


VIEW OF THE CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO FROM NICTHEROY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE BAY



ADMIRAL DI MELLO  
The instigator of the revolt against President Peixoto



PRESIDENT PEIXOTO  
Against whom the revolution in Brazil is directed



Coleção  
Documentos

43

# A 2.<sup>a</sup> REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA BRITÂNICA

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# **A 2ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA BRITÂNICA**





DIRECTORA: MARÍLIA PULQUÉRIO FUTRE PINHEIRO



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# A 2ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA BRITÂNICA



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**O autor:**

Reto Monico nasceu em 1953 na Suíça italiana. Em 1977, licenciou-se em História na Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Genebra. Doutorou-se em 2003 com a tese *Suisse-Portugal: regards croisés (1890-1930)*, publicada em 2005. Nos seus trabalhos, analisa sobretudo a imagem dada pela imprensa internacional e pela diplomacia suíça sobre aspectos e acontecimentos da História contemporânea de Portugal e do Brasil. Nesta coleção, publicou em 2020 uma trilogia sobre o Golpe de Deodoro da Fonseca em novembro de 1891 visto pela imprensa internacional. (Cf. n<sup>os</sup> 27, 28 e 36)



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## Apresentação

A imprensa britânica debruça-se com uma certa frequência sobre o que se passa durante estes seis meses no porto carioca, com telegramas, resumos de agências telegráficas, cartas de leitores que censuram Peixoto e outras que o defendem, relatos dos correspondentes no Brasil, comentários e editoriais. Encontra-se também as perguntas feitas, no Parlamento de Londres, ao Governo da Rainha Vitória sobre a sua atitude perante o bloqueio da baía do Rio de Janeiro e o que faz concretamente para defender os interesses dos comerciantes ingleses, prejudicados por essa guerra civil.

Se, como já vimos<sup>1</sup>, os analistas norte-americanos estão, na sua esmagadora maioria, do lado do Governo brasileiro e contra qualquer veleidade de restaurar o regime imperial, os jornais analisados neste volume podem-se dividir em duas tendências principais: por um lado, os que apoiam, quase sem reservas, o movimento insurreccional, um regresso da monarquia e que atacam duramente Floriano Peixoto; por outro lado, os que têm uma opinião mais matizada. Estes não hesitam em criticar os rebeldes e não censuram sistematicamente o executivo do Rio de Janeiro. Tal como os seus colegas do outro lado do Atlântico, todos lamentam que as informações que chegam às

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. MONICO, Reto. *A 2ª Revolta da Armada na imprensa americana. Vol. I e Vol. II*, Lisboa-Rio Grande: Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2021. (Coleção Documentos, n. 42)

redações são parciais, duvidosas, fragmentárias e muitas vezes de pura propaganda, o que não permite uma visão completa e realista da situação.

Esta falta de notícias fidedignas pode explicar, pelo menos parcialmente, esta diferença de opinião no que diz respeito ao desenrolar dos acontecimentos: realçam o facto dos rebeldes estarem em boas condições, com cada vez mais apoios para ganhar o conflito, perante um governo que está a ir de mal a pior. Chegam mesmo a escrever que Peixoto – funcionário intrigante, corrupto, teimoso, que está a conduzir uma batalha perdida – já não é dono da capital. Para estes jornais, a vitória de Custódio de Melo – homem capaz, experiente e ambicioso – é simplesmente uma questão de tempo e só uma intervenção das Grandes Potências poderia salvar o Marechal de Ferro.

Outros periódicos, pelo contrário, notam que a posição do Presidente não está tão débil como parece. Honesto e forte, tem o apoio do Exército e do legislativo e não agiu como um tirano: por conseguinte, tem todo o direito de ficar no poder até o fim do mandato em novembro de 1894. As mesmas fontes consideram que a posição de Custódio de Melo e depois de Saldanha da Gama é difícil: não têm a possibilidade de efetuar um desembarque e Peixoto está a comprar uma nova frota nos Estados Unidos. Alguns põem em questão a legitimidade e os motivos da revolta e sublinham que os resultados obtidos são irrisórios.

Entre os jornais menos favoráveis à insurreição, um número significativo considera que os dois rivais parecem fracos ou, pelo menos, de força igual. Não há nenhum facto militarmente marcante: dos dois lados mantém-se uma

política de expectativa e, por conseguinte, o conflito não parece ter fim à vista. Para estes analistas, há muita violência nos discursos, mas, na realidade, as perdas humanas e os estragos materiais são pouco importantes. Todos admitem que estas batalhas incruentas perturbam os negócios e paralisam a atividade comercial. Floriano Peixoto e os chefes da revolta podiam resolver os problemas a través de eleições e de uma arbitragem, em vez de continuar a luta suicida.

Vários jornalistas constataam que, depois da queda de D. Pedro, o Brasil entrou numa fase de grande instabilidade, de anarquia, de desordens, de violência política. Os mesmos realçam logicamente a figura de D. Pedro II, o imperador filósofo, homem respeitável, honesto, brilhante e amável, substituído por ditadores: na realidade, são o Exército e a Marinha que detêm o poder, num país que corre o risco de se desmembrar. Por outras palavras, a República foi um presente envenenado e o Brasil tornou-se um terreno de caça de aventureiros gananciosos que querem só o interesse pessoal e o dos seus parentes e amigos.

A eventualidade de uma restauração monárquica recebe o apoio de uma curta maioria dos observadores britânicos. Alguns julgam que o país, cansado do novo regime, precisa de um líder forte para evitar a fragmentação do Brasil, e têm a certeza que o filho da princesa Isabel será proclamado imperador. Alguns quotidianos pensam que os Bragança não tencionam, por enquanto, regressar ao passado, também porque não dispõem desse homem providencial.

Dois diários chegam mesmo a propor que seja um príncipe alemão a ocupar o trono abandonado em novembro de 1889!

Uma minoria dos analistas admite todavia que a república ocupa o terreno, que os rebeldes estão muito longe de ganhar a guerra civil e que, do lado monárquico, não há nenhum candidato sério que tenha o perfil para ocupar o cargo. Não será nada simples mudar de regime também porque terá de ultrapassar um grande obstáculo, a firme oposição dos Estados Unidos.

Quanto ao papel das Grandes Potências, os avisos divergem. Se uma parte dos editorialistas deseja que as frotas estrangeiras intervenham para pôr um termo a este conflito que prejudica os interesses comerciais, nomeadamente britânicos, outros opinam que os comandantes desses navios só podem atuar para proteger os interesses dos seus concidadãos, sem favorecer um dos dois rivais. Do ponto de vista humanitário, as pressões exercidas sobre o Almirante de Melo para que renuncie a bombardear a capital é sem dúvida louvável, afirmam os que se opõem ao uso da força militar por parte dos navios estrangeiros. Porém, ao mesmo tempo, estes afirmam que não se deve intervir nos assuntos internos brasileiros, mesmo tendo como objetivo a proteção dos residentes estrangeiros e dos seus bens

O incidente de 29 de janeiro de 1894 entre os rebeldes e a frota americana e que resultou na inevitável capitulação de Saldanha da Gama perante o Almirante Benham é comentado pelos principais jornais britânicos, mais apreensivos que os seus colegas do outro lado do Atlântico. Os jornais apresentados neste volume preocupam-se com o que se passou no porto

carioca. Conscientes que a derrota de da Gama perante a poderosa frota americana conseguiu quebrar o bloqueio do porto e enfraquecer os rebeldes, analisam o sucedido, ironizando, por vezes, sobre a ação do comandante americano, cansado de estar à espera. Interrogam-se se este episódio não significa uma interferência direta de Washington nos assuntos internos brasileiros, para evitar nomeadamente um regresso da monarquia. Perguntam-se também se, agora, os outros poderão fazer o mesmo, sem que estas eventuais iniciativas por parte dos comandantes europeus no Rio sejam consideradas como uma violação da doutrina Monroe. *The Graphic* pensa que a luta de Saldanha da Gama irá continuar. De opinião diametralmente oposta é *The Newcastle Weekly Courant*, que censura o comandante da frota rebelde de ter perdido uma ocasião para pôr um ponto final nesta «deplorável guerra civil».

Logicamente, a imprensa anglo-saxónica toma em conta os interesses comerciais britânicos, lesados por esta interminável guerra civil. Lamentam a situação muito complicada na qual se encontram os seus navios de comércio perante a quase paralisação das suas atividades. Criticam o governo de Londres e a pequena frota de guerra no Rio de não conseguir lidar com a situação. Atacam o ministro Lord Rosebery pela falta de apoio aos seus mercantes. Esperam dele que dê um murro na mesa, com já fizeram os alemães e os americanos, e que aja rapidamente, deixando de lado o princípio da estrita neutralidade. O Brasil é muito importante: com efeito, quase metade das suas importações provém da Grã-Bretanha. Por conseguinte, o que interessa, no fundo, é a paz, a estabilidade política, e não o tipo de regime.

Em meado de março de 1894, Saldanha e os seus oficiais fogem a bordo de uma corveta portuguesa, abandonando a luta. Alguns jornais, como os londrinos *The Times* e *The Pall Mall Gazette*, têm muitas dificuldades em reconhecer a derrota da «baleia» da Gama perante o «elefante» Peixoto. O primeiro acusa o chefe do executivo do Rio de se querer vingar; o segundo recrimina os americanos de terem feito a guerra a cidadãos de uma nação amiga. Outros continuam a não perceber as motivações profundas dos insurretos, dos quais já não querem ouvir falar, e, sem lamentar o insucesso da causa monárquica, congratulam-se pelo fim desta guerra louca e sem sentido, uma ótima notícia para os comerciantes ingleses e para os que investiram, nomeadamente na indústria cafeeira. Reparar-se-á que, nos cerca de 150 textos transcritos neste livro, a palavra café aparece só três vezes, número que temos de comparar com as cerca de trinta alusões feitas a esta matéria prima nos dois volumes sobre a imprensa norte-americana acima citados.

Mencionemos, por terminar, entre os vários documentos inseridos neste volume, os longos artigos escritos pelo correspondente de *The Times* no Brasil de outubro de 1893 até março de 1894. O jornalista inglês, apesar de nunca esconder a sua simpatia pelos revoltosos e de não poupar críticas a Floriano Peixoto, é um importante testemunho ocular de vários acontecimentos. Relata, entre outros, a ação dos navios das Grandes Potências, alguns combates (por exemplo, a tomada da Ilha de Mocangué e da Ilha do Governador), a explosão do depósito de munições, o afundamento do *Javari*, os duelos de artilharias sem nenhum resultado tangível, a falta de pontaria dos dois lados. Fala da vida

quotidiana no Rio, em Niterói e também a bordo dos navios rebeldes. Entrevista Custódio de Melo em novembro e duas vezes Saldanha da Gama. Resume, entre outros, o confronto verbal que este teve com o Almirante Benham a 23 de janeiro, durante a qual o comandante da frota americana, segundo o relato feito pelo chefe dos rebeldes brasileiros, perdeu a calma. Afirmou que iria assegurar a total proteção da atividade comercial e garantir o desembarque de material bélico para o governo, utilizando a força se for preciso.

O jornalista sai da capital a 21 de fevereiro de 1894 a bordo do *Aquidabã* rumo a Desterro onde entrevista o General Federalista Gumercindo da Silva. Envia o último artigo de Montevideu a 20 de março, no qual escreve que a derrota no porto carioca é «uma grande perda para a revolução, mas que não vai impedir a continuação da guerra civil»<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> Uma análise mais aprofundada destes documentos será apresentada no volume *Olhares francófonos sobre a 2ª Revolta da Armada*, previsto para 2022 nesta mesma coleção.

# Sumário

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1. «Revolution in Brazil. The Porto of Rio Blocked»,  
*The Morning Post*, 8 de setembro

*Estes são os primeiros telegramas que se referem à revolta no porto carioca encontrados na imprensa britânica. The Daily News e The Leeds Mercury, entre outros, publicam os mesmos despachos, também a 8 de setembro.*

[REUTER'S TELEGRAMS]

BUENOS AIRES, SEPT. 6.

Advices from Rio de Janeiro published here report that three vessels of the Brazilian squadron have revolted against the Government and called upon the latter to resign. The Government has refused to yield.

It is added that the garrison of the fortress of Santa Cruz remains faithful to the Government and is prepared, if necessary, to open fire on three vessels and sink them.

BUENOS AIRES, SEPT. 7.

According to later news from Rio de Janeiro, the revolutionary movement against the government is headed by Admiral Custodio de Melo. The insurgent vessels are the turret-ship *Aquidaban*, the cruiser *Republica* and *Trajano*, and four torpedo boats. Marshal Peixoto, the President, is reported to have proclaimed himself Dictator.

ROME, SEPT. 7.

A despatch from Rio de Janeiro of today's date announces that the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs has informed the foreign representatives in the capital that the squadron has revolted against the Government which, however, feels itself strong enough to maintain public order, but cannot prevent any attempt to bombard Rio de Janeiro.

The Italian cruiser *Bausan* has arrived at Rio, and the cruiser *Dogali*, of the Italian Navy, leaves Bahia at once for the Brazilian Capital.

NEW YORK, SEPT. 7.

The *Herald's* Correspondent at Montevideo telegraphs that the officers in command of the squadron now lying off Rio de Janeiro have, through Admiral Custodio José de Melo, intimated to President Peixoto that he should resign.

The squadron consists of the cruisers *Aquidaban*, *República*, and *Trajano*, and three torpedo boats.

The garrison of Santa Cruz, which remains loyal to President Peixoto, is under fighting orders, and is awaiting an attack on the fort by the squadron. In the meantime, the port of Rio de Janeiro has been blocked.

It appears that President Peixoto vetoed a Bill which rendered it impossible for the Vice-President to succeed to the Presidency. This action on the part of Marshal Peixoto enraged the Naval officers, and it is to this cause that the revolt is attributed.

All communication with Rio has been prohibited by the Government, although it is believed that this measure is only of a temporary character. In the meantime, telegraphic messages intended for Uruguay or Argentina, *via* Lisbon will be accepted for transmission through Brazil, although they will be subjected to a close scrutiny, and will consequently be delayed.

The City of Rio is said to be in a state of great alarm, the naval squadron having demanded the resignation of the Government.

Advices have been received from Rivera stating that a great battle has been taken place between the revolutionists in Rio Grande do Sul, under Savana, and the Government troops under General Portugal, and the General Castilho, the Governor of the Province, has ordered all available troops to proceed in active pursuit of the revolutionists. Details of the fighting have not yet come to hand.

## 2. *The Standard*, 8 de setembro

*Este primeiro comentário publicado na imprensa inglesa sobre o início da revolta da Marinha sublinha que se trata de algo mais sério. Considera muito alta a probabilidade de uma guerra civil entre Peixoto – que apoda de funcionário «teimoso» – e o Exército de um lado, a Marinha, ou uma parte dela, do outro. Por enquanto, os revoltosos podem bombardear a capital, mas não estão em condições de bloquear o porto: dessa forma, eles não podem «forçar a mão do Presidente».*

*Acusa o Exército e a Marinha de quererem ter o mesmo papel que tiveram «a Guarda Pretoriana no Império Romano, os Janizaros em Argel, os Mamelucos no Egito». Esta luta entre as duas instituições das Forças*

*Armadas, sem esquecer as revoltas nos estados, provoca «uma alternância de anarquia e de despotismo», lamenta o jornal londrino, segundo o qual tudo começou «poucos meses depois do destronamento de D. Pedro».*

*O Brasil vivia muito melhor durante o Império, conclui o jornal, que, no entanto, termina com uma nota de optimismo: estes distúrbios e insurreições vão acabar, «e quem sabe se, um dia, um grande e poderoso Estado não irá surgir do fervilhante caldeirão da política sul-americana».*

According to the telegrams from Brazil which we print this morning, the Republic is on the eve of a Revolution more serious than either of the two which it has witnessed within the last four years. President Peixoto in 1891 ousted Marshal Fonseca, who was suspected of wishing to play the Dictator, and is now himself accused of similar designs. He has vetoed a Bill rendering it impossible for a Vice President to succeed to the Chief Magistracy, and the Navy has, for some reason, resented this exercise of his undoubted prerogative. The officers and crews of the Squadron – consisting of one turret-ship, two cruisers, and three of four torpedo-boats – now laying in Rio de Janeiro harbour have, under the leadership of Admiral CUSTODIO DE MELO, revolted against the Government, and called upon it to resign. The authorities – or at least the Party in office at the hour when the telegrams were despatched – profess to be confident in their ability to preserve order, the garrison of Fort Santa Cruz still remaining loyal. But if the rebellious ironclads choose to bombard the city, it will be impossible to prevent them. For the present, however, the vessels have taken up a position enabling them to blockade the port, so as to force the PRESIDENT'S hands. That functionary is, nevertheless, reported as “stubborn” and prepared to resist; he is even said to have formally

declared himself Dictator, an act which would to some extent justify the attitude of the Navy. Should the Army take one side and the Navy another, or one section of the Fleet side with the Government and another act against it, civil war is certain. Moreover, as usual happens, the rebellion is likely to extend, with the result that whichever Party crushes the other, the leader of the victorious faction will be virtually Dictator. The curse of all these Republics in the repeated attempts on the part of the Army or Navy – if a Navy exists – to play the same *role* in the State as the Pretorian Guard did in the Roman Empire, the Janissaries in Algiers, and the Mamelukes in Egypt. And once the effort is successful, the Government becomes simply an armed despotism. It was Marshal FONSECA's popularity with the Army which enabled that faithless soldier to displace his Imperial master, and it was the loss of it which made it possible for Marshal PEIXOTO to oust him from office before he has enjoyed the reward of his treachery for more than a couple of years. The Navy, it seems, is now trying to shoe its power in politics. If successful – and we may be sure the revolt is no sudden impulse – the head of the new Revolution will make it his interest to pamper the sailors, just as his predecessors pandered to the soldiers. The result will be an alternation of anarchy and despotism. Indeed, within a few months of the dethronement of DOM PEDRO, during whose reign Brazil enjoyed a quietude unusual for a South American State, civil war began, and, in spite of bold official denials, has continued, with short intermissions, ever since. There was a rebellion in Mato Grosso so determined that the State declared itself independent, under the title of the "Republica Transatlantica"; and the embers of revolt are still smouldering. The Province of Rio Grande do

Sul, as will be seen from our telegrams, is still unpacified, and within the last few months the rebellion there has been obtaining greater and greater support. Even Santa Cruz, on the loyalty of the garrison of which President PEIXOTO depends, was not at peace last year, the convicts having imitated their countrymen at large by trying their luck at mutiny. So serious was the outlook at that date, that, before rising, the Legislature granted the PRESIDENT unlimited powers, which were soon exercised in the suppression of an outbreak in Ceara, and still later by proclaiming a state of siege, necessitated by the discovery of a plot in favour of Marshal FONSECA. In short, the latter state of Brazil is worse than the first, the Republic than the Empire. Constitutional Government has never been more than a farce – a something provided for in print, but so seldom exercised that the people have had little opportunity of comparing its merits with the mild rule of DOM PEDRO, whose only fault was that he was too cultured a Sovereign for subjects so unappreciative. The worst of the outlook is that the revolts, of which there have been so many, are likely to increase. Provincial Governors, separated from the capital by vast stretches of forest, will consider whether they, too, cannot imitate their friends in Rio, who become Presidents and Ministers and Marshals with such startling rapidity, and retire – so the gossip of the capital affirms – well enriched by their services to the Republic. No doubt, all these uprisings and disturbances are working to an end, and who can tell but that some day a great and powerful State may emerge from the seething cauldron of South American politics.

### 3. *The Morning Post*, 9 de setembro

*O jornalista tenta perceber porque razão Peixoto vetou a lei do Parlamento: trata-se provavelmente de garantir que o futuro chefe de Estado pertença à mesma tendência política. No entanto, interroga-se porque isso provocou uma reação da Marinha e não «do Exército ou da população civil».*

*Agora, acrescenta, vai haver confrontos entre os navios rebeldes que querem bombardear a cidade e as tropas governativas que vão disparar sobre a frota. Entre os dois inimigos, os navios de guerra das grandes potências querem evitar que o Rio de Janeiro seja bombardeado.*

*Tudo isso é muito negativo para a república brasileira, que tem também de enfrentar as revoltas regionais, nomeadamente no Rio Grande do Sul. Porém, os brasileiros «vão colher o que plantaram», avisa o jornalista. Com efeito, «decidiram empurrar o seu brilhante e amável soberano de uma maneira, talvez, sem precedentes na história da ingratidão popular; e desde então viveram num estado de instabilidade, típico da América do Sul. Se o resultado final for o ruptura dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, as pessoas só poderão culpar a elas mesmas pelo desmembramento do seu país.»*

The news which reached this country on Thursday<sup>3</sup> of an insurrectionary movement on the part of the officers of the Brazilian squadron at Rio against the authority of President PEIXOTO is cause for regret rather than for surprise. It appears that the immediate reason of the revolt was the action of the PRESIDENT in exercising his constitutional right of veto in the case of a Bill which has been passed in order to render it illegal for any citizen who has filled the office of Vice-President of the Republic to hold Presidency. In the absence of precise information as to the significance of the President's

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<sup>3</sup> Trata-se de quinta-feira dia 7 de setembro, um dia depois do início da insurreição.




Fig. 1: «O porto do Rio bloqueado» (*The Morning Post*, 8 de setembro)



Fig. 2: «Evitado o bombardeamento do Rio» (*The Yorkshire Herald*, 9 de setembro)

exercise, in this particular case, of a technically constitutional prerogative of his office, one can only gather from the apparent probabilities of the situation what may be presumed to have been the intention of Marshal PEIXOTO. All the South American Republics bear a striking family resemblance to one another in respect to their constitutional methods of procedure, and there is no particular reason to expect any remarkable divergence on the part of the latest addition to their number. It has been customary in South American States for the President for the time being, on the Party who is running the President, to take steps to secure the reversion of the coveted office to some politician who can be depended upon to play the same game as the patriot whom he is to succeed. It is not improbable, therefore, that Marshal Peixoto has taken steps to provide in that manner for the future of his country after his own retirement from office. The Congress, however, had not, apparently, thought fit to take the same view of the case as the PRESIDENT, and has passed a Bill upon which Marshal PEIXOTO has placed the extinguisher of his Presidential veto. Such is the most plausible explanation of the President's behaviour, though why that behaviour should have incensed the Navy rather than the Army or the civil population of the capital is more than anyone can say who is not intimately acquainted with the working of public feeling at Rio. At first it seemed as if the vessels under Admiral MELO'S command would be able to exact obedience by means of the *ultima ratio* of a bombardment of the Brazilian capital. President PEIXOTO, however, seems to have been equal to the occasion. Fortified by the fidelity of his troops, he is reported to have proclaimed himself Dictator, and to have ordered the Artillery in garrison at the fortress of Santa Cruz, which

commands the harbour, to open fire upon the insurgent vessels as soon as they came within range. Furthermore, it is stated that the Admirals commanding the foreign warships in harbour have decided to prevent the threatened bombardment. Upon that course the foreign Admirals may be congratulated. It would never do for the interests of European residing at Rio to be injured more than is absolutely unavoidable on account of the quarrels between hostile political factions. The outlook, however, is distinctly unpromising for the future welfare of the United States of Brazil. The bond of federation which holds loosely together the component parts of the enormous country may not be very powerful for good. But it is, at all events, a check upon the multiplication of small independent States, each governed in accordance with Brazilian principles recognized in South America. It will be distinctly unfortunate if the news of the insurrection of the squadron at Rio encourages the supporters of the rebellion at Rio Grande do Sul, which has not yet been definitely quelled, to further efforts in the direction of independence. The Brazilian are, however, only reaping what they have sown. Before the Revolution of the 15<sup>th</sup> of November, 1889, they enjoyed a full measure of constitutional government under the mild sway of the late Emperor Dom Pedro. They chose to hustle their amiable and accomplished Sovereign out of his dominions in a manner which is, perhaps, unprecedented in the history of popular ingratitude; and they have been in a state of typical South American instability ever since. If the ultimate result is the disruption of the United States of Brazil people will have nobody but themselves to blame for the dismemberment of their country.

#### 4. *The Times*, 9 de setembro

*O jornal conservador pensa que esta revolução é mais séria do que as anteriores, pois a frota rebelde tem a possibilidade de bombardear a capital. No entanto, o forte de Santa Cruz, que controla a baía, está nas mãos das tropas governamentais.*

*O articulista faz uma comparação entre esta situação, com a marinha descontente de Floriano Peixoto, e aquela de novembro de 1891, com o mesmo corpo da Armada que ameaçou bombardear a cidade no caso de Deodoro da Fonseca recusasse de abandonar o poder. Na altura, Custódio de Melo estava no comando e colaborou com Peixoto pressionando Deodoro. Este deixou o poder, afirmou o próprio Peixoto, para o interesse to país.*

*Agora a história repete-se, escreve o articulista. «O que é que fará Peixoto? Vai agir consoante o seu manifesto de novembro de 1891, e imitar o brilhante exemplo do seu predecessor, evitando uma guerra civil e um derramamento de sangue, ou vai lutar?»*

They conduct their not infrequent revolutions in Brazil with such exemplary humanity, good taste, and politeness that the arrival of a portion of national fleet off the capital in a state of insurrection need not necessarily cause the general perturbation which such an event would justifiably arouse elsewhere. The incident, at first sight, looked rather serious for, the MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS informed the representatives of the Powers that the insurgent ships were in a position to throw shells into the city. But we learn today that the foreign Admirals, action on the initiative of their French colleague, have decided to prevent the threatened bombardment. According to a telegram from Buenos Aires, where they should be connoisseurs in revolution, it would seem

that this energetic foreign intervention was hardly necessary, for the fortress of Santa Cruz commands the hostile vessels, and is held by a garrison devoted to the existing Government. If the fortress is well placed and if it is armed with modern artillery which is tolerably well served, it should be able to sink the rebel ships before they could do much damage, even supposing that, contrary to all precedent, they intend real mischief. The fleet is not in itself very formidable. It consists of a single turret ship, two cruisers, and four torpedo boats, or, according to another account, of three cruisers and three torpedo boats. That is hardly the sort of force which undertakes to overthrow a well-established Government.

The point of interest, of course, is to know whether the Government of MARSHAL PEIXOTO happens to be well established or not. The fact that there has been miscellaneous fighting in Rio Grande do Sul for some months past is immaterial. There is generally fighting in Rio Grande do Sul, and, although the latest accounts from that region are vague, even for South American intelligence, still the assertion that there has been a battle, and that the Government of the Province has ordered all available troops "to proceed in active pursuit of the revolutionist" raises a slight presumption that he has not been annihilated. A graver matter is that the ships now threatening Rio de Janeiro are commanded by ADMIRAL CUSTODIO JOSÉ DE MELO, who has had some experience in the conduct of such matters before. The circumstances in which the sailor politician last found it desirable that he should intervene bore in some respects a curious resemblance to those which are said to exist at

present. It will be remembered that MARSHAL DEODORO DA FONSECA, the First President of the United States of Brazil, did not altogether realize all the expectations that had been formed of him. In November, 1889, he first appeared as saviour of his country, when he debauched the Imperial troops, seized the capital, arrested the Liberal Ministry, which had played into his hands, shipped off his Sovereign, DOM PEDRO II., to Europe at a few hours' notice, and proclaimed a provisional Government, of which he assumed, of course, the temporary direction with the amplest powers. The elections to the National Assembly were postponed in view of the disturbed condition of the country, and that body was not allowed to meet for many months. When it did meet its conduct wrung the heart of the PRESIDENT. It got to loggerheads with him, cavilled at his liberal notions about finance, and finally had the bad taste to insist on discussing a Bill fixing the responsibility of the President and the crimes for which he might be impeached. That was the last straw. PRESIDENT FONSECA scouted the measure, which he declared to be "false in principle" and "odious in that it was evidently passed against the actual PRESIDENT". After this outrage he felt that but one course remained to him. He took it with promptitude and proclaimed himself Dictator.

It is at this point that the situation in November, 1891, so closely resembles the situation in September 1893. A revolt broke out in Rio Grande do Sul, and nobody paid any particular attention to it. But ADMIRAL CUSTODIO DE MELO exchanged views with some brother sailors and with GENERAL FLORIANO PEIXOTO, who happened at that time to be Vice-President of the Republic under

PRESIDENT FONSECA, a dignity which he had earned, by the way, by leading over the Imperial troops of which he was the commander to the sided of the insurgents in November 1889. The result of these conferences was that the downfall of FONSECA was decreed. "ADMIRAL MELO – says the telegram describing the *coup d'État* which appeared in our columns at the time – then assumed the command of the turret-ship *Riachuelo*, the largest ship in the Brazilian Navy, and on Sunday night all the ships under his direction took up positions for an attack upon the town. On Monday morning, however, MARSHAL DEODORO DA FONSECA recognized the futility of resistance, and at 9 o'clock announced his resignation". GENERAL PEIXOTO felt it his duty to assume the Presidency forthwith, and immediately issued a manifesto, which has a peculiar interest in the president conjuncture. After a brief reference to the events of the 22<sup>nd</sup> and the 23<sup>rd</sup>, "preceded by a rising in the heroic State of Rio Grande do Sul", and after recording his approbation of the "civil act of the military classes of the country in support of the law, for which violence cannot be substituted", the new PRESIDENT expresses his warm admiration of the "self-denial and patriotism exhibited by the GENERALISSIMO MANUEL DEODORO DA FONSECA, in his resignation of power in order that civil contention and bloodshed might be avoided between Brazilians, as well as dissension between his companions in arms, the glorious factors in the immortal movement of the 15<sup>th</sup> November 1889". He adds that the aim of the *pronunciamento* was "to maintain the inviolability of the law, which in democratic communities", he sententiously adds, "is even more necessary as a check to political passions than under absolute Governments". Devotion to the Constitution, a thirst for

economic reform, and boundless gratitude to the performers in the “civil act”, which has induced his predecessor to judge discretion the better part of valour, fill the rest of document. It will be curious to observe how far it still represents the sentiments of the DICTATOR PEIXOTO, for Dictator, it is hardly necessary to say, he has now become. His term of office as President expires in a legal way in the middle of November, 1894. The Congress has been passing a law which appears to have altered the rights of Vice-Presidents to succeed to the Presidency. The PRESIDENT has vetoed the law, just as FONSECA vetoed that other objectionable project for trying unsatisfactory chief magistrates. The navy, or a part of it, is dissatisfied now as it was dissatisfied then. ADMIRAL MELO has again gone aboard a warship – doubtless again the largest he could find – and again seems to be bent upon performing a “civil act” by military means, and the “heroic province” if Rio Grande do Sul is again in revolt. It is seldom that history repeats itself so closely. What will PRESIDENT PEIXOTO do? Will he act up to his manifesto and imitate the bright example of his predecessor in avoiding civil contention and bloodshed, or will he fight it out? The answer, we imagine, depends a good deal on the calibre of the guns and the temper of the troops in that fortress of Santa Cruz.

## 5. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 11 de setembro

*Agora, a revolta no Rio Grande do Sul, de novo ativa, parece ter um novo trunfo com a revolta da marinha, nota o jornal, segundo o qual, naquele estado, as tropas governamentais correm o risco de se encontrar «entre dois fogos».*

*A segunda parte do artigo debruça-se sobre o papel de Custódio de Melo: em novembro de 1889, assistiu Deodoro; dois anos mais tarde, com Peixoto, teve um papel importante para derribar o mesmo almirante; agora, está outra vez a rebelar-se contra o Presidente em exercício que, na sua opinião, viola a Constituição.*

*Graças à intervenção da frota estrangeira, por enquanto, não há bombardeamento da cidade, nota o diário de Birmingham, preocupado pelo «drama sangrento» que pode viver o Brasil e pela sua futura integridade territorial.*

The forecast we hazarded the other day as to the probable course of the revolutionary movement in Brazil has been speedily verified. The State of Rio Grande do Sul is again in active revolt against the Federal Government; and the navy, or that proportion of which is controlled by Admiral DE MELO, has apparently thrown in its lot with the insurgents. Owing to the strict censorship exercised by the Rio Government over foreign telegrams, it is difficult to know precisely what is passing in the disturbed province, and as to the feeling of the capital, which is now in a state of siege, we are quite in the dark. There can be little doubt, however, that the crisis is a very serious one for President PEIXOTO, if not also for Brazil, and we shall be much relieved if it does not end in the dismemberment of the Republic, or the secession, at all events, of Rio Grande. It is evident, from the news which reaches us via New York, that the people of Uruguay, the Republic which lies immediately to the south of Rio Grande, are in full sympathy, if not also in practical alliance, with the insurgents in the latter State. It is stated, for instance, that a battle has taken place between the Brazilian troops under general CASTELHISTA and a force of Uruguayan troops

with whom they came into collision on the frontier. General CASTELHISTA, it will be remembered, is the officer who was lately accused of having murdered a number of Uruguayan citizens in the course of his operations against the Rio Grande insurgents. The result of the battle is not stated, and it was probably, therefore, indecisive; but as no fewer than 150 men were killed, to say nothing of the wounded, the fighting would seem to have a very determined character. According to advices from Rivera, there has also been heavy fighting between the revolutionists in Rio Grande and the Government troops under General PORTUGAL. General CASTILHO, the Governor of the province, is said to have ordered all available troops to proceed in active pursuit of revolutionists, from which statement it is to be inferred that the latter have sustained a reverse. If so, the position is likely to be changed when Admiral DE MELO'S squadron reaches Santos. It was nothing but the intervention of the navy a month or two ago which prevented the success of the insurgents in Rio Grande and Porto Alegre, and now that the Admiral has gone over to the enemy, whilst the Uruguayans are joining with the insurgents, it looks as though the Government troops were likely to be taken between two fires. It was interesting to note that Admiral DE MELO is the President maker and unmake of Brazil. It was he who assisted the first President, Marshal DA FONSECA, into office in November, 1889, when the Emperor, Don PEDRO II., was shipped off so unceremoniously to Europe at a few hours' notice; and it was the same admiral, just two years later, who was instrumental in deposing DA FONSECA for the unpardonable crime of creating himself Dictator. General PEIXOTO was at that time Vice President of the Republic, and with Admiral DE MELO'S assistance he promptly succeeded to

the chief dignity. On that occasion also Admiral DE MELO'S trump card was the blockade and threatened bombardment of Rio de Janeiro. Unfortunately, President PEIXOTO appears to have disappointed the expectations of the patriotic admiral just as much as this predecessor, President DA FONSECA. PEIXOTO began well with fervent expressions of devotions to the Constitution, ardent yearning for economic reforms, and eternal gratitude to the political friends with whose assistance he had attained to supreme power. So long as the new President had his own way everything went well, but when the National Assembly proceeded to criticise his policy, to demur to any prolongation of his term of office, and to pass a bill disqualifying future Vice-Presidents from becoming Presidents of the Republic, his mainly soul rose in revolt against these petty limitations, and, following the example of his predecessor, he attempted to play the dictator by vetoing the obnoxious bill. Admiral DE MELO, therefore, has felt it incumbent on him to bring war vessels once more to the rescue of the Constitution. By the intervention of the foreign admirals in Rio he has been dissuaded for the moment from carrying out his threat to bombard the city, but the blockade of the port is maintained, and all the vessels that could be spared have gone to Santos under the admiral's orders, with a view to joining hand with the southern insurgents. It looks very much as though history were about to repeat itself, and that we should shortly see re-enacted in Brazil the sanguinary revolutionary drama which was so lately brought to a close in Chile. In that case, we are afraid the integrity of Brazil is doomed, for the State of Rio Grande appears to be irrevocably bent

upon severing itself from the rest of the Republic, and the example of secession is contagious.

## 6. *The Manchester Guardian*, 12 de setembro

*O jornal, embora desconfie bastante das notícias recebidas do Brasil, tenta resumir a situação. Como em novembro de 1891, a marinha parece ser o garante da Constituição: há dois anos interveio contra a tentativa ditatorial de Deodoro; agora, faz o mesmo contra Peixoto, «que apanhou o mesmo apetite pelo poder absoluto que o marechal Fonseca».*

*Todavia, no fim do texto, o editorialista reconhece que não há certezas nestas análises. Com efeito, «o espírito de patriotismo e o espírito de absolutismo pessoal deslocam-se e mudam rapidamente de lugar nos peitos dos homens públicos da América do Sul».*

The telegraphed accounts of the insurrection in Brazil are not to be trusted. The unofficial telegrams are scrappy, and have perhaps been doctored in the post; the fuller official reports are probably false. The mortality among South American Governments is high, but if one of them has ever been known to say die, as the phrase is, in late years, it has certainly not said it in despatches for European consumption. Nevertheless, it is not hard to imagine what the chief elements of the situation are. Everybody remembers Marshal FONSECA'S attempt to turn his presidency into a dictatorship in 1891. The province of Rio Grande do Sul led the insurrection against him and drove out its Governor, CASTILHOS, a creature of FONSECA'S while the fleet rose under Admiral CUSTODIO DE MELO, threatened to bombard Rio de Janeiro, and scared

FONSECA, who was always overweighed with the part of NAPOLEON, into resignation. FONSECA, was succeeded by the former Vice President, Marshal PEIXOTO. PEIXOTO is still President, and, curious to say, the new movement of insurrection seems to have begun in the province of Rio Grande do Sul, which rose against FONSECA two years ago, and to have culminated in a mutiny of the fleet lead by Admiral CUSTODIO DE MELO, who also was at the head of the revolution of 1891. Thus the very forces which overthrew FONSECA and set up PEIXOTO are now endeavouring to pull PEIXOTO down. Their action in 1891 was patriotic and praiseworthy; is it they that are changed to traitors now, or is it PEIXOTO himself? PEIXOTO telegraphs to his London Legation that it is they. We are not so sure. Marshal PEIXOTO has incurred grave suspicion on many grounds. He restored CASTILHO to the Governorship of Rio Grande, though the character to this adherent of FONSECA has suffered seriously in the events of 1891. The President, again, has been accused of intriguing with the army. Quite lately he vetoed a Bill which provided, strictly in the spirit of the Brazilian constitution, that persons in his own position should be ineligible for re-election to the Presidency at the end of their term of office. It is quite conceivable that, – as many Brazilians seem earnestly to believe – Marshal PEIXOTO has caught the same itch for absolute power as Marshal FONSECA, and that he has turned from the navy to the army in search for the necessary physical instrument for a *coup d'état*, and that the navy under admiral CUSTODIO DE MELO is again acting as the true guardian of the Constitution. But we must in frankness disclaim any feeling of certainty on the point, so swiftly do the spirit

of patriotism and the spirit of personal absolutism shift and exchange their abodes in the breasts of South American public men.

## 7. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 13 de setembro

*A insurreição no Rio Grande do Sul pode ser vista como algo de local, nota o jornal, mas o que se passa na baía do Rio tem uma «significação nacional». Trata-se de uma luta entre uma parte da frota, comandada por Custódio de Melo e Peixoto, apoiado pelo Exército.*

*O editorialista resume o combate de dia 10, durante o qual os revoltosos, que sobrestimaram as suas forças, não conseguiram por pé na terra. De facto, os rebeldes não têm a capacidade de atacar a capital, mas podem bloquear a capital o «fazer muitos estragos a outros mais pequenos portos ao longo da costa brasileira», sublinha o diário inglês.*

*No entanto, o quotidiano de Birmingham – que não esquece que a frota não pode ficar sempre no mar e que precisa de abastecimento – escreve que, antes de poder fazer prognósticos sobre esta «luta fratricida», era preciso saber, nomeadamente, quantos navios estão do lado da revolta, quantos têm uma atitude neutral, quantos ficam do lado do governo, e «em que medida o Presidente Peixoto tem o apoio do Exército».*

Brazil is now fairly plunged again in the throes of civil war. The old standing insurrection in Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost state of the Republic, might be regarded, perhaps, as a merely local development, but there can be no mistake as to the national significance of a struggle in which the army and navy are engaged on opposite sides and which is waged under the walls of Rio itself. The city, we may explain, is situated on the southern shore of a fine bay, some fifteen miles in depth by eight miles wide, and enclosed on

every side by lofty hills, rising to a height of over 2,000 ft. On the northern side of this bay, near the mouth, which is five miles across, stands the beautiful suburb of Niteroi. A few days ago, it will be remembered, the insurgent fleet, under Admiral DE MELO, suddenly quitted the position it had taken up before Rio de Janeiro, with the alleged intention of making a descent on the coast at Santos, the chief port of San Paulo, and then pushing on to Porto Alegre, in order to join hands with the insurgents in Rio Grande. This departure of the squadron, however, seems to have been merely a feint to divert attention from the real object of attack, which as the metropolitan suburb of Niteroi, previously mentioned. From motives either of policy or humanity, Admiral DE MELO is evidently not prepared at present to carry out his threat of bombarding the capital itself, but he feels under no such restraint with regard to Niteroi, which was supposed to be but poorly defended. President Peixoto, however, appears to have made good use of his time in strengthening the defence of the bay, and when the rebel fleet, which had to attack the place on Sunday last<sup>4</sup>, they evidently met with a rather warm reception. The attack opened with a heavy bombardment of the port by the fleet, and then, under cover of the artillery fire, an attempt was made to capture the town by means of landing parties. As the boats neared the shore, however, they were met by the Federal troops and police, who strenuously opposed their landing, and a desperate engagement ensued. The insurgents, we are told, were mowed down by the Krupp guns of the Government troops, whilst the heavy guns mounted in the

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<sup>4</sup> Domingo dia 10 de novembro.

forts exchanged shots with the warships. Eventually, it seems, the insurgents were driven back to their boats with heavy loss, and rowed back to the ships under a raking fusillade from the troops on shore. The loss of the assailants in this fierce engagement is stated at fifty-one killed and thirty wounded, but no estate of the losses on the Government side is at present forthcoming. The material fact is that the naval insurgents have miscalculated their strength, and have failed badly in their first attempt to secure their coveted footing within striking distance of the capital. The moral effect of this reverse cannot fail to be serious in disheartening the insurgents in Rio Grande and elsewhere, and proportionately elating the Government party; but it may easily be overrated. The six vessels, which are apparently all that follow the flag of the revolted admiral at present, may be too few and too weak to effect the capture of the metropolitan port, but they are quite strong enough to blockade it, and so to shut off Rio de Janeiro from the outer world; and when the ships can be spared from the dull and passive work of blockading the capital they are quite capable of doing a good deal of mischief at many of the minor ports along the Brazilian coast line. At Rio Grande they would be welcomed, of course, with open arms by the insurgents who are fighting the Government troops in that State; but it is a far cry from Rio Grande to Rio de Janeiro, and no one knows better than Admiral DE MELO the hopelessness of endeavouring to eject the President by any pressure which can be brought to bear upon him from so remote an extremity of the Republic. Before hazarding any opinion on the issue or duration of the fratricidal conflict which has just begun in Brazil, we should need a great deal more information than is afforded us by the brief telegrams

transmitted through the *New York Herald*. We should like to know, in the first place, to what extent President PEIXOTO commands the allegiance of the land forces, who are the true arbiters of power in most of these South American States; and in the next place we should want some explanation as to the intention and whereabouts of the other vessel of the Brazilian navy. The latter is supposed to consist of nine armour clads, in addition to some fourteen torpedo-ships, and of these only three warships and three torpedo-boats are known to have thrown in their lot with Admiral DE MELO. Are we to understand that the remainder are opposed to him are simply wavering or neutral? Even if we assume the solidarity of the Brazilian navy in its opposition to the President, it remains to be ascertained what are its peculiar resources and chances of assistance from the Brazilian people. So long as the vessels remain at sea, they are, of course, out of danger from the army and the forts, but they obviously cannot remain at sea indefinitely. They must go into port for supplies from time to time, and we have yet to learn what are the prospects of obtaining supplies. When these, among other factors of the situation, are clearly established, it will be time enough to attempt a forecast of the extraordinary cat and fish struggle between the land and naval forces of Brazil which is now engaging the attention of the nations.

## 8. *The Standard*, 13 de setembro

*Os telegramas falam de «duro combate» com a vitória das tropas governamentais, nota o jornal, que ironiza sobre estas vitórias que, todavia,*

*não conseguem pôr um ponto final nos conflitos que se eternizam. O jornalista londrino lamenta de não poder explicar o que se passa na baía do Rio porque as informações recebidas não o permitem.*

*O essencial deste artigo é dedicado à decadência do Brasil onde, na opinião do articulista, a anarquia e o desmembramento tomaram conta do país desde a queda de D. Pedro II. Já não se respeita nem o Presidente, nem o Parlamento, cada província pensa por si. Não há um poder central forte.*

*Por outras palavras, lamenta o quotidiano britânico, o Brasil está-se a tornar como a esmagadora maioria das repúblicas latino-americanas, onde reina a desordem, a violência política, a anarquia, as revoltas permanentes, onde as facções se combatem e os interesses locais e individuais dominam.*

*Este editorial não deixa entrever nenhum raio de luz para o maior país da América do Sul: «Os bons elementos da sociedade não têm nenhum ponto de encontro – todas as Instituições são ameaçadas de naufragar no turbulento triunfo do individualismo.»*

The latest telegrams from Rio de Janeiro *via* Montevideo, states that there has been “severe fighting” between PEIXOTO’S “Government” and the “Rebel” Fleet. Victory, as usual, is claimed for the troops of the man who controls the telegraph; but these South American official victories never seem to end the fighting. The crushed “rebel” of today is as lively as ever tomorrow, and now and then becomes the triumphant Ruler. Again and again, the rebellion in the Brazilian Province of Rio Grande do Sul has been ended by official telegram, and a few weeks ago a rebel Admiral was said to have been caught and on his way to Rio to be shot or hanged. But fighting still goes on there, and the orders of the Rio Government are as completely ignored as if the “rebels” never knew that they had been annihilated. Another Admiral now

commands the still rebellious Fleet. What is actually happening in the neighbourhood of Rio, these scraps of news flashed to us over the cables from places far distant from the scene of strife do not permit us to comprehend. But they are significant enough of the general drift of the think. "Governments" in Brazil may bottle up sources of information wherever they have the power, but they cannot stop the march of events, or hinder for one day that consummation of anarchy and dismemberment which is overtaking the erstwhile South American Empire of the House of BRAGANZA. Brazil has been falling into pieces ever since the day when the late Dictator, FONSECA, and his tools of master conducted DOM PEDRO on board ship, and bade him begone. The old EMPEROR might not be either a commanding or a particularly noble personality, but he was honest and respectable, a better man by far than most of those he left behind him. He being banished, there was no centre of authority to which the Provinces of the Empire could look up. It was every Province for itself, and only at one point were most of them united. They had a common hatred of and contempt for the central Government of Rio. Neither officials nor Parliament there commanded the slightest respect from any one. They were plunderers, whom it was the duty of citizens, in their own town local interests, to overthrow. Brazil, in short, has fallen into the same miserable plight as most of the other States and communities of South America. Her politicians use the word of liberty only to cloak infamies hardly to be dreamt of in Europe. Everywhere among them, except, perhaps, in Chile, the scum or the population has floated to the top and settled there, and the splutterings of revolution and rebellion, of which every other day brings news from one point to another, are

emanations of a social organization driven to despair. The burdened, cozened people rush hither and thither to try to throw off the adventures to whom they entrusted their interests. Often, they fail – so far, at least, they have not been particularly successful, either in Brazil or further South, because the rogues have possession of most of the “arms of precision”. But the defeat of the rioters brings no peace to the land. Beaten under here today, rebellion rears its head yonder tomorrow, and every fresh disturbance carries the whole body politic nearer to a state of complete anarchy. The good elements of society are without a rallying point— all Institutions threaten to founder in the riotous triumph of individualism. Both in Brazil and in the Argentina Confederation, the conflicts is between centralized government and State freedom, and neither in these countries nor anywhere else in South America are there visible the materials out of which strong central Government could be formed. So the coil and welter will go on— for all the world like a knot of lamprey in a tub. The proper end to this ferment is spasmodic despotism, and we should not be at all surprised to see the biggest States of South America parcelled out among a brood of swaggering, petty tyrants, as in Central America. In Ecuador, Guatemala, and such like, civil war and freed blood-letting take the place of a “general election”, and the “President” in office frequently establishes his right to the Chair by shooting his predecessor. Neither Brazil nor Argentina is today far away from this development of practical politics.

## 9. *The Morning Post*, 13 de setembro

*Os revoltosos, face à oposição dos navios de guerra das grandes potências, que não permitiram o bombardeamento da capital, tentaram desembarcar em Niterói, mas tiveram de recuar, constata o jornalista, que se interroga sobre o futuro imediato da insurreição. Descreve a seguir os dois grandes navios que estão sob o comando de Custódio de Melo e tem de admitir que não é possível fazer um prognóstico antes de conhecer o grau de fidelidade do Exército em relação ao presidente, agora autoproclamado ditador.*

*Tal como The Birmingham Daily Post dois dias antes<sup>5</sup>, pensa que existe uma forte analogia entre a atitude de Melo em novembro de 1891 e aquela que tomou nestes dias. Depois de ter resumido o conflito entre o Congresso e Peixoto, a propósito do veto deste sobre uma lei que impedia o Vice-Presidente de se apresentar à eleição para o cargo supremo, interroga-se se os Brasileiros não podiam «ter deixado morrer D. Pedro como Imperador do Brasil».*

*Afinal, conclui o editorialista, os Brasileiros «não têm nenhuma garantia que o Almirante de Melo ou uma outra pessoa que substituisse Peixoto», não tivesse também a tentação «de se tornar o seu dono absoluto»: «Por conseguinte parece que suportam o Presidente baseando-se no princípio que é melhor ficar na frigideira política do que dar um salto num provável fogo».*

The insurgent Brazilian Admiral, CUSTODIO DE MELO, has at last made an effort to carry out his threats of bombardment in order to coerce the Government of President PEIXOTO. It will be remembered that the Admiral commanding the foreign war-vessels in the port of Rio, acting on the initiative of the French Commander, intimated to the rebels that they would not permit a

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<sup>5</sup> Cf. Texto 5.

bombardment of the capital. That, we may presume, is one reason why the fire of the insurgents on Sunday last was not directed against the city of Rio itself, but against the town of Niteroi, which is a suburb of Rio, situated almost immediately opposite the capital, on the eastern side of the great harbour. Perhaps, also, they imagined that Niteroi would be less adequately supplied with troops and guns than the capital. But whatever may have been the reasons which induced them to attack Niteroi, the attempt failed signally. The boat which endeavoured to effect a landing under cover of the fire from the ships were compelled to retire with heavy loss to their crews, the engagement being described as desperate. It remains to be seen whether the insurgents will or will not be compelled, in consequence of this reverse, to surrender at discretion, as it has been suggested that they would probably have to do. Admiral DE MELO has, however, at least two powerful ships under his command, – that is to say, the *Aquidaban* and the *Republica*. The first of these is a powerful ironclad, launched in 1885, her main armament consisting in four 9in 24-ton Armstrong guns, besides an equal number of 70-pounder 5-ton guns. The second is a nearly cruiser, and, like the *Aquidaban*, is armed with torpedoes. Besides these vessels the insurgents have a couple of torpedo-boats. It is, however, impossible to predict the course which events may take place, since much must necessarily depend upon the fidelity of the land forces to the PRESIDENT, or, as he has now proclaimed himself, the DICTATOR. As the merit to the quarrel, it would appear that Admiral DE MELO is playing precisely the same game against FLORIANO PEIXOTO as he formerly played against Marshal DEODORO FONSECA. When the first President of the United States of Brazil turned out to be

a very imperfect substitute for the amiable and accomplished Sovereign whom he and PEIXOTO conspired to dethrone in November, 1889, it was Admiral DE MELO who, in conjunction with PEIXOTO, compelled FONSECA to retire just two years after his successful *coup d'état*. PEIXOTO was then Vice-President of the Republic, and having himself become President, after having filled the subordinate post he, no doubt, perceived the practical advantages to be derived from securing the succession to some trusty servant of his own. The name of that personage has not, so far as we are aware, been mentioned in connection with the present revolt; but the decision of the Congress that no one shall be eligible for the Presidency who has held the post of Vice-President suggests that President PEIXOTO has taken good care to appoint the right man to that office. Naturally, the PRESIDENT has resented the interference of the Congress with his prospective political arrangements, and has vetoed the Bill. The Brazilians must this time be beginning to doubt whether, after all, they would not have done better to allow Dom PEDRO to die, as he lived, Emperor of Brazil. They have probably no guarantee that Admiral DE MELO, or any one else who might be substituted for Marshal PEIXOTO, would be content to be a profitable servant of his country instead of scheming to become an absolute master. Consequently, they seem to be supporting the PRESIDENT on the principle that it is better to remain in the political frying-pan than to take a leap into a possible fire. But the outlook, in any case, is not very promising for the future of the United States of Brazil.

## 10. *The Daily Mail*, 14 de setembro

*A mediação das grandes potências não obteve resultados e houve um bombardeamento da capital, refere o jornal, que reproduz também as notícias vindas do Governo, satisfeito por ter «impedido a fuga do porto da frota rebelde e de a ter apanhado como numa cilada.*

*No entanto, sublinha o quotidiano londrino, «como no Chile, no Brasil, a marinha é o árbitro» da situação que não parece nada favorável para o Governo de Peixoto.*

The bombardment of Rio by the insurgent fleet began yesterday morning, but we shall have to wait for the details, as the first measure of defence was to cut all the telegraph wires. Our correspondent, however, is able to tell us that the largest and strongest of the forts forming the defences of the harbour has already declared for the rebels. This looks unpromising, to say the least of it, and it tends to confirm the doubts as to the loyalty of other forts which have been expressed by the correspondent of *The New York Herald*. It was understood that the foreign squadron, on the initiative of the French Admiral, would combine to save the city from the horrors of this extreme measure. The mediation, if it is to be called by name, has evidently been of no avail. Their efforts will now be confined to securing their own safety, and that of foreign shipping, and their measures to this end will no doubt be tolerably complete. They may also prevail on the insurgent squadron to spare the city itself, and to confine its attention to the forts. The well which Truth inhabits in Brazil seems to be uncommonly deep. The news of the bombardment is altogether at variance with the official reports of the situation which appeared yesterday,

and of which indeed there are some traces today. Then, the Government boasted that it had succeeded in preventing the escape of the rebel fleet from the harbour, and had caught it there, as in a trap. The proverb as to the building of a golden bridge for flying enemies seems to be exemplified by the latest phase of struggle. Matters do not look promising for the Government. In Brazil, as in Chile, the navy is the arbiter. In the present instance, it is probable animated by the belief that what it has made it can unmake, for it put President Peixoto in his place.

## 11. «The Naval Revolt in Brazil», *The Graphic*, 16 de setembro

*O semanário faz uma ligação entre esta sublevação da marinha e o grande descontentamento que reina no país, «cuja manifestação mais impressionante é a ainda incontrolada revolta no Rio Grande do Sul». Parece que na Marinha, acrescenta The Graphic, há uma facção que simpatiza com os movimentos anti-federais».*

*O Imperador foi deposto por um pronunciamento. «Desde então, o resultado foi de ter por trás do Presidente em exercício um poder, não do povo, mas do Exército e da Marinha, lamenta o jornalista. Este termina o seu artigo com um sinal de esperança: «não é impossível que uma situação mais feliz para o Brasil possa surgir da destruição mútua destes dois ramos das chamadas forças "nacionais".»*

At this distance it is difficult to ascertain what is actually going on at Rio, especially as the Government is, for some reason of its own, exercising a severe control over all independent communications of the outside world. So much however, is certain. A serious mutiny has occurred among the warships

stationed at Rio, and the Admiral in command has called upon Marshal Peixoto to resign the Presidency. Fighting has already taken place, and, in an attempt to capture a suburb of Rio, the mutineers have, according to the official accounts, been repulsed. There can be little doubt that the insurrection is in some way connected with the complex discontent of the country, which has found its most formidable expression in the still unsuppressed revolt in Rio Grande do Sul. The recent action of Admiral Wandenkolk<sup>6</sup> shows that there is a party in the Navy which sympathize with the Anti-Federal movement. The outbreak is, however, an illustration of the curses which invariably follow in the train of revolutions managed by the military forces of a country. The deposition of the old Emperor Dom Pedro was in no sense due to a national movement, but to a military and naval *pronunciamento*. The result has been that ever since then there has been a power behind the Republican President in the shape, not of the nation, but of the army and navy. The navy deposed Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, and it is now attempting to upset Marshall Peixoto. It would seem, however, that the pretensions of the navy are now being resisted by the army, and it is not impossible that a happier state of things for Brazil may arise out of the mutual destruction of these two branches of what are called the "national" forces.

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<sup>6</sup> Em abril de 1892, treze generais, entre os quais o ex-ministro da defesa do Governo Provisório Eduardo Wandenkolk (1838-1902), publicam um manifesto que contesta a legitimidade de Floriano, e pedem novas eleições.

**12. «Foreign», *The Manchester Guardian*, 15 de setembro**

The news from Brazil is serious. The insurgents, it is stated, bombarded yesterday morning the forts commanding the entrance to the harbour of Rio de Janeiro as well as the arsenal, and a few shells were also fired into the city. The Government declares that the disaffection is confined to the warships, but it is evident that the telegrams which are permitted to leave the Brazilian capital are not to be entirely trusted. The situation, however, appears to be very serious.

**13. *The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle*, 18 de novembro.**

*«Desde que os brasileiros trocaram a monarquia pela república, tem sido uma desordem», escreve o jornal: «tiveram um ditador atrás do outro». Agora há uma revolta da marinha, com o exército apoiando o outro lado. Isso prova «que o governo brasileiro não tem poder real», afirma o quotidiano de Huddersfield, que lança uma farpa aos republicanos britânicos.*

The state of affairs in South America gets worse. Brazil is now the centre of attraction in that part of the world. Since the Brazilians exchanged the Monarchy for the Republic they have become more or less of an upset. In theory the equality, fraternity, and brotherhood of a Republic is very beautiful, but in practice it never works out so well. No sooner was the Republic established in Brazil that it became a question of who was to occupy the principal positions. One dictator after another has held it. That is the true way

of putting it, for the Presidents have held and have exercised more real power than the late Monarch even dreamed of enforcing. Internal quarrel of a more bitter, because of a civil, character have resulted. The latest is that of the navy and land forces taking different sides. The navy were not supported as they hoped to be on shore. Consequently, being in a position in which they could advantageously attack the capital they have done so in preference to running the risk of steaming out of the bay past the land forts and taking their chance of being injured or sunk by the heavy ordnance stationed there. Neither the bombardment nor the attack under its cover appear to have been successful, but it is quite clear from the fact that such an occurrence could take place that the Brazilian Government has no real power. For a whole navy to desert and attack their own countrymen show that something is seriously wrong with the constitution of the country and its government. Certainly, the example of Brazil is not the one to be followed, and our own theoretic Republicans, may well ponder over this attempt to put their crude theories into actual working. It is a result that must give them exceedingly cold comfort.

#### 14. *The Leeds Mercury*, 18 de setembro

*O jornal de Leeds lamenta não ter informações fidedignas do teatro dos acontecimentos: ou emanam diretamente do governo ou vêm da capital argentina.*

*Esta incerteza, nas bolsas, é favorável aos especuladores que provocam a baixa dos preços, acusa o jornalista. «Os que se dedicam a um comércio mais honesto, podem ficar satisfeitos por saber que os navios estrangeiros não participaram na ação da frota rebelde», acrescenta o*

*editorialista. Na sua opinião, os comerciantes britânicos, por enquanto, não parecem ter sofrido danos por causas destas operações militares no porto da capital brasileira, embora não se possam excluir «óbvios inconvenientes, como fortes flutuações nos câmbios das moedas, o desconforto pessoal devido ao estado de sítio, ou a granadas estraviadas».*

A revolution in South America seldom rises to the dignity of a nine day's wonder. As a rule, it is impossible to get a true account of what has happened until long after public interest in the occurrence has ceased. No reliance can be placed on contemporaneous telegrams from the fountain-head, owing to the simple fact that the party in possession of the wires persistently sends glowing accounts of its own successes, and excludes all other messages whatsoever. The present revolt in Brazil forms no exception to the general rule. No news at all comes direct from Rio de Janeiro, and we are dependent on reports from Buenos Aires, either direct or through New York, from which to glean some inkling of the progress of the "general election", or "revision of the Constitution", now in progress in the great Republic. All that we can clearly gather is that Admiral Melo, with a considerable portion of the Brazilian fleet, has rebelled against President Peixoto. On Saturday we were assured that the bombardment of Rio by Fleet has failed, but our faith was shaken somewhat by the naïve sentence appended to the report, "All the news contained in the above despatch emanates from Government sources". Today the account we publish seems to show that Admiral Melo gained a decisive advantage by his attack, and that he is in possession of the important fort near Niteroi which command the entrance to the capital, and that President Peixoto has retired to

Santa Ana. But here, we are confronted with the fact that this view of the situation rests on rumours and opinions current in Buenos Aires, and, it may be, founded of no surer basis than the hopes of partisans. No doubt the very uncertainty of what is happening in Brazil is being turned to profitable account by the "bears" on the Stock Exchanges. Those engaged in more legitimate trade may find some satisfaction in the report that the foreign war-vessels at Rio took no part in the action with the rebel fleet. If this is true, we ought to be able to conclude that no damage was done to British merchantmen lying in the harbour or to the property of British traders on shore. A change of Government, if it takes place, is not likely to affect the position of those foreigners engaged in commerce in Brazil, though the actual transition be fraught with obvious inconveniences, such as violent fluctuations of exchanges, and such personal discomfort as a state of siege and errant bombshells are calculated to produce.

**15.** «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Belfast News-Letter*,  
19 de setembro

*Pergunta feita no Parlamento a Edward Grey.*

Mr. CLOUGH asked what steps had been taken for to protection of British life and property at Rio Janeiro.

Sr. E. GREY said that H. M. ships *Sirius* and *Beagle* were now in Rio harbour, and the *Racer* was under order to proceed there. Ships of war belonging to France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, and the United States were also

on the spot, or on the road to Rio, for the protection of neutral shipping. Her Majesty Minister had reported that the trade was paralysed, and that it was impossible for vessels to unload their cargos. On Saturday night he reported that the commanders of the neutral ships of was were endeavouring to prevent the bombardment of the town by the insurgent vessels.

## 16. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 de setembro

*Artigo que apresenta como catastrófica a situação de Floriano Peixoto e que prevê mesmo uma dissolução da República em vários estados!*

The Brazilian Parliament, we are told this morning, has voted a loyal address to President Peixoto; but loyal addresses are not of much service to a man who has been compelled to retreat from his capital, leaving the citizens of the mercy of Admiral Melo's squadron, which is now thirty ships strong to say nothing of merchant steamers. Peixoto will make his final stand at Santa Ana, but the man who made him and now seeks to compass his overthrow gains daily. The navy is daily going to his side; indeed, Peixoto has but one warship to count upon, and it is of little service, for the sailors cannot work [??]<sup>7</sup>. Pernambuco and Bahia are now in revolt, the rebels have seized Niteroi and the arsenal and the customs house, grave doubts prevail as to the loyalty of the army, and any day the citizens of Rio may get tired of being bombarded. This is certainly the most serious of all the Brazilian revolutions and the break-up of

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<sup>7</sup> Palavra ilegível

the republic which was foretold as the likeliest issue of its establishment seems to be imminent. For Brazil is composed of home-ruled States with contrary interests.

## 17. *The Times*, 20 de setembro

*Depois de uma longa introdução sobre a maneira de interpretar as várias notícias e, também, os silêncios impostos pela censura, por parte do poder central na América do Sul e no Brasil em particular, o quotidiano londrino chega a uma primeira conclusão: «nenhuma das duas fações alcançou uma vantagem decisiva».*

*Por um lado, Peixoto pode ter imposto a censura à informação «por razões militares», para «limpar o solo e as águas da República da mancha da revolta». No entanto, isso prova que «os planos do Presidente ainda não estão maduros».*

*Por outro lado, se Custódio de Melo tivesse conseguido, com a ameaça, o mesmo que fez com Deodoro dois anos antes, já o teríamos sabido, pois teria tido o controle do telégrafo. Isso ter-lhe-ia permitido comunicar ao mundo «quanto admirava o patriotismo desinteressado do último Ditador, que abdicou para evitar mais derramamento de sangue».*

*O último parágrafo é dedicado a Custódio de Melo, homem capaz, experiente, ambicioso, que «discutiu com o Presidente Peixoto por razões pessoais». Na opinião do jornal, que, embora prudente, considera mais fidedignas as informações vindas de Montevideo e de Buenos Aires, o almirante não teria «embarcado de novo no jogo da revolução – o que implica, mesmo na América do Sul, riscos para o derrotado – sem primeiro ter julgado que tinha razoáveis hipóteses de ganhar».*

*O jornal londrino dá-nos a seguir uma série de informações que parecem poder permitir a Melo de «fazer respeitar a Constituição»: só um forte ficou sobre o controle do Governo, o de Santa Cruz, que controla a entrada, mas que parece ter problemas de abastecimentos, ficando os outros*

*neutrais ou do lado da insurreição ; o exército que, «nominalmente» segue Peixoto, «tornou-se indisciplinado e desordeiro» ; « as notícias da suposta derrota do governo no Rio Grande do Sul, se forem confirmadas» podem afetar a fidelidade das tropas»; a força do «poder naval do Almirante de Melo; os rumores de um eventual ataque dos revoltosos ao porto de Santos e os da adesão da Bahia e de Pernambuco e de toda a esquadra naval do Rio Grande do Sul à revolta.*

*No entanto, The Times escreve que todos estes elementos e notícias favoráveis à frota rebelde, «têm de se manter, por enquanto, como uma mera conjectura». Mas se forem «mesmo só aproximadamente verdadeiros, não se pode negar que não vaticinem nada de bom para o Presidente Peixoto.»*

True to the traditions of the free Republics of South American, the politicians in possession of the capital of Brazil continue to impose absolute silence on the Press and the citizens still subject to their power. Although this custom has been universally observed by these fanatical worshippers of liberty on the French pattern, since they severally copied out the Constitution of the United States under the hallucination that all the rights of man might heirs by compliance with this easily performed formality, it has been observed that the rule is subject to certain well-defined exceptions. When the Government happens to be stronger than the rebels, and to be demonstrating the fact by such undeniable proofs as sanguinary victories in the field, followed by military executions, the embargo on news is speedily raised, and the successes of the party of law and order are divulged forthwith to an expectant world. It follows that, when a persistent silence is maintained, the world draws its own inferences, and that those inferences are invariables unfavourable, and sometimes altogether too unfavourable, to the Dictator of the day. A modest

reluctance to proclaim his own triumphs or the downfall and punishment of his insurgent fellow-citizens was never yet imputed to one of these devoted patriots and disinterested defenders of the law by any human being out of their immediate reach. Consequently, when no triumphs are blazoned forth in magniloquent manifestoes, it is assumed, on occasion over hastily, that no triumphs have been won; when no tidings of the vindication of the law's outraged majesty on the persons of captive rebels are received, it is cynically and it may be quite erroneously judged that rebels are not being captured, and therefore cannot be hanged. There is, of course, a good deal to be said for this reasoning, which is based upon a knowledge of the laws of human nature as it manifests itself in certain phases of semi-civilization, and stands corroborated by the recorded phenomena of the innumerable rebellions, revolts, and insurrections which have rendered the history of South America such lively and edifying reading since its peoples first flung off the yoke of monarchy and settled down to the unrestrained enjoyment of republican bliss. But, on the other hand, it must be remembered that such a state of things raises an equally strong presumption that the revolution in progress has at very least hung fire. In a really well-planned and well-executed movement the gag is not required. Victory declares itself on the side of the new guardian of the State in the course of a few hours, and then, of course, the merest prudence impels the chiefs of the discomfited faction to do the gagging for themselves. The rank and file transfer their services to the winning party with alacrity, and strive to drown the memory of their late "seditious" cries by the sonorous volume of the shouts with which they hail the conqueror.

An application of these general principles to the present crisis in Brazil points to the conclusion that neither faction has yet achieved a decisive advantage. The stringent measures adopted by PRESIDENT PEIXOTO to prevent intelligence of any kind from Rio reaching the outer world may of course be due to purely military reasons. It is possible that behind the outlying parts of the city – or such of them as still adhere to him – he may be concerting some elaborate system of operations which will purge the soil and the waters of the Republic of the foul blot of rebellion. Secrecy may be indispensable to the design, and then the interruption of the postal and telegraph services is at once intelligible. Still, the incident shows that the PRESIDENT'S plans are not yet mature. They are at best what lawyers call "executory", and executory designs for the suppression of insurrections have an unhappy tendency to miscarriage. On the other hand, it is clear that PRESIDENT PEIXOTO'S former companions in arms "in the immortal movement of the 15<sup>th</sup> of November", when he treacherously led the late EMPEROR'S troops over to the Republicans, have not yet persuaded him, by bombardment or other inducement, that the game of law and order is up. Had they done so they would be in command of the telegraph wires, and ADMIRAL DE MELO would no doubt have assured everybody who cared to know how highly he admired the unselfish patriotism of the late Dictator, who had abdicated this functions to avoid the further effusion of blood. A suitable precedent for such a proclamation exists, as we have already ventured to point out, in the manifesto issued by GENERAL PEIXOTO, when he felt in his duty to supersede PRESIDENT FONSECA in virtue of the "civic act of the military

classes» in November, 1891. It must be quite familiar to the ADMIRAL, as he happened to be the Minister – *ad interim* – who countersigned it.

Such news as there it tends, it will be seen, to confirm the reputation of ADMIRAL DE MELO as an old revolutionary hand. He is known to be a man of ability, and he enjoys the prestige that comes from past success. Although his ambition is notorious, and it is said that he has quarrelled on personal grounds with PRESIDENT PEIXOTO, it seems natural to suppose that he would hardly have embarked again on the game of revolution which is not unattended with risks to the loser even in South America – had he not first felt satisfied that he had reasonable prospects of winning it. While all intelligence on the course of events must be accepted with the utmost reserve, until the victory of one side or the other has robbed Brazilian news of the passing interest it possesses, it should be noted that the reports which reach us come from neutral sources, or at any rate come through neutral channels. They are to that extent less unworthy of belief than if they proceeded directly from places in the occupation of either of the belligerents, but, on the other hand, is not unlikely that both sides have partisans in such cities as Montevideo and Buenos Aires, who busy themselves in the concoction and dissemination of rumours favourable to their own factions. If the statements sent from these capitals to New York may be relied on, ADMIRAL DE MELO would seem to be in a fair way of enforcing his views of the Constitution once again. If he does, we shall doubtless hear what they are. All the forts commanding the bay are either neutral, we are told, or favourable to the fleet, with the single exception of

Santa Cruz. As Santa Cruz dominates the narrows entrances from the Atlantic on the eastern shore, the exception would be important were the fort is in a good state of defence. It is said, however, that both provisions and ammunitions are short, and that, although the army still nominally adheres to PEIXOTO, it has become undisciplined and disorderly. The news of the alleged defeat of the Government in Rio Grande do Sul, if it be true, is pretty certain to penetrate to the capital, despite the precautions of the PRESIDENT, and it can hardly tend to increase the devotion of the troops. The "sea-power" of ADMIRAL DE MELO, on the other hand, would appear to be telling against his adversaries. He has drawn supplies from the vessels approaching Rio, and, according to the latest rumour at Montevideo, three of his ships are said to have steamed for the important port of Santos, which can hardly be expected to offer much resistance to so formidable a force, even its inhabitants are heartily loyal to the PRESIDENT. That, however, may be doubted, if any credit is to be given to other items of news from Uruguay. It affirmed that Bahia and Pernambuco, with the whole of the Rio Grande squadron, have gone over to the "rebels", while the *Tiradentes* has only been saved to the Government, by the arrest of several of her officers, on the requisition of the Brazilian Minister at Montevideo. We hear, too, of naval officers in Rio itself bettering the instructions given them by PRESIDENT PEIXOTO during the last revolution, "declining" his commands, and refusing to act against their old commander, ADMIRAL DE MELO. What amount of trust is to be placed in these statements must remain, as we have insisted, a matter of mere conjecture for the present. But, if they be even approximately true, there is no denying that they bode ill for PRESIDENT PEIXOTO.

## 18. *The Glasgow Herald*, 20 de setembro

*O quotidiano escocês reproduz, sem nenhum espírito crítico, a opinião de um antigo diplomata britânico «que conhece bem o Brasil». Na sua opinião, desde a proclamação da República, houve «corrupção, desperdícios e má gestão nos governos republicanos» no Rio. Este diplomata tem a certeza que o neto de D. Pedro será proclamado imperador!*

A gentleman, formerly in the diplomatic service, who knows Brazil well, in a conversation today expressed his own conviction that the revolt of the Brazilian fleet will end in the restoration of the empire. The late Emperor, he said, could easily have retained his throne if he had thought it worth his while to fight, but that he deliberately allowed himself to be expelled from the country. The Imperialist party, he added, is still very strong, and it has grown since the Republic was proclaimed, owing to the corruption, waste, and mismanagement of the Governments that have since been in power. He does not believe, however, that the late Emperor's daughter will be restored. She is unpopular with the planters, because it was she who carried the emancipation of the slaves, and she is unpopular with the Liberals because she is accused of being too much under the influence of the Church, while her husband, the Comte d'Eu is extremely unpopular. But their son, who is now almost of age, will be restored to the throne. My informant at one time was well acquainted with Admiral de Melo, who commands the revolted fleet. He tells me that the admiral has always been an imperialist, and that his object is to bring back the young Prince. This opinion is undoubtedly very widely held amongst the

leading financial houses in the city, and that accounts for the very slight fall there has been in Brazilian stocks. There has been hardly any selling; on the contrary, some of the more sanguine capitalists have been buying.

## 19. *The Guardian*, 20 de setembro

*Outro artigo que faz uma análise pouco ponderada da situação no Brasil. Com efeito, considera como quase certas a queda de Peixoto, a revolta de várias províncias e a firme intenção de Custódio de Melo de restaurar a antiga monarquia.*

The insurrectionary movement in Brazil is more serious than was at first supposed. The fleet is apparently all with admiral MELO, and the army is shaky. Rio de Janeiro has been bombarded, and it is even possible that it may have already fallen. Several provinces have already declared against the PRESIDENT, and, short of foreign interference, which is unlikely, it looks as if he must succumb. What would his disappearance mean? General PEIXOTO is the second President who has governed the Brazilian Republic since the Emperor PEDRO was dismissed. The first, Dr. FOSNECA, was got rid of by a *coup d'état* in the November of last year, and General PEIXOTO was chosen to succeed him. Recently a Bill was introduced to prevent the President from seeking office for a second term. This Bill was vetoed by PEIXOTO, and Admiral MELO, who had been a member of PEIXOTO'S Cabinet, but who had already has serious differences with him on other matters, then raised the standard of revolt. The really interesting question is whether MELO is acting for himself or someone

else, and what he will do in case he obtains military possession of the country. Dom PEDRO would never hear of his reinstatement by force, but Dom PEDRO is dead, and his family, who are now in Portugal [*sic!*], are known to be less particular. It appears to be thought that MELO is a Royalist at heart, and that his object is to play the part of General MONK<sup>8</sup>. In that case, we fear, bad days are in store for Brazil.

## 20. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 20 de setembro

*Nesta pequena nota, o diário londrino, que critica a censura imposta pelas autoridades brasileiras, julga provável a derrota de Peixoto, que só uma intervenção das «Potências estrangeiras» podia salvar. Lamenta também a mudança de regime em novembro de 1889 que, na sua opinião, foi um desastre para o país: «Muitas vezes, a mórbida paixão por princípios abstratos torna-se um luxo oneroso».*

With the usual blind foolishness of the temporary rulers in South American Republics, the postal authorities in Brazil have, so far as lay in their power, cut off all correspondence with the outer world. The consequence is that the news about Rio is confused and untrustworthy. Still it would seem that the rebels, as Admiral de Melo's supporters are called, are gaining ground, and it is more than likely that President Peixoto will have to succumb unless – which is improbable – the Foreign Powers intervene to save him. There was a great flourish of trumpets when the last vestige of monarchical institution

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<sup>8</sup> Em 1660, o general George Monck (1608-1670) coloca Carlos II no trono da Inglaterra.

disappeared from the Western Hemisphere south of Canada. But if Republican sentiment was gratified, Brazil has paid dearly for the gratification. Under the late Emperor the country flourished and improved; since his departure it has suffered one long spell of disorganization and discontent fatal to its prosperity, and culminating in a civil war which threatens to ruin it. A morbid passion of abstract principles is very often an expensive luxury.

## 21. *The Leeds Mercury*, 20 de setembro

*Não vai ser nada fácil depor Peixoto, afirma o jornal, mas enquanto [os rebeldes] estiverem no mar e ele na terra», não vai haver nenhum «encontro decisivo».*

*The Daily Graphic* has been favoured with a photograph of General Floriano Peixoto, the President of the Republic of Brazil, whose term of office must be nearing a close, if we may judge from the latest intelligence regarding the insurrection in that distressful country: "An honest rather than a strong man" is the description given of General Peixoto, and the strong man is as much needed as a honest one if the Brazilian Government is to be set upon its legs again. General Peixoto was chosen to succeed Marshal da Fonseca. He is no mere carpet knight, but has seen service, and may yet be able to give a good account of the rebels. So long, however, as they are on the sea, and he on the land, the chances of a decisive encounter must be rather remote.

## 22. *The Standard*, 20 de setembro

*Só notícias agradáveis para os revoltosos...*

The insurgents in Brazil are steadily gaining ground everywhere. After a heavy bombardment of Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, several of the Federalist gunboats left the bay to attack Santos. Military and Naval officers ashore have refused to obey the orders of President PEIXOTO, and his cause is regarded as lost unless he receives foreign aid. The garrisons of all forts in the bay of Rio, except Santa Cruz, have declared in favour of the revolution. Bahia and Pernambuco have also deserted the PRESIDENT.

## 23. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 21 de setembro

*Também este diário – que acredita sem nenhum espírito crítico em quase todas as notícias desfavoráveis relativas a Peixoto – está convencido que a situação do Governo brasileiro está «a ir de mal a pior»: outros navios alinhariam com os revoltosos; três navios de guerra estariam navegando para Santos com o objetivos de tomar o porto, privando desse modo o executivo de uma importante fonte de rendimento; o governo teria abandonado todas as posições na zona costeira do Rio; a lealdade do Exército para com o chefe de Estado não seria tão sólida. O articulista chega mesmo a escrever que a capital está nas mãos das tropas de Custódio de Melo.*

*Todavia, avisa o jornal, a guerra está muito longe de ter acabado, porque as tropas governamentais podem continuar a luta no interior, onde a posição de Melo é muito débil, e «há muito mais cidades importantes para conquistar». Porém, o articulista pensa que, em breve, vai haver um golpe em favor do chefe da insurreição: nessa altura, os «ratos militares» irão abandonar o navio presidencial.*

Whilst accounts of the revolutionary struggle in Brazil are still perplexing and contradictory, the balance of evidence inclines more and more to the view we have repeatedly expressed that the President is fighting a losing battle. Since our last reference to the military situation at Rio de Janeiro, the position of the Government has gone from bad to worse. All forts save one which command the entrance of the bay appear to have either capitulated to the insurgents or declared themselves neutral, and the garrison of the solitary fort of Santa Cruz which remains faithful to President PEIXOTO, is said to be reduced nearly to its last crust and its final cartridge. Moreover, the discipline of the army, or that part of it which has retreated with the President to Santa Ana, is described as anything but satisfactory. We are informed that three of the insurgent warships, *Aquidaban*, *Primeiro de Março*, and *Republica*, have succeeded in forcing the passage to the harbour with the object of proceeding to Santos, where they propose to blockade the port and seize the Custom House, thus cutting off an important source of revenue from the Government, and securing much needed help for the insurgent cause. It is significant of the probable issue of this expedition, that the Brazilian gunboat stationed at Santos, which has hitherto been faithful to President PEIXOTO, has now joined the rest of the navy in supporting the cause of Admiral DE MELO. There is corroboration also of the report previously received that Bahia, Pernambuco, and the whole of the Rio Grande Squadron, have declared against the President. The *Tiradentes*, which is at Montevideo, is still preserved to the Government by the timely interposition apparently of the Brazilian Minister there, who has

had several of the officers arrested for fear they should induce the crew to mutiny; but the value of this support is a good deal diminished by the fact that the vessel is disabled by a breakdown in her machinery, which is not likely to be soon or easily repaired. This is the last authentic intelligence from Rio which has been conveyed to Montevideo by passengers on board the steamer *Magdalena*; but later news from Uruguay, at present unconfirmed, places the position of the Government even in a worst light. It is stated that the cruiser *Riachuelo*, the largest vessel in the Brazilian navy, has declared in favour of Admiral DE MELO, who has also been joined by the cruiser *Benjamin Constant*, and all the vessels of the Brazilian Lloyds service. The two cruisers, we believe, are still in European waters. As a consequence, presumably, of the renewed bombardment of the city on Sunday last, Rio de Janeiro is said to be now in complete possession of the insurgents. In that case the blockade of news from the quarter should be promptly raised, for it is only a losing cause in South America which thinks it necessary to muzzle the telegraphs and the post office. The government is understood to have abandoned all its positions on the coast of Rio; but if the army remains faithful, it may prolong its resistance for a considerable time in the interior, where Admiral DE MELO'S ships cannot follow it, and assuming that it has secured the control of the railways, it may even join hands with General CASTILHOS' forces in Rio Grande do Sul. That general, however, appears to be rather hard pressed himself just now, as he has repeatedly asked for aid, which the President, of course, is unable to send to him. It would be a mistake, therefore, to suppose that the revolutionary struggle is nearly ended because the insurgents have got possession of the capital.

There are many other important cities yet to be taken before they can be said to command even the coastline. If the struggle has to be carried on in the interior, it is likely to be a protracted one, for, excepting in Rio Grande, the insurgents have no organized land force of any importance, and it takes time to drill and equip volunteers, however numerous. The cohesion of political partisans in South America, however, is usually rather loose, and the loyalist of today is often the revolutionist of tomorrow. Nothing succeeds like success in that part of the world, and unless Admiral DE MELO shortly sustains some serious check we should not be surprised to witness a military *pronunciamento* in his favour, which would practically end the struggle. The military rat is usually one of the first to desert the sinking ship, and President PEIXOTO must not count on the continued fidelity of the troops if he is unable to lead them to victory.

**24. «The Brazilian Revolution», *North-Eastern Daily Gazette*,  
21 de setembro**

*Mesmo o jornal da cidade de Middlesbrough acredita que «Peixoto já não é o dono da capital» e, como o Rio de Janeiro é tão importante para o Brasil como Paris é para a França, «se a derrota do Presidente Peixoto se confirmar, pode-se partir do princípio que o resto do país já se submeteu ou vais submeter-se à revolução».*

*O editorialista — que admite desconhecer as causas desta revolta — acrescenta que a fraca resistência das tropas governativas, «talvez tenha salvado a cidade». Com efeito, se o combate tivesse sido mais aguerrido, o bombardeamento teria sido mais violento.*

*Agora, conclui o jornalista, o importante é estabelecer a paz, porque esta guerra civil prejudicou muito os interesses comerciais britânicos. O*

*jornal fala da importância do Brasil para a economia do seu país: quase a metade das importações totais brasileiras provém da Grã-Bretanha.*

Admiral de Melo and his followers are probably no longer rebels. If it is true that they have beaten the President and the constitutional Executive, what yesterday was treason so is today loyalty. The news from Rio de Janeiro is still scanty and vague. There seems, however, little reason to doubt the report that the revolt against President Peixoto, led by Admiral de Melo and the navy, has completely succeeded, and that the constitutionally elected President is no longer master of the capital. To a larger extent than Paris ever was France Rio de Janeiro is Brazil, and if the news of the defeat of President Peixoto be true it may be assumed that the whole country has submitted or will shortly submit to the revolution. Certainly, the accounts received from day to day during the past week or ten days as to the progress of the civil war indicated little disposition in any quarter to make heroic sacrifices for the cause of the democratic constitution represented by President Peixoto. At the first the, as in duty bound, fought resolutely for the President; but it soon became obvious, notwithstanding the glorious victories with which they were credited in the news telegrams edited by the Government, that their spirit of resistance to the revolutionary movement of the fleet became daily weaker and weaker. The precise causes of the struggle or the aims of the revolution were and still are left unexplained. But whatever they may be, it was clearly apparent during the past few days that Admiral de Melo's party steadily increased, while the party of the President as steadily declined in strength; and that few men of the city

or in the army were prepared to hazard their lives in defence of the President and of the Constitution copied from the United States model after the deposition and deportation of the late Emperor. The comparative feebleness of the resistance has possibly proved the salvation of the city. If the partisans of President Peixoto had been unflinchingly resolute, the bombardment of the city by the fleet would have been much more severe. So far, we have heard little of the destructive results of the fire from the ships, although the city, in its long stretch of ten miles along the shore, was at the mercy of any naval forces that had command, like Melo's, of the harbour. Whatever may be the political effect of the revolution – whether, as we have seen it suggested, the Monarchy will be re-established, or there be no more than a substitution of de Melo for Peixoto in the Presidency – the immediate concern of Britain is the restoration of peace. Nearly one-half of the imports, amounting to between twelve or thirteen million, of the country is supplied by British merchants, and of the 1,500 vessels that nearly enter the harbour one-third have British owners. The civil war therefore meant a considerable commercial loss for British traders at a time when they can ill afford to lose anything at all. British interests are all in favour of the conclusion of the war and the establishment of a stable Government, whether Republican or Monarchical.

## 25. *The Standard*, 21 de setembro

*O articulista começa por afirmar que a vitória dos revoltosos, embora ainda não certa, parece provável, e que Peixoto é impopular. Mas o tema*

*principal do artigo é saber quem será o futuro monarca, no caso de Custódio de Melo vencer e de querer a restauração do trono. O jornalista ficaria muito satisfeito se isso acontecesse, porque o Brasil bem precisa de «um chefe capaz e autoritário» para evitar também uma fragmentação do país.*

*Exclui, à partida, a família Bragança e pensa que um príncipe alemão, que teria o apoio incondicional dos alemães que vivem no Rio Grande do Sul, seria talvez uma possibilidade. Mas, neste caso, admite o jornal, o Sul teria de conquistar o norte do país e isso não seria uma tarefa fácil.*

*O Brasil precisa de um chefe forte e resoluto, mas aí encontram-se «em abundância patriotas fúteis e fanfarrões, um tirano de vez em quando, mas nunca um líder de homens digno de um rei», lamenta, desiludido, o diário londrino.*

[??] authoritative news of any kind has been permitted to come to us from Rio de Janeiro that we are not yet certain whether Marshal Peixoto has been driven from power or not. Nevertheless, the probabilities are in favour of the triumph of the insurgent fleet, commanded by the “rebel” Admiral DE MELO. Marshal PEIXOTO was never popular in the country. His occupancy of the Presidential Chair was due to the dictatorial assumptions of the late Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA and almost since his accession the southernmost Provinces of the Republic have been in open revolt. He came in as the leader of a cabal formed round him when Vice President to oust the Dictator FONSECA. Is the leader of another revolted cabal to succeed him? Prominent Brazilians in Europe say “No”, and concur with the financiers interested on Brazil in holding the view that Admiral DE MELO’s success means the re-establishment of the Empire or of a Monarchy. We should be glad in some respect to think this probable. A strong Ruler, endowed with the attributes and *prestige* of Royal and

Imperial Majesty, might save these scattered States of Brazil from dismemberment, or from fratricidal strife and many years of anarchy. But where is the Monarch to be found? What hope is there of seeing either the late DOM PEDRO'S daughter, or her husband and she together, restored to the Throne of Brazil? They are both peculiarly obnoxious there. Some chances there might have been for one of their children, had the young man gone sword in hand to assist in winning back his grandfather's Crown. There is not much for one who seeks to triumph by mere intrigue, or by the fighting of others. An able, masterful Ruler would be invaluable for Brazil, and not a bad substitute for the freedom which is licence in some of Brazilian's neighbours. We should, therefore, be glad to think that the Leaders of the present revolt had found such a man for King; but if they have, he must have come from another stock than that of the House of BRAGANZA. A strong German Prince might to, and would be sure of the loyal support of his sturdy countrymen in the Province of Rio Grande do Sul. They have been the heart and soul of the rebellion against Rio Dictators and Rio corruption from the first, and no General of the Metropolitan Province can ever hope to unite them to the Federal Republic, whether by goodwill or by force. But they would follow a German Prince. Even then the South would have to conquer the North before unity could be restored. Brazil has four thousand miles of coastline, and the Provinces of the North have no means of intercourse with the South except by sea. The danger of a huge country thus situated is that of disintegration. Their interests drive the far-severed Provinces politically apart, and this sundering is what hangs over the United States of Brazil today. Stalwart, indeed, must the King or Leader be who

can overcome this tendency to separation, and hold the territories of the old Empire together. The climate of South America has not hitherto favoured the rearing of such a man. Flaring, windy “patriots” we have there in plenty, and a tyrant now and then, but a Kingly ruler of men never. If, then, a King worth sixpence is coming, he will have to be imported from a new stock, and we shall wait with much interest for the fulfilment of the prophecy that Admiral DE MELO is to be the “General MONK” of a new restoration.

## 26. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 21 de setembro

The Pall Mall Gazette *também está convencido que «Melo ganhou em toda a linha. Além disso, o jornal concorda com o seu colega<sup>9</sup> que propõe buscar um príncipe alemão para tomar conta do Brasil.*

If the news from Brazil be at all correct – but who would dare pledge faith upon a South American telegram? – Admiral Melo has won along the line. He is said to have demanded the surrender of Rio, offering the alternative of a bombardment to which his other efforts in that line are as child’s pay. Indeed, we do not see how the President is to recover himself, nor do we see what the issue will be of this most bitter civil war. *The Standard* suggests that a German prince might be induced to take over the monarchy, and some conclusion of the affaires is most desirable. We fancy, however, that South American republics are too loosely knit for that, and that in the end the county

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<sup>9</sup> Cf. Texto 24.

[country?] which might have been the strongest in the peninsula will become the battle-ground of small, powerless, vindictive, heavily indebted States.

## 27. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Bristol Mercury*, 22 de setembro

*Depois de ter afirmado que «uma autocracia benigna era mais adequada ao Brasil [...] que uma forma de governo de tipo representativo», o jornal de Bristol interroga-se sobre «as causas da instabilidade dos governos da América do Sul».*

*Cita como modelo a seguir o México de Porfírio Díaz<sup>10</sup>, que atraiu o capital estrangeiro e que fez construir uma rede de caminhos de ferro. Desse modo, afirma o jornal, o poder central consegue chegar em poucas horas a todas as partes do país e esmagar à nascença, «com implacável severidade», qualquer tentativa de rebelião.*

*Por conseguinte, na opinião do diário, o Brasil só terá uma estabilidade governativa quando tiver as estruturas que lhe permitão atingir, num tempo razoável, as várias províncias do país.*

*«Peixoto, até agora, mostrou-se um homem de recursos. enérgico e a sua posição vai sair reforçada se conseguir» repelir o ataque de Custódio de Melo, escreve o jornalista que acrescenta: como o Congresso está do seu lado, «não é obrigado a mostrar a mesma complacência para cada almirante ou general agitado que quer deter as rédeas do poder».*

Brazil has now been occupied for some days in its favourite pastime of revolution, to the serious injury of its trade and credit. Its career it got rid of its aged Emperor by a sudden and peaceful *coup d'état* has not redounded to the glory of republican principles. Recent events appear to indicate, if indeed a

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<sup>10</sup> Porfirio Díaz (1830-1915) governa o México com mão de ferro durante 35 anos, de 1876 a 1911.

general inference can legitimately be drawn from such confused date, that on the whole a mild autocracy was better suited to the Brazilian temperament than the political activity of a representative form of government. But with the pathetic death of Pedro II in exile in Europe almost all hope of restoring tranquillity through the revival of the monarchy disappeared, though it is said that this is one of the objects of Admiral de Melo insurrection. A valuable contribution would be made to political science if some competent observer would undertake to investigate the causes of the instability of governments in South America. The example of Mexico shows that under favourable conditions it is possible to maintain for a long term of years the same form of constitution without revolution or serious disorders. Since 1867, when Emperor Maximilian was shot, Mexico, under the skilful and firm rule of President Diaz, has advanced in commercial and national prosperity. The secret of the success of President Diaz appears to be the foresight which he has displayed in encouraging foreign capitalists to traverse the country with railroads. The remotest district is thus placed within a few hours' journey of the capital, and as the President is a capable military commander who puts down the least semblance of riot with unrelenting severity, the ambitious conspirator really has no opportunity of starting a rebellion. Besides, the prosperity of the country under the present administration has been such that the indolent Mexicans, whose characteristic answer to all invitations to exert himself is "Tomorrow", is not likely to desire a change unless a very powerful case is made out in its favour. It is significant that while the area of Brazil is more than four times that of Mexico, the latter has about the same number of miles of railway as the

former. The probabilities are that Brazil will never be provided with a stable Government until, like its northern rival, it is well supplied with those resources of civilisation which annihilate distance and delay, and thus destroy the best friends of disorder. President Peixoto has hitherto shown himself a man of energy and resource, and his position will be considerably strengthened if he can successfully repel the attempt of Admiral de Melo to displace him. He has announced his intention of holding office till the end of 1894, and the cause of order will be materially promoted if he is able to keep his word. If Congress has pronounced against him, it might have been his duty to resign, but he is not bound to show the same complaisance towards every restless admiral or general who desires to hold the reins of power.

## 28. «The revolution in Brazil», *The Times*, 23 de setembro

*O autor da carta critica um telegrama enviado de Viena e publicado pelo jornal londrino. Recusa a ideia segundo a qual «o Almirante Custódio de Melo organizou a revolução contra o Marechal Peixoto [...] para pôr cobro ao favoritismo, ao nepotismo e ao esbanjamento de fundos». Por outro lado, lembra que Presidente tem o apoio do Legislativo, que «recusou com larga maioria» a impugnação de Peixoto.*

*Além disso, o «Anglo-brasileiro» desmente que Melo seja monárquico; enumera os barcos da marinha brasileira e os seus soldados e marinheiros; avisa que a tentativa de restauração levaria o país à guerra civil; lamenta o peso excessivo dos militares na política da jovem República. Finalmente, prevê que, sem nenhum apoio por parte do Exército, «a louca iniciativa do Almirante Melo está condenada a acabar miseravelmente».*

TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES

Sir, – The telegram from Vienna, with the reference to the revolt in Brazil, which appears in your issue of today, is in many particulars most inaccurate, and I trust you will permit me as briefly as possible to state the actual facts of the case.

It is altogether erroneous to assert that the insurgent party, under the leadership of Admiral Custodio de Melo, has risen in revolution against Marshal Peixoto, Vice-President of the Republic, to put an end to a system of favouritism, nepotism and squandering of funds. Now Marshal Peixoto governs with the majority of the Congress, actually sitting, and no expenses can be ordered by him without the consent of the Tribunal of Accounts and that are not within Budget limits. The navy, however, under the influence of Admiral Melo, is seeking to place itself above both the Congress and the Constitution. It has received no delegation for this from the Brazilian nation, which legally and rightly is solely represented by the Congress. The opposition brought forward a motion for the impeachment of Peixoto, as provided for in the Constitution, but this proposal was rejected by a large majority. It is under these circumstances that the navy claims to take the law into its own hand. Hereafter the army, in its turn, might do the same, and so perfect anarchy would reign in Brazil.

With respect to the coffee crop, it is true that this year it will be about one-fifth less than that of the previous year, but, on the other hand, the price has gone up, so that the country will thus be compensated for any loss in consequence of the reduction in quantity.

Scarcity of small currency is not peculiar to Brazil; it exists in Italy, Russia, and other countries. As regards Brazil however, the evil is already remedied by the coinage of nickel.

Admiral Melo is not, and never has been, a Monarchist. Even in the time of D. Pedro II., when he was Naval Attaché in England, his Republican ideas and feelings were well known. His object now is to oblige President Peixoto to resign, being himself a candidate at the election of a new President, which will take place by universal suffrage in March, 1894.

Touching the strength of the navy, it only exists in the Correspondent's imagination, as to numbers and ships. Brazil possesses two strong ironclads, one being a Toulon for repairs; two new cruisers, lately built by Messrs. Armstrong, of Newcastle; a few gunboats and torpedo-boats, and some old ships, worth very little. In the absence of defections in the army, and without military co-operation, Admiral Melo's foolish enterprise is doomed to reach a miserable end. As for the restoration of the Monarchy, in the present state of the country such an attempt would mean simple civil war and separation of the States. No Brazilian who loves his country wishes to see a return of the Imperial *régime*. The new institutions have been freely accepted and no step backward is now possible. For good or evil Brazil must continue to be a Republic, and after 50 years of Parliamentary and national liberty it is not likely that it will ever submit to militarism of any kind. Unfortunately, the Republic

was proclaimed by the army and the navy, and the military element has had a temporary preponderance, but it is only for a period of transition.

In conclusion, I may observe that the Brazilian army numbers 18,500 men, and not 15,390, as stated in the telegram, and that the navy is manned by not more than 5, 000 hands. I may add that, so far as is known in Brazilian circles here, there is no diplomat of any standing in Vienna recently arrived from Brazil. Yours, etc.

London, Sept. 22

ANGLO-BRAZILIAN

[\* None of the statements the accuracy of which "Anglo-Brazilian" disputes were made by our Vienna Correspondent, who simply forwarded an account of an interview which has appeared in the *Neues Wiener Tagblatt*. ]

## 29. «The Revolt in Brazil», *Dundee Courier and Argus*, 23 de setembro

*O jornal de Dundee não acredita numa fácil vitória dos revoltosos, tendo em conta que Peixoto beneficia do apoio do Exército. De Melo pode esperar tomar a capital se conseguir o bloqueio do porto, mas, se isso acontecer, realça o editorial, vai haver uma fragmentação da república em vários estados.*

*O regresso da monarquia é julgado de um modo positivo pelo diário escocês, que, no entanto, cita uma outra fonte segundo a qual, Custódio de Melo só quer «que a Marinha tenha uma influência predominante na República, naturalmente com ele na presidência», perspectiva que, todavia, não parece suscitar o entusiasmo do editorialista.*

If any reliance can be placed on the reports cabled yesterday concerning the hostilities in Brazil, revolution is not to become law without a vigorous resistance on the part of President Peixoto. The President can evidently count on the loyalty of the land forces, and with their assistance he has been able to repulse the insurgent vessels at Santos. The only hope of the rebel Admiral Custodio de Melo now rests in securing the surrender of Rio de Janeiro. His vessels are in the bay hemmed in by the forts, and they cannot effect a landing in consequence of the resistance of the land forces. His power to capture the town, therefore, depends on his stock of ammunition, and on the diminution of provisions in the capital itself by reason of the stoppage of supplies. According to one report, the citizens are already being put to the pinch for the necessary of life, and it is predicted that the Admiral will be in possession immediately. So long as Peixoto is able to command the support of the provinces, however, there is little likelihood of the revolution becoming an absolute success, and the result that would follow the downfall of Rio would probably be the disintegration of the Republic. Prominent Brazilians in Europe and financiers interested in Brazil have sanguinely anticipated that victory for Admiral de Melo would mean the re-establishment of the Monarchy. If that were to be the outcome of the revolutionary movement, there would be some grounds for regarding it with favour. A wise and firm ruler invested with the authority of Royalty might be the means of rescuing the country from the state of chaos into which it has fallen, and its citizens from the perpetual turmoil of internecine warfare. But a correspondent who has recently returned from Brazil, and whose views are set forth in our columns today, puts a totally

different complexion on Admiral de Melo's intentions. Like Hal o' the Wynd, the Admiral de Melo is fighting of his own hand. His sole object is to make the Navy the dominating influence in the Republic, with Admiral de Melo, of course, in the Presidential chair. If Monarchy there is to be, Admiral de Melo must be the Monarch. Having regard to the part which the Admiral has already played in fomenting the spirit of revolution in the country, Brazil may well pray to be delivered from the domination of a ruler under whom its last state would most probably be worst that its first.

**30. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Nottinghamshire Guardian*, 23 de setembro**

*Pequeno comentário em parte copiado do Standard de dia 20<sup>II</sup>.*

The insurgents in Brazil are steadily gaining ground everywhere. After a heavy bombardment of Rio de Janeiro on Sunday, several of the Federalist gunboats left the bay to attack Santos. Military and naval officers ashore have refused to obey the orders of President Peixoto, and his cause is regarded as lost unless he receives foreign aid. The garrisons of all the forts in the bay of Rio, except Santa Cruz, have declared in favour of the revolution. The Government has abandoned its chief positions along the coast, and forts and

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<sup>II</sup> Cf. Texto 21.

gunboats one after the other go over to the insurgents. There is a general impression that the Government of President Peixoto is doomed.

### 31. *The Newcastle Weekly Courant*, 23 de setembro

*Comentário muito parecido com o anterior, embora este semanário insista mais sobre as informações que são fragmentarias e duvidosas».*

Civil war has broken out in Brazil. Unfortunately, the information concerning the outbreak is scrappy and unreliable. All that seems to be definitively known is that there is fighting, and that there is rebellion. Each side in turn, seems to get possession of the telegraph wires, and, as it usual with such outbreaks, one side of the story is true until the other is told. There seems to be no doubt, however, that the insurgents have entered the harbour of Rio de Janeiro, where Admiral Melo maintains an intermittent bombardment. The reports also state that war has spread through Bahia, Pernambuco, and the Rio Grande. The Government is said to have abandoned its chief positions along the coast, and forts and gunboats one after the other are going over to the insurgents. There is, in fact, general impression that the Government of President Peixoto is doomed.

### 32. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 23 de setembro

*Mais um pequeno artigo que enaltece os revoltosos. O jornal londrino não acredita nas notícias vindas da capital uruguaia na qual se fala duma*

*derrota da frota rebelde. Elas «não têm significado nenhum» porque «a gente de Peixoto conseguiu exercer pressão sobre alguns funcionários em Montevideo».*

The news from Brazil must still be received with a sort of expectant scepticism. We know what will be, but we know next to nothing of what already has been. It is evident that Peixoto's people have managed to put pressure on some official in Montevideo, for a telegram this morning speaks of the defeat of a rebel squadron. The Squadron however, consists of two gunboats, a ship of war, and a few minor steamers, which broke out of the harbour of Rio the other day: and the news means nothing at all. Besides, we can set against in the fact that the Federal troops in the Rio Grande have been compelled to raise the siege of San Eugenio. Moreover, it is certain that Rio has refused to accept Admiral de Melo's ultimatum, for we have the intelligence from an untainted source. That worthy who has been shooting and murdering officers in the intervals of his blockade, now lies (apparently for the first time) with his decks cleared for action. Knowing the Brazilian character as we do, it seems doubtful whether Rio will care to fight him; and if Rio fights it will probably surrender as soon as it can do so with any show of decency.

### **33. *The Yorkshire Herald*, 26 de setembro**

*O jornal de York –que lamenta a queda do Império quatro anos antes – não tem confiança nos despachos que chegam do Brasil. Não pensa que os rebeldes tenham obtido grandes sucessos, mas, ao mesmo tempo não*

*acredita que a situação na capital seja assim tão calma como a descrevem as fontes do governo brasileiro.*

*Interroga-se sobre as verdadeiras intenções de Custódio de Melo, que, no seu entender, não têm como objetivo a restauração dos Bragança, mas sim a demissão de Peixoto. O jornalista põe também em evidência o facto do Presidente ter o parlamento do seu lado e, por conseguinte, de respeitar «as disposições da República».*

*Embora admita que haja muitas coisas que não funcionem no atual executivo, o editorialista reconhece que, no caso duma vitória dos revoltosos, em vez de um ditador apoiado pelo Exército, os brasileiros teriam um comandante supremo da Marinha: nos dois casos, «os sentimentos das pessoas seriam subordinados aos caprichos de um só homem». «Qualquer mudança seria de mal a pior», escreve o editorialista, que pensa também nos britânicos que vivem no território da jovem República e na importância económica do Brasil para o comércio do seu país.*

A telegram received yesterday in New York from Montevideo states that Admiral MELO has renewed the blockade of Rio de Janeiro, and is organizing a squadron to sail for the Northern ports. Four years have elapsed since in "three glorious days" Brazil exchanged a hereditary Monarch for a Republic, and during that time the country has been a scene of unrest which has now culminated in open revolution. When DOM PEDRO gave place to Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA, the forms of the Monarchy were superseded by those of a military Dictatorship extending over a country half the size of Europe. Never did an old order of things pass away so quickly and with so little bloodshed. Only one Minister was shot, and as soon as the good EMPEROR had taken shipping for Lisbon, tranquillity reigned supreme, the people following their regular avocations under the new regime just as they had done under the old

dispensation. Some critics described the complete yet quiet change which had occurred as “revolution-making whit rose-water”. Established institutions, however, cannot be suddenly overturned without injury to the country. This has proved to be the case of Brazil. There was an absence of violence when the Monarchy was abolished, but the rising which might have been expected to accompany that event was simply postponed. South America has been the headquarters of insurrection for years, and Brazil has been swept into the vortex. Under the Empire it enjoyed a fair share of social and political stability; but now public security has vanished, and no one can say when good order and commercial equilibrium will be restored.

Telegram from the scene of the revolution being subjected to the severest censorship by interested parties, it is impossible for Europeans to arrive at an exact knowledge of the situation. If we accept as true what are called the “official” dispatches from Rio de Janeiro to Senhor ALCINDO GUANABARA, the special delegate of the Brazilian Government in Europe<sup>12</sup>, we might imagine that public order had not been disturbed at all. Supplied with provisions by the railways connecting it with the State of Sao Paulo, the capital has, we are assured, never suffered from want of food, and the insurgents have never succeeded for a moment in taking possession of a single point on the coast. This “official” intelligence comes from the officers of Marshal PEIXOTO, the President of the Republic, who governs with the support of the majority of

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<sup>12</sup> Alcindo Guanabara (1865-1918), jornalista e político brasileiro, membro da Constituinte, viajou pela Europa em 1893.

the Congress, and who has an interest in making it appear that the revolutionary movement led by Admiral MELO is not been attended with success. It seems certain, however, that if Admiral MELO who has control of the Brazilian warships, has not scored any decided triumph for the rebel party, he has disturbed tranquillity at Rio much more than Marshal PEIXOTO would have us suppose. What Admiral MELO'S precise aims are, cannot very clearly be ascertained. A few days ago it was reported that he contemplated the restoration of the Monarchy, and he was represented as a devoted adherent of DOM PEDRO. This, however, is now absolutely contradicted. We are told that he is not and never was a Monarchist, the real object of his rebellion being to oblige President PEIXOTO to resign. If he intends to secure this result by directing his guns upon the capital, he will thing not have the sympathy of outsider in the dispute. If President PEIXOTO has been holding his position in spite of an adverse vote of Congress, he might be said to be setting himself above the Constitution. Such, however, is not the case. The Opposition submitted to Congress a motion impeaching the PRESIDENT, but the proposal was defeated by an overwhelming majority. He therefore retains office in accordance with the provisions of the Republic, and Admiral MELO has no mandate from any authority for the course he is pursuing. A system of favouritism and nepotism may exist, but the rebels have adopted a very unconstitutional method of putting this down. The revolutionary party derive their strength and encouragement from the fact that the PRESIDENT has nothing before him but chaos or arbitrary rule. He has whole provinces full of insurgents, while

Congress contains a large contingent of his worst enemies. The feeling dominant amongst the people is that the existing state of thing must collapse.

There can be no question that should success attend the rebel movement, Admiral MELO will make short work with President PEIXOTO and his Government. The chief and almost the only thing on which the existing Executive rely is the fidelity of the Army. The loyalty of the troops, however, under the prevailing state of affairs, is not much to be depended upon. Brazil seems to be doomed to militarism for some time to come. A *Times* correspondent states that after fifty years of Parliamentary and national liberty, Brazil is not likely to submit to this; but when the Government passes, as it is likely to do now, into the hands of a Dictator who is paramount in the Army, or of an admiral, who is supreme in a rebel Navy, the feeling of the people will be subordinated to the caprice of a single man. In the meantime, the development of the resources of the country is stopped. Any change is from bad to worse, and the most discouraging feature of the situation is that the strife is not likely soon to terminate. The Brazilians who are easily governed, are suffering all the horror of civil war. They too easily exchanged their Monarchical institutions for the Republican regime, which affords a wider field for the intrigues of ambitious men that is furnished by the old kingly form of government. In regard to what is transpiring in Brazil, our interest centres in the numerous residents at Rio and elsewhere, and the important stake we have in the trade and resources of the Republic. For all concerned the present condition of things cannot come to an end too soon.

### 34. «Imperium et Libertas», *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 27 de setembro

*Sem dúvida, o «rei filósofo» Dom Pedro fez erros, admite o jornal londrino, mas «se compararmos as condições do Brasil durante o seu reinado [...] com aquelas de outros estados sul-americanos» não há dúvidas: «para Dom Pedro, governar era um dever, para outros governantes provisórios, um negócio».*

*O jornalista, como a esmagadora maioria dos seus colegas britânicos, lamenta que, «no Brasil, num mau momento, o espírito doutrinário [republicano] ganhou vantagem» e mandou embora o imperador. Na sua opinião, «o sonho selvagem de uma Confederação Pan americana» do secretário de Estado Blaine teve um papel importante na mudança de regime de novembro de 1889.*

*«A partir daquele momento, o roubo e as malversações, que eram no mínimo desaprovados durante o império, tornaram-se ordem do dia no que é nominalmente uma República, mas que é de facto uma ditadura militar», realça o editorialista,*

*Este, no último parágrafo, interroga-se sobre as intenções de Custódio de Melo, interpretando as declarações do chefe da insurreição como favoráveis a um regresso da monarquia: «Mas seja como for, uma restauração do Império parece muito provável.». Como muitos diários britânicos e também alguns jornais franceses, toma os seus desejos por realidade.*

Brazil ought to convey melancholy warning to the doctrinaire politician. For over fifty years under a monarchical form of government this naturally rich country enjoyed at least the benefits of fixed and settled government. We are far from denying that there were abuses and shortcomings under the rule of Dom PEDRO. But they were for the most part inseparable from the conditions of the country. Latin races are “gey ill” to rule at any time, and when they are

turned loose in a spacious and distant colony they are apt to run very wild. But if we compare the condition of Brazil under the rule of Dom PEDRO – who went very near to realizing PLATO’S ideal of a philosopher-king – with that of other South American States, we recognize the futility of believing in the infallibility of Republican institutions. Governing to Dom PEDRO was a duty, to other temporary rulers in South America it was and is a trade. He might have made, and did make, mistakes, but at least they were disinterested errors of judgment, and were not the result of self-seeking. Elsewhere, the man who profited by a popular movement sought to enrich themselves and their families with all convenient rapidly during their spell of power, knowing it to be brief and precarious, and that their lives were staked upon success. From all the dangers incidental to this desperate form of political gambling Brazil was exempt for more than a half a century. In an evil moment for Brazil the spirit of the doctrinaire got the upper hand. The army was tampered with, and Dom PEDRO and his family were shipped off to Europe before hardly one per cent of the population knew what was happening. There can be no doubt that the revolution was in some measure due to Mr. BLAINE’S wild dream of a Pan-American Confederation. It would be unfair to say that he encouraged the conspiracy to dethrone Dom PEDRO, but it is quite certain that the ringleaders were well aware that he would hail the downfall of the Empire with something more than satisfaction. The existence of a monarchical form of government in any part of South America was necessarily fatal to a confederation of which the United States of America was to be the recognized head. And so Dom PEDRO was sent away, accompanied by the respect of those who had deposed him, and

by the heartfelt regrets of Brazilians who were not enamoured of abstract theories, and who cared little for, and believed less in, the possibilities of Mr. BLAINE'S Utopian dreams.

From that day to this, Brazil has gone from bad to worse. Jobbery and malversation, which were at least discountenance under the Empire, have been the recognized order of the day under what is nominally a Republic, but is virtually a military dictatorship. And at last there has been, as invariably happens, a counter-revolution. What will be the upshot no one can say? The Brazilian legations abroad issue from time to time statements to the effect that Admiral DE MELO, who is in command of the insurgent fleet, is reduced to the direst straits, that the country espouses warmly the cause of President PEIXOTO, and that the movement may be expected to collapse at any moment. But this hardly tallies with the rigour which the officials at Rio suppress the despatch of any news to the rest of the world. Open telegrams on business matters are permitted, but nothing else. This does not look confidence, and from outside sources of information we should infer that President PEIXOTO'S regime is fast nearing its end.

The intentions of Admiral DE MELO in the event of his success are not very clear. In the proclamation he has issued, after denouncing President PEIXOTO and "the corrupt members of the senate and venal deputies", he concludes: "If by my aid, in making this stand for liberty, our cause shall triumph, I shall hand over the Government to the charge of those honourable men who gave freedom to our nation before". This may of course be interpreted

as an allusion to the late Imperial dynasty, under whose auspices the independence of Brazil was proclaimed, or it may refer to those who deposed Dom PEDRO. But this is hardly likely, since most of them are to be found amongst the supporters of President PEIXOTO. The situation is still further complicated by the issue of another proclamation on the part of four members of the Brazilian Congress on board the *Aquidaban*. They denounce the present regime in terms almost identical with those employed by Admiral DE MELO, but conclude with the statement that “in giving him the command of their forces at this juncture they have in view the restoration of peace and law and the re-establishment of Republican principles”. But, as learnt from NAPOLEON III., adherence to Republican principles is not inconsistent with an Imperial form of government. This announcement, too, may therefore point to a restoration of the Empire. In whose person it is to be revived, in the event of the success of the counterrevolution, is also involved in mystery. Some maintain that the successor to Dom PEDRO will be of his grandsons; other aver that the choice has already fallen upon Prince AUGUSTUS of Saxe-Coburg, who is now serving in the Brazilian Navy [*sic!*]<sup>13</sup>. But be that it may, a restoration of the Empire seems more likely than not; and seeing that under the Empire Brazil enjoyed a fair measure of prosperity, and was exempt from the revolutions which constantly paralyze all enterprise in South America, the best friends of Brazil, and those most deeply interested in its welfare, would welcome such a consummation.

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<sup>13</sup> Trata-se de Augusto Leopoldo (1867-1922), segundo neto de D. Pedro. Ex-oficial da Marinha imperial brasileira, em 1893, está em Viena, já incorporado na Marinha austro-húngara.

### 35. «The War in Brazil», *The Leeds Mercury*, 30 de setembro

*O que se passa no Brasil, escreve o diário de Leeds, prova que os republicanos brasileiros não conseguiram «manter a ordem e garantir a prosperidade ao seu país». Para o editorialista, a História castiga os povos que maltrataram os «legítimos chefes»: os franceses que executaram o rei em janeiro de 1793, foram humilhados pelos prussianos em 1870; os brasileiros, que mandaram embora Pedro II, sofrem agora os tormentos da guerra civil.*

The civil war in Brazil has come to belie the confident and oft-repeated assertion of the head of the Legation of this city, that affairs under the Republic would settle down peaceably, and that the rising in the province of Rio Grande was of a purely local nature. In renewing the course of events since the abdication of Dom Pedro, one is reminded of the warning addressed by the Emperor William<sup>14</sup> to his officers at Donchery<sup>15</sup> (after Sedan) as to the evils that befall a nation which treats its rightful head as the French treated Louis XVI in 1792. The excessive optimism of the young Brazilian Republicans as to their ability to maintain order and secure prosperity to their county has, so far, not been borne out by events. The state of things is forcibly brought home to the English mind when one reads of a band clerk being killed at his desk by a shell.

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<sup>14</sup> Guilherme I (1797-1888) foi rei da Prússia a partir de janeiro de 1861 e imperador alemão desde janeiro de 1871.

<sup>15</sup> É nesta pequena localidade, situada a poucos quilômetros de Sedan, que se realiza o encontro entre Napoleão III e Bismarck, depois da derrota francesa de 2 de setembro de 1870.

### 36. *The Glasgow Herald*, 2 de outubro

*Reflexões sobre a eventual intervenção das Grandes Potências, para a qual é indispensável obter o aval dos Estados Unidos.*

I hear that an exchange of views is taking place between the Great Powers as to the advisability of naval intervention at Rio. A forcible intervention could not be undertaken obviously without the cooperation of the United States. Brazil when it declared the Republic imitated in every particular the constitution of the United States, and in the recent commercial convention has done its utmost to secure the friendship of the great northern Republic. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the United States would consent to a forcible intervention; but of course, one or other of the parties to the struggle might be induced to invite friendly intervention, and then the United States might take the lead. At all events I have good ground for believing that communications are passing between the Powers as to the advisability of some kind of action. The damage done in Rio, according to the information that reaches the Foreign Office, is not as great as might have been expected, but the diplomatic representatives at Rio, and all foreigners in fact, are shocked at the way in which an open town is being bombarded, life taken, and property destroyed. Some Englishmen have already been killed, one a much respected employee of an English bank, and I believe that one or two foreigners of other nationalities have likewise been injured.

### 37. «The Situation in Brazil», *The Bristol Mercury*, 4 de outubro

*Não podemos saber exatamente o que se passa no Rio, afirma o jornal, segundo o qual a verdade tem de estar mais ou menos a meio caminho entre a versão oficial e a dos rebeldes. O que parece certo, nota o diário de Bristol, é que esta guerra não é tão terrível como tem sido afirmado. Porém, «estas batalhas incruentas [...] perturbam inevitavelmente os negócios e paralisam o comércio».*

*O jornalista declara que Peixoto, «até se provar que agiu como um tirano», tem o direito de cumprir o seu mandato presidencial. Por outro lado, acusa Custódio de Melo de agitar «os elementos da desordem» e de não representar «um movimento genuinamente constitucional».*

It is impossible not to feel a keen interest in the turbulent affairs of the great Brazilian Republic, whose untold natural wealth and marvellous resources would, in the hands of a more energetic and orderly people, place it among the leading nations of the world. At present the situation appears to be decidedly critical. The facts are, however, difficult to ascertain. A strict press censorship is exercised, which naturally eliminates from all messages every statement unfavourable to the Government, and the official manifestos have only to be compared with those issuing from the rebels to show that the truth may lie between the two extremes, but that it would be almost impossible to tell exactly where. *The New York Herald* is probably the best channel for information, yet the letters which it has received only carry us up to the 22<sup>nd</sup> of last month, and much may have happened in the interval. But if its correspondent may be trusted, the slight successes obtained by the rebels are making the Government unpopular. Admiral de Melo perseveres with the

blockade of Rio de Janeiro, and his troops have bombarded the arsenal and also the neighbouring towns of Armacao and Niteroi. As twenty persons were killed in the two cities, the inhabitants have taken alarm and left them desolate. From this act it is easy to infer that the terrible character of the actual fighting is much exaggerated. The people, notwithstanding their readiness with their revolvers, are not fond of serious war; and when it comes to killing, they feel that matters are being carried too far. A few shells which fell into the streets of Rio de Janeiro caused a general flight to Petropolis, twenty-five miles distant. These bloodless battles are not important from a census standpoint, but they necessarily disturb business and paralyse commerce. Without being on the spot the merits of the dispute cannot be decided, but, in the absence of evidence that Marshal Peixoto is acting tyrannically, one is inclined to believe that he is in the right. There is not the slightest proof that Admiral de Melo represents any genuine constitutional movement. President Peixoto was elected in 1891, and, as the term of office is four years, he has a right to remain in power till the close of 1894. The Admiral appears to be relying upon the restlessness which is characteristic of the people of Brazil. In other words, he is stirring up the element of disorder which has already produced much trouble and will cause more until the railway system is better developed, and it is possible to concentrate troops rapidly at the point where they are wanted to suppress sedition.

### 38. *The Times*, 5 de outubro

*O quotidiano felicita-se de um ponto de vista humanitário, pela decisão tomada pelas grandes potências, salvo a Alemanha, de impedir de Melo de bombardear a cidade. No entanto, precisa o jornal, os navios estrangeiros que se encontram na baía do Rio não têm de se meter na guerra civil, que é um assunto interno ao Brasil, realça o editorial, mas atuam sobretudo para proteger a vida e a propriedade dos estrangeiros que vivem na capital brasileira.*

Acting under discretionary powers conferred upon them by their respective Governments, the commanders of the foreign men-of-war now present in the Bay of Rio have informed ADMIRAL DE MELO that he cannot be permitted to attack the city. There are ships of the British, French, German, Italian, American, and Portuguese navies in the Bay, and the officers representing all these nationalities, with the exception of the German commander, have acted together. The step which they have been authorized at last to take will undoubtedly command general approval. The intermittent bombardment carried on by the insurgent Admiral must have caused cruel suffering and grievous loss to the civil population of the unfortunate town, and must have endangered, if not destroyed, a large amount of foreign property, without exercising any material influence on the progress of the struggle between PRESIDENT PEIXOTO and his late colleague and fellow-conspirator. The operation is always a terrible one, even when the shells are directed a fortress in the course of a regular siege. But its horrors are unspeakably magnified when, as in the present instance, fire unexpectedly opened on a populous city.

The ordinary conditions of life in Rio are probably very much the same as in other peaceful towns. Its inhabitants have built houses and shops and markets in perfect security, as they imagined, from anything worse than an occasional *émeute* in the streets. They are unable to abandon their homes and property, and they can find no shelter from the shells which may at any moment come crashing through the roofs. From reasons of humanity alone everybody must rejoice that the foreign Governments have seen their way to forbid a barbarous and useless method of warfare. Humanity, however, is not the ground on which they base their intervention. Primarily, the struggle between PRESIDENT PEIXOTO and ADMIRAL DE MELO is no concern of theirs. It is a purely domestic contest, in which, as such, they have not right to interfere. So strongly does the German Government feel the force of this argument that, although they are very large numbers of born Germans settled in Brazil, it has refused to authorize the German commander before Rio to take joint action with his fellows. The other Powers justify their intervention expressly upon the ground of their duty to their own subjects, whose lives and property are endangered by the action of a party still technically rebels without any recognized *status*. Notwithstanding the scruples of the Germans, there can be no reasonable doubt that the attitude of the other Powers is perfectly correct. All of them, and more particularly Great Britain, have interests of a more or less substantial order in the city of Rio, and it is intolerable that those interests should be wantonly sacrificed to enable one Brazilian politician to put pressure to another. As the object of the Powers is to protect the town, the commanders will probably allow the fleet to continue shelling the forts, if it can do so without injury the private property. Perhaps,

however, the Admiral will now withdraw his ships elsewhere. In the south, if the telegrams which reach us from New York may be relied upon, his party is rapidly making away. The provinces of Parana and Santa Catarina are said to have declared in his favour, and, if this be the case, he now commands the whole southern coast line, as the trifling force at the disposal of the Government is evidently making no impression on the Federalists of Rio Grande do Sul. [...]

### 39. «Neither Humane nor Politic», *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 5 de outubro

*O longo editorial debruça-se sobre o mesmo tema que o texto anterior, a intervenção das grandes potências para evitar um bombardeamento do Rio de Janeiro. Contrariamente ao seu colega de The Times, o jornalista – que condena todas as violências, mas que considera a guerra como um facto – concorda com o ponto de vista do governo alemão: não se deve intervir nos assuntos internos brasileiros, mesmo tendo como objetivo a proteção dos residentes estrangeiros e dos seus bens.*

*Acha «absurdo» e desumano só defender estas pessoas e não os outros habitantes da cidade. Além disso, considera que esta proibição não vai resolver nada, antes pelo contrário: vai prolongar o conflito, vai favorecer um lado contra o outro, fazendo «aumentar as zonas de miséria e a desolação».*

*Finalmente, coloca a questão da defesa dos residentes ingleses num país em guerra, dando como exemplo uma situação parecida com a da Comuna de Paris em 1871: «Teríamos o direito de dizer ao Governo francês: “não pode bombardear Paris, para não prejudicar as propriedades inglesas?”»*

*Na conclusão, o articulista afirma claramente que o melhor para o Brasil era o regresso dos Bragança, mas não é por isso que os ingleses têm de agir concretamente em favor ou contra os monárquicos brasileiros.*

If it were possible to direct international politics solely by regard for what *The Times* calls reasons of humanity, the action of the different foreign Governments in forbidding the bombardment of Rio by Admiral DE MELO would command general approval. It is no doubt a shocking and revolting thing that shot and shell should be poured to a populous city to the destruction of life and property. But all the incidents of warfare are in themselves shocking and revolting. And perhaps if one studied the whole question of mankind into classes that may legitimately be killed and maimed, and classes that may not, would appear even more repugnant to reason and morality. But war – whether civil or international – is a stern fact which has to be recognized. It cannot be ignored simply because it is horrible, and every year the civilized nations of the world spend ever increasing sums of money on perfecting the instruments of destruction, human and mechanical. That this things should not be we are all, or nearly all, sorrowfully convinced. As Archbishop MAGEE<sup>16</sup> once said, in his fearless fashion, politics cannot be conducted on the principle of the Sermon of the Mount. The more is the pity, but the fact remains. Such being the state of the case, though on abstract grounds we rejoice that Rio for the time being is no more to be bombarded, we cannot shut our eyes to the gravity of the steps taken by the Governments, including our own, which forbid Admiral DE MELO to conduct his campaign in his own way. And indeed, as *The Times*, which

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<sup>16</sup> De origem irlandesa, William Connor Magee (1821-1891) foi arcebispo de York durante alguns meses em 1891.

defends the course adopted, says<sup>17</sup>, "Humanity, however, is not the ground on which they base their intervention... The ... Powers justify their intervention expressly upon the ground of their duty to their own subjects, whose lives and property are endangered by the action of a party still technically rebels without any recognized *status*." To this doctrine Germany alone among the Great Powers represented in the Bay of Rio by warships demurs. There is a very considerable German population in Rio, but the Government declines to intervene, on the ground that the struggle between President PEIXOTO and Admiral DE MELO is a domestic contest, in which they have no right to interfere. And we hold that German is right.

For where are we to end, and how are we to draw the line? If the intervening Powers were to say boldly, in the interest of humanity, and on the ground of protecting the lives and properties of our own subjects, we think this struggle has gone on quite long enough and we mean to stop it, there would be at least some logical justification of their action. But they do not say so, and they have no intention of saying so. They do not tell Admiral DE MELO that the must not bombard, kill, and slay in one particular spot, and as if to add a touch of humour to what is tragic enough, the *Times* gravely remarks that, "As the object of the Powers is to protect the town, the commanders will probably allow the fleet to continue shelling the forts, if it can do so without injury the private property." Kill as many Brazilians as you please, they say in effect, destroy what public property you like, but if a shell should stray into a French, or

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<sup>17</sup> Cf. Texto 38.

American, or English hen-roost, we shall muzzle your guns. That surely is an absurd position to take up, and it will not in the long run prove a humane one. The effect of the prohibition will not improbably be to prolong the struggle, to give a temporary advantage to one side, and to extend the area of misery and desolation which war, and especially civil war carries with it.

But perhaps, is not the most serious side of the question. Where, we ask, is the line to be drawn? There are more English subjects and more English private property in Paris than can be found in Rio. Suppose another Communist outbreak – we say nothing of a French-German war – and a recurrence of the necessity to bombard the city, should we have the right to say to the French Government, You must not rain shot and shell into Paris, lest you injure English property? And if we had the right should we enforce it? There is, of course, but one answer to these questions. And if it be argued that Brazil is a small Power, and France a great one, the door is at once opened to issues which nobody cares to contemplate. The question resolves itself into this: if the Powers are prepared to assume responsibility for the orderly government of Brazil, well and good. Let them interfere, and let them interfere effectively. But everyone knows that they are not so prepared, and that the United States would resent any such interference with the MONROE doctrine. Therefore, we hold with Germany that they are bound not to intervene at all. It has been maintained in these columns that a restoration of the Empire would probably be the best solution of Brazilian evils, but we should never dream of urging any

active encouragement of the Imperialists. Neither should we help to suppress them. [...]

#### 40. «The crisis in Brazil», *The Times*, 5 de outubro

*Carta de um inglês que reside no Rio, favorável a Peixoto, na qual dá uma imagem negativa dos rebeldes, acusados de «cometer todos os tipos de depredações no porto, com o objetivo de interromper o abastecimento» da cidade. Na conclusão, o autor da missiva, que deseja a vitória do Governo, escreve que, no caso da em sucesso dos revoltosos, « é difícil de prever o que irá acontecer».*

An English resident writes, under date Rio, September 10: – “The situation is very serious, and it is difficult to foretell the outcome of it all. President Peixoto has – unlike Fonseca two years ago – done nothing illegal, nor has his administration been such as to warrant the revolt. There is very little sympathy on the part of the people with the revolutionists, who hold the warships and commit all kinds of depredations in the harbour, with a view to cutting off supplies. The President has the army and Congress with him. Soldiers fill the streets and guard every accessible landing-place. All attempts to land on the part of the rebels have been repulsed. If the President succeeds, by the active measures he is taking, in quelling the revolt and punishing the promoters of it as they deserve the country will be the better for it, but if the revolutionists get the upper hand it is difficult to predict what may happen”.

#### 41. «The Revolution in Brazil. Reported Capture of a Cardiff Ship by Rebels», *Western Mail*, 5 de outubro

*Algumas informações sobre o navio Norma, que transportava carvão, provavelmente capturado pela frota rebelde. Podemos ler também um pequeno relato enviado pelo capitão deste navio de quatro mastros, cujo trabalho de descarga foi interrompido pelo rebentar da insurreição, quando ainda tinha cerca de dois terços do carvão para entregar.*

Information has reached Cardiff to the effect that the four-masted ship *Norma* has been captured by the rebels at Rio de Janeiro, and is now in their possession. The *Norma* is a new steel ship [...]. She left Cardiff with a cargo of 3,500 tons of coal<sup>18</sup>, loaded by Messrs. Cory Bros., and, according to advices received by Captain Begg, she arrived at her destination on the 28<sup>th</sup> of August. The master [...] wrote in the highest terms of the ship, but, owing to adverse winds and other circumstances, her first voyage was not a fast one. During the first five days after she arrived at her berth, 1,100 tons were discharged, and then the revolution interfered with the work. The captain telegraphed to this effect, but nothing further has been received from him. The information that the ship had been captured with other sailing vessels and steamers was contained in a letter which Messrs. Cory Bros. received this week from their agent at Rio. The latter states that the vessels, all of which were loaded with coal, were taken to an island in the harbour, where they were sheltered from the fire of the forts on shore. The presumption is that the vessels have been

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<sup>18</sup> E com 26 homens a bordo, incluindo três grumetes.

captured in order that coal might be obtained for the warships in the possession of the rebels. Some of the coal was consigned to the Brazilian Government.

#### INTERVIEW WITH CAPTAIN BEGG

A *Western Mail* reporter has an interview with Captain Begg in his house at Partridge road, Cardiff, on Wednesday<sup>19</sup> evening. He had not, he said, received any direct information with reference to the capture of the *Norma*, and he was disinclined to believe the report sent to Messrs. Cory. It took he remarked, 21 days for a letter to reach England from Rio de Janeiro, and the last telegram which he received must have been despatched several days after the letter to Messrs. Cory was posted. In that telegram nothing was said about the vessel having been captured. Captain Begg, however, admitted that it was possible that a message containing the information that the vessel was in the hands of the rebels would not be allowed to pass over the telegraph wires, which are in their hands. He is not at all anxious about the safety of the vessel, as the only object which the revolutionists could have, would be to transfer the cargo to their own men-of-war.

#### AN UNPLEASANT EXPERIENCE

The last letter which Messrs. Begg and Co. received from Captain M'Donnell is dated from the *Norma*, rio de Janeiro, September 10, and gives a brief but graphic description of the position. Captain M'Donnell states:

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<sup>19</sup> 4ª-feira dia 4 de outubro.

We have got no cargo since Tuesday<sup>20</sup>, and I have no idea when we are likely to commence again. I have not doubt you will know more about the revolution at home than we do here. The bay is full of ships and steamers. It is not at all a pleasant situation to be lying her, as the musket balls are flying about in all directions every night, as the small torpedo boats come in amongst the shipping and open fire on the city, while the troops on shore return the fire. There are several warships now in the harbour.

#### COMMUNICATION WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE

Messrs. Cory Bos. and Messrs. Begg and Co. have communicated with the Foreign Office with reference to the reported capture of the *Norma* but up to Wednesday night had received no reply.

#### 42. «The Situation in Brazil», *The Times*, 6 de outubro

*O jornal de referência publica uma carta de um inglês «bem familiarizado com os assuntos brasileiros». Este testemunho não acredita nos telegramas recebidos do Rio, nomeadamente os enviados pelos revoltosos; desvaloriza a importância das destruições na capital e, sobretudo, espera que as Grandes Potências possam intervir a fim de pôr um ponto final nesta guerra civil, altamente prejudicial para a economia do país.*

We have received the following letter, dated October 5, from an Englishman who is well acquainted with Brazilian affairs, and who has exceptional opportunities of obtaining reliable information:

Permit me to call attention to the anomaly that whilst the city of Rio has been said to have been bombarded for the last three weeks there have

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<sup>20</sup> 3ª-feira, dia 5 de setembro.

been large transactions, both financial and commercial, all the time, and, moreover, with few interruptions, there has been constant telegraphic communication between Rio and England. On the other hand, the telegrams, both emanating from Government sources and inspired by Peixoto, and those emanating from Melo and transmitted here *via* New York, have been utterly unreliable, gross exaggerations having been committed on both sides. On the whole, however, the Brazilian Government news has been the most reliable, and it is satisfactory to hear that the damage done to the town of Rio itself is practically of no importance.

It is clear that the action of the various Governments, in giving instructions to their representatives to intimate clearly to Melo that the bombardment of the open city must cease, cannot be too highly praised. This is one of the rare instances in which the safety of human life and the protection of property have not been imperilled by international jealousy. It would be a matter of universal satisfaction in the influence of the Great Powers could be used still further to put an end to this civil war.

The facts of the case are somewhat peculiar. Peixoto's term of office expires in the spring, and then the President will be chosen by the vote of the nation. There are several candidates for his office, and whoever is chosen will possess far greater authority than any one since the fall of the Monarchy. There can be no doubt that the various aspirants to power feel this, and would like to assume a dictatorship before the President has been chosen by the people. If the Powers could intervene to propose an armistice until the time of the Presidential election, then an end would be put to a struggle which is not only detrimental to the interests of the country of Brazil, but which also prevents the ordinary progress of its export and import trade with Europe. The fact of Brazil having large commercial interests with all countries ought to be an inducement for all the Powers to continue their point action to bring about a cessation of the present strife, all the more as there is no question of any one country having any predominant political influence.

### 43. *The Leeds Mercury*, 7 de outubro

*Artigo baseado nos despachos favoráveis aos revoltosos. Escreve que houve vários mortos e de muitas destruições em Niterói e Armação, bombardeados pela frota rebelde, e que a capital tem dificuldades de abastecimento. Trata os soldados de Peixoto como «rufias, preparados para cometer qualquer atrocidade».*

If the reports may be credited, the insurrection in Argentina has been overcome by the Government troops, although its ashes may smoulder for some time, and may even break afresh into flame, as is the fashion in those South American Republics. While the sway of law and order is being re-established in this part of the Continent, the revolt in Brazil is still in progress, but does not seem to make much headway. On Monday the bombardment of Armação and Niteroi was resumed, and they were exposed all day to a hail of shot and shell. In consequence the inhabitants have abandoned them. Several persons were killed, and much valuable property destroyed. The arsenal of Rio de Janeiro and the Fort Santa Cruz were also bombarded, but did not suffer much damage. A few shells fell in the city and created the liveliest alarm. The inhabitants are withdrawing to town inland. The Government is said to grow more unpopular every day, and President Peixoto, who refuses to resign, is said to rule only by the aid of his military force, numbering some 5,000 men, mostly ruffians ready for any outrage. To escape from these wretches many families are said to have abandoned their homes. On the whole the intelligence received seems to show that the position of Admiral Melo and the rebels is growing

stronger. Rio de Janeiro is reported to be suffering from insufficiency of food supplies, due possibly to the blockade.

#### 44. *The Hampshire Advertiser*, 7 de outubro

The revolution in Brazil is still in progress, the prospect of ultimate success resting with the insurgents. Rio has against been bombarded, but not much damage has been done. Telegrams received in New York report more defections to the insurgents. The provinces of Parana and Santa Catarina have joined the insurrection, and Itaquí, Guarhi [??], and Rio Grande are in the hands of the insurgents. President Peixoto has issued a manifesto declaring that he will not resign, and will continue to fight so long as he controls the 5,000 troops now under his command.

#### 45. *The Yorkshire Herald*, 9 de outubro

*Neste comentário temos, por um lado, as acusações contra a tropa de Peixoto que age com muita violência na capital e, por outro lado, a opinião contrária, segundo a qual o Presidente respeita o Parlamento. Neste caso, é Custódio de Melo que «se quer pôr por cima da Constituição».*

The latest telegrams respecting the revolution in Brazil show that practically nothing but anarchy prevails at Rio de Janeiro and the district of the capital. The news is still extremely contradictory, but it is quite clear that

the army upon which President PEIXOTO mainly depends for support is in a very disorganised condition. Business at Rio de Janeiro is entirely suspended and citizens have had to flee for their lives:

President PEIXOTO'S soldiers are, says one telegram, committing murders and robberies, and are apparently beyond all restraint. They have killed many defenceless persons, and carried on a general plundering of shops and residences. [...] All the English residents have been warned by the British Minister to make their escape from Rio de Janeiro, as the fleet has given notice of its intention to continue bombardment. Postal facilities are suspended and President PEIXOTO searches every mail as it enters or leaves the capital. The sympathies of the city are with Admiral DE MELO.

At the moment it is impossible to say which side will in the end prevail. It was at first stated that the insurgent party, under Admiral MELO has risen in revolt against President PEIXOTO, to put an end to a system of favouritism and a squandering of public money. That, however, was promptly contradicted. It was declared that the PRESIDENT was governing with the support of the majority of the Congress, and that no expense could be incurred without the sanction of a financial tribunal, whose operations were strictly limited by the conditions of the Budget. The Navy, under the influence of Admiral MELO, was shown to be trying to place itself above the Congress and the Constitution. It is certainly had received no authority for its action from the Brazilian nation, which ought to be represented by the Congress, at the lead of which is President PEIXOTO.

#### 46. *The Glasgow Herald*, 9 de outubro

*Artigo muito pessimista que prevê um «completo desmembramento do país», com eternos conflitos.*

The fear of an utter disruption of Brazil is growing very strong here. It would almost seem as if the President has lost control of the army, and that it is becoming licentious and unmanageable. The three southern provinces, too, are reported to be not only in insurrection, but acting in concert. Some who are intimately acquainted with the country, and who have large business interest in connection with it, think that what has so often been put forward will in the end come to pass –namely, a union between those three provinces and Uruguay. Others think that each province will set up for itself, and that there will be a period of utter anarchy. Probably all these pessimistic views are being carried too far just now; but the private intelligence that reaches banks and trading firms in the city is certainly very gloomy, and nobody is able to see any end to the present troubles.

#### 47. *The Glasgow Herald*, 10 de outubro

*O editorialista escocês –que se queixa de receber telegramas contraditórios sobre a guerra civil no Brasil – interroga-se sobre a possível intervenção das grandes potências no porto do Rio. Como The Pall Mall Gazette cinco dias antes,<sup>21</sup>, sublinha três aspetos; só podem proteger os*

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<sup>21</sup> Cf. Texto 38.

*interesses dos seus cidadãos; não podem agir de modo a favorecer uma das duas partes em conflito; não teriam agido de tal modo com uma grande potência.*

*A seguir, fala das condições que os representantes destes países teriam posto a Peixoto e da intenção, na qual não parece acreditar, do presidente formar uma frota para enfrentar o seu inimigo.*

*No fim do texto, o jornalista acredita mais numa vitória de Custódio de Melo. Na sua opinião, este está em melhores condições para ganhar do que o Governo legal: «já destituiu um Imperador e um Ditador, e [...] Peixoto terá de recolher à vida privada (se conseguir salvar a pele), como o seu predecessor».*

No doubt the truth about the civil war in Brazil will be known some days, perhaps, when the British public has lost all interest in the subject. At present it offers only a daily series of conundrums, the puzzle being to find the kernel of fact in each budget of contradictorily telegrams. It was ever thus in South American warfare, but that does not make the condition any more endurable to those who have interests at stake in that vast dominion – not to mention the cause of humanity, which is usually the last thing the South American thinks worth considering. The one item of news received within the last few days that is beyond doubt is that the commanders of the foreign warships in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro have compelled Admiral Melo to refrain from shelling the unfortified portions of the city. This step has been taken ostensibly in the interest and for the protection of foreign residents, but it was a step that could not have been taken with a strong Power. It is one, moreover, in which the German Government refused to concur – doubtless from a perception of the awkward precedent which it may create. Had the Foreign Powers agreed to say that the struggle has lasted long enough and must now be terminated by them

if the belligerents cannot come to term, the course could have been defended as consistent with both common sense and fairness. What they say is in effect – “Fight away as much as you please, provided you do not injure person and property of any of our subjects.” This proper course for these subjects is to remove out of the way of peril, for we cannot deny the right of Brazilians to revolutionise, and to resort to the harsh arbitrament of civil war, if they have a fancy for this sort of thing. And it need hardly be pointed out that for the Foreign Powers to prevent one of the parties to that civil war from resorting to certain measures which he may deem essential to his success is to give an advantage to the other which he ought to be left to obtain for himself if he can. Whether it is time for the Powers to interfere to put an end to the war altogether is another question. A good deal might be urged in favour of the view that it is, for the country is becoming both demoralised and impoverished by the strain and passion of the struggle. The cause of it has already been explained here, if the course of it is obscure and the end of it problematical. According to a Montevideo telegram of Sunday, the diplomatic body had formally intimated to President Peixoto that he must either effect a compromise with Admiral Melo within a limited number of days or evacuate the city, otherwise they would recognise the rebels as belligerents. This statement, however, has been contradicted by a Buenos Aires telegram of yesterday, and on the face of it it seems to be improbable. The latest intimation is to the effect that the foreign naval commanders have landed parties to protect foreign subjects, and have notified President Peixoto that if he fortifies the waterfront of the city, they will be compelled to recognise Admiral Melo as

a belligerent. Technically the Admiral is, up till now, only an insurgent, and yet he seems to have the balance of power on his side. The story that the President is organizing a fleet to meet the Admiral on his own element must be received with all reserve. Fleets are not to be set afloat on a week's notice, and money is not overabundant in Brazil. Moreover, the forces in alliance with, if not under the orders of, Admiral Melo seem to be gaining ground at Rio Grande, Santos and elsewhere. As it is usual in South America revolutions for the "insurgents" to win, it seems probable that the victory will ultimately be with the Admiral, what has already deposed one Emperor and one Dictator, and that Peixoto will have to retire into private life (If he can save his head) like his predecessor. It is highly improbable that Admiral Melo intends to restore the Monarchy, but whether he will assume the Dictatorship himself nobody knows. Meanwhile the next thing to be looked for is the revolt of more Provinces and the proclamation of other Republics.

**48.** *North Eastern Daily Gazette*, 11 de outubro

The revolution in Brazil makes little progress. Unfortunately, however, there is little sign of movement toward pacification. Neither side seems gaining, but meanwhile the country is galloping to ruin.

#### 49. *The Morning Post*, 12 de outubro

*O conflito dura há mais de um mês, não há fim é vista, constata o jornal, o qual não vê em de Melo um paladino da monarquia. O editorialista não considera que o governo tenha roubado ou esbanjado o dinheiro público, mas acusa-o de ter posto em causa «os direitos de autonomia das várias províncias. Lamenta a situação vivida pelos cariocas, mas lembra que o país é imenso e que os habitantes das províncias não são afetados pelos combates no porto da capital.*

The progress of time does not seem to be accompanied by a corresponding tendency towards the solution of the Constitutional problem in Brazil. Considerably more than a month has now elapsed since the commencement of the struggle between President PEIXOTO on the one hand and Admiral DE MELO and his insurgent Naval force on the other. And still despite the periodical appearance of optimistic telegrams from one side or the other, there is no apparent reason why the opposing parties should not go on defying each other and issuing mutually contradictory manifestos, for another month to come. The fact is that a thick mist of mendacity obscures the scene of the conflict, and all efforts to pierce it have so far proved abortive. A recent telegram from Rio to a news agency affirms that “starling developments of the situation may be expected shortly”, that “everything tends to a restoration of the Monarchy”, and such a restoration is now only a question of term. It is not quite easy to reconcile that assertion with the language of the insurgent leader, Admiral DE MELO, in the latest manifesto attributed to him. One has been given to understand all along that the present Naval revolt is the expression of

widespread dissatisfaction with the Central Republican Government at Rio, which has not only been guilty of gross extravagance and jobbery in the management of the public moneys, but has also pursued a policy of unnecessary interference with the autonomous rights of the various provinces of the vast country of Brazil, which the Empire, wiser in its generation than the Republic, has the good sense to respect. Consequently, one regarded the eventuality of the recall of the House of BRAGANZA as being bound up with the fortunes of the insurgents. Now, however, side by side with the prediction of a speedy restoration of the Monarchy, one finds the express declaration of Admiral DE MELO that in case of success he will adhere rigidly to Republican institutions and forms government. The bewildered observer of the Brazilian crisis, therefore, constrained to doubt whether the solution of the difficulty is any nearer today than it was at the outset. The bombardment of the capital is reported to have been once more resumed, Admiral DE MELO having, apparently, cleared his conscience of responsibility for the wanton injury he is inflicting on life and property in that beautiful city by casting that inconvenient burden to his opponent, PEIXOTO. The unfortunate inhabitants of Rio who have to bear the brunt of the existing difference of opinion between the Admiral and the Marshal are exhorted to remember that:

If some persons fall victims to the movement, and if the discipline of Army life causes brother to fight against brother, the blame for this state of things falls not upon those who are attempting to save the country, but upon him who, through unlawful ambition, has brought on and unpatriotically maintains civil war in the bosom of his country.

There is only one comparatively satisfactory reflection which is suggested by the state of affairs at Rio. That is that the territorial extent of Brazil is so enormous that the inhabitants of the more remote provinces can scarcely be affected in any practical way by the fact that civil war is raging at the capital. Civil war is, indeed, often raging in one or another of the Brazilian provinces, as witness the case of Rio Grande do Sul for months past. The area over which the present conflict is the cause of practical hardships and perils to the population is necessarily small, and the provincial Brazilian, no doubt, lives out his life in blissful unconcern as to the fate of the roofs and facades of the capital under the fire of the national ships of war. Some day, it may be supposed, something will happen to decide the fate of the conflict; but until that time the world in general and the Brazilians in particular must perforce be content to possess their souls in patience.

**50.** «Brazil. The Capital again Bombarded», *The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle*, 12 de outubro

*Os ministros chileno e argentinos no Rio protestaram contra «a ingerência entre os beligerantes dos representantes diplomáticos de outras nações», comenta o jornal que espera agora pela reação de Washington.*

*Na segunda parte, o jornalista de Huddersfield limita-se a traduzir o manifesto de Custódio de Melo que põe todas as culpas da guerra civil em Peixoto.*

Admiral de Melo has recommenced firing upon Rio de Janeiro, which is in a state of panic. The fact that the bombardment continues is thought to be due either to a perfidious breach of promise on the part of Admiral de Melo, or to the fact that President Peixoto has refused to dismantle the batteries, and persisted in shelling the ships, thus drawing their fire upon the city.

Much anxiety is felt in Rio de Janeiro to know what action President Clevenand will instruct Mr. Thompson, the Unites States Minister, to take with regard to the question of supporting the Argentina and Chilean Ministers in a protest against the local diplomatic representatives of other nations interfering between belligerents. They have raised the cry of America for American, and assert that this is just the time when the Monroe doctrine should be unmistakably asserted. They declare that the other American Governments are well able to do all the interfering necessary, and are looking to the leader of American nations to come to the front and assert herself. Only Uruguay of the South American nations represented in Rio de Janeiro remains neutral in this matter.

Admiral de Melo has issued a manifesto, in which he declares that in case of success he will adhere rigidly to Republican institutions and forms of government. He says:

Since September 6th the people have seen unfolding before their eyes a long panorama of naturally painful events, which were do solely to President Peixoto's obstinate determination to hold on to power at any cost.

President Peixoto is charged with violation of the Constitution and sacrificing the most vital resources of the country by exposing in for many months to a civil war.

I have solemnly declare, Admiral de Melo continues, and I now repeat, that neither I nor my companions aspire to power for our own benefit. Our only object is to save and restore peace to the country and to liberate the people who have been subjugated and sacrificed be the iron hand of tyranny and by inconceivable want of patriotism and reckless ambition of the chief of the Government, who refuses to submit to the clamour of public opinion, which demands the restoration of peace in Rio Grande do Sul and the abandonment of power on the part of Peixoto. Unfortunately, certain innocent persons have suffered by this patriotic revolt which I have led; but even they, I feel sure, will not fail to sympathise with those who have constituted themselves the defenders of their rights and liberties, and are now fighting heroically for the salvation of true Republican principles. Therefore, if some persons fall victims to the movement, and if the discipline of army life causes brother to fight against brother, all Brazilians ought to recognise the truth and see that the blame for these lamentable occurrences falls entirely not upon those who are attempting to save the country, but upon him who through unlawful ambition has brought on and unpatriotically maintains civil war in the bosom of the country. I am full confident of final triumph in my campaign because it is the cause of liberty and Republicanism, and means the redemption of the country from oppression and tyranny.

**51. *The Hampshire Advertiser*, 14 de outubro**

The revolution in Brazil continues to run its somewhat uneventful course. Occasionally a few shots are fired at the Rio fortifications by the insurgent fleet, but nobody seems to be very much the worst for it, and

business is proceeding as usual. Admiral de Melo, the leader of the insurgents, has issued a manifesto in which he denounces the reckless ambition of President Peixoto, and claims that the revolutionists are the defenders of the citizens' rights and liberties, and are fighting for the salvation of true Republican principles. The President has also issued a manifesto, in which he intimates that if the general elections about to take place are unfavourable to him he will know how to respect the national will.

## 52. «Divided Brazil, *The Graphic*, 14 de outubro

Some effort is being made by the Powers to stop the disastrous civil war in Brazil. Thus, the commanders of the foreign warships at Rio have forbidden Admiral de Melo to make any attack on Rio to endanger foreign subjects, while to balance affairs they will not allow President Peixoto to establish new fortifications in the city. Otherwise, matters remain much the same. President Peixoto will not give up power, and the insurgents are equally determined to hold their own.

## 53. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 16 de outubro

*Pequena nota sobre a proclamação do Governo brasileiro a propósito da revolta liderada por Custódio de Melo. «A privação [do uso da bandeira] apenas indica que é um rebelde; e toda a gente já estava consciente disso», nota, ironicamente, o jornal londrino.*

The so-called Government of Brazil has issued a proclamation which will have a certain interest for international lawyers, and also serve the purpose of reminding the world that there is a body of incompetent persons claiming to rule that immense county. These gentlemen desire the world to know that Admiral Melo's fleet and the ships he has seized, and the forts that have gone over to him are in no way connected with the financial business they carry on under the style and title of a government, and are therefore formally deprived of the right to use the Brazilian flag. No doubt that Admiral Melo is deeply grieved. At the same time, he will probably persist in using the emblem of his patriotism throughout the war, which seems barely to have begun its interminable course. The deprivation merely indicates that he is a rebel; and every one was already aware of the fact. But the proclamation has a ceremonial interest, and therefore we notice it in a column which is usually devotes to serious matters.

**54. «The early Days of the Brazilian Revolution», by a Naval Officer,  
*The Pall Mall Gazette*, 19 de outubro**

*Este relato de um oficial da marinha inglesa fala do acordo entre Vandenkolk e Melo, dois «acérrimos inimigos», para «resistir à opressão» exercida por Peixoto. Narra a seguir, o início da revolta no dia 6, o contacto entre os revoltosos e as frotas das Grandes Potências, os combates que ocorrem principalmente durante a noite.*

*Este testemunho é favorável aos insurrectos e ao próprio Almirante. O chefe da insurreição explica os seus objetivos: não quer candidatar-se à Presidência, mais sim libertar o país da opressão «de um governo autocrático*

*de um tirano militar». Custódio de Melo tem a certeza que o desembarque [das suas tropas] vai atingir os seus objetivos» e que «dentro de três meses a paz será restabelecida».*

Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 22

In a young republican country like Brazil there is always an element of instability in its internal affairs; but few believed a crisis was so near at hand, or that any concerted plan of action existed for the overthrow of the government. It would seem that President Peixoto has a rooted antipathy to the navy and matters naval in general, and has allowed the navy to decline to such a degree that there are now but seven ships that could keep the sea. He has, moreover, governed the country with a military despotism unknown even in the annals of Brazil. These and other influences induced Admirals Vandenkolk and de Melo (though themselves bitter enemies) to join hands in resisting his oppression. It has transpired that the *émeute* was to have taken place in July last, but this was frustrated by Vanderkolk's untimely capture Santa Catarina, and by his captivity under sentence of death in Fort Santa Cruz. Foiled for a time, De Melo himself, Minister of Marine, devoted his energy to accumulating powder, stores, munitions of war, &c., on board his remaining ships, till suspicions were aroused in the President's mind; consequently, the battleship *Riachuelo* was ordered to France for extensive repairs, while the remaining vessel, *Aquidaban*, was to proceed into dock for a thorough refit. Had the latter been allowed take place, the revolution would have been paralyzed, and the

morning of the 6<sup>th</sup> September would not have seen the whole fleet steaming round the bay prepared and ready for action.

#### THE SIXTH OF SEPTEMBER

All that day was spent in towing the obsolete iron clads and torpedo-boats away from the dockyard hands to the rebel position. This was accomplished without any opposition from the Government till the evening saw de Melo at the head of a fairly formidable fleet, consisting of one ironclad, two cruisers, four torpedo-boats, three coast-defence ironclads, six gunboats, and three despatch vessels, besides old vessels without engines, to be used as hospital ships and depots. Having collected these he slipped his moorings, and, with three shrill shrieks on the siren, as if in defiance, he proceeded, with all his consorts, across the bay, there to form his base of operations off Point Areia. Consternation was visible everywhere on receipt of the news. Congress hastily assembled, and a deputation went afloat in the endeavour to effect a compromise. It is needless to state the only terms were the resignation of the President and his Ministry.

#### DE MELO AND THE POWERS

As a hasty meeting of representatives of the European Powers, it was determined to put all interests into the hands of the senior British naval officer. Consequently, an officer was sent to Admiral de Melo to caution him how far his acts would be regarded as a breach of international law, and warning him concerning the protection accorded to foreigners by the English fleet, who, he

pointed out, was now raising steam to take action if necessary. Happily, this was averted, and throughout all negotiation the Admiral has behaved with great courtesy and consideration, thereby gaining all to his side, as against the action of the Government party, who deliberately shot at the Italian Consul coming from his ship, killing a sailor. For this a protest was at once lodged, and responded to by £500 being delivered on board the Italian ship next day, the funeral being attended by all officers in the harbour in full dress. A curious sight was witnessed next day on the arrival of the steamship *Magdalena* from Europe with the mail. Here was seen the huge lighter of the company loaded with mails bags, and passengers being towed ashore by the English boats, the passengers all escorted by lieutenants and boats' crews safe through the Custom house without the usual delay, and to their respective destinations. In the meantime, the rebels were not idle. By night their torpedo-boats patrolled the harbour, bringing a perfect hail of bullets on them as they passed the sea-front, replying to the same with an occasional quick-firing gun. It is needless to say most of the bullets hit every vessel in the harbour except the boat they were intended for. By day a perpetual fusillade was kept up between two regiments of soldiers who had been driven away and the fleet, who has taken the arsenal at Niteroi, with immense stores of powder and shell, besides coal in abundance.

#### THE BOMBARDMENT

This, varied by an occasional attack on the dockyard, constituted the operations of the next few days. On the afternoon of the 12<sup>th</sup>, at a council held

on the French flagship *Arethuse*, which had arrived, it was decided to allow Admiral de Melo a free hand in his operations. So on the morning of the 13<sup>th</sup> the foreign fleet steamed up to a safe anchorage, leaving the British cruiser *Racer* to blockade the mouth of the harbour to prevent the ingress of the vessels. The real business was now to begin. Shortly after 10 A. M, the Admiral having placed his worst ships in place of advantage, steamed to attack Fort Santa Cruz at the head of his fleet. The *Republica* (cruiser) opened fire first and gallantly went into action. Reserving her heavy guns for the fort she played a shower of well from her quick-firing guns on the sandbag batteries in the town, soon silencing their fire. Not so the *Aquidaban*. Though the thunder of her enormous guns seemed to strike the water anywhere, but in the desired direction. Two of her shells reached the fort, killing eighty-six men and completing silencing the guns till a relay was forthcoming. The fort only possessing on the land side guns of small calibre could not to any damage, but can be considered to have held their own, as their flag flies as gaily as ever, and they are said to be eager to renew the fray, and, as they express it, "wipe the navy out". Firing continued till sunset, when it is estimated 350 shots were fired from the fleet, 172 from the fort, of which eight of the former went home and none of the latter within 300 yards of their targets. With the exception of an occasional wild shot from the batteries in the city all remains quiet by day, the only excitement being generally about two A.M. when a cruiser of transport runs the blockade, and gets away to sea uninjured. There was a certain mystery as to their destination; but it has, with other points been cleared up in a series of interviews with

admiral de Melo. In course of conversation, the Admiral was asked if he would allow himself to be put forward as a candidate for the Presidency.

Far from it," said he; "my only idea is to relieve this suffering people from the growing burdens of their taxation and from the autocratic Government of a military tyrant who erects batteries on what was heretofore a defenceless town, thereby hoping that I may fire on the town and incur the odium of nations en general\*. It is not my intention so to do, my principal object being to gain possession of Fort Santa Cruz, thereby to prevent the ingress of egress of vessels hostile to my cause and to form a base for my operations, which will probably take the form of a descent of city troops by a force from the revolted provinces of Rio Grande and Santa Catarina. These I am bringing up in my transports and cruisers; and I have no doubt the landing will effect its purpose, supported as it will be by a general attack by the fleet, and the peace will be established within three months.

Questioned touching the prevailing rumour concerning the restoration of the Empire, he replied that, though an ardent republican by nature and interests, he would rather hoist the monarchical flag than see his country sink back to the depths of degradation he is endeavouring to raise it from.

\*At the instigation of the British commander-in-chief it has been pointed out to the President that Admiral de Melo is well within his right in firing on a town when it puts itself on a semi-defensive footing and consequently these batteries will be demolished.

## 55. *The Leeds Mercury*, 21 de outubro

*A situação militar parece estar bloqueada no porto do Rio de Janeiro, onde Custódio de Melo teria conquistado o depósito naval de Armação.*

The destructive conflict in progress in Brazil illustrates the old story of the bull and the whale. They cannot come to close quarters. Admiral José de Melo from time to time pounds away at the capital and the forts near it, but is afraid to land; while President Peixoto and his forces being without a fleet, cannot sink or capture the vessels of the rebel Admiral. Shortness of ammunition, provisions, or men may paralyse the hostile fleet, but not anything the President and his supporters are capable of doing as they are now situated. The bombardment of Rio de Janeiro proceeds intermittently. It has caused serious loss of life and great destruction of property. One acquisition by Admiral de Melo may have important results. He has captured, after a fierce fight, the naval depot at Armacao. It is stated that President Peixoto has convoked Congress, and that the elections will take place on the 30<sup>th</sup> inst.

**56. «Interesting Letter from a Cardiff Man. An Eye-Witness of the Bombardment of Rio», *Western Mail*, 21 de outubro**

*O autor desta carta, testemunha ocular do início da insurreição, é tranquilizador: o perigo para os habitantes da capital brasileira é mínimo. Com efeito, precisa a missiva, «a revolução neste país não se pode comparar com uma na Europa»: no Brasil, «uma revolução significa um desacordo, ou por antipatia pessoal, o por ambição, entre diferentes fações do Estado Maior. Nunca atinge as classes perigosas, as massas». Estas só olham para os acontecimentos para ver «como estão a correr as coisas, a fim de salvar a própria pele».*

A well-known Cardiff townsman has received the following letter from his brother in Rio, which may be interesting:

My first object in sending you these lines is to assure you all of our safety here. You have probably heard by this time of the revolutionary movement on the part of the navy against the actual President of Brazil, Floriano Peixoto. This movement was declared on the 6<sup>th</sup> of September, and culminates on the 13<sup>th</sup> by the bombardment of the city – that is, certain portions of it – by the insurgents. I was fortunate enough to be an eye-witness of the whole of the engagement and it was interesting in the extreme. A friend of mine was also successful in taking views of the fight, and these I will forward you in the course of few weeks. Of course, the people were very much terrorised, but I still repeat there is no, or very little, personal danger, and a settlement may soon be looked for. The worst feature of all is that trade is completely paralysed, and until things are settled one way or another I am afraid no improvement is possible. Let me point out to you that a revolution in this country cannot be compared with one in Europe, because these people never govern in one single thing; they *are governed*, and a revolution simply means a disagreement, either from personal dislike or motive of ambition, between different sections of the *état majeur*. It never reaches the dangerous element, the masses – at least, it never has done so, so far; and only in cases of extreme provocation or hardship would the indolent race rouse themselves. All they do is to apathetically watch the turn things are taking, to save their own skin. These, then, are my reasons for saying that there is a minimum of personal danger.

## 57. *The Observer*, 22 de outubro

*Este correspondente debruça-se sobre a intervenção das Grandes Potências no porto do Rio de Janeiro. O objetivo não é de intervir nos assuntos internos do Brasil, mas de proteger os europeus residentes e os seus bens. Segundo este testemunho, os comandantes dos navios estrangeiros – com a exceção do alemão – obrigaram Peixoto a retirar as bateiras que tinha*

*posto para proteger a cidade, evitando desse modo que a capital continuasse a ser bombardeada.*

A correspondent writes – The civil war in Brazil still drags on its weary course, and so far as we in Europe can judge, there is no reason why Admiral de Melo and President Peixoto should not go on issuing proclamations, exchanging shots, and despatching contradictory telegrams to the outside world of an indefinite period. AS to the merit of the dispute, we are probably not competent to judge; but the bombardment of Rio is undoubtedly a very serious matter for the foreigners who are resident in that city, and it is to protect the interests of the citizens of their respective States that the foreign war vessels are assembled in Rio harbour. Some misconceptions exists as to a recent incident, which has been accurately described as the intervention of the European Powers— Germany excepted – in the quarrel between the Admiral and the President. This misconception has given rise to a certain amount of unnecessary talk about the Monroe doctrine on the other side of the Atlantic. The facts are perfectly clear and simple. In bombarding Rio, Admiral de Melo confined the fire of his ships to the forts, and did not shell the open town where the European quarters are situated. Taking advantage of this, the President erected batteries in the open town for the purpose of attacking the ships. This naturally drew the fire of the ships on the town, and placed in jeopardy the lives and properties of Europeans. Thereupon the commanders of the foreign war vessels in Rio harbour – with the exception of the German Admiral – addressed remonstrance to both Admiral de Melo and President Peixoto, with

the result that the batteries were dismantled, and the ships ceased to fire on the open town. The intervention was strictly confined to this object, and was at no time in contemplation to intervene in what is recognised by the Power to be a domestic quarrel with which they have no concern.

**58.** *The Leeds Mercury*, 28 de outubro

*Lista de acontecimentos sobre esta revolução que avança, embora lentamente.*

It is now clear that the revolution in Brazil is making headway, although the progress of the rebels is not marked by haste. Admiral de Melo having captured Desterro, has made in the seat of his Government. There is Senhor Frederico Loreno, captain of one of the insurgent vessels, has been proclaimed, provisionally, President of Brazil by the Admiral. President Peixoto still rules in Rio de Janeiro, and no doubt regards a pretender more or less as of little moment. At any rate Brazil is certain not to be so happy as Brentford was with its two Kings of legendary memory. Proclamations play a conspicuous part in South American revolutions. Admiral de Melo, in his most recent fulmination, declares that an attempt has been made to assassinate him by means of an album loaded with dynamite, which he is persuaded was sent to him with the connivance of President Peixoto. The insurgent warship *República* has appeared off Montevideo, and invited the *Tiradentes*, which has just come out

of dock there, to come outside and fight. The *Tiradentes*, however, did not respond to the challenge.

## 59. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 1 de novembro

*O correspondente do jornal londrino envia um resumo dos acontecimentos., entre os quais podemos destacar: a falta de pontaria da frota rebelde; o Rio, contrariamente a Niterói, não sofreu estragos; a formação do Governo Provisório em Desterro; a hostilidade contra estrangeiros; um navio afundado e outro danificado.*

RIO DE JANEIRO, OCT. 27 (via Galveston)

The insurgent fleet, in conjunction with Fort Villegagnon, daily bombards Niteroi, Santa Cruz, and São João, but its fire is badly directed. There was some heavy firing last Wednesday, and the insurgents' magazine on the island of Mocangue was hit, 40 tons of powder being exploded.

Rio de Janeiro has as yet received no damage, but Niteroi has suffered severely, though there has been practically no loss of life on either side hitherto. The garrison at Niteroi, which is composed chiefly of militia, numbers 1,500 men and that of Rio de Janeiro consists of 5,000 regulars. The insurgents have 1,500 men afloat.

The Provisional Government of the United States of Brazil, which is firmly established at Desterro and Santa Catarina, is constituted as follows: — President, Captain Lorena; Minister of Marine, Senhor Mourao; Minister of War,

Senhor Cardozo. It is organizing some land forces and has received eight cannon and 1,500 Mauser rifles, which have been brought from Montevideo by the cruiser *Republica*, which is now lying off Desterro. Admiral Melo obtains money and pays his followers regularly.

There is a strong feeling here adverse to foreigners. Marshal Peixoto considers that the foreign warships showed sympathy with the insurgents because they move out of the line of fire when requested to do so by Admiral de Melo.

The resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Senhor Carvalho, as due to the action of Marshal Peixoto in appointing a medical man, Senhor Barata to be a Judge of the Supreme Court. The new Minister, Senhor Nascimento, is a man of no standing.

The armed steamer *Urano*, which, when leaving Rio de Janeiro on the 15<sup>th</sup> inst., was badly hit, has arrived at Desterro, and reports that 40 of her crew were killed. The insurgents have plenty of ammunitions.

Some decisive action on the part of Admiral de Melo is expected shortly. The Government is today mounting guns on the city batteries.

The *Republica* has rammed the transport *Rio de Janeiro*, which was conveying 1,100 troops to Santos. Five hundred men were drowned. Admiral de Melo confirms the information. He denies that he has any direct intention of restoring the Empire. He wishes to be recognized as a belligerent by the foreign Powers. He expects the warships *Riachuelo* and *Benjamin Constant* to join the

insurgents. The flagship *Aquidaban* is slightly damaged. — *Our Special Correspondent*

## 60. *North Eastern Daily Gazette*, 2 de novembro

*Nesta guerra há mais discursos violentos do que propriamente estragos feitos ao inimigo.*

The sanguinary intention of these wagers of war in Brazil are terrible. The Government party say they intend to fly by balloons and drop explosives on the rebel ships. They further say that Admiral de Melo is caught in a trap, and will be demolished when the war vessels bought in America arrive. Admiral de Melo responds by saying he means to demolish the Peixoto Government, if not Rio de Janeiro itself. On the whole, however, remarkably little actual harm seems to be done by either party to each other, though meanwhile the State is being ruined.

## 61. *The Huddersfield Daily Chronicle*, 6 de novembro

*O mal do Brasil são estas dissensões internas, sublinha o jornal que não vê nenhuma personalidade do lado monárquico que possa liderar uma reconquista do trono. Por outro lado, pensa que as grandes potências deviam impor a paz, até com a força das armas, «para salvar o povo do Brasil de ser completamente arruinado por aqueles que professam o desejo de servi-lo».*

No one can wonder, after their recent experience, if the people of Brazil do look back with longing eyes to the time when they had rest and peace under the Monarchy. But before a restoration is possible, a further expression of opinion that any yet put forward would be needful. The unfortunate part of the matter for the Royalists is that they have no really strong candidate for the office. Now that quiet, studious, harmless DON PEDRO is dead, the sentiment attaching to his name has largely been swept away. His daughter is unpopular, and her husband is more so, and nobody of public opinion in the country could be expected to back them up. It is suggested that one of their sons might take the position, and much could be said in favour such a course being adopted. The country, which is a rich one in natural products, and with great fortune possibilities before it, is being ruined by these internal dissensions. Interference by the United States and some of the European Powers has been hinted at, and it would indeed be a mercy if anything of the kind could take place. Largely, the context is one of personalities. It is kept up by personal jealousies, and depends very largely indeed upon the chief combatants. However much these men may differ upon the question of their own merits, they ought not to be allowed to keep the whole country unsettled in order that this purely personal matter may be decided. Whatever may be the future of Brazil, Monarchical or Republican, it is a shame to our modern civilisation that the present state of things should be allowed to exist. It ought not to be difficult to overcome international jealousies and unite in a scheme for saving the people of Brazil from being completely ruined by those who profess to desire to serve them. International arbitration would gain a great triumph if even by

force of arms these great nations could at once, and permanently, settle this apparently interminable civil quarrel.

## 62. *The Leeds Mercury*, 7 de novembro

The ships purchased in the United States by the Government of Brazil will sail on the 15<sup>th</sup> instant for a certain Brazilian port, where their temporary crews will be replaced by officers and men of the Brazilian Navy. The whole sum expended on the vessels will amount to 1 ½ million dollars.

## 63. *The Yorkshire Herald*, 11 de novembro

*Esta guerra civil é «um grave problema para os que lidam com este angustiante e turbulento país», afirma o quotidiano de Iorque, que põe em relevo o facto de Peixoto não só ter resistido, mas também de ter tomado a iniciativa de formar uma frota. O jornalista critica duramente o amadorismo e incompetência que provocaram a morte de marinheiros britânicos.*

The civil war in Brazil is an unmitigated nuisance to all who have any dealings with that distressful and turbulent country. The Brazilian Navy, under Admiral MELO, seemed likely to on time to defeat such land forces as President PEIXOTO could command, but the latter, by keeping his soldiers in as good humour as possible, not only holds his own at the capital, but he is getting together some ships, by purchase from abroad, with which he hopes to compel Admiral MELO to raise the blockade of Rio. The United States Government,

though having no love for the President, is exceedingly jealous of Admiral MELO, whom he suspects of entertaining the design of restoring a Monarchical form of Government in Brazil and bringing back some member of the lately exiled Imperial family. A disastrous indication of the blundering incapacity with which affairs are being conducted has just occurred. It is furnished by the lamentable incident in which a boat's crew from the British cruiser *Sirius* went ashore on broad daylight to procure some sand, and were blown up by the explosion of a mine, fired by the PRESIDENT'S forces in the supposition that the boat's crew in question were for one of Admiral MELO'S ships.

#### 64. «Victims of Revolution», *The Graphic*, 11 de novembro

*Morte de quatro membros da marinha britânica que os homens de Peixoto tomaram por alvo, pensando que fossem rebeldes.*

The civil war in Brazil has cost the lives of three British officers in most needless fashion. It appears that a party from three British warships landed near Rio to dig for sand, and were mistaken by President Peixoto's forces for members of the rebel fleet. They were fired on, and the fire struck a neighbouring powder magazine, which exploded, killing Lieutenant Mowbray and Boatswain Harris of the *Sirius*, Lieutenant Tupper, of the *Racer*, and an [??] seaman. So far there is little sign of either Government or rebels giving way. The Government are bringing out warships from Europe, while the insurgents

have sunk a transport bringing troops to Rio, with a loss of 1,100 men for the Government.

## 65. *The Morning Post*, 13 de novembro

*Embora reconhecendo que é muito difícil saber o que se passa realmente no porto carioca, o editorialista londrino apresenta uma lúcida análise da situação militar.*

*«A posição de Melo é obviamente difícil» e o Almirante «está a jogar um jogo desesperado»: por um lado, os depósitos de munições estão a esvaziar-se; por outro lado, vai ter de enfrentar a nova frota de Peixoto. Mas, na opinião do jornalista, o chefe da revolta, além de ter sobrestimado o seu poder, cometeu sobretudo um grave erro pensando que bombardear o Rio seria suficiente para obter o seu apoio. Uma frota não pode ganhar uma guerra sem combater e sem desembarcar tropas.*

*Ao mesmo tempo, Peixoto comprou três navios de comércio «fortemente armados» que, na realidade, não têm qualquer possibilidade de competir com navios «construídos expressamente para o combate», como o Aquidabã, enfatiza o quotidiano.*

*No fim do artigo, o diário interroga-se sobre esta futura batalha entre os navios rápidos, mas demasiado vulneráveis, adquiridos nos Estados Unidos e dois couraçados que, no entanto, estão a ficar quase sem munições.*

It is rather difficult to understand what is actually occurring at Rio de Janeiro. A number of reports are recorded from a variety of sources which are more or less interested, but they do not contribute materially to a comprehension of the state of the case. If, however, we disregard the international question, and look at things essentially from the naval point of view, the situation is full of interest to students of contemporary naval

development. *The New York Herald* had stated that Admiral MELO has again commenced the bombardment of Rio by the *Aquidaban*, and it seems to be assumed that he has adopted this course in order to strike a decisive blow before the vessels which Marshal PEIXOTO has purchased arrive in the extensive harbour of which Rio can boast. This may or may not be the case, but if it be true it would seem to indicate that Admiral MELO is playing a desperate game. The same, perhaps, may be said of Marshal PEIXOTO, who has to contend with other foes besides those who to be found and Rio Harbour, and who may perhaps find in the long run that the story of Spain has found a model parallel. Be this as it may, the position of Admiral MELO is obviously difficult. The notion that a force which has not the command of the sea, so far as its immediate enemy is concerned, can afford to bombard towns may be set on one side. The whole teachings of history are against it. A victorious fleet can practically do what it pleases, and a fleet which has not fought, but which practically commands the sea without fighting, may, in exceptional cases, think it worthwhile, as a collateral object, to attack a fortified place, as the Allied Fleet bombard Sebastopol nearly forty years ago<sup>22</sup>. The notion, however, that anything is to be gained by a mere expenditure of shot and shell which is not supported by a land attack must surely be regarded as obsolete, and it is hard to believe that Admiral MELO would ever have emptied his magazines in frying upon Rio de Janeiro if he had had the smallest idea that he would have

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<sup>22</sup> Principal episódio da guerra de Crimeia (1853-1856), o cerco de Sebastopol durou de outubro de 1854 até setembro de 1855.

had to encounter a hostile squadron. He would probably have run the gauntlet of Fort Lage, Fort Santa Cruz, and Fort San Joao, which command the entrance to the bay, and, using as little ammunition as possible, they would have sought a more friendly shore. His mistake seems to have been that he exaggerated his own influence, and thought that by firing a few shells into the city he would be able to induce it to declare on his behalf. Now, however, he finds himself, with deplete magazines, opposed to a squadron which Marshal PEIXOTO has apparently managed to gather together. It may or may not be true that the Brazilian PRESIDENT has succeeded in purchasing three ships which are intended for the Navy of the United States, and which are represented at present by one ship afloat, the other two being not yet launched. The probabilities are against such a bargain having been concluded, but anything is possible when a State in the position of Brazil is the dealer. The one thing apparently certain is that Marshal PEIXOTO has bought a number of merchant vessels of great speed, which are, we are told, to be heavily armed. We may fairly ask what is the use to which they are to be applied. Admiral MELO'S party has no commerce upon which to prey, and such merchant cruisers, with their exposed machinery, would be useless against the *Aquidaban* or the *Republica* if the latter two ships were in fighting trim. In other words, no armed cruiser can ever compete to for a moment with a ship designed expressly for fighting. It is in the fact that Admiral MELO'S magazines must be nearly empty, and that he will apparently be attacked by vessels possessing a great vulnerable area, that the naval interest of the situation lies. He cannot be ignorant of the preparation made for his extermination. Will he trust to the ram or to a short,

sharp exchange of shots? It is evident that, in any case, Englishmen may possibly learn something from the impending struggle, even though the political aspects may remain for future determination.

### **66. *The Belfast News-Letter*, 14 de novembro**

*Esta guerra civil está muito longe do seu fim, e os navios comprados por Peixoto ainda estão em Nova Iorque, constata o jornal de Belfast.*

Events are still moving slow in Brazil, and there is no saying when the beginning of an end may be looked for. President Peixoto does not, however, appear disposed to provide any loophole for known or unknown opponents, and, therefore, has, according to news from Montevideo, issued a decree, continuing the application of martial law in Rio de Janeiro until the end of the month. Presumably the President hopes by the times to have disposed of Admiral Melo and his fellow-rebels. As, however, the recently acquired ships which are to account for Melo's fleet have not yet left New York for Brazil, and are not due until tomorrow or Wednesday, and the voyage will take probably a fortnight, President Peixoto is clearly a man of very sanguine temperament in only extending the military law to November 30<sup>th</sup>.

### **67. *The Glasgow Herald*, 17 de novembro**

*É praticamente impossível saber o que se passa realmente no porto do Rio de Janeiro, constata o jornalista, sendo as notícias dadas pelos*

*rebeldes, tal como as do lado do governo, pura propaganda. Por conseguinte, na Europa, ninguém pode saber «as verdadeiras causas desta miserável luta intestina», nem «ter a possibilidade de formar uma opinião credível sobre o seu desfecho».*

*O mesmo reconhece pouco credível que o apoio a Peixoto seja tão fraco como dizem alguns despachos porque, se assim fosse, já teria sido derrotado pelos revoltosos, ao mesmo tempo, não se pode dizer que de Melo esteja completamente isolado, visto que se mantém no porto do Rio e que consegue ameaçar as posições governativas.*

*No fundo, escreve o jornal, «a atitude da grande maioria da população brasileira perante as duas partes em conflito é de filosófica indiferença». Por outras palavras, o espírito republicano é tão fraco como foi o «genuíno sentimento monárquico em novembro de 1889». Isso permitiu a vitória de «um punhado de ambiciosos militares e de intriguistas políticos, ávidos de obter os lucros do poder».*

*O articulista não poupa críticas a Peixoto: «Porém, o roubo, a corrupção e a opressão militar em larga escala, que caracterizaram a administração de Fonseca, não diminuíram com o seu sucessor, mas aumentaram». Ao mesmo tempo, o jornal londrino escreve que a verdadeira razão da ação de Custódio de Melo tem mais a ver com a «sua ambição pessoal e com o desejo que a Marinha, tal como o Exército, tenha o seu papel em regular os destinos políticos do Brasil».*

*O último parágrafo debruça-se sobre a eventual restauração da dinastia de Bragança. Na opinião do editorialista – que não menciona nenhum candidato ao trono – há um grande obstáculo a um regresso da monarquia. Com efeito, os Estados Unidos, «pela sua afinidade com a ideias democráticas e republicanas», mas, sobretudo, porque uma mudança de regime podia ter como consequência a anulação do tratado de reciprocidade de fevereiro de 1891, via com maus olhos o restabelecimento do Império derrubado a 15 de novembro de 1889.*

*São essas circunstâncias que explicam a atitude norte-americana, muito favorável a Peixoto, tolerando que a nova frota do governo brasileiro seja preparada em Nova Iorque, sublinha o articulista. Todavia este pensa que, ao governo de Washington faltou de um pouco de bom senso: «porque, se*

*o Almirante de Melo e os seus seguidores vencerem no combate que parece se aproximar do fim, dificilmente esquecer-se-ão que a ação dos Estados Unidos lhes foi desfavorável.»*

For at least to months the great Republic of Brazil has been in the those of a civil war the active operations of which have been almost exclusively confined to the comparatively restricted area of the harbour of Rio de Janeiro and a few points on the southern coast down to the Uruguay frontier. The European residents in Rio and its vicinity are numerous: the European interests existing there are very considerable and substantial; and, with the exception of Buenos Aires, the Brazilian capital is undoubtedly the most important centre of commerce between the Old and New Worlds on the eastern coast of the South American continent. In these circumstances it might have reasonably been anticipated that information as to the precise cause, course, and details of the conflict that is going on between President Peixoto's Government and the insurgent forces under Admiral de Melo would have been ample and fairly trustworthy. Yet it may be doubted whether at the present moment anybody on this side of the Atlantic – not even excepting the official representatives of the Brazilian Government – knowledge about the origin of this miserable internecine struggle or has the means of forming an authoritative opinion as to its probable issue. Declarations and statements have been profusely issued on both sides, but the only conclusion which may safely be drawn from an impartial examination of these documents is that each of the parties has no hesitation in telegraphing to Europe such reports as

are most likely to promote its own ends. On the one hand, we have been assured from the outset that the insurrectionary movement initiated by Admiral de Melo is an isolated ebullition of discontent; that President Peixoto is secure in the loyal support non only of the army of the Republic but of the population of Rio and the various State Governments; that the position of the rebels is becoming every day weaker and mere desperate, and that the Government is only waiting to complete the organization of a naval force in order to put an end to the business. On the other hand we are told that Peixoto is a corrupt despot, who retains power at Rio merely because he is upheld by a few thousand soldiers; that the mass of the citizens detest him, and heartily sympathise with Admiral de Melo; that the Provisional Government which has been organized at Desterro, the capital of the State of Santa Catarina, is finding ample support both in that State and in Rio Grande do Sul, while in several other States – notably in Parana and Pernambuco – its sympathisers are also in the ascendant.

Where the truth really lies amid all these conflicting allegations it is impossible to determine, because what is positively known of the facts of the situation does not seem to agree with the representations of either side. It is difficult to believe that there exists any very keen discontent with the administration of President Peixoto either in Rio itself or over the greater part of Brazil, otherwise the numerically insignificant military force at his disposal would scarcely be permitted to ride roughshod over the will and sentiments of the whole community. But then it is evident that the stories about the isolated

and insignificant character of the insurrection movement are equally underserving of credit. Admiral de Melo has had no difficulties in maintaining himself in Rio harbour, and in inflicting serious damage on the land defences and some injury on the city itself. One, at least, to the harbour forts has declared on his side. The Provisional Government organized by his adherents appears to be firmly established at Desterro, and the Revolutionists who have long been causing trouble in the State of Rio Grande do Sul have made common cause with it. If throughout the vast northern and western regions of Brazil there has been no enthusiastic adhesion to the insurrection, there has been an equal absence of demonstrations on the other side; and indeed, the attitude of the great majority of the people of Brazil towards both parties seem to be one of philosophic indifference. Whether this attitude can long be observed without the total disorganisation and disruption of the somewhat fragile bonds which keep together the various States of the Republic is exceedingly doubtful. At the same time it is not in itself unintelligible, or even surprising, when we bear in mind that the whole course of the political events that have occurred at Rio since the overthrow of the Monarchy in November, 1889, has been virtually independent of the popular will outside the capital. The revolution by which the luckless Dom Pedro was expelled was not in the least an ebullition of national zeal for Republican institutions – it was the word of a handful of ambitious military officers and political wirepullers eager for the spoils of power. Public indifferentism and the absence of anything like a genuine sentiment in the community gave these conspirators an easy victory, but ever since, with brief intermission, they have been quarrelling among themselves

concerning the division of the plunder. Marshall Fonseca was at first master of the situation, because he had the army behind him, and because there was no organized force of any kind to keep him in check. But when he quarrelled with the Chamber, Vice-President Peixoto, who had apparently undermined his influence among the soldiery, seized the opportunity of expelling him from power and grasping the headship of the Executive for himself. The wholesale jobbery, corruption, and militarist oppression that characterised Fonseca's administration seems, however, to have been rather intensified than diminished under his successor. Peixoto's misrule is said to have been the motive of the revolutionary enterprise of Admiral Melo; but that officer was implicated in the conspiracy against the late Emperor, and it is probable enough that his strongest motives have been personal ambition, and a desire that the navy, as well as the army, should play its part in regulating the political destinies of Brazil.

One thing, at least, is certain amid all the confusion: the experiment of converting Brazil from a Monarchy into a Republic has, in presence of a profound national indifference as to forms of government, proved a disastrous failure. The Imperial system was not conspicuous for strength or efficiency, but at any rate it prevented that continual struggle for power and its prizes which has constituted the history of most of South American States since the era of independence. Of evils arising from such a state of things Brazil also has now had experience; and those of her citizens who take an intelligent and patriotic interest in public affairs seem to be awakening to the conviction that the

change of system has been a source of calamity and loss instead of gain. It is reported on very good authority that Admiral de Melo and the Provisional Government have resolved on declaring for a restoration of the Monarchy, and it is believed that this decision will greatly strengthen their cause. But such a policy undoubtedly has its dangers. The downfall of the Republic and the rehabilitation of "effete" Monarchical institutions would be regarded with great disfavour by the Government and people of the United States, and this is not only on the sentimental ground of their attachment to Democratic and Republican ideas, but also because they are apprehensive that under a restored Imperial *régime* the reciprocity treaty between the States of Brazil, which was negotiated some two years ago, and which has been very advantageous to the trade of the Northern Republic, might be cancelled. It is chiefly to their anxiety on this score that is due the readiness with which the Washington Government have winked at the evasion of the neutrality laws in the organization at New York of a squadron with which President Peixoto hopes to be able to overpower the insurgent chief on the element where he has hitherto been master of the situation. There is some reason to doubt the wisdom of the policy which induces the United States Government to sympathise so openly with Peixoto; for if Admiral de Melo and his adherents prove successful in the struggle which seems now to be approaching its culmination, they are not likely to forget that the influence of the United States was inimical to them.

## 68. «The War in Rio», *The Times*, 17 de novembro

*Esta carta retifica as informações publicadas nos jornais britânicos, afirmando nomeadamente que os rebeldes não controlam a capital e que a frota de de Melo «não atinge proporções alarmantes». O correspondente escreve também que muitas vezes os tiros não atingem os alvos (em média, um barco por semana). Mesmo um bombardeamento durante todo um dia não faz «grande impressão». Por outras palavras, «neste acontecimento, não há muito entusiasmo», a tal ponto que os navios estrangeiros organizam uma «corrida naval internacional, cada quinta-feira».*

(FROM A CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Oct. 22

Many of the newspapers that have recently reached us from England contain information which is much at variance with the real progress of events here. It is stated, for instance, that this city is in the hands of the rebels. Such is not the case, nor is it likely to be unless de Melo, the rebel admiral, secures the adhesion of many who are now loyal to the Government. No doubt, if he can get together a sufficient number of troops, he will land and endeavour to take the city by assault. This is supposed to be his scheme. But his fleet is not of alarming dimensions. It consists of one ironclad, the *Aquidaban*, which, although a small ship, is capable of rendering effective service; one old turret ship, the *Javari*; a corvette, the *Trajano*; and about six merchant ships armed with small but good guns, of which some are three-ponder Q. F.'s<sup>23</sup>. The *Javari* is not at present able to render the best account of herself as her engines are

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<sup>23</sup> Canhão de carro armado britânico de 47 mm de calibre.

not in working order, and whenever she desires to engage the enemy, she presents the curious and unique spectacle of being towed into action. The *Trajano* is a wooden whip. De Melo's operations within the harbour are now assisted by Fort Villegagnon, which, with 600 marines, has recently gone over to the rebels. Outside of the harbour the Admiral's force consists of a capital little second-class cruiser and three or four small ships. These vessels seem to have been doing the rebels good service along the coast, and to have been the means of inducing several of the southern provinces to throw over their allegiance to the Government. It is reported today that the rebels have formed a provisional Government at Rio Grande. There seems to be no prospect whatever of an immediate settlement of the quarrel. In view of food becoming dearer every day in Rio, de Melo, it is said, is hoping for a rising among the masses, in which event he would attempt a landing. Meanwhile, he is endeavouring to get reinforcements from the south. President Peixoto has about 2,000 soldiers in Rio. I forward a map showing the disposition of the opposing forces. The various ranges have been carefully calculated and may be taken to be almost quite accurate. The ships do not appear to be anxious ever to get to close quarters and seldom vary their position. Nor does it ever seem to occur to them that they might gain some advantage by concentrating their fire. Each commander evidently acts according to his own idea of the fitness of things. Altogether it is a very half-hearted affair. Sometimes a whole day is spent in bombardment and no material impression is made. Nineteen out of 20 shots go short of over. And there is on an average about one short every then or 15 minutes. The gunners at the forts are not more skilful. It is a safe



computation to say that they hit a ship about once a week. As there are so many men-of-war of different nationalities in the harbour – English, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, and American – we have instituted a great international sailing race for every Thursday. It is our chief amusement. So far, the British boats have won every time. The Racer's cutter was an easy victor on the last occasion. The star is always amusing. There is but a shirt distance to cover before going round a buoy, and as all the boats generally arrive there about at the same time there is a free interchange of compliment peculiar to the tar. At this takes place in half-a-dozen different languages, and the various crews as a rule understand none but their own, no one is much the worse, though mutual apologies are subsequently made with unfailing regularity. Yesterday I was taking part in one of these races and was standing over to Niteroi. I had sailed to within 600 yards of the shore when the ships opened fire to cover an attack and the forts ashore replied. A shot fell ten yards ahead of me in the water, another went over the boat, and another fell alongside. I tried to look as if I liked it, but thought it as well to go about. This is just in time to catch the mail.

### 69. *The Hampshire Telegraph*, 18 de novembro

The latest news from Brazil is to the effect that the leaders of the insurrection have decided, on the suggestion of Admiral de Melo, to hoist the Imperial flag and direct their efforts towards the restoration of the Monarchy.

The decision has, it is said, created a good impression. Admiral Saldanha da Gama, Chief of the Naval College, and the ablest of Brazilian naval officers, who has hitherto been neutral, has now openly declared for the insurgents, and will take command of the operations at Rio de Janeiro. The insurgents are reported to be gaining ground in the interior.

## 70. *The Observer*, 19 de novembro

*Otimismo desmedido do semanário londrino quanto ao regresso da monarquia no Brasil.*

The proclamation by Admiral Melo of the Comte Pierre d'Eu, grandson and heir of the late Emperor Dom Pedro II., as Emperor of Brazil is a somewhat startling result of almost exactly four years of Republicanism in that country. Republican governments are, as we know, not remarkable for steadiness or permanency anywhere, and in Brazil the Republican rulers have succeeded each other with a rapidity which has considerably damaged Brazilian credit abroad and produced endless disorder at home, culminating in civil war. Admiral Melo, by proclaiming the Comte d'Eu as Emperor, no doubt thinks that he is playing a strong card against his adversaries, and it would not indeed be surprising if the Brazilians had got sick of Republicanism, and were yearning for a return of the ordered liberty and the peaceful prosperity they enjoyed under the Government of Dom Pedro. The young pretender, who was born at Petropolis, near Rio de Janeiro, is the grandson on his father's side of the Duc

de Nemours, so that the direct Bourbon line has again a prospect of obtaining a crown.

## 71. *The Standard*, 20 de novembro

*O quotidiano britânico constata que, nesta guerra civil, os dois adversários são fracos, que há pouco derramamento de sangue e que nenhum dos dois parece ter uma vantagem significativa sobre o outro. Se todas as Grandes Potências intervissem ao mesmo tempo, acabariam os combates, escreve o jornalista. Este nota que ninguém «desalojou» o Governo do Rio e que não será fácil para Custódio de Melo sair do porto em direção ao norte, para enfrentar a nova frota vinda dos Estados Unidos.*

*A proclamação do neto de D. Pedro Imperador do Brasil por parte do Almirante é logicamente vista com os bons olhos pelo jornal que, no entanto, considera que de Melo não «está em condições de a pôr em prática». Em primeiro lugar, os rebeldes, tal como o Governo, festejaram o quarto aniversário do 15 de novembro de 1889, o que põe alguma dúvida sobre a consistência deste projeto; por outro lado, a intervenção das Grandes Potências que não querem deixar desembarcar munições no Porto do Rio e proíbem os bombardeamentos da capital, impedem à frota rebelde de «desalojar os seus adversários». Por conseguinte, de Melo tem duas possibilidades, acrescenta o editorialista: ou sai da baía do Rio para enfrentar navios governamentais, ou fica neste impasse militar e político.*

*Esta situação é muito prejudicial para o comércio, sublinha o artigo, e para os investidores europeus: «cem milhões do capital inglês estão enterrados em vários projetos no Brasil e as outras comunidades europeias também investiram outros cem milhões». É por isso que «os países estrangeiros não podem ficar indiferentes perante este duelo pernicioso.»*

*No último parágrafo, o articulista compara os quatro anos de republicanismo no Brasil com o reinado de D. Pedro. Depois de ter escrito um breve resumo hagiográfico da vida e das realizações do último imperador, ataca duramente os «gananciosos aventureiros sem princípios que se*

*disputam os lugares os poderes e as pilhagens»: «Trouxeram a guerra civil, paralisaram o seu comércio, e multiplicaram a circulação das notas por três».*

*Neste violento requisitório contra a jovem República, The Standard censura também os próprios brasileiros: «Se o Céu deu Deodoro da Fonseca aos Brasileiros, só podia ser para castigá-los pela ingratidão manifestada para com Dom Pedro II.»*

The news as to the Brazilian civil conflict continues to be uncertain and conflicting, and considerable doubt is now thrown on the report, so confidently telegraphed to Europe on Friday<sup>24</sup>, that Admiral DE MELO had proclaimed the young Comte D'EU, the grandson of the late PEDRO II., Emperor of Brazil. But even if the statement should prove to be unfounded, there are grounds for believing that some such step is in contemplation, and that the friends of the Monarchy are only waiting for a propitious moment. As to the actual situation, it is difficult, at this distance from the scene of action, and under the conditions of reserve imposed, not only on itself, but on others, by the nominally existing Brazilian Government, to ascertain with any approach to accuracy the relative strength or prospects of the two Parties engaged in the conflict. Marshal PEIXOTO lays a strict embargo on all news that might tend to disseminate the impression that his capacity to maintain himself in power is waning; and Admiral DE MELO on the other hand, is scarcely in a position to transmit much intelligence, even if he were anxious to do so. As far as we are able to judge, neither side has any decided advantages to boast of; and what strikes the European onlooker is the singular feebleness of both. We have been

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<sup>24</sup> Sexta-feira, dia 17 de novembro.

accustomed, in South American revolutions and civil war, to witness much fierce and relentless fighting, and a considerable amount of bloodshed, Peru, Chile, and Argentina having furnished striking examples of fratricidal butchery. But the Brazilian combatants do not seem to be able even to touch each other, one of them being apparently superior on land and other supreme on sea. It is an object lesson on the theoretical duel between the whale and the elephant of Prince BISMARCK'S practical wit<sup>25</sup>. The forts fire and the ships fire; but neither silences or much injures the other. Now and then a stray and innocent civilian is killed, but only in this way, and by the occasional destruction of property, are the population of the capital reminded that a state of war exists in the vicinity. The Foreign Powers whose vessels are stationed off Rio have done their utmost to induce the combatants to leave civilian, civil life, and commerce alone; but, if they were to do this altogether, the fray could scarcely be carried on. One of the latest rumours is that Admiral DE MELO, whether he previously proclaims the Comte D'EU Emperor or not, intends to raise his Naval siege of Rio de Janeiro, and to proceed northward, with the object of intercepting the vessels bought by Marshal PEIXOTO in the United States and elsewhere. But it is notorious that his flagship, the *Aquidaban* is but an indifferent mover, owing to defects in its engines; and it is probable that few, if any, of his ships would be equal to the task of tackling a vessel of war properly handled. Indeed, it is obvious that, if the existing Government can

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<sup>25</sup> Um dia, para explicar a impossibilidade duma guerra entre a Inglaterra e a Rússia, Bismarck tê-los-ia comparado a um igualmente improvável combate entre uma baleia e um elefante.

hold on until it provides itself with a Naval force capable of competing with that under Admiral DE MELO, it will that be in the better position of the two. It is certainly has not yet been dislodged from the capital, however faithfully the Insurgents in the Southern Provinces may adhere to the fortunes of its adversary.

This is another circumstance, reported in our column today, which strengthens the impression that, even if Admiral DE MELO has proclaimed, or should proclaimed, the comte D'EU Emperor, he is not in a position to carry the proclamation to effect. Last Friday was the fourth anniversary<sup>26</sup> of the dethronement of the wise and virtuous DOM PEDRO II., and of the establishment of the adventurous and shaky Republic whose authority is now challenged. As a matter of course, the anniversary was celebrated by Marshal PEIXOTO and his adherents with every exhibition of sympathy and enthusiasm. But it is said that the Squadron of Admiral DE MELO did the same; and, if such were the case, it would certainly seem to point to some element of suspicion in his mind as to the solidity of the Prince's prospects. The Navy Department at Washington has received a despatch from Captain PICKING, of the United States Marine, expressing an opinion somewhat to the foregoing effect, and also stating the belief that the Admiral is being much crippled. It must, however, be born in mind that American sympathies would be with the Government of Marshal PEIXOTO, especially if it were known in the States that the Admiral meditated a

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<sup>26</sup> Na realidade, o quarto aniversário do «estabelecimento da aventureira e instável República» no Rio de Janeiro foi dois dias antes, quarta-feira dia 15 de novembro.

Monarchical Restoration. But what is, perhaps, more interesting and important is the conclusion at which the Naval Representatives of eight Powers, the United States included, have arrived, which is not to permit munitions of war to be landed at Rio. The resolution seems to be a perfect fair one, and not in the least inconsistent with the strict neutrality between the combatants, seeing that ammunitions can be landed at Santos, which is in the possession of the Government, and connected with Rio de Janeiro by rail. The object of the decision of the cooperating Powers is to spare the capital the horrors of a double bombardment, and to retain for it some of the conditions under which commerce may be still carried on. But if Admiral DE MELO, is not allowed to fire effectually on the city, and if, further, he be prohibited from interfering with trade, it is not easy to see how he can possibly succeed in dislodging his opponents. These considerations will have probably weighed with him, should he have determined to raise anchor and set out to sea to seed an engagement with ships coming to the assistance of Government. Everything points either to his gradual embarrassment, or to the waging of a long purposeless, and sterile contest between two sets of forces, neither of them able to bring it to a definitive issue. In such circumstances trade cannot fail to be greatly crippled; and the chief sufferers are the foreigners, against whom Marshal PEIXOTO exhibits so unwisely a good deal of animosity. It is computed that one hundred million of British capital is sunk in various enterprises in Brazil, and that the amount invested by other European communities would amount to another hundred millions. It stands to reason, therefore, that foreign countries cannot remain indifferent to the prolongation of this mischievous duel, and that they

would be usefully employed in trying to devise an exit from the present profitless *impasse*.

Whether Admiral DE MELO does or does not set up the Comte d'EU as Emperor of Brazil, no impartial observer, no matter how eagerly Democratic may be his sympathies, would venture to deny that Brazil has been a terrible loser by the wanton substitution of a Republic for the Monarchy. The ambition or unthinking men who propagate Republican ideas in Europe would do well to fix their attention on Brazil to study its melancholy history during the last four years, and to compare its condition under DOM PEDRO II., and then under Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA, and finally under General FLORIANO PEIXOTO. The very names "DEODORO" and "FLORIANO" are a scathing satire on what Republican adventurers have to offer to a community living prosperously under a liberal and Constitutional Monarch. If heaven gave General DEODORO DA FONSECA to the Brazilians, it could only be to punish them for the ingratitude to the Emperor; and there is certainly nothing very flourishing in the affairs for which General FLORIANO PEIXOTO is responsible. DOM PEDRO II., who was a descendant alike of Braganza, of Bourbon and of Hapsburg, was only six years when he became, on the abdication of his father, Emperor of BRAZIL. He was declared of age in 1840, being then close on fifteen, and forthwith gave proof of that liberal culture and that devotion to welfare of his subjects which distinguished his reign. Public works of every useful kind were the constant object of his attention, and he did his utmost to encourage European colonization in Brazil, and substitute free for slave labour. Moreover, he abolished slavery throughout his Empire. In his

treatment of foreign questions he was equally successful, having helped to overthrow General ROSAS and to secure the free navigation of River Plate. Even over ourselves, in 1862, he achieved a little triumph, by the decision in his favour pronounced, at the end of the arbitration, by the KIND of the BELGIANS. Such were the benefits conferred on the Brazilian people by a Ruler whose only fault was an excessive mildness of character, and a determination never to use force in defence of a position he rated but cheaply. Everybody knows what the Republicans who dethroned him have done for Brazil. They have brought on in the curse of civil war, crippled its commerce, and multiplied its inconvertible paper money threefold. Comte Pierre D'EU could not accept the throne, unless his mother, the daughter of DOM PEDRO II., were to renounce her rights. He is a youth of eighteen, who has hitherto led a secluded and blameless life. The Brazilians would have to be congratulated if they secured such a Sovereign in the place of the rapacious and unprincipled adventures who are wrangling of place, power, and booty.

## 72. *The Morning Post*, 20 de novembro

*Apesar da notícia da restauração do Império por parte de Custódio de Melo não ter sido confirmada, o jornal fala do neto de D. Pedro II, come se a probabilidade dele se tornar imperador do Brasil fossem muito altas.*

*No entanto, no fim do artigo, o editorialista londrino tem de admitir que «a República «ocupa o terreno» e que os rebeldes estão longe de conseguir a vitória. Por outras palavras, o regresso dos Bragança não parece ser iminente. Por conseguinte, «o observador imparcial deve em primeiro lugar desejar o fim da guerra civil, que é tão desastrosa para os próprios*

*brasileiros como para aqueles países que têm relações comerciais com o Brasil».*

No confirmation having been received of report that Admiral DE MELO has proclaimed the restoration of the House of BRAGANZA, it is impossible to regard that statement as authoritative. At the same time, it is permissible to point out that there is a certain measure of inherent probability therein. At the very first outbreak of the present crisis at Rio it was suggested that a Monarchical restoration was possible the object of the insurgent leader. Admiral DE MELO is credited with the possession of strong Imperialist leanings, although it must be remembered that he certainly did not allow any loyalty which he may have had to the old *régime* to impel him to interpose on behalf of the late DOM PEDRO when that accomplished and amiable Sovereign was ignominiously hustled out of his dominions by the FONSECAS, the PEIXOTOS, and the rest of his ungrateful subjects. Nevertheless, it is quite conceivable that the ADMIRAL may be Monarchist at heart, or that, even if he was not so at the time of DOM PEDRO'S fall, he may have been converted by the fruitful spectacle of four years of a Republic which, so far as can be ascertained has behaved itself with a scrupulous respect for the traditional behaviour of South American Republics, and with absolutely no respect to the report for anything else. According to the report we have received Admiral DE MELO has proclaimed the grandson of the late Emperor as his successor. That prince is the youthful DOM PEDRO, Prince of Gran Para, the eldest of the three sons of the Comte D'EU and of the Comtesse DONA ISABEL, Princess Imperial of Brazil. If I be really intended to restore the

Monarchy the succession of DOM PEDRO, who has just entered upon the nineteenth year, would probably prove more acceptable to the Brazilian than that of his mother, the Princess Imperial, whose formal abdication of the Throne which is hers in virtue of the old Imperial Constitution would, however, have to be obtained. It is generally admitted that the comtesse D'EU and her husband are not popular in Brazil, in spite of their strictly constitutional attitude, on the three occasions when the Regency temporarily devolved upon DONA ISABEL and the signal military services rendered by her consort to his adopted country in the war with Paraguay. Indeed, it has been alleged that the revolution which deposed the Emperor was partly due to dislike in certain circle for the prospect of the early succession of the Princess Imperial to the Throne of her father. The proclamation of her son should disarm hostility on that score, while on general grounds it would certainly seem to augur well of any restored Empire that the new Sovereign should be a Prince born and brought up in Brazil, and likely to ripen into an intelligent and able ruler. The Prince of GRAN PARA would, moreover, unite in his own person two of the most ancient and most illustrious of the reigning Houses of Europe. As the son of the Comte D'EU, whose father was the DUC DE NEMOURS, son of King LOUIS PHILIPPE, he is a Bourbon, while, be the mother's side, he belongs to the House of BRAGANZA. It is, therefore, no mushroom Monarchy which Admiral DE MELO is said to intend to restore. Assuming that intention to exist, it remains to ask what are the probabilities of success. That there is, and indeed, must be, a considerable proportion of the Brazilian population which regrets the fall of the Empire may be taken as certain. Doubtless the not inconsiderable influence of the clergy

would be exerted in that direction. Nevertheless, the Republic holds the field, and after all these weary weeks of desultory warfare the insurgents seem no nearer the attainment of success that they were at the outset. The dispassionate observer, whatever his predilections may be as to this or that form of Government, must be primarily desirous to see a cessation of a state of civil war which is equally disastrous to the interests of the Brazilians themselves and to those of other countries which have dealings with Brazil.

### 73. *The Aberdeen Journal*, 20 de novembro

*«O Brasil está farto da República» afirma o jornal escocês que trata o neto de D. Pedro de «novo Imperador»!*

Brazil has had enough of a Republic. That news will scarcely surprise anyone who has had the patience to follow the bickerings and contentions, plots and counterplots. Admiral Melo is suspected by some shrewd observers of making his proclamation with a view to its immediate effect upon the people, rather than from any particular anxiety to restore the Braganzas. The reasons for passing over the Princess Isabel Comtesse d'Eu is said to be the unpopularity of her clericalism, but she also incurred unpopularity in a better cause by carrying out the enfranchisement of the slaves during the father's absence. Her son, the new Emperor, is great-grandson of Louis Philippe of France, for his father is the eldest son of the Duc de Nemours, second son of the

Citizen King. He was not very enthusiastic over South American politics here, but Brazil is a big country, and naturally excites interest.

#### 74. *The Leeds Mercury*, 29 de novembro

*Nada parece mudar no porto do Rio de Janeiro, constata o jornal que deseja una intervenção «conjunta por parte das Potências» para que acabe este conflito, que muito prejudica os ingleses que investiram no Brasil.*

The special correspondent of *The Times* in Rio de Janeiro, writing in the beginning of November<sup>27</sup>, was of opinion that a very strong undercurrent of feeling was setting in towards the cause of the insurgents. He believed that monetary support was being given to them from many quarters. The reason for this is "that a victory for the Revolution means a Congress elected by the popular vote, and an end to the system of military despotism" which has been maintained ever since the deposition of the Emperor and the fall of the Empire. The people, he declares, are tired of the existing Government, and mean to make a strong effort to overthrow it. Another month had lapsed, however, since the correspondent gave impression to these opinions, and we appear to be very little nearer to the accomplished revolution. The time has certainly come when, as another correspondent of *The Times* points out, joint action on the part of the Powers chiefly interested might be taken with a view of terminating the struggle. There can be no doubt that unless action is taken in that direction the

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<sup>27</sup> Cf. Texto 83.

capital of English investors lent to Brazil will be seriously imperilled, as the country, distracted and impoverished by the war, must soon be unequal to paying the interest upon its foreign debt.

## 75. «The Insurrection in Brazil», *The Times*, 21 de novembro

*O correspondente do jornal envia um longo artigo cinco dias depois da sua chegada ao Rio. Descreve os combates no porto e sublinha, como outros observadores, «a falta de precisão dos artilheiros».*

*Faz a seguir um balanço das forças dos dois lados, quer em homens, quer em armas, quer em navios de guerra. Por enquanto, nota o jornalista, há um certo equilíbrio entre os dois, sendo Peixoto o rei da terra e Melo o rei do mar, e não houve nenhum verdadeiro combate importante e decisivo.*

*«A ação das Potências estrangeiras foi de importância primordial», sublinha o articulista, porque conseguiram preservar as propriedades e salvar vidas na capital. Melo aceitou a proposta dos diplomatas desde que o governo retirasse as baterias em frente da cidade dirigidas contra a frota rebelde.*

*O enviado do Times constata que a vida e os negócios no Rio de Janeiro decorrem quase com normalidade. Nota também o número importante de residentes estrangeiros, e nomeadamente de nacionalidade italiana, portuguesa e francesa, sendo os ingleses e os alemães em menor número.*

*Dá a seguir o ponto de vista dos partidários de Peixoto, segundo os quais o Marechal tem o direito e a justiça da sua parte e que Custódio de Melo é um «rebelde que só defende os seus interesses». Enumera a seguir as opiniões desfavoráveis contra o chefe de Estado, acusado de ser um déspota, de esbanjar o dinheiro público, de ser um corrupto, de favorecer o Exército em prejuízo da Marinha.*

*Consegue entrevistar o chefe da insurreição que, logicamente, dá uma visão muito positiva da sua situação. Explica, em particular, porque foi*

*forçado a tomar a decisão de combater com as armas «o despotismo militar e a política financeira irresponsável» do Governo. De Melo mostra-lhe o livro-bomba que lhe foi endereçado.*

*O autor do texto – embora diga que os dois podem ter, em parte, razão – critica duramente a política financeira e monetária dos últimos três anos, durante os quais Peixoto esteve no poder. Tenta ser objetivo, mas, no entanto, escreve que a revolta armada «parecia o único meio à disposição para levar a cabo este protesto» e que há uma tendência «favorável ao partido revolucionário». Escreve que o Sul está contra o poder do Rio e que o Norte, por agora neutral, poderá apoiar o eventual vencedor. Além disso, é favorável que aos revoltosos seja reconhecido o estatuto de combatente.*

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Oct. 31.

I arrived at Rio on the 26<sup>th</sup> inst. in the Royal Mail steamer *Tagus*. Occasional shots were fired from one or two of the insurgent men-of-war towards Niteroi as we steamed up the harbour. At long intervals the shore batteries returned the fire; at 2 p.m. both sides desisted from wasting ammunition. At 5 p.m. the forts of Santa Cruz, San João, and Lage opened upon the insurgent stronghold of Villegagnon, the latter place replying vigorously to the attack: at the same time the squadron engaged the forts and batteries in and about Niteroi. This artillery duel lasted for an hour and a half, displaying a most lamentable lack of skill on the part of the gunners; then firing ceased for the night, with the exception of stray shots of the insurgents as they patrolled the harbour. The performance is repeated daily and has been the rule since the beginning of the month, except that on the 25<sup>th</sup> inst., the day previous to my

arrival, continuous firing was maintained during the day and prolonged far into the night. On the evening of that day a magazine in the possession of the insurgents exploded on the island of Mocangué, on the east side of the bay. It contained some two tons of brown pebble powder, partly damaged by damp. The explosion is described as one of terrific force, and it was at first supposed that a large quantity of warlike stores had been destroyed. Inquiries subsequently made enable me to state that such was not the case, owing to the fact that the bulk of the material deposited in the magazine had the day before been removed on board the *Aquidaban*, the flagship of Admiral Melo.

The troops at the disposal of the Government consist of 7,000 men, armed with latest pattern Mannlicher rifles, of all branches of the army. Of these, some 2,000 men, chiefly militia, and the volunteer cadet battalion from the Military College from the garrison of Niteroi and the forts adjacent; the remaining 5,000 regulars are stationed in Rio de Janeiro and the forts of Santa Cruz, San João, and Lage. Opposed to these Admiral Custodio Melo has a force of 1,500 men distributed over his fleet and 700 more forming the garrison of Villegagnon. The fort of Santa Cruz is armed with two heavy 10in. Armstrong guns and several other pieces of old-fashioned artillery; that of San João with one heavy 10in. Armstrong<sup>28</sup> gun; Lage with three 6in. Withworth guns; the various batteries about the city of Rio with Krupp field guns; Niteroi with one Armstrong 32-pounder, on Whitworth 32-pounder, and several batteries of

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<sup>28</sup> William G. Armstrong (1810-1900) foi um dos maiores industriais do século XIX. Inventou o canhão de campanha.

Krupp field-guns. The insurgent fortress of Villegagnon has the following armament: – 37 Armstrong guns, calibre 400, 250, and 68; 6 Withworth guns, calibre 12; 1 Armstrong gun, calibre 112, with Moncrieff<sup>29</sup> modification.

The warships composing Admiral Melo's fleet are: – (1) The *Aquidaban* (flagship), [...]; (2) The *Trajano*, a wooden cruiser, of which the engines are unfit for use [...]; (3) Steel cruiser *Republica*, built by Armstrong in 1893 [...]; (4) The *Liberdade* [...]; (5) The *Javari*, a turret ship, of which the engines are useless [...]; (6) The *Guanabara*, a wooden cruiser [...]. These six vessels, with the torpedo boat *Marcilio Dias* [...], from the portion of the Brazilian navy Admiral Melo has been able to make use of up to the present. The remaining two serviceable ships are the *Bahia* and the *Tiradentes*: both are away on the River Plate and have not yet declared if they remain loyal to the Government or throw in their lot with the insurgents. The former is a turret ships of the same class as the *Javari*, the latter an armed cruiser. The *Richauelo* and *Benjamin Constant* are still in Europe and the arrival of both is anxiously looked for. Should they declare against the Government, they will prove a most important addition to the strength of the insurgent squadron. In addition to these men-of-war, Admiral Melo has armed five merchant steamers, which were engaged in the frozen meat trade. This are: – (1) The *Meteora* [...]; (2) The *Palas* [...]; (3) The *Urano* [...] ; (4) The *Pereira Cunho* [...]; (5) The *Jupiter* [...]. In order to assist in patrolling the harbour and in general work, the insurgents have seized all steam launches and vessels not under the protection of some foreign flag. The

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<sup>29</sup> Alexander Moncrief (1829-1906), inventor do «canhão que desaparece» («*disappearing gun*»)

Government has only one steam launch left, with which to convey ammunition and provisions to Santa Cruz and Lage.

The condition of affair is a curious anomaly. There is no blockade of the city of Rio, owing to the action of the Powers in protecting foreign shipping, and allowing it to carry on the ordinary commercial business of the port; for the same reason, the insurgents have not turned the guns of the fleet of those of Villegagnon on the town. Today, there are two kings in Brentford – the legal President, or rather Vice-President, Marshal Floriano Peixoto is king of the land, and Admiral Custodio de Melo is king of the sea, or, more correctly, of the harbour and the coast line, for the Government forts of Santa Cruz, San João and Lage completely command the entrance of the harbour, and render the passage in and out a most difficult and dangerous undertaking for the insurgents. True, ships have several times run the gauntlet, and passed between the big gun on either side, but never without receiving serious injury. In the last case, that of the insurgent steamer *Urano*, the hull was badly hit and 40 men were reported as killed and wounded at her arrival at Desterro, the headquarter of the insurgent party. The key of the position is the possession of the forts at the entrance, and yet, for some reason difficult to fathom, the insurgents prefer to devote their energy and waste shot and shell in bombarding the town of Niteroi, the capital of the State of Rio Janeiro. It is impossible to see what great advantage the possession of this town would be to them in present circumstances. They have not a sufficient number of men to

garrison it securely, and from the point of view of obtaining supplies it would be much more important to get command of the entrance to the harbour.

Matters cannot continue long as they now are. The two sides growl and bark at one another but do not bite. Some 20,000 shots from different pieces of artillery have been fired and no decided advantage has been gained by either side. The insurgents have lost some 35 men killed, and the Government has had about the same number of casualties to record at Niteroi and Rio. The latter, however, sustained a further serious loss ten days ago when the cruiser *Republica* rammed the transport *Rio de Janeiro*, conveying troops to Santos. Eleven hundred men were on board the transport, and of these only 600 were saved by the *Republica*. A powerful adjunct to the strength of Government consists in the two searchlights, one on the hill of Gloria, the other on the fort of San João. By the aid of these the movements of the insurgent ships can be watched continually during the night, and timely warning given to the entrance forts if any attempt is made to slip past them. It has been agreed upon the foreign representatives conjointly with the Government and Admiral Melo, that the insurgents shall not fire upon the Gloria light so long as it is not used for the purpose of directing artillery fire upon the fort of Villegagnon, or the ships in harbour. The insurgents, on the other hand, mean to fire on the light if the slightest breach of this agreement occurs. The convention was made with the object of saving life and property in Rio, as artillery fire directed against the searchlight would inevitably lead of severe damage to the city. Every night the light shows the insurgent torpedo-boats and small craft cruising round the

forts and lose in shore. On the night of the 28<sup>th</sup> I could have thrown a stone on board the *Jupiter* from where I stood on the beach under the searchlight.

The action of the foreign Powers has, most undoubtedly, been of paramount importance. All their efforts have been directed towards the preservation of life and property in the city of Rio de Janeiro and the protection of foreign shipping. In what they have attempted they have succeeded admirably, and any casualties to life or destruction of property amongst foreign residents hitherto have been caused by unavoidable accident rather than by any wilful act on the part of the Government of the insurgents. It must not for a moment be forgotten that the city is completely at the mercy of Admiral Melo, and that at any moment he can lay it in ruins and thus force the resignation of Marshal Peixoto. Admiral Melo has in no way taken advantage of the fact that he has this power but has met the representations made to him in a most friendly spirit, and has honourably adhered to the promises he gave in acquiescing to the propositions made to him. The decision finally arrived at by the various diplomatic agents was to request Admiral Melo not to fire on the city, on condition that the Government refrained from erecting batteries or keeping guns in position within the town limits and did not use the appliance in the naval and military arsenals for mounting or equipping guns or manufacturing projectiles and munitions of war. The Government has fulfilled its part of agreement according to the strict letter, but while not actually mounting guns in position in the city, it has nevertheless made all preparations of so doing, and in a very few hours the various batteries would be

able to open fire. The supporters of Marshal Peixoto are very bitter against foreigners on account of the action taken. Why they should be so it is difficult to understand, and the Brazilians themselves can advance no substantial reason for it. They assert that Admiral Melo has been treated with undue partiality, and emphasize this by saying that the combined squadron moves from the usual anchorage at the request of the Admiral. It is quite true that they did so, but it could hardly be expected of them to remain passively in the direct line of fire from the insurgent warships.

On glance at the city of Rio is enough to show the beneficial effort accruing from the foreign intervention. Business runs its normal course and is only reduced in volume because of the restrictions on loading and discharging cargo. In a very few isolated cases a stray shell has caused damage to a building, but so slight has this been that it is estimated the total loss would not amount to a couple of thousand pounds. Loss of life has been of most rare occurrence. In the harbour a few sailors have been wounded accidentally, and possibly half a dozen cases have occurred on shore, amongst these being Mr. Whatman, a clerk in the London and Brazilian Bank, who was killed by a splinter of a shell whilst at luncheon. The vast number of foreign flags hoisted over houses in all quarter of the city shows the large proportion of foreigners who help to make up the population of 700,00 persons inhabiting Rio. Italian, Portuguese, and French colours predominate, and then, in lesser degree, are seen the flags of England, Germany, and the United States.

The view of the present state of affairs taken by the supporter of Marshal Floriano Peixoto is that he has right and justice on his side. He was legally elected and remains with a large majority of Congress in his favour. His followers deny that any act of the Marshal's savour of military despotism, and they call to mind the good service rendered and the bravery shown by him during the Paraguayan war. They further maintained that Admiral Melo is simply a rebel working for his own ends and aims – namely, to place himself in power as the President of the country and his friends in comfortable, lucrative offices. Such are the assertions constantly made by the friends of the Marshal. We can accept them for what they may be worth and digest them with a very large grain of salt. Now turn to the other side and hear what the supporters of Admiral Melo have to say about their chief. They uphold him as a man who has taken a heavy burden on his shoulders for the sake of the country, and who is fighting the battle for the benefits of the Brazilian people, and not for the sake of place of power. They accuse Marshal Peixoto of useless extravagance in connexion with the expenditure of public moneys, of establishing throughout Brazil a species of military despotism, of acting generally in a manner directly at variance with the spirit of the Constitution, of corruption with regard to public appointments, and, finally, of unduly favouring the army and neglecting the navy.

What conclusion can be drawn from such assertions so diametrically opposed in every way? Both sides, no doubt, are to a certain extent right in what they say. Floriano Peixoto is the legal head of the State, with a majority in

Congress. Admiral Melo, is, according to the Constitution of the Brazilian Republic, a rebel and an outlaw. But is there no excuse for his conduct when the events of the past three years in Brazil are impartially considered? Reckless administration of the Government finances has plunged the country into a financial crisis that will take years of careful nursing to obliterate; to the most casual observer it was evident that the Republic was saddled with a Praetorian system of government, and that everything was subordinated to the flood of militarism that submerged Brazil on the collapse of the Empire. We must gauge a country to some extent by the worth of its credit abroad and the value of its exchange. Three years ago, Brazilian bonds were thought a sound investment, and exchange stood at 28d. to the milreis. Today the bonds are almost unsaleable and exchange is at 10 1/2 d. I do not propose to enter into the financial condition of the country in this letter, but I have quoted the foregoing facts as they are proof positive that there is something seriously wrong in the manner in which the administration of the Republic has recently been conducted. With this state of things Marshal Peixoto has been most intimately associated, first as Vice-President under Fonseca and latterly as the occupant of the Presidential chair. If we add to this the fact that he has sanctioned the illegal use of \$123,000,000 (equal to, say, £6,000,000 sterling) of paper money during the past week to meet the extraordinary expenses caused by the revolution, it is impossible for us to consider that his method of administration is a financial success, whatever other good qualities he may possess.

On Saturday, the 28<sup>th</sup> inst., I succeeded in getting on board the *Aquidaban*, the flagship of Admiral Melo. It was no easy matter, for the pains and penalties are many and various for any person caught in communication with the insurgents. A friendly master of a sailing ship agreed to take me off to my destination and put me on board late in the afternoon. After half an hour spent in making a tour of the vessel, I arranged to return in the morning for a long interview with the Admiral. The *Aquidaban* is not much the worse for all the heavy firing to which she has been exposed. Four shells have gone through the upper deck and burst between decks; another passed through the funnel, and the mizenmast is half cut away; about a dozen shots have struck her on the sides without doing any damage. Both officers and men appeared cheery and contented. The Admiral's secretary showed me the infernal machine that was into from the shore for the purpose of disposing of the chief of the revolution. It consists of a thick volume entitled "*Consulado Estado*", with the edges gummed together; the centre was hollowed out and a pound weight of dynamite inserted. This was to be fired by a detonator fixed to the cover of the book, and would be exploded by the act of opening the volume. Happily, the Admiral had his suspicions of what the parcel contained, and so no harm was done. Leaving the *Aquidaban* at sunset, I went round to look at the *Javari* and the *Trajano*, neither vessel having apparently received any damage from the fire of the shore batteries. I then passed in shore not far from Niteroi, and was able to see that the bombardment, from the fleet has destroyed a large number of houses in the town. Just after passing the point to the north of Niteroi we found ourselves in a most unpleasant predicament. A shore battery opened fire on

some of the ships, and the *Jupiter* moved up and replied with her 12-pounder Whitworths. Then the *Trajano* and a battery on Mucangué Island joined in. For 15 minutes the shells hummed merrily over our heads, and then we passed out the line of fire.

Next morning, I returned early to the *Aquidaban*. Admiral Melo received me in his usual courteous manner, and was anxious to supply me with all information I wished for. He stated emphatically that his action in the revolution had been taken after mature consideration of the consequence, and that he and his supporters has been forced into it as the only means of making an effectual protest against the military despotism and reckless financial policy that, in his opinion, characterized the administration of Marshal Peixoto. The Admiral stated that the actual cause of matters coming to a head was the arbitrary manner adopted by Peixoto when he placed his veto on the Bill providing that no Vice-President was eligible for election to the Presidency. The President exercised his right of veto on September 5, and on the morning of the 6<sup>th</sup> the insurrection was declared. Admiral Melo declares that the question of the restoration of the Empire was never seriously mooted, but that if majority in a new Congress favoured such a moment it rested entirely with themselves to decide for or against it. He appears confident of success, but thinks he could gain his ends more expeditiously if he was recognized as a belligerent and enabled to use freely the rights that such *status* would confer upon him. Not only does he claim that the Provisional Government of the United States of Brazil is firmly established at Desterro, the capital of Santa

Catarina, but he also claims that the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Paraná are entirely with the insurgents. He states that Captain Lorenzo, the Provisional President, Lieutenant Mourão, Minister of Marine and acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Major Anibal Cardozo, Minister of War, and acting Minister of Public Works and Justice, were all men who had been selected on account of their fitness of the posts they now occupy. If the insurgents win the day, a general election will be held throughout the country, and it will be made a proviso that a civilian be elected as President.

Admiral Melo states that he has now fully 2,000 men under arms in Santa Catarina and that they are being drilled and organized as regular troops. He thinks his next move will probably be to occupy Santos, and to move thence to San Paulo. In speaking of the acts of Peixoto which irritated the Brazilians, he mentioned the appointment of Dr. C. Barata Ribeiro to be a judge of the Supreme Court. This gentleman is a doctor of medicine, and it is difficult to see how he can lay claim to any qualification of his new duties. One result of the appointment was to cause the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Carvalho, to resign at once his portfolio. Admiral Melo pointed out that in filling this vacancy in the Cabinet the Marshal had selected a man of no standing and no special ability for the post. In answer to a question regarding the attitude of the northern provinces at the present time, the Admiral said they were practically neutral, and would raise no opposition to his party if he was successful in the south. The insurgents are well supplied with ammunitions, having seized all the naval warlike stores in the possession of the Brazilian Government at the

time the revolution broke out. Admiral Melo also stated that he considered he had a sufficiency of money for his purposes.

The conclusion I have come to as regards the insurrection is that the trouble was brewing for many months before the outbreak actually occurred. It is evident, also, that the *raison d'être* of the affair was to make a forcible protest against the Administration of Marshal Peixoto, and that an appeal to arms appeared the only available means by which such a protest could be effectually lodged. The fact that the province of Rio Grande do Sul was in open revolt at the time was a coincidence and nothing more, for the question of Rio Grande is one of very long standing, and armed opposition to the national Government has been in active progress for some two years past. The people of Rio Grande dislike being governed from Rio and wish to have complete home rule for themselves. It was this that led them to rebel against the Government of General Castilho, who was the nominee first of Fonseca and then of Peixoto. As matters now stand it is tolerably certain that Rio Grande will throw in its lot unreservedly with the insurgents in the hope of obtaining eventually the measure of home rule it has been fighting for. Santa Catarina is entirely with Admiral Melo, and the adjoining province of Paraná is practically in his power. We have, therefore, the fleet and the three provinces of Rio Grande, Santa Catarina, and Paraná, opposed to the legally-constituted Government of Floriano Peixoto. It must not be forgotten that Peixoto is supported by Congress and that his exercising his right of veto on the bill providing that no vice-president should be eligible for the Presidency was in accord with the powers

vested in him under the Constitution. The provinces north of Rio de Janeiro will probably remain neutral and be ready to declare adhesion to the side gaining the victory in the south. The position in Brazil is on a different footing to that in 1891 in Chile. There the Congress opposed a Dictator; here a party of considerable force are endeavouring to impose to a majority of Congress a policy of reform by the aid of armed insurrection. One must bear in mind also that one active cause of the revolt was the feeling amongst the naval officers that their interests were entirely subordinated to those of the army. I find that, while open expressions of sympathy with the cause of the insurgents are few and far between, a very strong undercurrent of feeling is running in favour of the Revolutionist party, and the opinion is growing that Admiral Melo and his followers should be recognized as belligerents.

Martial law was prolonged on the 28<sup>th</sup> inst. until November 30.

## 76. *The Northeastern Gazette*, 21 de novembro.

*O que parece certo, nota o jornal, é que os dois contendentes parecem fracos: contrariamente ao que se passa em outros conflitos e guerra civil no Peru, no Chile e na Argentina, «os combatentes brasileiros nem sequer conseguem tocar-se».*

The news as to Brazilian civil conflict continues to be uncertain. A denial is given by Dr. Rui Barbosa, a prominent leader of the insurgent force, to the report so confidently telegraphed to Europe on Friday that Admiral de Melo has

issued a proclamation declaring the eldest son of the Comte d'Eu Emperor of Brazil. The rumour is said to be a ruse of the Presidential party. It would see, however, that should the statement prove unfounded there are some grounds for believing that some such step is in contemplation, as Marshal Peixoto lays a strict embargo on all news that might tend to disseminate the impression that his capacity to maintain himself in power is waning; and as Admiral de Melo, on the other hand, is scarcely in a position to transmit much intelligence, even if he were anxious to do so, we are scarcely in a position to judge of the relative strength or prospects of the two parties engaged in the conflict. Neither side would seem to have any very decided advantage; and at this distance the most prominent feature is, perhaps, the singular feebleness of both. In South American revolutions and civil wars, in Peru, Chile, and Argentina, we have had notable and lamentable examples of fratricidal butchery, and a good deal of fierce and relentless fighting. In this latest instance it would seem that the Brazilian combatants are not even able to touch each other.

**77. *The Northern Echo*, 21 de novembro**

The news of the proclamation of the Comte d'Eu's son as Emperor of Brazil is supposed to be a canard.

**78. *The Hampshire Advertiser*, 22 de novembro**

*Recém-chegados do Brasil, dois oficiais britânicos desmentem uma falsa notícia sobre a execução de dois oficiais brasileiros por parte de Peixoto. Relatam também a recusa de entregar aos revoltosos apoiantes do Governo brasileiro.*

On the arrival at Southampton on Saturday of the Royal Mail steamship *Thames* from Brazil, Captain Hicks and another officer were interviewed regarding the Lisbon telegram, published on Friday, stating that two insurgent naval officers who sought refuge on the *Thames* at Rio de Janeiro were taken from the vessel by order of Marshal Peixoto and shot. Both Capt. Hicks and the other officer declared that the story was entirely unfounded, nothing of the kind having occurred. On the outward voyage of the *Thames* a party of about 90 Brazilians, supporters of the Government, went on the board of the *Thames*, all dressed as civilians and without arms, for the purpose of proceeding to Montevideo, to take charge of the *Tiradentes*. On learning this, Admiral de Melo desired to forcibly remove some of these persons from the steamer, and his Flag-lieutenant, Belford, accompanied by Admiral Saldanha da Gama, has an interview on the subject, on board Her Majesty's ship *Sirius*, with the British senior naval officer, who, however, refused to allow them to carry out their wish.

### 79. *The Leeds Mercury*, 22 de novembro

The report that Prince Pedro de Alcantara had embarked for Brazil is pure fiction, his Highness being still at the Military School in Austria. It is stated moreover that the Comtesse d'Eu has no idea of abdicating her rights to the throne of Brazil. From Rio it is announced that the rebels are nearly exhausted.

### 80. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 24 de novembro

*O editorialista, que baseia uma parte da sua análise no longo artigo publicado pelo correspondente do Times no Rio, pensa que «o Brasil está na véspera de dias agitados»: os dois chefes estão impacientes de chegar a «uma prova de força».*

*Fala a seguir do afundamento do Javari, que reduz o poder de fogo dos revoltosos, da futura batalha entre a frota de Custódio de Melo e a que Peixoto «tão livremente encomendou em Nova Iorque», e do perigo do que a capital da jovem República tenha de viver o cerco, como os habitantes de Alexandria do Egito em 1801 e os de Paris em 1870-1871. Os comandantes das frotas estrangeiras e os diplomatas parecem já não poderem evitar que tal aconteça, afirma o quotidiano de Birmingham.*

*Quanto à escolha do regime, de Melo irá consultar o povo depois do fim dos combates, nota o jornal que se interroga sobre a eventual reação dos Estados Unidos.*

We are evidently on the eve of stirring events in Brazil. Whilst, on the one hand, the area of disaffection is manifestly extending, on the other, matters appear to be hastening to climax at the original centre of disturbance.

Pernambuco is now declared to be in a state of siege, and though Marshal PEIXOTO endeavours to explain away this sinister fact by stating that the state of siege is only directed against a small knot of conspirators, and that the people of the city and State generally remain loyal to the Government, everyone who knows anything of what is passing in Brazil is convinced that it indicates the spread of the revolutionary movement in the north of the Republic. At Rio de Janeiro the artillery fire on either side appears to be increasing in severity, or, at all events, in destructiveness, and both the Marshal and the Admiral are reported to be nerving themselves for a final trial of strength. On the insurgent side a heavy loss has been sustained by the sinking of their old turret-ship *Javari*, which is reported to have foundered in Rio harbour<sup>30</sup>, with loss of all hands, as a consequence of injuries sustained in an encounter with the forts of Niteroi, the residential suburb opposite the city. On the other hand, the islands fortress of Villegagnon, which has been for some time in the hands of the insurgents, is reported to have silenced the guns of the Government fort Lage, which is built upon an island commanding the entrance to the harbour, and this success has since been followed by the capture of the fort itself. The position is one of considerable strategic importance, but seeing that it is well within the range of the heavy guns of the Government forts of Santa Cruz and San Juan, which crown the points forming the entrance of the harbour, it may be questioned if Admiral DE MELO will be able to reap much practical advantage from his victory. The city, of course, is at his mercy, and he is practically in

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<sup>30</sup> O *Javari* foi afundado a 22 de novembro.

possession of the suburb, though not of the forts, of Niteroi; but if it be true that the *Javari* is sunk, his fighting power must be considerably reduced, for his total fleet only consisted of one effective ironclad the *Aquidaban*, the turret-ship *Javari*, the wooden corvette *Traiano*, and some six merchant steamers armed with small guns. The *Javari* has been throughout fighting at a great disadvantage, as her engines were not in working order, and when she desired to engage the forts she had to be towed into action. Outside the harbour Admiral de Melo has, or lately has, a second-class cruiser and three or four small ships, a sufficient force, doubtless, to prevent a *coup de main* by any of the new foreign warships which Marshal PEIXOTO has been commissioning so freely from New York and other foreign contractors. One of these naval recruits is believed to be now bearing down upon Rio de Janeiro, and in that case the Brazilian people are likely to be treated to the spectacle of a naval engagement *à outrance* in their own spacious harbour. Before that event takes place, however, they are likely, it seems, to be treated to an experience of an equally exciting but less agreeable character, in the shape of a bombardment. Hitherto Admiral DE MELO has confined his attention to the forts, and the city has only slightly and casually made acquaintance with his shells; but, according to the *Times* correspondent<sup>31</sup>, the insurgent leader thinks that the time has now come for more decided measures with the besieged city, and the commanders of the foreign warships and the members of the Diplomatic Corps, who have hitherto opposed any attack upon Rio itself, have reluctantly come to the conclusion

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<sup>31</sup> Cf. Texto 75.

that they are not justified in interfering with the course of military events any longer, and that Admiral DE MELO must be allowed to carry on the war in his own way, regardless of consequences. In the House of Common last night, Sir E. GREY, on behalf of the Government, was forced to admit that there was no power to prevent Admiral DE MELO from shelling the city if he thought proper, and by this time, in all probability, the citizens are sharing the experience of the residents of Alexandria and Paris<sup>32</sup> during the Egyptian and Franco-German wars, as "besieged residents". Any lingering hesitation on the part of the insurgent Admiral must have been dispelled by observing that his opponent was mounting guns against him within the city boundaries, in violation of his arrangement with the foreign Diplomatic Corps, which latter body is reported to have prudently got out of harm's way by removing to the neighbouring heights of Petropolis. In spite of recent circumstantial disclaimer of monarchical intentions on the part of the insurgent leaders, Admiral DA GAMA, we learn, confirms *The Times* correspondent's statement on this point, adding that Admiral DE MELO will wait until the revolution is over and then take the vote of the nation on the question. How the difficulty is to be arranged with the United States, however, we are not informed.

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<sup>32</sup> O cerco de Alexandria durou de 17 de agosto a 2 de setembro de 1801 ; o de Paris, de 17 de setembro de 1870 a 28 de janeiro de 1871.

## 81. *The Daily News*, 24 de novembro

Much has been heard of the supposed departure of Prince Pedro d'Alcantara, son of the Comte d'Eu, for Brazil. The mystery has been cleared up. The "prince" seen at the St. Lazare Station in Paris turns out to be a wealthy Cuban of the name of De Pedro, who was going to Saint-Nazaire to embark for Havana<sup>33</sup>. The Brazilian decorations worn by the friends of the travellers, who came to see him off, were simply rosettes of Charles III, or of Isabella the Catholic.

## 82. «Brazil: Republic or Empire», *The Graphic*, 25 de novembro.

*O semanário observa que, apesar do telégrafo e dos transportes a vapor, não se sabe exatamente o que se passa nesta grande crise política brasileira, «num dos centros mais importantes da atividade mundial», o que facilita a difusão de boatos.*

*Parece que os rebeldes podem atuar com grande liberdade, mas, no entanto, não conseguem sair da baía, nem obter uma vitória decisiva, escreve o jornalista londrino.*

*Este, na segunda parte do artigo, debruça-se sobre a eventual restauração monárquica que, por várias razões – entre as quais «a deplorável carreira» do novo regime – não lhe parece impossível: «Em circunstâncias favoráveis, a República é o melhor governo possível. É mais do que evidente que, no Brasil, não obstante a doutrina Monroe, tais condições favoráveis não existem».*

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<sup>33</sup> Cf. *A Segunda Revolta da Armada na imprensa francesa*, (no prelo) textos 35 e 36.

For three months a state of things has existed in the Bay of Rio Janeiro for which it would be difficult to find a precedent, even in the astonishing records of South American *pronunciamentos*. A handful of revolted warships has, during the whole of this period, held at bay all the resources of a great Republic bombarding the capital at its leisure, laying whole townships in ruins, obtaining victuals and munitions of war, apparently in plenty and without difficulty, and yet unable to escape into the open sea or to obtain any decisive success on land. The situation is enveloped in mystery. With all the resources of this age of telegraphs and steam it is actually possible for a great political crisis to be fought out in one of the chief centres of the world's activities without the world being able to ascertain what is really taking place. The thing would be incredible were it not being enacted before our eyes. Such a situation must, of course, be brimful of sensational rumours. The latest of these rumours – the story which credits the insurgent Admiral de Melo with having proclaimed the restoration of the Empire – is not the least likely of the strange reports which have escaped from time to time from the smoke and fury of the Rio conflict. That the chief statesman of the insurrection, Senador Rui Barbosa, should believe it to be impossible goes for nothing. Admiral de Melo doubtless knows his own mind better than Barbosa knows it. That even the loyalist should contradict it is even less convincing, since it seems to show that they would not be over pleased if it were true. On the other hand, it has in its favour the cohesion to the rebel court of one of the staunchest Imperialist in Brazil, Admiral Saldanha da Gama; and, furthermore, it is rendered probable by the deplorable career of the Republic itself. The *coup d'état* which deposed the old

Emperor not only put an end to the Monarchy, but at the same time terminated a half-century of peace and prosperity. The Republic set loose a chaos of conflicting factions which has brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. It is possible to be a theoretical Republican and yet recognise this terrible fact; and if Admiral de Melo has arrived at the conclusion that a restoration is advisable, he may none the less be faithful to the academic conviction that, under favourable circumstances, a Republic is the best of all possible governments. It is very evident that the favourable conditions do not exist in Brazil, the Monroe doctrine notwithstanding.

**83. *Lloyds Weekly Newspaper*, 26 de novembro.**

*Custódio de Melo proclamou imperador o neto de D. Pedro: «trata-se da última jogada de um homem em sérias dificuldades ou o ato de um comandante consciente que está a expressar a voz do povo? Interroga o jornalista. Este sugere a hipótese que isso foi feito por pressão do clero católico. De qualquer forma, «ser proclamado imperador ou sentar-se no trono imperial são duas coisas distintas», conclui o semanário.*

The proclamation by Admiral Melo, of Prince Pierre, son of the Comte d'Eu, as Emperor of Brazil, came as a surprise to most people, and speculation is rife as to whether it is the last move of a man in sore straits, or the act of a commander conscious that he is giving expression to the popular voice. Born at Petropolis, near Rio, in 1875, the young prince is a grandson of the Duc de Nemours, and son of Isabela de Braganza, daughter of the Emperor Dom Pedro,

and Hereditary Princess of Brazil. It was the clerical leanings of his mother that made her so unpopular, and that was alleged to have been the cause of the revolution four years ago, and it is therefore possible that his proclamation as Emperor may have been brought about by the priesthood, which, in spite of recent events, is still a power in the country. But to be proclaimed Emperor, and to be seated on the Imperial throne, are two different things; and if, as some persons suppose, Melo's proclamation is merely a bid for the help of the Northern provinces, Prince Pierre will probably decline to receive the honour thus thrust upon him.

#### 84. «The Insurrection in Brazil», *The Times*, 28 de novembro

*O correspondente descreve os combates que continuam sem, no entanto, provocar grandes prejuízos dos dois lados. Dedicava a seguir três parágrafos, cerca de 40 % do artigo, às «tremendas explosões» de um depósito de munições: foram 70 durante quase duas horas, na tarde de dia 3. Foi tão forte que até partiu painéis de vidro na capital, que fica a cerca de oito quilómetros de distância. Houve 13 mortos entre os revoltosos e quatro ingleses, e vários feridos. O correspondente considera que a causa principal desta tragédia foi «a culpada negligência por parte do chefe dos rebeldes». Porém, esta perda de munições, nota o jornalista, não vai afetar as capacidades militares da insurreição.*

*Depois de ter apresentado o Governo Provisório, «firmemente estabelecido em Desterro», o artigo fala da adesão dos federalistas à causa defendida por Custódio de Melo e das dificuldades de Peixoto no Rio Grande do Sul, onde, na sua opinião, só controla, Pelotas, Porto Alegre e a cidade de Rio Grande.*

*Como no artigo publicado uma semana antes, o jornalista insiste sobre a formação «de uma forte corrente em favor dos insurretos. Ganham*




Fig. 4a: Antes de depois da explosão do armazém de pólvora na Ilha do Governador a 3 de novembro(*The Graphic*, 16 de dez)




Fig. 4b: A casa da guarda, antes e depois da explosão ; as ruínas do armazem de munições; um torpedo destinado a fazer explodir o navio almirante dos rebeldes (*The Graphic*, 16 de dez.)

*simpatia enquanto o Governo perde-a». Com efeito, argumenta o correspondente do jornal londrino, «uma vitória da revolução significa um Congresso eleito por um voto popular e o fim de um sistema baseado no despotismo militar. [...] Os Brasileiros estão fartos de um Governo pretoriano e, neste momento, vão fazer um esforço muito grande para o derrubar».*

*No penúltimo parágrafo, explica o ambicioso, mas teórico plano dos rebeldes, que prevê nomeadamente a conquista do Estado de São Paulo, e as medidas tomadas pelo Governo de Peixoto que, na opinião do jornalista, subestima a força dos seus inimigos.*

*Finalmente, o correspondente relata o ambiente hostil para com os estrangeiros que se sente na capital. Cada vez que um navio das Grandes Potências se aproxima do Aquidabã para pedir explicações, os apoiantes de Peixoto consideram que se trata «de uma visita de simpatia para com o Almirante de Melo», relata o articulista. Este considera que «a atitude dos representantes diplomáticos na terra e os oficiais navais no mar é absolutamente neutral e imparcial, sem favorecer ninguém, procurando agir de modo a salvar vidas e minimizar as destruições». Na sua opinião, a única maneira de sair deste impasse era dar o estatuto de beligerantes aos rebeldes, o que permitia ao mesmo tempo acelerar o fim do conflito.*

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 5.

So far as the general situation at Rio is concerned, there are only one or two points of interest to comment on since my last communication, day to day events of importance having been already sent forwards by cable. The artillery duel between the insurgent fortress of Vellegagnon and Santa Cruz and San João continues as formerly, resulting in small damage to either side. The shooting from the Government forts has shown a distinct improvement, and many shells have burst on the outside walls of Villegagnon, a few also falling in

the interior. So far, however, the fort is intact to all intents and purposes, and total casual amongst the 600 men now forming the garrison are only six killed and some 20 wounded. The bombardment of Niteroi is continued from the *Javari* and *Guanabara*, aided by the launches and torpedo-boats; to assist in the operations on this side of the harbour a battery of three 4.in. Whitworth guns has been mounted on the island of Mocangué, and from this point firing is maintained on the Government battery at Punta de Areia, and shells are also thrown over the high land at the back of this positions into the town of Niteroi. With the exception of the *Javari* and the *Guanabara*, the fleet has hardly fired a shot for the past four day. Admiral Melo is forced to play a waiting game until his arrangements in Santa Catarina and Rio Grande are further advanced, and his apparent inactivity up to the present must be accounted for in this way.

On Friday, November 3, an event occurred, bringing in its train disastrous and terrible consequences. I had gone on board her Majesty's ship *Sirius* to see the senior naval officer of our squadron, Captain Land, and at 3 45 p.m. was sitting in the ward room talking to some of officers. Suddenly the air was rent with the noise of a terrific explosion, and the ship trembled from stem to stern. We all rushed on deck just in time to see a second explosion of slightly lesser magnitude take place at the point of the island of Governador, some three miles distant, at the spot where the national powder magazine was placed. For time past this has been in the possession of the insurgents, and it is from her that they have drawn a large supply of ammunition. Detonation after detonation followed the first two explosions, and I counted over 70 distinct reports,

following at intervals, between 3 45 p.m. and 5 30 p.m. The concussion was so severely felt in Rio, five miles distant, as to shatter many panes of glass. Whilst watching the scene of the disaster, an officer reported to Captain Lang that two of the ship's boat had proceeded to the vicinity of the magazine early in the afternoon for the purpose of obtaining a supply of sand. The senior officer at once despatched a launch to see after the safety of the boats' crews. It appears that it was customary on Friday afternoons to make a picnic excursion of the sanding expedition, and advantage was taken of the opportunity to give the crews a run on shore. In the course of an hour the launch returned with the sad report that at the party on shore Lieutenant Mowbray, First Lieutenant of the *Sirius* Lieutenant Tupper, of the *Racer*, and Boatsman Harris, of the *Sirius*, were missing; two men were brought off in the launch, one so severely wounded that he died in a few hours; one boat was reported as entirely broken up, the other one as uninjured. The remainder of the party were stated to be on shore, but the launch was unable to reach them, owing to insufficient water. Medical aid was at once sent and search parties despatched to look for the missing and wounded men. One able seaman was found dead and five others injured, two of this severely. Of Lieutenant Mowbray and Tupper no trace has been found, although the vicinity has been most minutely searched and the sea near the spot dragged. The body of Mr. Harris was discovered near the shore.

It appears that on landing from the boats the two officers and the boatswain were about 100 yards ahead of the remainder of the party and nearer of the magazine when the first explosion took place. Many of the wounded men

received their injuries from the shells which were lying in the lower magazine, and which continued bursting at intervals for nearly two hours after the first shock. At the time the magazine contained over 100 tons of ammunitions, including 12 tons of prismatic powder, 200 10in 800lb.: loaded Whitworth shells, several tons of loose powder, partly damaged, and some hundreds of barrel of fine grains rifle powder, besides other explosives. On the day the explosion occurred a party of the insurgents were engaged loading powder into one of the armed merchant steamers. The lieutenant colonel in charge and 12 men were killed and some 14 others wounded. The captain of the steamer was in his launch near the landing stage and was severely injured by the explosion of the boiler from the concussion caused by the exploded material. Our men were buried on shore on the afternoon of November 3, detachments from men-of-war of other nationalities attending the funeral. This is one of the saddest incidents that has occurred since the civil war broke out, and has been a source of universal regret. Admiral Saldanha da Gama testified practically his sympathy by placing at Captain Lang's disposal the hospital of Ilha das Cobras, maintained at his own expense since the insurrection commenced. This hospital is under the Red Cross, and is used for the men of the fleet who are wounded or disabled from any cause; it is on the small island of Cobras, a spot which has been treated as neutral ground since the present trouble began, and Admiral da Gama has taken it and all the sick and wounded of the insurgents under his special charge.

Two days previous to the explosion of the magazine, a warning was received by Admiral Melo to the effect that an attempt would be made to destroy this deposit of war material. As, however, for 15 days previously his men had been busy removing the stores and loading the war vessels and merchant ships without being in any way disturbed the warning was disregarded. The day previous to the occurrence two unknown men were seen in the vicinity and fired upon by the sentries; but, in spite of all this, on the evening of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of November the entire party from the magazine were taken on board ship and not one man was left to see that no attempt was made to tamper with the stores. The loss of so large a quantity of ammunition is a blow to the insurgents, but will not be severely felt by stock remaining, amply sufficient for their needs that in possession of the Government, if what I can learn on the subject be true. The loss was plainly due to culpable negligence on the part of the leader of the insurgents, and it is only one of many instances where a like apathy and carelessness have been displayed where most vital interests are at stake.

To turn to the general progress of affairs. From a revolt to the greater portions of the fleet against the Government of Floriano Peixoto matters have advanced to a stage that can only be designated as civil war, and that of a most serious and critical character. The Provisional Government of Captain Lorena continues firmly established at Desterro and gaining influence every day. [...] Admiral Custodio de Melo has been named Commander-in Chief of the Navy, and Senhor Silveira Martins is appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. This

latter appointment is of the very utmost importance and is proof positive that the victorious revolutionary forces in Rio Grande do Sul have agreed to join hands with the party of which Admiral de Melo is the chief. Silveira Martins is a native of Rio Grande, has travelled much in Europe and elsewhere, is a man well known for his enlightened views, and is the head of the opposition in the South. His adhesion to the side of the insurgents means that an army of some 6,000 men, who have been fighting hard for the past two years, will make common cause with the navy against the Government. With Silveira Martins comes General Gumerindo Saraiva, a most able leader, and one who has been successful in defeating the Government troops in every engagement in which he has taken part during the Rio Grande war. Meanwhile, to oppose the forces of the Provisional Government at Desterro and in the interior of Rio Grande, Marshal Peixoto is concentrating all his men at Porto Alegre, Pelotas, and the city of Rio Grande. These three points now represent the only foothold the Government has in the South. Moreover, it is a very difficult matter for Peixoto to maintain these forces with men, arms, and ammunition, as all transport by sea is completely cut off and the distance by land is not only very great, but, in addition, all reinforcements must of necessity pass through hostile country. The Minister of War, General Francisco de Moura, is commanding the Government troops in the South, and has with him at the three places already mentioned an army of seven thousand men.

A very strong under-current of feeling is setting in towards the cause of the insurgents. The gain sympathy where the Government lose it, and

monetary support is being given to them from many sources. The reason alleged for this – and I think it is the true one – is that a victory for the revolution means a Congress elected by the popular vote and an end to the system of military despotism which has held an iron grip over the country since the fall of the Empire. The Brazilian are tired of a Pretorian Government and will make a very strong effort at this juncture to overthrow it. Marshal Floriano Peixoto either cannot or will not recognize this fact, and consequently will leave no stone unturned to uphold the existing Government, with himself at the head of it. The elections of Congress should have taken place at the beginning of this month, but they have, by a decree of the Executive, been postponed. It is difficult to see how they could be any true gauge of public opinion in these troublous times. Under the existing *regime* pressure from those in authority would bring about any result that might be wished for, and a majority in favour of candidates shielded by the sacred cloak of officialdom would be a foregone conclusion. Such, at least, has been the experience of other South American countries when situated as Brazil is today.

The plan of campaign roughly is this: – Admiral Melo will remain in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro and prevent the Government from sending reinforcements to Rio Grande by sea. The Southern Squadron, consisting of the *Republica* and one of the two-armed merchant steamers, will stop all communication on the coast with Rio Grande or Santos. Meanwhile the Provisional Government are to expedite as much as possible the organization of the land forces, and a body of troops will be landed at Marica or Ibatiba, and,

marching overland, will, simultaneously with the fleet, make an attack on Niteroi. The Southern Army will march northwards on Santos and endeavour to gain possession of that port, success in this meaning complete mastery over the State of São Paulo. Evidently such movements are thought likely by the Government, for the various garrisons on the coast line to the east of Niteroi have been strengthened. The garrison of Santos has also been reinforced and additional fortifications and batteries erected. It is stated that Marshal Floriano is determined to provoke a decisive engagement very shortly and considers he is strong enough to prove victorious over all forces that can be brought against him by the fleet and from the South. He appears, however, inclined to underrate the strength of his opponents and to forget the experience of Garibaldi in Rio Grande<sup>34</sup> – that a Rio Grandense is hard to equal in guerrilla warfare.

The Press of this city, with the exception of the *Jornal do Comercio*, is extremely bitter in denouncing foreigners as enemies to Brazil. The smallest incident is twisted and turned in such a manner as a directly hostile act towards the Government. If a boat from any foreign warship is sent to the *Aquidaban* to demand an explanation of any occurrence that may take place in regard to shipping in the harbour it is at once construed onshore as visit of sympathy to Admiral de Melo. The attitude of the diplomatic representatives on shore, and of the naval officers afloat, is one of absolute neutrality and impartiality, favouring nobody, and only endeavouring to act in such manner

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<sup>34</sup> De 1835 a 1848, Giuseppe Garibaldi (1807-1882) passou um longo exílio na América do Sul. No Rio Grande do Sul juntou-se à Revolução Farroupilha de 1837 a 1841.

as may tend towards the preservation of life and minimize the destruction to property. In accordance with this principle, the senior naval officer of the combined squadron decline to allow the protection of a foreign flag to Brazilian lighters discharging warlike stores in the harbour for the Government, and this has given rise to much ill-feeling on the part of the supporters of Marshal Peixoto. The position for the foreign representatives and naval commanders is, undoubtedly, a difficult one and will continue so unless the insurgents are shortly granted the *status* of belligerent, the more especially as the Government authorities are quite unable to police the harbour, and, indeed, make no attempt to do so. I may mention *en passant* that the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents would greatly assist in bringing matters to a crisis and hastening the course of the civil war.

### 85. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 30 de novembro

*Embora haja notícias ligeiramente favoráveis aos insurretos, escreve o jornal, no fundo nada muda: o Governo está à espera que cheguem os navios comprados principalmente nos Estados Unidos; Custódio de Melo quer tomar a capital antes da chegada da nova frota de Peixoto.*

*Este artigo, que se baseia em parte no texto enviado pelo correspondente do Times e publicado dois dias antes, menciona que os rebeldes parecem ter «ganho terreno no Norte como no Sul», comenta um rumor sobre o desejo do Presidente de chegar a um acordo com os seus inimigos internos e sublinha também as dificuldades financeiras do Governo do Rio de Janeiro.*

*Na conclusão exprime, no entanto, o seu desejo que se chegue a «um compromisso entre os beligerantes», salvando assim vidas e bens «sacrificados em prol das ambições dos chefes rivais».*

The latest news from Brazil, though more favourable to the insurgent cause, does not point to a very early issue to the struggle. From previous telegrams we have been led to expect that events were crowding in for the catastrophe. On one side, the new Government fleet from New York was supposed to be under way for Rio de Janeiro to assist the forts in blowing Admiral DE MELO'S vessel out of the water. On the other hand, the insurgent admiral was said to be concentrating his forces, and summoning all his energies with a view to the capture of the city before the arrival of the Government's reinforcements. Nothing, however, of any consequence has happened as yet. Marshal PEIXOTO'S new vessels, though they have sailed from New York, are not going to the Brazilian capital – at all events just yet. A cruise and torpedo boat, purchased in Europe, are reported to be at Bahia. The *Niteroi* has gone to coal at Barbados, where the *America* will shortly join her, and all that is known about the *Cid* and its big dynamite gut is that it has put to sea. The new fleet, probably, is hardly strong enough yet to measure itself with that of Admiral DE MELO, more especially in view of the fact that the latter has blocked the entrance to the spacious harbour in which his vessels are riding with an elaborate network of torpedoes. It is not to be denied, however, that the insurgents at Rio have sustained a serious loss through the sinking of the old turret ship *Javari*, which they attribute, however not to the fire of the forts, but

to the springing of the vessel's plates by the vibration caused by her own heavy guns. The crew, it seems, lacked of skill or the appliance for stopping the leak, and they were therefore compelled to abandon their ship, which sank slowly about an hour afterwards, with all the stores and munitions of war on board. The insurgent fleet in Rio harbour is therefore reduced now to the *Aquidaban*, the *Trajano*, and half-dozen merchant steamers armed with small guns. Outside the harbour, however, Admiral DE MELO has still several vessels, including a second-class cruiser, to give timely warning of the approach of any hostile fleet. Meanwhile the tide of public sympathy in the remoter provinces of Brazil appears to be rolling in favour of the insurgents. The rich port of Para has now declared in favour of Admiral DE MELO, to whom it has made over its ships and shore artillery; and the *Times* correspondent<sup>35</sup> at Rio reports that the Brazilian generally are getting tired of the praetorian government of Marshal PEIXOTO, and will shortly make a strong effort to overthrow it. In the south, as in the north, the insurgent forces appear to be gaining ground, though isolates successes are claimed here and there for the Presidential troops. From Buenos Aires comes a strange rumour to the effect that President PEIXOTO is endeavouring to come to terms with the insurgents. If that be so, he must be nearly at the end of his resources, although his Foreign Minister stated only a few days ago that the Government, in spite of many defections, was still strong, and would be able to take aggressive action against the insurgents on the arrival of the New York vessels. The latter, of course,

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<sup>35</sup> Cf. Texto 84.

have been bought on credit, for the national exchequer is empty, and the provisional Government established at Desterro, in Santa Catarina, has issued a proclamation, announcing that it will not recognize any debts incurred by the PEIXOTO Government in resisting the insurrection, so that foreign contractors who have only the President's orders as vouchers run some risk of losing their money. Not only so, but the £6,000,000 of forced paper currency issued by Marshal PEIXOTO to meet the necessity of the State will in all probability be repudiated in the event of Admiral DE MELO'S ultimate triumph. The position is a difficult one for foreigners, and in the interest of all parties it is greatly to be arrived at between the belligerents before matters are pushed to extremity, and more blood and treasure sacrificed to the ambition of the rival leaders. In the event of monarchical restoration, it seems that the Duke of GRAN PARA<sup>36</sup> stands the best chance of being proclaimed Emperor.

## 86. *The Morning Post*, 2 de dezembro

*A República, afirma o editorialista, «provou ser um presente envenenado» para os Brasileiros que destronaram o «amável e notável soberano». «Desde então, o país «tornou-se o terreno de caça para todos os tipos de aventureiros»: Fonseca, Peixoto, de Melo.*

*Este não conseguiu derrotar Peixoto, e não vai conseguir tomar a capital sem que nesta haja uma sublevação contra o governo. Agora, de Melo foi para o Sul do Brasil, enquanto Peixoto espera pela chegada dos navios comprados nos Estados Unidos. O jornalista critica a «ingenuidade» desta*

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<sup>36</sup> Trata-se do neto de D. Pedro II, Pedro de Orléans e Bragança (1875-1940), primogénito da princesa Isabel.

*manobra dos chefes dos revoltosos: será um disfarce para esconder a sua vontade de enfrentar a nova frota dos seus inimigos que vem do Norte?*

*Depois de ter mencionado uma grande batalha no Rio Grande do Sul que, porém, terá pouquíssima influência sobre o que se passa no porto do Rio de Janeiro, o editorialista interroga-se sobre as «intenções dos insurrectos». De Melo quer substituir Peixoto ou está a lutar por outra pessoa? O jornal londrino é da opinião que a casa real de Bragança, por enquanto, não parece querer envergar o caminho duma restauração monárquica. De qualquer forma, «não tem a intenção de permitir a um dos seus membros de sair a correr, precipitadamente, ao apelo, real ou imaginário, de uma das duas facções em luta no Rio».*

*A conclusão do artigo é muito pouco lisonjeira para com o chefe da revolta: «Todavia, por agora, o resultado da insurreição naval do Almirante de Melo não é menos discutível do que quando rebentou, quase três meses atrás».*

The state of things which has prevailed in Brazil since the outbreak of the civil war might justly be described as the *reductio ad absurdum*<sup>37</sup> of a South American revolution. Indeed, the irony of destiny has never been more strikingly manifested than on the present occasion. Four years have elapsed since the Brazilian grew weary of the benign rule of their amiable and accomplished Sovereign the late Dom PEDRO. So far as could be ascertained at the time, or has been discovered since, they had no more sufficient reason for their discontent than the Athenians of old when they ostracised ARISTIDES<sup>38</sup> because they were tired of hearing him called the Just. The Brazilians,

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<sup>37</sup> Redução ao absurdo.

<sup>38</sup> Aristides de Atenas, o Justo (~535 a.C. – ~468 a.C.), foi um homem de Estado ateniense.

however, have certainly not succeeded in discovering a THEMISTOCLES<sup>39</sup> in any of the adventurers who helped to hustle the old Emperor out of his dominions with a cruel indignity which has never been surpassed in the history of popular ingratitude. The Republic which DOM PEDRO'S subjects were in such a hurry to establish has proved a fatal gift to Brazil. The country has been the happy hunting-ground ever since of the sort of adventurers who springs up, as if by spontaneous generation, as the product of such events as the proclamation of the United States of Brazil. First under Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA, and then under General FLORIANO PEIXOTO, assisted by Admiral DE MELO, the country went from bad to worse. Finally, on the 5<sup>th</sup> of last September, Admiral DE MELO resolved to treat PEIXOTO as he and PEIXOTO had previously treated FONSECA, and he gave the signal for the present naval revolt. PEIXOTO, however, has not proved so docile under dictation as FONSECA. He flatly refused to imitate the patriotic self-denial – under the strongest possible compulsion – which has prompted his predecessor to retire from public life. Whether the dictatorial Admiral has reckoned upon resistance on the part of his old confederate in the overthrow both of Dom PEDRO and of FONSECA we do not know. Perhaps he expected assistance from the land forces in Rio de Janeiro which was not vouchsafed him. One thing, however, is certain, that if he expected to coerce the capital into surrender by either the threat or the reality of bombardment, he has been signally disappointed.

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<sup>39</sup> Temístocles (~524 a.C. – 459 a.C.) foi um general e político ateniense. Ganhou a batalha de Salamina (480 a.C.) contra os Persas.

For many weeks past the insurgent squadron has been “bombarding” Rio de Janeiro. It is not denied that a good deal of damage has been done both to life and property, but it is at the same time perfectly apparent that Admiral DE MELO’s ironclads might pound away at the city for months without compelling it to surrender, unless some insurrectionary movement from within should turn the scale in their favour. It looks, indeed, very much as if the Admiral had expected something of that sort. As a practical sailor he must have known the difficulties in the way of effectual bombardment by a fleet and also the deficiencies of his own vessels and their armament. The PRESIDENT’S forces on their side have responded to the fire of the insurgents with more zeal than knowledge of range, while the inhabitants of the city – except the foreign commercial men, who are complaining bitterly – have exhibited a philosophic contempt, not unmingled with amusement, for the comparatively innocuous and altogether indecisive results of all this expenditure of powder and shot. During the last few days, however, things have taken a different turn. Admiral DE MELO and the insurgent squadron have raised southerly direction. This, however, is believed to be merely a stratagem on the part of the rebel commander. It is well known that PEIXOTO is expecting the arrival of naval assistance in the shape of various ships from several North American ports. The precise nature of these – that is to say, whether they are men-of-war or merely merchant vessels with men and arms on board – is not as yet known, at least on this side of the Atlantic. But, however, that may be, it is to be presumed that the announcement is correct which has been current for some time past, that the insurgent squadron intends to intercept and capture the ships. For

that purpose, Admiral DE MELO must obviously steer to the north instead of to the south, and if his adoption of the latter course be really meant to be a blind, one can only say that he is giving his adversary in Rio credit for a surprising amount of simplicity. Meanwhile, it has been reported that PEIXOTO has been assassinated, and that has, in turn, been contradicted. There seems, however, to be no reason to doubt the report of a great battle in Rio Grande do Sul. Fighting has been chronic in that province almost ever since the overthrow of the Empire. Indeed, it is in the provinces generally that the feeling against the Republic is said to be the strongest, because the Government at Rio, untrue to its Federal character, has shown itself disposed to interfere with the practical autonomy of the various States. But even an important victory and the capture of the Republican General in Rio Grande do Sul would probably have but slight effect upon the issue of the struggle at Rio. The European mind is apt to forget the influence of the enormous distances which separate the various portions of the vast territory of Brazil.

The question which has been uppermost all along in the minds of those who have devoted any attention to the present crisis is that of the intentions of the insurgents. What is Admiral DE MELO about? Does he merely seek to replace PEIXOTO by himself, or by some other eminent exponent of civil virtue? Or is it really to be "not LANCELOT nor another", but a Monarchical Restoration? All that is known with certainty is that the rumoured Proclamation of the Prince of GRAN-PARA as Emperor has been met by a distinct official statement on the part of the PRINCESS IMPERIAL, who resides at Versailles, that nothing is known of the

matter by the Imperial Family, and that the youthful Dom PEDRO – who was reported to have left Paris on his way do Brazil – is peacefully pursuing his studies in Vienna. That, indeed, is no more than might have been expected. The Brazilian branch of the House of Braganza, which has known how to preserve its dignity in the most trying circumstances, is not likely to compromise that special attribute of Royalty by allowing any of its members to rush off, post-haste, at the call, whether real or imaginary, of one of two contending factions at Rio. What might happen in the event of a definitive declaration by a majority of Brazilian people that here is a genuine desire to retrace the steps which the nation has taken, and to entreat the House of Braganza to return to its hereditary position, is another matter altogether. For the present, however, the outcome of Admiral DE MELO naval insurrection, must be regarded as no less doubtful than it was when it first broke out, almost three months ago.


### 87. «The Brazilian Insurrection», *The Graphic*, 2 de dezembro

*Quase todo o artigo, que tem também um retrato do jovem príncipe<sup>40</sup>, é dedicado ao neto de D. Pedro. Segundo o semanário britânico, «as discórdias entre republicanos, cansaram tanto os brasileiros, que estes estão quase maduros para uma restauração imperial».*

Whether Admiral de Melo is working secretly of the restoration of the Empire, or solely for his own interests, it is plain that the insurgents keep the

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<sup>40</sup> Cf. Figura 5.



**Fig. 5:** Dom Pedro de Alcântara, o filho mais velho da Princesa Isabel e do Conde de Eu»  
(*The Grafic*, 2 de dez.)

upper hand at present. Whilst awaiting the arrival of their powerful new vessels from the United States, the Rio Government have to face the unpleasant fact that the chief provinces favour Admiral de Melo. Para, indeed, has already declares on his side. Republican dissensions have so wearied the Brazilians that they are fast ripening of an Imperial Restoration. True, the legal heiress to the throne, the Comtesse d'Eu, is unpopular, but she would readily waive her claims on behalf of her eldest son, the Duke of Gran Para. This is the Prince who was supposed to have left France for Brazil secretly last week. This rumour arose through the fuss made over the departure of a young Cuban named Pedro, who was mistaken for the Prince. Meanwhile, the real Simon Pure was quietly studying in Vienna, and – according to report – was kept quite ignorant of events in Brazil at his parent's request. Prince Pedro d'Alcantara Louis Philippe is the eldest of the Comte and Comtesse d'Eu's three sons, and grandson of the late Emperor of Brazil. He was his grandfather's great favourite, and accompanied him into exile on the revolution of 1889. The Prince's education was carried on in Portugal and France until recently he entered the Academy of the Wiener, Neustadt. He is now eighteen years old, having been born on October 15, 1875 at the Imperial Palace at Petropolis near Rio. A tall, slim fair young fellow, he has a peculiarity in common with the present German Emperor – a withered left arm, due to a similar accident at birth. Like Emperor William, however, he has resolutely struggled against the defect till he has become a practised athlete, horseman, and cyclist.

## 88. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Times*, 6 de dezembro

*O correspondente do jornal londrino começa por dar uma imagem idealizada do país durante o Império. Na altura, escreve, havia pessoas «ricas e de prestígio» que conduziam os negócios do Estado, «a educação progredia o comercio prosperava, a agricultura desenvolvia-se, todos os tipos de indústria davam sinais de crescimento». Depois de novembro de 1889, «a aristocracia retirou-se da administração do Governo», salienta o jornalista, e os negócios do Estado passaram para as mãos de «irresponsáveis, ministros só de nome, que obedeciam «à vontade do chefe ditador». Por outras palavras, em vez de homens de qualidade, chegou ao poder «um bando de aventureiros desabastados, cujo principal objetivo era o benefício pessoal».*

*Descreve a seguir o que se passa a partir da queda do Império: a fundação do Banco da República, os subornos e a corrupção na atribuição das concessões do caminho de ferro, a especulação financeira, o golpe e a queda de Deodoro em novembro de 1891. O jornalista explica a demissão do Marechal da Fonseca «não porque tinha medo da oposição da marinha, mas porque não ousava enfrentar a guerra no Rio Grande [do Sul].»*

*Analisa a seguir a presidência Peixoto que, na sua opinião, começou bem, mas depois começou a dececionar os políticos—com a «constante e um tanto desleal maneira com a qual destituiu vários governadores dos Estados da União — e também os especuladores na capital. Chegou-se mesmo a ventilar a possibilidade de organizar uma nova eleição, mas o legislativo deu o seu apoio a Floriano.*

*«A administração de Floriano Peixoto tornou-se aos poucos mais fraca», prossegue o jornalista, que menciona a tentativa de golpe falhado contra ele em abril de 1892, o que provocou o banimento de algumas dezenas de conspiradores no distrito da Amazonas.*

*O articulista explica os «erros», que, do seu ponto de vista, o presidente cometeu. Floriano. Aceitou o regresso destes conspiradores do exílio. No Rio Grande do Sul, impôs o regresso de Julio de Castilho, provocando a demissão de Custódio de Melo do Governo e uma forte reação no Estado, e, é à médio prazo, a revolta federalista. Em dezembro de 1892*

*promulgou «uma reforma do Banco», para cativar a simpatia da «camarilha que anda à volta do Banco da República» e que, na prática, autorizou a emissão de grande quantidade de notas de papel.*

*Segundo o correspondente do Times, foi a partir desta data, que Peixoto «atuou mais como ditador do que como primeiro magistrado, apoiando-se aparentemente no elemento militar para o sustentar no poder, perante qualquer tipo de oposição que pudesse surgir.»*

*Depois do veto à lei que queria impedir ao Vice-Presidente em função de candidatar-se à presidência, estourou a Revolta. O jornalista sublinha o facto que no início, o único objetivo era derrubar Peixoto, mas que, dois meses depois, a questão do restabelecimento da monarquia está em cima da mesa. Alguns estados do Brasil estão a favor «de um regresso ao regime monárquico», mas resta saber, «se os insurgentes fazem desta restauração o objeto e a finalidade deste combate», realça o articulista.*

*Este, na sua conclusão, lamenta que os Brasileiros, por causa destas lutas intestinas, não possam consagrar «todas as suas energias ao progresso da educação e ao desenvolvimento das riquezas produzidas pelo seu solo fértil».*

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 14.

It is difficult to realize that the Empire of the Brazils of 1888 is the same country as the Republic of the United States of Brazil of today. Under Dom Pedro II., Brazilians credit abroad had steadily gained ground until everywhere it was favourably regarded amongst financiers. This fact served as a stimulant to Brazilian character, and a certain must feeling of pride was thereby generated in the minds of all educated Brazilians, no matter whether they belonged to Northern or Southern States. Above every other consideration, too,

the Emperor Dom Pedro was essentially a Brazilian *pur et simple*, and this formed a bond of unity throughout the scattered population of the immense area constituting the Empire. The administration of the country was conducted on fairly liberal lines, education made progress, commerce prospered, agriculture developed, and industries of all kinds showed steady advancement. At the head of affairs and as Ministers of State were found men of wealth and standing, who liked the prestige attached to the Court, and were ready and willing to assist with their services in the government of the country. What happened after the fall of the Empire is patent to all who watched the *régime* of the new-born Republic. The aristocracy withdrew from all connection with the administration of the Government, and the conduct of affairs passed into the hands of a body of irresponsible men, who were Ministers in name only, and who systematically bowed to the will of a dictatorial chief. In the place of men of substance came a band of needy adventurers whose chief object was personal gain, and to whom the word patriotism was an unknown quantity, or, at best, only recognized when it helped to fill an empty pocket. A few restless spirits in Rio de Janeiro wanted change in 1889, and they have got it in the shape of a civil war now devastating the country, and the financial chaos which threatens to plunge a rich heritage into bankruptcy. It is unnecessary to enter into the circumstances leading up to the revolution of November 15, 1889; that is ancient history, and was ably described in the columns of *The Times* on December 8 of that year. I propose only to give in order and in plain unvarnished language the events that have occurred from the time of the

deposition of Dom Pedro II. to the outbreak of the civil war on September 6 of the present year.

On November 15, 1889, the sedition fomented by a group of ambitious politicians came to a head, and for the Empire was substituted a Provisional Government of the United States of Brazil; this was done “in the name of the Army, the Navy, and the People”, to quote from the proclamation made at the time of the outbreak; the “People”, however, had no hand in the matter, and the term was used entirely *pro forma*.

In January and February 1889, Acts were passed creating the Banco da Republica, a great bank of issue, around which grouped themselves the crowd of hungry adventures styling themselves *republicanos* – that is, the people who believed that they saw an opportunity of making money and amassing rapid fortunes out of the new *régime*. Mayrink, the president of the bank, became the owner of *O País*, the semi-official newspaper of the Government; two of his fellow-directors are now two out of the three editors of that journal.

In February, 1891, the Minister of Agriculture and Public Works, Senhor Francisco Glicerio<sup>41</sup> (a São Paulo mulatto), authorized grants of lands and concessions for railways that were quite on a level with those made in Argentina and other South American countries during “booming” times. The *Jornal do Comércio* published lists of these concessions, and pointed out that

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<sup>41</sup> Francisco Glicério (1846-1916) foi ministro da Agricultura de janeiro de 1890 a janeiro do ano seguinte.

bribery and corruption played an important part where they were concerned. On February 24 of the same year the new Constitution came into force. At the election for President Senator Prudente de Moraes, of São Paulo, obtained 97 votes, showing that Congress had begun to tire of the dictatorial attitude assumed by Deodoro da Fonseca. His Ministers, seeing that he was beginning to lose prestige and power, rapidly abandoned him, and finally left him, on the pretext that they could not agree with his decision granting a railway concession for a line between 40 and 50 kilometres in length. They apparently forget the fact that they had in the previous 12 months allowed concessions for more than 140,000 kilometres to pass without remonstrance. Marshal Deodoro at once formed a new ministry, composed of men outside Congress, under the leadership of Baron Lucena, who was formerly a Judge and presided over two provinces in the time of Dom Pedro II. He was a man without marked ability or intelligence, but extremely energetic and considered honest. Baron Lucena began well, cancelling many of the concessions granted by his predecessor, Senhor Francisco Glicerio. Later on, however, he was drawn into the ring of speculators surrounding the Banco da Republica. These men had only one idea – it was that the State Bank should make further emissions of paper money, in order that fresh credits might be given them wherewith to pay their losses on the Stock Exchange. The Chamber of Deputies was distinctly adverse to any further issue of bank-notes, and the Senate resisted several dictatorial attempts made by Marshal Deodoro to pass measures authorizing an addition to the note issue. This opposition of the Congress, in conjunction with the childish pride which was characteristic of Marshal Deodoro, was utilized by

Lucena, who was deeply involved in speculation, and the Mayrink ring, as a weapon to convince the President that necessity existed for immediate action in shape of a *coup d'état*, inasmuch as the following of the Banco da Republica presented a threatening attitude towards himself. On November 3, 1891, this proposed *coup d'état* became an accomplished fact, and Marshal Deodoro proclaimed himself Dictator. He was supported in his action by the great majority of the Governors of the various States. Trouble, however, came upon him in somewhat unexpected form. On November 16 a rising occurred in Rio Grande do Sul against the Governor, General Castilho, for having consented to the violation of the Constitution by adhering to the *coup d'état* of Marshal Deodoro. The revolution became so far established that a Government was named, General Castilho deposed, and an election ordered. Meanwhile, at Rio Janeiro, a rising of the navy, under Rear-Admiral Custodio de Melo aided by a few army officers, took place on November 23, and had the moral support of the best elements in Congress. This movement was directly in opposition to Deodoro da Fonseca. The Marshal, who knew Rio Grande do Sul well, then determined to rising. It is said that he was not afraid of the opposition of the navy, but that he did not dare to face a war in Rio Grande.

We now come to the period when Marshal Floriano Peixoto stepped in as Chief Magistrate in virtue of his election as Vice-President of the Republic when Fonseca was elected to the Presidency. It must not be forgotten that he knew of all the circumstances of the rising under de Melo, and had promised to take arms at the opportune moment; moreover, his Ministers were chosen from

the side in Congress which has aided and supported the movement against Marshal Deodoro. Peixoto began his administration well. His first act was to cancel the decree allowing the Banco da Republica to issue more notes. On his assuming the executive on November 23, 1891, great hopes were entertained that reforms in the method of administration would take place, and the tenets of the Constitution be adhered to. These hopeful feelings were doomed to speedy disappointment. From December, 1891, to April, 1892, the Government of Marshal Floriano became notable for the steady, but somewhat underhand, manner in which it deposed the various Governors of the States of the Union. Quickly the spread of dissatisfaction became general amongst the politicians. The speculators in the capital and those persons who had accustomed themselves to grow fat on the spoils derived from open credits at the different banks of emission joined the discontent political throng and made common cause with them. Then the question was ventilated whether, according to the Constitution, a fresh election for the presidency ought not to have been held at the time Marshal da Fonseca resigned. However, as Congress had tacitly agreed to suspend the provisions provident for such new election, on the ground that it was for the general welfare of the country that Marshal Floriano should assume the Presidency, the discussion on the question of the legality of his tenure of office was dropped.

Gradually the Administration of Floriano Peixoto became weaker, and he was unfortunate enough to get at cross-purposes with several of the ablest of his Ministers, who consequently resigned. Then came a time when the

politicians of the school of Marshal Deodoro and such of the officers of the army and navy as remained faithful to the ex-President allied themselves with the persons who were continually clamouring for fresh issued of banknotes. These combined forces, overrating their strength, attempted, first, a revolt at Santa Cruz, and, secondly, a *coup d'État*. Marshal Floriano proved too strong for them, and, to retaliate successfully, declared martial law on April 10, 1892. Under the authority so derived he banished to the Amazonas district from 30 to 40 of the principal offenders and leader of the movement. At the moment these acts were quite of a popular character, in spite of their somewhat violent character, the more so as people were disgusted and tired of revolution rumour of revolts, and political agitation. But from this time onwards Peixoto took the bit in his teeth and made a series of blunders, the fact that he has succeeded so well with his experience of martial law inducing him to set aside the spirit and letter of the Constitution in every way. In Mai, 1892, he did not bring forward satisfactory evidence as to the necessity of his own action in deporting the persons he had exiled to the Amazonas. It is difficult to understand why he did not do so, as ample proof of their implication in the intended revolution could easily have been obtained. Peixoto, however, apparently preferred to carry matters with a high hand, in place of demonstrating clearly the justification for his procedure.

In June, 1892, Marshal Floriano made his second serious mistake. He deposed the Visconde de Pelotas, Governor of Rio Grande, who was aided in his administration of that State by Silveira Martins and all the most influential of

the local people. These had joined in the revolution, but had agreed to take no further steps to oppose the National Government, on the understanding entered into between General Oscar<sup>42</sup>, for the Government, and General Tavares<sup>43</sup>, on behalf of the people of Rio Grande, that no prosecutions were to be made for participation in the revolutionary movement. In this matter Marshal Floriano Peixoto did not keep faith with the Rio Grande people. General Castilho was again appointed Governor, and, supported by the national troops, he drove the people out of their State, alleging against them all manner of crimes. In despair large numbers of the Rio Grandenses emigrated to Uruguay. In February, 1893, these people attempted to return to their homes, and at all points this attempt was resisted by General Castilho. Then the war in Rio Grande began, and a very large number of Government troops were concentrated in that State. At his time Rear-Admiral Custodio de Melo, then Minister of Marine, opposed the Rio Grande policy of Peixoto. After receiving many promises from Marshal Floriano, all of which were unfulfilled, Admiral Melo resigned his portfolio on April 29, stating as his reason the fact that the President persisted in an unjustifiable and cruel campaign. The Minister of Agriculture and Industry also left the Cabinet for a similar reason. At the opening of Congress in May, 1893, Peixoto contented himself with saying that some trouble existed in Rio Grande do Sul, which he expected shortly to be able to suppress; though at that time there was an army of some six thousand men

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<sup>42</sup> Óscar Arthur de Andrade Guimarães (1850-1903) era na altura coronel.

<sup>43</sup> O general João Nunes da Silva Tavares (1818-1906) foi um dos responsáveis do início da Guerra Federalista contra Júlio de Castilho em fevereiro de 1893.

concentrated in that State. That much sympathy was felt in Rio de Janeiro with the cause of the insurgent sick and wounded; the subscription succeeded beyond the most sanguine expectations; some thousand of people put their hands in their pockets for it, and a large sum of money was raised. No doubt this was galling into the pride of the constituted authorities, as a sequel to this successful charitable movement, the promoter, Dr. Hilario de Gouvêa<sup>44</sup>, was thrown into prison. As no charge was preferred against him, it must be considered probable that his connexion with this popular relief fund has much to do with his incarceration. Dr. Gouvêa has since escaped.

In following up the events in connexion with Rio Grande do Sul I have omitted to mention some facts which have an important bearing on the administration of Marshal Peixoto. In November 1892, those persons who were exiled to the Amazonas were permitted to return to Rio de Janeiro. It is well known in this city that the chief magistrate did all in his power to make friends with them, and to some extent he succeeded. His principal opposition, however, still lay amongst the clique surrounding the Banco da Republica; in order to propitiate these people, Peixoto promulgated a decree, dated December 17, 1892, providing for a reform of the bank. This so-called reform was nothing more than an alteration of the bank's charter and an authority for the further issue of a large amount of paper money, under the cloak of an amalgamation of the Banco da Republica with the Banco do Brazil; it was, indeed almost

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<sup>44</sup> Hilário de Gouvêa (1843-1923), médico oftalmologista, foi um adversário de Peixoto. Conseguiu fugir e exilou-se em França., regressando ao Brasil só em 1905.

precisely that same thing that Baron Lucena had attempted and failed to secure for the band in November, 1891, under Deodoro da Fonseca, and with Marshal Floriano had not only opposed, but had immediately cancelled on assuming the government of the Republic. Moreover, Congress had adjourned when the decree was made, and Peixoto, therefore, clearly arrogated himself dictatorial power in the matter. It was from this time forward that Peixoto acted more as a dictator than a chief magistrate, and he apparently placed reliance on the military element to sustain him in power in the face of any opposition that might be raised against him. On September 5 of this year he placed his veto on the Bill providing that no Vice-President should be elected President, although Congress has expressed approval on the measure and allowed it to pass.

On September 6 the squadron revolted and the civil war began. At the commencement the object of the movement was, undoubtedly, simply to overthrow Floriano Peixoto and establish a Government presided over by a civilian. On Tuesday, November 7, the question of a restoration of the Monarchy was discussed by the insurgent leaders at a conference held on board the flagship *Aquidaban*. It was then shown that the States of Pernambuco, Bahia, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande, a majority of the people of Minas Gerais and in São Paulo, and an important section in the city of Rio de Janeiro were all in favour of a return to monarchical government, and it was decided that the efforts of the insurgents should be directed to that end. The fact that General Pego<sup>45</sup>, a well-known Monarchist, is in charge of a division of troops under Peixoto, and

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<sup>45</sup> Antonio José Maria Pêgo Júnior (1841-1907).

that Colonel Mendes<sup>46</sup>, a violent opponent of Republicanism, is commanding the national guard, is positive proof that when the movement first broke out no intention existed of any attempt to re-establish the Monarchy. It was an afterthought, engendered by the wishes of people in various parts of Brazil, and we have yet to see whether the insurgents make it the aim and object of the present struggle. A friend of mine a few days since remarked to me that in his opinion the end of this war would see the finish of the Praetorian system of government in Brazil, no matter which side won, or what other result might ensue. The gentleman who expressed this view is a Brazilian holding high office, and I am inclined to think he may be right. What Brazil wants is peace and tranquillity; her citizens should now be devoting all their energies to the advancement of education and the development of the riches gives them in a fertile soil and abundant production –instead, they are making history.

### 89. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 7 de dezembro

*Na opinião do quotidiano de Birmingham, «dentro de alguns dias vai-se decidir o destino da insurreição», nomeadamente se de Melo conseguir intercetar a nova frota comprada nos Estados Unidos e que está a caminho do Rio. Esta tarefa parece fácil, continua o articulista que, no entanto, pondera também a hipótese dos navios chegarem são e salvos ao porto carioca, o que causaria «algum problema aos revoltosos».*

*Depois de ter explicado que Custódio de Melo conseguiu sair com dois couraçados da baía do Rio de Janeiro para o alto mar, o editorialista*

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<sup>46</sup> Já coronel, Fernando Mendes de Almeida (1845-1921) foi comandante superior interino da Guarda Nacional de 7 de setembro de 1893 a 17 de abril do ano seguinte.

*resume uma parte da longa correspondência publicada na véspera pelo Times<sup>47</sup>, nomeadamente no que diz respeito às origens desta guerra civil, à situação no Rio Grande do Sul e ao eventual restabelecimento da monarquia que parece ter o apoio de alguns estados. Mas, para não ofender o «sentimento republicano nos Estados Unidos», sublinha o jornal, «esta nova prancha na plataforma dos revoltosos» não foi revelada ao público: «é possível que vários apoiantes do Almirante de Melo ignorem» que a restauração da família imperial faz parte dos objetivos do movimento.*

*De qualquer forma, conclui o jornal, «não parece que a forma particular do governo republicano brasileiro desde 1889 seja uma instituição muito apetecível», e é como uma ditadura militar: «considerando os resultados, foi um fracasso lamentável». Entretanto, esperando que os «brasileiros estejam maduros para uma República constitucional», porque não regressar «à forma suave de um governo monárquico durante o qual alcançaram uma tão invejável prosperidade, até à deposição de Dom Pedro há quatro anos»?*

A few days now should decide the fate of the Brazil insurrection. If Admiral DE MELO can succeed in intercepting the New York vessels which are on their way to Rio de Janeiro, before they are fairly delivered into the hands of the Government, he may look forward to the issue with considerable confidence, for Marshal PEIXOTO by all accounts is nearly at the end of his resources, and his cause is becoming daily more unpopular. On the other hand, should the newly purchased fleet evade capture until it has been transferred to the possession of the Government authorities, it is likely to give the insurgents some trouble. In addition to the dynamite gunship *El Cid*, which left New York

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<sup>47</sup> Cf. Texto 88. Duas ou três frases são inteiramente copiadas deste artigo.

some weeks ago, the *Niterói*<sup>48</sup> and the *America*, having completed coaling operations at Barbados, are now well on their way to Rio, and anew Ericssen submarine gunboat named *Piraling*, carrying a ton of gun-cotton for the use of her submarine gun, is being towed from New York to Brazil by the cargo steamer *San Luis*. None of these vessels, however, can engage in hostile operations, or offer forcible resistance to the insurgents until they have been transferred to the possession of the Brazilian Government and manned with Brazilian crews, so that if Admiral DE MELO or any of his naval scouts can manage to intercept them, their capture will be a comparatively simple affair. This is, no doubt, the explanation of the Admiral's sudden departure from Rio harbour, where the Presidential party led us to suppose he was securely entrapped by the fact of the entrance forts being in the hands of the Government. When the critical moment arrived, however, the insurgent warships *Aquidaban* and *Esperança* evidently experienced no great difficulty in running the blockade under cover of darkness, though the forts directed a heavy fire upon them. In explanation of this evasion the Government officials announced that the insurgents obtained information from a spy as to the whereabouts of the torpedoes which were intended to bar the passage. Meanwhile the insurgents in the Southern parts of the Republic, and especially Rio Grande do Sul, are steadily gaining ground. In the engagement near Bagé, last week, the Castilhistas, who support PEIXOTO, lost so heavily that the insurgents are now practically masters of the situation over 300 of their

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<sup>48</sup> *Niterói* é o novo nome de *El Cid*.

opponents killed and 1,000 taken prisoners. *The Times* correspondent at Rio de Janeiro sends an interesting and instructive review of the events which have led up to the present revolutionary struggle, and the real motive influences which have been at work on either side. From this it would appear that the outbreak originally was nothing more than a revolt against the arbitrary and unconstitutional acts of Marshal PEIXOTO, in superseding the governors of various States by creature of his own, dismissing or compelling the resignation of some of his ablest Ministers who dared to differ with him, banishing number of political malcontents to the Amazonas district, breaking faith with the disaffected people of Rio Grande by the reinstatement as governor of General CASTILHOS, supported by National troops, which provoked a lengthened and cruel campaign, sanctioning the issue of large amounts of paper money without consulting Congress, vetoing the bill passed which barred the succession of a Vice-President to the Presidency of the Republic, and generally assuming to himself dictatorial powers. The proposal of the insurgents to re-establish the Monarchy, we are told, was quite an afterthought, which was not adopted until the 7<sup>th</sup> of last month. One day they have a meeting, at which it was reported that the States of Pernambuco, Bahia, Santa Catarina, Rio Grande, a majority of the people of Minas Gerais and in São Paulo, and an important section in the city of Rio de Janeiro were all in favour of a return to monarchical government. It was then decided that the efforts of the insurgents should be directed to that end; but in order to avoid giving umbrage do Republican feeling in the United States this new plank in the insurgent platform was not immediately revealed to the public gaze, and it is possible

that even yet many of Admiral DE MELO's supporters are not aware of his plans. As we have before remarked, however, the particular form of Republican government which Brazil has enjoyed since 1888 [*sic!*] does not seem to be a very covetable institution, and is not easily distinguished from a military dictatorship. Judged by its results, it has been a lamentable failure; and unless the Brazilian people are ripe for a constitutional Republic on the model of those of the United States or France, which we venture to doubt, they may do worse than go back to the mild form of monarchical government under which they attained such enviable prosperity until the deposition of Dom PEDRO four years ago.

## 90. *The Leeds Mercury*, 7 de dezembro

*Este editorial constata em primeiro lugar as dificuldades de saber o que se passa realmente no porto do Rio: os despachos do Rio são favoráveis ao Governo; os da capital argentina, dão o ponto de vista dos revoltosos. Por vezes, existe uma «terceira fonte» que é de confiança, como «a longa carta do correspondente de The Times, datada do 14 de novembro»<sup>49</sup>.*

*O artigo do quotidiano de resume a seguir o que escreve o seu colega que está na capital carioca, da chegada de Deodoro ao poder até o início da Revolta da Marinha.*

The English student of current events in Brazil must own himself unable to arrive at anything approximating to an accurate knowledge of contemporary history in the great South American Republic. The news received from the

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<sup>49</sup> Cf. Texto 88.

scene of action is all suspect, and one has to try to average the various conflicting rumours in order to get beyond the bare fact that a revolution is proceeding, and that a good deal of damage has been sustained on both sides. The telegrams from Rio give accounts of the success of the Government, as is natural when we reflect that the wires are entirely under the control of President Peixoto. From Buenos Aires we chiefly get the reverse side of the shield, and the persistent reports emanating from that place of insurgents victories lead us to the inevitable conclusion that the sympathies of the Argentine authorities are with Admiral de Melo. The third source we must be grateful to receive an account from trustworthy source of the events which led up to the outbreak of hostilities just three months ago. Such an account is presented in a long letter from *The Times* correspondent at Rio, dated November 14<sup>th</sup>, and published yesterday. How the correspondent managed to smuggle his letter through it is impossible at present to say, but its outspokenness shows that he must have run considerable risks. The letter contains a sketch of the history of Brazil from the time of the fall of the Empire on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 1889, to September 7<sup>th</sup>, 1893, when de Melo declared war on President Peixoto. Every one remembers that peaceful revolution when Dom Pedro quietly left Rio never to return and Deodoro da Fonseca became first President of the Republic. *The Times* correspondent tells how affairs passed into the hand of needy adventures, anxious to enrich themselves and regardless of their country's welfare. In January and February, 1890, Acts were passed creating the Banco da Republica, with the management of which the Government became inextricably and fraudulently associated. A year later

followed the lavish grant of railway concessions, with which form of corruption we have become sufficiently acquainted in the Argentina. At the same time the new Constitution came into force, and da Fonseca was confirmed in his office of President. He did not trouble himself much about the Constitution, and his arbitrary use of his powers culminated in November, 1891, in a "coup d'état" by which he declared himself dictator. He was practically compelled to take this step by those interested in the Banco da Republica, who were anxious for an extension of the note issue of that institution, and could not gain the sanction of either the Senate or the Chamber of Deputies for their proposal. Da Fonseca's reign, however, was ended, for within three weeks of the "coup d'état" a rising in the Fleet, headed by Rear-Admiral de Melo, caused him to resign and find safety in Rio Grande do Sul. His fall brought to the head of affairs Floriano de Peixoto, Vice-President of the Republic. The latter began well, and the Banco da Republica received a momentary check. The hopes of those who thought that a better state of things was drawing were, however, doomed to disappointment. Peixoto began by changing the governors in the various States, although their dislike for the rule of da Fonseca inclined them favourably towards himself. Gradually the number of his enemies increased, and in April 1892, an attempt was made to depose him. He met the attack successfully, however, and declared martial law. From this time the spirit of the tyrant grew in him, and he disregarded the Constitution as freely as his predecessor had done. Another stupid act, the deposition of Visconde de Pelotas from the Governorship of Rio Grande do Sul, has the effect of rousing rebellion in that province, and civil war broke out which taxed all the powers of the Government to keep it at bay. This

war began in February of the present year, and led to the resignation of Admiral de Melo from the Ministry of Marine, who stated as the reason for taking this step that he could not countenance the unjustifiable and cruel campaign in which the President persisted. Meanwhile Peixoto has surrendered to the clamours of the Banco da República, and enabled that institution to flood the country with its paper. The discontent with his dictatorship – for that it virtually became – grew [??], and on September 6<sup>th</sup> Admiral de Melo, at the head of the fleet, declared war on Peixoto, as he had done, two years earlier on Deodoro da Fonseca. What the end will be no one can predict. The President has stood out longer and has been supported more loyally than the story of his misdeed would have led us to expect, and, so far as we can gather from the conflicting evidence available, there seems reason to believe that he is at least holding his own. Meanwhile the unhappy country is suffering. It is endowed with natural wealth to a dazzling extent, but its financial management is rotten, and the long-continued struggle is adding daily to its difficulties and to the prospect of national bankruptcy. As the correspondent we have quoted from says: “What Brazil wants is peace and tranquillity; her citizens should now be devoting all their energies to the advancement of education and the development of the riches gives them in a fertile soil and abundant production –instead, they are making history”.

## 91. *The Manchester Guardian*, 13 de dezembro

A little more interest has been given to the civil war in Brazil by the defection of Admiral DA GAMA from the Government and his assumption of the command of the insurgent fleet. The Admiral is said to be very popular with the navy, and he has apparently completely superseded Admiral DE MELO. In a manifesto issued on Monday<sup>50</sup> he “covertly” advocates the restoration of the Monarchy while inviting the Brazilians to choose their own form of government. Important events are expected at Rio.

## 92. «A New Leader in Brazil», *The Graphic*, 16 de dezembro

*Agora que Saldanha da Gama está no comando da revolta, esta parecer ter uma conotação mais monárquica, escreve o semanário londrino. Este fala também dos republicanos convictos que estão descontentes com o governo e que nunca aceitarão o regresso dos Bragança. Por conseguinte, o autor do artigo insta os Brasileiros a decidirem sobre a natureza do regime. Considera igualmente que esta luta, com «as suas batalhas irregulares e a suas vitórias inconclusivas, apenas drenam as forças vivas do país».*

The Revolution in Brazil has now entered upon a new phase. Admiral Saldanha da Gama, an official of greater influence and popularity than Admiral de Melo, has openly come to the front command of the insurgent squadron in the Bay of Rio, their former leader, Admiral de Melo, having sailed out to do

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<sup>50</sup> Segunda-feira dia 11 de dezembro.

battle with Peixoto's naval reinforcements. It is probable that de Melo will still nominally head the movement which he originated, but there is no doubt but that it will be greatly strengthened by the open adhesion of da Gama. The latter, moreover, introduces a new element into the game, the result of which has still to be seen. He is a devoted adherent of the former Monarchy, and in issuing his own proclamation to the country, while he invites the people to choose their own form of government in the future, he covertly suggests that it should be a monarchical one. Until now Admiral de Melo, though suspected of harbouring a wish to reinstate the old reigning family, has been careful to abstain from any open declaration of his own feeling; indeed, he has always protested that he has no fault to find with the Republic, but only with those who administered it. But though Admiral da Gama pursues the same cautious reserve, the mere fact of his having taken command will invest the insurgent cause with a meaning of restoration. It is difficult to foreseen what effect this will have upon the country at large. Undoubtedly, the late Emperor is greatly regretted in many provinces, and the establishment of the monarchy might induce many people to throw in their lot with the revolution who have hitherto held aloof. On the other hand, there are many convinced, though discontent Republicans, who will be by no means pleased that events should take this turn. It is time, however, that the country should declare itself one way or another. Every Brazilians must feel the present state of affairs, with its fitful fighting and inconclusive victories on either side, is simply draining the life-blood of the country.

### 93. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Times*, 18 de dezembro

*Nesta longa correspondência, o jornalista começa por descrever a preparação de sacos de areias, de trincheiras, de armas, ao longo da costa por parte das tropas do governo, para enfrentar um eventual desembarque dos revoltosos.*

*Relata a seguir o afundamento do Javari com todos os pormenores. Na opinião dos revoltosos, esta perda «não terá grandes consequências». Porém, acrescenta o correspondente do Times, «será preciso que a frota obtenha algum sucesso para apagar a sua memória».*

*Depois de ter descrito algumas escaramuças na baía do Rio de Janeiro e um episódio da Guerra Federalista, o jornalista denuncia os métodos cada vez mais ditatoriais de Peixoto: «1 500 pessoas estão agora na prisão nesta cidade» e sofrem de más condições, estando junto «com malfetores e criminosos». Escreve também que na Baía «estariam inteiramente dispostos a juntar-se aos revoltosos».*

*Os novos navios comprados no Estados Unidos ainda não chegaram ao Brasil, e os dois couraçados rebeldes estão à espera deles, nota o jornalista, segundo o qual Peixoto não tem oficiais em número suficiente para os comandar, no caso deles conseguirem entrar no porto da capital.*

*O correspondente de The Times – que condena os ataques de uma parte da imprensa carioca contra os diplomatas e os comandantes dos navios estrangeiros – nota como os «duelos de artilharia» entre os dois inimigos são diários, mas sem nenhum, «resultado tangível».*

*Na última parte artigo, aborda outros temas: a detenção por parte do Governo de brasileiros que entram nos barcos a vapor ingleses; o facto das tropas governamentais atirarem «deliberadamente» sobre os navios ingleses; as dificuldades encontradas pelos comerciantes que já não têm dinheiro e pagam os seus empregados com comida e alojamento; as deserções de soldados governativos.*

*Finalmente, o jornalista afirma que do lado do Governo, «há só um homem – o Marechal Floriano Peixoto. Se morrer ou se abdicar, a estrutura construída à volta dele colapsaria, porque não há ninguém que poderia calçar*

*as suas botas e continuar a guerra». Do lado dos rebeldes, ao contrário, há vários líderes «capazes de tomar o comando».*

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Nov. 27.

The past week has not been productive of any real alteration in the situation here. The contending parties have proceeded steadily with their preparations for the final struggle. Marshal Floriano Peixoto has built sandbag protections on all available points along the shorefront, evidently in anticipation of a landing from the fleet. Many of these sandbag walls are pierced with openings for machine-guns, and at several places the guns are ready at any moment to be placed in position. On the height in the city itself and at the back on Santa Teresa-hill batteries have been erected and trenches cut. Admiral Saldanha da Gama has pointed out these facts to me on several occasions and added that the city was now a fortified place, and that if the insurgents were provoked by any fire for the shore, they considered themselves perfectly justified in returning it with heavy guns if necessary. The desire of the insurgents certainly, and, I think, of the Government, is however, to save the city, if possible. I have the personal assurance of Admiral da Gama that he will not allow the ships to fire upon the town unless Marshal Peixoto orders artillery fire to be opened on the squadron. For my own part I am inclined to think that sooner or later artillery fire will be opened from the city batteries, and then the bombardment will undoubtedly take place. Meanwhile

the ships of the squadron have been overhauled and put in order for the last act of the drama.

On Wednesday last the *Javari*, a monitor ship built in France in 1875, went to the bottom. For some time past he had been unable to steam, and it was necessary to tow her into position whenever she was required to fire; but, still, her heavy armament was a standing menace to the people on shore, and her loss is a serious one for the insurgents. On Monday and Tuesday<sup>51</sup> it was found that concussion caused by firing the heavy turret guns had loosened some plates in the two fore compartments and that the ship was leaking badly; it was hoped, however, by pumping to keep the water down. On Wednesday morning it was found that the pumps on board were unable to control the leakage, and the ship was abandoned as sinking. About 1 o'clock there was a heavy list to starboard, but an attempt was then made to tow the vessel into Cobra Island; it was found impossible to do this, and at 2 30 p.m. the launches gave up the attempt. The end of the *Javari* came about 4 p.m., and a event happened just before she sank which speaks well for her crew. When it was seen that she was sinking the troops lining the shorefront opened a heavy musketry fire upon her and the three launches waiting near her. The few men on board the *Javari* stood this for some time and then, half an hour before the vessel went down, they opened fire with her turret and quick-firing guns on the shore people. At 3 50 the last gun was fired from the vessel; at 3 55 she plunged forward and went down head first in a perpendicular position. When the water reached her

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<sup>51</sup> 20 e 21 de novembro.

funnel an explosion took place and her decks were blown out. Probably this was caused by the water rushing into the auxiliary engine she was working for pumping purposes and moving the turrets. All the crew were taken off, and only one man was wounded by the heavy rifle fire poured upon the sinking ship by the soldiers lining the shore. The insurgents declare that the loss of the *Javari* is not of any great consequence, and is far more than compensated for by the fact that the *Tamandaré* is able to steam and use her ten 6-in. and two 5 in- Armstrong quick-firing guns. The moral effect of the sinking of the *Javari* was, however, of undoubtedly great importance on shore, and it will require some active success on the part of the fleet to obliterate the memory of it.

There have been some sharp skirmishes on shore, in the neighbourhood of the Armação, between landing parties from the ships and detachments from the garrison of Niteroi. In all of these the Government troops were worsted, and have lost together in the past week three officers and over 200 men killed and a number wounded. These skirmishes have, however, no practical result, and, in my opinion, are pure waste of time and ammunition. On the other hand, General Gomercindo Saraiva, with 6,000 of his irregular mounted cavalry from Rio Grande, is steadily advancing to the north. His troops are now only 80 miles south of the city of São Paulo, that at present being Saraiva's objective point. The government is sending what forces it can oppose the advance, but Saraiva will not only have numbers on his side, but his men are far hardier and more accustomed to smell powder. It is difficult to get news of what Saraiva is doing at all, as the telegraph lines to the north of him are in the hands of Peixoto, but

now and then he succeeds in sending a wire through, as he did last week, saying where he is. In Santa Catarina reliable news has come through saying that there are now 8,000 men, well armed and equipped, waiting for orders. The British Consul at Rio Grande says that the country in the neighbourhood is entirely in the hand of the insurgents, and that the Government troops do not seem inclined to attack them. General Teles, who has lately been Commander-in-Chief in Rio Grande, resigned his commission, and returned to Rio two days ago. He has, however, at the request of the Government, taken charge on the powder factory on the railway to Petropolis. His brother joined the *Aquidaban* three days since.

Marshal Peixoto becomes more and more dictatorial in his methods, and has alienated in the last few days most of the sympathy which he has retained. Every day people are arrested on the ground of being "suspected" of revolutionary tendencies, and over 1,500 persons are now in prison in this city on account of their supposed political leanings. They are treated with scant courtesy and herded with criminals and malefactors of all descriptions. Such proceedings will bring their own remedies before long, and will tell heavily against Peixoto. A few days ago, orders were sent to the Government of Minas Gerais to arrest the Visconde de Ouro Preto, the head of the Monarchist party in Brazil. The provincial authorities refused point blank to execute the order, and this fact indicates plainly the feeling in that State. From Bahia, also, I have news that they are quite prepared to declare in favour of the insurgents, chiefly,

it is true, because the people of Bahia foresee the probability of a restoration of the Empire.

The new Armstrong cruiser has not yet arrived, although expected at Pernambuco. She is to sail thence to join the *Tiradentes* and the *Bahia*. As soon as the point of rendezvous is decided upon the *Aquidaban* and *Republica* will proceed to attack the three vessels, unless they decide to throw in their lot with the insurgents. The two other vessels expected in a fortnight from New York are not regarded as formidable, even if they arrive in time to be of service to the present Government, before the final *dénouement* takes place. Whatever ships the Government may buy can be of small use to Peixoto unless he engages foreign crews to fight them, for all the naval officers of any standing have either joined the insurgents already or intended to do so very shortly.

Most unjustifiable attacks have been made on Foreign Ministers and commander of foreign warships by the portion of the Press in favour of Marshal Floriano. I need scarcely say that absolutely no grounds exist for the assertions constantly made that the insurgents are being unduly favoured not only have these attacks been made here, but the Brazilian Ministers in Europe have intrigued to obtain the recall of the various diplomatic representatives, and have succeeded in the case of the Minister for Portugal, than whom a more upright and honourable man it would be hard to find. I have already cabled to you that such intrigues deserve only the utmost contempt and I can only repeat now what I said before.

The artillery duel between Santa Cruz, the fort and batteries at São João, Lage, and the insurgent fortress of Villegagnon goes on every day, but without any tangible result beyond an immense expenditure of ammunition. Villegagnon has been knocked about a good deal but up to date only two guns have been dismounted – one a small piece, the other a Whitworth gun on a Moncrieff carriage.

The insurgents are gaining adherents in brio, and men are constantly passing over them. In the body of 1,2100 troops sent to the south to oppose the advance of Gomercindo Saraiva over 100 men deserted *en route* to São Paulo.

The Government has on several occasions of late arrested Brazilians on board English steamers. The custom now is for the fort of Santa Cruz to order all ships to wait outside the harbour; the Government then sends a launch from the military school and boards the vessel, and in four instances has arrested Brazilian subjects found on board. Possibly the legal Government may have the right to do this, but doubts are expressed here as to whether any such right does exist. A more serious matter is that Government troops constantly fire on the English flag, and several complaints have been made to the British senior naval officer on the subject. A few days ago a launch flying the white ensign and containing an English officer in uniform and two bluejackets was deliberately fired at from near the Armação, the shell falling in the water a few yards from the boat.

All trade and business is suffering very severely, and a few months more of the present condition of affair will ruin many merchants. As an illustration

of this the following fact is instructive: – It is the custom in Rio de Janeiro for the important trades people to provide board and lodging on their business premises for their *employés*; they continue to do so at the present time, but in many cases have ceased to pay any salaries, saying that all they can do is to give food and lodging, and that if the *employés* do not care to accept this in return for their services they can leave. I have found several instances of this amongst the larger Portuguese, Italian, and French retail dealers.

One important point in connexion with the civil war does not appear to be clearly understood in Europe. On side of the Government there is only one man – Marshal Floriano Peixoto. His death or abdication of office means absolute collapse of the fabric round about him; there is nobody who could step into his shoes and carry on the war. On the side of the insurgents a totally different condition exists. Admiral Custodio de Melo is the nominal leader head today, but Admiral Saldanha da Gama, Senhor Silveira Martins, General Gomercindo Saraival, General Salgado, and a number of other able and influential men are all capable of taking command, and would undoubtedly carry on the war in case of necessity. In all my interviews with Admiral de Melo and Admiral da Gama I found that both always regarded this point as one of the strongest features of the insurgent cause, and that they fully appreciated the value of it.

**94. *The Manchester Guardian*, 20 de dezembro**

*Esta síntese apresenta uma situação demasiado favorável para os insurretos. Dá igualmente a falsa impressão de que muitas províncias estão à beira da independência e que o regresso da monarquia é para breve.*

The long civil war in Brazil shows some signs of approaching a crisis. This has hitherto been averted by the foreign warships in the Bay of Rio, who have persuaded Admiral Melo to abstain from bombarding the city as long as President Peixoto abstains from firing his shore batteries. But the British Minister has warned British residents that they are in danger, and had better remove; which looks as if he had received intelligence that the agreement is likely to be broken. There is no doubt that the city is entirely at the mercy of the insurgent fleet. Meanwhile the provinces are successively setting up for themselves; and the manifesto of Admiral da Gama shows that some at least are growing weary of the blessings of Republican Government, and are anxious to take the first opportunity of restoring the Imperial rule which was so lightly flung aside.

**95. *The Birmingham Daily Post*, 21 de dezembro**

*Depois de várias semanas quase sem combates importantes, parece que os dois beligerantes estão com vontade de atacar-se, escreve o jornal. Este, que exagera a importância dos bloqueios feitos pelos revoltosos, põe em relevo a preocupante situação da economia brasileira prejudicada pelo conflito.*

*O editorialista saúda a intervenção das Grandes Potências para proteger o comercio internacional. Destaca em particular o papel dos Estados Unidos que querem reforçar a sua presença naval no porto carioca. O quotidiano britânico considera positiva esta decisão de Washington, sublinhando, no entanto, que os Americanos querem, ao mesmo tempo, evitar um regresso da monarquia no Brasil.*

*Para o diário de Birmingham, o tipo de regime tem pouca importância, o que interessa é que o governo do Rio de Janeiro seja «honesto e forte», o que não é o caso do executivo atual. Na sua opinião, «este Governo, de República só tem o nome. Na realidade, trata-se de uma ditadura militar».*

*No fim do texto, o jornalista critica a política financeira de Peixoto, com a perda de valor da moeda e o aumento da dívida nacional, que ameaça também os investidores britânicos. É por isso, conclui o artigo, que «credores britânicos não se irão queixar» no caso dos Estados Unidos quererem assumir «o papel de Deus ex-machina do Brasil». 1*

The revolutionary struggle in Brazil reminds us of those stirring productions of the itinerant drama which are always just "about to commence". At weekly intervals for nearly four months past we have been confidently assured by one or other of the belligerents that the war was about to begin in earnest, and that we were on the eve of decisive events; but the most that has happened has been the consumption of a little more gunpowder by the fleet or the forts of Rio, without either side apparently being a penny the worse. Now and again some magazine has exploded, a gun has been dismantled, or a careless civilian who has unthinkingly put his head in the way of a shell got bowled over, but these were purely accidental incidents, for which neither side could be held to blame. Their artillery duels, as a rule, have been conducted on the most human principle, and if blood has occasionally been shed it has been

the misfortune, not the fault, of the combatants. Latterly, however, both sides have shown an unmistakable disposition to hurt on another, and there have been frequent losses on the part not only of the unoffending public, native and foreign, but on the belligerent also. By the explosion of the magazine on the island of Governador several British officer and seamen unfortunately lost their lives, the island of Bom Jesus has been captured by the Government, and the old ironclad vessel, the *Javari*, having sprung a leak by the vibration of her own guns, foundered in the harbour, fortunately without losing any of her crew. Since then, the insurgent warship *Aquidaban* has successfully run the gauntlet of the harbour forts and gone out to intercept the newly purchased American fleet, which is coming to the rescue of President PEIXOTO, but so far the hostile vessels have not come into collision. In the meantime, the remaining insurgent ships in Rio harbour, assisted by the insurgent batteries, have been amusing themselves by cannonading the city, with the result of completely paralysing what little trade was still being pursued there; and as Santos and other Brazilian ports are also blockaded by the insurgents, the commercial situation throughout the Republic may be described as somewhat strained. Foreign traders upon whom this interruption of business necessarily inflicts heavy losses are naturally indignant, and it is presumably owing to their representations that the Government of Germany, England, and the United States have notified their refusal to recognize the blockade, and their determination to protect foreign trading interests against all comers. It is doubtless in pursuance of this notification that the United States Government has ordered four additional warships to Rio. Such a naval demonstration seems

out of proportion to the military or commercial exigencies of the situation, but it is possibly intended also to influence in some way the political issues involved, and especially to avert the threatened monarchical restoration, which would ill accord with the wishes and sympathies of the Republican support of the Monroe doctrine. The future form of government in Brazil is not a matter which greatly concerns us so long as the Government is honest and strong. That of Marshal PEIXOTO, unfortunately, is neither, and any change, therefore, is likely to be a change for the better. It should be borne in mind that the actual Government is Republican only in name. In point of fact, it is a military dictatorship, qualified by the promise of a Parliament next summer. Meanwhile the unhappy country is sinking deeper and deeper in the mire of indebtedness, and its financial credit has already sunk so low that the rate of exchange, which in 1889, before the deposition of the Emperor stood at 29½, has lately fallen to a fraction over 10. For the service of the National Debt, which exceeds 33 million sterling, more than one-sixth of the total revenue of Brazil is required, and the revenue for some time past has been a steadily declining quantity, whilst the expenditure has advanced by leap and bounds under the spirited military administration of Marshal PEIXOTO. If ever external interference was justified in the domestic affairs of a nation, it was certainly in the case of Brazil, where the men at the head of affairs are so recklessly squandering the resources not only of the Brazilian people, but of the national creditor; and if the United States Government is now bent on playing the part of a *deus ex machina* in Brazil, after the example of England in Egypt, British creditors at all events are not likely to complain.

## 96. *The Morning Post*, 22 de dezembro

*O essencial deste artigo é dedicado à atitude das províncias brasileiras que, na opinião do articulista, simpatizam pela causa monárquica e que teriam ficado galvanizada pelo conteúdo do manifesto de Saldanha da Gama. O jornalista inglês explica esta forte tendência monárquica em vários Estados pelo facto de D. Pedro ter respeitado a sua «independência», enquanto a República os explorou «em favor de aventureiros políticos do Rio»*

*Na segunda parte do texto, fala da possibilidade de que se recomece a bombardear a capital, o que prejudicaria também os estrangeiros que lá vivem e que devem suportar os «caprichos arbitrários do Marechal Peixoto».*

*Na conclusão, o quotidiano londrino parece ver o Presidente à beira do fim, embora admita que os rebeldes também possam perder. De qualquer forma, nada indica que haja uma mudança, qualquer que seja o vencedor.*

After the lapse of nearly four months since the outbreak of civil war in Brazil the conflict between the forces of Marshal FLORIANO PEIXOTO and Admiral DE MELO still drags its slow length along. Indication, however, are not wanting that the struggle is reaching a decisive stage, and that there is some hope that before many days shall have elapsed we may learn that one of the parties to the quarrel has been definitely defeated. The prospect of that desirable consummation does not seem to be so much due to the prowess either of the soldiers of the MARSHAL or the sailors or the ADMIRAL as to the determination of the Provinces to interfere in the conflict with a view to the settlement of the dispute. It appears that the general feeling of the provinces is opposed to the Republican system as interpreted by Marshal PEIXOTO, and that there is something like a Restoration of the Monarchy sweeping over the country. This feeling has, it is reported, been stimulated by the recent Monarchical manifesto

of Admiral DA GAMA, who has thrown in his lot with his comrades of the Insurgent Squadron. From many of the Provinces it is announced that the advocates of a Restoration are in a large majority, and it is also stated that an Insurgent General is advancing upon Rio from the South. Should the provincial populations really declare against Marshal PEIXOTO with anything approaching unanimity, his fate would almost certainly be sealed. Hemmed in between the advancing Provincials on land and the Insurgent Squadron at sea, he would very likely find himself deserted by the majority of his adherents, at all events, by those who did not believe themselves to be too deeply compromised to hope for acceptance by the other side. There is, indeed, no improbability in the assumption that the issue may be decided by a combination between the fleet and the provincial forces. The Brazilian Provinces have always been the strongholds of the Monarchical party; and although they accepted the Revolution of November, 1889, in default of ability to resist, they have never much loved, or had much reason to love, the new government. The reason of the provincial preference for the Monarchy is partly due to the fact that, under the mild rule of Dom PEDRO, the Provinces were practically left to manage their own affairs, whereas the Republic has interfered with and exploited them for the benefit of the political adventurers at Rio. Meanwhile it is reported that Marshal PEIXOTO has been throwing up extensive works in view of an attack by the Squadron, and the impression seems to be gained that a bombardment of a more vigorous character than any that has been made is likely to be soon attempted. In that event the beautiful city of Rio, which hitherto has sustained but slight material injury, will probably suffer considerably and a final stroke of

paralysis will be [inherited by (?)] the foreign commercial enterprise connected to the Brazilian capital. For it must be remembered that it is the interests of other countries, [England (?)] included, which suffer more than those of the Brazilian themselves by this chaotic condition of affairs. It seems too, from the latest accounts, that even the lives of foreigners are not safe from the arbitrary caprices of Marshal PEIXOTO. According to intelligence received in Liverpool two steamship owners who are connected with that city, but are Portuguese subjects, have been arrested and condemned to be shot by the Brazilian Government for the alleged offence of carrying insurgent passenger on their steamers. It is, of course, in the highest degree improbable that such a sentence will be executed; but the mere fact that it has been passed at all indicates the temper of the Government at Rio. In short, the reports all point to a vexatious and tyrannized interference with individual liberty on the part of Marshal PEIXOTO, which seems to indicate a consciousness on his part that his time is short. Nevertheless, one must not be unprepared for surprises. It is possible that the Insurgents may not succeed after all, or that, if they do, their success may not be followed by that important political change which is generally expected to ensue therefrom.

**97.** *The Leeds Mercury*, 23 de dezembro

In one side or the other does not gain the upper hand in Brazil before long, Rio de Janeiro will be reduced in ruins. The bombardment proceeds

intermittently. The shore batteries fire from time to time upon the rebel fleet, and the latter are not slow to respond by pouring shot and shell into the distracted capital. The inefficiency of the blockade of the port by the insurgents is made clear from day to day. The American and German warships in the bay, it is said, refuse to recognize it. It is also reported that the British commander there has received orders from his Government to protect British interests and disregard the blockade. Three more United States warships have been ordered to Rio.

### 98. *The Colonies & India*, 30 de dezembro

*Uma das características desta guerra civil, é que não há até agora nenhum facto militarmente marcante, nota o semanário londrino, que sublinha a importância, do seu ponto de vista, de Saldanha da Gama para a causa dos rebeldes.*

The war in Brazil goes on in desultory sort of way, no decisive or brilliant movement taking place on either side, so far as we over here can make out from the extraordinary rumours which reach us from the seat of hostilities. The latest of these is to the effect that Rio has fallen into the hands of de Melo but not confirmed. There can be no doubt that Admiral da Gama's active participation in the trouble is a great source of strength to the insurgents. From the first outbreak of the trouble, it was pretty well known that he was not overfond of the Peixoto Government, and some time back he openly declared against it. But now that he has actually taken over the command of the

revolutionary squadron left at Rio, while de Melo is seeking the new Government fleet on the high seas, the benefit derived by the insurgents from his partisanship is increased tenfold.

**99.** *The Bristol Mercury*, 2 de janeiro

An event has happened in Rio de Janeiro which may have an important bearing upon the civil war now raging in Brazil. It is believed that Admiral Melo has been seriously wounded by fragments of a shell, and that he is proceeding to Montevideo to have his injuries attended to. The Brazilians, like the Mexicans, are exceedingly cruel, and have no sort of objection to inflicting pain on others, but they do not like to be themselves hurt. Now that the war has become so serious that a leading combatant has actually been injured, it is not unlikely that steps may be taken to bring the strife to an abrupt close.

**100.** *North-Eastern Daily Gazette*, 4 de janeiro

It is difficult to say which side is winning Brazil. Of late reports received seem to favour the view that the insurgent party are making progress. Unless, however, this progress be appreciably accelerated within a few days the tide of fortune may change. Marshal Peixoto is now getting his fleet in order. About the middle of the month, he expects to have in full operation against the enemy ten torpedo boats, four gunboats, and two cruisers.

**101.** «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Times*, 12 de janeiro

*Pergunta na sessão de dia 11 do Parlamento britânico*

SIR T. SUTHERLAND asked the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether steps had been taken by her Majesty's representatives in Rio de Janeiro to forward the unloading of British vessels in that port; and whether any further measures could be taken in this direction, so as to mitigate the serious loss which ship owners were sustaining owing to the prolonged detentions of their vessels.

SIR EDWARD GREY. — I can add nothing to statements which have previously been made to the effect that her Majesty's Minister and the Senior Naval Officer have been doing their utmost, to give all the assistance to British commerce that is possible in the midst of a civil conflict such as exists at Rio. Captain Land, however, reports that the firing of the Government and insurgent forces at each other takes place at uncertain periods and at various portions of the shore, and that this constitutes a danger against which it is often impossible to protect those who attempt to land cargoes. It would not be possible for the British representative at Rio to take any further measures without infringing the principle so strict neutrality from which it would not be proper for her Majesty's Government to depart.

## 102. «The Civil War in Brazil», *The Times*, 15 de janeiro

*A situação dos rebeldes é «relativamente difícil», admite o jornalista; têm menos homens e navios porque os outros foram para o Sul, para apoiar o Governo Provisório em Santa Catarina; por outro lado, o Governo do Rio está a «concentrar as suas forças para esmagar a revolução na baía». Na sua opinião, é essencial que Saldanha da Gama consiga resistir algumas semanas e que possa continuar a bloquear as saídas e as entradas do porto da capital, antes que chegue «uma força considerável» que se está a preparar no Sul do país. Nesse caso, os insurretos terão a possibilidade de desembarcar e de entrar no Rio de Janeiro, afirma, confiante, o correspondente do jornal londrino.*

*«A questão da proteção dos interesses comerciais pelos navios de guerra estrangeiros» é complexa, relata o artigo. A decisão tomada por todos, menos pela Alemanha, é de intervir quando estes navios são alvos de tiros diretos ou de confiscações, mas nada podem fazer, apesar dos protestos dos comerciantes europeus, quando os mesmos se encontram no meio de um tiroteio. Nessa perspetiva, os comandantes desta frota já avisaram firmemente os «comerciantes e os proprietários dos navios do constante perigo» a que estão sujeitos, sublinha o jornalista.*

*Este está a bordo do Tamandaré quando o navio é alvo dos tiros das tropas governamentais: quatro obuses atingem o navio e umas dezenas passam poucos metros acima. No relato, põem-se em evidência a intensidade do fogo inimigo, a falta de munições do navio rebelde e a sua relativa fragilidade, sendo o casco de madeira e sem armadura.*

*Entrevista a seguir Saldanha da Gama. Por um lado, este afirma que, em caso de vitória, será o povo que decidirá o tipo de regime que quer par o país. Por outro lado, admite que os seus marinheiros «sofrem de algumas privações» e que andam um «pouco desanimados perante a dimensão do trabalho que está diante deles». O jornalista está, porém, convencido que, se a ajuda de 1000 homens vindos do Sul chegar a tempo, eles vão recuperar força e moral para o combate. Se for o caso, um desembarque será possível. O mesmo constata uma melhor atitude dos combatentes dos dois lados, sendo,*

*na sua opinião, os marinheiros rebeldes mais disciplinados. No fim da entrevista o Almirante afirma que «conhece «os seus compatriotas suficientemente bem» e que não espera, por conseguinte, nenhum apoio terrestre. Sabe também que, em caso de êxito, será aclamado pelos mesmos, que se colocarão do lado do vencedor.*

*Do lado governativo, está-se a pôr todos os meios à disposição para derrotar os rebeldes. O texto fala de cerca de 400 peças de artilharia e de 7 000 homens que combatem contra os insurrectos, com a parte melhor do Exército que está no Rio Grande do Sul. O articulista sublinha a coragem destes homens de Peixoto, embora não tenham tido a necessária formação para o uso dos mosquetes. Apesar de constatar que o Governo está preparado e atento, o correspondente de The Times continua a pensar que um «desembarque de tropas juntamente com um ataque vindos dos barcos dará provavelmente lugar a um sucesso dos revoltosos».*

*O jornalista visita também a ilha de Villegagnon: põe em relevo a coragem dos marinheiros e, igualmente, a sua boa disposição, apesar de eles viverem numa posição muito perigosa, com uma média de dez mortos e feridos cada semana.*

*Narra os ataques dos homens de Peixoto à Ilha do Governador no dia 15 e à de Mocanguê seis dias depois. Os insurgentes foram obrigados a retirar-se das duas ilhas, causando perdas pesadas aos inimigos. Com isso, o Governo está a fechar o cerco à volta dos rebeldes, nota o articulista, segundo o qual não vai ser possível para os homens de Saldanha da Gama aguentar muito mais tempo: se de Melo «não enviar imediatamente reforços, os insurgentes vão perder a enorme vantagem que têm de manter o Governo em cheque no Rio de Janeiro» e isso seria «um rude golpe pela causa» da revolta armada.*

*No fim do longo artigo, fala da recusa do Governo do Rio de pôr os feridos sobre a proteção da bandeira da Cruz Vermelha, e por três razões: o Brasil não assinou a Convenção de Genebra; os feridos depois iam voltar ao combate contra o Governo; os hospitais que existem são suficientes. Assinala também o perigo da febre amarela.*

RIO DE JANEIRO, DEC. 24

I have refrained from sending any long letters during the past three weeks because my telegrams have conveyed all news of moment to you. I am still sending my communications *via* Montevideo for the reasons that the Director of Telegrams will not allow any message to pass direct to London unless it consists of some bare fact favourable to the Government of Marshal Peixoto; under such circumstances I consider it more to the advantages of *The Times* that my telegrams should be forwarded as hitherto, though the system entails a delay of three days.

The position at the moment is a somewhat difficult one for the insurgents under the command of Admiral Saldanha da Gama in the Bay of Rio de Janeiro. The Government has concentrated all their efforts to crush the revolution in the bay. So far, the insurgents have maintained their position and continue to hold the legal authorities in check, notwithstanding the fact that many of the ships of the squadron and nearly 800 officers and men have been despatched to the South to assist in organizing the land forces and generally aiding in the firm establishment of the Provisional Government at Santa Catarina. From such information as I have been to obtain, good service has been rendered, by the officers and men despatched from here, and in two or three weeks time it is probable that a considerable force will be ready to embark for this port. The crux of the affair is whether Admiral Saldanha da Gama can hold out in his present position until the arrival of this force from the South. Can he do so the situation will become extremely difficult for

Marshal Peixoto, for all the insurgents really need a body of men to land and retain a footing in the city. Once this is accomplished much support will be accorded to them from many quarters. Marshal Peixoto does not, apparently, estimate the movement in the South at its proper value, and, moreover, heralds the fact of the concentration of the insurgent forces on Villegagnon, Cobra Island, and the various ships as a sign of weakness. Such, however, is not really the case. Admiral Saldanha da Gama knows well that the great point is to maintain in his position in front of the city and cut off free ingress and egress for supplies to the shore; to do this he has withdrawn from all outlying points and is prepared to defend his present position to the utmost extent of his power.

The question of protection of commercial interests by the foreign warships in port is the subject of much discussion at present. The naval commanders of the different nationalities, with the exception of the senior German naval officer, have publicly announced that they will afford protection against seizure and against their flags being deliberately fired upon; but they point out that is impossible to protect life when ships or men working in launches and lighters allow themselves to be caught in a cross fire between the Government troops and the insurgents; moreover, the ship-owners and merchant are warned that there is constant danger of this cross fire breaking out, as it has done on several occasions, and for this reason both ship-owners and merchants are strongly advised not to risk the lives of their *employés* in the attempt to load or discharge cargo under existing circumstances. This

action does not satisfy the mercantile community, who wish, somewhat unreasonably, to obtain such protection as would enable them to carry on their ordinary business of life as though the bay of Rio were not the scene of warlike operations. The naval commanders are all agreed upon the line of action they have determined to adopt, and they state positively that it is out of their power to go further unless their respective Governments ordered them to intervene by armed force and prevent any firing at all between the troops and the insurgents. That the action of the naval commanders is fully justified is evidenced by the fact that on the 21th inst. three sailors from foreign merchant vessels were killed whilst waiting at the landing place; they were in their boat and had come to take off the masters of the ships they belonged to when firing began between the Government troops and the insurgents, and they had no time to get out of the line of fire.

On the 22<sup>nd</sup> inst. I paid a visit to Admiral Saldanha da Gama on board the cruiser Admiral *Tamandaré*. At this time, she was in action against the batteries of the fort of São João in Niteroi and the batteries recently erected by the Government on the point of the Armação. The range of the former was about 4,000 yards, of the latter about 3,00 yards. Four shells struck the ship whilst I was on board, one hitting the foremost funnel and exploding, another on the forecastle and ricocheting off, a third striking the starboard side amidships and doing no damage, and the fourth hitting the starboard quarter about 2 ft. above the water line and exploding between decks, making only a clean hole in the side of the ship and doing no damage beyond wounding one

man. Some 15 or 20 shells passed a few feet over our heads or fell a little short, but the shooting from the shore was consistently good, and this was all the more remarkable as the range was a fresh one, the *Tamandaré* having moved her position shortly before the firing commenced. The *Tamandaré* replied to the batteries with her 6in. quick-firing Armstrong guns, using Balestite smokeless powder and making very fair practice. The guns, however, were not used as quick-firing guns should be, and only one shot every five minutes or so was the order of the day. The whole power of the ship was thus thrown away, for, while she might keep up a rain of shell from her very modern artillery, she is used in a manner more appropriate to a heavily armoured line-of-battleship, and if this is persevered in her unarmoured wooden hull will be knocked to pieces in a very short time. Possibly it may be that the supply of ammunition for her guns is limited, but is so she should not be put into action as a target for the forts to fire at. Admiral da Gama appears to quite appreciate this fact, but for some reason which I was unable to ascertain, he is unwilling to risk running the ship past the forts and making use of her for outside work.

The main object of my visit to Admiral Saldanha da Gama was to ascertain from him personally what true there was in the reiterated assertions of the supporters of Marshal Peixoto that the idea of a restoration of the Monarchy was causing discontent amongst the insurgents. The Admiral answered in a perfectly straightforward and explicit manner on the subject. He recalled to memory former conversations we had held concerning the matter, and again reiterated emphatically that the decision must come from the

Brazilian people and would not be imposed upon the country by the insurgents if they gained the day. He further added that he found that the insurgent officers considered his presence as one of the leaders of the civil war any impediment to success, or likely to cause dissension on account of political opinion in the ranks of those fighting against the Government, he should immediately resign the command. He states that the men under his command are naturally suffering many hardships and are, in some cases, a little downhearted at the magnitude of the work before them, chiefly because reinforcements from the South are so long delayed, but he has not observed, nor does he contemplate the possibility of, any wish to terminate the war except by complete victory over the Government of Marshal Peixoto. The Admiral states that three officers did desert from the insurgent ranks some two weeks ago, but they had at best only been lukewarm supports of the cause, and he attached no importance to their action. Of course, the Admiral may be mistaken in his opinion, but I repeat what he told me and must leave it for time to decide whether he is right or wrong. I feel convinced from my conversation with the officers of the insurgents that the appearance of some reinforcement from the south is all that is needed to make them redouble their efforts not only to win but to act at once and bring about a decisive movement. What that movement may be depend on the strength of the reinforcements of they arrive in time to give timely aid; but it is certain that with a fresh force of 1,000 men appearing on the scene a landing would be effected, probably in Niteroi. I may add that as regards bravery under fire, the insurgents leave little to be desired; they are quiet and cool, and only need a little more experience and discipline.

In this respect, the Government troops also have greatly improved in the past few month, but they have less discipline than the sailors. In the course of my interview with Admiral Saldanha da Gama, I asked him if he had ever expected any movement on shore in his favour after he formally declared that he meant to fight against the Government. His answer was: "No," and he added that he know his fellow countrymen well enough to have foreseen that he could expect small help from them. In this, therefore, he has not been deceived in any way, and neither will he be so if the insurgents win the day and the people on shore throw up their hats and declare themselves in favour of the victorious side.

The government is using every endeavour to make he position in the harbour untenable for the insurgents. Every point round the bay is being made use of the military purposes, and guns are now mounted on all commanding elevation in and about the city of Rio de Janeiro, the shore front between the city and the Fort São João, from Santa Cruz to Niteroi, and recently on the Armação and Mucangé Island. In all there are some 400 pieces of artillery in position, many of these being very old-fashioned and of little use, but Whitworths, a few Armstrongs, and a number of Krupp field guns make a very respectable show, and, well-handled, should enable the troops to give a good account of themselves when any attack is made upon the city. The National Guard, now forming a large proportion of the garrison of the city, as not a formidable appearance from a soldier's point of view and, moreover, they have never been taught the use of their arms or done any musketry practice; still, there are now some 4,000 of them to deal with, and at their backs about 3,000

regular troops. These latter, judging from their behaviour in the various skirmishes I have seen them engaged in, have a fair amount of courage and only require to be well led to make good soldiers. The weak point with them, as with the National Guard, is that they have never received proper instruction in musketry; a defect impossible to remedy at the present juncture. The pick of the army was sent down to Rio Grande do Sul to carry on the war there, and is therefore not available for the defence of the capital; but with the men at his command Marshal Peixoto should be able to make a good fight for it against the troops from the south if an attack is made. Now, however, his idea seems to be rather to try and crush the insurgents on the water and in Cobras Island and Fort Villa Gagnon by heavy artillery fire than to anticipate any landing of the enemy or possible attack on the city. I cannot help thinking, therefore, that a landing of troops combined with an attack from the ships would probably be attended with success on the insurgent side.

Day after day the artillery duel between the forts continues, and the amount of ammunition used has been enormous: still the firing goes on as if the supply was inexhaustible. I ran over to Villegagnon one night to ascertain the extent of damage done. Between Cobras Island and Villegagnon my launch dropped in for a shower of bullets from the soldiers lining the shore front, who for about an hour kept up a heavy fire on the fort, the latter replying with the machine guns. All the buildings in Villegagnon are in ruins, the garrison, numbering 14 officers and 250 non-commissioned officers and men at the time of my visit, living in the casemates under the batteries. The centre face of the

battery looking seawards is much cut away by the fire of the forts at the mouth of the harbour, but this does not interfere with the work of the guns, although they are very much exposed, and the men working are in continual danger from splinter of shells and rifle fire from shore. The mortality amongst the garrison has been very heavy, an average of some ten men killed and wounded each week being the record since the fort joined the fight. Since my visit a shell from 10in. Armstrong gun at São João penetrated into the casemates just as the men were at dinner, killing five men and wounding nine. Neither officers nor men showed any signs of discouragement, and were perfectly cheery and contented. I found one gun's crew sleeping round the gun in a most exposed and dangerous position, and when I asked them why they did this, was told that they preferred being ready to open fire at a moment's notice. This spirit more or less animated all the men I spoke to, and shows that as brave men they deserve every praise.

On December 15 the Government ordered General Silva Telles to reoccupy the island of Governador, and detached about 1,000 men for the purpose. Admiral Saldanha da Gama landed a force of 200 sailors and marines and four field guns to oppose them. The troops waded across from the mainland and marched across the island, opening fire on the buildings near where the insurgents were stationed. When the main body of the troops came within 500 yards of the insurgents the latter opened a heavy fire from the battery and a machine gun as well as with rifles. General Telles was wounded early in the fight and taken back to the mainland, where he died on the 22<sup>nd</sup>

isnt., and was buried with full military honours on the 24<sup>th</sup>. The troops broke under the heavy fire poured into them by the insurgents and suffered heavy losses, having some 80 men killed and many wounded. Immediately after the fight Admiral da Gama withdrew his men from the island, stating that it was impossible for him, with the few men under his command, to occupy it in sufficient strength to render it safe against further attack by the Government. On the 21<sup>st</sup> isnt. the forces of Marshal Peixoto attacked the island of Mucanguê Grande, which up till now has been in the possession of the insurgents. Admiral da Gama landed a few men on the island and sent some launches to attack the troops as they attempted to land. The launches and men were forced to retire after a sharp skirmish, and then for some hours afterwards the *Tamandaré* and the *Jupiter* continued shelling the island, but were unable to drive the troops out of it, although heavy loss was inflicted, four officers being amongst the wounded.

It will be seen from the results of the various skirmishes I have mentioned that the Government are gradually closing in upon the insurgents in the harbour and that the position of Admiral da Gama is becoming more difficult every day. Unless the promised reinforcements arrive from the south, I do not see how he is to hold his position in front of the city much longer. It requires all the men he has under him to man his ships and garrison Cobras and Villegagnon, and there is no reserve to effectually resist any attempt on the part of Marshal Peixoto to occupy every island in the bay and so encircle the insurgents with a complete ring of artillery. It Admiral de Melo, who went to

the south for the special purpose of bringing reinforcements, does not send aid at once the insurgents will lose the enormous advantage, they now have in being able to hold the Government in check in Rio de Janeiro, and, moreover, the moral effect on the various provinces will be a sever blow to the cause of the insurgents.

I formally applied to the government for permission to render aid to the insurgent sick and wounded men under the usual conditions attached to the Red Cross. The Minister of Foreign Affairs refused the permissions asked for on the following grounds: – (1) That Brazil did not sign the Geneva Convention, and, consequently, was not obliged to respect the Red Cross; (2) that the men, when cured, would return to the insurgent ranks to again fight against the Government: (3) that the military hospitals on shore were sufficiently large to receive the insurgent wounded as well as those amongst the Government troops. In the personal interview I had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs I offered to take in and treat Government troops or sailors equally with men from the insurgent ranks, but my efforts were unavailing, and I was point-blank refused protection for the Red-Cross flag or permission to carry on the work. I may mention that Admiral da Gama offered to give up the island of Enxadas for the Red Cross work if I obtained a promise from the Government not to fire on the hospital or the Red Cross flag.

DECEMBER 25

My effort to obtain reliable information from the south have not met with much success. All communication with Santa Catarina, the headquarters of the

insurgent Provisional Government, is stopped by order of Marshal Peixoto, and such news as I am able to get is of the most fragmentary description. Matters do not look cheerful for either side at the present moment. A hot spell of dry weather has set in, and this is said to be the sure precursor of an outbreak of yellow fever epidemic, a factor that may possibly play an important part in the termination of the civil war in this city. Naturally, sanitary precautions have been somewhat neglected during the past few months, and a virulent attack of this scourge Brazil is not considered at all unlikely.

At a Cabinet Council held this morning it was decided to again prolong martial law, the date of the prolongation being left to the decision of the Vice-President. It is stated that probably the extension will be until January 31.

### 103. *The Glasgow Herald*, 16 de janeiro

*O diário escocês debruça-se sobre a situação vivida pelos navios britânicos de comércio no porto do Rio e que se queixam de ter sido abandonados pelo governo de Londres. Oitenta comandantes destes navios enviaram uma nota de protesto ao Foreign Office. O editorialista explica que aos rebeldes não foi dado o estatuto de beligerante e isso não permite ao comandante da frota britânica na baía do Rio negociar com eles. Por conseguinte, o «capitão Lang tem de se manter neutral».*

*No segundo parágrafo, o jornalista fala das dificuldades e dos riscos que correm os negociantes que querem descarregar ou simplesmente atracar no porto carioca. O Governo não pode garantir a segurança e os rebeldes «misturam-se» com os navios de comércio para se protegerem «sem escrúpulos» do fogo vindo das baterias governamentais, aumentando desse modo o risco para os não-combatentes.*

*O editorialista critica esta atitude das autoridades do seu país que, «com quatro navios de guerra, não conseguem lidar com esta situação». Acusa tanto os rebeldes, que se escondem no meio dos navios britânicos, quanto Peixoto, que é «uma personagem responsável que descaradamente recusa qualquer responsabilidade». Na sua opinião, o ministro inglês devia fazer sentir a sua voz, como já fizeram os alemães e os americanos. Além disso, todas as potências deviam obter dos dois beligerantes que «reconhecessem o direito dos comerciantes». Por outras palavras, «o governo devia agir e rapidamente» e pôr entre parêntesis o princípio a «estrita neutralidade».*

Our correspondents who complain of the neglect of British interests at Rio de Janeiro have an indubitable grievance, and it is high time that the Government wakened up to the state of affairs so bitterly resented by the shipmasters on the spot and their owners home. It must be admitted, of course, that the situation is a ticklish one. Brazil is contending with a rebel who commands the harbour of Rio. Our naval commander in these waters can deal with President Peixoto as the representative of a friendly Power, but as he does not recognize Admiral de Melo as a "belligerent", he is practically precluded from making any terms whatever with the rebel chief. At the same time, paradoxical as it may seem, Captain Land is forced to remain neutral. That is to say the only argument he could legitimately use with the rebel Admiral would be force, and that weapon is forbidden to him. Our Government themselves are witnesses. For we have it from Mr Gladstone that "the insurgents have not been recognised as belligerents" and from Sir Edward Grey, Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that "it would not be possible for the British Minister in Rio to

take any further measure s without infringing the principles of strict neutrality, from which it would not be prudent for Her Majesty's Government to depart". It is a pretty dilemma. Our representatives at Rio can parley with both combatants, of whom only one, the President, is amenable to diplomacy, the other, being nobody's servant, can snap his fingers at all the Great Powers of the world simply because these Powers must not "infringe the principle of strict neutrality" by applying to him the only weapon he could feel –namely, force.

Mark what follows. British ships have been lying by the score off Rio for months, waiting to discharge, or for ballast if they have had the luck to get rid of their cargoes, at enormous risk. The Brazilian Government did indeed appoint a safe place "fore the embarking and disembarking of merchant captains", but at the same time declined all responsibility for the safety of merchant shipping. How "safe", moreover, this Praia de Harmonia is may be inferred from the facts that at least two British shipmasters have been warned by our senior naval officer that if they move their vessel in to discharge, and if any of the crew are killed, they will be charged with manslaughter; and a ship's boy belonging to the Crown of India was shot dead at that very landing. But that is not the worst. It is only fair to the Brazilian Government and to Captain Lang to admit that they may find it impossible to prevent the rebels from firing upon the Praia da Harmonia, and that their permit to the captains to land there is necessarily qualified by their powerlessness. The other subject of our countrymen's complaint is a more serious one. The rebels, it seems, use

without the slightest scruple the British shipping as a convenient cover from Peixoto's fire. In the official proclamation which appointed the Praia da Harmonia as a "safe place" for disembarking, an equally "safe anchorage" was assigned to the merchantmen by Captain Lang, acting as the mouthpiece of the Brazil Government. Now this "safe anchorage" is apparently as great a fraud as the "safe place" for landing. Rebel ships mix with the traders utterly regardless of the fire thus drawn upon these from the shore batteries. One shipmaster declares that he was fired across though he was lying five cables within the "safe anchorage". And, to crown all, the Brazil Government have a notice posted on the British Consulate that they will fire on the rebels wherever they are, and will not be responsible for damage to merchant shipping.

Now, admitted that our representatives at Rio may really be unable to ensure a safe landing for merchandise, surely, they are carrying "strict neutrality" to a ridiculous extreme when they permit these irresponsible "non-belligerent" rebels to hide amongst the British shipping, and draw upon it the fire of the President, who is a responsible personage, but coolly disavows all responsibility. It is incredible that Her Majesty's Minister, supported as he is (witness Mr Gladstone) by four ships of war, is incapable of dealing with this state of matters. It is reported some time ago that the American and German naval commanders at Rio had intimated that they would not permit further bombardment until safe anchorage for merchant vessels loading or discharging could be obtained. Nothing, however, can be built upon that, because there is no evidence that the threat was effectual, or that these

officers have as a matter of fact done anything more for their countrymen that Captain Lang has done for his. But it must strike everyone as, to say the least, peculiar that our naval commander should be unable to back up the threat of his German and American *confrères*, and that, so far as is known, no attempt should have been made to secure such a concert between the foreign naval forces at Rio as would have compelled recognition of traders' right from both of contending parties. If the traders have no rights, then, as the master of the *Annanmore*<sup>52</sup> puts it, they should be sent out of the way. Nobody seems to know whether or not the protest despatched by eighty British shipmasters at Rio to Lord Rosebery<sup>53</sup> last month ever reached the Foreign Office. Lord Rosebery should, however, know by this time what is going on. The situation must be aggravated at this moment by the renewed firing which is reported by the latest cables. Therefore, the Government should act, and act quickly. Captain Lang may naturally be afraid to "infringe the principle of strict neutrality" which Sir Edward Grey holds so sacred. A word from the Foreign Office would suffice to remove the officer's scruples, and enable him to insist that Government and rebels alike should on their part observe "strict neutrality", and that the former should make some pretence at least of fulfilling their obligation to keep open the port of Rio.

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<sup>52</sup> Navio construído em Glasgow em 1893.

<sup>53</sup> Archibald Primrose, 5ª conde de Rosebery (1847-1929) foi ministro britânico dos Negócios estrangeiros de agosto de 1892 a março de 1894. A seguir, será Primeiro ministro até junho do ano seguinte.

## 104. *The Yorkshire Herald*, 16 de janeiro

*Como a maioria dos seus colegas, o quotidiano de Iorque, queixa-se da falta de informações fidedignas que permitiriam ter uma ideia muito mais precisa sobre a situação real do conflito na baía do Rio de Janeiro. Constata que a causa principal invocada pelos rebeldes para explicar a revolta (lutar contra «o sistema de favoritismo e o esbanjamento do dinheiro público por parte do Governo de Peixoto) foi recusado. Por um lado, o Presidente tem o «apoio da maioria do Congresso; por outro lado, tem «o tribunal financeiro» que controla o orçamento.*

*De qualquer forma, as duas partes parecem de força igual: por conseguinte, «estamos perante a perspectiva de um conflito longo e mortífero», constata o editorialista, segundo o qual a mudança de regime em 1889 «deixou amplo campo às intrigas dos ambiciosos».*

*Nesta situação de anarquismo, com as «instituições do país à beira do colapso» e com a atividade comercial quase parada, o jornal acha confortante a intervenção dos diplomatas estrangeiros que avisaram o Almirante de Melo para ele «não atirar sobre as zonas indefesas da capital». Caso contrário, conclui o articulista – tranquilizado pelos números de navios de guerra britânicos no Porto do Rio de Janeiro – a frota estrangeira «teria necessidade de intervir».*

The contradictory character of the news from the scene of hostilities in Brazil renders it well high impossible to get a correct idea as to the position of the rival parties. It is abundantly plain, however, that the utmost confusion prevails everywhere. The rebels at Cobras Island have bombarded the Government land batteries, and are now said to be preparing for a general attack, while the Government forces are reported as ready to for any assault. But there is nothing in the nature of the operations to indicate that any very serious conflict is impending. Only four years have elapsed since in “three

glorious days” Brazil exchanged a hereditary Monarchy for a Republic, and during that time the country has been a scene of unrest which has culminated in open revolution. When DOM PEDRO gave place to Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA, the forms of the Monarchy were superseded by those of a military dictatorship over a country half the size of Europe. Never did an old order of things pass away so quickly and with so little bloodshed. Only one Minister was shot, and as soon as the good EMPEROR has sailed for Lisbon, tranquillity reigned supreme, the people following their usual avocations under the new regime just as they had done under the old dispensation. Some described the change which had occurred as “revolution-making with rose water”. Institutions, however, of long standing cannot be suddenly abolished without injury to the country. The fact has been verified by what has occurred in Brazil. There was an absence of open violence when the Monarchy disappeared, but the revolt which might have been expected to accompany that event was simply postponed. For years South America has been the scene of insurrection, and Brazil has at last been swept into the vortex. Under the Empire it enjoyed a fair share of social and political stability; but now public security has vanished, and no one can say when good order and commercial equilibrium will be restored.

At the moment, it is impossible to say which side will in the end prevail. It was at first stated that the insurgent party, under Admiral MELO, has risen in revolt against Present PEIXOTO, to put an end to a system of favouritism and a squandering of public money. That, however, was promptly contradicted. It was declaring that the PRESIDENT was governing with the support of the majority of

the Congress, and that no expense could be incurred without the sanction of a financial tribunal, whose operations were strictly limited by the conditions of the Budget. The Navy, on the other hand, under the control of Admiral MELO, who is now said to have been stricken down with fever, was shown to be trying to place above the Congress and the Constitution. The Admiral certainly has no mandate for his action from the Brazilian nation, which ought to be represented by Congress, at the head of which is President PEIXOTO. The supporters of the rival parties are pretty well balanced, and that being so we have the prospect of a protracted and deadly strife. Business is at a standstill, and all the institutions of the country are in a condition of collapse from which it will take years to recover. The Brazilians, who are easily governed, are suffering all the horrors of civil war. They too easily exchanged their Monarchical institutions for the Republican regime, which affords a wider field for the intrigues of ambitious men than is furnished by the kingly form of government. While the anarchical state of affairs prevails, it is comforting to know that the Diplomatic Body have, in the interest of European residents at Rio de Janeiro, informed the insurgent Admiral that he must refrain from launching into the undefended parts of the capital. Admiral MELO and his lieutenants are wise enough not to ignore such an instruction. If they did disregard it, the officers of the foreign fleets, who have been maintaining as attitude of neutrality, would be under the necessity of interfering. We have been assured<sup>54</sup> by Mr. CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN<sup>54</sup> that England has in Brazilian

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<sup>54</sup> Henry Campbell-Bannerman (1836-1908) é ministro da Guerra do Reino Unido de agosto de

waters more ships than any other Power. This is satisfactory, but the number of British vessels is not greater than is demanded by the interests we have in stake.

### 105. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 16 de janeiro

*A única certeza é que, apesar de tudo, os dois contendentes continuam a lutar, nota o jornal londrino, que censura as tropas do governo por elas terem bombardeado um hospital.*

The Civil war in Brazil drags its slow length along, and we seem no nearer to the end than we have been at any time since the trouble began. Nor, indeed, is it easy to form anything like an accurate estimate of the condition of the two forces. There is a great deal of hard swearing on both sides; for every day for months past first one set of belligerents and then the other have assured us that their opponents are on the very verge of collapse and yet they continue to bombard one another with undiminished vigour. One thing is, however, certain, and that is the universal condemnation with which the deliberate bombardment of a hospital by the Government batteries will be received. Rebels are rebels, even in South America, but they must be fought in accordance with the law of war. Incidents of this kind very often mark the turning-point of a campaign by determining to which side the sympathy of the civilized world shall incline.

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1892 a junho de 1895. Será Primeiro-Ministro de dezembro de 1905 a abril de 1908.

## 106. «Brazil», *The Bristol Mercury*, 19 de janeiro

*O quotidiano de Bristol observa impotente como, na América do Sul, há sempre um ou dois países em guerra civil. Não percebe a razão pela qual Peixoto e de Melo continuam o combate, em vez de resolverem os problemas através de eleições ou de uma arbitragem.*

*Constata que este «conflito suicida» provoca perdas em vidas humanas, destruições, grandes danos ao comércio e «um incalculável prejuízo ao Rio de Janeiro em particular e ao Brasil em geral». O editorialista insiste sobre a «ideia de uma arbitragem». Com efeito, é «a prosperidade do país» que devia ser prioritária e não «o triunfo pessoal de um ou outro chefe em disputa».*

As we remarked in reviewing the events of the year 1893, it is the unfortunate experience of those who have to observe and chronicle the history of the world that one or another of the South American States seems to be always in a state of civil war, or something approaching it. All that the experienced journalist has to do is to note the particular country which, for the time being, fills the bill. This appears, in a measure, amusing from the other side of the world; but it means a great loss of life to those immediately concerned, a serious destruction of property, and a prolonged interruption of business. Whether adverse criticism may be offered from the colder Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon point of view, it must be admitted that these races of Spanish descent are no cowards; they face the arms of modern precision and deadliness, with unfaltering courage and fight with tigerish determination. The stand which the dictator Balmaceda made could excite little sympathy, but the most important witness bear testimony to the splendid determination with

which the battles were fought by the troops on both sides. The extensive and important Republic of Brazil is at the present moment the scene of a similarly suicidal strife. Possibly, some great domestic principles are involved, but it is absolutely impossible for foreign observers to understand why President Peixoto, who seems to have the best of the game so far as land forces are involved, and Admiral de Melo, who holds command of the sea, in squandering Brazilian lives and devastating Brazilian territory, are in a state of civil war. South America seems to be a continent to which the Irishman's statement particularly applies, and with him it was a word and a blow, and the blow came first. There appears really to be nothing in dispute between the parties which could not be settled by the peaceful arbitrament of the ballot box, if personal ambition and self-glory did not come first. We really do not know enough of the facts which have led to sympathy with one or the other, but it is clear that the war has done incalculable injury to Rio Janeiro in particular, and to Brazil in general. The rivals can increase the exhaustion of the country, but it is a drawn game, and both sides can go on fighting for a long while. All these facts tend to increase the value of the idea of arbitration which has now been brought upon the scene, and we trust it will readily be adopted. The welfare of the country should be the first consideration, and the personal triumph of either of the contending leaders is a trifle compared with the restoration of peace to a distracted country. British interests have, we know, suffered largely through the bombardment of Rio; but our remarks are not dictated by any insular or selfish feeling. The strife should be promptly ended, and any competition between those who aspire to direct the destinies of Brazil should be settled by

peaceful means, instead of by the brutal arbitrament of war. There is no reason why they should not, and we trust the saner course will prevail.

### 107. «The revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 30 de janeiro

*O correspondente do jornal londrino relata que o Almirante Benham já tinha proposto a sua mediação e, perante a resposta negativa do chefe da insurreição, tinha avisado Saldanha da Gama que iria «proteger o comércio e também o desembarque de material para o Governo, e que usaria a força se for necessário».*

*O mesmo escreve que Peixoto fez esperar duas horas o comandante da frota americana, antes de lhe comunicar que não o podia receber, apesar de este encontro ter sido marcado com antecedência.*

*Finalmente, constatamos que os vários comandantes da frota estrangeira pediram instruções aos respectivos governos quanto à atitude que tinham de tomar com os rebeldes: «teriam de usar a força para proteger a navegação ou conceder carta branca aos insurretos?»*

RIO DE JANEIRO, JAN. 25 (*Via* Montevideo, Jan, 29)

Admiral de Melo is now in Curitiba, the capital of the State of Panama. He has organized a Provincial Government in that State, and proposes to move northwards immediately, General Saraiva with his troops being on the frontier at São Paulo.

On January 22 the American Admiral at Rio invited Admiral da Gama to have an interview with him on board the flag-ship *New York*. Admiral da Gama declares that he assumed rather a peremptory manner, stating that the insurgent cause was hopeless, and proposes to arrange a reconciliation.

Admiral da Gama replied that the only terms possible were the resignation of Marshal Peixoto and free election to the Presidency. The American lost his temper, and said that he would protect commerce, as well as the landing of Government material, using force if necessary. Admiral da Gama replied that the insurgents controlled the States of Rio Grandee, Santa Catarina, and Parana, and would make any effort to hold out at Rio until the arrival of southern troops. He considered that they had a fair chance of victory.

The insurgents today occupied the island of Bom Jesus, which commands a portion of the north city, and seized some artillery and a few prisoners. The Government warship, the *Cid*, the *Aurora*, the *Parahiba* (now the *Bahia*), and the remainder of the fleet are expected there. The inactivity of the Government is causing discontent among its partisans ashore. Heavy artillery fire continues daily between the forts. The *Sirius* left yesterday for Parana and Desterro to ascertain the position of the insurgents.

Yesterday the American Admiral went to the Palace to pay an official visit, which had previously intimated. Marshal Peixoto kept him waiting for two hours, after which an orderly informed him that the President was busy and unable to receive Americans. This is regarded as a direct insult to the American Navy.

A naval conference of foreign commanders, held today, decided to telegraph to their respective Governments informing them that the insurgents have complete control of the harbour, and asking for instructions from their

Governments whether force is to be used to protect the shipping, or whether the insurgents are to be given a free hand. – *Our Special Correspondent.*

**108.** «At Rio», *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 30 de janeiro

*O jornalista – que define o conflito como «drama infeliz» e «lamentável», cujos atores são, por um lado, um ditador e, por outro lado, dois almirantes que não inspiram nenhuma confiança – debruça-se sobre a frota comprada nos Estados Unidos. Esta não parece estar à altura dos desafios que a esperam. Peixoto «caiu nas mãos de contratantes», que lhe venderam o que a historiografia chamará de «esquadra de papelão».*

*No segundo parágrafo, o articulista sublinha como de Melo conseguiu passar a barra do porto do Rio de Janeiro e põe, com um certo exagero, esta «façanha» no mesmo plano que outras da história naval. Acrescenta que, «os fortes governamentais do Rio de Janeiro mostraram-se impotentes a impedir os movimentos» da frota rebelde.*

*O analista escreve que esta situação específica da guerra civil brasileira pode «ilustrar a probabilidade da Frota russa no Mar Negro um dia forçar a passagem para o Mediterrâneo».*

The world has not lately witnessed anything more lamentable than the wretched drama of civil warfare now being enacted at Rio de Janeiro. A revolution, to be respectable, should at least evoke heroes, but, in Brazil, we find on one hand a military dictator, sacrificing the common rights of humanity in the eager hold upon power, refusing protection to the Red Cross, and shelling an undefended hospital, and permitted to exercise his sway by the people of the city he has cowed; on the other, two insurgent admirals, whose timid and tentative professions of loyalty to the republic and to royalty are no such as to

inspire either confidence or enthusiasm. Between the rival factions interests scarcely calculable are being paltered with, the interests of British subjects largely; and we shall be fortunate if we can gain some lessons of profit from the struggle. A little light is certainly thrown upon the naval problem. What is the value of an improvised fleet? What has become of that which President Peixoto brought together? Machinery troubles, and the difficulty of getting the scratch crews to serve, hampered the progress of his new ships southward, and the *America* (ex-*Britannia*) was disabled. When the famous dynamite cruiser *Niteroi* (ex-*El Cid*) reached Pernambuco she was in a useless condition. Her monster gun was discovered to be provided with but five loaded shells, some empty ones, and a good number of dummies. The same was the case with her Hotchkiss cannon, and, as to her disorganized Sims-Edison torpedo, the responsible man did not know how to work it. Swords and cutlasses there were none, and of Winchesters and revolvers but a few, these well-provided with ammunition, too. The *Niteroi* brought from New York the torpedo-boats *Feiseen* and *Javelin*, but these seem to have been hoisted of her deck by some external means, for there, owing to the weakness of her davits, according to a recent report, they remained. And to add to the difficulty of the case, each had a hole in her bottom, and the *Feiseen* could not have discharged a torpedo. So much, then, for fleets hastily improvised, and we are in no way surprised to find that with craft such as these the insurgent commander considers it unsafe to enter the harbour at Rio in face of the fire of Villegagnon, and the island of Cobras.

But President Peixoto, in improvising his fleet, has taught a lesson that should not be forgotten. If, with his imperfect means, poor resources, and small opportunities, he has fallen into the hands of contractors less careful of his interests than of their own, this is no reason why a rich Power, involved in war, should not increase its fleet by purchasing efficient ships of war from States more or less impoverished. We well know, from the case of Turkey, which some years ago disposed of efficient ships both to this country and to Germany, that circumstances may arise in which such a transfer might be accomplished. We should, therefore, be prepared to meet such a sudden expansion of the fleets of our adversaries by taking energetic measures to augment our own. On the other hand, Admiral de Melo has done much to enforce a lesson that has long been accepted by naval officers. By his skilful escape from Rio in December, and by his bold forcing of the bar on January 12, on both occasions under a heavy fire, he has shown that ships, if they do not engage forts and batteries ashore, except by stray shots in passing, have the best chance of running through their fire without serious injury. The Government forts of Rio de Janeiro have, in fact, shown themselves quite powerless to interfere with the insurgent admiral's movements. If we do not cite, for the purpose of historical illustration, the disputed circumstances of the passage of the British fleet under the guns of the Sound batteries at Elsinore<sup>55</sup>, there are other instances of ships running safely past forts in Sir John Duckworth's double passage though

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<sup>55</sup> A frota de Nelson força esta passagem a 30 de março de 1801.

the Dardanelles in 1807<sup>56</sup>, in *Farragut's* famous deed at New Orleans<sup>57</sup>, and in a degree also in the forcing of the Menam by the French<sup>58</sup>, as well as in other case, that must be considered along with Admiral de Melo's success in this matter at Rio de Janeiro. All these instances throw light upon that critical question, the forcing of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by Russia. They do not tend to show that such a passage is possible with a convoy of transport, but they illustrate the likelihood of the Russian Black Sea fleet forcing its way some day into the Mediterranean.

### 109. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 31 de janeiro

*Esta carta começa com uma longa introdução histórica desde a presidência de Fonseca até à tomada de posse de Peixoto. Insiste a seguir sobre a importância do veto deste à lei que lhe impedia de continuar no poder, violando dessa forma a Constituição.*

*«Depois de muitas hesitações», Custódio de Melo aceitou tomar a chefia da revolta, escrevem os autores da missiva, segundo os quais se trata de uma revolta popular, paga com o dinheiro da «população civil do Brasil» e cujo objetivo é «derrubar o despotismo militar». Estes «cidadãos brasileiros» concluem a carta, denunciando a censura do governo que provocou o fecho de vários periódicos, incluindo a Étoile do Sud e o Rio News.*

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<sup>56</sup> Tentativa falhada de fevereiro/março de 1807 da *Royal Navy* de impôr as condições ao Império turco durante a guerra entre os dois países (1807-1809)

<sup>57</sup> Batalha da Guerra de Secessão em abril-maio de 1862.

<sup>58</sup> Este episódio ocorre durante o verão de 1893.

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*

Sir, – Passing through England on our way to the seat of war in our country, Brazil, we ask your permission to offer a word to the English people concerning the cause of our trouble.

We should like to say, first, that we have noted the fairness and truthfulness of the report from your Correspondent since the outbreak of the war. We have no contradictions to offer, but simply explanations as to how it is that a civil war, a war undertaken in the cause of civil liberty, should bear in some respects the aspect of a revolt of the navy, and how it comes about that the civil population appears to be inert and mere passive spectators.

The war in Brazil is not a simple revolt of the navy against the constituted authorities. To understand well the facts, we must go back some time. The first President of the United States of Brazil, Marshal Fonseca, instead of promoting a free election of the national representatives by the people, admitted illegal interference in the first elections so that, with his consent, more than half of the members of the Chambers were military men.

The President thought that these men would be docile to his wishes, and as soon as she discovered this mistake, he despotically dissolved the Congress and declared himself dictator.

Of the 20 governors of the provinces 19 recognized this act of the President, and sent him congratulatory telegrams. One only among them, the Governor of Para, protested against this dictatorial act. He thereupon declared

his province to be separated from the Union until the Congress should be restored.

This act of Fonseca was done on the 4<sup>th</sup> of November, 1891, and by the 15<sup>th</sup> the course taken by the governors of the provinces was generally known. The population of the country was much agitated; the people of Rio Grande do Sul, the southernmost province, had taken arms against its governors. Dr. Castilhos, and the revolution began there on the 9<sup>th</sup> of November, 1891. The troops sided with the people and Dr. Castilhos was obliged to resign.

The navy was then ordered to move several ships for the purpose of suppressing the revolution.

Admiral Melo, supported by the great majority of the members of the dissolved Congress, regarded this order as contrary to the oath of allegiance to the Constitution which the navy had taken, and, assuming the lead in the movement, he represented to the President that the ships could not move without the orders of the Congress. The President at once resigned, and Congress reassembled. Thereupon, as provided by the Constitution, Marshal Peixoto, the elected Vice-President, became provisional President. Marshal Fonseca has not held office for two years, and the law provided that the vice-President should not, in that case, complete the four years of Presidential service, but should, within three months, arrange for an election of President.

He did not do this, but, fortified by an Act of the Congress, continued to remain in power – a Vice-President remaining as President.

He came to power sustained by the best hope of Brazilian because the Constitution had been upheld, and every one blessed the action of the navy. The Vice-President, though the action of the troops in the several provinces, violently removed the presidents of 18 of the provinces – the men who had approved the assumption of dictatorship by Fonseca, and, strangely enough, removed, also by military force, the Governor of Rio Grande do Sul, who had been elected by the people, and he replaced Dr. Castilhos, who, equally, with the other 18 governors, had supported this violent act of Fonseca.

All Rio Grande rose to arms, and from July, 1892, that noble province has fought for its own liberty and that of the country. The best blood of Brazil has been shed there in a contest provoked by the unaccountable caprice of the Vice-President.

Admiral Melo, who was in July, 1892, the Minister of Marine, remonstrated more than once with the President, but with no result.

In Brazil the Ministers are mere secretaries to the executive power, and are not responsible for the acts of the Executive.

Unable to serve any longer, under these conditions, Admiral Melo resigned.

Admiral Chaves accepted office, and the war against Rio Grande was pressed forward with vigour.

The cry against the Government of the Vice-President became general and clamorous throughout the country, but Congress made no effective

movement until it proposed a law that no Vice-President in provisional power could be elected President.

This the Vice-President vetoed. The term of existence of the Parliament was to expire by law in a few days, and a vote was passed confirming the provisional Presidency of the Vice-President until March, 1894, when the Presidential term expires.

The elections for a new Parliament should have been held in October, 1893, but there has been no election.

It became apparent that the Vice-President was not only continuing to act as President against the Constitution, but intended to continue to hold that office, although the Chambers which had condoned his usurpation had made it clear that he ought not to do so. These Chambers were, as already stated, made up largely of military men by the votes of the autumn of 1890.

Invitations then came to Admiral Melo from the most influential citizens of the Southern Provinces and of the capital and also of Pernambuco to take the lead in support of the Constitution.

After much hesitation he consented. The support in the capital itself has been moral and financial, but the military force has prevented active cooperation. The Southern Provinces are fulfilling all that they promised in supporting the movement by army also.

If the movement were not popular in the capital its prisons would not be full, as they are, of the best people. The revolution is an effort made by the

people, aided by the navy, to overthrow the military despotism, which is detested. The navy could not by itself and with its own resources have maintained a war for five months, as it has done.

It must be clear that the money – the sinew of war – comes from the pockets of the civil population of Brazil. The victory of the insurgent party means an era of prosperity throughout Brazil. Their defeat means the continuance of war by the Southern Provinces so long as the military dictatorship shall continue.

The Press of the capital has lost power. The papers independent of the Government has all been suppressed. The *Gazeta de Noticias*, the *Jornal do Brazil*, the *Gazeta da Tarde*, the *Correio da Tarde*, the *Cidade do Rio*, have ceased to appear. The editor of the *Jornal do Comercio*, a paper 65 years old, of the importance of *The Times*, England, is in prison.

This gentleman, Dr, Jose Carlos Rodrigues, is well known in England.

The weekly religious paper, the *Apostolo*, was forced to close its doors for having blessed the revolution. As to foreign papers published in the capital, the only two, one French and one English, *Étoile du Sud* and *Rio News*, have also been obliged to close their doors.

We are, Sir, yours faithfully,

BRAZILIAN CITIZENS

## 110. *The Standard*, 31 de janeiro

*O artigo fala do incidente que ocorreu a 29 de janeiro entre os rebeldes e a frota americana e que resultou na inevitável capitulação de Saldanha da Gama perante o Almirante Benham. Por conseguinte, este conseguiu quebrar o bloqueio do porto, pelo menos em favor dos navios comerciantes com a bandeira dos Estados Unidos, e sobretudo, tirou aos insurretos a possibilidade de reduzir a capital à fome, realça o articulista.*

*De qualquer forma, conclui o jornalista, num país tão vasto como o Brasil, uma vitória de Peixoto no Rio não significaria que o Presidente dominaria todas as províncias.*

The situation in Brazil has been suddenly altered by an unlucky collision between the Insurgents under Admiral DA GAMA and the United States Squadron under Admiral BENHAM. A prolonged blockade of the port has been kept up, more or less effectively, by the rebel Navy, and it has, of course, inflicted great loss on the foreign vessels which were waiting for an opportunity to discharge their cargoes. Hitherto all nations had submitted to an inconvenience which they did not see their way to bringing to a termination. This morning it happens that we are printing the reply which Lord ROSEBERY has addressed to a Correspondent who has called his attention to the insufficient protection that was extended to British subjects on merchant vessels at Rio. The Foreign Secretary regrets the deplorable state of affairs in Brazil, but points out that our Government cannot depart from their general policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign State. But he also says that the British Naval Officer is giving the same protection to our fellow-subjects as other foreigners are receiving from the Naval forces of their

respective Governments. That remark is no longer true. Last Saturday, it appears from the telegrams we publish this morning, the captain of three merchantmen, flying the United States flag, appealed to Admiral BENHAM, who at once promised them the escort which they required. Due notice of this – very remarkable – change of attitude was given to the Insurgents, but Admiral DA GAMA, not knowing what to say, made no reply to the intimation. On Monday<sup>59</sup>, however, he informed Admiral BENHAM that any vessels which approached the wharves would be fired upon; and when they appeared in company of the United States cruisers *Detroit*, he acted on his word. There was a brief interchange of shots, which did no actual harm to either party. But the moral effect was such that Admiral DA GAMA at once offered to surrender. The reply of Admiral BENHAM was that he and his officer might take asylum on board the United States men-of-war. It is stated that the Insurgent Commander was anxious to accept these conditions, but has been overborne by the advice of his colleagues. So the position stands. The result is that the blockade of Rio has been broken up so far as United States trading vessels are concerned, nor do we suppose that the example will be lost upon the merchants and Naval officers who represent other nations in the port. The only question that remains outstanding is how far the Washington Government will approve and support the action of its Admiral in the Brazilian waters. It has refused, like the other Powers, to recognise the Insurgents as belligerents, but this abstention from interference between the two factions has been prompted rather by

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<sup>59</sup> Segunda-feira, 29 de janeiro.

International etiquette than by obedience to any positive precept of the Law of Nations. If the United States no longer abide by this punctilio, Great Britain and other States which have a stake in the Brazilian trade will, no doubt, follow suit. If the blockade is thus forcibly raised there is an end of the Insurgents' hope of reducing General PEIXOTO to submission by starving out the Capital. This was their mainstay. But they are reported today to have achieved simultaneously some considerable successes in their operations on land. In a Federation so loosely organized as the United States of Brazil, with so wide a territory and such scanty means of communication, a victory of the Government Party at Rio would not necessarily be followed by ascendancy throughout the country. A lingering rebellion might be maintained for months and years in the more distant Provinces, and suddenly it might gather sufficient force to expel from office the group of politicians who seem for the present likely to retain it.

«The Situation at Rio de Janeiro», *The Manchester Guardian*, 31 de janeiro

*Este comentário é inteiramente copiado do artigo anterior<sup>60</sup> !*

The situation in Brazil has (observes *The Standard*) been suddenly altered by an unlucky collision between the insurgents under Admiral da Gama and the United States squadron under Admiral Benham. The result is that the blockade of Rio has been broken up so far as the United States trading vessels are concerned, nor do we suppose that the example will be lost upon the

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<sup>60</sup> O jornalista do *Manchester Guardian* só pôs algumas palavras com letra pequena : *capital, federation, provinces*.

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### 111. *The Manchester Guardian*, 1 de fevereiro

*Depois de ter tentado saber exatamente o que se passou entre os insurrectos e a esquadra americana, comparando a entrevista dada pelo*

*Almirante Benham com os avisos oficiais recebidos pelo Departamento da Marinha em Washington, o articulista aborda o tema da Doutrina Monroe.*

*Agora que os Estados Unidos saíram da sua neutralidade e forçaram o bloqueio do porto, vão aceitar que as outras potências possam fazer o mesmo ou vão interpretar estas iniciativas como «uma violação dos privilégios reivindicados pela Doutrina Monroe»? interroga-se o editorialista. Na sua opinião, «O departamento da Marinha em Washington não consegue controlar os oficiais navais».*

*De qualquer forma, a iniciativa do Almirante Benham «ou vai provocar uma grande mudança no teatro da guerra ou mesmo acelerar o seu fim».*

Those who buy newspapers in Europe of course understand clearly that no warranty whatever can be given with any news telegraphed from American seats of war. It must be taken "with all its faults and a the purchaser's risk," like horses at an auction. It follows that all comment on such news must be hypothetical. When we try to forecast here the possible results of a bloody revolution in Chile or a terrific battle in Brazil, it must not be hastily concluded that anything of the kind has taken place. MR. KIPLING'S hero says of the Sudanese soldier that "he's generally shamming when he's dead,"<sup>61</sup> and South American Governments, armies, and navies that have been overthrown, cut to pieces, or sunk in one day's telegrams have a way of reappearing almost unscratched in the next morning's paper and carrying on the every-day work of administration and civil war very much as usual. The news which in this particular case we have to read with scepticism comes from Rio de Janeiro.

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<sup>61</sup> Do poema «Fuzzy Wuzzy», no livro *Barrack-Room Ballads* publicado por Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) em 1892

There what may be called the Brazilian Opposition for the time being is blockading the Ministry in the town, to the great inconvenience of many foreign merchant vessels which are waiting to unload in the harbour. The United States Admiral on the station has determined, it is said, that as far as United States traders are concerned the blockade must be raised, and on Monday he convoyed a couple of merchantmen to the wharves. The "incident" now began. First, it is stated, Admiral DA GAMA, commanding the Brazilian insurgents' fleet, fired an innocuous but threatening musket-shot under the bows of one of the non-combatants. In a second telegram the musked-shot becomes a volley. The United States Admiral BENHAM, replied either with one or more shots, according to the source of the telegram. From this point onwards the accounts differ still more widely. Admiral BENHAM, who seems to have been instantly interviewed by a reporter – according to the native American custom at crises of State, – says that all opposition now ceased and no heavy guns were used. But a very different story is told in "official advices received by the Navy Department" at Washington. The insurgents, they say, answered the United States shot last mentioned by firing over one of Admiral BENHAM's ships: Admiral BENHAM re-joined with a shell, which struck but did not hurt the enemy, who then fired a whole broadside in a direction opposite to that in which the United States vessels lay. There was another shot from Admiral BENHAM, and then comes the climax

The insurgents signalled that unless the *Detroit* ceased firing they would sink her. The language used by the United States Admiral in answer to this signal was of such a nature that the incident was at once closed for the day.

Now it is not possible that both of these reports are true. The “official advices received by the Navy Department” must surely have been received from Admiral BENHAM pouring out his story to the reporter flatly contradicts Admiral BENHAM telegraphing to his own Government. Perhaps the account given by the interviewer may be dismissed the first, as it would be unjust, without actual knowledge of persons, to rate any human testimony lower than that of an American interviewer bent on a good “beat” [*sic*] The “official advices”, then, are left, and these can only be judged as yet by the internal evidence of their own probability. We are asked to believe that only after firing shots over and wide of the United States men-of-war Admiral DA GAMA signalled his threat of actual hostile firing. Then we are asked to believe that only after striking one of the insurgent vessels with a shell did Admiral BENHAM “use language of such a nature” that the Brazilians thought better of it. A character of FARQUHAR’S says of another that when threatened “he acted like a man of honour, drew his sword, swore, and put it up again”. But that was in a farce; and though plenty of South American warfare is farcical enough in a tragic way, we can scarcely believe yet that the Brazilian Admiral, after a long interchange of preliminary flourishes, decided that he did not mean business, allowed the incident to “close”, and begged Admiral BENHAM, as the telegram says, to let him surrender and be taken on board the United States flagship. It is credible that the American Admiral has insisted on the admission of his countrymen’s trading vessels to the port. And if this is true it may be a very serious piece of news for the British traders who, next to the American, are the

owners of most of the ships now unable to discharge their cargoes at Rio de Janeiro.

Hitherto all the nations concerned have submitted to the conditions of the blockade. Lord ROSEBERY has just told a Glasgow firm that:

Her Majesty's Government, while they regret the present deplorable state of affairs at Rio, cannot depart from their general policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of a foreign State, or attempt to dictate that the hostile operations of the contending parties shall be restricted to suite the requirements of British interests.

This is sound policy, but the abandonment of the attitude of non-intervention by the United States and the forcible interference of their navy in the interests of American merchants render the hardship still more difficult for others to bear. It is possible that the United States might be willing to countenance other Powers in forcing an entrance to the harbour, as they are themselves reported to have done. But it is not certain. Their favourite "Monroe Doctrine" lays down that any European interference with independent States in the American continent is to be treated as an act unfriendly to the United States. If the American Government, while intervening itself, should insist on treating similar intervention by European Power as a breach of the privileges claimed under the Monroe Doctrine, and if a European Power should insist on claiming equal freedom for its subjects from the hardships of the blockade, then there would be all the materials for a very pretty quarrel indeed. Fortunately any one of several possibilities would avert this danger. If the American Admiral has done what is reported of him, it is quite possible that he

has done without orders from Washington and that the step taken may be reversed. Only the other day President CLEVELAND has to stigmatise as a gross excess of duty the interference of the American navy in the affairs of Hawaii, and a series of similar incidents have made it pretty plain that the Navy Department at Washington is unable to keep its naval officers in hand. At the theatre of a civil war in which American interests are concerned they are as little amenable to discipline as the Irish Constabulary<sup>62</sup> at a popular meeting during the worst period of recent years. Again it is quite possible that a partial raising of the blockade might cause it to be soon raised altogether. Half its efficacy is gone when supplies can enter Rio freely from the most important quarter concerned, and Admiral BENHAM'S reported action might either bring about a great shifting of the scene of war or even greatly hasten its end. But even if the worse comes to the worst there ought to be no departure on our part from the policy of non-intervention, which alone is honourable.

## 112. «Affairs in Brazil», *The Bristol Mercury*, 1 de fevereiro

*O quotidiano constata que a guerra entre a frota revoltosa e as tropas de Peixoto dura há demasiado tempo, sem solução. Os comandantes das frotas estrangeiras no porto carioca bem queriam intervir, mas «infelizmente, o código ético pede uma atitude de estrita neutralidade no que diz respeito aos assuntos internos de um Estado estrangeiro», lamenta o editorialista. Este ironiza sobre a intervenção do chefe da frota americana, «cansado de estar à espera»: «temos de congratular o Almirante Benham por ter*

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<sup>62</sup> A Real Polícia Irlandesa foi criada em 1882 pela Grã-Bretanha.

*estabelecido o princípio de “negócios primeiro, prazer depois”, que tem de ser aplicado à guerra civil. Não parece improvável que os outros comandantes sigam este exemplo, com o resultado que, no futuro, a guerra será feita nos intervalos do comércio, em vez do comércio nos intervalos da guerra».*

Further reports received yesterday show that the Admiral in command of the American squadron in Rio de Janeiro harbour has done an eminently shrewd and sensible thing. Owing to the wretched guerrilla warfare carried on between Marshal Peixoto, the President of Brazil, and a rival, Admiral de Melo, which has lasted in a nearly moribund condition for close upon a year, foreign trade with the wealthy new Republic has been seriously disturbed. If the struggle has been of a purely military character Europe might have been able to look on with serene indifference. But unhappily Admiral de Melo's strength lay in the war vessels which he has seduced for their allegiance, and with these he naturally resolved to blockade Brazil's principal harbour, Rio de Janeiro. As the President's forts are able to some extent to silence or keep at a distance the Admiral's men-of-war, and as Marshal Peixoto has virtually no ships and Admiral de Melo no land soldiers, the present desultory strife, might, apart from external interference, be carried on as interminably as a recurring decimal. The situation reminds one of a state of things sometimes reached in a game of draught when, if it were not for a time rule, the movements might be repeated for an eternity without giving any decisive result. It looked as if perpetual war, if not perpetual motion, has been achieved in the Republic of Brazil. Possibly this prolonged struggle would not have interfered very much

with the idle existence of the people. They would have been provided with excitement and endless possibilities of betting of a result. Foreign nations, however, cannot afford to be so complacent. Many of them have interests at stake in Brazil, and it must often have seemed to the merchant concerned a monstrous thing that their business should be constantly interrupted and the development of the immense resources of Brazil retarded because a naval adventurer and a President unable to suppress him choose to make the harbour of Rio de Janeiro their cockpit. The commanders of the squadron representing the various nations interested must at times have felt strongly tempted to step in and compel the combatants to come to a peaceful agreement. Unfortunately, the code of international ethic prescribes an attitude of strict neutrality in regard to the internal affairs of a foreign State, and all that the commanders of our fleet and of the other squadrons have been able to do is to give protection during lulls in the warfare to merchant vessels wishing of proceed into the harbour. Admiral Benham, commanding the United States squadron, appears to have grown weary of waiting, and he notified Admiral da Gama that he must not fire upon American vessels. The Admiral seems to have been perplexed by this new policy, but he fired a volley at an American tug, which was taking a cable ashore. The *Detroit*, of the American squadron, promptly retaliated, and the insurgents had the imprudence to threaten that they would sink her. The message, however, adds that "the language used by the United States in answer to this signal was of such a nature that the incident was at once closed for the day". Admiral Benham is to be congratulated upon having laid it down that the principle of "business first,

pleasure afterward" must apply to civil war. It is not unlikely that the other commanders will follow suit, with the result that war will in future be carried on in the intervals of trade, instead of trade in the intervals of war.

### 113. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 2 de fevereiro

*O jornal londrino não critica a atuação de Benham, mas não queria que os americanos interviessem na guerra civil para impedir o regresso do antigo regime, invocando a Doutrina Monroe: «Se o Almirante Benham atacar um insurgente brasileiro apenas porque sabe ou tem a suspeita dele ser monárquico, seria tão pirata como da Gama se este tivesse atirado sobre um negociante americano.»*

So long as Admiral Benham was content to protect American vessels from any damage they might suffer an account of Admiral da Gama fatuous blockade, he was well within his right and his duty. But the State Department at Washington has issued a paper which declares that Benham's orders are to protect American commerce, and as the same time to put an end to the machinations of Monarchists against the Government of Brazil. In other words, if da Gama and de Melo propose to restore the Empire, Benham is instructed to resist them. This is the Monroe doctrine again. But the Monroe doctrine is not yet codified with the law of nations. And if Admiral Benham attacks a single Brazilian insurgent merely because he knows or suspects him to be Monarchical, he is as much a pirate as da Gama would have been if he had fired upon an American trader. He has «encountered the steady opposition of all the

other Powers"; and quite rightly, for Brazilian is no more under Mr. Cleveland's suzerainty than the United States are under our own.

#### 114. «The Revolt in Brazil» *The Times*, 3 de fevereiro

*Neste longo telegrama, o correspondente do jornal londrino dá a sua versão do incidente da véspera, com o Almirante americano que, ao responder a Saldanha da Gama, explica a sua intenção de proteger os navios atacados pelos rebeldes. Na opinião do jornalista, a maioria dos ministros estrangeiros no Rio não aprovam a ação da marinha norte-americana.*

RIO DE JANEIRO, Jan. 30 (via Montevideo, Feb. 2)

The trouble between the Americans and the insurgents reached a climax yesterday. Early in the morning the insurgents fired on an American barque as it was nearing the landing-stage. The American warships immediately cleared for action and steamed into position, the *Detroit* lying between the shore and the insurgent cruisers the *Trajano*, the *Guanabara*, and the *Liberdade*.

Then the *Detroit* fired a 6-pounder Hotchkiss over the *Trajano*, and the latter replied with a blank shot. Then the *Detroit* fired a rifle shot, hitting the stern-post of the *Trajano*. The latter again replied with a blank shot. An American officer immediately boarded the *Liberdade*, asking whether the blank shot meant a cessation of hostilities. Admiral da Gama replied that the blank shot was meant as a protest against the action of the Americans.

Later on Admiral da Gama held a meeting of the senior insurgent officers, and discussed the situation. The officers expressed entire confidence in Admiral da Gama, placing themselves unreservedly in his hands. Admiral da Gama then sent a letter to the American admiral, asking whether the action of the American warships meant the interference of the United States in the domestic quarrel of Brazil.

An answer was returned today, stating that there was no intention to interfere, but that the action complained of had been taken solely for the protection of American commerce. Admiral Benham added that he would not protect ships, which came voluntarily into the line of fire, but that he would use force to protect ships against deliberate fire from the insurgents.

In an interview, which I had today with Admiral da Gama, he said that he could continue here as at present for several weeks. He expects reinforcements of troops next week, and probably he will then have sufficient force to enable him to take up his position on shore and await the advance of the southern army. He further stated that his ammunition was short, but sufficient for present needs.

Many volunteers are joining Admiral da Gama from sheer discontent with the method of administration adopted by the Government of Marshal Peixoto.

Advices from Desterro state that men are now ready to proceed to Rio de Janeiro. General Saraiva with the army is preparing to invade the province of

São Paulo. The Government cruisers *Cid*, *Britania*, *Aurora*, and *Parnaíba* and seven torpedo-boats, are now at Bahia, Admiral Gonçalves commanding. A steamer laden with ammunition from the Government, proceeding to Bahia from Rio de Janeiro, was wrecked outside Bahia last week and the cargo was lost. Three of the crew were saved.

Yesterday the Finance Minister called a meeting of the managers of the leading banks and stated that the Government wished to raise the rate of exchange. In the present circumstances he asked whether the banks would assist. No direct answer was given.

Constant artillery fire and occasional skirmishing on the shore front occur almost daily without practical result for either side.

The acting Minister of War tendered his resignation on Saturday in consequence of the general bad treatment of the officers who have been imprisoned as suspected sympathizers with the revolution. His successor is General Costallat<sup>63</sup>, the director of the military schools, a strong supporter of Marshal Peixoto.

A conference of foreign diplomats has discussed the question of the belligerent rights of the insurgents. No actual decision was arrived at, but the feeling was distinctly favourable to recognition, though the United States representative opposed it. A majority of the Ministers telegraphed to their

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<sup>63</sup> Bibiano Sérgio Macedo da Fontoura Costallat (1845-1904) foi ministro da Guerra de janeiro a novembro de 1894.



Fig. 6: «Conflito entre americanos e rebeldes», *The Glasgow Herald*, 31 de janeiro




Fig. 7: «A Ação do almirante americano. Alvejado barco rebelde», *The Standard*, 31 de janeiro

respective Governments, advising the recognition of the Brazilian on both sides as belligerents, and expression opinions distinctly adverse to the action of the American fleet yesterday.

A naval conference today discussed a note from Admiral da Gama saying that the city was now fortified, and that, therefore, it was not necessary to give notice in the event of a bombardment. No decision was arrived at, but the officers consider that the Admiral should give notice. Some of the Ministers of Marshal Peixoto's Cabinet threaten to resign, it is said on account of the inactivity of the Government in the present crisis. Martial law has been prolonged till February 25.

### **115. «The Struggle in Brazil», *The Graphic*, 3 de fevereiro**

*Outro relato do incidente de dia 29, o qual, não significa o fim do combate, segundo o semanário britânico, que apresenta a situação militar como demasiado favorável aos rebeldes. Chega mesmo a falar da «gradual desintegração» das forças governamentais.*

It is very difficult to get as the truth as to the real state of affairs at Rio, and the latest reports from that scene of warfare do not help to make the atmosphere of false rumours any clearer. Only one thing seems fairly certain, and that is that there has been some kind of collision between the Admiral of the United States Squadron and the leader of the insurgent fleet; but whether that collision has led to an interchange of shots or only of angry words, it is

impossible to say. That Admiral da Gama's attempt to convert his partial blockade of Rio into an absolute blockade of the whole port should have invited a strong remonstrance from the American admiral is likely enough. But the story that is current as to the latter's conduct goes a good deal further than this. It is said that Admiral Benham insisted on escorting three American barges to the quays, and that, in doing so, the cruiser *Detroit*, exchanged shots with a rebel warship and poured "a volley of small shell" into the latter's stern-port. According to another telegram there was quite a sharp engagement between the American Squadron and the rebels, which resulted in the surrender of Admiral da Gama to the United States admiral. This report is said to be credited at the Brazilian Legation in London. No doubt the wishes of the Brazilian authorities have considerably quickened their belief, for they are reported to have added that this surrender will virtually break up the insurgent forces and ensure the termination of the revolution within a few days. On the other hand, the United States Government express entire ignorance of any such occurrence, and deny that Admiral Benham has received any instructions to mediate between the belligerent parties. For it was also asserted that this action on the Admiral's part was the sequel to an ineffectual attempt that he had made to persuade Marshal Peixoto and Admiral da Gama into accepting him as a mediator. In the meantime, all the intelligence that is received by way of Buenos Aires points to the growing confidence of the insurgent's cause in the provinces and the gradual crumbling away of the Government forces. It seems hardly likely that while Admiral de Melo appears to be carrying all

before him on land his colleague should tamely surrender his position at sea out of deference to the United States Admiral.

### 116. *The Leeds Mercury*, 3 de fevereiro

*Uma versão ligeiramente diferente da contenda entre da Gama e Benham, apresentada como um contratempo no meio de vitórias por parte dos revoltosos.*

The reports from Brazil have been exceedingly perplexing within the past few days. Early in the week it was stated that after a fierce fight, in which both sides suffered serious losses, the insurgents gained possession of Port Madama, took a number of prisoners, and were besieging Niteroi. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion of the Government troops were also said to have fraternised with the insurgents. On the same day that these rebel successes were announced came a report that Admiral Vasco da Gama [*sic!*] had surrendered to Admiral Benham, who is in command of the United States warships in the bay. The intelligence received next day showed that if the insurgent leader contemplated such a step, he had carried it out. Communications, had, indeed, passed between Admiral Benham and he, but they had reference to firing on American ships as they approached the quays to unload. The United States Admiral warned da Gama that if these ships were fired upon, the fire would be returned. Preparations were made by clearing the United States ships for

action do give effect to the threat, but the insurgents refrained from molesting the vessels.

### 117. *The Newcastle Weekly Courant*, 3 de fevereiro

*O semanário de Newcastle lamenta a ocasião perdida por da Gama para pôr um ponto final nesta «deplorável guerra civil».*

Admiral da Gama, the leader of the Brazilian insurgents, has lost an opportunity of getting out of his trouble that is not likely to occur again. At Rio de Janeiro, the other day, a collision took place between the insurgent warships and those of the United States. Three merchant vessels, flying the stars and stripes, were endangered by chance shots from the insurgent warships, and appealed to the commander of the American warships for the protection of an escort to accompany them to the wharves. As this was about to be done, one of the insurgent ships fired at the barque *Good News*, whereupon the *Detroit* replied with a shot across the bows of the *Guanabara*, and was about to deliver a broadside when the insurgent signalled that he would cease firing. Had Admiral da Gama been allowed to surrender, as appears to have been his disposition, it might have accelerated the end of the deplorable civil war that has so long distracted Brazil.

## 118. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 5 de fevereiro

*Dura crítica do jornal londrino contra a ação do Almirante americano que não se devia meter, nem ter-se metido, nos assuntos internos brasileiros. A Europa tem muitos interesses a defender no Rio de Janeiro, acrescenta o jornalista, que «não será permitido ao Almirante de desempenhar o mesmo papel que Patrick Egan, o amigo dos assassinos, teve com Balmaceda e os revolucionários chilenos.»*

Having taught the Brazilian insurgents how to conduct themselves before the majesty of his flag, Admiral Benham is now putting the newspapers of Rio under censorship and exacting apologies from editors who tamper with his copy. Doubtless there are many contributors to the press who wish that they were Admiral Benham. But really we cannot see why this energetic officer – who from his country’s point of view quite deserves the congratulations he has received – should be allowed to interfere in what, after all, is only a Brazilian affair. It would be no business of America’s – so long as American citizens were left unharmed – if the Brazilian rebels were blown sky-high and if every Brazilian loyalist were bombarded to “the bowels of inevitable smash”. Benham has no right to defend his action on the plea that the European Powers are intriguing for the restoration of the Empire. They are doing no such thing, although the policy would have every excuse if it could be shown that Brazil desires an Emperor as much as she needs one. But so many European interests are involved in Rio that Admiral Benham will never be allowed to play the sort

of game with Patrick Egan<sup>64</sup>, the friend of murderers, played with Balmaceda and the Chilean revolutionists.

### 119. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 6 de fevereiro

*Nesta longa carta, o jornalista debruça-se em primeiro lugar sobre os aspectos militares: os tiros das forças governamentais contra as posições dos rebeldes, uma batalha na Ilha do Engenho, a tentativa do governo de tomar a ilha de Boqueirão.*

*O correspondente do jornal londrino informa que há também civis que estão com os rebeldes, e nomeadamente 300 mulheres e 440 crianças. Acusa a seguir as forças governamentais de terem bombardeado o hospital situado na ilha das Enchadas.*

*Encontra-se mais uma vez com Saldanha da Gama, ao qual sugere que aceite «uma reconciliação entre as duas partes». O reporter, que fez a mesma proposta indireta ao Governo, insiste em particular sobre as consequências catastróficas desta guerra para o Brasil e «na possibilidade de o país se desintegrar em várias pequenas repúblicas». O almirante põe uma condição prévia: a demissão de Peixoto.*

*Todavia, o chefe da rebelião continua confiante na chegada de tropas vindas do sul que possibilitariam um desembarque e a vitória final «poucas horas» depois. Informa também o articulista que recebe «grandes quantidades de dinheiro dos seus simpatizantes em terra» e pode dessa forma pagar os homens e as despesas.*

*O correspondente conta a organização da famosa expedição cujo objetivo era de invadir São Paulo para ocupar o porto de Santos, antes de chegar à capital. Na sua opinião, «quem ganhar a primeira batalha no Estado de São Paulo, vai por fim vencer no Rio de Janeiro.»*

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<sup>64</sup> Patrick Egan (1841-1919) foi ministro americano no Chile de 1889 a 1893. Apoiante de Balmaceda, tentou provocar uma guerra entre Washington e Santiago do Chile.

*Depois de ter mencionado os rumores de uma «revolução nos Estados de Minas Gerais e de São Paulo», o correspondente debruça-se sobre a situação do comércio na capital que está quase parado. Sublinha as dificuldades e os riscos que existem para carregar e descarregar as mercadorias e também a forte inflação dos produtos importados, nomeadamente nas cidades do interior. Realça também o facto que se os rebeldes tivessem o estatuto de beligerantes, o Rio morria de fome em pouco tempo.*

*Termina o artigo falando da febre amarela e da aposentação do Capitão Lang, «uma grande perda da comunidade inglesa» no Rio de Janeiro.*

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, Jan. 10

The present position of the contending parties does not show much alteration in the Bay of Rio de Janeiro since my last letter<sup>65</sup>. The Government continues to carry out the intention of endeavouring to cut off all supplies to the insurgents and to constantly worry the ships with artillery fire from the many heavy guns mounted on various commanding points during the past month. It is difficult to see what other plan of action Marshal Floriano Peixoto could adopt under the existing circumstances; the balance of force is certainly largely in favour of troops on land, but they are of necessity greatly scattered on account of the long shore line to be defended and the need for a strong garrison to be maintained in Niteroi. It is constantly asked why the Government makes no attempt to storm the insurgent strongholds on Villegagnon and Cobras Island; the reason probably is that Marshal Peixoto

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<sup>65</sup> Cf. Texto 102.

fears that the troops might suffer a reverse if the attempt were made, and understands well that the moral effect of such a reverse would militate greatly against his chances of success in the future. Both forts are strongly defended, and, moreover, the troops would have to approach in boats of launches, exposed to heavy fire from artillery, machine guns, and rifles. I have frequently asked Admiral Saldanha da Gama if he considers his garrison on Cobras and Villegagnon strong enough to successfully repel an attack in force. His answer invariably is that if the Government attack him at either of these points he can not only hold his own, but will inflict heavy loss on his enemies.

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> instant a sharp fight took place on the island of Engenho. The Government occupied the place for the purpose of cutting off the access of the insurgents to the island of Paqueta and has mounted a 70-pounder Whitworth gun and a Krupp 3 1/2 -inch field piece to command the passage and prevent steam launches carrying provisions from Paqueta to the insurgents. The garrison of the island consisted of seven officers, 120 men, and some 25 civilians in the employ of the Government. About 10 a.m. the *Trajano*, *Jupiter*, and two of the armed launches began shelling the island. This continued until 7 p.m., and the fire was returned from the Whitworth and Krupp guns. At 7 o'clock 200 men were landed from the insurgent ships for the purpose of storming the place. The troops opened a heavy rifle fire on the landing parties, and for a moment the advance was checked, but only for an instant. Then some of the officers ran forward, and the men at once followed them up the hill to the guns. In ten minutes both guns were captured and some of the soldiers made

prisoners, the remainder rushing away into the woods. The insurgents then sent two launches round to the back of the island to prevent any escape to the mainland, and despatched search parties to seize everybody they could find. In all five officers and 63 men were captured, 13 dead bodies were counted and five wounded soldiers were found, these latter being at once removed to the hospital on Enchada Island. Twenty-five civilians in the employ of the Government were removed to the ships and a considerably quantity of ammunition and other stores were seized. The insurgent loss was two men killed and five wounded, a loss quite out of proportion to that suffered by the Government, and this is the more remarkable from the fact the soldiers were behind trenches and well under cover. The prisoners are well treated and the men are now working in the different ships with the insurgents. Admiral da Gama returned the officers their swords and placed them on one of the transports, giving them permission to write to their friend on shore to say that they were well and properly cared for. The colonel commanding the garrison on Engenho and his aide-de-camp both escaped by means of a small boat which they jumped into as soon as the sailors began landing. The following day the Government sent up a body of troops to the mainland and the rear of the island and opened a heavy fire; the *Jupiter* and some launches went close in and replied vigorously to this, and the troops were finally withdrawn without making any further attempt to land on Engenho. A few days previous to this affair the Government attempted to occupy the island of Boqueirão, where a large deposit of ammunition is placed. The insurgents repelled the attack and inflict sever loss on the Government troops. Next day Admiral da Gama

removed all the serviceable ammunition on board the various ships, and causes what was left in the deposit to be blown up, much of this being rifle ammunition only suited to the weapon the troops are armed with, and useless for the riles served out to the navy. The insurgents still remain in possession of Boqueirão and have a garrison of 60 men on the island. These two little successes have done much to raise the spirits of the officers and men in the insurgent ranks, and they appear quite determined to make every effort to retain possession of the harbour.

During the first week of the New Year the forts at the mouth of the harbour were quite and hardly fired a shot; lately, however, they have again begun pounding away at Villegagnon and Cobra Island; the forts on the Niteroi side have also been firing heavily on to Cobras during the past few days. In the opinion of many officers here it is an extraordinary thing that the heavy guns have not given out, as they have fired the times as many rounds per gun as is generally conceded to be the life of heavy artillery. Most of the batteries have been continuously firing at long ranges and with extreme elevation, and yet they are now making some very fair shooting after four months of constant work. Some of the best work in the harbour of late has been done by the 6in. Armstrong guns on the cruiser *Tamandaré*, using a charge of 17lb. of cordite. Unfortunately, several accidents have occurred on board, due almost entirely to carelessness; the ship is undermanned, and to avoid delay it has been the custom to bring on deck a supply of the explosive sufficient of the afternoon's work. On three occasions shells from the shore batteries have burst close to the

supply of cartridges and exploded them, burning and wounding two officers, who have since died, and some 12 or 14 men.

Yesterday I went on board the *Tamadaré* and I had a long interview with Admiral da Gama. He states he is able to hold out in the harbour without assistance for another month, but could not do so a day longer unless reinforced by more ships of men sufficient to enable him to effect a landing. One great drag upon him is the large number of non-combatants he is called upon to find food for. Of these, 300 are women, 440 children, and some 230 sick and wounded men; in addition, there are various civilians who have sought refuge on board his ships. The women and children are distributed over three transports set apart for their use. The sick and wounded are all on Enchadas Island, which is entirely given up to hospital work. The Brazilian naval medical staff are doing their duty at Enchadas in a most praiseworthy manner, and the sick and wounded receive every attention and care they can possibly have need of. I may mention that Surgeon Senior, from H.M.S. *Sirius*, has charge of the nursing of the patients and has done most excellent work, obtaining wonderful results. He has introduced into the hospital *regime* a system of order and attention to detail hitherto unknown in this part of the world. In addition to many other duties Dr. Senior takes charge of the whole of the night work in the hospital, and so gives the regular staff a respite and time for the night's rest they certainly deserve. Medical officers from the various foreign men-of-war frequently visit the hospital, but they have never put their hearts into it as Dr. Senior has done. That his work is thoroughly appreciated both afloat and

ashore I have good cause to know, and I can only say that amongst Brazilians his name will be hereafter respected and honoured by both sides in this quarrel as that of a man who is willing to devote his best energies and his professional skill to alleviate pain and suffering. I regret to say that the batteries on the Niteroi side have deliberately fired at the hospital. I cannot believe that this has been done with the knowledge and consent of the Government of Marshal Floriano Peixoto, the more especially as I had thoroughly explained only a few days before to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the island of Enchadas was simply and solely a hospital at the present time and was not in any way used for warlike purposes. Last week, when I was at the hospital, a shell from the direction of Ponto Caju fell into the kitchen and exploded; this I imagined might have been fired by error and I said nothing about it. On Saturday last eight shells running were fired from Niteroi at the hospital; the first three passed over the buildings, the last five struck and exploded in the wards. The effect of the explosion was that two badly wounded men died from shock to the system, and the patients in the two worst case wards rushed out to the open square, deranging all bandages and losing the benefit of the careful treatment they were undergoing. Such barbarity speaks for itself, and, as yet, the Government has not stated that the act was not approved of. Admiral da Gama pointed out to me that it was impossible for wind or bad shooting to have carried shells intended for Cobras into Enchadas, as the latter is fully one-third of a mile distant at right angles to the former. My last return from the hospital for yesterday morning was 209 cases – this is not including convalescents on board the hospital-Ship *Marte*.

Whilst in conversation with Admiral da Gama, I touched on the question of the possibility of bringing about a reconciliation between the two parties. He at once stated that such an arrangement would only be possible with the condition that Marshal Floriano Peixoto resigned office, that the Government was handed over to Dr. Prudente Moraes, the President of the Senate, and that a free election was allowed and a vote taken from the people of Brazil as to what form of government they desired. He added that if Dr. Prudente Moraes declined the responsibility of taking charge of the government he would be satisfied if two men from each side in the quarrel were appointed and allowed to carry on the government until an election was held. I impressed strongly upon him the fact that a continuation of the present civil war meant financial ruin to Brazil and possibly the disintegration of the country into a number of small Republics, and I begged of him for the sake of his country to carefully consider any proposals made to him for the purpose of bringing about peace. He promised me he would do so, but maintained that any settlement must entail the resignation of Peixoto. I have, indirectly, approached the Government on the same subject. Possible some good may be the outcome, but I confess that I am not very sanguine of the result. Admiral Saldanha da Gama appears very hopeful, and says he is in confident that the ultimate result will be the victory of the insurgents, unless some such arrangement as the one I have already mentioned is arrived at. He seems assured that the arrival of strong reinforcements from the South is only a question of time, and that with the arrival of troops the revolution will be brought to an end within a few hours after a landing is effected. I only repeat this as the view put forward by the

Admiral, not as my own opinion, for I must first see the troops from the South arrive before prophesying as to the final outcome of the war. I found the *Tamandaré*, now the Admiral's flagship, a good deal knocked about from shells that have struck in the past two or three days, but her guns are in good order, and her armament altogether struck me as being immensely superior to any artillery on shore in possession of the Government. Before leaving Admiral Saldanha I ascertained from him that he was receiving ample supplies of money from his sympathizers on shore, and that last week a sum equal to £12,000 was sent to him to pay his men and meet all current expenses. He informed me, moreover, that he has received notifications that other large sums of money were at his disposal if required.

Two days ago I received reliable information from Santa Catarina as regards the progress of events there. It appears that some dispute arose with regard to political matters, and a period of deadlock lasting for about three weeks ensued, consequent upon a divergence of opinions between Admiral de Melo and his particular friends and Generals Gumerindo Saravia and Salgado. In place, then, of bringing reinforcements to Rio de Janeiro, as he had promised Admiral da Gama to do, Admiral de Melo did absolutely nothing. At last the officers of the squadron, who has received information of the true state of affairs, requested Admiral de Melo to meet them on board the *Aquidaban*, then lying about 15 miles from Desterro. At that conference the senior officers informed the Admiral that they would not allow their cause to be lost through any petty political quarrels or jealousies, and that some active measures must

be taken at once. The result of this meeting was that one or two noisy politicians were informed that their departure from Santa Catarina would be agreeable to the Provisional Government, and forthwith they were sent to Montevideo. Immediately this was done General Saraiva returned to his army and proceeded to take up a position near the seacoast and close to the northern frontier of the State of Paraná, Admiral de Melo proceeding to Paranaguá in the cruiser *Republica*. My correspondent goes on to say that from Paranaguá de Melo will proceed to Santos, General Saraiva invading the State of São Paulo at the same time. The *Aquidaban* at the time of writing was under orders to proceed to Rio de Janeiro to render assistance to Admiral da Gama, and to explain to him all details as to the plans decided upon by General Saraiva and Admiral de Melo. Two transports, the *Meterora* and *Uranus* have accompanied the cruiser *Republica* to Paranaguá, and one can only presume that they are there for the purpose of embarking troops for landing at Santos, if the occupation of that port be determined upon. If this Southern army is really on the march northwards, and my information tends to show that it is so, we can reasonably hope for some decisive action before very long. It is almost certain that whichever side wins the first battle in the State of São Paulo will win the day eventually in Rio de Janeiro. At present the Government are entirely dependent on Santos for any further entrance of supplies of war material, and if that port is lost the Government will be in a bad way.

I am told by Admiral da Gama that he is informed of an impending outbreak in favour of the revolution in the States of Minas Gerais and São

Paulo. After careful inquiries on shore, I can only say that I can obtain no confirmation of this information, although there is, undoubtedly, a very strong current of feeling in favour of the insurgents in both places. I am inclined to think that any local outbreak would be easily crushed by the Government, and that the only real force the insurgents in Rio de Janeiro can rely upon to aid them is the army under the command of General Gumerindo Saraiva, and some weeks must necessarily elapse before those troops can possibly arrive within striking distance. They are all irregular mounted cavalry, and it is doubtful if they would agree to travel here by sea, even if the opportunity to do so was afforded them. It is persistently rumoured here, and I have met several Government officials who appear to believe the rumour, that General Pego and the 800 men under his command in the south of the State of São Paulo have gone over to the insurgents. I asked Admiral da Gama if he had heard this, and his answer was that he had only heard it as a rumour and nothing more. He stated, however, that General Pego was a personal friend of his and would have found means to communicate with him if he had thrown in his lot with the revolution.

The commercial community of Rio de Janeiro is suffering acutely at the present conjuncture. Exporting firms are practically doing nothing; importers have, in most cases, actually ceased to do business at all. To load or discharge ships is a matter of extreme difficulty and also of great danger on account of the constant firing from launches along the shore front and the return of his fire by the Government troops. The shore authorities put every obstacle in the way of

ship owners and even decline to allow, in many cases, the usual complement of men to go on board a ship to discharge the cargo, asserting that the men from the various gangs employed by the stevedores are constantly deserting when they once get afloat, and that they join the insurgents. It is the opinion of every shipping agent of any note in this city that the duty of the Government is to declare Rio de Janeiro a closed port until such time as the authorities are in a position to police the waters of the harbour and give protection to foreign ships. From inland towns in Brazil dependent on supplies from Rio de Janeiro complaints come daily of scarcity and abnormal prices for all imported articles. I do not think that there is as yet any real want, but the time is not far distant when such a condition will prevail if matters continue as they are at present. So little is produced in the country and Brazil generally is so entirely dependent on the outside world for the necessaries of life that direct interference with the usual course of trade, as is now the case, must cause many hardships in the country districts. Indeed, I have frequently heard it said of late that if the insurgents were given the *status* of belligerents and allowed to blockade the port the city would be starved into submission in less than a fortnight for the reason that no food would be forthcoming to feed the army.

Yellow fever increases steadily. Seven to eight deaths are officially reported daily and, in addition, there are several merchant vessels in the harbour with men down from this cause. The intensely hot, dry weather now prevailing is said to be the sure precursor of a severe epidemic, which this year promises to be more fatal than is customary, owing to the neglect of the usual

sanitary precautions as regards cleanliness and the incapacity of the authorities to enforce them in the disturbed state of affairs now existing.

Captain Land, in command of H.M.S. *Sirius* and senior naval officer of this station, was invalided yesterday. It is a great loss to the English community, more especially at the present time, as he has kept himself conversant with every detail of the war and done all in his power to protect British interests where protection was needed.

## 120. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Standard*, 6 de fevereiro

*Nesta carta enviada a 1 de janeiro do Rio, o correspondente nota que este conflito arrasta-se. Na sua opinião, há três saídas possíveis: ou vai faltar o dinheiro; ou vence Custódio de Melo – que, entretanto «não está a fazer nada em Santa Catarina»– com o seu plano de trazer tropas do Sul para atacar as tropas governativas em terra ou Peixoto, que espera pela chegada da sua nova frota, consegue derrotar os rebeldes.*

*Todavia, dos dois lados, mantem-se uma política de expectativa. Se nada mudar, nota o autor do artigo, isso pode continuar durante «quatro anos». Na última parte do texto, descreve o ataque de dia 31 de dezembro contra o navio-hospital dos rebeldes, «que tem a bandeira da Cruz Vermelha de Genebra» e também contra um navio onde estão «as mulheres e as crianças dos homens de serviço dos navios».*

A Correspondent, writing from Rio de Janeiro, on January 1, says: – “The revolt is dragging slowly along. As the weather is getting intensely hot, and the bad season is coming upon us, the continuance of this interminable quarrel will be very trying to all concerned. There appear to be three conditions under

which matters may be brought to a crisis. First, a failure of the sinews of war, which must bring a collapse to either party. Second, the successful issue of a plan of campaign which, it is whispered, de Melo has in contemplation, and which is as follows: Two thousand troops to be transported from Rio Grande and landed outside the harbour on Rio side, the ships being made their base. Rio then to be attacked, the ships inside engaging the forts at the bar with the view of preventing any troops being withdrawn from them to the aid of the city. The troops in Rio proper are not numerous, and it would take along time to transfer reinforcements from Niteroi, as this could only be done by land. In the event of de Melo attempting to carry into effect the programme in question, it is supposed that he would land his men at a point about eight miles from the city and four from the suburbs. With careful mœuvring, there is no reason why he should not be successful, as, in consequence of the distribution of the Government forces round the Bay, in the forts, &c., he would have, comparatively speaking, an insignificant number of the Government troops to meet. It must be remembered also that Saldanha da Gama is in the harbour with 1200 men, and would render effective assistance. Whether de Melo, however, intends acting up to the rumours that I have mentioned or not it is impossible to say. At present he is at Santa Catarina doing absolutely nothing, and the 4000 troops that he has with him are presumably doing ditto. The third condition under which this land and sea duel may be brought to a speedy termination is the probability of Peixoto's success as soon as he has the handling of a navy of his own. Government ships of war are beginning to arrive. Already the *Aurora* from England, and the *Cid*, from America, have reached

Pernambuco, and another ship is on her way. The *Aurora* is a torpedo gunboat, and the *Cid*, I believe, a dynamite ship. The *Aurora* has been at Pernambuco for five weeks, but so far no use has been made of her. It would seem that if she and the *Cid* came down any night and communicated with Santa Cruz, the Government fort, they could easily ascertain the exact positions of the *Tamandaré* and the *Trajano*, and blow them out of the water without a gun being fired. However, they seem to prefer remaining in a secure harbour to trusting themselves on the vasty deep now they have arrived. Whatever, therefore, may happen, it seems that both sides are playing a waiting game. The first wait has lasts four months now, and with a continuance of the present policy of a caution there is no reasons (except money difficulties) why it may not last four years. Yesterday, at about two p.m., our attention was suddenly drawn to a shot falling into the water quite close to us. We were unable to discover at first whence it came, but were not long in finding out. Another hurled along, and then we saw that San Juan, a Government fort, was deliberately firing at the Insurgent hospital ship, which was flying the Red Cross of Geneva, and also at another ship which had on board the wives and children of men on service in the Insurgent Fleet. I have never witnessed such a disgraceful spectacle, to say nothing of the fact that these ships were anchored among the foreign shipping collected inside of official bearings, and boats with passengers were plying to and fro, a casualty to those not concerned in this miserable squabble might easily have happened. The two Insurgent ships lost no time in taking refuge astern of us, and a German steamer, which was very nearly hit, shifted her berth. The fort then ceased firing. About

thirteen shots altogether were fired. The English Squadron in the harbour has been reduced, and the Italians have recalled three of their ships.”

## 121. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 7 de fevereiro

*Esta carta de um «anglo-brasileiro» refuta, ponto por ponto, os argumentos expostos por «Cidadãos brasileiros» numa missiva publicada a 31 de janeiro<sup>66</sup> e na qual responsabilizam Peixoto pela atual guerra civil.*

1) *Peixoto tomou o lugar de Fonseca quando este apresentou a demissão e foi depois confirmado por um voto do Congresso.*

2) *Mesmo aceitando a ideia que o Marechal tenha agido arbitrariamente (o que nega o autor da carta), «de Melo não tem nenhum direito de o acusar», ainda mais que colaborou com ele como ministro da Marinha. Na realidade, sublinha a missiva, o chefe da revolta quer promover as suas ambições pessoais.*

3) *Admitindo que estas queixas correspondem à realidade, «quem deu à marinha o mandato de as corrigir?»*

4) *Acusam o Vice-Presidente de não ter organizado as eleições, mas se o tivesse durante o estado de sítio, os seus adversários teriam dito que teria sido «uma farsa». Além disso, conhecendo a data, porque o Almirante de Melo não esperou para conhecer «a expressão da vontade nacional antes de precipitar o seu país no vórtice de uma sanguinária e desastrosa guerra?».*

5) *Peixoto vetou o famoso voto do Congresso que queria impedir um Vice-Presidente que exercesse o cargo de chefe de Estado de ser reeleito, porque esta situação já está estipulada na Constituição. «Vetou [esta proposta] porque era supérflua». «Se ele tivesse tentado manter-se no poder além dos limites fixados pela Constituição<sup>67</sup>, a revolução teria sido eventualmente justificada». Mas não foi o caso, porque, na opinião do autor da carta, Peixoto agiu sempre respeitando a Lei fundamental da nação.*

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<sup>66</sup> Cf. Texto 109.

<sup>67</sup> 15 de novembro de 1894.

6) «A revolta no Rio Grande do Sul não tem nada a ver com» a revolta da marinha. A intervenção das tropas federais «foi invocada pelo Governador legalmente eleito do Rio Grande.»

O anglo-brasileiro não utiliza meios termos quando define esta insurreição: «A revolta naval no Brasil é uma intolerável usurpação de poder, desprovida de justificação nacional, e que só pode ser caracterizada como um ato de pirataria que, infelizmente, não só acarretou graves prejuízos para o Brasil, mas que também implicou perdas incalculáveis para o comércio estrangeiro, em particular para o britânico.»

#### TO THE EDITOR OF *THE TIMES*

Sir, — The statements and views put forward in the letter appearing in your issue of January 31 and purporting to emanate from "Brazilian Citizens," are so incompatible with an impartial and accurate recital of facts that I trust you will grant me the privilege of making some reply to them in your influential columns.

The war in Brazil, your readers are asked to believe, "is not simple revolt of the navy against the constituted authorities." Now, this is precisely what it is, and I venture to think that the antecedent particulars given by your correspondents are in no way calculated to disprove the fact. It is not a question of what Fonseca, or those who were associated with him, did or have done, but as to whether the policy and proceeding of Marshal Peixoto warranted recourse to civil war as the only means of cure or redress. It is indeed practically admitted that the latter, in conformity with constitutional law, took the place vacated in consequence of the resignation of Marshal Fonseca as President of the Republic; and as for the allegation that a

Vice-President, acceding to power under these circumstances, was bound by the Constitution, and altogether irrespective of the will of the representatives of the nation, to arrange for the election of a new President within a period of three months. I take leave to call it into serious question. It is clear that this was not the opinion of Congress itself, for your correspondents themselves put it on record that Marshal Peixoto, in remaining at the head of the Executive Government, was “fortified by an Act of Congress.” In most civilized countries enjoying representative institutions an Act of Congress counts for something. It should at least carry with it as much emphasis and authority, let me say, as an unproved assertion of anonymous writers, obviously actuated by motives of partisanship in their contribution to this controversy.

As regards the arbitrary conduct attributed to Marshal Peixoto, people of common sense will, I presume, be hardly likely to accept the account given by the “Brazilian Citizens” without the usual grain of salt. It is not to be expected that his enemies will speak well of him. In any case, however, Admiral de Melo has no right to accuse him, much less to originate a naval revolt. It is notorious that, until he resigned his post as Minister of Marine – it was long after the three months within which Marshal Peixoto, as we are now told, should have arranged for the election of a new President – Admiral de Melo was a most active and influential co-operator with him in that policy which now conveniently denounced in such sever terms. For the change of Governors, deportation of army and navy officers, and all the rest of it, Admiral de Melo was, perhaps more than any other, responsible. This pretext for treason and

rebellion is altogether too flimsy to deceive persons who have had an opportunity of making themselves acquainted with what has occurred in Brazil. So far as Admiral de Melo is concerned the course eventually adopted by him, can, I contend, be more reasonably ascribed to his desire to promote objects of personal ambition.

Nevertheless, assuming the grievances, as described, to have existed in reality, I would ask, Who has given the navy a mandate to redress them? It is not monstrous that public property should be seized upon and used by citizens possessing no mandate from the people, and in defiance of the representatives of the nation, at the time in Session at Rio de Janeiro? What would be said if such a thing were attempted in our own country? The naval revolt in Brazil is an intolerable usurpation of power, devoid of rational justification, and can only be characterized as an act of piracy, which unfortunately has not inflicted grave injury upon the Brazilian alone, but has also entailed incalculable loss upon foreign, and particularly upon British commerce.

When the grounds put forward in explanation of this great crime are more closely examined the reasons adduced would appear to be for the most part hypothetical. The revolt would seem to have been set going because Marshal Peixoto was understood to harbour certain intentions inimical to the liberty and Constitution of the Republic. Rightly or wrongly, wisely or unwisely, I claim for Marshal Peixoto that hitherto he has carried on his Government within the limits and powers with which the Constitution invests him as head of the Executive, being throughout supported by a majority in

Congress. It goes without saying, of course, that his majority has been vehemently and virulently assailed. It has been accused of venality, docility, cowardice, and want of patriotism; but charges of this description are easily made, and are as a rule simply worthless. The same accusations might be launched against any parliamentary majority. What is wanted is proof, and this is not produced by "Brazilian Citizens".

These gentlemen observe:— "The elections for a new Parliament should have been held in October, 1893, but there has been no election." I compare this to the act of knocking a man down and kicking him for falling. The outbreak of the revolt on September 6 last year produced a condition of affairs which rendered it practically impossible, or at last very inadvisable, to have a general election. Such an election, held under martial law, could have commanded no confidence, and would have had its authority disputed. It would, especially by Marshal Peixoto's opponents, have been treated as a farce. The Vice-President has, therefore, most judiciously postponed the elections until after the restoration of peace. But is it not surprising that Admiral de Melo, with the date of the general election so close at hand, could not have waited for an expression of the national will before precipitating his country into the vortex of a sanguinary and disastrous war?

Now with reference to the law passed by congress, declaring that no Vice-President in provisional power could be elected President, which was vetoed by Marshal Peixoto. By the Brazilian Constitution the new President has to be elected on the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, 1894, but he only takes possession on the

following 15<sup>th</sup> of November. By the same Constitution Marshal Peixoto cannot be re-elected, and thus it was useless to pass an Act of Congress to create a disability already provided for in the fundamental law of the nation. He vetoed it because it was superfluous. Has he sought to retain power beyond the limit fixed by the Constitution, then revolution might have been possibly justified, and the whole country would have been against him.

The insurrection in Rio Grande do Sul has nothing to do with the question. In the time of the Empire a similar struggle lasted for a period of seven years, and was only terminated by means of negotiation. That State is controlled by two parties of about equal strength, who fight *à tour de rôle* for power. According to the Constitution the Federal intervention was invoked by the legally elected Governor of Rio Grande.

To conclude, I may represent that this revolt has been condemned by nearly every person of real influence and importance in Brazil, amongst them Dr. Pena, the able Governor of the State of Minas Gerais, and Dr. Martins, chief of the Republican in Pernambuco (in spite of his political opposition to Marshal Peixoto).

Apologizing for the length of this letter, and in the hope that you may be able to afford it space in your columns, I remain, &c.,

AN ANGLO-BRAZILIAN

**122.** «Brazil. British Ships at Rio», *Huddersfield Daily Chronicle*,  
7 fevereiro

A deputation will be received at the Foreign Office on Thursday next from the Clyde Ship-owner's Association, which will present information forwarded from Rio de Janeiro by the captains of British vessels there, complaining of the interference shown to British shipping interests. More than 80 British ships are at Rio unable to receive cargo, while vessels of other nationality are being cleared.

**123.** «The Brazilian Insurrection», *The Graphic*, 10 de fevereiro

*O semanário prevê que «se está a chegar ao fim» da luta», com os rebeldes que parecem ter alguma vantagem.*

After lingering on for so many months, it looks very much as if the struggle in Brazil were coming to a head. Admiral da Gama intends to formally blockade and bombard Rio, complaining that whilst the insurgents had been prevented by the Powers from firing on the city President Peixoto had taken advantage of the situation to construct strong fortifications. Inland the Government forces have been badly beaten at Curitiba, the capital of Parana, and as the insurgents have captured a Government transport with an admiral on board the moment seems auspicious for a decisive blow. It is suspected, too, that the new Government vessels on which such hopes are set have had their

machinery disabled by traitors. Foreign merchant vessels are in a much improved position in the Bay of Rio, thanks to the plucky conduct of United States commander, Admiral Benham. The commanders of the other foreign squadrons are quite ready to follow his lead.

#### **124. *The Hampshire Advertiser*, 10 de fevereiro**

*Dura crítica a Lord Rosebery, o Secretário de Estado para os Assuntos Exteriores, pela falta de apoio aos navios mercantes ingleses no porto do Rio.*

Why did not Lord Rosebery see the shipping folk who called at the Foreign Office on Thursday?<sup>68</sup> They wanted to protest against the inattention of the Foreign Secretary to the claims of ship-owners who trade with Brazil. At Rio de Janeiro, the American have asserted their rights; we have tamely submitted to this lawless war. Lord Rosebery can hardly be proud of his position. He wants to shroud his diplomacy in secrecy; but the merchants who trade with Brazil want some further assistance, and will hardly put up with his refusal.

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<sup>68</sup> Quinta-feira, dia 8 de fevereiro.

**125.** «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 12 de fevereiroRIO DE JANEIRO, FEB. 7 (*via* Montevideo, Feb. 11)

The movement in aid of the insurgents, which has been attempted on sore during the past few days, has collapsed. Marshal Peixoto received timely information and caused the leaders to be arrested. They included two generals and 20 officers of lower rank.

The news which comes from the South is untrustworthy. It is, however, rumoured that the advance of the insurgents past the frontier of the State of São Paulo is continuing steadily. The position of Admiral da Gama is stronger, for he is receiving many recruits and quantities of supplies from the districts near the head of the bay. On Monday<sup>69</sup> 70 men joined the insurgent ranks.

The Government are moving troops from Niteroi to Rio de Janeiro. They are also reinforcing the garrison of São Paulo, but are taking no other active measures. Their new fleet is still at Bahia.

Admiral da Gama is not interfering with the foreign shipping. There is a small movement of commerce in the harbour. General Niemeyer, Commandant-in-Chief of the troops at Niteroi, resigned on Monday.

The Government have ordered that the elections for President, Vice-President, Senators, and Deputies shall be held on Marche 1. Marshal Peixoto announces that he will not be a candidate. The Opposition say that the

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<sup>69</sup> Segunda-feira, dia 5 de fevereiro.

Constitution prohibits an election when martial law is prevailing in any part of Brazil. – *Our Special Correspondent*.

## 126. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Times*, 13 de fevereiro

*Esta longa carta resume os acontecimentos ocorridos no Sul e no porto carioca, onde regressou o Aquidabã, reforçando provisoriamente os rebeldes. O jornalista, que critica a moleza de Custódio de Melo, lamenta as querelas intestinas e as intrigas políticas em Desterro. Descreve a seguir o ataque a Paranaguá e a preparação da expedição em direção a São Paulo e ao porto de Santos, um dos principais objetivos dos revoltosos. Reconhece, no entanto, que esta marcha será extremamente difícil: «vamos ver se o General Saraiva a pode realizar».*

*Na baía da capital, narra a tomada da ilha de Mocambé por parte dos marinheiros de Saldanha da Gama que, controlam também Conceição, Velha Viana e a ilha do Engenho. Fica surpreendido pela inação do Governo cuja nova frota ainda não chegou ao destino. Parece que «Floriano Peixoto considera que a melhor maneira de esmagar o Almirante da Gama é de o atormentar com a artilharia e de fazer o possível para cortar os fornecimentos de todo os tipos».*

*Este estado de coisas provoca um certo descontentamento entre as tropas governamentais que continuam à espera de um grande ataque contra os revoltosos, sublinha o correspondente do jornal londrino, que, por outro lado, põe em evidência o moral em alta entre os rebeldes depois da tomada de duas ilhas, a do Engenho e a de Mocangué.*

*O parágrafo mais interessante deste longo texto é onde se relata a discussão acesa e sem concessões entre o comandante da insurreição e o chefe da esquadra americana, que ocorreu a 23 de janeiro, a bordo do navio a vapor New York. Benham, sem meios termos, diz a da Gama que os rebeldes «não têm absolutamente nenhuma razão para fazerem a guerra contra o Governo do Marechal Floriano Peixoto». Perante a resposta do almirante brasileiro, o comandante da frota americana insiste sobre o facto «dos*

*insurrectos não terem nenhum apoio em nenhuma parte do Brasil e que o Governo do Rio, a curto prazo, vai conseguir dominar completamente qualquer resistência. Seria melhor para o Almirante da Gama concordar com as condições que lhes forem oferecidas».*

*Este defende o seu ponto de vista afirmando que controlam três Estados, que esperam resistir no Rio antes da chegada de reforços, e que exigem a saída de Peixoto. Então, Benham «perde a calma». Afirma que «vai assegurar uma total proteção ao comércio, até para o desembarque do material de guerra destinado às tropas governamentais; além disso, vai usar a força se for preciso». O comandante da insurreição diz ao correspondente do jornal londrino que esta última afirmação de Benham significa, de facto, que há uma ameaça de uma intervenção armada por parte dos Estados Unidos». O jornalista não se pronuncia sobre esta potencial ameaça, mas constata que o Almirante americano tem a força militar mais do que suficiente para exercer uma forte pressão sobre os insurrectos.*

*No fim do artigo, o correspondente, que, cada vez que pode, nunca perde uma oportunidade de dar uma imagem positiva dos revoltosos e do seu chefe, fala de um ato de clemência de Saldanha da Gama perante um prisioneiro, ao pedido do próprio jornalista, e a conquista da ilha de Bom Jesus.*

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT)

RIO DE JANEIRO, JAN. 24.

Since my last letter I have gained an experience of the treacherous nature of the weather in the Bay of Rio, which was within an ace of severing my connexion with *The Times*. I had been on board the mail steamer to post my correspondence and bid goodbye to Captain Lang, the senior naval officer, when a breeze sprang up off the land. I returned to her Majesty's ship *Racer* and in company with the first lieutenant of that ship proceeded to the hospital

on Enchadas Island; suddenly, when we were about 400 yards from the *Racer*, a heavy squall struck us and capsized the boat. There was a strong choppy sea running at the time, and the position was far from pleasant. My own difficulties were added to by the fact that a pointer who was in the boat jumped on my shoulder and put me under water. Not satisfied with being thrown off once, the dog jumped on to my shoulder again just as I felt nearly done for. Happily, a boat from the *Racer* was very soon on the scene and picked us all up, my last recollection being that of a friendly hand getting hold of me, and then an hour afterwards I woke up to find myself lying in the cabin of Captain Rolleston, of the *Racer*, to whose kindness and to the able treatment of the ship's doctor, Surgeon Stallkartt, I am indebted for my life.

The *Aquidaban* has again forced the bar at the mouth of the harbour and passed the Government forts without damage to herself. I received information that she would be off the entrance on Thursday evening, and went afloat meaning to stay on her Majesty's ship *Sirius* to see her enter; my boat accident in the evening landed me on to the *Racer* instead, and from this ship I obtained an excellent view of the proceedings. At 4.30 a.m. on Friday, the 12<sup>th</sup>, the *Aquidaban* was reported as coming into the entrance; 15 minutes later she was abreast of Santa Cruz, and then that fort, Lage and São João, opened a heavy artillery fire at her. The ship came in steaming about ten knots, passed about 300 yards from Santa Cruz and only fired two broadsides, one at Santa Cruz and Lage. Not a single shell touched the ship when passing those forts, but 20 minutes later when opposite Niteroi a 4-in. Whitworth shell from the battery

known as São João de Batista struck some light gear on the tipper deck and a sailor was slightly wounded by a splinter; again, a few minutes afterwards, a 6-in Whitworth shelf from the Government battery at the Armação also struck the upper deck and penetrated into the ward-room, slightly wounding another man; these two were the only casualties. I boarded the ship two hours after her arrival and had a long chat with Captain Alexandrino de Alencar<sup>70</sup>, who commands her. He states that either torpedo or a submarine mine was exploded about a hundred yards from the *Aquidaban*, when she was abreast of Fort Lage, and that a column of water rose into the air to a height of some 20 metres, but that he left felt no shock from the explosion. I found the *Aquidaban* looking in much better trim than when she left here on November 30; she is clean and shipshape, all the officers and men are in good spirits, and ready to go into a hard fight at any moment.

Naturally, the presence of this very powerful weapon of war is a great addition to the resources at the disposal of Admiral Saldanha da Gama and materially alters his position in the harbour; moreover, he has received many recruits from the shore during the last few days and he is, therefore, well able to hold his own for the time being. The *crux* of the whole affair is, however, the arrival of troops from the south, and on this matter I shall have more to say later on in my letter. On the morning of the arrival of the *Aquidaban* one of the

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<sup>70</sup> Alexandrino Faria de Alencar (1848-1926) é um dos comandantes da Revolta da Armada. Comandou o *Aquidabã* na última batalha. Entre 1906 e 1926 será cinco vezes ministro da Marinha.

insurgent armed launches ran in close to the Gamboa and opened fire on the troops lining the shore-front, then steamed slowly up at about 150 yards from the water's edge, firing the while with the Nordenflet machine guns. The soldiers in reply opened a heavy musketry fire on the launch and on Cobras Island; the latter joined in with about a hundred rifles, and for an hour there was very sharp firing, the result being that some soldiers were killed and wounded, the insurgents having no casualties. During the little engagement, the 6-in. Whitworth gun on the Armação and the 4-in. Whitworth at São João Baptista each fired three shells directly at the insurgent hospital on Enchadas Island; three of these hit the buildings, and three badly-wounded men died from the effect of shock to the system. I have before pointed out the barbarity of firing at a defenceless hospital, and can only say now that if the foreign warships interfere, as they have done, to stop the bombardment of the city of Rio de Janeiro they certainly ought to give equal protection to the insurgent hospital.

Now to turn to affairs at the headquarters of the insurgents in the south. I learn from Captain Alexandrino de Alencar, in command of the *Aquidaban*, that on the arrival of Admiral de Melo at Desterro political intrigues amongst the various cliques taking part of the revolution at once broke out and threw all else into the background. Certain politicians wished to push their own interests without regard to the fact that if the insurgents were to win the day all private ambition and petty jealousy must be laid aside. The quarrelling over appointments in the Provisional Government and the splitting of straws as to

particular lines of policy continued for a period of five weeks, and was only ended by the fighting section stepping in and ending the trouble. Generals Gomercindo Saraiva, and Salgado, on behalf of the forces on land and the officers of the fleet at sea, plainly intimated that they did not intend to allow the day to be lost by further delay caused by certain noisy civilians. The result of this intimation was that Senhores Barros Cassal, Maciel, and some others were sent away from Desterro to Montevideo; and Senhor Cardozo, Minister of War in the Provisional Government, resigned his portfolio. The some active measures were taken to push forward the campaign. General Saraiva moved with his troops to the northern frontier of the State of Paraná, whilst Admiral de Melo in the cruiser *Republica*, and accompanied by the two armed merchant ships *Urano* and *Meteora*, at once proceeded to attack the Government forts at Paranaguá and the near vicinity, the *Aquidaban* at the same time proceeding to Rio de Janeiro to assist Admiral Saldanha da Gama to hold the harbour. Captain Alencar informs me that matters were so strained at one time that Generals Saraiva and Salgado threatened to retire with their men to the State of Rio Grande and render no further aid towards gaining the day in Rio de Janeiro. The impression I formed from the information I obtained was that Admiral de Melo behaved in a weak and vacillating manner from the first moment of his arrival at Desterro. And assumed the attitude rather of a politician than a naval officer at the head of a revolutionary movement. Indeed, it was only when his hand was forced by his own officers and by the leaders of the insurgent troops that he became alive to the fact that his first duty to the men he had brought into the civil war was to fight and use every exertion to bring the present

struggle to a successful issue, without considerations of place or power for himself or his friends. One final result of this political bungling has been to cause the officers of the revolutionary movement to regard Admiral Saldanha da Gama as their real chief in the future, although de Melo still nominally remains in the position he formerly occupied.

In Rio de Janeiro the Government continue to pursue a policy of inactivity hard to understand. Apparently Marshal Peixoto considers that the best way of crushing Admiral da Gama is to worry him with artillery fire and endeavour to cut off supplies of all kinds. Three weeks ago there seemed every likelihood of such tactics proving successful, but matters now show differently. The arrival of the *Aquidaban* was, undoubtedly, unexpected and puts another complexion on the attitude of the insurgent forces in the harbour. Then, again, the non-arrival here of the much-talked-of warships recently purchased by the Government creates a feeling of distrust amongst the most ardent supporters of Floriano Peixoto. True these ships are at Pernambuco and could be here in a few days, but the fact remains that they do not appear. The only active movement on the part of the Government during the past fortnight has been to throw reinforcement into Niteroi to fill up the gaps made in the ranks by the fire of the insurgents. It is impossible to disguise the truth that a strong feeling of discontent is growing steadily amongst the troops. I do not think this is so much due to political opinion as to the constant worry and continued state of tension entailed upon the officers and men by the necessity of doing guard duty along the shore front and at the many points on which artillery has been

mounted. Both officers and men imagined that all fighting would be over long before the present time, and they blame the Government for the incapacity it shows in not endeavouring to strike some decisive blow with the large force at its command. It is only in the past week or ten days that this discontent has been openly expressed, but it has long lain dormant and must come to a head in some form very shortly. The Government has ordered another regiment of the line down from the interior of the State of Goiás, and with this additional force it is possible some movement may be made; at least such is the general report, but for my own part I think rather that these men are needed to replace the heavy losses in killed and wounded suffered by the troops on the Niteroi side and along the shore front of the city. The Government fleet at Pernambuco has been further strengthened during the past few days by the arrival of two small torpedo-boats from Germany, and three other are expected this week. Admiral Gonçalves has been ordered from Montevideo to Pernambuco to take over the command of the ships.

On the 16<sup>th</sup> isn't a sharp fight took place on the island of Mocangué. This place was formerly in the hands of the insurgents, then was taken by the Government troops and a battery erected on the heights for the purpose of annoying the insurgent ships. At 3 45 a.m., the *Aquiudaban* moved down opposite the island and opened a heavy fire with her Nordenfelt machine-guns and quick-firing Hotchkiss six-pounders. Then at 4 15 a.m. the launches ran in close to the land and took up the fire with machine-guns and rifles. At 4 30 a.m. the boats landed three parties of 27 men each at different points, with a reserve

of 30 men, on the Island of Mocangué Pequena. As soon as the men landed they charged up the hill to the guns and gained possession of the battery after a sharp hand-to-hand fight for 15 minutes. Immediately the insurgents had the battery under their control they turned the guns on to the troops stationed on the Punta Areia and the Armação and succeeded in silencing the rifle fire directed against them from those places. Three officers and 108 men were taken prisoners, the commanding officer and 10 men killed, and 15 men wounded on the side of the Government; whereas the insurgents lost only five killed and seven wounded. Both sides showed plenty of pluck in this little engagement, but the sailors were better led and showed more determination, and probably owe their victory to those two facts. An incident occurred just at the close of the fight showing that the soldiers were not lacking of courage. When the island was in the hands of the insurgents, and whilst a heavy fire was still going on between the men on the island and the troops on shore, two boats but out from the Armação, crossed to Mocangué, and rescued fifteen to twenty soldiers who must otherwise inevitably have become prisoners. In addition to the three Krupp filed guns and the 72-pounder Whitworth, with a fair supply of ammunition, the insurgents obtained about 200 Mannlicher rifles and some 20,000 cartridges and other supplies on Mocangué. Naturally this success, following closely on the taking of the Engenho Island, has done much to give confidence to the men in the insurgent ranks, and they appear to be ready and willing to attack other points; no doubt they might do this successfully, but without reinforcement of men to hold places when they are taken it is small use to make the attempt. The insurgents now hold Mocangué,

Conceição, Velha Viana, and Engenho, and it is as much as they can do to garrison these places with the very limited number of men available for duty.

The information I have from the South tends to show that the insurgents have gained ground during the past ten days – in fact, from the time that the political quarrels were ended. On the 15<sup>th</sup> inst. the cruiser *Republica*, with Admiral de Melo on board, in conjunction with the armed merchant steamers *Uranos* and *Meteora*, went in to Paranaguá and began bombarding that town. After two hours fighting the garrison surrendered, and the forts at San Antonio and elsewhere in the vicinity followed suit. The soldiers, with very few exceptions, went over to the insurgents, and the net gain to the revolution appears to be about one thousand men, a large number of rifles and ammunition, six Krupp field guns with 20,000 rounds of ammunition, and some other old-fashioned artillery. Two days later a deputation arrived from Curitiba, the capital of the State of Paraná, requesting the insurgent leaders to form a Government for the State and appoint the necessary officers. At Curitiba were found further supplies of arms and ammunition, including a battery of six Krupp field guns and ten pieces of other artillery. Admiral de Melo is now in Curitiba, General Saraiva and his army being to the north of that city with the avowed intention of marching at once to São Paulo. He is however, delayed on account of having lost several thousand horses in the long marches he has undertaken of late, and is now endeavouring to remount his men on animals collected in Paraná. Further details of the events in the South have not yet arrived, owing to the telegraph lines being cut and all means of communication

extremely difficult. That my information is correct is confirmed by the fact of General Lima, in command of the Government troops, and the Governor of Paraná having arrived without escort at São Paulo, and having stated that events according to my description had actually occurred. I have also seen a copy of a telegram to the Government practically repeating the same story. My advice states that the next move will be for General Saraiva to march on São Paulo, an attack on Santos being made simultaneously by sea. The Government evidently think that some such plan is in the air, as the garrison of São Paulo has been strengthened as far as possible and fresh guns have been mounted at all suitable points in Santos. The march to São Paulo from the northern frontier of Paraná is a difficult one on account of the natural obstacle presented by a mountainous country without roads, and it remains to be seen if General Saraiva can accomplish it.

On the 23th instant, at the request of Admiral Benham, commanding the United States squadron now in the harbour and senior naval officer on the station, Admiral Saldanha da Gama attended on board the United States steamer *New York* to confer on certain matters concerning the civil war. Admiral da Gama informs me that throughout the interview the attitude assumed by the American Admiral was that the insurgents had absolutely no cause for waging war against the Government of Marshal Floriano Peixoto. When da Gama explained a few of the reasons of the outbreak of hostilities, and pointed out conclusively that Admiral Benham was misinformed as to facts, the United States Admiral shifted his ground and, according to da Gama, stated

that the insurgents had absolutely no hold on any part of Brazil, that the Government would be completely successful in overcoming all resistance in a very short time, and that it was best for Admiral da Gama to agree to any term offered to him. To this the insurgent leader replied that the revolution held the ascendancy in the States of Rio Grande, Santa Catarina, and Paraná, that the insurgents hoped to be able to hold out in Rio de Janeiro until the arrival of troops from the South, and the only possible terms he would agree to were to unconditional resignation of Marshal Peixoto and a free vote throughout the county as to the form of government and representation in the Chambers. Admiral Benham then stated that Marshal Peixoto proposed to publish the announcement that the next President must needs be a civilian, and that no military or naval man would be eligible as a candidate. Da Gama pointed out that any election undertaken whilst Marshal Peixoto remained in power could not be a free one and would not be acceptable to the insurgents. Apparently the United States Admiral somewhat lost his temper towards the close of the interview and spoke of arbitration by his Government and went on to say he should give full protection to commerce, even to the extent of protecting the landing of war material for Government; furthermore, that he should use force if it was necessary to do so. I gather from Admiral da Gam that he considered the manner in which this latter statement was made to amount to an actual threat of armed intervention on the part of the United States Government. I am unable to say how far Admiral Benham is prepared to carry out the policy he foreshadows in the account of this interview as related to me, but he has a large force at his command, and may possibly be able to bring heavy pressure

to bear on the insurgents. In the harbour at present the United States navy is represented by the *New York, Charlestown, Detroit, Newark, and San Francisco*, all modern and powerful vessels. From reliable information I learn that Admiral Benham has no instructions to interfere by force in Brazilian matters, but what may be the outcome of any representations he may now make to his Government is another matter.

An incident occurred yesterday, showing that want of humanity is onto one of Admiral da Gama's faults. A son of Dr. Barata Ribeira, Judge of the Supreme Court, was wounded and taken prisoner by the insurgents on the Island of Mucangué. His father, who is one of Admiral da Gama's most bitter enemies, asked me if I could do anything to help hem to obtain the release of the boy and a safe conduct for him to be brought on shore to his home. I promised to try, and went straight to the Admiral, putting all the facts of the case before him. Without any hesitation an order was written out for his release and passage to the shore, and the boy was landed a few hours afterwards. It was an act of magnanimity deserving of record.

This morning the insurgents occupied the island of Bom Jesus, nearly opposite the Ponto Caju and close to the northern part of the city of Rio de Janeiro. It is an important strategic position, commanding parte of the city and also acting as a support to the insurgent ships. A few prisoners were captured and some pieces of old-fashioned artillery, but practically no resistance was offered to the occupation.

Today there is news that Government cruises *Cid*, *Aurora*, and *Paranahiba* are off Bahia and are expected to enter that port.

**127. «Belligerents Rights and the Brazilian Civil War»,  
*The Manchester Guardian*, 13 de fevereiro.**

*Carta de um membro da Câmara de Comércio de Manchester que defende o governo legal de Peixoto e critica a atitude dos representantes diplomáticos europeus, – entre os quais, na primeira linha, os ingleses – por estes estarem a encorajar os rebeldes, prolongando dessa forma, o conflito.*

*Para R. D. Rusden, não há dúvidas: os diplomatas europeus manifestam a simpatia para com os amotinados porque o Brasil é uma república e eles «pretendem em secreto, restabelecer a monarquia». O autor da carta ataca também o Foreign Office e o Ministro dos Negócios estrangeiros inglês: «os nossos diplomatas no estrangeiro e os funcionários do Foreign Office aqui são recrutados nas fileiras dos conservadores e dos reacionários, e a afirmação extremamente rígida de não intervenção de Lord Rosebery faz parte da mesma política hostil. A destruição da República brasileira seria para todos eles uma fonte de deleite.»*

*Rusden lembra também que, nesta situação, com a ameaça de destruição na capital, muitas sociedades comerciais de Manchester poderão sofrer grandes prejuízos. É por tudo isso, que convida a Câmara de Comércio a agir imediatamente.*

*To the Editor of the Manchester Guardian*

Sir. – Again it seems that the demand is being raised by the mutineers in Rio that they should be accorded belligerent rights, and so elevated into position of honourable combatants. Surely this is the very crown and acme of

imprudence, for observe that is the position of these men and of the Government they are trying to destroy, and destroying much else in the process. President Floriano Peixoto is the legal President of the Republic; no one disputes that. The action of the President in vetoing a certain bill was an act entirely within his legal competence to perform, but Custodio de Melo, who for two years had been Minister of Marine, made that veto an excuse for his mutiny, after which the Brazilian Chambers endorsed all that President Peixoto had done, and before separating gave him a free hand to do whatever he thought proper. It is impossible, therefore, to deny that the present Government of Brazil is the legally constituted Government, and ought to have the support of foreign Powers; instead of which there appears to have been a more or less veiled hostility throughout on the part of the foreign diplomatic body in Rio. With the exception of the American, the sympathy and encouragement of the foreign representatives in Rio – our English ones at the head of them – has undoubtedly been of much value to the rebels, and has prolonged a most disastrous context which might otherwise have been ended long ago. Today we hear that the American Ambassador was being received by the Brazilian President as an acknowledgment of the impartiality of his attitude; and a further fact most significant in this connection is stated – viz., that no foreign Minister has been received by President Peixoto since the disturbance began. All this goes to prove the truth of the statements which I made in the Chamber

of Commerce on Monday<sup>71</sup>, though they do not appear in the very defective reports of my speech.

The reason for this hostility to Brazil and friendship for mutineers is not far to seek. Brazil is a republic; the mutineers are, or pretend *sub rosa* to be, in favour of restoring a monarchy; our diplomatists are recruited from the Tory and reactionary ranks, and Lord Rosebery's exceedingly rigid pronouncement of "non-intervention" is part of the same hostile policy. The destruction of the Brazilian Republic would be a source of delight to the whole lot of them. The bombardment of Rio de Janeiro is threatened. Rio is a city of 300,00 to 400,00 inhabitants –nearly as large as Manchester. The bombardment, if such a scandal is permitted, will take place from a point quite close, and right opposite to the most important part of the city. The destruction of life and property must be enormous, and there is not a house in the trade in Manchester that will not suffer, and perhaps very severely from the destruction of property and consequent loss of credit. I differ entirely from the profound and Delphic reply of the President of the Chamber of Commerce on Monday, that "the time has not come, and when it did come something would be considered, " &c. I have heard of a boy who whistled as he went for want of thought, and I suppose my friend Mr. Samuel Ogden had had no opportunity of thinking of this matter.

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<sup>71</sup> Trata-se provavelmente da segunda-feira dia 5 de fevereiro.

But I maintain that the time is now and today, and that the Chamber will be wanting in its duty if it does not speak and act at once, and with force enough to shake Lord Rosbery out of his Whig superstitions. —

Yours, &c.

R.d. RUSDEN

**128.** «British Shipping at Rio», *The Glasgow Herald*, 13 de fevereiro

*Pergunta na sessão da Câmara alta inglesa na véspera.*

Sir E. ASMEAD-BARTLETT asked the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether British merchant ships at Rio were enjoying the same facilities for discharging their cargoes as those of any other country; and whether the Government would take steps in any settlement of the present struggle in Brazil to secure British commerce not less favour than that of other countries.

Sir E. GREY said that British vessels did enjoy the same facilities as were given to those of other nations; and the government would neglect no opportunity for securing to British commerce generally the same advantages as were given to other nations.

**129.** «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Aberdeen Journal*, 14 de fevereiro

*Resposta de Edward Grey a uma pergunta de um parlamentar na Câmara dos Comuns na véspera.*

Sir E GREY, replying to Mr Parker Smith, said that, in response to representation from the foreign Powers, the Brazilian government had made a change of place for landing goods at Brazil, on September 16, and subsequently promised to remove the guns from the island of Bom Jesus till a safer anchorage than the one then available could be assigned. The British senior naval officer was instructed by telegraph on the 10<sup>th</sup> to report on the statement that insurgent vessels were in the habit of sheltering themselves among the merchant vessels, and he had authority to protect British goods and lighters carrying British goods from seizure and interference where engaged in legitimate business. Such protection, however, could not be given within the zone of fire when the combatants were engaged. The Government had no information to the effect that the instructions to the German and United States naval authorities directed them to give a greater degree of protection than was accorded by the naval authorities of other Powers. The measures taken had been decided upon in conferences of the senior naval officers, including the French, Austrian, Italian, and United States. The British naval authorities had refused assistance in cases where, owing to the firing between the combatants, the discharging of cargoes would have endangered the lives of the seamen of Her Majesty's ships and of the merchant vessels. The Government could not undertake to vary the instructions forwarded.

### 130. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 21 de fevereiro

*Várias informações telegráficas sobre a ligeira ferida de Saldanha da Gama, os vários barcos de guerra, a posição de Custódio de Melo e das tropas de Gumencindo Saraiva.*

RIO DE JANEIRO, FEB. 16 (*via* Montevideo, Feb. 20)

The final returns of the fight at Armação last week show that the total losses on the Government side were 550n killed and wounded, and 60 taken prisoners. Of the insurgents, 146 are missing. The wounds which Admiral da Gama received are not dangerous. The insurgents wounded, who are in the Enchadas Hospital, are progressing favourably.

The insurgents are in good spirit, and are ready to enter upon another fight at any moment. Admiral da Gama states that he has sufficient provisions and ammunition to last for several weeks; and that he will make every endeavour to maintain his present position until the arrival of troops from the south. He obtains many supplies and some men from the districts in the vicinity of Magé and Teresopolis, near the head of the bay.

The Government cruiser *Cid* left Bahia, bound for the south, with troops, last night. She will probably call outside Rio de Janeiro, and then proceed to Santos. The gunner attached to the dynamite gun has deserted. The remainder of the fleet is still in Bahia. One torpedo-boat has stranded on a reef at Maceió. The engines of the *Destroyer* have broken down. The vessels find much difficulty in obtaining crews Persons who arrived here from Bahia yesterday

state hat it is unlikely that the fleet will leave for some weeks. They also state that the general opinion is that none of the vessels are formidable excepting the *Aurora*. The *Aquidaban* leaves here on Sunday to intercept the *Cid*.

Advices from Desterro state that the strong position which the Government have at Lapa is their last foothold. The State of Parana was taken on Friday last, after severe fighting, in which many were killed and wounded on both sides. The general commanding the Government troops was wounded. Six hundred prisoners were taken. Admiral de Melo is now at Desterro with the *Republica*. He will probably come north shortly. The Government cruisers *Tiradentes* and *Bahia* are still at Montevideo. The latter ran aground in attempting to enter the dock on Wednesday.

The Government received a telegram yesterday from the officer commanding the troops in the district of Santos, stating that General Saraiva, with his army, is near Itarraré, on the frontier of São Paulo, and that the Government force will be insufficient to resist him unless it be strongly reinforced. The Government are raising more troops for the National Guard in the States of São Paulo, in order to resist invasion. They have also sent orders to the garrison of Porto Alegre and Pelotas, in Rio Grande, comprising 2,000 men, to march to the north.

Yellow fever is increasing greatly. There has been one case on the American warship *Newark*, and three on the Austrian warship *Zrinyi*, the commander of which has died. There are 15 cases now in the British Hospital.  
– *Our Special Correspondent*.

**131.** «Brazil. The insurrection», *The Huddersfiels Chronicle*,  
21 de fevereiro

According to the intelligence received at Buenos Aires, from Rio de Janeiro, the cannonade between the insurgent vessels and the Government forts and batteries has again been resumed. It is reported that the *Niteroi* has arrived outside the harbour with the intention of engaging the insurgent squadron, and that she has landed a number of volunteers from Bahia. General Saraiva, commanding the insurgent land forces, has arrived at Iguape on his northward march, and will proceed at once to Sao Paulo. An engagement has been fought at Itapeva da Fascina, on one of the main routes to Sao Paulo from the south, in which the Government forces have been defeated. Admiral de Melo will commence the bombardment of Santos, which is the port for Sao Paulo, as soon as General Saraiva arrives in the vicinity of the latter town. Great discontent prevails among coffee-planters, as the recruiting for the National Guard has deprived them of the usual supply of labour.

**132.** «Rio de Janeiro» *The Standard*, 21 de fevereiro

*Pergunta na Câmara dos Comuns no dia 20 de fevereiro*

Sir E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT asked the First Lord of the Treasury whether, in view of the fact that the Brazilian insurgents had maintained for over five months a successful blockade of Rio de Janeiro and other ports, and

occupied a large portion of Brazilian territory, her Majesty's Government would now recognize them as belligerents.

Mr. GLADSTONE was understood to say that there was no evidence that the insurgents in Brazil had constituted a Government of such a character as would entitle them to recognition as belligerents, or would justify any other Government in giving them that recognition.

### **133. *The Glasgow Herald*, 22 de fevereiro**

*Para as finanças brasileiras, para as casas comerciais britânicas e para os que investiram no Brasil, é indispensável que este conflito acabe quanto antes.*

City houses with South American connections entertain the belief that the end of the Brazilian trouble is drawing near. The Monarchist party have for some weeks been hinting that March would probably see the crisis of the struggle; and although such a crisis would not necessarily involve any Monarchist ascendancy, the large share which Monarchist money and brains have had in engineering the existing state of affairs gives the opinion of the party much weight. The announcement of the end of the war would be good news to British investors, as well as to the many firms who have connections with Brazil. I was told today, by a member of a well-known house, that the country will not be able to meet its engagements much longer if peace is not arrived at. Even the powerful support which the Government has received, and

is receiving at the hands of Messrs Rothschild, will not suffice unless some change can be brought about. The British capital invested in Brazil amounts to about £200,000,000; and of this not less than half represents the capital of private firms and traders, who, of course, have been most injuriously affected by the war. The coffee industry, which is the staple trade of Brazil, and in which a vast amount of British capital is locked up is suffering seriously.

### 134. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Standard*, 26 de fevereiro

*O autor desta carta acha fantasiosa a informação segundo a qual a esquadra americana teve de proteger os navios comerciais britânicos no Rio. O único objetivo desta falsa notícia, acrescenta a missiva, é de provocar uma intervenção dos navios de guerra britânicos contra a insurreição.*

*O mesmo trata Peixoto de «ditador» de tirano e de corrupto, o que obrigou os «galantes almirantes de Melo e da Gama» a se revoltarem e bloquearem a capital. Este defensor da revolta da marinha brasileira critica a «injustificável» atuação do comandante Benham que, com a sua intervenção de dia 29 de janeiro, favoreceu o atual presidente: este «prometeu outras e maiores vantagens para o comércio americano», tudo isto à custa dos britânicos.*

*Evidentemente, sublinha o autor da missiva, os mercadores britânicos também queriam desembarcar a sua mercadoria, para evitar maiores perdas, mas, escreve M.P., «se Peixoto ganhar, os prejuízos para o comércio britânico serão muito maiores do que o simples atrasos de algum carregamento».*

*Critica por fim o Governo liberal de William Gladstone de ter negligenciado os interesses «vitais» ingleses numa zona onde o capital britânico investido é «muito maior do que o das outras nações» e de ter enviado «uma esquadra fraca e totalmente inadequada».*

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE STANDARD*

SIR, — It is to be hoped that neither the Government nor the public will fall into the trap laid by the absurd telegrams which have just appeared from Brazil. According to these, Admiral Benham, of the United States Squadron, has given protection to British merchant vessels which the British men-of-war refused, and British merchant sailors have in consequence trampled the Union Jack under foot.

These statements are clearly fabulous. Their object, however, is patent — is to excite British public feeling against the insurgents, and to provoke the armed interference of our Squadron, which would benefit Marshal Peixoto, the President at Rio. All must sympathise with the owners and sailors' of our merchant vessels, who have not been able to land their cargoes owing to the Civil War. But there is a far greater danger threatening British interests that the delay of few cargoes, aggravating as that may be.

Three years ago the new Brazilian Republic made a very favourable Treaty with the United States, to the serious injury of British commerce. The Dictator Peixoto, whose corruption and tyranny have forced every honest and manly element in Brazil to revolt, has been for some time doing his best to get the United States to intervene on his behalf. He has promised further and greater favours to American commerce. In consequence of these promises, and because the United States fear a Monarchical restoration in Brazil, Admiral Benham, commanding the very powerful American Squadron at Rio, has lately

interfered in a most high-handed and unjustifiable way, in order to help Peixoto.

The Insurgents, under their gallant Admirals, de Melo and da Gama, maintained an effective blockade of Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian Capital, for five months. They had thus cut off the Dictator from all reinforcements and from receiving fresh cannon and munitions of war. Admiral Benham, having first advised and then commanded the Brazilian Naval officers to abandon their just and patriotic contest and to surrender to Marshal Peixoto, proceeded forthwith to use force. He compelled Admiral da Gama, at the cannon's mouth, to permit the American merchant vessels to land their cargoes, including munitions of war. Admiral Benham thus aided Peixoto in the most practical way; but he committed a most lawless breach of International polity.

British merchants vessels naturally want to land their cargoes, but they will do well not to lose sight of the greater in the less. If Peixoto wins, infinitely greater injury will be inflicted upon British commerce than that caused by the present delay of a few cargoes.

The way in which the present Government are neglecting vital British interests in Brazil is disgraceful. Nearly one hundred million pounds of British capital are engaged in Brazil. Our interests there are infinitely greater than those of any other nation. Yet Mr. Gladstone and his colleagues refuse to send more than a weak and wholly inadequate Squadron of second and third class cruisers and gunboats at Rio. The United States Squadron is more numerous

that, and four times as powerful as, the British. The American Admiral is allowed to “boss the whole affair”, while our men-of-war take a back place.

How different it would have been in the days of Parmerston<sup>72</sup> or Beaconsfield<sup>73</sup> !

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,

M. P.

February, 24

### 135. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Standard*, 27 de fevereiro

*Esta carta acredita, contrariamente à missiva anterior, que os marinheiros britânicos pisaram a sua bandeira no Rio. Critica também, como o autor da carta publicada na véspera, a fraqueza da frota inglesa no porto carioca, que nem sequer tem um almirante no comando, mas um simples capitão. A Grã-Bretanha devia defender melhor os seus interesses comerciais no Rio, onde o transporte marítimo britânico «representa nove décimos do total», realça J.L. Rainer.*

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<sup>72</sup> O Visconde de Palmerston, nobre e político britânico, foi vários anos Secretário de Estado para os Assuntos Estrangeiros (de novembro de 1830 a novembro de 1834 ; de abril de 1835 a setembro de 1841; de julho de 1846 a dezembro de 1851) e Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido de junho de 1859 a outubro de 1865.

<sup>73</sup> Trata-se de Benjamin Disraeli, Conde de Beaconsfield, Primeiro-Ministro britânico em 1868 e de fevereiro de 1874 a abril de 1880.

TO THE EDITOR OF *THE STANDARD*

SIR, – In conversation with a gentleman just returned from Rio, with respect to the reported insult to the British flag by English sailors, I was yesterday informed that such a thing most probably occurred, as even our mail steamers have the greatest difficulty in obtaining an escort for mails and passengers. It was new to me, and it will probably be so to most people, that there I no British Admiral at Rio, a Captain being in command of the Fleet (?) there, which consists of only two puny gunboats, as against the American Fleet of five of their largest ironclads, a force sufficient to wipe out the Insurgents in half an hour.

That the Government can expect if, indeed, they take the slightest interest in the question – that British mercantile interests, which form nine-tenths of the shipping business at Rio, can be efficiently guarded by this noble squadron, is beyond belief. And until we send a force sufficient to show that we mean to protect ourselves, we may look for such incidents as that reported.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant

J.L.RAINER

Southampton, February 26.

**136.** «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Times*, 2 de março

*Perguntas sobre a situação no Brasil no parlamento inglês.*

Mr. ANSTRUTHER asked the Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, for information as to the alleged custom of the insurgent vessels in Rio Harbour taking refuge behind British merchantmen and drawing the Government fire upon them; and whether he was prepared to give any instructions to the officer in command of the British Squadron on the subject.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT asked whether it was not a fact that he Brazilian naval officers, who headed the revolt against the Marshal Dictator, had always shown themselves, as far as the conditions of civil war permitted, friendly to British interests.

SIR E. GREY — I am not aware that the Brazilian naval officers in question have shown anything else than impartiality as between different nations. Of course, their attention has been greatly engaged by their own affairs. In answer to the first question put to me I have to say that reference has been made on this point to Captain Lang, who is now home, and he states that he never observed the insurgents' launches sheltering themselves under the foreign merchant vessels at the assigned anchorage, but that it is possible that they did so in the Gamboa where merchant vessels were advised not to go. The present British Senior Naval Officer, who was instructed to report on the subject by telegraph, denies that it is the practice for the insurgents' launches so to shelter themselves.

In answer to Mr. ANSTRUTHER, who asked a question with reference to the Liverpool steamer *Nasmith*.

SIR E. GRAY said, — The statement referred to was brought to the notice of her Majesty's Government by the Clyde Sailing Shipowners' Associations in the form of extracts from American newspapers, but no confirmation of such a report has been received from any other quarter, and it is desirable, more especially in the case of news which does not reach us direct from Rio, to receive more certain information before giving implicit credence to what is reported in the Press (Hear, hear) The instruction to her Majesty's representatives at Rio would certainly cover such a case as that referred to. I have to add that, in view of the outbreak of yellow fever, the Senior Naval Officer has thought it imperative, on the ground of health, to reduce the number of British warships in the harbour, and that for the same reason all the other foreign warships have left except those of the United States and one Portuguese. As long as the present conflict continues the officers and crews of merchant' vessels sent to Rio run the risk of great delay in discharging their cargoes, and of very serious exposure to the fever.

COLONEL HOWARD VINCENT asked the Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs whether he was aware that most of the news reaching this country from South America was cable *via* new York; and whether he was in a position to state the number of British ships entering and clearing Rio de Janeiro since the outbreak of the Brazilian civil war on September, 6, and the number which had been injured by frequent cannonade in the bay between the 20 insurgent vessels and the Government forts of Santa Cruz and Lage, or the Republican shore batteries at Niteroi.

SIR E. GRAY. — The answer to the first question is in the affirmative. With reference to the second question, the annual shipping returns have not yet been received from Rio, and even these would not give the number of ships for any particular month. A few instances only of injury to British vessels have been reported to the Foreign Office, and those not of a serious nature: but one British seaman was killed by a shell when taking refuge in a shed on shore where a Brazilian soldier was killed by the same shell, and another British sailor, when in a boat in the harbour, was wounded in the leg by a rifle bullet.

COLONEL HOWARD VINCENT asked the Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs whether it was a fact that Lord Rosebery and her Majesty's Government authorized the British Minister and Senior Naval Officer at Rio de Janeiro to associate themselves last October with their foreign colleagues in preventing the threatened bombardment of the business quarter of Rio de Janeiro, replete with British interests, and that all foreign nations with the exception of Germany joined in the action thus initiated by Great Britain and saved the city from material damage.

SIR E. GRAY. — At the suggestion of her Majesty's Government instructions, were given to the naval commander at Rio of France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United States to concert with the British naval commander measures to prevent the ships of the Brazilian insurgents from destroying the lives and property of foreigners at Rio, and Rebar-Admiral de Melo, who threatened to bombard the town, was warned that any attack on the city would be prevented by the ships of those Powers by force if necessary. The

German Government considered such action on the parte of foreign naval commanders as incompatible with the attitude of strict neutrality which Germany desired to maintain, and the German naval commander did not join to the intimation made to M. de Melo.

### **137. *The Leeds Mercury*, 3 de março**

*Sobre a perda de dois navios rebeldes.*

The fluctuations of the prolonged conflict in Brazil are surprising. Last week the insurgents were reported to have scored in the ordnance duel; this, the reports are all the other way. According to information received at Buenos Aires, an explosion had occurred upon the insurgent vessel *Venus*, by which thirty-three persons were killed, including the commander and two officers, while fifty persons were wounded. Even this disaster is eclipsed by that which befell the insurgent steamer *Jupiter*. She is said to have been sunk by the Government batteries at Niteroi, all on board going down with her. Whence comes the ammunition which the rebel fleet are daily firing away! Their original store must have been expended long ago. Some astute trader must be making a pretty penny in keeping them supplied!

**138.** «Brazil. The Situation at Rio», *The Huddersfield Chronicle*,  
8 de março

The Foreign Office, last night, stated that the senior British naval officer at Rio has reported, by telegraph, that there is no interference whatever on the part of either the Brazilian Government or the insurgent with vessels leaving that harbour, and he has already made arrangements with the Brazilian Government and with the insurgent admiral, so that lighters and tugs may obtain all ballast required without molestation. Captain Pipon further reports that yellow fever is raging in the harbour, and that he considers that the port would be closed, and all vessels ordered to proceed out of the harbour.

**139.** «Latest Intelligence. The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 14 de  
março

*Longo telegrama que relata os últimos acontecimentos, com a mensagem do chefe dos rebeldes a Peixoto que recusa os termos impostos por Saldanha da Gama. O documento explica que este, sem o Aquidabã e o República, perante as intenções do Presidente que ameaçava bombardear, com todos os meios à sua disposição, os navios e os fortes ainda nas mãos dos insurrectos, não tinha nenhuma possibilidade de sair vitorioso.*

RIO DE JANEIRO, MARCH 13.

Admiral da Gama has sent a message to Marshal Peixoto offering to surrender the insurgent fleet and to cease hostilities. He specified as the terms

of capitulation the immunity of himself and all connected with the revolution from punishment. After despatching the message the insurgent leader sought safety and requested an asylum on board the Portuguese man-of-war *Mindelo*, which is at anchor in the harbour. The Portuguese commander received him courteously, and he is now on board of the vessel. After consulting with the Portuguese commander, Admiral da Gama modified his terms of peace in several respects. He offered to capitulate on the following conditions: –

The insurgents to surrender the forts in their possession and turn over to the Government all the warships in the Bay of Rio de Janeiro and to hand over the prisoners now in their hands. The insurgent to surrender the garrison of the forts and the crews of the vessels upon condition that the admiral and all his officers be allowed to withdraw to a foreign country under the protection of Portugal, and that the lives of the insurgent soldiers and sailors be spared.

This message has been forwarded to Marshal Peixoto, but his reply is not yet known. It is, however, considered probable that some arrangement will be made to terminate the war so far as the insurgent fleet in these waters is concerned.

Nothing whatever has been heard of the movement of Admiral de Melo and the vessels *Aquidaban* and *República* since he ran past the forts. It is thought that he is now in the South.

The circumstances which led to Admiral da Gama's surrender were, no doubt, the extensive preparations for a decisive encounter which were being

made by Marshal Peixoto; his official decree announcing that all the Government batteries would open fire upon the rebel ships in the bay as well as upon the forts of Villegagnon and Cobras Island, and the warning which had been given to the citizens to leave their homes and seek places of shelter outside. With the *Aquidaban* and the *Republica* out at sea, and the loyal navy guarding the entrance to the harbour, Admiral da Gama was placed at an enormous disadvantage. The sentiments of the people were that even if Marshal Peixoto did draw fire upon the city his attempt to bring the rebellion to an end by a general engagement would justify his doing so.

LATER

Admiral da Gama's terms of surrender have been rejected by Marshal Peixoto. The loyal forts began firing on the insurgent vessels at noon, but the latter did not return the fire. The city batteries opened fire at 3 o'clock this afternoon.

The city is deserted. — *Dalziel*

#### 140. *The Times*, 14 de março

*O editorialista comenta a nova situação baseando-se, em parte, no telegrama que acabamos de citar. É forçado a admitir que os rebeldes foram derrotados, mas isso não o impede de atacar Floriano Peixoto, cujo poder «tem origens duvidosas» e que o exerce de «despoticamente». Este, quem nem sempre foi «um modelo de fidelidade» — é acusado de querer uma*

*«desnecessária efusão de sangue e de tomar «medidas de castigo vingativo contra os adversários vencidos».*

*No último parágrafo, o jornal londrino, além de analisar o ponto de vista de Portugal, explica a derrota dos insurretos pela «medidas rigorosas» tomadas pelo Governo legal. Por outro lado, na sua opinião, o atraso na chegada de reforços do Sul, é devido a querelas intestinas entre os rebeldes. De qualquer forma, mesmo se esses homens tivessem chegado à capital, «não teriam encontrados aliados».*

*Finalmente, num país onde, para o poder central é difícil controlar todo o território, o Governo do Rio agora fica aliviado, e pode voltar à normalidade, com o comércio a funcionar novamente.*

The civil war in Brazil has entered upon a new phase. After many vicissitudes, the Government of MARSHAL PEIXOTO has established a clear ascendancy over the insurgents under ADMIRAL SALDANHA DA GAMA'S command in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro. Since the weakening of his force within the harbour by the withdrawal of the two ironclads which forced the passage of the forts under ADMIRAL DE MELO, and since the strengthening of the Government navy by the arrival of the vessels purchased in the United States, ADMIRAL DA GAMA'S position has become daily more precarious and perilous. Nearly three months have elapsed since the insurgent commander frankly recognized the fact that he was playing a game against time. His hold on the forts seized by the insurgents within the harbour and the safety of his own ships were depended on the arrival from the South, where GENERAL SARAIVA, in concert with ADMIRAL DE MELO, was reported to be making rapid progress. How far this was true it was impossible to determine with certainty. Manifestly, however, the progress of the Southern insurgents was, at any rate, not rapid enough to

deliver ADMIRAL DA GAMA in time. Meanwhile, though the insurgents had not been in all cases unsuccessful in the partial engagements which took place with the harbour of Rio, the Government became gradually stronger. On Sunday, the Ministers of MARSHAL PEIXOTO officially informed the representatives of foreign Governments that, at the expiration of 48 hours, military operations against the insurgent squadron would be resumed. The population of the capital were at the same time warned that it would be more prudent for them to leave the city temporarily, as the Government forts and ships were about to open fire on ADMIRAL DA GAMA'S squadron and upon Fort Villegagnon and Cobras Island, which have been for a long time past in the hands of the insurgents. The warning, we may add, was acted upon with promptitude. It appears that ADMIRAL DA GAMA found himself practically incapable of meeting a combined attack of this character. Despairing of the appearance of a relieving of forcing his way out of the harbour with his inferiors vessels in the teeth of a destructive fire from the government forts and ships, he resolved upon surrendering.

In South American warfare – especially in civil warfare – there is an element of sheer ruthlessness. It might have been expected that the Government of MARSHAL PEIXOTO would have welcomed ADMIRAL DA GAMA'S offers, which, after consultation with the senior officer of the Portuguese navy, were made in a form amounting substantially to a complete capitulation. ADMIRAL DA GAMA proposed to surrender to the Government the forts in possession of the insurgents as well as the ships under his command in the

harbour, and to give up the prisoners that he had taken. The crews of the ships and the garrison of the forts were also to surrender, on condition that the Admiral and his officers should be permitted to retire in safety, under the protection of Portugal, to some foreign country, and that the lives of the soldiers and sailors should be spared. It is not yet known whether or not MARSHAL PEIXOTO has definitively refused the terms of capitulation offered by ADMIRAL DA GAMA. It has been stated that he insists on proceeding with the bombardment unless there is an unconditional surrender of the rebels, to be followed, no doubt, by a series of executions and other severe punishment; but in other quarters it is believed that, even now, some arrangement is probable. The prolongation of the bombardment, for which preparation were said to be in progress down to the last moment, and, indeed, according to one account, began, though somewhat feeble, at 3 o'clock yesterday, would be, after ADMIRAL DA GAMA'S offers, an unnecessary and inexcusable act of barbarism. It is doubtless true that ADMIRAL DA GAMA would not have consented so easily to submission if he had retained any hope of prolonging a successful resistance. The Government, however, might be content with putting an end to the war so far as Rio itself is concerned, with strengthening the defences of the capital, after the surrender of the insurgents, against any possible attack from the outside, with acquiring an indisputable naval superiority, and with delivering the commerce of Brazil from the paralysis to which it has been condemned since the outbreak of the civil war. An abstract horror of treason can hardly be so strong a sentiment in MARSHAL PEIXOTO, whose own career has not been exactly a model of loyalty to his Sovereign, to his former chief, or to the Constitutions,

new or old, which he had sworn to respect, as to justify a needless effusion of blood and measures of revengeful punishment directed against defeated opponents.

The captains of the Portuguese warship *Mindelo*, on which ADMIRAL DA GAMA appears to have sought refuge, though he is said to have since returned to his own vessel, treated the insurgent leader with courtesy. He has been instructed, however, by the Government at Lisbon to abstain from any interference with the course of events and only to take part in such semi-official measures as the representatives at Rio of all the other Powers may deem "opportune and necessary". Portugal has, undoubtedly, looked on the insurgent movement, which has had something of a Monarchical colour, with a not unfriendly eye. At the same time there are no interests for which Portugal is specially concerned that are involved in the struggle at Rio, nor, if there were, would it perhaps be possible for any interference on her part to save ADMIRAL DA GAMA'S in his present situation. The capitulation of the insurgents, conditionally or unconditionally, is practically certain, whether the bombardment is seriously meant or not. It cannot be doubted that there was a considerable party in sympathy with the insurgents in Rio itself, but the rigorous measures of the Government nipped in the bud an attempt a few weeks ago, on the part of these malcontents, to join hands with ADMIRAL DA GAMA, and smothered an intended rising of two regiments of the National Guard. The delay in the arrival of assistance from the South is attributed, by some who are friendly to the insurrection, to quarrels over personal questions

between the insurgent generals and ADMIRAL DE MELO, but it is not at all clear how far this is the case or how far the movement has all along been too feeble gravely to menace the central Government. Even if southern insurgents were now able to advance upon São Paulo and subsequently upon the capital itself, they would find no allies at Rio with whom to join hands. It is true that Brazil is a country of low organization, and that, even under the Imperial Government, local insurrections dragged on for years. It will probably be a long time before the Government at Rio de Janeiro can feel quite sure of the safety of São Paulo and Paraná, or can entertain much hope of re-establishing authority in the distant southern province of Rio Grande do Sul. But, for the moment, the collapse of the insurrectionary movement under ADMIRAL DA GAMA relieves the Government from its more pressing anxieties, and offers an opportunity for returning to orderly government and commercial progress. MARSHAL PEIXOTO'S power is of tainted origin, and is now exercised despotically under a state of siege, for which there will be no longer any excuse as soon as the harbour is cleared of the insurgents. A constitutional President, DR. PRUDENTE DE MORAES, an ex-President of the Senate, was elected a few days ago by a large majority. It is worthy of remark that a couple of months ago ADMIRAL DA GAMA told our Correspondent that, if MARSHAL PEIXOTO resigned in favour of DR. DE MORAES, the insurgents would feel it unnecessary to prolong the contest.

### 141. *North Eastern Daily Gazette*, 2 de novembro

*Nesta guerra há mais discursos violentos do que propriamente estragos feitos ao inimigo.*

The sanguinary intention of these wagers of war in Brazil are terrible. The Government party say they intend to fly by balloons and drop explosives on the rebel ships. They further say that Admiral de Melo is caught in a trap, and will be demolished when the war vessels bought in America arrive. Admiral de Melo responds by saying he means to demolish the Peixoto Government, if not Rio de Janeiro itself. On the whole, however, remarkably little actual harm seems to be done by either party to each other, though meanwhile the State is being ruined.

### 142. «Peace in Brazil» *The Bristol Mercury*, 14 de março

*O jornal tenta perceber os motivos da fuga de Saldanha da Gama; por um lado, a «ação decidida» do Almirante Benham; por outro lado, o resultado das eleições presidenciais, extremamente favorável ao Governo, e que prova que «o povo brasileiro continua fiel ao marechal Peixoto».*

*O editorialista congratula-se com o presidente brasileiro pela sua firmeza que «muito contribuiu para salvar o país». Considera que Peixoto não tinha «nenhum motivo de tipo constitucional para deixar o lugar ao Almirante de Melo: «foi devidamente eleito e ainda não tinha acabado o seu mandato. Se tivesse apresentado a demissão, teria gerado tanta confusão como se o Gabinete inglês tivesse de apelar ao país cada vez que os chefes da oposição declarassem isso necessário.»*

*De qualquer forma, conclui o diário de Bristol, esta é uma excelente notícia para os commerciantes ingleses, que sofreram muito prejuízos durante estes seis meses, tendo em conta o facto dos produtos britânicos representarem «quase a metade» do total das importações brasileiras.*

There is every indication that the protracted civil war in Brazil is nearing its end. The Foreign Office of the United States has received information from Rio de Janeiro that Admiral da Gama, upon whom Admiral de Melo's hopes chiefly rested, has taken refuge on board a Portuguese vessel, and has sent Marshal Peixoto an offer to surrender on certain conditions, which, according to yesterday's telegrams, the President has contemptuously rejected. It will be interesting to know the causes which led to this humiliating step on the part of a man who only recently deserted the Government for rebels. Possibly the approaching cessation of hostilities is to be attributed to the decided and sensible action of Admiral Benham, who insisted that the almost childish playing at war into which the strife had degenerated must be subordinated to the convenience of forewing traders having business to transact. The British commander does not seem to have acted with equal vigour, for reasons which are no doubt excellent but which are not very obvious. Admiral Benham's interference was, however, regarded with sympathy by all the naval commanders in the harbour, and the rebels must have found the task of carrying on a partial and desultory blockade at once tedious and unsatisfactory. Admiral da Gama and his friends must also have been influenced to some degree by the result of the elections in Brazil, which were decidedly favourable to the existing Government, one of whose supporters was

elected President by a considerable majority. If notwithstanding the weariness of the long-continued civil conflict and the native fickleness of the people the country still remain faithful to Marshal Peixoto, the chances of the rebels could not be very bright, and the wisdom of seeking to make terms while a show of resistance was still in their power, became apparent. If, as anticipated, the war is now at an end, Marshal Peixoto deserves the hearty congratulations of those who wish well to the Republic of Brazil. By his firmness he has established a precedent for stable government. There was no constitutional reason why he should give way to Admiral de Melo, when he placed himself at the head of the disaffected navy. He has been duly elected and his term of office had not been completed. To have resigned would have brought about as much confusion as if the English Cabinet were to appeal to the country whenever the leaders of the Opposition declared that such a step was necessary. After a struggle which has lasted over six months, he has succeeded in holding his own until his term of office was over, and he has arranged for a constitutionally elected president to follow him. In a republic so prone to violent changes as Brazil has shown itself to be such firmness as Marshal Peixoto has displayed is a considerable contribution to the salvation of the country. English merchants will be delighted to hear of the end of a state of things which has been extremely prejudicial to a trade in which they are deeply interested. The importance of the impending peace can best be realized when it is considered that of the total imports of Brazil nearly a half comes from the United Kingdom.

**THE REVOLT IN BRAZIL.**  
—  
**PROPOSED CAPITULATION.**  
—  
**THE INSURGENTS' TERMS  
REFUSED.**  
—  
**(THROUGH REUTER'S AGENCY.)** ●  
**RIO DE JANEIRO, MARCH 13.**

**END OF THE REVOLT IN  
BRAZIL.**  
—  
**REBEL FORTS BOMBARDED.**  
—  
**UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER.**  
—

Fig. 8 e 9: *The Standard*, 14 e 15 de março

### 143. *The Morning Post*, 14 de março

*Os comerciantes ingleses – que muito perderam durante estes seis meses – tal como os habitantes do Rio, estão satisfeitos que este «monótono» e «profundamente ridículo» conflito tenha acabado, sublinha o articulista. Para eles, no fundo, pouco importa qual é o «soldado ou marinheiro ambicioso que é Presidente dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.»*

*O editorialista nota, e com uma certa razão, que «é impossível saber qual era o verdadeiro objetivo para o qual lutaram os dois Almirantes Insurrectos.» Não pensa que seja a restauração do Império, mas, talvez, a «ambição pessoal de Custódio de Melo». Mas esta, conclui o jornal londrino, será, um dia, a tarefa dos historiadores.*

According to the latest intelligence from Rio de Janeiro the Civil War in Brazil is virtually at an end. The Insurgent Admiral DA GAMA is stated to have taken refuge on board a Portuguese ship, and from that position of safety to have offered to surrender on condition that the lives of the Insurgent sailors and soldiers be spared, and that he and the other officers be allowed to withdraw to a foreign country under the protection of the Portuguese Government. If this news be correct – and one must always allow for the possibility of flat contradiction within twenty-four hours – the conflict is at an end so far as concerns the Brazilian capital, which it has been the aim of the one faction to capture and of the other to keep. At the same time it must be remembered that hostilities will probably go on in one or several of the most distant States of the vast Brazilian Federation. Admiral DE MELO, the prime mover of the revolt, who showed his good sense some time ago by sailing away from Rio and leaving Admiral DA GAM to carry on the blockade, may still be able

to cause local trouble. That, however, will matter little to the Central Government at Rio. As a matter of fact there generally is fighting going on either in Rio Grande do Sul or one of the other Provinces, and nobody at Rio is a penny the worse of that. The Insurgents were dangerous so long as they had any chance of getting possession of the capital; but if they have recognised the impossibility of doing that the possibility of their success must have disappeared. There is every reason to be satisfied with that result. The state of things which has prevailed at Rio since Admiral DE MELO first took ship and declared against President PEIXOTO on the 7<sup>th</sup> of last September has been most disastrous to the commercial interests engaged in the Brazilian capital. Those interests are largely British, and the complaints of the Liverpool and other ship-owners have been loud and long. To them, to the other foreigners who have business relations with Brazil, and, indeed, to the majority of the inhabitants themselves, it can matter exceeding little whether this or that ambitious soldier or sailor be President of the United States of Brazil. The inhabitants of Rio, who have been described in the letters of eye-witnesses as exhibiting a quite Parisian indifference to such trifles as blockades and bombardments, would probably have been equally pleased if the Insurgents could have ousted President PEIXOTO without doing serious damage to their beautiful city. But, since that is not to be, they will accept the return to the *status quo ante* with gratitude for the termination of an entertainment which was growing monotonous. After six months one begins to feel that one has had enough fireworks. Now that it is all over – if over, indeed, it be – it is even more apparent than before that the whole affair has been profoundly ridiculous. It is

impossible to say what was the real object for which the two Insurgent Admirals were fighting. Was it, as has been widely believed, the Restoration of the Monarchy? Doubtless the House of BRAGANZA has numerous adherents, whose faith must have been increased by the downgrade course of Brazilian prosperity since the amiable and accomplished DOM PEDRO was hustled out of his dominions. Nevertheless there has been no unanimous, or even audible, demand for a Monarchical Restoration. The Insurgents, if they intended anything of the kind, have never ventured to say so. It seems more probable that personal ambition prompted Admiral DE MELO to resent President PEIXOTO'S refusal to allow himself to be debarred from future power and place by Act of Parliament. That, however is merely a probable conjecture. All that we know is that Brazil is likely to go back to her previous paths under the direction of the victorious PEIXOTO, who has known how to outstay his opponents. Provided that trade be permitted to resume its normal course without delay, there is no need to be otherwise than content that this is so. Some day, perhaps, the historian will ascertain with certainty the real object of this six months' civil war.

#### **144. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 14 de março**

*O elefante (Peixoto) ganhou contra a baleia (da Gama) porque uma outra baleia (os Estados Unidos) o ajudaram, sintetiza o quotidiano londrino, que fica aliviado por o comandante da insurreição não estar nas mãos do Marechal de Ferro.*

The terms have been refused on which Admiral da Gama offered to give up his share in the doubtful struggle between the elephant and the whale so soon as the elephant got help from another whale; and Senor Flaviano de [*sic!*] Peixoto once more takes himself to be dictator of Brazil, in fact as well as in name. The Portuguese Minister seems to have done what he could to secure a decent moderately dignified retreat for Admiral da Gama, who is now back on his own flagship, and may refuse an unconditional surrender, with its consequent imprisonments, courts-martial, and murders grim and great. He may fight like a rat in a hole; or even yet he may try to steam away to sea, and we rather incline to wish him the best luck he can get; for the tender mercies of a Peixoto are sure to be cruel, and the Admiral has shown some pluck. Meanwhile, where is Admiral Custodio de Melo, and what plays many he be amusing himself withal?

#### **145. *The Manchester Weekly Times*, 16 de março**

*Artigo muito crítico no qual todos ficam mal na fotografia: Peixoto, que chegou ao poder depois de uma revolta; Custódio de Melo, que ajudou Peixoto, mas que depois se rebelou contra ele; os rebeldes que não conseguiram uma unidade de ação.*

*Nada se ganhou com estes seis meses de luta, nota o articulista, que acusa os beligerantes de achar aquilo muito divertido, contrariamente ao povo brasileiro e aos que praticam comércio com este país.*

*O Brasil nada ganhou com a mudança de regime, antes pelo contrário: com todos estes «aventureiros que tomam ou tentam tomar o poder, o país está a perder terreno», lamenta o semanário de Manchester.*

The Brazilian war is at an end. After lasting six months it has closed with the surrender of the insurgents, and the position is pretty much as it was before the hostilities broke out. Very little, if anything, has been gained by half a year's fighting, whilst the loss to the Republic must have been very heavy. The struggle has had features which frequently present themselves in the history of the South American States. Marshal Peixoto, the President, against whom the revolt was directed, is himself the representative of a successful rebellion. He was placed in the position he has victoriously defended by Admiral de Melo, the leader of the movement under which the first President of the Republic, Marshal da Fonseca, was forced to resign. The admiral having placed Peixoto in power, became his principal supporter. But the two friends could not agree. In the view of de Melo President Peixoto displayed arrogant and dictatorial tendencies, whereupon the admiral took up the sword. Fortunately for him he was able to secure the adhesion of practically the whole of the Brazilian Navy, and at one time it seemed as if he was going to win, especially after he forced the entrance to Rio Bay. But the rebel leaders themselves were not a happy family. Quarrels arose, and warlike operations were seriously delayed and hampered. It became evident, indeed, a few weeks ago, that the insurrection was making no progress, and when Peixoto's newly-organized fleet appeared off the entrance to Rio Bay it was apparent that the end was not far off. It is a very pretty game which these leaders play. They enjoy it very much, no doubt. The people of Brazil, and of the countries which trade





Fig. 10 e 11: Retratos de Saldanha da Gama e de Custódio de Melo  
(*The Manchester Weekly Times*, 16 de março 1894)

with South America, do not fund so much fun in it. To those who are outside the hostile forces these wars are simple a source of pecuniary loss and of personal misery. The victory of either side does not represent any gain to the cause of popular freedom. So far Brazil has not derived much benefit from the deposition of Dom Pedro four years ago. With one adventurer after another seizing, or attempting to seize, the reins of power the country is rapidly losing ground, and must continue to do so. It is to be hoped that the savage reprisals which have so often followed the close of civil wars in South America will no longer be repeated.

**146.** «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 16 de março

*Perguntas na Câmara dos Comuns na véspera.*

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT asked the Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs whether he could give the House any information as to the progress of the civil war in Brazil, and especially as to the reported surrender of Admiral da Gama.

COLONEL HOWARD VINCENT asked the Under-Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs whether her Majesty's Minister at Rio de Janeiro had confirmed the report of the cessation of the civil war in Brazil, and such case if her Majesty's Government would render all assistance possible to British traders to recoup the disastrous losses of the past six months of siege, and use his influence with the Brazilian Government to devote itself to the development of

the riches of the country and the opening up of fresh channels for international trade.

SIR E. GREY. – The Senior Naval Officer at Rio, telegraphing on the 14<sup>th</sup> isnt., states that the Portuguese Commanding Naval Officer has received Admiral Saldanah da Gama and many of his officers and men on board his vessel. Her Majesty's Government have not yet received any further details relating to the surrender of the insurgent forces in Rio Bay. The question of how to deal with claims of British subjects in Brazil is now being considered in consultation with the law officers of the Crown. The Government of Brazil cannot be asked to take advice from outside as to the development of their own country, but her Majesty's Government are anxious to use every means in their power to promote trade with Brazil as soon as the political state of the country admits of it.

SIR A. ROLLIT asked whether any complaints from British residents had been receive as to the neglect of their interests.

Mr. HANDBURY asked whether it was true that one of the officers had taken refuge on one of her Majesty's ships.

SIR E. ASHMEAD-BARTLETT asked whether the Government would use its influence to obtain element treatment for those who had surrendered.

SIR E. GREY. – I can only say, in answer to the last question that her Majesty's Government has been most careful to abstain for any interference whatever in what was a purely internal matter (her, hear), and cannot promise

that they can see their way to take any action in the final settlement of the dispute. It is true that in disturbances of this kind some innocent persons must suffer. British trade is considerable, and it has suffered, and that has naturally given rise to many complaints which we have received; but I am sure that her Majesty's Minister and the Admiral, who had a most difficult task to perform (hear, hear), have discharged their duties well and done the utmost possible under the circumstances. With regards to Admiral da Gama, our latest information is that he is on board a Portuguese vessel, no a British ship.

**147. «Marshal Peixoto Triumphant», *The Graphic*, 17 de março.**

*O semanário londrino considera positivo o desfecho deste «jogo» que parecia nunca mais acabar. Não lamenta nem a derrota dos revoltosos, dos quais não percebe a razão de fundo do seu combate, nem a restauração monárquica, visto que no Brasil «não parece que haja uma vontade» de regressar ao antigo regime.*

One has become so accustomed to regard civil war in Brazil as a chronic, if not a very serious, evil that the news of the collapse of the insurrection has come as somewhat of a surprise. Ever since Admiral de Melo issued his first proclamation against Marshal Peixoto, in the early days of last September, the strife has gone simmering on. Rio has been bombarded by the insurgents, who, in turn, have frequently repulsed by the Presidential forces when trying to effect a landing; and a vast amount of injury has been done to the commercial interests of the capital, which are largely British. So far outside observers could

judge, the game might have been played for an indefinite period, without either side being much nearer final failure or success. At last, however, Admiral da Gama (who succeeded Admiral de Melo, retired goodness knows where) finally made up his mind to go on board an English cruiser, and thence to surrender to Marshal Peixoto. As it has never been made clear yet that the insurgents were fighting for anything but a share of the spoils of victory, nobody need be sorry they have given up the game. They may or may not have intended to restore the Monarchy, but as there does not seem to be any general desire for Restoration it really does not matter whether they did or did not. We presume that Brazil will once more revert to the somewhat uneven tenour of its way under the auspices of the virtuous and victorious Peixoto. It might have done worse, and there is certainly no evidence that it would have done better had the tables been turned and Admiral da Gama won the game.

**148.** *The Leeds Mercury*, 17 de março

*Depois de seis meses de luta, «os Chefes da revolta refugiaram-se a bordo de navios estrangeiros, deixando os seus apoiantes entregues ao seu destino.»*

The revolution in Brazil is at an end. This popular method with South American Republics of effecting a change of Government has not in this instance succeeded. Although the hostile forces have been peppering away at each other for more than six months, the contest long ago ceased to interest

any one outside of Brazil. It was not easy to see which side had the vest of the artillery duel or the skirmishes which occurred from time to time. Now, however, the action of Admiral da Gama leaves this point in no doubt. He has offered on behalf of the insurgents to surrender the forts and the men-of-war they possess in Rio Bay, and hand over their prisoners on condition that the Admiral and his officers be allowed to withdraw to a foreign country, and the lives of the insurgent soldiers and sailors be guaranteed. President Peixoto and his Cabinet, however, declare that the surrender must be unconditional. After a little hesitation, the insurgent leaders took refuge on board foreign ships of war in the bay, leaving their followers apparently to their fate.

**149.** «Net Result of the War in Brazil», *The Leeds Mercury*, 17 de março

*Este guerra, louca e sem sentido, acabou, deixando o país numa situação tão desastrosa que vai precisar de muitos anos para recuperar.*

Most of your readers will be pleased to learn that the stupid, senseless war in Brazil is practically over. It has been raging with more or less fury since last September, with the result that Admiral da Gama has now given in, and Marshal Peixoto will probably be elected President [*sic!*], and dictate what terms he pleases. It is said that our British capitalists have advanced something like £100,000,000 to develop the resources of that country. This foolish war has suspended business, closed banks, and destroyed many

valuable lives, and will in all probability have landed the country in such a state of bankruptcy and it will take many years to recover from.

**150. *The Newcastle Weekly Courant*, 17 de março**

*Enquanto os chefes dos rebeldes estiverem livres, «não há nenhuma garantia de paz, mas talvez já não iremos ouvir falar de Da Gama e do Almirante de Melo, o líder da quadrilha», deseja o jornalista de Newcastle. Segundo este, agora, o «Brasil, sob a direção do Presidente Peixoto, pode regressar em breve ao caminho da paz.»*

Well might the inhabitants of Rio rejoice over the termination of the civil war, which has not only disturbed the trade of that port but of Brazil generally. It has been a very protracted struggle, without any good purpose. The rebels, failing to obtain conditional terms from the Government, have surrendered unconditionally... Admiral da Gama, leader of the insurgents, and some of his officers are reported to have found an asylum on board foreign ships that put to sea before the Government fleet showed a disposition to attack. That is regrettable, since, so long as they are free, there is no guarantee of peace. It may be, however, that da Gama, like Admiral de Melo, the ringleader of the revolt, may be heard of no more. If he can escape from his pursuers, he is not likely to return to Rio again, only to forfeit his life. If he has good sense to keep away, Brazil, under the direction of President Peixoto, may soon return to the paths of peace. To British ship-owners, whose interests have been prejudicially affected

for a longer period than one cares to think of, the intelligence that the revolution is ended will be welcome indeed.

**151. *The Pall Mall Gazette*, 17 de março**

*Se da Gama, na opinião de Peixoto, é um pirata, pergunta o jornal, também o mesmo se pode dizer dos marinheiros e dos oficiais americanos que constituíram a tripulação do Niterói, observa o jornal que comenta: «Fizeram a guerra a militares – militares rebeldes, na verdade, mas militares na mesma – de uma nação amiga.»*

Now that the Brazilian revolution has collapsed, the advices from Rio are much more entertaining that they have been since Admiral Benham threatened to blow the insurgent squadron out of the water for piracy. Admiral da Gama, for instance, is now said to be on a Portuguese man-of-war, and his ungenerous conqueror has demanded his surrender as a pirate; which request raises several very pretty questions of international law. For instance, how does the Admiral's case compare with the case of the American officers and men who manned the *Niterói*? Surely, they also are pirates, That is to say, they have waged war on the subjects – the rebel subjects, indeed, but still the subjects – of a friendly Power at a time when they held commission or were employed as sailors in the American navy. Finally, what has become of Admiral de Melo, whose flagship has been discovered derelict in the southernmost waters of Brazil?

*Neste outro comentário, publicado na mesma página, o jornalista londrino realça o facto do envio da nova frota brasileira de Nova Iorque para o Rio de Janeiro constituir um excelente material para um autor de romances humorísticos e igualmente para um historiador.*

The unwise among the people and the fools, as the Psalmist called them, who will not understand, tell us that the day of romance is over that this gloomy century keeps its soul too closely under the microscope to have any time for adventure. What, then, are we to think of the Brazilian squadron's voyage from New York to Rio? If it be true, it is worthy of the muse that inspired Hakluyt<sup>74</sup> and Purchas<sup>75</sup>; if it be false, Esquemeling<sup>76</sup> and Captain Johnson<sup>77</sup> never invented a better yarn about their buccaneers and marooners. The Admiral and all the captains, including the American officer in charge of the flagship, were daily on the point of blows. By night the Brazilian officers, secretly sympathizing with the rebels, tried to tamper with the engines, and were only prevented by spies. They managed to ruin three torpedo boats of their own flotilla and to sink another. They tampered with the dynamite gun; once the *Itaipu* hid her lights, and attempted to ram the *Niteroi*; one the *Parmaíba's* officers tried to run her ashore. Then for three days the only food in the flotilla

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<sup>74</sup> Richard Hakluyt (1552-1616), religioso, geógrafo, historiador, tradutor e diplomata inglês, ardente paladino da expansão inglesa.

<sup>75</sup> Samuel Purchas (1575-1626), contemporâneo de Hakluyt, é um religioso, autor de uma vasta coleção de histórias de viagens.

<sup>76</sup> Alexander Olivier Exquemelin (1646-1707), pirata e escritor francês.

<sup>77</sup> O capitão Charles Johnson é o autor do *livro Uma História Geral dos Roubos e Crimes de Piratas Famosos* publicado na Grã Bretanha em 1724.

was salted horseflesh and beans. What a chance for a sufficiently humorous novelist, or even for a historian. !

**152.** «Latest Intelligence. The Revolt in Brazil», *The Times*, 21 de março

*Relato da viagem do correspondente do jornal que sai do porto do Rio a 21 de fevereiro a bordo do Aquidabã que, dois dias depois, muda de rota e navega para o Sul. O jornalista muda de navio e com o República chega a Paranaguá a 27 de fevereiro. Passa a seguir por Ponta Grossa, Desterro de onde sai a 15 de março para o Rio Grande do Sul. Sublinha que os três estados (Paraná, Santa Catarina e Rio Grande do Sul) estão do lado da insurreição.*

*Descreve as forças militares rebeldes, que parecem preparadas para invadir o Estado de São Paulo; fala com o general Gumercindo Saraiva e da sua oposição ao Governo provisório de Desterro, Governo que, entretanto, foi dissolvido. Realça o facto da derrota no porto do Rio de Janeiro «ser uma grande perda, mas que não vai impedir a continuação da guerra civil».*

MONTEVIDEO, March 20.

I left Rio de Janeiro at 3 o'clock on the morning of February 21 in the *Aquidaban* under a heavy fire from all the Government forts and batteries. The vessel steamed at the rate of six miles when forcing the bar. She passes 200 yards from Santa Cruz and gave that fort and São João a broadside. We were clear of all fire at 4 o'clock. Four shells from heavy guns struck the *Aquidaban*, hitting the funnel and cutting away the lower bridge, part of the fore rigging, and some light work on the upper deck. Nobody was hurt. We met the cruiser *Republica* outside quit Admiral de Melo on board, and continued the voyage to

Bahia the same day with the object of attacking the Government ships. On February 23 Admiral de Melo signalled to turn southwards and make for Ilha Grande, where se arrived on February 23. Admiral de Melo stated that the engines the *Republica* required repairs, and that he was going to Paranaguá.

Leaving the *Aquidaban* at Ilha dos Porcos I transferred myself to the *Republica*. We arrived at Paranaguá on February 27, and on the following day I went to Curitiba, the capital of the State of Parana. The entire State was in the possession of the insurgents. Then I proceeded to Ponta Grossa, where I found General Saravia and the headquarter staff of the insurgent army. The main body of the army was at Castro, 50 miles south of the frontier of the State of São Paulo. The army consists of 4,000 men exclusive of 2,000 raised locally for the defence of the State of Parana. The troops are well armed, and there is a fair supply of ammunition, chiefly captured at various places from the Government troops. The army consists of infantry and cavalry, a battery of six Kropp field guns and four machine guns. It is now ready to invade the State of São Paulo. General Saraiva states that the men are in good spirits and consider that success is probable. He expects the arrival of General Salgado with 1,500 more men in a few days. I saw a telegram from the latter saying that he was marching northwards for a combination with Saraiva. On March 2 the advance guard captured a reconnoitring party of the Government troops, who stated that there were only 1,500 men on the southern frontier of São Paulo. Of these 300 were infantry and the remainder National Guards and police. They had 12 field guns.

On March 2 I left Ponta Grossa with General Saraiva and his staff, arriving at Curitiba the same night. A council of war was held next day, at which it was decided that reinforcements should immediately be sent to Rio de Janeiro, that Admiral de Melo, with the *Republica* and an armed steamer, should attack Bahia, and the General Saraiva should continue his advance to the city of São Paulo.

Since the capture of the State of Parana the position of the insurgents has materially improved. They have obtained supplies of arms, ammunition, clothing, and provisions, also 700 *contos reais* in cash. General Saraiva informed me that the political affairs of the insurgents were unsatisfactory. He disliked the composition of the Provisional Government at Desterro, saying that it was not representative and that he would not acknowledge its authority. He and all the other leaders of the revolution except Admiral de Melo regarded Senhor Silveira Martins as their chief. The latter has declined to hold any relations with the Government at Desterro. General Saraiva said that he hoped soon to replace the Provisional Government by responsible Ministers under the guidance of Senhor Silveira Martins. The great majority of the officers and civilians are favourable to this course. Meantime the Provisional Government has been abolished and in its place a commission of three persons – Cr. West. Dr. Ferreira Melo, and Senhor Maciel – will administer the affairs of the insurgents. The surrender of the insurgent fleet at Rio de Janeiro is considered a serious loss to the revolution, but will not prevent a continuation of the civil war.

I left Desterro on March 15 for Rio Grande do Sul. I find that opinion there and in Porto Alegre is favourable to the revolution. The Pelotas Government insurgents dominate the greater part of the State. It is rumoured in Rio Grande that Admiral da Gama and four hundred officers and men have been taken by Portuguese warships to Santa Catarina. The cruiser *Republica* is now at Paranagua; the *Aquidaban* at Desterro.

Throughout the States of Parana, Santa Catarina, and Rio Grande do Sul no elections were held on March 1. Public opinion in these States is distinctly against recognizing as valid the election of Dr. Prudente de Moraes as President and of the new members of the Senate and Chambers of Deputies. — *Our Special Correspondent.*

### 153. *The Times*, 24 de março

*Este editorial prova que o jornal conservador londrino ainda não digeriu a vitória do Governo brasileiro. Com efeito, o analista não fala das razões na origem da derrota dos revoltosos na baía da capital brasileira, mas das intenções atribuídas a Peixoto de se querer vingar dos seus inimigos e de os querer executar sem julgamento. O jornal julga que o atual Presidente, considerando o seu passado, está muito mal colocado para dar lições de constitucionalismo e de respeito da legalidade.*

*Sublinha também as divergências do lado da rebelião, entre os insurretos no Paraná e no Rio Grande do Sul e os vencidos no Rio, entre de Melo e Gumercindo Saraiva, mas, na sua opinião, estes atos ditatoriais do Marechal de Ferro só podem fortalecer a oposição contra o Executivo Federal.*

*A melhor solução, para que o país possa virar a página deste período de instabilidade que dura há quatro anos, seria entregar imediatamente o poder ao presidente eleito a dia 1 de março, conclui o editorialista.*

It is reported that MARSHAL PEIXOTO has revived certain decrees which give the chief of the Executive in Brazil the power to execute rebels without trial. The formality of this "revival" appear do be a mockery, for the power in question is essentially an abrogation of law and a reversion to the state of things which precedes the establishment of legal guarantees and legal procedure. We do not question the right of any community or of any Government to resort, under the pressure of imperative necessity, even to a remedy so extreme as this. But it surely cannot be affirmed that MARSHAL PEIXOTO can point such a justification for getting rid of his vanquished enemies without so much as the intervention of a drum-head Court-martial. The insurrection in the harbour of Rio de Janeiro has completely collapsed. ADMIRAL SALDANHA DA GAMA and some seventy of his officers have taken refuge on board two Portuguese ships of war, which have been allowed to steam out of the harbour without molestation, and have made for Buenos Aires. The insurgents who have been left behind, and who have surrendered, having no other choice, to the Brazilian Government, on the desertion of their chiefs, are almost entirely common soldiers and sailors, with a few inferior officers. Is it against these poor fellows that MARSHAL PEIXOTO desires to employ his powers of summary executions? It is a case for resorting to the severities that were used against CATILINE'S conspiracy? Is MARSHAL PEIXOTO'S own record so clear

that he can venture to claim an authority which cannot be safely intrusted to a Government that is not absolutely above suspicion? These are questions which irresistibly suggest themselves, when we hear of the latest measures and the rumoured intentions of the Brazilian Executive. Their proceedings are not rendered less serious by the intimation that "Jeddart justice" will be thus dealt out by MARSHAL PEIXOTO, not only to the insurgents sailors and soldiers now in the hands of the Government, but to any foreigners who may have aided or abetted the rebels. There is a possibility that British subjects may be charged, rightly or wrongly, with assisting the rebels in some way, and, if they have done so, they bear the share of responsibility. We do not, however, admit that such persons, merely because they are so accused, perhaps quite without foundation, can be held liable to "execution without trial" under MARSHAL PEIXOTO'S revival of the musty decrees of 1838 and 1851.

The moral basis for such an abrogation of law as is said to be proposed appears to us to entirely wanting in the present case. The danger of the insurrection, so far as it existed in the harbour of Rio, is at an end, while, so far as it exists in the Southern provinces, where GENERAL SARAIVA'S army is in possession of the State of Parana, it is likely to be aggravated rather than removed by a system of sanguinary reprisals in the capital. It must be remembered that MARSHAL PEIXOTO is the last man who can claim to act upon strict principles of constitutionalism and legality. He emerged from comparative obscurity by the part he took in the successful conspiracy against the Imperial Government in 1890 [*sic*], and in the following year he repeated

that performance by overthrowing his chief, MARSHAL FONSECA, and stepping into his place. These are the common incidents of revolution, but, when a man has passed rapidly through such a career, he has no moral right to act with rigorous severity against vanquished rebels and conspirators. The demand for the surrender of ADMIRAL DA GAMA and his officers, now that they have escaped out of Brazilian waters, will probably not be entertained. It is stated that the British and Italian Governments have made representations in reference to this demand, recommending humane counsels. For the Portuguese commanders, or the Argentine Government, if the refugees are at Buenos Aires, to surrender them would be almost as revolting as it would have been for this country to have handed over the French Anti-Bonapartists who evaded the *Coup d'État* to LOUIS NAPOLEON. We do not know how far there is a technical justification for the argument, said to have been urged by the Powers named, "that the asylum sought by those who have committed no crime at common law should be respected." Unquestionably, ADMIRAL DA GAMA and his associates were in the position of rebels against the constituted authorities at Rio, and, as they had not been recognized as belligerents either by the Brazilian Government or by foreign countries, their proceedings, according to writers on international law, may be brought within the definition of piracy. But the claim for the surrender of such "pirates" is not equally indisputable. At any rate, it is inconsistent alike with humanity and expediency for MARSHAL PEIXOTO to prosecute a terrorist policy after the insurrection has been suppressed at Rio, and before any adequate attempt has been made to grapple with it in the Southern provinces.

We should have thought that MARSHAL PEIXOTO would have seen the importance of building a golden bridge for a retreating enemy. ADMIRAL DE MELO has been proclaimed head of the Provisional Government at Desterro, but, as our Correspondent explained in a despatch we published at the beginning of the week, the pretensions of that officer are not at all favourably viewed by GENERAL SARAIVA. Unless the revengeful spirit displayed by MARSHAL PEIXOTO should produce a reaction, the difference between the insurgents in Parana and Rio Grande do Sul and the discouragement caused by the misfortune of ADMIRAL DA GAMA might very probably result in the gradual dying out of the resistance. Anger and the ruthless punishment of their fellows and fear of similar treatment for themselves are more likely to keep alive the rebellious spirit among those now in arms. It may also be observed that MARSHAL PEIXOTO's assumption of dictatorial power at the present moment may be regarded with some suspicion by his own party. A new President and a new Vice-President were lately elected, and, in due course, MARSHAL PEIXOTO ought to resign his government in their hands. Whether or not he is likely to do so if he should succeed in acquiring dictatorial authority, including the right of putting opponents to death without trial, may be a question. It will be remembered that PRESIDENT FONSECA was accused of endeavouring to establish a dictatorship for himself by assuming unconstitutional powers, and that it was for this a successful revolt of the navy and the army deposed him from his office and put MARSHAL PEIXOTO in his place. It is desirable, not only for the sake of the Brazilian themselves, but in the interest of all countries which have any dealings with Brazil, that the state of uncertainty and insecurity which has

prevailed since the downfall of the Empire should cease. Unfortunately we see no promise of improvement in projects of military autocracy combined with measures of vengeance against defeated political opponents.

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## Résumé en français

Entre septembre 1893 et mars de l'année suivante, la presse britannique se penche régulièrement sur les événements qui se produisent dans le port de Rio de Janeiro. Elle publie des télégrammes, des résumés d'agences de presse, des lettres de lecteurs, des commentaires, des éditoriaux et des articles envoyés par des correspondants parmi lesquels il faut mentionner ceux du correspondant du journal conservateur londonien *The Times*. Sans doute manifeste-t-il une certaine sympathie à l'égard des insurgés, mais ses longs articles constituent des documents de toute première importance, qui servent souvent de matière première à un certain nombre d'analyses publiées par d'autres quotidiens du Vieux Continent. Il y décrit la vie à Niteroi, à Rio et à bord des navires; il rapporte certaines batailles ; il interviewe Custódio de Melo et Saldanha da Gama.

Si les journaux américains, dans leur écrasante majorité, défendent le gouvernement brésilien, les périodiques analysés dans ce volume peuvent être divisés en deux groupes : d'une part, ceux qui appuient les yeux fermés le mouvement insurrectionnel, un retour de la monarchie déchue en 1889 et qui censurent systématiquement Floriano Peixoto ; d'autre part, ceux qui expriment une opinion plus modérée. Sans soutenir le gouvernement républicain, cette minorité rédige des commentaires beaucoup plus nuancés et

n'hésite pas à mettre également en lumière les carences et les erreurs des marins rebelles.

Tous les analystes britanniques s'accordent cependant sur un point : l'information reçue est incomplète, peu fiable et partisane. Cela peut expliquer en partie cette différence d'opinion. Certains déclarent que les rebelles sont dans une situation militaire très favorable, avec des soutiens chaque jour plus consistants et pratiquement sûrs de l'emporter sur un exécutif à la peine. D'autres affirment que Peixoto – fonctionnaire intrigant, corrompu, têtue, et qui mène une bataille désormais perdue – n'est plus maître de la capitale. Pour ces journaux, la victoire de Custódio de Melo – homme d'expérience, capable, ambitieux – n'est plus qu'une question de temps. Seule une intervention des Grandes Puissances pourrait sauver le Maréchal de Fer.

D'autres périodiques font remarquer que la position du président n'est pas si fragile. Honnête et fort, il bénéficie de l'appui de l'Armée de terre et du Congrès. Selon eux, il n'a pas agi comme un tyran : par conséquent, il doit rester jusqu'à la fin de son mandat en novembre 1894. Les mêmes analystes jugent que de Melo et Saldanha da Gama se trouvent dans une position très difficile : ils n'ont pas les moyens d'effectuer un débarquement pour s'emparer de Rio de Janeiro ; par ailleurs, Peixoto est en train d'acheter une nouvelle flotte aux États-Unis. Quelques éditorialistes remettent surtout en cause la légitimité de leur action et soulignent (le fait) que les résultats qu'ils ont obtenus sont minimes.

Un nombre non négligeable de ces journalistes estime que les deux antagonistes sont faibles, ou, dans le meilleur des cas, de force égale : il n'y a aucune bataille digne de ce nom, les deux parties préférant attendre. Par conséquent, à court terme, on n'envisage pas une fin à cette guerre civile. Les déclarations fracassantes sont à l'ordre du jour, mais en réalité, les pertes et les dégâts matériels sont limités. Plusieurs analystes souhaiteraient une solution négociée à cette lutte, très dommageable pour l'économie brésilienne et pour le commerce international. La Grande Bretagne a d'importants intérêts à défendre au Brésil, auquel elle fournit presque la moitié de ses importations. La presse ne manque pas de le souligner, censurant la politique menée par le cabinet de Londres qui, contrairement à celui de Washington, ne défend pas ses marchands dans le port de Rio de Janeiro.

À l'instar d'une partie de la presse états-unienne et surtout de celle de la droite en France, plusieurs commentateurs font une comparaison entre la situation du pays à l'époque de D. Pedro et celle vécue depuis la chute des Bragance. De leur point de vue, le pays n'a rien gagné à l'avènement de la République, bien au contraire : la stabilité politique et la prospérité économique font partie du passé glorieux du Brésil. Depuis quatre ans, affirment ces éditorialistes, ce sont des dictateurs militaires, des aventuriers qui tiennent le haut du pavé : ils n'ont qu'un objectif, se remplir les poches, en favorisant leur famille et leurs proches.

Les journaux anglo-saxons parlent logiquement d'une possible restauration monarchique dans le plus grand pays d'Amérique du Sud. Certains

sont convaincus que le fils de la princesse Isabelle, qui n'a que 18 ans, sera proclamé empereur. D'autres pensent que les descendants de D. Pedro n'envisagent pas un retour au pays et deux d'entre eux proposent même un prince allemand pour occuper le trône laissé vacant le 15 novembre 1889. Cependant, une minorité des commentateurs britanniques ne prennent pas leurs rêves pour des réalités : ils admettent que la République occupe le terrain et que la révolte est très loin d'avoir remporté la partie. Conscients qu'il n'y a aucun candidat au profil idéal pour assumer cette charge, ils soulignent que les monarchistes brésiliens devront franchir un obstacle peut-être insurmontable : la ferme opposition des États-Unis.

Quant au rôle joué par les grandes puissances, les avis divergent. Si une partie pense que les flottes étrangères devraient intervenir pour mettre un point final à ce conflit, pour d'autres, les navires étrangers ne peuvent agir que pour défendre leurs propres concitoyens sur place. Une minorité d'analystes exige une neutralité absolue, parce que les pays européens et les États-Unis ne peuvent pas s'immiscer dans les affaires intérieures du Brésil, même pour éviter un bombardement de la population civile.


Mentionnons pour terminer deux événements importants parmi ceux relatés dans cet ouvrage : l'intervention américaine du 29 janvier et la fuite de Custódio da Gama le 13 mars 1894. Les journaux britanniques sont beaucoup moins élogieux à l'égard du coup de force du commandant Benham qui réussit à faire capituler da Gama en brisant le blocus du port de Rio. Conscients que cette attitude américaine favorise le gouvernement en place et constitue un

sérieux revers pour l'insurrection, ils se demandent si cela ne signifie pas une ingérence de Washington dans la politique brésilienne dans le but d'écarter notamment la possibilité d'un retour de la monarchie.

Quant à la décision peu glorieuse du chef de la rébellion et de ses officiers, si *The Times* et *The Pall Mall Gazette* ont beaucoup de mal à avaler la pilule de l'échec de la rébellion, la plupart des journaux – qui continuent à s'interroger sur les causes de cette guerre civile – sont soulagés par la fin des combats, une excellente nouvelle pour les marchands anglais et pour tous ceux qui ont investi des capitaux au Brésil. En d'autres termes, peu importe la nature du régime en place à Rio, dans la mesure où on enlève les entraves au commerce international.



VIEW OF THE CITY OF RIO DE JANEIRO FROM NITEROY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE BAY



ADMIRAL DI MELLO  
The instigator of the revolt against President Peixoto



PRESIDENT PEIXOTO  
Against whom the revolution in Brazil is directed



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