republican, by insurrectional movements. And this has been the state of feeling amongst the South American Republics in general. Wherever a disposition on the part of the President for the time being has shown itself to become dictator, this feeling has immediately met with sturdy opposition by the people. Such determination is construed by monarchists of Europe to indicate dislike of the Republican system and admiration of the monarchical one. It is nothing of the sort, but displays a determined dislike of the reins of Government being placed in one hand, and a resolution to govern themselves through the agency of those select as their governors. And they are perfectly justified in shooting as they would a mad dog any President who attempted to transform himself into a dictator. Has this been done when Louis Napoleon transformed himself from President into Emperor, France would have been spared the terrible misfortunes that followed thereon.

We have little knowledge about Brazil, but it is most assuredly a country difficult to govern. It is nearly as large as all Europe, having a population of about fourteen millions. Under the Empire the franchise was limited to about one hundred and thirty thousand persons, and its National Debt £8 per head. It possesses rich gold and diamond mines, but its resources have been cramped by the effects of bad and selfish government.

2. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 23 de novembro

Latest news from Brazil is to the effect that the insurgents in Rio Grande do Sul threaten to march on Rio de Janeiro. The squadron on Upper Uruguay river has revolted against Fonseca. The States of Bahia and Pernambuco are said to be arming volunteers to participate in the revolution. Hostilities seem to be impending.

3. *The Times*, 24 de novembro

Deodoro foi deposto como D. Pedro dois anos antes. De facto, observa o diário, a marinha e o exército não querem governar, mas observam e quando julgam que o chefe de Estado já não serve, falam educadamente com ele e comunicam-lhe que tem de sair da cena política.

O problema de fundo no Brasil vem de longe: o próprio D. Pedro não governava e é por isso que o mandaram embora, sustém o jornal londrino. Os homens melhores não participam na vida política do país. Por outras palavras, falta uma classe dirigente à altura para governar o Brasil e resolver os

problemas. Isso não é irrelevante para os europeus, sobretudo pensando no dinheiro público e privado investido neste enorme país.

The Times nota também que a formação de um bom governo central é uma condição indispensável para que o Rio Grande do Sul, e outras províncias, não entrem num processo de secessão, embora esta escolha tivesse, para estes novos Estados, consequências muito negativas no plano financeiro e comercial.

News comes this morning of another important step in the development of the Brazilian imbroglio. MARSHAL DA FONSECA appears to have been summarily driven from power by the revolt of the navy, which, until the other day, was supposed to be entirely devoted to him. The deposition of the Dictator seems to have been managed as simply as quietly as the overthrow of the Empire. A deputation of naval officers waited upon him, represented that the people were tired of him and his ways, and advised him to avert the necessity for unpleasant measures by immediate resignation. Perceiving that he had no means of effectual resistance, he bowed to the inevitable and handed over his exalted functions to SENHOR PEIXOTO. He may be supposed to have felt some surprise at suddenly discovering that he was regarded as superfluous and detrimental, for, according to very recent intelligence, he was planning the changes in the constitution which he thought desirable, quite in the manner of a man fully convinced that Congress would readily bow to his will. So far he was probably right, since it is not by Congress that a change of Government is brought about in Brazil. The elected representatives of the people seem to form mere ornamental appendages to the constitution. We suspect that they are practically returned by the Government that happens to be in power, but,

however that may be, they appear to acquiesce in whatever state of affairs they find actually existing. Brazilian politics, which seem sufficiently chaotic from an ordinary constitutional standpoint, fall into a kind of order if we assume that real political power rests with the permanent officials of the army and navy. Government by Praetorian Guard is not a novelty, and in this case we may even admire the naval and military modesty which not only admits the continued existence of a Parliament singularly unfit to command respect, but also pursues with patience the somewhat discouraging search for competent civil administrators. So far as can be seen, these officers have no thought of seizing upon the high offices of the State. They confine themselves to sitting in judgment upon Emperors and Presidents. After a longer or shorter trial, they come to the conclusion that the man in power will not do. They go and tell him so in politest manner, and, if he is a prudent person, he makes his bow and vanishes. Then some other personage takes his place, and the army and navy resume their attitude of attentive observation. The machinery differs from ours, but it seems so far to work smoothly.

These active representatives of Brazilian people do not betray any pedantic affection for any particular form of government. It is true they have destroyed the Empire and made Brazil a Republic, but it is difficult to see how they could help themselves. DOM PEDRO was intrusted with the task of governing, but, though he was personally an excellent man and very popular, he did not govern. There is every reason to believe that he was sent away, not because he was an Emperor, but because he was not a ruler. But an emperor

without some halo of hereditary right is obviously absurd and impossible, hence DOM PEDRO'S successor could not well be anything but a President. Republicanism thus seems to be an accident of the situation, and to be so accepted by the mass of the Brazilian people. Of course there are some who attach importance to the form of government, and thus we hear of Monarchists and Republicans, but apathy with which change is regarded by the community at large goes to show that it is not really conscious of any difference, and that the desideratum is some one who can rule, no matter what he may be called. There is undoubtedly a very serious side to all this rather comic travesty of constitutionalism. Cliques of naval and military officers cannot long usurp the functions that properly belong to the civil community, without undergoing demoralisation. There is a distinct danger of the whole business degenerating into an ignoble scramble among bidders of the suffrage of soldiers and sailors emancipated from all real discipline. But the root of the evil lies in civil misgovernment. The political debility of DOM PEDRO was a much more serious thing than it superficially appeared, and it was undoubtedly during his reign that the seed were sown which are now producing evil fruit. MARSHAL FONSECA evidently does not possess the character and ability needed to cope with extensive civil and commercial disorder. A very good and capable ruler might have failed to please the army and navy, whose interference is regarded in this country with wholesome distrust. But, as a matter of fact, the state of affairs under the PRESIDENT has been worse than under the EMPEROR, and it is impossible to deny that the army and navy may find in the general

mismanagement of public affairs an extremely plausible justification of their action.

Behind all this lies that decay of public spirit which is a malady most incident in modern communities. Some of our correspondents have explicitly recognized the abstention of the better men in Brazil from active participation in public life as the real root of the evil, and all who enter into discussion of Brazilian affairs make admissions which imply the same thing. It is a question not without interest for foreign observers whether any remedy is discoverable. For, in its absence, there can be little doubt that things will go from bad to worse, and that, sooner or later, very serious consequences will ensue to public and private creditors of Brazil. Already the Republic is threatened with disintegration. It is not easy to get at precise attitude of the province of Rio Grande do Sul, but it seems certain, notwithstanding all optimistic explanations, that it contemplates secession, at least conditionally. Its people are, by comparison with other parts of Brazil, political active and intelligent. They are not disposed to allow their substantial interests to become the playthings of civil incompetence or of military ambition. So far as their attitude can be made out, they would prefer to remain within a well-governed Republic, but are prepared to withdraw from an ill-governed one. That is an intelligent and reasonable attitude, but it raises some very delicate questions for Brazil bondholders. The commercial relations between Rio Grande and the others provinces, or some of them, will no hinder secession if inclusion in the Republic be found on other grounds intolerable. Separation would be no

absolute bar to the continuance of these relations, and might bring commercial, as well as social and political, compensations. The separated province might, indeed, have to face hostile tariffs, and the fear of them undoubtedly makes for unity. But that disadvantage will not weigh against a general conviction that unity means hopelessly bad government. It is not altogether easy to bind together an area so enormous as Brazil, even when government is good, and it may be feared that, if the disruptive process begins with Rio Grande do Sul, it will extend to other provinces.

4. *The Morning Post*, 24 de novembro

Nada surpreendido pela queda do Ditador, o jornal nota que, a partir do momento em que, dois anos antes, mandaram, «demolindo a lei e a ordem», D. Pedro para a Europa, tornaram possível a ditadura de Deodoro ; a «violação da Constituição» por parte deste «abriu o caminho» a esta última revolta. Tudo isto ilustra a grande instabilidade que domina a vida política brasileira.

O futuro não parece nada claro: por um lado, não se sabe qual será a atitude de Floriano Peixoto; por outro lado, ignora-se se algumas províncias, como o Rio Grande do Sul, irão enveredar pelo caminho da secessão ou se ficarão na Confederação.

In spite of the fact that a strict censorship has been exercised over telegrams, it has been evident for some past to anyone who could read between the lines of the intelligence which was allowed to filter through the wires that the general condition of affairs in Brazil was by no means favourable to the Dictatorship which Marshal DA FONSECA had assumed. It was easy to declare

that the revolt in Rio Grande do Sul, the richest and most important of Brazilian Provinces, was a mere local outbreak, directed against the Governor of the Province. It was equally easy to represent the discontent of such Provinces as San Paulo – almost adjoining the capital – and Bahia and Pernambuco, the great coast Provinces of the north, as mere ebullitions of local political feeling, which needed nothing but a strong Government to keep them within bounds. The latter statement may possibly be true, but it is now clear that that Government will not be supplied by Marshal DA FONSECA. The general dissatisfaction with his rule has culminated in a revolt in which the Navy seemed have played the principal part, and he has been deposed in favour of General FLORIANO PEIXOTO, who was Vice-Chief of the Provisional Government after the overthrow of the Empire, and was Minister of War up to the time of the reconstruction of the Cabinet in January last. No surprise will be felt at the announcement that the revolution was not carried out without a certain amount of excitement. It would be strange, in fact, if a violent change in the Government of a country were to be carried through with all the calm which benefits the operation of a constitutional measure. To the European observer, however, the position will suggest more than one element of danger. Granted that Marshal DA FONSECA'S assumption of a Dictatorship was illegal, his overthrow adds only another illustration of the instability of Brazilian affairs. This seems to be the fate of revolutions. The great difficulty with which they have to contend is that of establishing themselves. Each one deals a blow at the soundness of existing institutions, and by so doing prepares the way of its own dissolution. When Brazil calmly ejected its Emperor it destroyed the sanctions

of law and order, and rendered possible Marshal DA FONSECA'S assumption of a Dictatorship. This violation of the Constitution smoothed the way in its turn for the forcible revolt which has just been carried out. The question which now possesses the greatest importance is the action which the Provinces will take in the immediate future. A few days ago it appeared probable that Brazil would split up into a number of independent Republics, amongst which Rio Grande do Sul, with its fine climate, its great fertility, and its large infusion of a hardier race, might be expected ultimately to take the lead. It remains to be seen, however, whether the centrifugal aspirations which seemed so recently to dominate the situation will now obtain full scope, or whether the new President will succeed in recalling the recalcitrant Provinces to their allegiance. This is a subject in regard to which it is impossible to speak at present. We do not even know what may be the policy of General FLORIANO PEIXOTO, or whether he is inclined to fight for his own hand, or to play the part of a MONK in the restoration of an ancient Monarchy. His antecedents would point rather to the former conclusion; but there are many indications that the supporters of the late EMPEROR are far from being extinct in Brazil. On the whole, the situation is by no means clear. It is not improved by the fact that the lower classes in Brazil are generally devoid of political knowledge and incapable of political sentiment; but, in any case, its development will be awaited with interest.

5. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 24 de novembro

Artigo muito pessimista que se debruça sobre a revolta no Rio Grande do Sul onde a Junta pede a demissão do ditador e a formação de um governo constitucional. O jornalista, que explica quais são as forças militares de um lado como do outro, receia que o país tenha de enfrentar uma guerra civil e passar por uma «prova atroz», como foi «recentemente» o caso do Chile.

Once more we are assured through the Brazilian Legation in London that peace and order reign throughout the Republic, with the exception of one unruly province. Telegrams arriving at Rio de Janeiro daily, we are told “confirm the existence of perfect tranquillity in all the States with the exception of Rio Grande do Sul”; but the authorities, it will be observed, no longer pretend to regard the revolt of Southern States as a merely local disturbance. It is now acknowledged that “the Constitutional authorities have been deposed and a Provisional Junta set up by acclamation.” This Junta, according to official message, is presided over by Dr. ASSIS BRAZIL», “who shows himself hostile to the Federal Government.” This is assuredly a rather important qualification to the rule of “perfect tranquillity”, more especially in view of the announcement of the Government that it is “taking measures to suppress the anarchical movement,” or, in other words, to plunge the country into civil war. A decree, it seems, is about to be issued for the blockade of the port of Rio Grande; but “the Government”, we are assured, “will use all moderation.” It is to be feared that this magnanimity will not be reciprocated by the insurgents, who seem disposed, on the contrary, to force the fighting. All

the Dictator's attempts to heal the breach by conciliatory methods have, so far, proved futile. The only condition upon which the people of Rio Grande will lay down their arms is that Marshal DA FONSECA shall abdicate. The three generals whom he lately sent to Rio Grande to quell the insurrection have returned with the report that it is impossible to land troops at Porto Alegre owing to the obstructions at the entrance of the lagoon, and since then Porto Alegre has fallen into hands of the opposition. The diplomatist, Baron LUCENA, who was sent to parley with the malcontents, has not been any more successful. The Junta of Rio Grande have refused to entertain his proposal, and they have informed him that the only condition on which they can agree to a settlement are that Marshal DA FONSECA shall abandon the Dictatorship and retire, and that another ruler shall be chosen who would observe the Constitution and permit the assembly of Congress. Even Marshall's own officers appear to be falling away from him. Captain CABRAL, of the Brazilian war ship *Alagoas*, which was sent by Marshal DA FONSECA'S order to the upper Uruguay Squadron, has informed the agent of the Junta that he will not fire a shot against Brazilians. Senator BARCELLO, moreover, a former supporter of the Marshal, has deserted him and gone to join the insurgents. On the other hands, some 10,000 of the National Guard assembled at Pelotas refuse to join the Junta, and the town of Santa Catarina is held by the Dictator's troops against an impending attack by the insurgents. A collision between the two parties cannot be long delayed, as they are now within striking distance of one another at more than one point. At Rio Grande, where the Junta have six ships of war, the Governor, General ALLISTAN is endeavouring to land a considerable force which he has conveyed

there in transports; but the post is said to be strongly garrisoned and fortified, besides being defended by torpedoes, and the chances, therefore, are not very favourable to the Dictator in this quarter. The insurgents are evidently full of fight, and Dr. ASSIS BRAZIL has telegraphed to Baron LUCENA that unless Marshal DA FONSECA'S forces soon attack Rio Grande those of the Junta, under general OSORIO, will march upon Rio. This threat, however, is not very easy of execution, owing to the enormous distance and the great difficulty of the country that separates the two cities, and the Junta are scarcely in a position to despatch a naval expedition to the capital while the bulk of the Brazilian navy remains loyal to the Dictator. It would be an error of policy, moreover, for one State to endeavour by aggressive action to coerce the others, which would then probably make common cause against the aggressor. It would be much more easier for Rio Grande to announce secession, and remain on the defensive. The States of Bahia and Pernambuco are reported to be arming volunteers, with a view to a general revolt of the northern provinces. In that case, of course, Rio Grande might render efficient aid to the other disaffected States, and perhaps prevent the dismemberment of the Republic by an advance in force upon the capital, but under actual circumstances any such step would obviously be premature and mischievous. How the crisis will end it would be impossible, with the means at our disposal, to predict; but we are sorely afraid that matters will be worse in Brazil before they are better, and that country is destined to undergo a similar fiery ordeal to that which Chile has lately passed through before it is restored to peace, order and unity.

6. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 24 de novembro

Pequena nota irónica sobre a «vida feliz» dos ditadores sul-americanos. Para eles é só pena ser tão curta !

The life of Dictatorship in South America may be a merry one, but it is uncommonly short. Fonseca has had very little play for his money. His removal was effected as genteelly and agreeably as that of Dom Pedro himself. A few naval officers waited on him, and intimated that Brazil (which is to say, the Navy) had had enough of him, and that on the whole they thought he had better take himself off. He, very judiciously, did so without more ado. The great heart of Brazil (always understanding thereby the Navy) then called General Floriano Peixoto to power. Peixoto, who seems to have been the Brazilian Balmaceda's Vicuña¹⁷, so to speak, lent himself to the arrangement, which no doubt may be regarded as final – for a few weeks.

7. «The Brazil dictatorship Ended», *The Daily News*, 24 de novembro

Os autores deste golpe, que aboliram a censura e cujos pedidos parecem respeitar o espírito da Constituição, destituíram Deodoro, frustrando as suas tentativas de se tornar todo poderoso, como uma espécie de «Imperador» da República.

¹⁷ Claudio Vicuña Guerrero (1833-1907), político e diplomata chileno que apoia Balmaceda na guerra civil de 1891. Foi eleito presidente, mas não chega a assumir o cargo porque os seus inimigos ganham a revolução.

“No man” said PYM¹⁸ “hath gone about breaking Parliaments but in the end a Parliament hath broken him.” Marshal DA FONSECA suppressed the Congress at Brazil and the Brazilians have stood by Congress and his power is broken. We shall now get the true history of the revolution; for the account of the overthrow of the Marshal-President begins with the news that “the censorship on the despatch of telegrams has been partially removed.” That censorship was an ugly fact against the Marshal DA FONSECA. Why should a strong Government have desired to suppress news if the revolt was confined to one province and was of no threatening import? Despotic acts have clearly been followed by lying despatches, and upon these all the presumptions are against the Marshal being in the right and in favour of the so-called revolutionists. It had been represented that the Navy was with FONSECA, or at least, that it was so divided that it could not declare against him; but we now learn that the revolt of the Navy against him has put an end to his career. General FLORIANO PEIXOTO now stands as President in his stead. He was Vice-Chief of the Provisional Government after the overthrow of the Empire, and Minister of the Cabinet in January. There is therefore no reason to suppose that the displacement of FONSECA in his favour implies any danger to the Republican form of government.

¹⁸ John Pym (1584-1643), membro do Parlamento, líder do Partido Puritano durante a Primeira guerra civil inglesa, lutou contra o absolutismo.

The presumptions in favour of the Revolutionists are as strong as those against the overthrow Marshal. Their story from the first has been such as to command the sympathy of believers in popular movement. They distrusted the Marshal and feared he aimed at the restoration of Imperial rule. They consequently provide against emergencies by framing a law of impeachment. Marshal DA FONSECA'S action in vetoing this law because it was aimed against himself, in assuming a Dictatorship and in dissolving the Congress, seems to distant observers as strong a justification of the Parliament's action as events could supply. In all that we have been allowed to hear of the action of the Revolutionists, we have heard of nothing so disquieting as this. On the contrary, all their demands have sounded perfectly constitutional. They required the President do abandon his Dictatorship, and to retire, and they asked that a Ministry should be chosen which would observe the Constitution, and permit the immediate assembling of Congress. They objected to the decree of the Dictator on the perfectly intelligible grounds that he annulled the privileges of Congress, and did away with concessions which were granted when the Republic was established. Every colour was given to these assertions by the Marshal's own recent Message, in which he at last showed signs of yielding to the demand for a meeting Congress. He fixed the elections for February 29, and the meeting of the new Congress in May, thus providing for himself nearly six months in which to strengthen his dictatorial position. He "required" – so the Message said – amendments of the Constitution tending to establish the independence of the judiciary and the executive, to provide safeguards for the upholding of the Presidential Veto, limiting the prerogatives

of Congress, enlarging the powers of the Executive, and revising the representation. This is very like saying that the Marshal-President and his Government were to re-establish the Imperial power in the person of Marshal FONSECA. It is not so surprising to learn that almost immediately after the issue of this Message the revolt in Brazil has become so general as to lead to the Dictator's irretrievable downfall.

8. *The Liverpool Mercury, 25 de novembro*

O articulista compara os conflitos constitucionais no Chile de Balmaceda e no Brasil de Fonseca e chega a uma conclusão: o regime constitucional parece ter um futuro na América do Sul onde os ditadores não têm o apoio do povo.

The despatches from Brazil announcing the deposition of President da Fonseca demonstrate the futility of attempting, by official censorship, to prevent facts from leaking out to the world. We were aware since the deposition of the Congress that an insurrectionary movement was gathering strength. The Executive persistently telegraphed to the Ministers abroad that all was quiet, and when occasionally notice had be taken of the circumstantial reports of risings in Rio Grande, they were referred to as small partisan movements which the troops would suppress by a mere show of force. The truth of the matter is that Fonseca was endeavouring, after the fashion of the late Balmaceda in Chile, to hide from Europe the real condition of things, in the hope that he would ultimately be enabled to make his usurped position secure.

But he has as length been compelled to admit, in spite of constant denials, that the people were hostile to him, and that the maintenance of his dictatorship depended solely upon the army and navy. There are striking points of similarity between the constitutional conflicts in Brazil and Chile. In each case the head of the Executive quarrelled with and strove to override the Parliament. The Parliaments, one after the other, appealed to public sentiment, which quickly declared itself on the side of the representative body. Balmaceda had the advantage of securing the adhesion of more than half the army, and he was consequently able to make a prolonged and sanguinary fight. Fonseca had no control, as he had discovered, over the armed forces of the State, and he could not refuse a resignation of office which was demanded, so to say, with a pistol at his head. Another parallel is to be found in the attitude of the inhabitants of the respective capitals. Santiago gladly acclaimed the victorious Congressionalists and Rio de Janeiro, delivered from Fonseca, gave itself over to rejoicing. On the whole, therefore, constitutional government would seem to have a hopeful future in South America. If dictatorships should still continue to be possible, and to cause terror and convulsion, they are not approved by the masses, nor even by sailors and soldiers, and they are likely to be costly experiments to those who endeavour to create them. Fonseca may congratulate himself that he escaped with mere deposition. Had he shed to the blood of the people his fate would have been different.

9. *The Northern Echo*, 25 de novembro

As cartas políticas de novo baralhadas no Brasil.

Once more have the political cards been shuffled in Brazil, and this time it is General Peixoto who comes to the top of the pack. It will be remembered that when the Brazilians got tired of a monarchy and shipped the amiable Dom Pedro off to Europe as coolly as though he had been a bale of coffee, the reins of government were entrusted to General Fonseca, who was placed at the head of the Republican Government which was shortly afterwards established. A few week ago, however, Fonseca dismissed Congress, with whom he disagreed upon a question of veto, and established a dictatorship. Now news comes that the dictator has had and to resign owing to a revolt in the navy, and General Floriano Peixoto, who was vice-chief of the Provisional Government after the overthrow of the Empire, and Minister of War prior the reconstruction of the Cabinet last January, has been declared President in place of Marshal da Fonseca. The usual disturbances seem to have accompanied the change, the volatile Brazilians destroying the offices of the two Government newspapers and otherwise manifesting their disagreement with the existing order of things.

10. «City Notes. Sharp Recovery in Brazilian Bonds», *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 25 de novembro¹⁹

Os títulos brasileiros começam a recuperar e o milréis está a subir no Rio de Janeiro.

The reaction in Brazilian bonds has been sharp and decisive. Following the incipient improvement on Monday²⁰ afternoon, There was a further rise yesterday of 5½ to 6½ in each of the loan. There were plenty of buyers, but no seller, and as consequence the quotations rose rapidly. There is, however, a good deal of leeway still to make up before we reach the prices which prevailed prior to Fonseca's *coup d'état*. The following is a comparison of the quotations on October 27 and this morning :

	Oct. 27.		Nov 25.		Lower
4 %, 1889	67 ¾	...	58 ½	...	9 ¼
Gold Loan, 4,5%	82 ½	...	70 ½	...	12
4,5 %, 1888	72	...	62	...	10
4,5%, 1883	73	...	63	...	10

The recovery in Brazilian has favourably affected all other Foreign Government bonds. The Western and Brazilian Telegraph Company have received

¹⁹ 4ª-feira.

²⁰ Na tarde de 2ª-feira, dia 23 de novembro, a notícia da queda de Deodoro já tinha chegado à City de Londres.

information that the fiscal have been removed from all offices in Brazil, and that there are now no restrictions on telegrams to and from that country. The exchange in Rio has risen to 12 ½ d.

11. *The Glasgow Herald*, 25 de novembro

Depois da catastrófica política do governo de Deodoro, ainda não se sabe como é que vai atuar Floriano Peixoto: vai continuar na mesma linha que o seu antecessor ou vai convocar o Parlamento e organizar a eleição do novo presidente? Se insistir em favorecer o exército, com fazia o marechal, vai provocar «descontentamento e uma outra revolução»; se enveredar por outro caminho, não tem a certeza de obter o apoio das tropas.

O Brasil está, por conseguinte, numa situação confusa, onde existem todos os elementos para que «o impasse político» se prolongue: «o país entrou num novo período de revoluções», conclui o editorialista, que chega mesmo a emitir a hipótese de um confronto entre os partidários de uma restauração monárquica e «os mais ardentes e sinceros republicanos» brasileiros.

The catastrophe in Brazil, the news of which is now amply confirmed, was probably not quite so sudden or so unexpected as, to watchers on this side of the Atlantic, it may appear to have been. Ever since the Marshal-President took the decisive step of dissolving the Congress and assuming to himself the power of State, outsiders have not been permitted to know anything of what was really going on at Rio more than the Government thought fit to reveal. Telegrams have been published every day announcing with very little variation in their language, the perfect tranquillity that prevailed, not only in the capital, but over almost every parts of Brazil; the confidence felt by the public in the

good intentions of the Dictator, and in his resolve to maintain order and the Constitution; and the cordiality with which the various provinces –with apparently trifling exception of Rio Grande do Sul – were giving in their adherence to the new order of things. There was not the slightest reason to suppose that these announcements were true, because it was known that a rigid official censorship had been established over everything transmitted by the telegraph cables, and that no news which did not please the censor would be sent at all. But with the exception of a few brief and indefinite telegrams which came from Montevideo, there was no means of collating or correcting then untrustworthy despatches from Rio. Now the curtain has been abruptly lifted, and a transformation scene revealed. For some days an insurrectionary movement against the Dictator has been smouldering in Rio, There was universal popular discontent against his arbitrary rule; but as the army still remained true to him, an open rising seemed a very dangerous and difficult enterprise. The problem was solved by the officers and sailors of the national navy, who on Monday morning assembled in force, seized the naval arsenal, and then demanded the immediate resignation of Marshal Fonseca. The Dictator is said to have taken completely by surprise, but, finding resistance useless, he published a manifesto announcing that in order to avert civil war he resigned the Presidential powers to the Vice-President of the Confederation, General Peixoto. Forthwith there was general rejoicing throughout Rio. The state of siege which has been maintained there ever since the 4th inst. was raised, the Ministers of the ex-Dictator followed the example set by their chief and resigned, and the expectation prevailed that the new head of the Executive

would restore the Constitution and re-convene the Congress illegally dissolved by his predecessor.

It is by no means certain, however, that things will go so rapidly and smoothly as this, or that Brazil will escape with another bloodless revolution from the consequence of the past two years of misgovernment. Marshall Fonseca may be an honest and well-meaning though incapable man, or he may be a corrupt and unscrupulous adventurer. In either case, it is certain that he and his advisers have contrived to do a great amount of mischief in the short time they have been at the head of affairs. They have involved the finances of Brazil, they have depreciated her currency, wasted her resources, and done as much as could well be accomplished to inflict permanent injury on her credit. Happily the natural wealth of the Republic is so great, and its internal obligations are so small compared with that wealth, that the mischief done in this way cannot be serious, and under a Government with some pretension to strength and stability recovery would be rapid. But what is the likelihood that such a Government will be established? General Peixoto is simply another military ruler, with no more right to the supreme authority in the State than Marshal Fonseca had, and, so far as is known, with no greater capacity for using such authority aright. He is an old comrade of the ex-Dictator, gave him support in the military *émeute* of November, 1889, which ended in Dom Pedro's dethronement, and has since filled the post of Minister of War. If he be an unselfish patriot, if he re-assembles the recently-dissolved Congress and invites it to elect a Head of State to whom he can hand over his temporary

functions, all may end well; for such conduct would give to the provinces a strong pledge that their local rights and liberties will be respected, and a satisfactory assurance of that kind will even yet suffice to arrest the movement of secession which has been initiated with such vigour by the people of Rio Grande du Sul. It is necessary to bear in mind, however, that General Peixoto is, after all, only the nominee of Marshal Fonseca; that he represents the material and political interests of the army; and that during the past two years the soldiery have enjoyed exceptional privileges and advantages in consequence of the part they played in dismissal of the Emperor. Marshal Fonseca's rule has, in fact been chiefly repugnant to the people because of the favours he has systematically accorded to the army. If General Peixoto attempts to continue the same policy, he will provoke discontent and revolution; but if he adopts another course it is exceedingly doubtful whether he will be able to count on the peaceful acquiescence of the troops. Then in the present state of confusion and uncertainty the political friends of the Imperialist system are very likely to attempt a movement in favour of Dom Pedro's restoration; and while the majority of the Brazilian would perhaps not be sorry to see such a consummation, there is a section of sincere and ardent Republicans who would resist it to the last extremity. In short, there are in the present situation of Brazil all the elements of protracted political disturbance. The country has entered on a new period of revolution, of which it may be confidently affirmed that the end is not yet.

12. *The Leeds Mercury*, 26 de novembro

A ditadura acabou, mas os problemas financeiros, tal como no Chile e, sobretudo, na Argentina perduram. O Brasil está «à beira da bancarrota».

We learned from the telegraph received yesterday that the deposition of MARSHAL DEODORO DA FONSECA, as President of the United States of Brazil, was quite as peremptory as the deposition two years ago of the EMPEROR DON PEDRO II, and even less ceremonious. He had carried matter with high hand. By dismissing the Congress and establishing a state of siege, he contrasted in himself sovereign and executive authority. He further took upon himself to suppress the transmission of all news but that of which he was pleased to approve. For a time his assumption of dictatorship was recognized, but the recognition was of brief duration; and as we know, there is as little disposition on the part of the Brazilian people to submit to personal government of a President as of an Emperor. On Monday representative from the fleet stationed at Rio de Janeiro waited upon PRESIDENT FONSECA and requested him to resign. They gave him twenty-four hours to consider the demand. The game was up, and he had lost. It was hopeless to offer any resistance, and he wisely spared the city from the bombardment which was threatened by resignation at once. The Vice-President was immediately summoned, and was provisionally appointed his successor. The action of the Navy was fully confirmed by the will of the people, and the Republic has once more been accepted by all the provinces. The state of siege has been raised, the dismissal of the Congress has

been revoked, and is to reassemble on the 18th December, and proceed as though nothing had occurred. The administrative departments have been relieved from the veto placed upon their action by MARSHAL FONSECA, and trade has been resumed. We wish we could add that public confidence abroad as well as at home has been fully re-established. The course of events of late years in South-America has been too startling to justify the assumption that the revolutionary fever has exhausted itself. For the moment in Brazil, as in the Argentine Republic and in Chile, order prevails, and that is all that it can be said. The financial difficulty, unhappily, remains in an exaggerated form; and so far as the present affords the means for forecasting the future, the political revolution will be followed by a financial revolution scarcely less disastrous. The Argentine Republic has sunk deeper and deeper into a state of insolvency, which has really become hopeless. Chile has virtually an empty exchequer out of which to pay the cost of the late war; and Brazil is notoriously on the verge of bankruptcy. It is not a pleasant look-out, and until the financial position can be improved, there is little prospect of the revival of trade and commerce.

13. *The Leeds Mercury*, 28 de novembro

A mudança ocorreu sem derramamento de sangue e muita gente parece satisfeita com a queda de Deodoro.

Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca has not had a long reign as President of the Republic of Brazil. It is only two years since his predecessor, Dom Pedro, was

deposed, the object of the revolutionists at the time being to introduce the Republican form of government in place of a Monarchy, which was deemed unsuited of the New World. As in this instance, so in this, the revolution has been carried out without serious bloodshed. The first indication of the movement against Fonseca was the cutting of a railway last Saturday night. Next morning the navy was in open revolt, and a deputation of officers waited upon the President, and, informing him that certain recent dictatorial proceedings on his part had created dissatisfaction, intimated that if he did not immediately resign, he would have to take consequences. The Dictator was not prepared to resist, and he promptly issued a manifesto, stating that in order to avert civil war, he handed over the Presidential power to General Floriano Peixoto, Vice-President of the Confederation. Peixoto was the chief of the Provisional Government after the overthrow of the Empire, and Minister of War prior the reconstruction of the Cabinet last January. The revolution produced a panic in Rio de Janeiro, and there was some rioting, but the disturbances did not last long, and grate satisfaction is said to be felt throughout the Republic that Fonseca has been turned out.

14. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 28 de novembro

It is rumoured that, under the new order of things in Brazil, the capital will be removed from Rio de Janeiro to a town on the opposite side of the bay.

15. «Brazil», *Reynolds Newspaper*, 29 de novembro

A ditadura de Fonseca, que quis imitar Balmaceda, foi deposta sem derramar sangue, quase pacificamente, e isso deve ter irritado os reacionários ingleses que pensam que as repúblicas não podem durar e que os povos «só estão aptos» para serem comandados por «um rei ou por um imperador», escreve em tom sarcástico o editorialista britânico.

O mesmo vê naturalmente como positivas as derrotas de Balmaceda e de Fonseca: isso traz esperança para o futuro do subcontinente que será florescente.

The Reactionists at home will be very angry at what has taken place in Brazil. They were chuckling among themselves at the supposed inevitable tendency of every South American Republic to slide into Empire, controlled by some self-constituted "saviour of society." And they were getting ready to tell us how impossible it is for Republics to endure – how the people are only fit to be saddled, and bridled, and ridden by some king or emperor. All the usual platitudes about the "many-headed mob" and the development of military rule on the ruins of Republican institutions were being concocted. And now the Brazilian have upset all these nice little schemes by righting themselves after their crisis with an ease which most monarchical countries might well envy. So long as news from Brazil was vague and contradictory, we said nothing, for we felt that European critics were not in a position to utter anything worth listening to, seeing that they were really ignorant of the true facts. Now, however, it is perfectly plain that what was done by Balmaceda in Chile, was attempted by Fonseca in Brazil. The President tried to set himself above the

law and to governs with something like arbitrary power. Happily this highhanded procedure has been quickly suppressed without that destructive civil war which had so greatly injured Chile. Here and there a few signs of turbulence manifested themselves, but on the whole general peace has reigned, far greater peace than would have obtained in any European monarchy had the monarch been removed. And now the Brazilians have rid themselves of their temporary dictator, and a new Republican Ministry is installed in office. Fonseca, the would-be imitator of Balmaceda, relied upon the army to support his designs, but the army failed him, preferring a solid alliance with the people. The whole affair was as bloodless and quiet as the Brazilian Revolution itself of two years ago. This is, on the whole, a happy augury for the future of the vast continent of America, which, with the exception of the British colonies, is now entirely Republican from Behring's Strait to Cape Horn. The great curse of South America in the past has been the military *pronunciamento*; but now that Balmaceda in Chile and Fonseca in Brazil have been taught so thorough a lesson by the representative of the people, it may be hoped that in future the progress of the South American Republics may be more peaceful and orderly than in the past. Few of us realize what a vast future is in store for South America, which may be filled up with population, and flourishing with a mighty commerce, when Europe is almost "played out." The whole world, therefore, is interested in the welfare of the Republics of South America.

16. *The Liverpool Mercury*, 30 de novembroβπ

O jornalista de Liverpool espera que, com o fim da crise, as trocas comerciais entre a Europa e o Brasil sejam de novo prósperas

It has not been generally noticed that the fall of President Fonseca in Brasil obviates the necessity for a general election in that country. Fonseca's successor, Floriano Peixoto, has by proclamation annulled the decree dissolving the Congress, and therefore Parliament can meet again and proceed with its constitutional business as if nothing had happened. General Fonseca is thanked for his timely surrender of powers which, had he clung to them, would have caused bloodshed. The probability is that Fonseca would have maintained his arbitrary position if the armed forces had remained faithful to him. But he perceived that they were no nor likely to tolerate his dictatorship than they would be to restore the Emperor, and he knew how to bow to compulsion with the air of a constitutionalist. He has not only resigned the presidentship, but his command in the army as well, so that at this moment he is simply an ordinary citizen of the republic. His successor feels confident that by maintaining internal order, cultivating amicable relations with all foreign nations, fostering domestic industries, and reforming the banking system, he will be enable to raise the credit of the country and appreciate its currency in international exchange., The principal interest of Europe in the affairs of Brazil is commercial, and it is to be hoped that the crises now happily over will lead to a healthy revival of business.

17. «Affairs in Brazil», *The Dundee Courier*, 30 de novembro

Comentário muito optimista do quotidiano de Dundee, que acolhe com satisfação a queda do «tirano insensato Almirante da Fonseca» que, felizmente, continua vivo. Apesar de tudo, nota o jornal, «o crédito do país» não foi, no essencial, prejudicado.

Judging from the turn affairs have taken in Brazil, it would seem that popular sentiment is more strongly favourable to a republic than it was imagined. The overtures made on behalf of Dom Pedro have not had the slightest effect upon the situation, and Marshal da Fonseca, the foolish and tyrannically inclined President, has been quietly supplanted by General Peixoto, who promises, in the capacity of President, to govern the country in a fashion that will commend itself to the people. He has in view, among other reforms, the reduction of the national expenses, in order that the credit of the Republic may be re-established. It is noteworthy that, notwithstanding that has occurred in Brazil, the credit of the country has not been vitally impaired. In British financial circles a good deal of confidence is still manifested in Brazilian securities, and that confidence will be strengthened by the orderly and strictly constitutional manner in which matters have been arranged during the past week or two. It is also gratifying to learn that, notwithstanding the misconduct of the ex-President, the military tribunal before which he was arraigned has determined to protect his life.

18. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 30 de novembro

Afortunadamente, nota o editorialista de Birmingham, o novo governo e a Junta de Rio Grande chegaram a um acordo para o posto de governador, embora seja demasiado cedo para «supor que todas as dificuldades foram afastadas».

No que diz respeito a Floriano Peixoto, o seu manifesto é «grandiloquente e caloroso», escreve o jornal, que prefere julgar o novo presidente não pelas promessas que faz, mas, pela sua atuação e capacidade em recuperar a riqueza perdida do Brasil.

It is satisfactory to learn that the last serious obstacle to the pacification of Brazil has been removed without bloodshed by the formal recognition of the *de facto* Government or Junta of the important southern province of Rio Grande. Up to Friday last it looked very much as though nothing had been gained by the deposition of the Dictator DA FONSECA but a change of regime. The provincial authorities of Rio Grande refused to accept the substitution of General PEIXOTO for Marshal DA FONSECA as a satisfactory settlement of the matters in dispute, although the new President formally announced his adhesion to Constitutional rule, and promised that Congress should be invited to renew its deliberations forthwith. And this distrust of the new order of things was not diminished by the demand of the PEIXOTO Cabinet that the Junta of Rio Grande should be dissolved, and the old Government reinstalled in office. On the receipt of this notification, the Junta at once stopped the disbanding of the levies raised for the purpose of the revolution, and announced its intention of resisting the reactionary requirements of the Presidential authorities. For

the moment indeed it looked as though the civil war, which the arbitrary conduct of the former President had so nearly provoked, had been not averted, but simply postponed. Fortunately the Government has recognised the danger, if not the injustice, of reinstalling the creature of the ex-Dictator in the offices from which they have been so justly expelled by the revolutionary Junta. If such a hard measure had been imposed upon the province it would have been equivalent to a vindication of the conduct of the deposed authorities in supporting the Dictator's unconstitutional actions, and placing themselves in opposition to the will of the people, and it must inevitably have led to retaliation and strife between the government of the province and the leaders of the recent revolutionary movement, to whose independence and public spirit the overthrow of the Dictatorship is due. Now, that the censorship on Brazilian news is lifted, it is only too evident that the attitude of Rio Grande do Sul towards General DA FONSECA had the moral approval, if not the active support, of several other States of the Union, including Para and Bahia, which have since deposed their Governors for their servility to their regime of Marshal DA FONSECA. Even if Rio Grande, therefore, had been willing to stultify itself at the bidding of the new Government by taking back its old State officials, the breach would in all probability have continued open in other provinces where equally advanced views of public rights prevailed. By the confirmation of Dr. ASSIS BRASIL in the Governorship of Rio Grande, fortunately all danger of further conflict is averted; but it would evidently be premature at present to assume that all the difficulties are at an end, and that the Congress will necessarily endorse in every particular the policy of the new Government. Even the very

liberal terms accorded to the ex-Dictator are not unlikely to give rise to keen discussion. In his newly published Presidential manifesto, General PEIXOTO lays stress upon patriotism and self-denial displayed by his predecessor in surrendering the reins of Government rather than to provoke civil war; but it is at least a moot point selfish prudential considerations. In order to resist the revolutionary movement in Rio Grande he must have depended in the first place upon the army and the navy, but the leaders of those services gave him plainly to understand that he must not count upon their support if he persisted further in opposing the national will. His surrender, therefore, was an act of self-preservation rather than self-denial, and he yielded to consideration not of patriotism, but of stern necessity. Under such circumstances it would not be surprising if the first act of the Congress were to impeach the President for his violation of Constitutional rule, and the heavy sacrifices which his obstinacy and incompetency inflicted upon the trade and industry and credit of the country. We are by no means sure either that the new President will prove any wiser or more public-spirited than Marshal DA FONSECA. His manifesto is a grandiloquent and effusive document, which does not say much for the sagacity of its author, though it may perhaps suit the Brazilian market. It contains plenty of complimentary phrases for the army and navy, "the heroic State of Rio Grande," the magnanimity of the ex-Dictator, and the grandeur of the "immortal movement of the 15th of November 1889", or, in other words, the successful conspiracy which resulted in the deposition and expatriation of the venerable Emperor, but very little in the way of definite pledges of reform. But on any case we should prefer to judge the new President by his performances

rather than by his promises, and if he has the will and capacity to raise the fallen fortune of his country we shall no have long to wait for results.

19. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 30 de novembro

The new President of Brazil has issued another manifesto, in which he appeals to the country to cease all further revolution.

Periódicos consultados

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Birmingham Daily Post, The
Daily News, The (Londres)
Dundee Courier, The
Freemen's Journal (Dublin)
Glasgow Herald, The
Leeds Mercury, The
Liverpool Mercury, The
Manchester Gardian, The
Morning Post, The (Londres)
Northern Echo (Dalington)
Pall Mall Gazette, The (Londres)
Reynolds Newspaper (Londres)
Standard, The (Londres)
Times, The (Londres)

Résumé en français

Dans deux volumes de cette collection, nous avons présenté les analyses de la presse francophone et étatsunienne sur la crise politique brésilienne de novembre 1891²¹. Ce troisième livre est consacré aux regards portés par quinze quotidiens britanniques sur les mêmes événements.

Dans les premiers jours qui suivent la proclamation de l'état de siège par da Fonseca, la presse de l'autre côté de la Manche, relativement surprise par le coup de force du maréchal, concentre ses analyses sur deux points : d'une part, elle étudie les aspects juridiques pour essayer de comprendre quels sont les pouvoirs accordés par la constitution brésilienne, respectivement, au Parlement et au chef de l'exécutif ; d'autre part, elle publie plusieurs articles consacrés à la crise financière, au recours illimité à la planche à billets et à l'inflation galopante.

Même si certains commentateurs font de brèves allusions au retour de la famille Bragance, la majorité d'entre eux est formelle : si, deux ans auparavant, le peuple n'a même pas bougé le petit doigt pour défendre l'empereur détrôné, personne ne songera à soutenir une hypothétique tentative de la part de son petit-fils. Par ailleurs, tous affirment que ce virage autoritaire est extrêmement

²¹ MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa francófona*. Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020. (Coleção documentos, n° 27).
MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa norte-americana*. Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020. (Coleção documentos, n° 28)

négatif pour l'image du Brésil, pour ses exportations, pour les commerçants anglais et pour les titres brésiliens cotés en bourse.

Les quotidiens britanniques critiquent durement le manque d'information, les dépêches contradictoires, les méthodes répressives de Deodoro, qui ne pense qu'à ses intérêts et à ceux de sa famille. Ils ironisent sur le rôle de la censure dans un pays où, selon les sources officielles, tout est calme et sous contrôle. Ils mettent également en évidence que l'écrasante majorité de la population n'est pas instruite et peut, par conséquent, être facilement manipulée.

Plusieurs analystes se penchent sur les révoltes dans quelques états. À la première place et objet de nombreux articles, le Rio Grande do Sul, considéré comme le plus riche et le plus développé. Si quelques-uns semblent croire à un éclatement du territoire de l'ancienne colonie portugaise, d'autres, comme l'éditorialiste du *Times*, écrivent que cela n'arrivera jamais et préfèrent parler d'autonomie.

Malgré les nombreuses attaques de la part des quotidiens américains contre les Anglais qu'ils accusent de mener une campagne contre le Traité commercial entre les Etats-Unis et le Brésil, la presse britannique n'aborde pratiquement pas cette question. Nous avons trouvé une seule et brève allusion à cette problématique : le 20 novembre, *The Manchester Guardian* estime que, avec ce Traité entré en vigueur le 5 février, le Brésil est plutôt perdant.

Les journalistes britanniques se réjouissent du départ du dictateur et que sa chute ait eu lieu avec relativement peu de remous et de violence. En outre, ils considèrent que la défaite du maréchal est positive parce qu'elle prouve que, en Amérique Latine, il n'y a pas de place pour les dictateurs.

Cependant, les problèmes subsistent. Les plus pessimistes écrivent que le pays est au bord de la faillite et dans une situation pour le moins confuse ; un éditorialiste prévoit même une guerre civile. D'autres, plus optimistes, notent que les titres brésiliens sont en train de récupérer une partie du terrain perdu pendant la dictature de Deodoro et croient en une reprise de l'activité économique et des échanges commerciaux. Tous déplorent l'absence d'une classe dirigeante à la hauteur des défis qui attendent le Brésil et qui rassurerait tous les Européens qui ont investi dans le pays.

Relevons enfin la prudence des éditorialistes britanniques lorsqu'ils parlent, au même titre que leurs collègues américains, de Floriano Peixoto, le nouveau président : ils préfèrent attendre et le juger sur la base de ses réalisations.



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CRISIS IN BRAZIL MARTIAL LAW PROCLAIMED.

(REUTER'S TELEGRAMS.)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 4.
Congress has been dissolved, martial law has
been proclaimed, and a dictatorship re-established.

SECOND EDITION.

FOREIGN TELEGRAMS.

MANCHESTER, THURSDAY MORNING, Nov. 5.

(REUTER'S TELEGRAMS.)

COUP D'ETAT IN BRAZIL.

PROCLAMATION OF A DICTATORSHIP.

RIO DE JANEIRO, WEDNESDAY.

Congress has been dissolved.

Martial law has been proclaimed, and a dictator-
ship established.

MARTIAL LAW IN BRAZIL

RIO DE JANEIRO, Wednesday. —The Congress has
been dissolved. Martial law has been proclaimed,
and a dictatorship established.

THE REVOLT IN BRAZIL.

DOWNFALL OF MARSHAL
FONSECA.

RIOTING IN RIO DE JANEIRO.

INSURRECTION AT RIO DE
JANEIRO.

DOWNFALL OF MARSHAL
FONSECA.



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