



RIO JANEIRO BLOCKADED.

THE BAY OF RIO DE JANEIRO.

FIRING ON RIO JANEIRO.

The Rebel Brazilian Fleet Has Begun
to Bombard the City.

Brazil in the Throes of Another Big
Revolution.

The President's Resignation De-
manded by the Rebels.

Backed by a Squadron of Several For-
midable Vessels.

FEAR AND ANXIETY IN WASHINGTON



Coleção
Documentos

42

A 2.^a REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPRENSA AMERICANA

VOLUME I
(SETEMBRO-NOVEMBRO 1893)



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RETO MONICO

**A 2ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA
IMPRENSA AMERICANA**

**Volume I
(setembro-novembro 1893)**





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Reto Monico

A 2ª REVOLTA DA ARMADA NA IMPREENSA AMERICANA

Volume I
(setembro-novembro 1893)



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Apresentação do 1º volume¹

Depois de termos estudado os artigos publicados pela imprensa francófona² e anglófona³ sobre a tentativa autoritária do primeiro presidente da República do Brasil em novembro de 1891, debruçamo-nos sobre o que escreveram os principais jornais americanos, francófonos e ingleses de setembro de 1893 até março do ano seguinte, acerca da Segunda Revolta da Armada⁴.

Estes dois volumes reproduzem o que cerca de 50 jornais americanos publicaram durante estes seis meses sobre a crise provocada pela revolta da frota brasileira no porto do Rio de Janeiro. Escolhemos essencialmente

¹ Limitamo-nos a indicar aqui os principais temas abordados pela imprensa norte-americana. No volume *Olhares francófonos sobre a Segunda Revolta da Armada*, a publicar nesta coleção em 2022, vamos apresentar uma análise mais completa do que escreveram os jornais anglófonos e francófonos sobre estes seis meses da História do Brasil.

² MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa francófona*. Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020. (Coleção documentos, nº 26)

³ MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa norte-americana*. Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020 (Coleção documentos, nº 28) ; MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa britânica*, Lisboa/Rio Grande : CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020. (Coleção documentos, nº 36)

⁴ Dois volumes sobre a imprensa norte americana, um sobre a imprensa francesa, um sobre os jornais ingleses e um quinto volume, previsto para 2022, sobre outros olhares francófonos que vai incluir as correspondências do Brasil de dois jornais parisienses (*Le Temps* e o *Journal des Débats*) e os comentários do belga *L'Indépendance Belge*, do *Jornal de Genève* e da *Gazette de Lausanne*.

editoriais e comentários, com a única exceção dos três primeiros textos que são unicamente informativos.

Nos dois primeiros meses da revolta, tratados neste volume, a imprensa dos Estados Unidos escreve com uma certa frequência sobre os acontecimentos que ocorrem no porto do Rio de Janeiro. Os jornais tomam logo consciência de que se trata de algo de grave e não de uma pequena revolta e ficam, como as folhas franceses e inglesas, muito preocupados com as ameaças de bombardeamento que pairam sobre a capital brasileira.

Se, nas primeiras semanas, a maioria destes órgãos de informação critica os dirigentes da jovem república e parece simpatizar com os insurretos, lamentando a queda de D. Pedro II quatro anos antes, a pouco e pouco, os comentaristas americanos começam a preocupar-se com as eventuais ingerências das nações europeias e com o hipotético regresso da monarquia no Brasil.

Muitos quotidianos, alguns dos quais bastante alarmistas, batem na mesma tecla, lembrando a importância da doutrina Monroe, pilar da política externa de Washington: não se trata, notam os editorialistas, de intervir no Brasil e de desempenhar o papel de polícia da América Latina, mas de impedir que as potências europeias imponham a sua solução aos brasileiros.

Quase ninguém consegue explicar as origens desta guerra civil que apresentam como um conflito entre os dois ramos das Forças Armadas e/ou uma luta entre as ambições de Custódio de Melo, apoiado pelas forças conservadoras

e reacionárias e de Floriano Peixoto, respaldado pelo Exército e por uma boa parte dos republicanos. Praticamente todos aplaudem o Governo de Washington quando este substitui o contra-almirante Stanton a 26 de outubro, porque, poucos dias antes, saudou os navios rebeldes

Muitos sublinham que o povo não está, de longe, preparado para este novo regime, proclamado por uma minoria de militares; lamentam sobretudo a importância do Exército e da Marinha na política brasileira e as lutas entre facções. Acham incompreensível que navios brasileiros possam bombardear a capital do país que deviam servir e proteger.

Todos estão conscientes que as notícias que chegam às redações são contraditórias, incompletas e difíceis de averiguar e chegam a acusar a Grã Bretanha de manipular as informações para enfraquecer o Governo do Rio.

Uma grande maioria dos analistas norte-americanos constata que o conflito não evolui e que está num impasse: os revoltosos não têm a possibilidade de desembarcar tropas para atacar as forças do Presidente ; por outro lado, este não tem navios para derrotar a frota que bloqueia o porto da capital.

É por isso que Floriano Peixoto manda emissários para comprar numa nova frota, principalmente nos Estado Unidos. É um tema que vários órgãos de imprensa analisam, quer do lado estritamente militar, quer do ponto de vista político e diplomático. Com efeito, o facto destes serem transformados em navios

militares no porto de Nova Iorque, pode pôr em causa o estatuto de neutralidade da república norte-americana.

No segundo volume, que trata dos outros quatro meses desta guerra civil, veremos, entre outros aspetos, que a forte presença naval de Washington, reclamada por vários articulistas americanos, terá um papel central no desenvolvimento e no fim desta luta entre o Presidente Floriano Peixoto e a frota rebelde, chefiada por Custódio de Melo e, a partir de dezembro, por Saldanha da Gama⁵.

⁵ Um agradecimento muito especial ao Francisco Mata pela atenta revisão dos textos destes dois volumes.

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Breve cronologia

(setembro-novembro 1893)

6 de setembro: início da Revolta; o almirante Coelho Neto, chefe do estado-maior da Armada, visita os comandantes dos navios de nacionalidade inglesa, francesa, italiana e portuguesa, solicitando apoio moral no sentido de evitar o bombardeamento do Rio de Janeiro, o que não foi aceite pelos diplomatas de tais países, que optaram por uma estrita reserva.

7 de setembro: o almirante Luís Filipe Saldanha da Gama, diretor da Escola Naval, adere ao movimento, manifestando simpatias monárquico.

13 de setembro: a esquadra revoltada bombardeia fortificações governamentais; Floriano Peixoto publica um manifesto, proclamando a resistência.

21 de setembro: Custódio de Melo revela a sua intenção de arrasar as docas da alfândega.

25 de setembro: o *Aquidabã* toma posição entre a ilha das Cobras e o Arsenal da Marinha, iniciando o bombardeamento, respondido pelas baterias dos morros de São Bento e Saúde.

29 de setembro: agravamento da situação, com o chefe rebelde anunciando operações em grande escala contra o forte de Santa Cruz, e no caso de resposta de terra, afirma que seria inevitável o bombardeamento do Rio; os comandantes estrangeiros procuram um meio de oferecer aos súbditos das suas nações uma

proteção eficaz, decidindo pela organização de uma brigada internacional, que ocuparia a linha do cais, a fim de dar cobertura aos estrangeiros que quisessem deixar o Rio de Janeiro.

30 de setembro: a possibilidade de bombardeamento gera pânico na cidade. A população procura deixar o Rio em busca de refúgio; o Ministro dos Negócios Estrangeiros da Inglaterra, consegue a adesão de Portugal, França, Itália, Holanda e Estados Unidos para um pronunciamento coletivo em defesa do Rio de Janeiro.

2 de outubro: os comandantes estrangeiros informam Melo de que se oporiam, inclusive pela força, ao bombardeamento da cidade. Garantem que as forças governamentais não irão promover qualquer pretexto de hostilidade; o governo assume de bom grado o compromisso.

4 de outubro: os comandantes estrangeiros reforçam a exigência quanto à retirada de baterias de defesa da cidade.

5 de outubro: *Entente* promovida a partir da diplomacia estrangeira. Durante três meses, o Rio de Janeiro assistirá a um permanente duelo de artilharia entre os rebeldes e as fortalezas governamentais, perante a esquadra estrangeira, arvorada em juiz supremo da pendência, resolvendo as desinteligências diárias, julgando reclamações e apontando, em cada caso, a origem da provocação ou da violação do acordo.

14 de outubro: Frederico Lorena instala em Desterro o Governo Provisório da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil.

15 de outubro: os rebeldes reclamam do uso por parte das forças governamentais de um poderoso holofote; os diplomatas estrangeiros conseguem convencer o governo a retirar o equipamento.

20 de outubro: Custódio de Melo informa o almirante francês que atacaria o Arsenal de Guerra como represália à manobra governamental; os diplomatas estrangeiros tentam uma mediação.

21 de outubro: O Contra-Almirante Oscar F. Stanton, chefe da esquadra americana, entre na baía do Rio de Janeiro. É demitido das suas funções cinco dias depois, por ter saudado os navios rebeldes e tido uma entrevista com Custódio de Melo.

24 de outubro: o governo nega as acusações dos rebeldes quanto a atividades ilícitas na defesa cidadina.

3 de novembro: explosão de um depósito de munições dos rebeldes na Ilha do Governador. Morrem treze revoltosos e entre quatro a oito ingleses. (As fontes divergem)

8 de novembro: o governo brasileiro reclama junto à *Entente* quanto a manobras realizadas pelos rebeldes.

1. *The Daily Picayune*, 7 de setembro

Telegrama na 1ª página do jornal que anuncia a revolta na baía do Rio de Janeiro e o corte das comunicações telegráficas. Praticamente todos os jornais publicam estas duas informações neste dia ou na sexta-feira dia 8.

Valparaiso, Sept. 6. — A correspondent from Montevideo telegraphs that the officers of the naval fleet now at Rio Janeiro, Brazil, intimated to President Peixoto that he should resign. The fleet consists of the cruisers *Aquidabã*, *Republica* and *Trajan* and three torpedo boats. The demand of the officers was made by Admiral Custodio José Melo.

In the fortress of Santa Cruz is stationed a garrison loyal to the Peixoto administration. They are under fighting orders, and are awaiting an attack on the fort by the squadron. The port of Rio de Janeiro has been blockaded. News has been received officially announcing the reports of the revolt.

All communication with Rio has been prohibited by the government.

2. *The Evening Star*, 8 de setembro

Este vespertino faz duas manchetes⁶ sobre os recentes acontecimentos na capital brasileira, publica um telegrama vindo de Paris e um longo despacho do correspondente do New York Herald em Valparaiso. Este documento confirma a sublevação, o facto do Exército e dos que estão no Forte de Santa Cruz ter ficado fiel ao presidente e a suspensão do telégrafo.

⁶ Cf. Figuras 5 e 6.




Fig. 1 : *The Pittsburg Press*



Fig. 2 : *The Times Democrat*

Manchetes na primeira página sobre o Brasil já a 7 de setembro.

Paris, Sept. 8. – A dispatch from Rio Janeiro says that at the instance of the French commander the foreign admirals in Brazilian waters have decided to prevent the bombardments of the city by the revolutionary squadron.

The *New York Herald's* Valparaiso, Chile, correspondent cables:

Latest advices received here from the seat of the revolt in Brazil state that the army still remains loyal to Peixoto, and that the artillery in the fortress of Santa Cruz, which commands the entrance to the bay, are under fighting orders and will not await an attack by the squadron, as was first intended, but will open fire upon the men-of-war if they come anywhere within range.

One cause of the suspension of telegraphic communication to or from Rio Janeiro by the Brazilian authorities is the fear of Peixoto's government that if the news of the naval revolt should travel south from the capital it would give a new impetus to the revolution in Rio Grande do Sul.

In fact, there is every probability that the state of Santa Catarina will now throw in its lot with the Rio Grande rebels, anyway, and join forces with them against the president.

Affairs are reported to be in a very unsettled and unsatisfactory state in Santos also.

The feeling here is that little short of a general and prolonged revolution faces President Peixoto, and this is strengthened by the suspension of telegraphic communications of all kinds with Rio Janeiro, because in former troubles of a similar nature the restriction placed on cable dispatches by Brazil has been confined to messages in cipher. The fact that the present embargo applies to the capital only is taken to mean that the trouble is still wholly confined to the vicinity of Rio.

Well-informed Brazilian in Valparaiso, however, who are friendly to Peixoto's government, declare themselves perfectly confident of his ability to bring the rival revolvers to terms, though even they admit he will hardly be able to prevent a bombardment of Rio Janeiro by men-of-war.

3. *The Times-Democrat*, 8 de setembro

O jornal da Luisiana publica também na primeira página as notícias telegráficas sobre os recentes acontecimentos no Rio de Janeiro.

Special to *The Times-Democrat*.

Valparaiso, Chile, Sept. 7.— (By Mexican cable to the *New York Herald*) — News which I sent you yesterday of the revolt of the Brazilian naval squadron in the harbor of Rio Janeiro because President Peixoto had vetoed the bill which made it impossible for the Vice President to become President, is fully confirmed today by an official dispatch from Rio to the Chilean government. The latest advices received here from the site of revolt state that the army still remains loyal to Peixoto, and that the artillery in the fortress of Santa Cruz, which commands the entrance to the bay, are under fighting orders and will not await attack by the squadron, as was at first intended, but will open fire upon the-men-of-war if they come anywhere within range.

[...]⁷

STATE OF SIEGE DECLARED

The *Herald* correspondent in Montevideo telegraphs that the Brazilian legation there has received a telegram from the Minister of Marine in Rio Janeiro saying that a state of siege has been formally declared in the capital. The government, it adds, counts

⁷ Publica a seguir o mesmo telegrama que *The Evening Star* (cf. Texto 2).

on the support of the army and the majority of the naval officers. It sets much store also by the garrisons in the forts. The foreign gunboats in the harbor are prepared, under the command of the French Admiral, to defend the city against bombardment. The provinces support the Federal government in this affair, and though there are rumors of a general rising against Peixoto, yet these reports lack confirmation. It is generally believed that the city of Rio itself is remaining quiet.

Latest advices received in Montevideo are to the effect that Peixoto has declared he will spend his last cartridge in defeating the revolt and will proclaim himself dictator if necessary.

Another dispatch says that without coming within range of the guns of Fort Santa Cruz or giving the artillerymen there a chance to open fire on it, the rebel squadron has put to sea and sailed for parts unknown. The Brazilian warships *Bahia* and *Tiradentes*, stationed at Montevideo, and all the rest of the navy remain firmly loyal to Peixoto.

Official Notification of the Revolt in the Navy

By Associated Press:

Rome, Sept. 7. — An official dispatch from Rio Janeiro says:

The Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs has informed the representatives of foreign countries that the naval squadron has revolted against the government, which, he said, was strong enough to maintain order. The dispatch added that the government would be able to prevent any attempt that might be made to bombard Rio Janeiro. The dispatch states that the Italian cruiser *Bausan* has arrived at Rio Janeiro and that the *Dogali* is on her way there.

Rio de Janeiro, Sept. 7.— The diplomatists of the foreign vessels now here on the French squadron have decided to interfere if the insurgent fleet attempts to bombard the city.

SOLDIERS ARE LOYAL.

**President Peixoto Believed to be
Able to Bring the Naval Revolu-
tionists to Terms.**

THE SITUATION AT RIO JANEIRO, BRAZIL

**Great Dissatisfaction Felt in Several States
of That Country—Report That the Reb-
els Will Unite Against the Govern-
ment—Suppressing News.**

Fig. 3 : *The Buffalo Commercial*

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

**Revolution Among Naval
Officers in Brazil.**

**They Call Upon President Peixoto
to Resign.**

**The Port of Rio Janeiro Block-
aded.**

Fig. 4 : *The Weekly Times-Democrat*

A 8 de setembro, os acontecimentos no Brasil continuam em destaque nas primeiras páginas dos jornais norte-americanos.

4. *The Morning Call*, 8 de setembro

Tragicomédia no Rio!

The liberties of republican government are sacredly guarded in Brazil, now by the army, then by the navy, and occasionally by both and a mob of improvised insurgents at the same time. Some little pleasantry of this serio-comic character is now being enacted. President Peixoto has been requested by the crews of three cruisers and three torpedo-boats at Rio do resign. If he stays in their neighborhood they may compel him. Dictatorism has a bad effect on citizenship.

5. «The Trouble in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 8 de setembro

O articulista toma logo consciência de que se trata de uma revolta de uma certa importância e, sobretudo, perigosa para Floriano Peixoto: a marinha é um corpo muito disciplinado, tem, entre outros, «três formidáveis navios de guerra», tem a possibilidade de bloquear o principal porto do país, e pode receber ajudas do Rio Grande do Sul.

Para os Estados Unidos, este conflito ameaça o abastecimento de café e vai travar o aumento das exportações americanas para o Brasil, lamenta o jornal da Luisiana.

Scarcely has a reasonable hope that the long revolution in Southern Brazil would soon come to an end been entertained, when news of another and still more serious outbreak in that distracted republic is received. This time the trouble is of the gravest possible nature, and from present indications it does not

appear likely that the rebellion can be quelled without serious bloodshed, if it can be quelled at all.

The latest Brazilian revolution has taken place at the capital, Rio de Janeiro, itself, and revolutionary force consists of the naval squadron assembled there. Ever since the rebellion of Admiral Waldenkolk [*sic!*] the loyalty of the navy has been under suspicion. The officers of the fleet at Rio, which consists of three formidable warships, and as many more torpedo boats, demand the resignation of President Peixoto and his ministry.

Owing to the difficulty of transporting troops, and the generally unsettled state of public opinion in Brazil, the revolt of so well-disciplined a body as the navy constitutes a serious menace to the existing order of things in Brazil. It will be remembered that it was a similar revolt of the naval force which accomplished the overthrow of Marshal Fonseca. It will also be remembered that at the time of the overthrow of Dom Pedro and his empire the navy took no active part in the movement, and for a long time the loyalty of the naval force to the new regime was suspected.

Although it appears that the rebellion, so far, is limited to the naval force stationed at Rio, there can be little doubt that the entire naval establishment will sympathize with the rebellion and make common cause against the Government. Brazil has a comparatively strong navy, consisting of a number of iron-clad battle ships and cruisers, as well as gunboats and torpedo vessels. This fleet would be able to pretty thoroughly blockade the leading Brazilian ports, and, as the fleet would unquestionably receive assistance from the southern province

of Rio Grande do Sul and other disaffected sections, the revolt would have very much the same general chance of success as had the contest against Balmaceda in Chile two years ago.

A serious civil contest in Brazil would be a most regrettable matter from every point of view. It would seriously interfere with the importations of coffee into this country, which are annual very extensive. It would, also, check the steadily improving demand from Brazil for American products.

While Brazil is engaged with a revolution at home, she is also threatened with a serious struggle with the neighboring Republic of Uruguay. The massacre of certain Uruguayan subjects by Brazilian troops has aroused the ire of the little republic, and a strong demand from satisfaction has been made upon the Brazilian Government. The trouble at home will probably determine the authorities at Rio to make the necessary reparation demanded by Uruguay.

6. *The St.Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 de setembro

O problema do Brasil é que tem uma república, mas só de nome.

Brazil seems to have gained nothing but the name of a republic by the deposition of poor Dom Pedro. Perhaps it would have been better for the cause of liberty had the change in the form of government been postponed until a revolution might have been accomplished without giving rise to military factions and sectional discord.

7. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 8 de setembro

O café, o eterno símbolo do Brasil!

A revolution in Brazil ? Lay in your stock of coffee now.

8. «The Common Fate», *Oakland Tribune*, 9 de setembro

Afinal, o Brasil, que funcionava bem durante o reinado de D. Pedro II, não foge à regra: como as outras repúblicas na América Latina, precisa de «anos de sangue e de dores de parto antes de aprender», de violências, de guerra civil, antes de aprender, e mal, o que é o autogoverno. Neste caso, considera que se trata de uma luta entre o exército e a marinha e prevê uma vitória dos revoltosos.

O diário californiano acusa claramente os agentes monárquicos de serem a causa de toda a instabilidade do país. Na sua opinião, as intrigas dos defensores do antigo regime estão também por trás desta última revolta da marinha.

Brazil seems to be showing the fate common to all the Latin-American republics. In fact it seems a practicable impossibility for men of the blood going to make up the nations south of us to learn the lesson of self-government without long years of blood and travail, and even then to learn it so imperfectly that government can only be administered in peace by a man of remarkable strength. Only Diaz has made order possible in Mexico, and the Chileans, the Yankees of the South, have not been without their little episodes going to make life exciting. But it has seemed, heretofore, that Brazil was to be exempt from the

TROUBLE IN BRAZIL.

**American Coffee Merchants Are Said to
Be Seriously Affected.**

**No Warship There Except the Yantic-
Secretary Gresham's Dispatch to
the United States Minister.**

Fig. 5

RIO TO BE PROTECTED

**Decision of Foreign Admirals in
Brazilian Waters.**

ARMY FAITHFUL TO THE PRESIDENT.

**Rumors of Dissatisfaction Through-
out the Republic.**

SUSPENDING COMMUNICATION

Fig. 6




Fig 7

A 8 de setembro, na primeira página, *The Evening Star* publica duas manchetes sobre o Brasil e um retrato pouco parecido de Floriano Peixoto.

common fate. Under the Braganzas the land was well-governed, peaceful and prosperous, and the ruler was well-beloved. The whole spectacle, indeed, formed an object of lesson to the old world and the new, the more emphatic from the constant turbulence of the republics all about it. That Dom Pedro loved his people is unquestioned, for he gave up his crown without a struggle, because he thought they desired to be free of him, deeming that perhaps they might be happier so, and went out to face poverty such as is not always the lot of dethroned monarchs. It mattered little to the Brazilians that he died of a broken heart afterwards, and perhaps it mattered as little to the Emperor. He had rather to be dead than banished from the loved associations of a lifetime. But the spectacle was one of the most pathetic of contemporaneous history.

The Brazilian, left to their own devices, have been no more peaceful and no less turbulent than their neighbors. In one part of the realm or another the fires of civil war have been constantly kept alight since Dom Pedro was deposed, and neighbors who theretofore dwelt in harmony have fallen as naturally into the habit of shooting down their neighbors, as if, like other Latin-Americans, they had done nothing else in their lives. It has been hinted, since the death of the Emperor, that the intrigues leading to these rebellions in various parts of the country have had their origin and that agents everywhere were at work in the interest of the Braganza line for restoration of the empire with the crown upon the head of Dom Pedro's daughter, Maria Pio [*sic*]. The latest revolt, too, bears internal evidence of an inspiration entirely without the borders of the republic. As was the recent Chilean war, resulting in the downfall

of Balmaceda, it is a struggle between the army and the navy – and as in the Chilean war, it is likely the navy will win by sheer force of superior organization, and because of the facility which the ships can get from one part of the country to another, Brazil being a land settled, for the most part, along the sea coast. The naval officers have summoned President Peixoto to surrender, and at last accounts were threatening to bring the forts of Rio down about his ears if he did not resign his office. The alleged cause of the trouble is the vetoing of a law relative to the Presidential succession, but that would seem to be a matter in which the navy has little interest. The real cause will be found to be vastly different from that, if it is ever found at all, and the whole episode bears much more strongly the stamp of an imperial intrigue than could any local revolt in an obscure promise. The husband of the daughter of Dom Pedro, it should be remembered, is a Bourbon, and no Bourbon ever sat upon a throne with grace or surrendered one without a struggle in which the element of intrigue played a prominent part.

9. «Where practical politics is needed»,
Elvira Gazette and Free Press, 9 de setembro.

Florian Peixoto «tem muito a fazer», nota o quotidiano da cidade de Elvira: já preocupado com a Guerra Federalista no Rio Grande do Sul, tem agora de enfrentar a revolta da marinha.

O editorialista nota, com uma certa ironia, que estas lutas violentas irão parar quando os cidadãos das repúblicas latino-americanas tomarem conta do facto que, nas lutas e nas disputas eleitorais, também se pode brigar. Naquela altura, os combates políticos irão substituir as guerras civis.

President Peixoto of Brazil has his hands full. He was having hard enough work to put down the revolution in Rio Grande do Sul. The revolt of the fleet, which is blockading Rio Janeiro and threatening to bombard the city, is very annoying.

Brazil has not behaved handsomely since the overthrow of Dom Pedro. Da Fonseca, who engineered the revolution against monarchy, quarreled with the Congress, closed the chambers by force, and proclaimed himself dictator. The fleet and the army compelled him to resign. The vice-president, Peixoto, succeeded him, but has had a hard time coping with insurrectionary disorders in various parts of the country. Now the navy is in rebellion.

The great trouble with South American countries professing republicanism is that they have not learned the satisfactions of battles at the polls. Politics is not so much a diversion and occupation as in this country, nor the ballot box as intelligent and efficacious settler of disputes. These disorders will continue in all South American countries until ambition turns more to the practical variety often lamented in the United States. Management of parties and contest at the ballot box afford a satisfactory exhaust for contentious spirit. The South Americans do not know this yet, but they may in time. When the aspiring have learned that political manipulation is sufficiently exciting, is as good a means of rise, much safer to the individual and infinitely less damaging to the country, then we may expect hotter civil contests with the result of less frequent resort to violent revolution. The *animi* outletting in civil wars need

diversion into practical politics. South America may then hope for the quietude of the United States.

10. *The Brooklyn Daily Citizen*, 9 de setembro

Se as grandes potências intervierem para evitar o bombardeamento da capital brasileira, haverá uma espécie de protetorado, garante da paz. Isso seria muito positivo para «o comércio, para a civilização» e para os próprios habitantes do Brasil, sublinha o quotidiano.

The determination of the foreign admirals in Brazilian waters to prevent the bombardment of Rio by the revolting navy practically establishes a protectorate in Brazil, and until orders from their governments are received will result in maintaining the President in power. If this action of the foreign admirals be sustained by their government it will be easy to make protectorate permanent and thus bring peace to that disturbed country. In the interests of trade and commerce, of civilization and of the people of the distracted countries of Central and South America, an agreement of all the civilized powers that would put an end to the at present ever-recurring revolutions in all of them ought to be arrived at. [...]

11. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 9 de setembro

Apesar dos despachos publicados na imprensa, o cônsul brasileiro em Nova Iorque assume o papel do «incrédulo Tomé» e afirma que está tudo «tranquilo» no seu país.

The Brazilian Consul at New York professes to doubt the news received from his country, because he has had no information of trouble in Brazil. Nearly all representatives of South American countries are called upon at some time or other to act the role of the "unbelieving Thomas," but when newspapers of the standing of *The New York Herald* receive and publish daily dispatches declaring that there is a revolutionary uprising, the public may depend upon it that trouble exists, even if the official representatives of Brazil make themselves black in the face protesting that everything is serene.

12. *The San Francisco Call*, 9 de setembro

President Peixoto of Brazil is not yet between two fires, because the army is not with the navy in demanding his resignation. But affairs are evidently very much perturbed. There has been a struggle to get the command of the telegraphic wires, which, according to the party in possession, generally announce tremendous victories, and in a year or two almost slay the whole population. But the wires are now cut around Rio.

13. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 9 de setembro

Brazil got along better as an empire than as a republic. This, however, is no indictment against republics, but only against Brazil.

14. *The Chicago Tribune*, 9 de setembro

In the number of its yearly revolutions Brazil's only successful competitor is the earth.

15. «The Revolt in Brazil», *The Sun*, 10 de setembro

O quotidiano de Nova Iorque começa por comparar esta revolta dum parte da marinha brasileira com a da marinha chilena na primavera de 1891, afirmando que este corpo das Forças Armadas tem muito poder político na América do Sul. Depois de ter lembrado que a frota de Custódio de Melo esteve na revista naval no porto de Nova Iorque, apresenta os principais navios da marinha brasileira. No fim do artigo, interroga-se sobre a dimensão da revolta e sobre uma hipotética aliança com os federalistas do Rio Grande.

A peculiarity of the republics to the south of us is once more illustrated by the events of the past week at Rio Janeiro. As in the spring of 1891 the greater part of the Chilean navy raised the standard of revolt against BALMACEDA in the port of Valparaiso, so now a portion of the Brazilian navy at Rio Janeiro has declared against President PEIXOTO. The parallel goes still further; for, as the Chilean army meanwhile remained true to BALMACEDA, so the Brazilian army continues loyal to PEIXOTO. And still further, as the Chilean fleet put off from Valparaiso to establish for the Congress party a base of belligerent operations distant from the capital, so now Admiral MELO'S squadron is reported to have left Rio Janeiro to seize Santos, with a view to joining the rebel cause in Rio Grande

do Sul. In the South American republics the navy is often an important political factor, being able to pull down and to put up Governments.

To the people of the United States this outbreak will possess a peculiar interest, not only because of its possible effect on our commercial interests in Brazil, and on our merchant marine engaged in trade with that country, but from the fact that two vessels of Admiral MELO'S squadron were among our guests at the naval review in New York harbor. Certainly no one then foresaw that the powerful *Aquidaban*, whose heavy armor and potent 9-inch rifles gave her a very high rank in the international array, and her smaller but faster consort, the *Republica*, would within a few months be declared outlaws, and be found starting an insurrection in Brazil. Besides these special points of interest in the current events, the well being, peace, and prosperity of that country must always be a matter of interest to us, and all the more so now, since within a few years Brazil has taken the great steps of overthrowing both slavery and monarchy.

Breaks in telegraphic communication have made it difficult to know exactly how far the revolt has spread in the navy, and exactly what support has been given to it among the people, either on the coast or in the interior. It is plain, however, that if the fleet as a whole, or even excluding the vessels now at Montevideo, should join in the insurrection, it would command a formidable force. The *Riachuelo*, the prototype of our own *Maine*, with her combination of good speed, this water-line and turret armor and powerful battery, was considered in her day the best-around armored cruiser in the world. The *Solimoes* and the *Javary*, French-build vessels, are a pair of light-draught, double

turret armor-clads, having about 3,600 tons displacement, with twelve inches of armor and carrying each four 10 ¼ inch Withworth rifles. The *Sete de Setembro*, *Mariz e Barros*, and *Bahia* are smaller armor-clads, and there are several little river monitors. Among the unarmored cruisers is the *Almirante Tamandaré*, which was, when launched at Rio in 1890, the largest vessel ever built in South America, having a displacement of 4,735 tons, a speed of 17 knots, and a powerful battery. The *Benjamin Constant* is another modern cruiser of good qualities. The *Tiradentes* was one of our visitors at the naval review. The *Barroso*, *Trajano*, and others might be mentioned. The personnel last year, including the marine corps and apprentices, exceeded 6,500 officers and men.

But it is by no means certain that the revolt is general in the navy. Information received indicates, indeed that some of the vessels are loyal to PEIXOTO, and very likely the naval arsenals and the river gunboats might not join in a movement of the cruising fleet. On the other hand, whatever the extent of the defection of the fleet, it may become formidable through striking an alliance with the revolutionists of Rio Grande do Sul. This State has a population of perhaps two-thirds of a million people, and over one-fourth of the number are from central Europe. It has maintained a revolt now for a long time, in spite of all efforts at conciliation, and its situation makes its subjugation a difficult task. When FONSECA was overthrown it was thought that Rio Grande do Sul might give cordial support to his successor, PEIXOTO, but the hope has been disappointed.

The people of the United States will heartily wish for Brazil a speed and happy issue out of the series of political troubles and revolutions which have

beset her so persistently ever since Dom PEDRO was overthrown and the republic was set up.

16. «The Brazilian Family Quarrel», *The Times*, 10 de setembro

O quotidiano de Filadélfia não hesita: as potências estrangeiras têm de intervir de uma maneira ou de outra para pôr termo a esta revolta, que prejudica o comércio internacional, e, sobretudo, para evitar que o Rio seja bombardeado.

The somewhat hazy information comes from Rio Janeiro to the effect that the *de facto* government has stopped all telegraphic communication with the outside world for fear the news will encourage more revolution, while the existing rebels, who have possession of the Brazilian navy, propose to bombard Rio Janeiro if President Peixoto doesn't resign. To checkmate the designs of the embittered combatants, the foreign legations at Rio are disposed to demand the reopening of cable communication by the Brazilian government and to call on the admirals of their respective fleets to make the rebel Brazilian navy behave itself.

Assuming that this approximately describes the Brazilian situation, it indicates that under modern conditions a nation important enough to maintain general commercial relations with the outside world cannot be allowed the luxury of an old-fashioned rebellion or the privilege of dealing with rebels in its own way. The produce marts of the rest of the world propose to know the price

of coffee and hides in Brazil or know the reason why, and the foreign residents of Rio do not mean to allow every Brazilian rebel to shell the town they live and do business in if they can induce their diplomats to interfere.

It will be interesting to watch the success of this sort of foreign intervention in the Brazilian family quarrel. Applied to quarreling individuals this sort of arbitration usually fails unless one or both of the belligerent parties are locked up in the county jail. There doesn't seem to be any county jail available for this purpose in connection with the Brazilian *imbroglio*.

17. *New York Tribune*, 10 de setembro

A presença de vários navios estrangeiros devia ser suficiente para impedir um bombardeamento da capital brasileira.

Although official dispatches received at the State Department yesterday from Brazil announce that there is danger of the bombardment of Rio de Janeiro by the revolutionary fleet, and that martial law has been declared at the national capital, yet there is every reason to hope that the presence of the large number of foreign cruisers lying at anchor in port for the purpose of protecting the life and property of the large colony of foreigners established in the Brazilian capital will have the effect of preventing any attack by the insurgents upon the city. Under the circumstances there should be small cause of anxiety on the part of those of our readers who may happen to have relatives or friends at Rio.

18. *The Sioux City Journal*, 10 de setembro

Southern Brazil is again suffering an attack of the peculiar political *cholera infantum* that has more than once threatened the future of the young republic.

19. «The Troubles at Rio», *The New York Times*, 11 de setembro

Na primeira parte, o editorialista descreve a potência de fogo de quatro navios da marinha americana e espera que, a médio prazo, juntamente com os outros vasos de guerra, possam evitar um bombardeamento do Rio de Janeiro.

Fala a seguir do veto de Peixoto à lei votada pelo Congresso que queria impedir ao vice-presidente de se tornar chefe de Estado, decisão que parece ser a causa imediata da sublevação dum parte da frota. Justifica a proclamação de lei marcial mas, por falta de informações, não pode avaliar corretamente a dimensão e a força desta revolta.

Lamentando a instabilidade política da jovem república, põe também em evidência as dificuldades suplementares para os negociantes de café do seu país. Finalmente, como o seu colega de The Sun⁸, relewa que uma eventual aliança dos revoltosos com os federalistas destabilizaria o governo brasileiro.

The revolt of a portion of the Brazilian Navy against the Government of President PEIXOTO makes still another call upon our fleet for the protection of American interests and property. It happens that for a long time our only vessel regularly on the South Atlantic station has been the small wooden craft *Yantic*, of 900 tons displacement, carrying a pair of nine-inch smoothbores, an eight-

⁸ Cf. Texto 15.

inch muzzle-loading rifle, and a sixty-pounder breech-loader. Her station at Montevideo, and her complement is about 154 officers and men. But it fortunately happens that the *Charleston*, a fine steel cruiser of 4,040 tons and 18 knots speed, with a main battery of two eight-inch and six six-inch high-power rifles, is somewhere in Brazilian waters. She has probably touched at Rio Janeiro on her way to Montevideo, she can there be recalled. The *Yorktown* was also at Montevideo Sept. 1, on her way to the Pacific. Finally, the *Newark*, selected as Admiral STANTON's⁹ flagship on the South Atlantic station, is to be hurried away this week from Norfolk where she is fitting out. She is a 19-knot cruiser, of 4,083 tons displacement, carrying twelve six-inch rifles.

The movement which has caused this preparation in our own navy and induced the Italians to dispatch the *Dogali* from Bahia to Rio has led the war ships of foreign powers now there to take measures to prevent the threatened bombardment of the city. It recalls, as has been suggested, Chile's recent civil conflict, with the legislative arrayed against the executive power, and the former supported by the navy. The Brazilian Congress, it is said, recently passed a law to prevent the Vice President from becoming President, which seems to have been aimed against Peixoto, who promptly met it with a veto. It is asserted that this veto was the particular act that caused the revolt of the squadron lying in port, after demanding that the President should resign. The cutting of telegraphic communication and the placing of the capital under martial law

⁹ Oscar F. Stanton (1834-1924) entra na Marinha em 1849 onde fica até 1894. Participa ainda na Guerra Hispano-americana de 1898.

dropped a curtain on the scene at a critical moment and left the outside world in doubt as to how far the insurrection of the ships had been countenanced, supported, or followed on the shore. It is not even clear how much of the navy has joined in the rebellion; and it is recalled that not long ago the demonstration of a Brazilian Admiral against Peixoto Government was put down by naval forces.

The Brazilian representative at Paris has issued a statement denouncing the naval revolt on the ground that the President had in no way violated the Constitution. His assumption is, apparently, that the exercise of the veto power by the President had been in the ordinary course of his prerogative. However the facts may turn out to be, the action of the squadron justified the Government in putting the city under martial law, and that, in turn makes it uncertain to what extent the rebellion has spread. It is difficult to imagine that a portion of the navy should, without support from an influential part of the Government of the people, undertake such a revolt. The meager dispatches sent out by the Government do not, however, minimize the revolt, although they indicate that the President relies on the army and also on a part of the navy.

It was natural that the first announcement of the naval revolt should be followed by the surmise that the vessels would go south to communicate with the rebellion which has prevailed so long in Rio Grande do Sul. Such a coalition, it is true, would hardly be based on identical grievances or ambition, but it would add to the Government's perplexities. Brazil has had a stormy and trying initiation in popular government, and her prolonged troubles under her new

political system may well excite sympathy. Our merchants dealing with that country, particularly in the coffee trade, naturally have pecuniary interests at stake, but even people who are not thus concerned would be sorry to see the republic rent by factions and threatened with civil war.

20. «Brazil's latest» *The Pittsburg Post*, 11 de setembro

Trata-se de uma luta entre a marinha e o exército cujo objetivo é pilhar os cargos públicos, resume o jornalista que analisa o problema de fundo: a república foi feita «por políticos ávidos» e «egoístas» e não por uma revolta popular. Por conseguinte, os dirigentes republicanos brasileiros pensam só nos seus interesses e aproveitam-se da apatia da população, realça o jornal da Pensilvânia, que parece lamentar a mudança de regime em novembro de 1889.

The interruption of the ordinary channels of communication between this country and Brazil renders it impossible to get at reliable details of the revolution or revolt against President PEIXOTO now in progress. But from what is known of the condition of the country, and what has been learned of this latest movement, it may apparently be best summarized as an armed struggle for the spoils of office, in which the navy sides with the power that be and the army with those want to be.

That the upsetting of the empire and the institution of a republic was managed by ambitious politicians rather than the result of any spontaneous uprising among the people has long been evident; and the troubles since that change has been caused by similar selfish strife among the place-hunters. While

every American holds the belief that a republic is the one and only ideal form of government, it is doubtful whether Brazil as a whole would not have a more prosperous country today if Dom PEDRO's reign had never been interrupted.

As matters now stand the country is liable to be torn up more or less by civil strife until some adventurer turns up with ability and strength sufficient to hold his competitors in check as a ruler with power approaching absolute despotism, under the title of president, dictator or emperor – the name makes little difference. There is not much that is more than theoretically democratic about the present government of Brazil, and its people manifest little of the inclination which is the first essential of self-government.

21. *The Brooklyn Citizen*, 11 de setembro

É só graças à intervenção dos navios das grandes potências que o presidente Peixoto, «fanfarrão» e arrogante, ainda está no poder, afirma o quotidiano.

The boastful tone assumed by President Peixoto, of Brazil, concerning the insurgents, according to late dispatches, is not warranted by the facts. The insurgent navy is not bottled up in Rio harbor, as alleged, by the forts, but if foreign men-of-war had not interfered, would before this have laid the city in ruins and driven the braggart President out; and if it be true that many of the naval officers have yielded allegiance to him, it is only because they know that the revolt cannot succeed if foreign powers interfere at all. It is not a matter of any

consequences here, or perhaps there, which gang of adventurers is on top; but it is worthwhile to keep the truth in view all the time.

22. *The Buffalo Courier*, 11 de setembro

De República, o Brasil tem só o nome !!

Brazil may be less of an Empire now than it was four years ago, but is not more of a Republic at present that it was at that time. It is not a government of law, liberty, and order – it is not a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.

23. «The Why of Revolutions», *The Times*, 13 de setembro

As muitas revoluções dos «nossos vizinhos meridionais» parecem ter um único objetivo: permitir aos jornais de países mais calmos e que lidam com uma «atualidade política monótona», de encherem as páginas com notícias mais cativantes. Dessa forma, satisfazem às exigências da imprensa, a «alavanca da civilização», nota com sarcasmo e ironia o jornal de Filadélfia que acrescenta: um dia vai haver uma rubrica intitulada, «Do nosso correspondente especializado nas frequentes revoluções».

It was once thought that South America might have been designed for some other purpose than merely to fill up the dull political season elsewhere with news of revolutions. Valuable as its product in this respect may be, in furnishing matter for the newspapers of less eruptive regions, it was hard to

conclude that so big a section of the continent had been exclusively set apart for such an object. It may be said that a cable dispatch announcing another revolt in Brazil or a rising in Nicaragua makes entertaining reading when prosperity dishes up, but the same encomium could be passes upon a well described slugging match or the story of a dog fight.

As those localities, however, around and beyond the equator are seldom or never heard of excepting when throwing down one government and setting up another, the balance proof unquestionably seems to favor the idea that giving work to the news cables is their sole reason for being. If this is the right view of the case it undeniably brings out the importance of the public journal in strong relief and more than solidifies its claim to be one of the greatest – it not the greatest – of the agencies of modern progress. That a people should become dissatisfied with a ruling party or a dynasty, and proceed to smash things in order that the citizen of the United States may be able to peruse his favorite sheet with additional interest at breakfast, is the grandest tribute ever paid to that mighty lever of civilization, the press.

As there appears no other reason visible for the persistence series of revolutions indulged in by our Southern neighbors, the supposition put forth must obtain till a better is supplied. As the outs offer no particular excuse for wanting to get in, and the ins can give no satisfactory reason why they shouldn't go out, the thing goes back to general principles, and these principles seem to have a sound foundation in that mentioned.

True, this theory has not yet become extensively known, but it may spread in time and the day come when the department "From Our Regular Revolution Correspondent" will be as common in all well-conducted newspapers as are "Weather Probabilities" or «"Local Affaires" today.

24. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 13 de setembro

O quotidiano californiano – que, nesse aspecto, contradiz o New York Times¹⁰ – lamenta que os Estados Unidos não tenham nenhum navio que possa intervir a curto prazo na baía do Rio de Janeiro. E tudo isso por culpa do Partido Democrata.

The insurgents in Brazil have had an encounter with the Government troops in which they suffered a defeat, if the dispatches to the Brazilian Minister are trustworthy. According to the accounts received the land forces remain loyal to the Government, but the rebels have possession of the navy. The war vessels of Germany, England and France are hastening to Rio from Montevideo to protect the property and lives of foreign subjects. The cruiser *Yorktown* has just departed from Uruguay for the Straits of Magellan, so the United States has no vessel nearer than Nicaragua. The *Detroit*, which had just been ordered to the latter country, has been instructed to proceed at once to Rio, but cannot reach there for a month at least. The facts are not creditable to the country, but the condition of affairs is not improved so long as the Democratic party is in power,

¹⁰ Cf. Texto 16.

for it will take all of our rapidly diminishing revenues to pay the army of office-holders. It takes a protective tariff and confidence to make the country prosper and permit it to stand alongside other great powers.

25. *Asheville Daily Citizen*, 13 de setembro

O quotidiano da Carolina do Norte também lamenta que os navios americanos não possam chegar a breve prazo à baía do Rio de Janeiro.

A few weeks ago several fine representatives of the Brazilian navy came into New York harbor to help celebrate the anniversary of the discovery of this country. Now the guns of that same section of the same navy are turned against the capital of Brazil; so fast does the political situation of the South American republics change with the passing breeze. It will all be over in a days or two, and then the malcontents will begin to scheme for the next revolution. Meantime, our new navy does not shine in the supposed emergency. It has been thought necessary to have several United States vessels where they could be sent to Brazil on short notice; but now that they are wanted the Secretary of the Navy has not been able to reach any of them by telegraph to hurry them to Rio Janeiro.

26. «The Threatened Bombardment of Rio», *The Times Picayune*, 14 de setembro

O diário da Luisiana lamenta que a própria frota brasileira ameace a sua capital. Comparando esta situação com a que viveu Buenos Aires sete anos

antes, o editorialista de Nova Orleães considera que, se acontecer, os estragos de um eventual bombardeamento do Rio seriam muito maiores.

According to the dispatches from South America, the rebel fleet, which has been hemmed in the Bay of Rio for some time past, has given notice to all the foreign representatives that it would proceed to bombard the forts defending the city of Rio and the city itself on Wednesday morning, Sept. 13. It is reported that the rebels propose first to attack the forts, and, in the event of silencing them, to attack the city itself.

It is not stated whether or not the foreign representatives in Rio protested against the bombardment of the city, but it said that foreign warship and the shipping in the harbor to Rio have moved to places of safety out of the probable line of fire, and, although it is not specified, it may be assumed that arrangements have been made to protect the property and lives of foreigners.

It is much to be deplored that so populous and rich a city as Rio de Janeiro should be exposed to the horrors of bombardment in this enlightened age. It is bad enough to be exposed to destruction at the hands of a foreign enemy, but, in the present instance, Rio is threatened by its own fleet, and it may be questioned whether a considerable proportion of the people of Brazil are in sympathy with the rebellion which now promises the destruction of their magnificent capital.

The bombardment of Rio, if, indeed, that event should occur, has a parallel in the bombardment of Buenos Aires about seven years ago. In that case it was also a rebellious naval squadron that attacked the city, as a result of an outbreak

against the Government, in which the navy sided with the rebels. The Government in that instance was successfully overthrown, and it now remains to be seen whether the case of Rio will prove a parallel also in the result of the extinguishing of the Government of Brazil.

It is reported that the forts guarding the approach to Rio are manned by troops loyal to the Government, and that the land forces are all opposed to the rebellion. Should this prove to be the case, a desperate struggle may be looked for; but there is serious doubt as to the loyalty of the army, and it may prove at the last moment that the Government has been deceived as to the sympathies of the soldiery. If the garrison at Rio is secretly in sympathy with the course of the navy, as some believe, we may expect to see the forts given up without a serious struggle, and Rio thus spared the horror of a bombardment.

In the case of the bombardment of Buenos Aires, none of the attacking ships were of large size, hence the damage to the city was, comparatively speaking, light. The Brazilian fleet, however, is composed of large ships of modern built. They are armed with the heaviest guns, hence their fire cannot but prove exceedingly destructive. We very much doubt if the bombardment of the Brazilian capital under the existing circumstances can be justified in international law and usage. Considerable damage must necessarily result to foreign interests, and foreign complications will be sure to arise if the bombardment is persisted in.

27. «Republicanism in Disgrace», *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*,
14 de setembro

Este editorial constata «o triste espetáculo» dado pelo novo regime republicano. Trata-se de um problema de fundo, escreve o jornal da cidade de St. Louis: para chegar a um regime democrático, como nos Estados Unidos, é preciso tempo. Tem de se aprender com os erros, educar o povo e formar as elites. É preciso tempo: a França, por exemplo, precisou de 100 anos para atingir o objetivo. Por conseguinte, na América Latina, «não se trata do fracasso do republicanismo, mas do fracasso das pessoas que não sabem utilizá-lo corretamente».

Brazil has presented a sorry spectacle of republicanism for the jeers of monarchists since she exchanged a mild and liberal king for a series of tyrannous dictators. Torn by internal dissensions, racked by revolution and civil war and with her capital city in danger of being wrecked by contending forces of Brazilians she is a fit object of the finger of monarchical scorn.

Those, however, who find in the experience of wretched Brazil an argument against republicanism itself take a superficial and false view of the case. Brazil's history since the overthrow of the monarchy only emphasize the fact repeatedly demonstrated that capacity for free self-government comes by growth, not sudden conversion. It is accomplished not by revolution alone, but by a process of education in which self-restraint and the appreciation of the true aims and methods of government play an important part.

The American people worked out the problem of free republican government with comparative ease, because the principle of liberty and the

capacity for self-government had been nurtured and developed in them before the actual change took place. France, on the other hand, with eager aspiration for liberty, but without training, required nearly a century of experiment, and painful struggle to attain the capacity for its enjoyment. The experiences of all of the South and Central American republics illustrate this truth to a greater or less degree. Under the forms of liberty they suffer the ills of tyranny and continued revolution.

The failure of Brazil and her sister republics to attain peace and happiness under republican government is not due to a failure of republicanism, but to the failure of the people to make proper use of it. But their situation is not helpless. That they are struggling is an indication of growth. They are learning from failure how to win success. The education of the people is constantly going on. The better elements will gradually concentrate for good government and sound methods and they will find leaders who will work out their will with patriotic loyalty.

No mesmo número, o quotidiano do Missouri escreve este pequeno comentário:

When the Brazilian people make up their minds that they will not have dictators of any faction or kind Brazil will enjoy peace. The dictators are doing all in their power to help the people to this decision.

28. *The Daily American*, 14 de setembro

Contrariamente ao que dizem os despachos oficiais, não se trata de uma pequena revolta, realça o quotidiano de Nashville que, no entanto, tem a certeza que o Brasil será capaz de ultrapassar todas estas «perturbações».

The report received through channels controlled by the Brazilian Government to the effect that the portion of its navy which recently rebelled in the harbor of Rio Janeiro was “bottled up” and would soon surrender does not, it seem from later dispatches, correctly represent the situation. The insurgents are now reported to be decidedly on the aggressive, threatening both the capital and the ports at the entrance to the harbor with bombardment, and there is a prospect of the garrison of the forts weakening in loyalty to the Government. Whatever may be the exact state of affairs in Brazil, enough is known to show that the political upheaval in that country is serious, and that the ultimate outcome is not certain. American earnestly sympathize with the young Brazilian Republic, and do not doubt that it will finally right up and maintain its republican form and institutions no matter which side wins in the present struggle. The aftermath of the transition from the monarchical form of government under the mild and just DOM PEDRO to a republic is somewhat “rocky”, but Brazil will undoubtedly emerge from her troubles and take a high place in the galaxy of South American republics.

29. «Bombarding Brazilians», *Buffalo Evening News*,
14 de setembro

O jornal deseja a vitória dos revoltosos para que possam derrubar o «ditador e usurpador» Peixoto. O presidente, que desrespeitou a constituição, é também o principal responsável da revolução federalista no Rio Grande do Sul, escreve o quotidiano da cidade de Buffalo.

The rebellion navy of Brazil is, according to dispatches, shelling Rio Janeiro or bombarding the protecting forts, and it is reported that the garrison of the largest and strongest fort has declared for the rebels. This is somewhat alarming for President Peixoto and must shake his faith in his lucky star. President Peixoto's disregard of the Constitution has brought about this revolt of the navy, which is largely sympathized in by the people throughout the country, but more especially by the residents of the Province of Rio Grande do Sul, where the interference of the President precipitated an active and determined revolution. He acted the part of a dictator when he vetoed a bill which the Legislature passed to remedy his failure to order an election of President as the organic law requires. According to American ideas of what is due to the people, there is ample justification for this attempt of patriotic Brazilians to make a change in the Presidential office by deposing a dictator and a usurper. The overthrow of President Peixoto may not bring forth an ideal ruler in his stead, nor readjust matters so that peace may reign for a season, but the possibility of better and more peaceful days for Brazil calls forth the hope that the present revolution may be successful.

It is difficult to remember when the province of Rio Grande do Sul has been at peace. A chronic revolution is in progress there nearly all the time. Rebellious and ambitious Governors start out upon a guerrilla warfare whenever the wind blows from an undesirable quarter. To keep the country in subjection requires a strong and imperious Government at the Brazilian capital and hence the constant conflict between the ruling powers and the people.

30. «Brazilian News», *The Brooklyn Citizen*, 14 de setembro

O jornalista sublinha as contradições entre as várias notícias chegadas do Brasil a partir do dia 11 (2ª-feira), lamenta as pouquíssimas informações recebidas e constata que o corte das comunicações decidida pelo governo do Rio é uma prova da sua fraqueza.

No último parágrafo, precisa as exigências dos comandantes dos navios estrangeiros na baía do Rio que só permitiriam um bombardeamento dos fortes e não da cidade.

Today's news from Brazil might be deemed exciting if one knew that it was true; but inasmuch as telegraphic communication between Rio and New York is absolutely cut off, everybody is in as great a state of doubt about it as the barber who qualified his own belief by remark, "You can always, sometimes, generally tell". On Monday we were informed in a roundabout way that Rio was going to be bombarded by the rebel fleet.

On Tuesday, it was stated, on the same excellent authority, that the admirals of the foreign vessels in that harbor had refused to allow the

bombardment. On Wednesday the President was reported as saying that all the officers in the forts of the harbor were loyal to him, as were also nearly all the officers of the fleet, and that the fleet was bottled up in the harbor by the forts and dares not try to get to sea. Today we are notified that the city is being bombarded by the fleet.

Evidently what we know about the situation there is as nothing compared with what we do not know about it, though the cable end being on the hand and under control of the Government, the fact that communication with us has been shut off seems to indicate that the Government knows its own weakness and wishes to conceal the truth in the hope that something may turn up to relieve it from the embarrassment due to the hostile navy in the harbor ready to pounce upon it the moment that foreign protection is withdrawn.

Beyond that, it may be surmised from all that is said and all that was known about Brazil before this complication arose, that what the commanders of foreign vessels demanded was that there should be no general bombardment of the city, it being their duty to protect the interests of their own countrymen resident or in business in Rio de Janeiro, there having been no formal declaration of war; and that the bombardment now going on, if any there be, is simply an attack by the naval vessels on one or more of the forts. If they reduce these to submission, the surrender of the city to the rebels might follow as a matter of course; and the attack on the forts might well enough have been permitted by the foreign vessels, after every non-combatant was properly removed from the line of fire.

31. «Civil War in Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 14 de setembro

O articulista nova-iorquino é favorável aos revoltosos que, na sua opinião, combatem contra um presidente «ilegal», que não quer organizar novas eleições presidenciais para ficar no poder.

Nota que os oficiais da frota conhecem o mundo e têm um nível superior aos do exército. «A marinha parece ser a força mais civilizada da América do Sul», realça o jornalista que, por outro lado, não prevê nenhum problema diplomático na medida em que os ministros e os navios de guerra estrangeiros só intervirão para proteger os seus compatriotas.

The sympathy of the people of the United States is with the Brazilian insurgents. The latter are protesting against the unlawful conduct of President Peixoto and demand that he shall respect the constitution of the republic. Peixoto crowded out of office a constitutional elected president, and he has refused to order an election for the choice of his successor. He is in office and he proposes to remain there. The army supports him, because he has it under his eye, but the navy, which is on the sea beyond his reach, is fighting for liberty. The officers of the navy know more of the world than those of the army. They have been in countries where administration change is an orderly way and their respect for law is greater than the respect of the land forces, who have been accustomed to the peculiarities of South American government. The bombardment of Rio yesterday, however, was an argument which succeeded in converting the garrison of one of the largest forts in the harbor into insurrectionists and it has decided to help the navy in bringing about the re-establishment of constitutional government. The navy seems to be the most

SHELLS.
—
**The Bombardment
at Rio.**
—
**One of the Garrison,
Surrenders.**
—
**Wild Panic Prevails Throughout
the City.**
—
**No American Warships on Hand to Pro-
tect Our Interests.**

Fig. 8: *Oakland Tribune*

**RIO JANEIRO
BOMBARDED.**
—
**The Insurgent Fleet Gives Notice of
Its Intention**
—
**And Very Promptly Carries It Into
Effect.**
—
**One of the Garrison in the Narrows
Sides With the Rebels.**
—
**The Inhabitants of the City All Panic-
Stricken.**
—
**Cable Service Interrupted—The Govern-
ment Censorship Resumed.**

Fig 9 : *The Times Picayune*

FIRING ON RIO JANEIRO,
—
**The Rebel Brazilian Fleet Has Begun
to Bombard the City.**
—
FEAR AND ANXIETY IN WASHINGTON

Fig. 10: *The Brooklyn Daily Citizen*

Manchetes de dia 14 de setembro sobre o bombardeamento do Rio.

civilized force in South America. It was the navy of Chile which rebelled against the unlawful government of that country and which forced the uprising rulers to retire.

There is little danger of international complications resulting from the trouble in Brazil. Foreign war ship will take part in the demonstration of hostility only so far as is necessary to protect the citizens of the various countries which they represent. The diplomatic corps will also confine its attention to the protection of foreigners. Nations do not send ministers to each other to prevent civil war.

32. *The Standard Union*, 14 de setembro

The fermentation in Brazil is bubbled into a bombardment. If the Brazilians could manage to sink their navy they would have a chance for a few days' tranquility. However, civil war is in the blood of South America, and we presume it will be continued until the bloodshed becomes educational. We of North America do not find ourselves in a position to be instructive and admonitory, but when we do have a war it is a big one, and when it is over we have a fair article of peace.

33. *The New York Times*, 15 de setembro

O governo de Washington está a tomar as medidas necessárias para que haja uma força naval americana na baía do Rio de Janeiro.

The departure of the *Detroit* from Norfolk to Brazil yesterday morning affords an evidence of the energy of Secretary HERBERT in looking after the protection of American interests during current events at Rio de Janeiro. The *Newark*, the regular flagship of the South Atlantic station, is within a few days of being made ready at Norfolk for her cruise southward, but the Secretary did not deem it advisable to wait at all, and hurried off the *Detroit*. This action was the more remarkable since the latter vessel had been reported to be booked for Greytown; but the need of Rio Janeiro were more urgent. Long before she reaches the present destination, however, she will have been preceded by the *Charleston*, whose arrival at Montevideo, on her way to the Pacific, was reported to the Navy Department yesterday. She had made the run for Barbados without touching at Rio, but has already been ordered back to the Brazilian capital. The little wooden *Yantic*, at Montevideo, has all along been available, but the Secretary was not disposed to send to Rio a craft which might appear to such disadvantage, if very serious duties were imposed upon her. The events of the last few days in that port, including Admiral MELO's bombardment of the forts, show that the urgency employed in procuring a representation of our flag there was fully justified.

34. «Brazil», *The Indianapolis Journal*, 15 de setembro

Artigo que fala da Constituição de 1891, dos vários poderes executivos, legislativos e judiciários, do sistema de ensino, da separação entre o Estado e a Igreja.

It has been a little less than four years since the last revolution in Brazil. In November 1889 the Emperor, Dom Pedro, unusually well known in this country among the world's royalty, because of his sojourn here and his intelligent interest in progress, was compelled to resign. He and his family were exiled, and Brazil has declared a Republic. The present President Peixoto, who was formerly Vice-President, became President by the resignation of Marshal Da Fonseca in November 1891. In June, 1890, the provisional Congress, which, in February of 1891, established a new constitution by which Brazil, adopting the federative form, became the United States of Brazil.

Each of the old provinces (and the Federal district that was reserved), formed a State which existed independently of the Federal Government except for the maintenance of order and the execution of Federal laws. Fiscal and postal affairs belonged to the Union exclusively. The legislation authority is vested in a National Congress with the sanction of the President. The Congress consists of a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. Members of the Congress can hold no other office of any kind. The Chamber of Deputies is elected for three years by direct vote and consists of representatives from the States (in which minority representation is provided), the proportion not greater than one to every 30,000

population as shown by the census every ten years. The number of deputies now is 202.

No State can have less than four representatives. The body of representatives has the initiative in all legislation relating to taxation. Senators are chosen by the State Legislatures, three for each State, for nine years, and the Senate is renewed to the extent of one third every three years. The Vice-President of the Republic is president of the Senate. The executive authority is exercised by the President, whose term of office is four years, and who is not eligible for the succeeding term. The President and Vice-President are elected directly by the people on an absolute majority of votes, the election being held on the first of March in each presidential year. The votes taken in separate districts are counted at the capitals of the different States. Congress scrutinizes the votes, and if no candidate has an absolute majority Congress elects those who have obtained the greatest number of direct votes. In case of an equality the eldest candidate is declared elected.

The President nominates and dismisses ministers; has supreme command of the army and navy within certain limits, and the power to declare war and to make peace. With the consent of Congress he appoints members of the supreme Federal tribunal and the diplomatic ministers. The franchise includes all citizen twenty-one years old, duly enrolled, except beggars, illiterates, soldiers in service and members of monastic orders under vows of obedience. The local governments of the States must be Republican in form, and have distinct and independent administrative, legislative and judicial branches.

The executive and legislative branches are elective. The judges are not elective, nor are they removable from office except by judicial sentence. The Federal district is governed direct by the Federal authorities.

According to an official estimate in 1888 the total population of Brazil was 14,002,335, which was an apparent increased of 41 per cent, in sixteen years, or at the rate of a little over 2 ½ per cent, per year, Brazil was the last country in America to abolish slavery. On May 13, 1888, the Crown Prince as Regent gave the royal assent to a measure declaring slavery abolished from the day of promulgation of the law and repealing all former laws on the subject. Both chambers refused to give any compensation demanded by slave owners.

The established religion of the empire was the Roman Catholic, but under the Republic the connection between church and state was dissolved, and equality was declared for all forms of religion, though the Federal Government continued to provide for the salaries and maintenance of the existing functionaries of the Catholic church. Public education is divided into three forms, primary, secondary and scientific, the latter being controlled by the central government directly. The secondary form is under the charge of the provincial governments except at the capital. The primary instruction is under the charge of the Government at the capital, and in the States authorities. Education is free, and in several States is now compulsory. In 1889, the attendance on the primary schools was given as 300,000. The total number of illiterates is returned at 8,365,997, or 84 per cent, of the population.

35. «The Situation in Brazil», *The Times Picayune*, 15 de setembro

Depois de ter mencionado os bombardeamentos dos fortes e também do Rio, o jornalista nota que os rebeldes são muito mais fortes do que as tropas governamentais. Fala também da simpatia da marinha brasileira pelo antigo regime, mas, ao mesmo tempo, admite que será muito difícil realizar uma restauração do império.

The reports from Rio de Janeiro have been so meager that it is impossible to conjecture but in the vaguest possible way the course of events there. No direct information has been received, except a brief dispatch to the State Department at Washington, which afforded little information other than a confirmation of the report that the threatened bombardment had taken place and was still in progress.

The brief accounts that have come to hand in a roundabout way state that the rebel fleets attacked the forts in the Bay of Rio Wednesday morning, and that the principal one had gone over the side of the rebellion. Some shells were also thrown into the city, and the arsenal and harbor forts had been bombarded.

If these reports are true, and there is little reason to doubt but that they are, the rebels are immensely stronger than the Government dispatches of a few days ago indicated. It is also very clear that the navy depends upon assistance from the land forces in bringing their attempts to capture the capital to a successful issue, and the surrender of one of the forts to them indicates that they count with reason on a portion of the soldiers.

It is now very clear that the action of the fleet is but a part of a deep-laid scheme to overthrow the present government. There has been grave dissatisfaction for some time past with the course of President Peixoto, and his downfall was but a question of time.

What the leaders of the present rebellion propose to do when they have succeeded is not known, but in this connection it must not be forgotten that the navy has never yielded but a lukewarm allegiance to the republic, and has always been suspected of loyalty to the old imperial regime. The fact, therefore, that the navy is at the head of the present revolt is sufficient to create the suspicion that a plot for the restoration of the empire may be at the bottom of the trouble. Republicanism is but vaguely understood in Brazil, and monarchy has many adherents. The most serious difficulty in the way of a restoration of the empire, however, is the unpopularity of Dom Pedro's heir, the Princess Imperial.

36. *The Morning Call*, 15 de setembro

O jornal californiano, segundo o qual «os interesses americanos estão em risco», condena claramente os bombardeamentos da capital brasileira por parte da frota rebelde.

No doubt exists that the beautiful city of Rio de Janeiro has been bombarded by the rebel fleet and rebel forts. It is a wanton proceeding which cannot find a particle of moral justification, and may do much harm to Brazil for

a long time. It is quite enough to risk of a cannonade from a foreign power, but that a capital should be shelled out of pure patriotism for the improvement of politics is entirely consonant with the notions of despotism prevalent in South American republics. If the shelling and conflagrations are very destructive it may be some time ere the frivolous Brazilians can borrow enough money to rebuilt. Such extremes destroy credit and confidence. A Unites States cruiser has been ordered to Rio. It is still a long was off, and American interests are in jeopardy.

37. *Buffalo Courier*, 15 de setembro

Estes quase quatro anos de república foram um desastre, escreve o quotidiano do estado de Nova Iorque. Embora mencione uma possível restauração monárquica, o jornal acha mais provável a usurpação do poder por parte de um militar.

The Capital of Brazil has been bombarded by the revolutionary forces. The Republic of the United States of Brazil has now lasted more than three years, and it has been a caricature of republican government during the whole period. Though monarchy ought to have no place in the New World, people would not be greatly surprised if in the near future the grand-son of the late Dom Pedro II should be proclaimed Emperor by some military chieftain. But it is probable that a soldier of sufficient power to be able to restore the fallen dynasty would prefer to usurp supreme power for himself.

38. *St. Louis Post-Democrat*, 15 de setembro

O preço do café vai subir por causa da guerra civil e da política do Partido Democrata.

The war in Brazil will probably make coffee higher, and the restoration of the duty on that indispensable product by the Democrats will still further increase the price.

39. *Buffalo Evening News*, 15 de setembro

American cruisers are stretched along from the naval yards on the sea coast to the Bay of Rio de Janeiro, but no one of them is where an American cruiser ought to be at this crisis in the affairs of Brazil

40. *Evening Gazette*, 15 de setembro

Why do not Brazil and Nicaragua come into the Union and get a taste of good government?

41. «A Fleet That Wasn't Ready», *The Times*, 16 de setembro.

O diário da Pensilvânia lamenta que a frota americana não tenha estado em condições de ter tido pelo menos um navio de guerra na baía do Rio de Janeiro, quando os rebeldes estavam a bombardear a cidade. Chegarão dentro de uma semana e, talvez, seja demasiado tarde para defenderem os interesses dos americanos, deplora o jornalista de Filadélfia.

The United States has one of the best war fleets on the high sea, or would have if it were ready to go to sea. This may seem to be a trifling matter in times of peace, and yet the bombardment of Rio by the Brazilian insurgents, an entirely unlooked-for event two weeks ago, has demonstrated the necessity of having a war fleet ready for war at all times. The cruiser *Charleston*, which is at Montevideo, has something the matter with its steering gear which must be remedied before proceeding to Rio. The *Detroit*, which was ordered to proceed to Brazil from Hampton Road, must lose two days to comply with a contract regulation, and the *Newark* cannot be ready to sail before the first of next week. At the best it will be another week before any American vessel can reach the scene of disturbance. There may be no American interests left to be protected by that time.

It is not probable that anyone in particular is at fault for the state of unreadiness which characterizes the American navy when its services are most needed. The bombardment of Rio was an event that could not be foreseen, the relations between the Brazilian Government and our own are of the most amicable nature, and there is no reason why the Brazilian rebels should be


unfriendly to us. But when it comes to shooting, everything and everybody within the range of the firing are liable to get hurt, and it would have been a source of confidence to American residents and business concerns at Rio if there had been an American man-of-war or two in the harbor when the cannon began to boom.

The lesson is a very emphatic one on the necessity of being always ready. Vessels in commission should be in complete condition for service and ready to go on a voyage to protect American interests without losing a week's times for repairs or to comply with a contract. Otherwise, a very capable war fleet may prove to be of no more use than an equal number of scows or barges.

42. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 16 de setembro

Não parece que no Brasil se deseje um regresso da monarquia, afirma o jornal preocupado com uma eventual subida dos preços do café.

The Brazilian mess seems to be a little nastier than was at first conjectured, but there is no sign that a desire for monarchy is at the bottom of the row. In all probability it is like most South American quarrels – a vigorous kick of the outs against the ins. It is to be hoped that the trouble will not continue long enough to make the price of coffee rise too higher for the consumer of modest means



A VIEW OF RIO JANEIRO, SHOWING THE HEART OF THE CITY.

Fig. 11: O centro da cidade do Rio de Janeiro (*San Francisco Chronicle*, 16 de setembro).

43. *The Shreveport Times*, 16 de setembro

The new revolution in Brazil and the bombardment of Rio de Janeiro have given the state and navy departments unusual activity, and Uncle Sam's cruisers have been dispatched to the scene to protect American interests. The war excitement may subside as rapidly as it has grown and probably be the usual "flurry" of a South American insurrection.

44. *The St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 16 de setembro

The republic has never been free from danger of failure in Brazil, owing to factional discord and conspiracy, but it is to be hoped that success will ultimately be gained through the discipline of experience and gradual increase of intelligence and patriotism.

45. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 16 de setembro.

Entre os rebeldes e o atual governo, chegue o diabo e escolha!

It is no credit to the Brazilian insurgents that the bombardment of Rio did not result in the death of defenseless women and children. Brazil may be suffering under a bad government, but these barbarous rebels, should they gain control, would make no better one.




Fig 12 : *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 16 de setembro

46. *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 16 de setembro

If big Brazil sets such a horrible example what can be expected of her little sister?

[...]

If Brazil only had a thoroughly modern navy the present fracas would be interesting. The world is aching to know just how valuable the newfangled fighting boats are in a real scrimmage.

47. *Buffalo Evening News*, 16 de setembro

Este jornal lamenta também a falta de rapidez da marinha americana para proteger os interesses dos seus compatriotas no Rio.

Naval vessels it seems cannot be concentrated at a given point with alacrity. Trouble in Brazil has been going on for some time, but American interests there are still unprotected by American war vessels.

48. *The Times Picayune*, 16 de setembro

If the bombardiers do any damage to Rio de Janeiro they should be held responsible for it when Brazil has a government.

49. «The Conflict in Brazil», *The Morning Call*, 18 de setembro

O diário californiano considera que este conflito não tem uma grande importância para o mundo e que o que se está a passar no Rio é uma consequência lógica da transição «do império para a república».

Mas o artigo debruça-se principalmente sobre as dificuldades que encontra um país tão vasto para conservar a sua unidade e para evitar um desmembramento. Embora não exclua completamente a possibilidade que o Brasil fique unido, o jornalista fala do Rio Grande do Sul e do Mato Grosso como se estes dois estados tivessem grandes possibilidades de se tornarem independentes.

The pending conflict in Brazil has no world-wide importance. It is merely the fermentation of the elements which were roused to activity by the transition of the country from an empire to a republic. It was hardly to be expected that a country of 14,000,000 people could change their form of government and their institutions without some friction.

To the outsiders it appears that Marshal Deodoro Fonseca, who was chosen President in 1889, when the Emperor Dom Pedro II was dethroned, was a man of ability and honest purpose. But his term was spent in quelling or endeavoring to quell insurrections. They wore him out, and he resigned, in 1891, when he had three years still to serve, and he was succeeded in an orderly legal way by Vice-President Floriano Peixoto. He found the same obstacles in his path, and, like his predecessor, spent his time in conducting civil war in his retirement from the city of Rio in consequence of the occupation of the harbor

by an insurgent squadron. Whether this involves his final overthrow remains to be seen.

The trouble with Brazil is its enormous size and the want of unity among its people. It is nearly as large as the United States, and the greater portion of its area is arable. The various States of which it consists are empires in themselves, and have little or no affinity with their sister States. When the old regime was overthrown several of these resolved to set up for themselves and severed their connection with Brazil. One of these was the province of Rio Grande do Sul, which expelled the agents of the Rio Government and has carried on a war for independence ever since. Another was the enormous province of Mato Grosso, which is as large as Alaska, and abounds in gold, iron and all manner of agricultural products. This province communicates with the outside world by the Paraguay, and has no commercial intercourse with Brazil proper. It declared its independence and its 100,000 inhabitants announced their intention of becoming one of the sovereign nations of the world. The example has been followed by other provinces, and bloody wars would be raging if the belligerents could get at each other.

It is possible that Peixoto or his successor may succeed in reuniting the *disjecta membra* of the empire, but the chances are that he will not. When the War of Independence ended in this country it was found a difficult task to induce the thirteen independent colonies to form in a consolidated republic. Large concessions had to be made to lure recalcitrant States into the Union. And this, though the States were all on narrow strip bordering on the ocean, and were

within such easy access of each other that during the war armies had marched from end to end of the strip. Indeed, there were many level-headed men who doubted very seriously when the constitutional convention was in session whether the divergent interests of the several States could ever be reconciled. The obstacles in the way of union are more formidable in Brazil.

Mato Grosso's interests are more closely allied with those of Bolivia or Paraguay than they are with those of Brazil, and the people of the Valley of the Amazon have little in common, save accident of consanguinity, with the people of Minas Gerais and Espiritu Santo. There is a stage in the evolution of communities where the centrifugal force is irresistible, and each community seeks a destiny of its own. The subsequent stage, where centripetal force acquires power, only comes into play afterwards. South America is in the former Stage. Half a dozen independent States now divide the territory which was once embraced by the Spanish province of Peru; and, reasoning by analogy, it seems likely that Brazil may go through the same process of disintegration.

The tendency of modern government is, however, to consolidation rather than to secession. But much depends upon the character and habits of a people. If Brazil were inhabited by a people with the training of Americans it would be absurd to look on a division of the republic for a remedy for the evils that now threaten it. Rebellion may be overthrown, but when once the independence of provinces is recognized the work of reuniting them takes time – often centuries of time.

50. «The Brazilian Revolt», *The Omaha Daily Bee*, 18 de setembro

O jornal prevê uma queda de Peixoto que usou métodos inconstitucionais para ficar no poder. Porém, o diário da cidade de Omaha está convencido que o regime republicano é o melhor para o Brasil e para salvar o país da influência europeia.

The latest intelligence regarding the revolution in Brazil indicates the probable overthrow of President Peixoto, against whom the revolt seems to be directed, rather than against the republic. It appears that practically the entire naval power of the country is in rebellion, while the revolt is also gaining ground on land. The appeal of the president to the provinces to send troops to the defense of Rio Janeiro is reported to have met with no response, and all advices are to the effect that the insurgents have a decided advantage at nearly every vital point. Of course, those reports are to be received with some allowance, but, taken as a whole, they furnish reason for believing that the revolt is very likely to triumph.

It appears that Admiral Mello, the leader of the revolt, professes not to be dissatisfied with the republic, but merely demands the resignation of Peixoto on the ground that he holds his executive position by illegal and unconstitutional usurpation of power. The accusations against him are that he has overridden the will of the congress, vetoed bills which were intended to limit and define his power, and planned and schemed to secure either his own hold on the presidency for an illegal period or the succession of someone who would be a tool in his hands. There is doubtless some substantial ground for this

arraignment, but the fact is, there has been a good deal of political unrest in Brazil ever since the bloodless revolution of 1889, which sent Dom Pedro into exile. The revolution was not the result of a popular uprising, but was contrived and carried out by a small military clique, and while it was subsequently acquiesced in by the people and a republican form of government set up modeled after that of the United States, it is questionable whether the men who succeeded to power have ever enjoyed the full confidence of the country. At any rate, Brazil has at no time since the dethronement of the emperor been altogether free from more or less threatening political disturbance.

The American people, who were the first to recognize the change of government in Brazil from the imperial to the republican system, would very greatly regret to see the republic overthrown and perhaps some sort of dictatorship substituted which would keep the country in constant turmoil and furnish a better opportunity to European powers to increase their influence there. Doubtless, there is no danger of a return to an imperial form of government, but it is quite possible that something much worse might happen for Brazil than the mild rule of the gentle old emperor who died in exile. The wish of the American people is that the republic shall stand, not only because such a political system is the best for the Brazilians, but also for the reason that it is another safeguard against the further invasion of this hemisphere by European political methods. There is already a very powerful European influence in Brazil, and it cannot be doubted that it would take the greatest possible advantage of an overthrow of the republic to strengthen its influence

and to bring that country into closer political relations with the chief countries of Europe. Such a possibility the people of the United States cannot regard with entire complacency.

51. «Brazilian Affairs», *The Times Democrats*, 18 de setembro

Também o quotidiano de Nova Orleães acredita na vitória dos revoltosos. Embora ache que o Brasil estivesse em muitas melhores condições no tempo de D. Pedro II e que a Marinha seja filo-monárquica, julga impossível uma restauração do antigo regime porque, nestes últimos quatro anos, a situação mudou. Com efeito, depois de novembro de 1889, «o exército tornou-se uma guarda pretoriana que faz e desfaz presidentes: cada general, sabendo que na república pode, com um golpe de Estado, vir a ser chefe do país, tornou-se naturalmente um conspirador».

All the indications point to the success of the Brazilian rebels. They have the advantage of victory and the possession of the capital; and there seems to be no reason to doubt that the great mass of. The rebels, on the other hand, are gaining daily, and their possession of the fleet and the capital, with its arsenals, will give them more prestige and strength.

The revolution at Rio is only one of the numerous outbreaks which are disturbing the peace of the Brazilian republic just at present. There are a half dozen others raging in various portions of the country, and in the southern provinces a bloody civil war has been going on for years. In fact, everything indicates the speedy dissolution of the republic and its breaking up in a half dozen States like Central America, unless some better central power than a

military government can be established. Brazil has gone steadily from bad to worse under the military adventurers who have ruled it since Dom Pedro was exiled.

It has been reported that the success of the revolutionists against Peixoto will mean a restoration of the monarchy. It is not improbable that this will be tried. The revolution by which Dom Pedro was overthrown was not a popular rising, but rather the success of a conspiracy of a small military clique. The people said nothing because they were given no chance to think or speak, and when the Emperor was shipped out of the country it was too late. The navy has always had monarchical leanings, and it would be no surprise to learn that its leaders deemed a monarchy safer and better than the present anarchy and civil war, and proposed to invite one of Dom Pedro's descendants to mount the imperial throne. But although a monarchy, such as existed before the revolution, was undoubtedly a far better form of government than the present military anarchy, nicknamed republic, and in spite of the fact that a great majority of the people who are not Generals would like to see Dom Pedro Regime restored, we believe that it is a case of Humpty Dumpty, and that it will be impossible to put the empire back again where it was after the experience of the last few years. The army has become a Pretorian guard, making and unmaking Presidents; and every General, knowing that under the republic he can, by a coup d'état, making himself a ruler of the country, has naturally become a conspirator. With an army as demoralized as that of Brazil is, and with a people as helpless as they have shown themselves, and with so many military adventurers at the front, whoever

is called to the Brazilian throne will have no bed of roses to lie on. While the new revolutionary party may desire to restore the monarchy, it will find when the time comes that it is impossible to do this, and that no ruler could restore Brazil to the conditions in which it was before revolution, license, conspiracy and anarchy got control of it.

52. *Asheville Daily Citizen*, 18 de setembro

Este quotidiano da Carolina do Norte também lamenta a ausência de um navio de guerra americano no porto de Rio de Janeiro.

It is exasperating to those who favor a large navy and try constantly to find something for it to do, that in the first emergency it should be wanting. When the last revolution broke out, in Brazil it was according to the eternal fitness of things that the United States should be represented in the harbor of Rio Janeiro by one of our smart cruisers. But a week went by before one could be ordered by telegraph to go to the scene of action. That one was the *Charleston*. Her commander replied that his steering apparatus was broken down and that he would have to coal before leaving Montevideo for Rio. The *Newark*, too, was ordered from Norfolk to Brazil, but she could not be made ready before today. The *Detroit* also was started in the same direction, but after she had not been regularly accepted by the government and was still the property of the contractor who built her, and she was recalled. All of which suggests a lady's watch – pretty to look at, but not as serviceable as could be wished.

53. *The Nebraska State Journal*, 18 de setembro

Não se sabe se Peixoto tem forças militares suficientes que o apoiem para resistir aos revoltosos que agora bombardearam a cidade.

The naval rebellion against the Brazilian government has assumed a serious phase as the war vessels in revolt have been bombarding the city. Peixoto, the acting president, has retired beyond the reach of the fire and it seems to be a question whether he will be able to rally a sufficient force about him to retain his place. So far, there have been no accessions to the insurgents from the army, but it is suspected that the revolting naval officers have assurances of assistance if they succeed in effecting a landing.

The excuse for the revolt in the veto of the act passed by the Brazilian legislature forbidding the candidacy of the vice-president for president Peixoto was the first vice-president of Brazil, now the acting president, and it is charged that he vetoed the bill in his own interest. It was evidently aimed at him.

54. *Oakland Tribune*, 18 de setembro

You will observe that it has become a revolution instead of a rebellion in Brazil. The Government still claims to be on top, but the change in the manner of designating the revolt works the difference between an unsuccessful attempt to overturn existing conditions and an attempt that promise to be successful.

55. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 18 de setembro

Só um governo de tipo militar pode garantir a estabilidade ao Brasil.

It is to be feared that the only stable government possible in Brazil is one resting upon force and managed by an adroit politician and capable soldier. The people have not yet been disciplined for self-government.

56. *St- Louis Globe-Democrat*, 18 de setembro

There was more of the spirit of true republicanism in Dom Pedro's imperial regime than there has been in the so-called republic which displaced it. Still no sort of monarchy can be reared in Brazil ever again.

57. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 18 de setembro

If there are more governments like that of Brazil, they will not vote money to build up powerful navies.

58. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 18 de setembro

Brazil affords very little aid and comfort just now to the friends of a republican form of government.

59. «Reversion to Monarchy», *Oakland Tribune*, 19 de setembro

Para o jornal californiano não há dúvidas: o Brasil estava muito melhor durante o reinado de D. Pedro II. Agora, acrescenta o jornalista, não se sabe se esta revolta vai ter como resultado um regresso dos Bragança. Pensa que será muito difícil, mas lembra que os Bourbon, dinastia à qual pertence o marido da princesa Isabel, nunca abandonaram facilmente a luta.

De qualquer forma, para os Estados Unidos, são os interesses puramente comerciais que são prioritários. Os brasileiros têm de decidir que regime querem, mas sem uma intervenção armada das potências europeias, conclui o quotidiano de Oakland.

Under Braganzas, and before that as a dependency of Portugal, Brazil found a model in the steadiness of its government to the turbulent States about. Under a republic, scarce lasting four years, there have been four revolutions, each one more bloody than the rest, and one of them, that in the State of Rio Grande do Sul, ending almost as long as the republic itself has endured. It would not be astonishing if, under these conditions, the thoughts of the conservative classes of Brazil, the classes holding vested interests, should turn back longingly to the times of Dom Pedro and his predecessors. There is nothing so cowardly as commerce, no set of men so ready to truckle for peace as commercial men. It was

deemed in 1889 that Brazil was ready for a peer form of government than that afforded under an empire, which, if it had a fault it was the fault of too great liberality. Dom Pedro gave up his crown without a struggle, thinking that the people he loved might be happier, perhaps, if left to themselves and died in a foreign land of a broken heart. It is known now that Brazil was no more ready for self-government than are the other republics of Latin-American and Dom Pedro lived to see that Brazil was vastly worse left to her own devices than she could ever have been under his benign sway.

Whether the success of the present revolution means a restoration of the monarchy, however, is at least doubtful. It may be only one of those factional fights between ambitious men that have marked the history of every republic in the Western World south of our own, the precursor of other factional fights between leaders of the victorious party, but it is significant that the present outbreak should have occurred in the navy, a branch of the Brazilian arms organized by the late Emperor and always staunchly imperial, and that the movement seems to have had sufficient strength on shore to have forced the abandonment of the capital by President Peixoto at the firing of a few shots into the citadel of Rio. The swift success of the bombardment, in fact, speaks of the powerful lever of commercial interest, for a long siege would have resulted in the destruction of the vast stores of coffee laid up in the warehouses of Rio and the consequent loss to the merchants of the city. This combination of naval forces smacks of a desire to return to the stable government of imperialism – and it should be borne in mind that the husband of the woman who will sit on the

Brazilian throne, should the empire be restored, the Count d'Eu, is a Bourbon. The Bourbon have always given up thrones, but no Bourbon has ever let a crown slip from him without a struggle, long and bitter carried on by scheming and chicanery and force of arms to the last ditch. The Bourbons have not ceased to lay claim to the crown of France, though there is no longer a crown of France, and the husband of Dom Pedro's daughter would feel much more at home as Prince Consort, or, mayhap, emperor of Brazil, than he feels now wandering about the world as that most miserable of created beings, a prince without a crown.

As to the interest of the United States in the matter – well, that interest, too, is commercial rather than political. So long as the Brazilians are left to fight out their own battles without direct armed intervention from the old world, it is all one to us whether they choose to live under a republic or whether their fancy turns them to an empire.

60. «The Troubles in Brazil», *The Daily Inter Ocean*, 19 de setembro

Para o quotidiano de Chicago, trata-se de uma revolta filo-monárquica contra a república. Apresenta, por um lado, uma situação militar demasiado favorável às tropas de Custódio de Melo; por outro lado, não poupa as críticas a Floriano Peixoto e supõe que a influência dos navios de guerra estrangeiros no desenrolar dos acontecimentos será insignificante.

The revolutionary movement inaugurated by the navy against the Brazilian government is really but the recoil of imperialism against republicanism. At the time Dom Pedro was deposed the navy was strongly in

sympathy with him, and did not afterward transfer its allegiance. The report that the daughter of the emperor, who is a woman of strong character and lofty ambition, has been constantly intriguing with the former adherents of and present sympathizers with the imperial cause is credited in official circles. Whatever conspiracy there may have been in this direction has been favored by the arbitrary methods of President Peixoto, who, to further his own interests, has stirred up political revolts in several cases to secure the removal of governors and has made himself unpopular with the people by acting somewhat as a military dictator.

There has been revolution in Rio Grande do Sul for more than a year, and the attempts to subdue these and other disturbances have served to strengthen the forces of rebellion and impress the imperialist sympathizers of the growing reaction of the states. The final blow that inaugurated revolution seems to have been struck timely, and Admiral Melo is practically master of the situation, for he not only has the entire navy, but reports indicate the cooperation with him of a portion of the land forces, including the garrison of one or more of the forts about Rio Janeiro. Peixoto is so pressed that it is thought he will unite with the Governor of Rio Grande in a desperate effort to regain power and authority. If, however, the navy has any considerable support by land, and it presumably has, as the attitude of the rebels is that of well-assured advantage, The Republic of Brazil is in great peril, and the restoration of the imperial dignity imminent.

What significance may attach to the fact that warships of foreign powers, including the United States cruiser *Charleston*, have been ordered to Rio cannot

be determined, but it is not supposed that may seriously interfere with the proceedings of Admiral Melo and his forces, who are, it is reported, already in possession of the custom-house and arsenal. The general aspect is threatening of war, but it fortunately is the rule of South American countries to be very speedy in their fights. Though some of the rebels are actuated by a desire to see ex-President da Fonseca restored [*sic*]¹¹, it is believed that the revolutionary impetus and momentum are imperialist, whether or not they succeed in their purpose.

61. «In Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 19 de setembro

Também este jornal julga que os revoltosos estão numa posição muito favorável: «Se não houver uma mudança inesperada da situação», Custódio de Melo será vitorioso a curto prazo, e o «usurpador» Peixoto terá de fugir.

The prospect for constitutional government in Brazil is getting brighter. The revolting navy is gaining recruits and the land forces are growing less loyal to President Peixoto. The whole Rio Grande squadron has deserted the president and Admiral Gama, director of the naval school in Rio Janeiro, has refused to obey the president orders. Other naval officers on shore have declined to take commands, declaring that they would not fight against Admiral Melo, the leader of the insurgents and their old commander. The army is still nominally faithful, but there is much disorder in it and it may join the revolters at any time. It

¹¹ Deodoro da Fonseca faleceu um ano antes, a 23 de agosto de 1892 !

President Peixoto loses its support his case will be hopeless. The people in the capital are panic stricken and in no condition to defend an attack upon them. Unless there is some unforeseen change in the situation, Admiral Melo will soon be victorious and the usurping president will be a fugitive.

62. *Asheville Daily Citizen*, 19 de setembro

Agora um outro ditador vai substituir Peixoto que, na realidade, «atuou como um rei, muito mais do que Dom Pedro», escreve o jornal que coloca a questão de fundo: haverá no país o homem certo para ocupar este cargo respeitando a Constituição?

It seems pretty certain now that the present government in Brazil will be overthrown that is to say, Brazil will slough off or drive off on dictator and set up another. The present President has had no regard for the constitution, he has acted more like a king than Dom Pedro, the last in Brazil to wear a crown, and there will, be no sorrowing by friends of true liberty over his downfall. What a real republic may be, Brazil might have an opportunity to realize it just the right man should succeed the present ruler, but it is even doubtful in the country has such a man or that he would be understood if he should be elected and proceed to occupy his place as president and only that.

63. «The Brazilian Revolution», *The Daily Picayune*,
20 de setembro

Os rebeldes parecem ter obtido vários sucessos e, embora Peixoto tenha conservado alguns apoios, a vitória final dos primeiros é dada como quase certa. Sem nenhum espírito crítico, o jornal da Luisiana, parece mais preocupado pelas consequências económicas desta situação de bloqueio, nomeadamente para os comerciantes de café.

As the *Picayune* anticipated, the trouble in Brazil has rapidly extended from the capital of the country to the provinces, and rebellion now bids fair to prove so formidable an uprising as to render it impossible for President Peixoto to maintain himself. Owing to the cutting off of telegraphic communication, the information from the scene of the disturbance is fragmentary and unsatisfactory, and it is thus impossible to form an entirely correct idea of the exact situation. Even Official information to our Government in Washington is scant, the authorities having, in fact, been without advices from the American Minister at Rio de Janeiro for three days. Enough is known, however, to show that the revolutionists have so far been entirely successful, and have badly crippled the power of the existing Government.

According to the reports so far received, the rebel fleet at Rio has secured possession of such vessels as the Government possessed, and has been thus enabled to increase the force of ships to thirty. All the forts in the harbor but one – that commanding the entrance – have either joined the rebels, assumed a position of neutrality, or been silenced. The town of Niteroi has been captured,

as well as the arsenals and Custom-house of Rio. President Peixoto has been compelled to leave the city, and has established himself beyond the capital, at a suburban town.

Not satisfied with practical possession of the capital, the rebels have sent some of their ships to blockade Santos and the seaports south of Rio, with a view of shutting off the revenues of the Government. It now appears that the fleet sent some time ago to suppress the rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul has deserted the Government standard, and other vessels hitherto loyal have also joined the revolution. This put practically the entire navy in the hands of Admiral Custodio de Melo, so that the blockade of the different Brazilian ports will not prove a very difficult matter, provided the foreign powers do not interfere.

The spirited defense made by some of the forts at Rio, and the action of the Brazilian Congress in voting a loyal address to Peixoto, prove that the President is not altogether without friends. He apparently still has the bulk of the army with him, and he will, in all probability, retire into the interior and seek to rally to his standard a force sufficient to prevent for a time the rebels from penetrating beyond the seaboard. There is, therefore, no prospect of an immediate settlement of the revolution, although the ultimate success of the rebels seems certain.

Owing to the stoppage of telegraphic communication, and the practical blockade of the port of Rio, trade has been entirely interrupted, and such interests in this country as are dependent upon traffic with Brazilian ports are naturally feeling the ill effects of the revolution. The coffee trade in particular

has suffered, and as the country has been caught with an unusually light stock of the berry, prices for that widely consumed article have advanced at a tremendous rate. An early settlement of the trouble in Brazil is, therefore, much desired by our business men.

64. «Brazilian Republic in Danger», *Democrat and Chronicle*,
20 de setembro

O jornal de Rochester acusa os comandantes dos navios das potências monárquicas europeias de terem permitido a apreensão de navios mercantes para abastecer os rebeldes. Deplora ao mesmo tempo o grande atraso na chegada dos navios de guerra americanos e pergunta se a «administração em Washington conhece os objetivos da revolta».

There have been intimations that the naval rebellion in Brazil is for the purpose of restoring monarchy. Telegraph reports yesterday indicated that the commanders of foreign war ships in the harbor of Rio are aiding the rebel fleet. It was stated that these commanders gave assent to the seizure of supplies from merchant vessels entering the port. The fact that the rebel officers paid for the goods that were taken does not alter the situation at all. The goods were consigned to merchants in Rio Janeiro, and the seizure is an act of piracy. Without supplies gained in this way the rebel fleet must soon abandon its position or submit to lawful authority.

The foreign commanders who consented to the seizure of supplies from merchant-men represent monarchial countries, and showed a willingness to prolong the rebellion against the president of the republic.

Is the administration at Washington aware of the situation and the purpose of the rebellion? The excuses that have been given for the tardiness of United States war ships in starting for the scene of disorder, will hardly bear examination. The cruiser *Detroit* was ordered to Rio from Norfolk, when the secretary of the navy bethought him that there were some formalities of acceptance of this vessel that ought to receive attention. The ship was signaled from one of the Virginia capes and ordered back. The *Newark* could not be repaired in time. The *Charleston* avoided Rio but stopped at Montevideo. She could not go to Rio until machinery was repaired. The failure of three vessels to proceed is a remarkable coincidence, and may be very serious if the republic be overthrown in the meantime.

65. «Brazil's Revolution», *The St. Paul Daily Globe*, 20 de setembro

Como outros colegas, o jornalista do Minnesota pensa que o Brasil nada ganhou com a mudança de regime, que de república só tem o nome. Crítica a seguir a «ditadura» de Fonseca e a de Floriano Peixoto, do qual anuncia erroneamente a queda, que não fizeram progredir o país, antes pelo contrário. Quanto à recente revolta, sublinha o editorialista, se triunfar, vai unicamente pôr no poder um outro «saqueador dos bens públicos». Será uma «outra ditadura tão opressiva como todas aquelas que a precederam».

It may well be questioned whether the people of Brazil bettered their condition when they overthrew the dynasty of Dom Pedro, and established a republic. The reign of that benign and kindly monarch was a blessing to his people. Under it slavery was abolished, and almost universal suffrage established. Commerce and manufactures were fostered and promoted, and Brazil was recognized by all nations as one of the leading powers in the world. The overthrow, exile and subsequent death of the emperor have been followed by a train of evils that has darkened the pages of the country's history with the records of bloodshed and disaster. Da Fonseca, who by military force overthrew the empire, established upon its ruins a dynasty that was, though a republic in name, but little better than an absolute despotism, in which the lives and property of citizens were at the mercy of the officers of the state. Taxation amounting almost to confiscation was imposed, and appeals for redress were answered by incarceration in a dungeon. But Fonseca's dominion was of short duration. In less than a year he was forced to flee the country [*sic!*]¹² to avert the just wrath he has aroused.

On the accession of Peixoto, who has just been overthrown [*sic!*]¹³, a pretense was made to guarantee the rights of the people. A constitution was adopted and a national legislature was convened. But the constitution was a mere form, of no binding effect upon the president-dictator, while the legislature did not represent the people. It was merely a cabal consisting of ambitious men

¹² Depois da sua demissão, Deodoro permaneceu no país.

¹³ Durante esta guerra civil, Peixoto permanece no poder.

working at cross purposes, in which the interests of the common people were esteemed of no account. Peixoto was as arbitrary as Fonseca, and each was far more despotic than Dom Pedro had ever been. The uprising that has destroyed his power and driven him from the capital was not, however, an uprising of the people, but a revolt among the officers of the army and navy. It was simply the result of a strife of power, and the chances are that the government that may be established by the revolutionists will be no whit better than that which has just been overthrown.

The revolution in Brazil is no evidence of the failure of republicanism on the South American continent. The government there has been republican only in name. It is, perhaps, doubtful if the people are yet fitted for self-government. If the reforms inaugurated by Dom Pedro has been carried out intelligently and the people educated up to an appreciation of their individual responsibility, there might have been hope for a model republic south of the equator. But no progress has been made under his successors. There has been retrogression instead, and the day of the establishment of a true republic has been postponed for half a century. There is little hope that the success of the revolutionists of the army and navy at the present time will better the conditions of things. It simply marks the establishment of another dictatorship as oppressive as any that has preceded it. Who the figurehead of the new government, which is simply an aggregation of public plunderers, will be, cannot yet be determined. But it makes little difference. The idea he represents will be the governing motive, not the individual or his personal desires.

66. «The Trouble in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*,
20 de setembro

O regresso da monarquia não tem nada a ver com a revolta, realça o editorialista californiano. Este dá uma imagem positiva de Floriano Peixoto que «não arredou pé». Coloca também uma questão de fundo: as nações da América do Sul são compatíveis com um regime republicano?

Recent news from Brazil confirms the opinion expressed by the *Chronicle* some days ago¹⁴, that the revolutionist movement is in nowise accompanied or dictated by the imperial idea, but that it is a quarrel between republican factions – a struggler on the outs against the ins. President Peixoto seems to be the objective point of the insurgents, but thus far no presumptive successor to the Presidency has been developed, unless it be the Admiral of the revolutionist squadron.

Rio Janeiro, which is bombarded every day, more or less, by the revolutionist fleet, is said to be in a state of anarchy, which presumably, has been super induced by falling shot and shell. President Peixoto has thus far held his ground, and this has given rise to the belief among some that the assaults of the fleet have been comparatively ineffectual. The fort of Santa Cruz still holds out, in spite of the fire of the fleet, and the army remains faithful to Peixoto, though much confusion and lack of discipline are reported among the troops.

¹⁴ Cf. Texto 39.

No one has yet ventured to assign any positive and immediate cause to the revolution. President Peixoto, so far as can be learned, ruled conservatively and cautiously. Certainly he did not aspire to be a dictator, or if so he kept this ambition very quiet. This Brazilian trouble adds renewed doubt to the fitness of a republican form of government for the nations of South America, for surely the spirit which led to the dethronement of Dom Pedro and his family cannot have run out so soon if it were then the genuine spirit of republicanism. It is a serious question whether the South American republics are not governmental blunders.

67. *The Omaha Daily Bee*, 20 de setembro

What the republic of Brazil evidently stands in need of is a little of the strengthening influence of Dom Pedro, the man who gave to that people a government with more liberty than it has enjoyed under the republic for the past few years. The word republic is not always synonymous with liberty.

68. *The Sioux City Journal*, 20 de setembro

The troubles in Brazil have already made an advance in the price of coffees.

69. *The Wall Street Journal*, 20 de setembro

Cables can be sent to Rio if they are in plain language and do not refer in any way to political events in Brazil.

70. «Chaotic Republics», *The Boston Daily Globe*, 21 de setembro

Editorial muito crítico para com esta «república de peluche» e os seus dirigentes. Mandaram embora Dom Pedro e agora o país está envolvido numa guerra sem fim entre as várias facções, afirma o jornal de Boston que acrescenta: «o povo não é suficientemente forte, inteligente e unido» para acabar com esta situação.

Brazil has been in a chaotic state since the overthrow of good old Emperor Dom Pedro in 1889. That exemplary monarch was unseated by Gen. Fonseca, his rival and chief of the military forces of the empire.

Pres. Fonseca soon began to quarrel with the federal congress. The fight between executive and congress waxed hotter and hotter until finally revolt and revolution appeared, when Fonseca, "in order to save the republic" resigned in favor of Peixoto, the present executive.

The formidable rebellion now in progress is directed against Peixoto, whose rival is Admiral Melo, now in command of the insurgent forces.

Behind all these shifting figures is Princess Isabela, daughter of the late Emperor Dom Pedro, around whom centers a royalist party intent upon restoring the monarchy.

If out of all this chaos one could extract anything like an intelligent and substantial national spirit among the people much might be expected. After the people had left good old Dom Pedro to his fate, they gave the Fonseca republic a very lukewarm greeting. In turn they got tired of him, and now they are tired of his rival. In fact no official head can long remain in sight that is proof against some rival clique.

It is difficult to get up much enthusiasm over this sort of stuffed republic. The people are evidently not strong, intelligent and united enough to hold rival officials and executives in check, and hence an endless war of factions.

71. «The Brazilian Rebellion», *The Daily Picayune*, 21 de setembro

Este editorial descreve a situação como extremamente favorável para os revoltosos. Afirma mesmo que Peixoto «está claramente à mercê dos seus inimigos», que têm a possibilidade de bloquear todos os portos do país, embora espere que os navios estrangeiros intervenham para proteger a capital do Brasil. Sublinhando a importância de ter uma forte marinha de guerra, o jornalista constata que o seu país tem «a costa indefesa».

The immense power of a navy for defense or attack is now being abundantly demonstrated in Brazil. When the revolt in that country started, not more than two weeks ago, it was confined almost entirely to a few of the

warships in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. These ships were able, without difficulty, to keep out of reach of the forts, and with their heavy guns could lie beyond the range of fire from the shore and shell the important point in the harbor of Rio selected for attack. They were also able to put a complete stop to the commerce of the Brazilian capital.

The early success of the fleet of Admiral Custodio de Melo brought the adhesion of all the vessels of the navy to the cause of the revolution, and it is now in the power of the rebels to blockade every one of the important Brazilian ports, and thus shut off the principal source of revenue of the Government. An attempt has already been made to capture Santos, the second port of importance in Brazil, and, according to the dispatches, a landing has been effected, and the capture of the city is a foregone conclusion. It will be equally easy to blockade and capture all the other Brazilian ports.

The possession of the navy by the insurgents in the Chilean civil war, some years ago, finally accomplished the overthrow of Balmaceda. In that instance the rebel warships blockaded the Chilean coast and cut off the Government's revenues, and although Balmaceda made a spirited defense and prolonged the war for quite a time, the rebels were able, with the possession of the fleet, to transport troops from one part of the coast to another, and to finally bring about the downfall of the Government.

President Peixoto is now clearly at the mercy of his enemies. The warships in the harbor of Rio, having become impatient at the delay in surrendering the city, have sent an ultimatum to the President, demanding

unconditional surrender, and, in the event of non-compliance, they threaten to shell the city and coerce it into submission. The bombardment hitherto has been directed mainly at the military depots, arsenal, forts and the like, the city itself being spared as much as possible. Now, however, the city is to be subjected to all the horrors of a regular bombardment, unless the Government yields.

We very much doubt if the foreign war vessels present in Rio will permit the bombardment of the city without an energetic protest. The shelling of a city of the size of Rio must necessarily entail much loss of life and incalculable destruction of property. We cannot believe that the factional strife in Brazil justifies such a proceeding.

The complete mastery of the situation in Brazil possessed by the naval establishment proves what vast importance to a country with an extended seaboard in the possession of an adequate naval force. The operations of the rebel navy in Brazil shows what could be accomplished by foreign enemy with a good navy against our defenseless coast, should we have the misfortune to become embroiled with any of the great European powers.

72. *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 21 de setembro

Tudo menos esta «república fictícia»!

It is believed in Brazil that the downfall of President Peixoto will be succeeded by a monarchy. Almost any government would be preferable to the

bogus republic that has been masquerading as the government of Brazil for the past four years. The Brazilian are not built for a republican form of government

**73. «The Trouble in Brazil», *Elmira Gazette and Free Press*,
21 de setembro**

A instabilidade no Brasil tem uma consequência para cada agregado familiar americano: o aumento no preço do café !

From the *New York News*.

The trouble in Brazil is unfortunate for the people of the United States. It has already had its effect on the price of coffee, and if order is not soon restored, nearly every home in this country will find its expenses increased in consequence. Our government is therefore doing wisely in trying to concentrate as many warships as possible at Rio de Janeiro.

74. «Red Tape or What !», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 22 de setembro

O Presidente Cleveland e o secretário de Estado Gresham têm de acordar e tomar conta da importância da presença de navios de guerra americanos na baía do Rio de Janeiro, exige o editorialista. Os americanos não devem combater do lado de Peixoto, acrescenta o diário nova-iorquino, mas devem impedir que as potências europeias apoiem os inimigos da república brasileira.

The deliberation shown by the secretary of the navy or the state department in dispatching war vessels to Rio Janeiro needs explanation. Up to the 19th the cruiser *Charleston* had not left Montevideo for Rio. It is announced that the *Newark* will be unable to get away before the 26th. She must take on coal at Norfolk and then proceed to Fort Wadsworth, New York harbor, to take an ammunition. The *Detroit* will remain in American waters until she is tested for forty-eight hours at sea. Mention has been made of the cruiser *New York*, but no effort has been made to get her ready for sea.

Under the present administration, it would seem that an increased fleet of war ships gives no new facilities for meeting emergencies. The rebellion against the authority of President Peixoto of Brazil has been brewing for some weeks, and the harbor of Rio is blockaded by the war ships of the rebels. Secretary Gresham¹⁵ has had fair warning, but, to all appearance, he has not lifted a finger to protect American interests in the chief city of the Brazilian republic. The republic itself is in danger by reason of the aid and comfort afforded to the rebellious fleet by the commanders of foreign war ships. Are President Cleveland¹⁶ and Secretary Gresham afraid to use our ships? Is the reactionary policy exploited in the case of Hawaii to be repeated, by allowing the re-establishment of monarchy in Brazil through European interference?

¹⁵ Walter Q. Gresham (1832-1895) foi secretário de Estado do presidente Cleveland de março de 1893 até à morte.

¹⁶ Stephen Grover Cleveland (1837-1908) foi o único presidente americano a ter sido eleito por dois mandatos não consecutivos (1885-1889 e 1893-1897).

The government of the United States is not called upon to fight the battles of President Peixoto, but is in duty bound to see that a republican government is not subverted by the undue interference of European powers. A powerful American fleet is needed in the harbor at Rio, and the sooner the president and Secretary Gresham wake up, the better.

75. *The Daily American*, 22 de setembro

Nestes dois pequenos comentários, o jornal do Nashville prevê uma vitória dos revoltosos, a breve prazo e com poucos mortos. Apesar de tudo, não acredita num regresso do antigo regime.

The history of revolutions in Brazil has been of the bloodless sort. A great big commotion is stirred up, much talking done, but little blood is shed. The one now in progress will very likely result in submission to the revolutionists with but little fighting and in a few days after submission the country will be quiet.

[...]

The coils of the Brazilian insurgents seem to be tightening around President PEIXOTO's government. Every indication now is that Admiral DE MELO will play about the same role in Brazil as Gen. CANTO¹⁷ did in Chile, and have everything his own very soon. There are reports that the Brazilian monarchy will be restored. These we do not think, however, are to be credited. We do not think

¹⁷ Estanislao del Canto Arteaga (1840-1923) combateu Balmaceda durante a guerra civil chilena, dirigindo a campanha no norte do país.

it at all probable that the former revolution in favor of a republican form of government will ever go backwards. Still, it must not be forgotten that the Brazilian have well in mind the mild and pacific reign of DOM PEDRO, and the contrast therewith of the troublous times Brazil has since had, may have an appreciable influence in favor of returning to monarchy. A few days will probably determine the result of the present struggle. The outlook is that Admiral DE MELO will soon be Dictator, temporarily at least.

76. *The Brooklin Citizen*, 22 de setembro

The cruiser *Newark* is taking on ammunition at Fort Wardsworth, and expects to be in harbor of Rio, Brazil, in about three weeks from now. By that time, if the Rebels are smart, there will be a new President in Brazil.

77. *The Daily Picayune*, 22 de setembro

The hope of the revolutionists in Brazil is to hold all the offices. They, in turn, will quarrel among themselves, and men who do business and raise crops will be squeezed to death to keep the fighters fat.

78. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 22 de setembro

Princess Isabella, it is said, is ambitious to become the empress of Brazil. If she does, the old proverb the «revolutions never go backwards» will be sadly discredited.

79. *Evening Gazette*, 22 de setembro

Lack of education is sometimes a good thing. If the gunners of her rebel fleet had learned how to shoot Brazil would be in more dangerous position than at present.

80. *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 22 de setembro

If Brazil must have a new President public opinion in this country will incline to the choice of some good man with an easier name to pronounce than Peixoto.

81. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*,
23 de setembro

O jornal utiliza artilharia pesada para atacar os revoltosos. Na sua opinião: são simplesmente piratas descarados, desesperados sem lei e não revolucionários. Não se pode começar uma revolução no mar, sem ter apoios

na terra, acrescenta o editorialista e bombardear uma cidade não é um ato revolucionário.

O jornalista, que põe em evidência a indiferença da população brasileira, pensa que é um dever para uma «grande potência como os Estados Unidos, com vastos interesses em causa, de proibir o crime».

The impending revolution in Brazil somehow seems undeserving of a name that necessarily implies public spirit and patriotism. The people apparently are apathetic, neither caring whether they are ruled by PEIXOTO nor whether PEIXOTO is overthrown by Admiral MELO. So far as the Brazilian themselves are concerned, it makes no difference what happens. They have shown the faintest aspiration for republican institutions, while they had neither respect nor reverence for the empire. They were alike indifferent when FONSECA overthrew Dom PEDRO and when PEIXOTO overturned FONSECA. It would be surprising after such conditions should they be surprised now when they see MELO overwhelming PEIXOTO.

But this Brazilian revolution, so-called, has one feature that has international interest and importance. It is not easy to distinguish between Admiral MELO'S fleet and a pirate navy. Captain KIDD¹⁸ as he sailed was not more devoid of authority than are the Brazilian ships of war now in the harbor of Rio. If their course is to be sanctioned by the neutral powers a ship of war may at any time become a menace to the government that created it and a squadron destroy the cities it was intended to protect. Every act that has taken place at Rio de

¹⁸ William Kidd (1645-1701) foi um célebre corsário escocês.

Janeiro since the beginning of the present conflict ought to be inadmissible under the law of nations. If Admiral MELO has the right to bombard Rio because he is dissatisfied with PEIXOTO, Admiral GHERARDI¹⁹ has the authority of the nations to knock New York and Brooklyn into smithereens if the policy of GROVER CLEVELAND fails to suit him.

There is no right more sacred than the right of revolution, but it must be put upon a very different basis from that assumed by Admiral MELO. Revolution must begin on land always – on the sea never. A revolution must have military backing before it can command a let-alone course of treatment from neutral powers. A few man-of-war capable of destroy unprotected cities on the sea coast do not constitute a revolution, and when such men-of-war threaten to destroy a city, as Admiral Melo's fleet has been threatening to destroy Rio de Janeiro for the last fortnight, it ought to be the duty of a great power like the United States, with vast interests at stake, to forbid the crime. It is difficult to regard the "revolution" in Brazil so far as anything more than the lawless effrontery of a naval desperado.

82. «The Brazilian Situation», *San Francisco Chronicle*,
23 de setembro

O articulista californiano, que cita essencialmente um artigo dum a revista, pensa que as causas da atual situação são muito mais profundas. Por

¹⁹ Bancroft Gherardi (1832-1903) era o comandante de um estaleiro da Marinha dos Estados Unidos situado em Brooklyn.

um lado, afirma que as dificuldades financeiras datam dos últimos trinta anos do império; por outro lado, sublinha a importância da margem de autonomia e de soberania de cada estado.

Quanto a Custódio de Melo, o jornal pensa que tem queixas contra Peixoto e está do lado das pessoas descontentes com a situação político-financeira. A conclusão do artigo é muito pessimista: « O Brasil está-se a aproximar do caos político e financeiro e está quase a cair aos pedaços».

It has been imagined, perhaps, that the existing revolution in Brazil was a spontaneous movement, brought about chiefly by the disappointment of would-be leaders; and while this may be the proximate cause of the movement antagonistic to President Peixoto, there are other causes which lie deeper and farther back.

As long as January of the present year, a writer in the *Fortnightly Review* pointed out, with much clearness and distinctness, the reefs and shoals which lay in the path of the Brazilian ship of state. He declared that the financial embarrassment in Brazil was not the consequence of the adoption of a republican form of government, but was a legacy from the empire. At the time of the expulsion of Dom Pedro, said this writer, in November, 1889, the revenue and expenditure had not balanced in one single instance for nearly thirty years, and the invariable yearly deficit had been met by continued borrowing, leaving Brazil sorely impoverished.

General Peixoto, who was at first nominated as President pro tem., to succeed General da Fonseca, was hailed as the savior of Brazil, but he soon found that in spite of the best intention he was hampered by difficulties and

circumscribed by limitations out of his power of control. Chief among these was that may be called lack of apprehension of the federal idea. The several States which go to make up the republic of Brazil insist on their sovereignty and autonomy, and yield only a half-hearted allegiance to the federal power. They carry the doctrine of State's rights to its ultimate limit, this being especially the case in the States of Rio Grande do Sul and Mato Grosso, which have never given more than a qualified assent to the federal plan.

Admiral Melo, the chief of the insurgents, is not believed to represent the monarchical idea. He stands rather for the factions which have, in the first place, some grievance against President Peixoto and his associated and second, for those which are discontent with the political and financial situation, and believe that any change would be for the better. The writer to whom reference has been made said, in concluding his article: "Let Brazilian Ministers represent it as they will, let the stability of the Government be consolidated as it may, in the view of at least one English watcher, the Republic of the United States of Brazil is looming larger as a political and financial wreck about to fall to pieces." Who shall deny to him at this moment the gift of prophecy?

83. «A Mock Republic», *The Buffalo Commercial*, 23 de setembro

Para o editorialista, as repúblicas latino-americanas têm um enorme problema: não há um espírito republicano. Fala do Brasil como de uma república fingida ou, no melhor dos casos, de uma república populista.

Embora ache que Peixoto esteja a resistir melhor do que Fonseca em novembro de 1891, constata que o Presidente «está a perder rapidamente terreno».

The history of Brazil, like the history of nearly all of the South American States, shows how difficult an undertaking it is to conduct the affairs of a republic successfully without republicans. The indispensable pre-requisite of a permanent republican government is a willingness of the majority of the people to settle their differences by law and not by appeal to arms, backed by a resolute determination to keep the peace if they have to fight for it. But the law-abiding instinct which has distinguished some races of the world above others, and which has made the Federal republic of North America possible, is not implanted in the Spanish American nature, and the habit seems one that they acquire very slowly even with many years of experience under republican forms of government.

Four years ago, the Empire of Brazil collapsed in one day under the threats of General da Fonseca, who was called “ardent republican” and was supported by a group of military officers. The good old gentleman, Dom Pedro, who had been the Emperor for many years, was given \$5,000,000 and shipped off to Portugal, where he died two years later [*sic*]²⁰. The provisional government, of which Fonseca remained head for fifteen months, survived many difficulties and crises and in February, 1891, its chief was elected. President of the Republic. Within a few months Congress began to oppose his policy the breach widened

²⁰ Dom Pedro faleceu em Paris a 5 de dezembro de 1891.

and finally the President, in the bad old South American manner, drove away the Legislature and assumed the dictatorship. In November of the same year (1891) a revolt against «the tyranny of Fonseca» was organized by a clique of naval officers and the dictator was forced to yield his office to Vice-President Peixoto. The new regime enjoyed about a year of comparative repose and then “discontent” manifested itself in the State of Rio Grande do Sul and war has virtually existed in different States since that time. The revolutionists are again led by naval officers and operations are confined to the sea-ports. President Peixoto has made a far more vigorous resistance to eviction than his predecessor did, but at last accounts seemed to be losing ground rapidly.

It is evident that the Republic of Brazil is a republic in name only. The country is ruled by military dictators, or oligarchies, whose access to power and tenure thereof depend wholly on the amount of armed forces they are able to muster in support of their claims. It is, in fact, a sort of Populist republic and if Governor Lewelling²¹, of Kansas, finds himself out of a job, after the next election in that State, he should be invited to emigrate to Brazil, where he will find the political usages and institutions congenial and may find an opening for his truly South American genius.

²¹ Lorenzo D. Lewelling (1846-1900) foi governador do Kansas entre 1893 e 1895. Apoiou-se no Partido Populista que controlava a Câmara enquanto o Senado era majoritariamente republicano. Houve uma «Guerra legislativa» até que a Supremo Tribunal do Estado tomou uma decisão em favor dos Republicanos.

84. *Oakland Tribune*, 23 de setembro

It has come out at last, and now it is said that the success of Admiral de Melos' party in Brazil means the restoration of the monarchy. Once more, therefore, a Bourbon will regain a throne. We shall see whether he has departed from the traditions of the family sufficiently to learn anything, or to forget something.

85. «The restoration of the Monarchy in Brazil»,
The Daily Picayune, 24 de setembro

Para o jornal da Luisiana, parece não haver dúvidas: o governo de Peixoto vai cair a curto prazo e o Brasil será de novo uma monarquia. O articulista nota que não pode lamentar a queda do novo regime, porque, na realidade, as instituições republicanas «nunca existiram no país». Foram quatro anos de um regime «militar despótico», de «desordens internas», e de «malgoverno».

The only foreign news of the past week has been that relating to the disturbed condition of affairs in Brazil. Although it is now more than a week since the bombardment of Rio commenced, that city still holds out against the rebels, though it must be confessed every indication point to the probability of the fall of the Peixoto Government in the near future. For some days past the rebel ships have been prepared to shell the city, and have only been prevented

from doing so by the endeavors of the foreign representatives at Rio to save the place from the horrors of a bombardment.

When the rebellion at first commenced it was thought that it was due solely to a sudden opposition of a portion of the naval force to some act of the Government particularly obnoxious to the naval service. Later developments have disproved this theory, however, and the unanimity with which all the naval vessels joined the rebels points to the likelihood of the outbreak being the result of a deep-laid plot.

When the trouble first began, the *Picayune* called attention to the fact that the navy had never been thoroughly loyal to the republic, hence there was room for the suspicion that at the bottom of the outbreak there might be a scheme to bring about the restoration of the monarchy. Recent developments prove that these suspicions were well founded, and it is now universally believed, even by well-informed Brazilians who have been interviewed in Europe on the situation, that the success of the revolution would mean the restoration of the family of Dom Pedro to the throne of Brazil.

Had real republican institutions ever existed in Brazil the *Picayune* would be the foremost to bewail the possibility of their being overthrown; but such institutions never have existed, the so-called republic having been nothing more nor less than a military despotism. The return to a well-ordered constitutional monarchy, such as that of Dom Pedro, would be infinitely preferable to the disorderly state of things which has prevailed in Brazil for the past four years. There has been more internal disorder, bad government, and loss of credit and

international prestige in Brazil during the past four years that during the entire half o century of the rule of Dom Pedro.

No mesmo número encontra-se também esta pequena nota irónica:

People who love coffee better than should call a halt to the political squabbles in Brazil.

86. «Two Great Republics», *The Sun* (N.Y), 25 de setembro

Para os americanos é difícil perceber o que se passa no Brasil onde a Marinha e o Exército se combatem e onde a frota bombardeia a capital, escreve o quotidiano da metrópole americana. Este compara a seguir os dois países; põe em evidências alguns pontos de convergências e, igualmente, o que os diferencia.

Nos Estados Unidos os militares obedecem ao poder civil; no Brasil são os generais e os almirantes que dominam a vida política, realça o jornalista. Em 1889, mandaram D. Pedro embora; dois anos mais tarde, foi Deodoro que teve de se demitir e, agora, o almirante de Melo quer derrubar o general Peixoto.

O Brasil conseguirá sair desta profunda crise só quando os militares estiverem «completamente e permanentemente subordinados ao poder civil», quando o país tiver «estadistas» a mandar no governo, «ou quando o povo fizer valer os seus direitos políticos», conclui o editorialista.

We cannot conceive of the occurrence of such incidents in the Unites States as we hear from Brazil. We cannot conceive of a grand revolt of the American Navy, or of Admiral GHERARDI or Admiral BENHAM acting as Admiral MELO and Admiral WANDENKOLK have acted, or of an American squadron bombarding New York as the Brazilian squadron has bombarded Rio de Janeiro,

or of President CLEVELAND flying from the shells of our navy as President PEIXOTO has fled from the shells of his navy, or of our naval fleet demanding the unconditional surrender of the Government. We cannot conceive of our army fighting our navy as the Brazilian army has fought the Brazilian navy. We cannot think of American officers seeking the aid of Mexico against their own country, as Brazilian officers have sought the aid of Uruguay. We say that we cannot conceive of the occurrence in this country of such things as have occurred in Brazil, a country which possesses a political system in some respects resembling our own.

Brazil is a republic like the United States; its territory is nearly as extensive as ours; its population is nearly one-third as great as ours; its Constitution is modeled upon ours; the Governments of its twenty States are organized as are those of our American States; it was founded and is largely populated by one of the strongest and steadiest races of Europe, the Portuguese; its negroes, once held in slavery, have been emancipated, as were ours; it has an excellent railroad and telegraph system; it has plenty of newspapers; it is a fertile and prosperous country, with a large commerce; it has its share of able statesmen.

Yet the course of things in Brazil, ever since the proclamation of the constitutional republic, has been subversive of the public peace and of popular freedom, and the occurrences of the present year are disgraceful to the country. We have never, not even in secession times, suffered from such occurrences in the United States.

The truth is that the army and navy of Brazil are predominant in the Government, while those of the United States are entirely subordinate to the civil power. In Brazil, the Admirals and Generals hold control of those affairs which, in this country, are under control of the people, through their chosen political representatives, the vast majority of whom are always civilians. Admiral GHERARDI or Admiral BENHAM, Major-Gen. SCHOFIELD²² or Major. Gen. HOWARD²³ or Major-Gen. MILES²⁴, would not be permitted for a moment to exercise any authority other than that which is conferred upon them by the legislation of Congress. The American people do not look to the army and navy for political leadership.

In Brazil it is otherwise. It was Admiral WANDENKOLK and Admiral MELO who, with Gen. DEODORO DA FONSECA and Gen. PEIXOTO, organized the revolt against Dom PEDRO and set up the republic, which, during the past three years, has been the plaything of their dishonorable ambition. DA FONSECA was made President and then driven from office in disgrace; PEIXOTO was made President, and is now fighting for his place; WANDENKOLK seized two ships of the navy and turned them against the Government which he had helped to create; MELO seized nearly the whole navy and is trying to overthrow PEIXOTO; the army has thus far stood by the President, but will undoubtedly desert him if the navy takes the

²² John Schofield (1831-1906), comandante geral do Exército americano entre 1888 e 1895.

²³ No fim da carreira, Oliver Howard (1830-1909), foi comandante do Departamento do Leste no porto de Nova Iorque.

²⁴ Nelson Miles (1839-1925), participa nomeadamente nas guerras contra os indígenas e na guerra hispano-americana. É o último comandante geral do Exército americano entre 1895 e 1903.

capital. The Generals who rule the several States, under favor of central Government, five of whom are in serious trouble, stand ready, if we can judge from their actions, to take the side of either party, or any party, that may promise to gratify their ambition.

These are the dire and droll results of putting the government and the politics of a republican country under the control of its army and navy, its Generals and Admirals. There can be no abiding place for Brazil while that control lasts, or until its military and naval arms are brought into complete and permanent subordination to the civil power, or until the Government is in the hands of civilians who are statesmen, or until the people assert their right to rule.

87. *The Morning Call*, 25 de setembro

O comentário ocupa-se, por um lado, do eventual regresso dos Bragança com o neto de D. Pedro II e, por outro lado, do nepotismo dos dirigentes republicanos brasileiros.

Should admiral de Melo succeed in his revolt it is possible that the monarchy may be restored in Brazil and the throne occupied by Prince Pedro, grandson of the late Emperor Pedro II. The Prince is the son the Emperor's daughter, the Princess Isabella, by her marriage with Comte d'Eu, grandson of King Louis Philippe of France, and was born at Petropolis, near Rio, on October 15, 1875. The fact that he is only 18 would not stand much in the way of

his accession in a country that made Dom Pedro Emperor at the age of 6 and consented to him governing in person at the age of 15. No mention is made of the Countess returning do Brazil. She is not popular and her husband is detested. It will require a lot of popularity on the part of the youth to make up for aversion to his parents. All manner of stories are now in order to the disparagement of the republic. Peixoto is accused of wasting the revenues and enriching his friends. Unfortunately if this were true it would not be a singular instance of abuse of privileges. To get possession of the treasury and dispense patronage are maxims of government in the name of the people governing themselves.

88. *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 25 de setembro.

Mais um artigo favorável aos revoltosos que, na opinião do editorialista, continuam determinados e com força.

The news from Brazil today should be encouraging to the friends of popular government. Admiral Melo has renewed the blockade of Rio Janeiro and is organizing a squadron to sail for northern ports. It is probable that the squadron will touch first at Para, where the people are dissatisfied with the present government. Rui Barbosa, a revolutionist, has escaped from Rio Janeiro and has published a letter in which he says that the navy under Admiral Melo is defending the rights of the Brazilian people against the military tyranny and despotism of President Peixoto. Minister Mendonça, who represents the Brazilian government in Washington, is constantly informed of the situation in

South America. He said yesterday that, whatever might be the result of the present trouble, it was certain that Brazil would remain a republic and that offset the rumors that the monarchy is to be restored. There is no indication that the revolutionists are growing weaker or less determined. They rather seem to be gaining strength. They will have it in their power to decide upon the form of government to follow their success. If they agree with Minister Mendonca all will be well.

89. *The Daily American*, 25 de setembro

The reader can take his choice of the news of Brazil. He can believe that the revolutionists have Rio de Janeiro and the coast south of it under their control, or he can believe that PEIXOTO is in no mood to be turned out and can overcome all opposition. But bear in mind that this Brazilian affair will be a comparatively bloodless one, or all former records will be broken.

90. «The Brazilian Revolution», *St. Louis Globe Democrat*,
26 de setembro

Os dirigentes brasileiros governaram durante quatro anos sem aplicar os princípios republicanos, afirma sem rodeios o editorialista de Saint-Louis: não há participação popular e o esmagador peso dos militares é algo de muito negativo. Uma república não pode funcionar sem o controle dos cidadãos, sobretudo, quando são as fações a mandar, deixando à marinha e ao exército o papel de «árbitros de todos os conflitos».

The revolution in Brazil is not an uprising of the people against intolerable abuses and oppressions. It is simply a contest between rival factions for the control of the Government, involving no principle or sentiment that appeals to the sympathy of the mankind. The first President was deposed by a similar movement, and now his successor's turn has come. There is nothing to show that war is justifiable, or that the country has anything to gain by a change of rulers. Peixoto is probably an arbitrary and dictatorial officer, as his enemies charge; but it is not at all likely that the man whom they propose to put in his place is any better. The political leaders of Brazil are all of that character. They believe in peremptory and intimidating methods, and rely more upon military force than upon popular opinion of the success of their schemes and undertakings. It is a curious fact that the Emperor, Dom Pedro, whom they drove out in the name of liberty and self-government, surpassed them all in point of true respect for republican ideas and processes. They have proceeded from the first upon the theory that the republic could be maintained only by monarchical means, and that no concession whatever must be made in the interest of free discussion and the amicable adjustment of difficulties. The whole tendency of the statesmanship of the country, in short, has been contrary to republican teachings and practices.

There is room for grave apprehension as to the stability of a democratic form of government which is operated by undemocratic methods and appliances. If the people are not capable of managing public affairs in an orderly

and satisfactory way, it is idle to talk about making them so by subjecting them to the discipline of practical tyranny. That is not truly a republic which puts the military above the civil power as a source of safety and an assurance of prosperity and progress; and the principal trouble with Brazil lies in the fact that she is thus exposed to constant dangers of turmoil and disaster. It is not to be expected that she will ever consent to a restoration of the monarchy. The time has gone by in her history for that sort of thing. But if the republic is to endure and prove beneficial, she will have to re-enforce it with a wiser understanding of the principles that it is supposed to represent and a different kind of devotion to its welfare. It can never be made thoroughly successful so long as its vital interests are left at the mercy of the various factions that exist in her politics, and that look to revolution for the promotion of their designs. She must suppress the mischievous theory that the army or the navy is the final arbitrator of all disputes. Her people must be taught to govern themselves in fact as well as in pretense, and to hold their public officials to a rigid accountability for all autocratic proceeding. That is the only way for her to gain the real blessings of republicanism, and to remove the perils that now interfere so seriously with the development of her wonderful resources and the attainment of an exalted rank among the nation of the world.

91. *The Omaha Daily Bee*, 26 de setembro

O jornal do Nebraska quer pôr os pontos nos ii no que que diz respeito à doutrina Monroe: não se trata de intervir diretamente num país do

continente americano, mas de impedir que as outras grandes potências o façam.

The Monroe doctrine seems to be well recognized in England. The London papers admit that the United States will not permit the restoration of the monarchy in Brazil. The admission is a little ill-timed. There is hardly anything in the Monroe doctrine to prevent the people of Brazil from selecting their own form of government, although all the influence of the United States would doubtless be used to prevent the restoration of the monarchy. What the United States would object to most seriously would be the restoration of the Brazilian monarchy by the interference of any foreign power.

92. *The Daily Picayune*, 26 de setembro

Brazil has a beautiful navy; but just now her guns are ungratefully turned towards Brazil.

93. *The Sioux-City Journal*, 26 de setembro

The war in Brazil is not responsible for the scarcity of sugar. The fault is with the trust right here at home.

94. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 27 de setembro

It may be that in his proclamation setting forth the reasons why rebellion exists in Brazil, Admiral Melo gives evidence both of sound sense and ripe judgment, but some of the insurgents have acted with a barbarity that ill befits a patriotic cause.

95. *The Washington Post*, 27 de setembro

It appears that Brazil is to remain a republic with monarchical tendencies.

96. «Expatriated Americans», *St.-Louis Post Dispatch*,
28 de setembro

Nesta carta, um leitor do jornal critica a atitude dos americanos que emigraram de livre vontade, e com pleno conhecimento de causa, para o Brasil. Quando tudo corria bem, não se interessaram pela sua pátria de origem. Agora, que a situação está muito mais complicada, pedem a intervenção dos Estados Unidos para os defenderem..!

To the Editor of the Post Dispatch :

A good deal is said about American interests in Brazil, but no explanation is given what these interests really are. As a matter of fact, the so called "American" interests boiled down are merely private interests. All Americans

who emigrated to Brazil went there knowing that at any time serious disturbances might take place, that their property was liable to confiscation or destruction, and that they were subject to the laws of Brazil. As long as everything was serene these self-exiled Americans too, not the slightest interest in the United States, but as soon as there is a possibility of losing a part or all of their earthly possessions the hue and cry goes forth that American interests are in danger, and kind-hearted Uncle Sam forthwith dispatches several warships to Rio de Janeiro to protect – what? Why, to protect the property of people who during their residence in Brazil never paid 1 cent of our taxes, people who never gave a farthing toward the construction of our navy, of individuals who in peace gave up their American citizenship, but who in times of war suddenly remember that they are citizens of this Republic and clamor for its protection.

These people have made their beds, now let them lie in them.

To protect private interests in foreign countries at the expense of the people at home is paternalism of the rankest sort.

UNCLE TOM

97. *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 28 de setembro

We prefer republics to monarchies or aristocracies, but when it comes to Brazil we demand that form of government under which the coffee plants thrive best.

98. *Okland Tribune*, 29 de setembro

Pequeno comentário muito irônico, sobre as notícias contraditórias que chegam às redações.

So many conflicting stories have been told about the revolution in Brazil that they begin to neutralize each other, and we shall presently come to believe that there has been no revolt at all, and no bombardment of Rio, and that Admiral de Melo and President Peixoto are but figment of the brain of some imaginative special correspondent.

99. «Brazil and America», *Evening Gazette*, 30 de setembro

Também²⁵ este editorial tenta definir o que é exatamente a doutrina de Monroe, criticando a interpretação feita por uma parte da imprensa britânica. Segundo o jornal de Cedar City, trata-se de uma «doutrina de paz e não de guerra». Os Estados Unidos, precisa o diário, «nunca entenderam ditar a forma de governo» aos outros países do Novo Continente. Esta doutrina só diz que «nenhuma potência cujo centro de decisão fique num outro continente, pode conquistar outros territórios neste».

É evidente que os Americanos se alegram que haja tantas repúblicas, e querem o fortalecimento das relações entre os dois países. Porém, refirma o jornalista, não irão intervir militarmente se os Brasileiros tomarem livremente, sem apoios externos, outra opção.

²⁵ Cf. Texto 91.

In discussing the situation in Brazil a part of the English press is led into a very grave error, both as regards the United States of America and the United States of Brazil. The British assert that, in pursuance of the Monroe doctrine this country would not permit the restoration of monarchy in Brazil. This is a basing supposition and an erroneous one, on the assumptions that the equatorial republic desires the return of monarchy. Again, the United States never assumed to dictate the form of government under which a people should live on the western hemisphere, and the Monroe doctrine simply asserts that no power, having its seat of government or center of influence on another continent, shall acquire further territorial right on this. It is true that this virtually makes America the protector of all western nations, and under this influence republicanism has overspread the two continents and taken root in the islands of the sea while the country is yet young. As the people, we rejoice at the result, but our rejoicing in this behalf is no greater that that with which we hail the triumphant democracy of the United Kingdom and manhood enfranchisement in Belgium. Emperor Dom Pedro of Brazil had no enemies in America. He was a grand monarch, a noble man, a patriot, and joy at the birth of the republic was tempered by grief for the old man's sorrow. To be sure, this country should not consent that any reigning family of the old world should place a king on the now empty throne at Rio. Bonaparte's experience in Mexico settled that point of international rule, but should the Brazilian reinstate the heir of Dom Pedro, the Monroe doctrine would not apply.

The adoption of our constitution, the patterning of our flag and the inauguration of methods meant to be like our own by the United States of Brazil afford the hope that at some time the two nations may be more closely joined and true American would regret to witness a step which would delay the consummation of this hope. But the Monroe doctrine is one of peace and not of war, of the possession by the rightful owners and not of conquest. Outside of her own well-being America's mission is simply one of education and enlightenment and hostile armies never were instructors in the school of human rights and should never be employed except in defense of liberty.

100. *The Wichita Daily Eagle*, 30 de setembro

The Brazilian minister at Washington confidently asserts that there is no danger of re-establishment of a monarchy in Brazil, however the present civil war terminate. The South American republics, as a rule, have not so managed their affaires as to do credit to the cause of self-government. Their constant jangling with each other and internal commotions go far to justify Pope's rhyming commentary –

“For forms of government let fools contest,
That which is best administered is best.”

101. «The Brazilian Civil War», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*,
1 de outubro

Desde a proclamação da República, o Brasil viveu tempos muito agitados, com revoltas nas províncias e uma grande instabilidade, nota o quotidiano de Chicago, segundo o qual o regime, na prática, não tem nada de republicano, com o povo na ignorância, e com as várias facções lutando entre si. Estas põem no poder um militar aventureiro que se torna ditador, defendendo os dos seus interesses e os dos seus amigos.

O editorialista tem a certeza que se Custódio de Melo tomar o lugar de Floriano Peixoto, nada vai mudar. No fundo, conclui o jornal, o regime de D. Pedro era muito mais republicano do que este.

The story of the Brazilian insurrection or civil war, printed elsewhere in these columns, is a clear and interesting exposition of the circumstances leading up to the present outbreak against the Peixoto régime in the greatest of South American States.

Beginning with 1889 it describes the downfall of the empire at the hands of the army and navy, the proclamation of the republic, and the abdication of the old Emperor, the establishment of the provisional Republican government, and the election of Da Fonseca as President. In June, 1891, the latter resigned on account of ill health [*sic*]²⁶ in favor of Gen. Peixoto, the Vice-President, who had been Secretary of War in the Provisional Government. He has held the office from that time to this, with popular dissatisfaction increasing all the time, and one or

²⁶ Como é sabido, Deodoro da Fonseca é obrigado a demitir-se a 23 de novembro de 1891 perante o ultimato da Marinha.

more of the Brazilian provinces in a state of revolt, which may be said to be chronic, as there has not been a time since 1889 when some province was not running a revolution against the General Government. He has been accused of seeking to make himself military dictator, of stealing the public money, of violating the Constitution, and of committing the most audacious acts of usurpation, though the ostensible cause of the present outbreak is Peixoto's veto of a bill passed by the Congress making the Vice-President, who is his tool, ineligible for the office of President. Da Fonseca before him had made himself dictator and indulged in usurpation. Peixoto unquestionably is trying the same game. There is no reason to believe, should the naval faction headed by Admiral Melo be successful in overturning the Peixoto government and a new President come to the front, that the latter would be any better. There is no element of stability in South American republics. The people are densely ignorant. They know little or nothing about candidates. They are the blind tools of factions seeding to elevate this or that military adventurer to power. When such a man gets into power there is no way to get rid of him except by revolution. The story of Da Fonseca is the story of Peixoto, and the story of Peixoto will be that of his successor, whoever he may be. The military power and idea of force lie at the base of the Brazilian and every other South American republic, so it will be a matter of little consequence to the world whether Admiral Melo be successful or not. If he fails Peixoto will more audacious than ever and continue his usurpations until some new and more successful revolution unseats him. If he succeeds he may take the Presidency himself, but whoever may secure the place he will be just as irresponsible and dictatorial, and he will continue so until he

in turn is overtaken by a revolution. Thus far the Republic of Brazil has enjoyed a more un-republican form of government than it had under the empire and the rule of the good Dom Pedro.

102. «Americans in Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 1 de outubro

Depois de ter resumido a aventura de Paul Boyton que, pelos vistos, queria, usando impropriamente a bandeira britânica, atacar um navio dos revoltosos, o jornalista coloca a questão do abastecimento dos rebeldes por parte de navios americanos de comércio.

Americans in search of adventure are to be found wherever it is likely that there will be excitement; so it is not surprising that one of them should turn up in Brazil. A man named Boyton, supposed to be Paul Boyton²⁷, the swimmer, was arrested in the harbor at Rio Janeiro while in command of a Brazilian tug flying the British flag. The captain of a British man of war objected to the illegal use of his colors. Boyton was turned over to Captain Picking of the United States cruiser in the harbor, and the captain has telegraphed to Washington for instructions. There is need of instructions, because it is supposed that Boyton proposed to attempt to blow up with a torpedo one of the ships manned by the insurgents, and has hoisted the British flag so that he could get near enough to the vessel to use his torpedo effectively. There is no way by which the United

²⁷ Paul Boyton (1848-1924), desportista, navegador, inventor e aventureiro americano.

States government can be held responsible for his action. He may have been in the employ of President Peixoto, but this would be difficult to prove.

The possible complications which may arise from the action of an American merchant vessels in supplying provisions to the insurgents are more serious. The subject has been brought to the attention of the state department and it is hoped that an understanding will be reached which will prevent all trouble.

103. *The Brooklin Daily Citizen*, 1 de outubro

It is said that large armies and navies are useful in keeping the peace. If so, it would be well for the army and navy of Brazil to begin at home. For at present these two branches of the peacekeeping department of the Government are fighting each other; in other words, promoting civil war.

104. *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 1 de outubro

There has been more despotism in Brazil in the past three years and three-quarters in which a so-called republic prevailed in that country than there was in the half century and over of Dom Pedro's rule.

105. *The Morning Call*, 3 de outubro

O jornal de San Francisco condena o bombardeamento da cidade decidido por Custódio de Melo e prevê como «inevitável» uma guerra civil.

The situation in Rio de Janeiro is still anarchic. De Melo is mercilessly compelling a surrender and is invoking all the terrors of bombardment and starvation to aid his purpose. Miseries indescribable must exist among the Brazilian ashore, but they are of little weight in a commander's estimation compared with the success of his strategy. During all Sunday the shells shrieked over the city. Many lives are possibly lost and much property must have been riddled and demolished. How the admiral gets powder enough for such prolonged devastation is a point not explained, but he has evidently a large supply. Telegrams about the situation are as usual one-sided. The rebels win at all points in one set and the Government in the other. Civil war on a broader scale than the blockade of the ports seems now inevitable. Brazil will not recover from its irruptive disposition for many years.

106. *The Daily American*, 3 de outubro

Sobre a «legalidade» duma eventual intervenção das grandes potências.

If Admiral de Melo has been prevented by the threats of the foreign war vessels at Rio from bombarding the city it is difficult to see what rule of

international law or usage would justify it. Reasonable provisions could be properly insisted upon to protect the lives and property of foreigners by giving them a reasonable time to remove to a place of safety; and it is true that at the request of the recognized Brazilian Government foreign governments might interfere to subdue rioters or a political mob. But where an insurrection rises to the dignity of war, which the situation in Brazil undoubtedly is, foreign governments should treat both sides as belligerents and assume pure neutrality. It is idle to say that the Brazilian insurgents are not carrying on war in the legal meaning of that term when the capital of the country is at their mercy but for foreign interference.

107. *The San Francisco Examiner*, 3 de outubro

England manifests a tendency to interfere in the affairs of Brazil. There is no particular reason for it unless that Brazil's affairs are none of England's business.

108. *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*, 3 de outubro

Often in politics there is nothing in a name. In Brazil the republic has been despotic while the empire was democratic.

109. «The War in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 4 de outubro

Trata-se de uma guerra superficial e ridícula, nota o jornal californiano, que sugere aos dois chefes, Melo e Peixoto, a partilha do poder entre si, de modo a acabar dessa forma o conflito cujas causas não parecem suficientemente explícitas. O atual chefe do executivo brasileiro não governou tão mal como isso, tendo em conta as circunstâncias, sublinha o jornalista, na opinião do qual Custódio de Melo não faria melhor no seu lugar.

Como outros analistas, também este editorialista lamenta a falta de consciência política na população do Brasil. Esta tão facilmente idolatra uma pessoa, como a pode vilipendiar no dia seguinte.

Possibly the contending forces in Brazil under President Peixoto on one side and Admiral Melo on the other, may be very much in earnest, but up to the present time the war has been almost farcical in its character. The insurgent fleet throws a few shot and shell into the city of Rio Janeiro, and then withdraws to collect its energies for a new assault. President Peixoto, in defense of his Government and authority, has a military following of about 5000 men, and of this force only a small part is composed of regular troops, the remainder being militia, police and firemen.

In few of the remarkably perfunctory way in which this war is being carried on, it would seem that foreign intervention might readily avail to stop it and to restore peace. It does not appear that there is any serious plan or even desire to restore imperialism in Brazil, and if Peixoto and Melo are quarreling over the headship of the republic, the difficulty might be adjusted by dividing the authority between them in some way.

Up to the present time no immediate and sufficient cause has been assigned for the uprising. Peixoto is declared to have been ambitious to secure the absolute control of Government, but that is always said of every President of a South American republic. He appears to have governed as wisely and fairly as any man could have done with his environment, and there is certainly nothing to indicate that Melo would do any better.

The trouble is that the Brazilians, like most South Americans, do not possess a clear knowledge of the fundamental doctrine and principles of self-government. They are strongly disposed towards hero worship for the moment, but the idol of their adoration is likely to be abused and reviled the next moment because he is discovered to be only human, not divine. The ultimate disposition of South America is one of the great problems which will have to be solved in the coming century.

110. *Oakland Tribune*, 4 de outubro

There may be an explanation of the whole trouble and a justification of Admiral Melo, too, in the fact that Sara Bernhardt was in Rio during the bombardment. The Portuguese are gallant fellows. That goes without saying. But even the Portuguese of Brazil would be justified in throwing a few shells in the divine Sara's direction should she chance to come within range of their gun.

111. *The Brooklyn Citizen*, 4 de outubro

From Sara Bernhardt's account of her recent visit to Rio de Janeiro, and other bits of information, it is indicated that rebel Admiral Melo of Brazil, has never attempted to the city, but that what he sought was to get possession of the forts in the harbor, and that he did not succeed. However, the end is not yet.

112. «Progress in the Far South», *New York Tribune*, 6 de outubro

As notícias vindas do Sul do continente americano são fortemente exageradas, as lutas não são assim tão graves, nota o diário nova-iorquino que, no segundo parágrafo, põe em evidência os progressos feitos na América Latina. Admite, porém, que as duas piores características das repúblicas sul-americanas são «os governos militares e as desordens financeiras.»

O editorialista vê também uma outra qualidade na classe dirigente destes países: sabem lidar, sem antipatia, com as «classes sociais baixas» e com «as raças inferiores» !!

There is a current impression that republican institutions have failed in Latin America. Probably the newspapers are somewhat at fault. There are seventeen republics south of the United States, and the cable news service is not as full nor as accurate as it ought to be. Reports of revolutionary outbreaks and military or naval insurrections attract momentary attention when conspicuously printed and accompanied by editorial reflections upon the instability and the political institutions and the frivolity of Spanish-American character. It ought not to excite surprise that American readers have a vague

idea of the tropical countries on their own continent as regions where there are occasional earthquakes and frequent revolutions, and where the conditions are unfavorable for political progress. What is published from the quarter is fragmentary and often grossly exaggerated, and a great mass of information of real significance and value in relation of the progress of Latin America is suppressed altogether.

Now the truth of the matter is that whatever may be the vices of the Spanish-American character, there are also many virtues. The Southern republics are not standing still; there are making remarkable advances in material civilization, and are slowly but steadily improving in their political conditions. Railways have changed not only the face of Mexico, but also its social order. Revolutions no longer occur there; brigandage has been suppressed, and the old degrading system of wage-slavery known as peonage is disappearing from the Northern States. The cities are now well drained and the streets are cleaner than those of American towns; and with increased facilities for education there is an advance in popular intelligence. In Central America, Colombia, Bolivia and Ecuador railways have been built only on a small scale, and there are fewer signs of improvement; but there is progress even there. Peru, in spite of its impoverishment, is recovering from the disasters of a war which ought to have been averted in the interest of civilization. Chili is a thoroughly progressive State, with marvelous maritime energy and a genuine love of republican institutions. The Argentine, with all its financial follies, is another Yankee-land with a future of magnificent promise. Brazil, last in the list of

Southern republics, is also lagging in the march of political development, but even with its disordered finances and its civil strife it is in a more hopeful condition today than it was under the imperial system of centralized despotism.

What are known as revolutions in tropical America are ordinarily the faction fights of politics. They are seldom as serious as the dispatches from Southern indicate. The presence of armed garrisons in the chief towns is a standing evil in every one of these republics, since it enables those in office to carry elections and to perpetuate their power. Military government and financial disorders are the worst featured of Spanish-American life. Even Venezuela, which in some respects is one of the most enlightened of Southern republics, is constantly exposed to military dictatorship and administrative corruption. But as an offset to these evils, which go with the strain of Spanish blood, there is a characteristic genius of dealing with inferior races. From Mexico to Brazil there are no antipathies of affinities of race which unfit the ruling classes for governing the lower and ignorant classes. Throughout tropical America there are signs of enterprise and creative power. Huddles of Indian huts on the spurs of the Andes are lighted every night with improved electric plant. The cities of Chile and the Plate countries combine the elegance of European architectural forms with the push and energy of Western towns in America. It is a progressive quarter of the world, faint and uncertain as may be the echoes which may be carried to Northern ears.

113. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*,
6 de outubro

O editorialista, depois de ter realçado o facto dos bombardeamentos terem sido devastadores, nota que o descontentamento não se limita à marinha. Admite que os últimos quatro anos foram muito agitados e atribui isso, pelo menos em parte, às condições geográficas e às características do «carácter latino».

Porém, o jornalista, que enumera os progressos realizados nas repúblicas sul-americanas, recusa-se a falar de falhanços desses regimes e rejeita a ideia de um regresso à monarquia.

The bombardment of Rio de Janeiro, which has been progressing in desultory fashion during the past two weeks with no very serious results, has at last assumed a decidedly critical phase. Yesterday the insurgents fleet, under the command of Admiral Melo, opened fire with such disastrous consequences that a great part of the city is believed to have been destroyed, and unless there is an intervention of the powers, with the view of claiming public feeling, it is considered probable that the Brazilian capital will soon be entirely in ruins. In the interior the rebels have made decisive gains.

As to the precise origin of the revolution, it is hard to form a correct idea, especially when the distance and the fragmentary character of the information received are borne in mind. The insurgents allege that it is entirely due to the misconduct of President Floriano Peixoto, who vetoed a bill which passed both houses of congress declaring him ineligible to the presidency, and who has in other ways defied public sentiment as voiced by the people's representatives.

Whatever the cause of the outbreak, it is manifest that the seeds of discontent are widely scattered, for several of the Brazilian states have declared against the administration, and they are sustained by fully one-half the army, to say nothing of the navy, which is bombarding the capital.

Observers of events in South America, who but three or four years ago read of the overthrow of Dom Pedro and the birth of the Brazilian republic with a feeling of hope that the attempt of the people to govern themselves would be in every way successful, will be supremely discouraged at the present unhappy conditions of affairs. They will argue that the country was better off under the imperial system, and that so long as the Latin character is so impulsive, so excitable, so fickle, it is useless to expect agreement without a strong centralized force to hold it in check. Certainly the period that has intervened since Dom Pedro's banishment has been replete with violence, and some of the causes of commotion have been so trivial, so infinitesimally petty, that people in the United States may well be pardoned if they have regarded them with sentiment akin to mirth. So, the truth is, as everyone knows, that revolutions in South America are as frequent as earthquakes there, a fact which is partly attributable to climatic conditions. And constant repetition of the same old story has made it somehow tedious and wearisome. But, making allowance for all the drawbacks which exist, that would be a bold mind, indeed, which would undertake without hesitation to declare that the experiment of self-government in South America has been a failure, or that the people of Brazil are more unfortunately situated today, than they were in the days of the monarchy.

Argentina, Peru, Venezuela, Chile, indeed all of the eight republics, without exception, have had their customary “revolutions”, but these outbreaks do not seem to have materially impaired the public welfare. The trade of the South American ports shows a steady, if not a wonderful growth, and as the interior is being developed by European and American capital, as railroads become more numerous and the channels of communication more direct, it is only reasonable to suppose that there will be gain for the better along lines of tolerance and self-control and real capacity for self-government. The policy of the United States, in accord with the Monroe doctrine, is to keep its hands off, but there can be no doubt that the proximity of this republic to the Latin races south of us, and the influence which it indirectly exerts, is a factor which must count for much in the growing civilization of the South American people. As to the revolution in Brazil, it is difficult to foretell which side will triumph, but there is certainly no likelihood of a departure from the present governmental system.

114. «The South American Rebellions», *The Sun*, N.Y, 6 de outubro

O quotidiano nova-iorquino compara a revolta da marinha brasileira à insurreição argentina que acaba de ser esmagada. Nota também, com demasiado optimismo, que, «neste momento, as outras oito [repúblicas] estão num estado de paz».

Quanto à revolta em si, sublinha, e com razão, que até ao momento «não houve nenhuma grande batalha.» No entanto, realça o facto do governo de Peixoto ter de enfrentar revoltas em quatro estados, o descontentamento das tropas e a sedição da marinha.

The rebellion in Argentina, which has been kept up for about three months²⁸, is at an end, if we can believe the official reports sent out by the Government there; and we have not any doubt that these reports are trustworthy in the main. Some of the rebel leaders have fled and others are in prison; the rebel troops have been disarmed; the rebel gunboat and the two rebel torpedo boats have been captured by the naval cruisers, all of which adhered to the Government. We do not see how the rebellion can be resumed, though there may yet be some fighting. Perhaps more than a hundred lives have been lost in the strife, and perhaps several hundred men have been wounded. The Government ought now to be more firmly established than it has been at any other time since President PENA²⁹ took office one year ago. Argentina is apt to be in a state of political turmoil.

The rebellion in Brazil is of the same nature as that which has come to an end in Argentina, and grew out of the misconduct of PEIXOTO as the other grew out of that of PENA. At least four of the Brazilian States are opposed to the Federal Administration and its policy, and we cannot say whether the Government will be able to hold its ground against the multiplying rebels, the discontented troops, and the seditious navy. We shall not be surprised at the success of the rebels; but we cannot answer the question, What next? The fighting has been desultory and

²⁸ Esta revolução da União Cívica Radical de 1893 contra o governo conservador tem duas fases : a primeira insurreição dura de 28 de julho a 25 de agosto ; a segunda, de 7 de setembro a 1 de outubro.

²⁹ Luis Sáenz Peña (1822-1907) é presidente da Argentina de outubro de 1892 até janeiro de 1895, quando apresenta a sua demissão.

indecisive ever since the rebels took the field in the State of Rio Grande do Sul last year, and there has not been a battle of any magnitude during the rebellion. We do not know why Brazil should be unable to produce a statesman able to pacify the country.

Brazil and Argentina are by far the largest, as they are the most powerful, of the South American republics. The other eight are in a peaceful state at this time, and only Venezuela has been disturbed this year. It is a curious fact that there are not any signs of the coming of a war in any of them, though Peru is on bad terms with Chile, and Bolivia is not on good terms with any of its neighbors, and Venezuela has had hard experiences under the dictator, CRESPO³⁰. We must hope that those of the republics which are at peace will restrain their belligerent passions as long as they can. How blessed is that country which enjoys peace with liberty.

115. «The War in Brazil», *The Daily Picayune*, 6 de outubro

Esta luta não está prestes a acabar, nota o quotidiano da Luisiana, que espera uma intervenção coordenada das grandes potências para que encontrem uma solução para este conflito.

The struggle now in progress in Brazil promises to prove a much more protracted affair than was at first thought probable. Although Rio has been

³⁰ Joaquín Crespo (1841-1898) foi Presidente da Venezuela entre 1884 e 1886 e entre 1892 e 1898. Foi assassinado a 16 de abril de 1898.

bombarded frequently, it still remains in the hands of President Peixoto, and although the Government has lost ground it is still far from being subdued, and as long as the rebels confine their operations to the sea it is unlikely that a crisis in the dispute can be reached.

It is announced that the occupation of the Island of St. Catherine by the rebel sailors is a move preliminary to the inauguration of active operations on land. Should this movement be followed by the secession of several of the States to the revolutionists, matters would begin to look very serious for Peixoto. The present method of starving him out by blockading the coast, while it may succeed in the end, is not calculated to hurry matters.

In the meantime, the foreign trade of Brazil is suffering and those countries which trade extensively with the disturbed republic are also losers by the trouble. Under the circumstances it would appear timely for the leading foreign powers interested in Brazilian trade to take steps to bring about a settlement on the dispute. It is true that the experience of the United States during the Chilean civil war was not encouraging to prospective peacemakers, but a joint attempt on the part of a number of the powers might have weight where an isolated effort would prove abortive.

Something has been done in the way of joint action by the powers already, as many of the foreign warships in Brazilian waters have protested against the further bombardment of the city, and have, if it is reported, been successful in securing compliance with their demands.

116. *Oakland Tribune*, 6 de outubro

Peixoto só tem uma possibilidade: esperar.

Two more States have revolted from Peixoto, but the President of Brazil says he will hang on just the same as long as he has 5000 troops behind him and holds the city of Rio Janeiro. As a matter of fact Peixoto has to hang on. The other fellows have the ships, and there is no way of getting out of the country.

117. *The Standard Union*, 6 de outubro

In Brazil bombarding the national capital is a very simple political experiment. It is nothing out of the ordinary, and theatrical.

118. «Light from Rio», *New York Tribune*, 7 de outubro

Depois de ter mencionado as causas imediatas da revolta e os aspetos jurídico-constitucionais da eleição presidencial no Brasil, o editorialista analisa o conflito entre o Exército e a Marinha. Face à inexistência da opinião pública, os dois ramos das Forças Armadas – que representam duas facções políticas antagonistas – intervêm na política. «Cada um tem os seus mecanismos de coerção», conclui o diário de Nova Iorque.

The New-York World's special cable dispatches from Rio give an intelligible account of the immediate causes of civil war in Brazil. Admiral

Vandenkolk was imprisoned by the Government on political charges³¹. The Senate, of which he was a member, declined to remand him to the jurisdiction of the courts for trial for treason. Senator Barbosa appealed to the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf, but this was denied. Then President Peixoto vetoed a bill, which had been passed by both houses of Congress, for establishing his ineligibility for reelection. With one of the naval leaders a prisoner, and with Peixoto a candidate for the Presidency in the elections to be held in March, Admiral Melo headed an insurrection, carried the fleet with him, and subsequently bombarded the fortifications and the town.

When these details are critically examined, a close resemblance may be traced to the ordinary election disputes and constitutional controversies prevailing in Spanish-American countries. The Brazilian Constitution provides for the election of President and Vice-President by an electoral college similar to the American system. The President, however, is ineligible for re-election, the theory being that a second term is dangerous, since it offers temptations for the employment of military force by the Executive in perpetuating his power. The same safeguard is established in other constitutions in Latin America, but it is frequently disregarded and openly violated. It often happens that a Vice-President succeeds to the Presidency and then seeks re-election, claiming immunity from the constitutional restriction, inasmuch as he was first chosen as Vice-President. This was the case in Brazil, where Peixoto succeeded

³¹ Em março de 1892, Eduardo Wandenkolk (1838-1902), é preso por ter assinado o Manifesto dos 13 Generais, que exigia a convocação de eleições. Será reformado no mês seguinte.

Deodoro. Congress, in order to anticipate this technical defense, attempted by special legislation to render a Vice-President who had become President ineligible for re-election as Chief Executive. Peixoto's veto was not overridden. He remained a candidate for the March elections, and had the marked advantage of controlling the army in all the capital and chief towns.

The only variation from what is a very common theme in South American politics is found in the rivalries between naval and military officers. Ordinarily elections are controlled by the army, but in Chile during the last civil war, and now again in Brazil, the navy has intervened in politics as a rival force. Peixoto with the army behind him was confronted with naval aspirants for Presidential honors. When he arrested one of the naval leaders the other headed a revolt, and in order to force the President either to resign office or to withdraw from the canvass bombarded Rio. It is a constitutional conflict only in name. It is virtually a political faction fight over Presidential succession, with the army and navy on opposite sides, and with a strong probability of the election of a compromise candidate in the end. There is no evidence of any popular reaction against republican institutions. The Brazilian people are having experiences similar to those which have attended elsewhere the practical operation of constitutional based upon the American model. In the absence of the moral restraints of enlightened public opinion the army and navy have intervened in politics. Military force on shore is met by broadsides from the fleet. Each faction has its own engines of coercion.

119. «The Brazilian Situation», *The Brooklyn Citizen*, 7 de outubro

Uma monarquia constitucional estável foi substituída por uma espécie de república, liderada por um bando de aventureiros egoístas, que originaram quatro anos de turbulências, lamenta o editorialista. Este, que cita a opinião de americanos que viveram no Brasil, critica a apatia dos brasileiros que nada fizeram para defender D. Pedro e que não têm o nível suficiente para utilizar os direitos políticos.

O mesmo resume a revolta a um conflito «pré-eleitoral» entre Peixoto, que tem o apoio dos comerciantes e do exército, e de Melo, apoiado pelos «que não se preocupam com o comércio e que gostam dele porque pensam que é uma melhor pessoa».

Mas todas as testemunhas citadas pensam que, de qualquer forma, seja quem for o vencedor, «o Brasil vai viver ainda durante muitos anos em condições muito perturbadas».

Reports from Brazil, not by a roundabout and untrustworthy process, but by word of mouth, and made by gentlemen who agree in their conclusions, though their interest in the matter was various, fully confirm the views taken of Brazilian affairs in these columns from the day when a constitutional monarchy was driven out to make way for a bogus republic and a gang of self-seeking adventurers.

Of course, it is useless to waste sympathy on the people of Brazil. They are not in that status of civilization which enables a people to make any use of personal liberty except to wrong each other; they have nothing whatever, except in the theory, to do with government affairs, and if they were not governed with the strong hand they would be unruly and law-defying.

If they had had any real appreciation of their opportunities they would not have permitted the benevolent Emperor Dom Pedro to be dethroned; for under his rule they have had a constitutional monarchy, and that is the next thing to a republic or a democracy, and they would have been able to understand that the most essential thing in any country which is looking for prosperity and intellectual advancement – in short, for full civilization – is a stable Government.

Since Dom Pedro was ousted, they have been in continual turmoil in consequence of the contentions of rival adventurers, not one of whom has ever paid the slightest attention to the obligations of the Constitution when they stood in his way, and the present trouble is simply an election trouble.

It differs from most of that kind in all Central and South America, in that it is a pre-election instead of a post-election fight. President Peixoto wants to be re-elected next March. Admiral de Melo is also a candidate. He knows that Peixoto with the army at his command, can easily “count him out”, so he has begun his political campaign already as the opportunity offered by the use of the navy to blockade the principle ports and cut off Peixoto’s supplies.

In this way he hopes to get hold of the election machinery himself, and to be in a position to count himself in and his adversary out when the latter’s term expires, if not before. Peixoto has the sympathy of the traders of all kind, because they do not want trade disturbed, and because he has the use of the army; that is, the election machinery. De Melo has the sympathy of a great many who care little about trade, and like him because they think he is the better fellow.

This is the situation to be deduced from what ex-Minister Conger, Dr. J.M. Lane, of the College of Sao Paulo, Brazil, resident there for thirty years, and others who have just returned, say about it; and the unpleasant part of their utterances is in the apprehension they express that, no matter which wins, Brazil will be in a disturbed condition for many years to come.

120. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 7 de outubro

Tempos muitos difíceis para os habitantes do Rio de Janeiro, escreve o jornal californiano que, apesar de realçar o facto dos brasileiros terem pouca consciência política, admite que, numa situação análoga, os americanos teriam a mesma atitude que os brasileiros.

The condition of the people of Rio is not an enviable one. Menaced by the naval vessels controlled by the insurgents on one side, and robbed and outraged by Peixoto's soldiers quartered in the city, life must be almost unendurable. It is not at all surprising that the masses in countries like Brazil have no strong political convictions. If Americans were placed between the fires of opposing men they would in all probability, like the Brazilian, cry out, "A plague on both yours houses," and regard with indifference the possibility of a return to the monarchy.

121. *The Evening Star*, 7 de outubro

When Brazil required Dom Pedro to step down, she forgot that while a republic is the best form of government, it requires a high average of level headed citizenship to run one successfully.

122. «A floating revolution», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*,
8 de outubro

A revolta chefiada por Custódio de Melo não tem nada de revolucionário, afirma perentoriamente o jornal de Pensilvânia, que compara os métodos usados pelos rebeldes aos dos corsários e aos dos piratas.

O editorialista interroga-se sobre o papel das grandes potências para garantir «a liberdade de comércio nos portos brasileiros», face a esta decisão de um «marinheiro de formar um governo rebelde num navio de guerra.»

Quanto a Peixoto, escreve o jornalista de Filadélfia, terá de apresentar a demissão, mas só quando a salvaguarda da república for garantida.

The longer the troubles in Brazil continue the more clearly it is demonstrated that the revolt has none of the attributes of a revolution. It is an uprising of warships against the city they are bound to protect. There is no revolt in the army on the part of the people, but, for the first time in history, an attempt is making to decide the fate of a vast empire on the quarter deck. Just what is the attitude of the foreign powers toward this peculiar revolt it has not been possible as yet to ascertain. According to one dispatch, the diplomatic representatives at Rio de Janeiro have requested President PEIXOTO either to

make a compromise with the rebels or leave the capital. This is preposterous. According to another dispatch Admiral MELO has been warned to bombard none but fortified points. This is reasonable and should have been done at the beginning of the revolt. If it has not been done it should be without delay.

So far as the foreign powers are concerned the real question is the freedom of commerce in Brazilian ports. It is said that Admiral MELO refuses to permit merchant ships into the harbor of Rio, justifying his conduct on the right of might. That is a law that is equally tenable for the corsair. That was the law of the pirate. Admiral MELO'S ships represent nothing but his will. They are without a flag. There is no ostensible government behind them. They are playing tricks with the world's commerce because a sailor has chosen to set up a rebel government on a warship. It is a singular state of affairs, but one that cannot last much longer, for it does not seem likely that the world will continue to tolerate a revolution" that is only afloat.

So far as President PEIXOTO is concerned it is clearly his duty to resign as soon as he can do so with the safety of the Republic assured. If ever now is the time for Brazil to become a republic in fact as well as in name.

123. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 8 de outubro

O «inofensivo» bombardeamento da capital é só «um desnecessário desperdício de munições».

The bombardment of Rio by the Brazilian admiral, according to all reports, is a needless waste of ammunition, since neither property nor life is put in much jeopardy. If the rebels are doing the best they can, they have shown the inefficiency of the navy of Brazil. If they imagine that a bombardment of noise will drive the government to capitulate, Brazil has queer naval officers. It may be that the rebels expect to win over the people by such leniency as a harmless bombardment may imply. At any rate, the nervous can be made very uncomfortable, as a mistake might be made and a shell do effective work.

124. «The Brazilian Revolution», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*,
9 de outubro

O editorialista não parece acreditar nem na notícia segundo a qual as potências europeias teriam exigido a saída de Peixoto da capital, nem que a cidade tenha sido alvo de um verdadeiro bombardeamento, nem nas notícias sobre atrocidades cometidas pelas tropas fiéis ao presidente.

Depois de ter lembrado a doutrina Monroe, pilar da política de Washington, o jornalista realça o facto que Custódio de Melo, obcecado pela sua «hostilidade pessoal para com» Peixoto, não tem nenhum «propósito revolucionário». O seu principal objetivo, com a ajuda da «frota renegada e hostil», é de forçar o seu adversário a demitir-se, mas não vai ser fácil, conclui o articulista.

The conditions reported by the news dispatches from Rio de Janeiro are not impossible, but it must be confessed that the stories are not plausible. That the diplomatic representatives of the foreign powers should have ordered President PEIXOTO and his army out of the capital because of the "atrocities" of

his soldiers would be not only unusual, but extraordinary. It is probable that PEIXOTO'S soldiers are very far from being angels, but to give the President of the Republic notice to leave the seat of government while it is threatened by a mutinous fleet would be international intervention of an unprecedented character. The United States are not likely to tolerate European intervention of any kind with the internal affair of Brazil, but intervention such as indicated by some of the press dispatches would be a complete abandonment on our part of the long established policy of the American government as defined by what is known as the MONROE doctrine.

It is almost certain to turn out that there is no truth in the wild stories of a reign of terror in Rio, just as it turned out that there was no real foundation to the stories of the repeated bombardments of that city. It will be observed that there has been no official reports at any time, while the stories of a reign of terror in consequence of the atrocities committed by PEIXOTO'S soldiers were denied by the representatives of the London and Brazilian Bank in Rio as late as Friday. It is specifically denied upon information received through this and similar sources that there has been any bombardment of Rio, except of the defended points, and that any atrocities have been committed in the Brazilian capital.

So far no adequate reason has been given for the revolt of the Brazilian navy. Admiral MELO seems to have been influenced wholly by personal hostility to President PEIXOTO, growing out of the VANDENKOLK affair some months ago. Beyond bringing the force of a recreant and hostile navy to bear upon PEIXOTO in order to compel his resignation and retirement, MELO seems to have no

revolutionary purpose. The Brazilian revolution so far has been only an effort to frighten Peixoto, the President, it turned out, was not to be easily frightened.

**125. «Reinforcements for Both Sides», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*,
10 de outubro**

Neste artigo fala-se das manobras dos dois adversários para tentar reforçar as suas posições. De Melo precisa de abastecimentos e de munições que procura na Argentina; espera também que outras províncias, nomeadamente a Baía – que tem «um excelente porto» –, se revoltem contra o presidente. Por outro lado, Peixoto mandou os seus agentes para a Europa e os torpedeiros comprados pelo governo estão a atravessar o Atlântico.

De qualquer forma, conclui o jornal, os brasileiros têm de decidir o seu futuro, e «sem interferências externas».

There are few indications of returning peace in Brazil. Admiral Melo's Ships in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro are running short of provisions and ammunition. If he has no powder he cannot fight and Peixoto could win an easy victory. His friends, however, do not propose to give up without a struggle. A ship has sailed from Buenos Aires loaded with food and powder and soldiers for the revolting admiral. An attempt is about to be made to induce the squadron in the upper Uruguay river to join the revolt. Rui Barbosa, who wants to be president, is in the state of Bahia stirring up those who are discontented with Peixoto and urging them to follow the example set by the states of Parana, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul by deserting the president. The capital of the state of Bahia is on a fine harbor, which the revolutionists want to use. If they get it they

will have a basis of supplies and they will not have to depend on Buenos Aires. Peixoto has not been idle. His agents in Europe have bought several torpedo boats, and they are now crossing the ocean. They will be greater activity in Brazil in a few days, or the trouble will be settled. The latter event is not probable. But whatever is the result, the Brazilians should be allowed to decide the questions at issue without foreign interference.

126. «Hands Off Brazil!», *The Sun*, N.Y., 10 de outubro

Este artigo quer pôr os pontos nos ii: as potências europeias não devem intervir na guerra civil brasileira. «A América para os americanos!»

The threats of the foreign naval commanders before Rio de Janeiro to interfere in the civil war had better not be carried out. It is our business to protest against their interference, whether it be in the interest of the lawful President, PEIXOTO, or of the rebel Admiral, MELO. We are not willing that there shall be European interference in the affairs of any American country or government. We were once or twice in danger of foreign interference during our own civil war; but, luckily for all parties, and especially of the threatening party, it was never attempted.

The Brazilian must be let alone in their civil war. They have as good a right of settle their own quarrel as we had to settle ours.

There has been some talk about a purpose on the part of certain European powers to put an Emperor over Brazil. Such a thing had better not be attempted. We would not like to see the attempt made.

There are great foreign naval fleets in the harbor of Rio. They are British, German, French, Italian, and Portuguese. In their name, most insolent messages have been sent to President PEIXOTO, and menaces have been made against his Government. The latest news is that they propose to land forces for the preservation of order and the protection of the subjects of the countries to which they belong. Suppose these powers had given notice that they would land forces in New York, under any such pretext, during our war.

Let the European naval commanders in Brazilian waters demean themselves with prudence.

Hands off Brazil!

America for Americans!

127. *The Times*, 10 de outubro

Os leitores começam a ficar cansados perante a pouca fiabilidade das notícias recebidas do Brasil!

The reports from Brazil continue as contradictory as the claims and charges of opposing parties of our own country election times. The revolutionists view with alarm the usurpation of President Peixoto, who in turn

points with pride to the evidences of his ability to maintain the so-called Brazilian Republic in the face of all the revolutionists of Christendom. Some inside facts about the real condition in Brazil would be worth reading just now. The public is getting tired of bulletins and dispatches about Brazilian affairs that fail to tell anything than can be credited.

128. «Let Brazil alone», *The Brooklin Daily Eagle*, 11 de outubro

Mais um pequeno artigo que rejeita qualquer intervenção estrangeira no conflito interno brasileiro.

The news from Brazil this morning confirms the report of several days ago that the insurgents have no intention of re-establishing the monarchy. Admiral Melo has issued a proclamation in which he declares that he is fighting to maintain the supremacy of Republican principles which have been overturned by President Peixoto. He says: "Our only object is to save and restore peace to this country and to liberate a people who have been subjugated and sacrificed by the iron hand of tyranny." The proposed interference of England and France in the affairs of Brazil is of more importance than the bombardment of Rio de Janeiro. The ministers of the other South American countries in the capital have protested against such interference because they believe that America can settle her own difficulties. They are waiting to hear from United States Minister Thompson. He has not yet received instructions from Washington, but there is little doubt as to what they will be. The United States are not in the habit of

meddling with the affairs of other nations and they have insisted that other nations should not interfere in their affairs. If Admiral Melo succeeds, we shall recognize his government, but if he be defeated then the present government will be the one with which we shall transact our business.

129. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 11 de outubro

O que se passa no Rio não tem nada de revolucionário. Trata-se de uma simples revolta naval, nota o jornalista da Pensilvânia, segundo o qual é preciso ter cuidado com as informações provenientes do Uruguai.

It begins to look as if there was not much of revolution in Brazil after all. A mere naval revolt is impracticable as a revolution, and so far there has been no uprising in any part of the republic that would indicate that of two evils any considerable proportion of the Brazilian people believe that MELO is to be preferred to PEIXOTO. Most of the rumors that have reached us have been sifted through the Uruguayan channels, and somehow the Uruguayans have been determined that PEIXOTO should not be allowed to have a leg to stand on. As to the story of the expedition organized by Dr. BARROS CASSAL in Buenos Aires, which also smacks of the Uruguayan flavor, it must be admitted that it is characteristic of South American warfare. When a single vessel undertakes to carry coal and munitions to his fleet of warships it is very certain that Sancho Panza is playing squire to Don Quixote.

130. «The Brazilian Crises», *New York Tribune*, 12 de outubro

O diário nova-iorquino — que se refere a um artigo da autoria de H.M. Lane publicado na mesma edição — enumera quem está por trás de cada um dos dois rivais nesta guerra civil, mas lembra que ambos tinham um papel importante durante o reinado de D. Pedro.

Peixoto, que conta com vários apoios institucionais, representa a ala mais radical do republicanismo e Melo os sectores mais reacionários, escreve o jornalista que, entre os dois males, escolhe Peixoto, embora seja favorável a uma solução de compromisso que os afaste.

No último parágrafo aborda, como outros jornalistas, a questão da intervenção das grandes potências. Do seu ponto de vista, os comandantes dos navios estrangeiros ancorados na baía do Rio têm de manter a neutralidade e intervir só para evitar «o bombardeamento da cidade».

Our correspondence columns contain this morning a most careful and impartial account of the causes of the recent revolt in Brazil. It is contributed by H. M. Lane, who is thoroughly conversant with the political history of the country before and since the overthrow of the Empire. While it sustains the general conclusions which have been expressed by *The Tribune* respecting the origin of the civil war and the tendencies of politics in the new Republic, it contains many details which have not been previously published. It will enable our readers to form an intelligent judgment of the merits of what is practically a personal conflict between President Peixoto and Admiral Melo, neither of whom was a pioneer Republican. Peixoto, who was the Adjutant-General at the time of the Emperor's downfall and enjoyed his confidence, now stands for the Radical Republicanism which triumphed in the revolution. The Admiral, who although

a strong Imperialist, was then more liberal than Peixoto, now represents all the reactionary elements.

It is not difficult to determine where the American sympathies legitimately belong in this conflict between rival aspirants for the Presidency. Peixoto has behind him the bulk of the army, a large majority of both houses of Congress, the Supreme Bench, the leaders of the Republican party, and the intelligence and conservatism of the influential Central and Southern States. Mello has with him the bulk of the navy, the minority of Congress, and an opposition party made up of heterogeneous elements Clericalists, Monarchists, disgruntled Republicans like Barbosa, and many States rights Separatists in Rio Grande do Sul, Bahia and the Northern States. Peixoto's triumph will promote the ends of public order and strengthen the national cause, and is to be heartily desired on that account; but it will inevitably insure his re-election in March by military pressure, and increase the evils of personal government. Melo's success, on the other hand, while it will counteract the tendencies toward military despotism, will arm an impracticable coalition of reactionary and separatist forces with political power and impair the stability of the National Government. As a hard choice between evils, Peixoto's cause is to be preferred. A compromise by which amnesty could be declared and the withdrawn of both Peixoto and Melo from the lists for the Presidential election would be the best possible solution of the present conflict.

The intervention of the foreign fleets in this civil war is attended with many embarrassments and difficulties. The circumstances are altogether

different from the conditions prevailing in Chile during the recent civil war. That was a conflict between the President and Congress in which the army was on one side and the navy on the other, and a Provisional Government was speedily established by the insurgents. In Brazil Congress and the President are acting together, and the fleet under Melo has nothing behind it that has the authority of law. On general principle, the foreign men-of-war ought to maintain neutrality in a civil conflict of this nature, and at the same time to employ their best offices in preventing, if possible, the bombardment of the city. The American Minister in Rio occupies in this crisis a position of commanding importance. He ought to be exceedingly wary and to avoid being unduly influenced by his European colleagues. Premature intervention against the *de facto* and *de jure* Government would be a very gross blunder.

131. «Chile and Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 12 de outubro

O jornal californiano responde indiretamente ao pedido do ministro chileno no Rio, o qual pedia a intervenção dos Estados Unidos. O editorialista reitera mais uma vez que o seu país deve manter uma política de neutralidade, como, segundo ele, aconteceu na recente guerra civil chilena. Deve intervir só por motivos humanitários e em concerto com as outras potências mundiais.

It is understood that the Chilean Minister at Rio Janeiro has protested against other nations interfering between the Brazilian belligerents, that is, the Government as represented by President Peixoto, and the insurgents as represented by Admiral Melo. He insists at least that Europe should not interfere,

and that the American Government aided by Chile and Argentina, should interpose, on the principle of America for Americans.

It makes a great deal of difference whose ox is gored. When Chile was in the throes of civil war the recent administration was denounced most bitterly by the Chilean revolutionists because President Harrison would not abandon Balmaceda entirely and throw the whole weight of the United States on the side of the insurgents. What difference is there between Balmaceda and Peixoto, as a matter of legal standing? If we had no right to interfere in the affairs of Chile, we have no right now to uphold Melo against Peixoto, or Peixoto against Melo, not to head a pan-American league to restore peace by forcible intervention.

If we interfere at all it must be in concert with other great powers of the world, and on the grounds of humanity alone. Because we are the strongest power in the Western hemisphere we are not justified in intervening in a civil war on the ground of Americanism alone, and Chile, which now advocates such a plan, would resent it in her own case as quickly as she did before. We know of no pan-American league or hegemony which would warrant the United States in interfering directly in a civil war in any South American republic. Our position should be that of strict neutrality, precisely as it was in the Chilean affair, and as the well informed among the Chileans now admit

Na mesma edição, publica este pequeno comentário onde fala da nota publicada por Custódio de Melo, na qual este reafirma a sua fé republicana. O jornal californiano fica muito bem impressionado com esta declaração e compara este «profissão patriótica» à «maneira grosseira e extravagante» com a qual Peixoto está a governar o país.

The rebel admiral has dissipated the hopes of the monarchists in Brazil by declaring that he is a republican fighting for true republican principles and the destruction of corruptionists, and that he does not aspire to power or desire to help any of his friends into office. These are patriotic and high-sounding professions, and some color of sincerity is lent them by the well-known fact that Peixoto and his followers administered the government of Brazil in a very loose and extravagant fashion. If Melo's revolt succeeds in giving Brazil a new set of officials who will subordinate their speculative instincts and give the country an economical and conservative government the Brazilians will be distinct gainers.

132. «Intervention in Civil War», *San Francisco Chronicle*,
13 de outubro

O jornal californiano é muito explícito: as grandes potências não devem intervir nesta guerra civil, como não o fizeram durante a Guerra de Secessão. Pode-se falar de motivos humanitários para evitar o bombardeamento da cidade e para proteger os norte-americanos e os europeus que lá vivem. No entanto, os que querem ficar na capital brasileira têm de «compartilhar a sorte» dos outros habitantes do Rio de Janeiro.

Dispatches yesterday said that the foreign Ministers to Brazil met on September 30th, the Unites States, France, Italy and Portugal jointly notified Admiral Melo that they would not permit him to fire on the city of Rio Janeiro.

This may have been prompted by humanity, and in that aspect of the case the intervention may have some defense, but outside of that it is not possible to see how any nation or group of nations can arrogate to itself the right to interfere in a civil war.

Suppose, for example, that there were civil war in Great Britain and that the Admiral of the channel fleet, representing the insurgents, should summon Liverpool to surrender and threaten to shell it if it declined to comply. Does anyone suppose that the United States, France, Italy, Portugal and Brazil could or would give any instructions to the insurgent Admiral which he would heed or obey? If Brazil were a first-class power she would be allowed to fight out her own battles and settle her domestic troubles for herself.

We had an illustration of that principle during the war of the rebellion. The South strained every nerve to induce the European powers to intervene and prohibit the blockading of the Southern ports and the shelling of Charleston and other places, but while England wanted badly enough to intervene she did not, for she knew the time might come when the neutrality of the United States would be, to her, the thing to be desired above all others.

Foreign residents in Rio Janeiro exposed to the fire of Admiral Melo's guns must share the fortune of the war with the people of the country. They are entitled to safe conduct if they wish to leave the city, but they are not entitled to remain there and demand that their own Governments guarantee and secure them immunity from the ordinary chances of civil war. Brazil, if Melo should succeed, would not be strong enough to resent this intervention of the powers

named, but non the less would she have a good cause of complaint against each and all of them.

133. «In Brazil», *The Sun* (N. Y.), 13 de outubro

O jornal – que rememora as intervenções de nações europeias no continente americano durante o século XIX – tem fortes suspeitas que os navios das potências do Velho continente ancorados na baía do Rio de Janeiro querem intervir militarmente no conflito. O editorialista alega que não se justifica o desembarque de marinheiros para proteger os seus compatriotas que vivem na capital do Brasil.

As nações europeias não devem intervir no Continente americano, proclama com força o quotidiano que espera, no caso de isso acontecer, uma reacção patriótica unânime dos brasileiros.

If the commanders of the European war ships before Rio de Janeiro were to seize the city under the pretext of preserving order they would, of course, possess the power to governing it and of supplanting the existing Government, and of destroying the rebel fleet in the harbor. They would be the masters of the capital of Brazil, empowered to crush out all resistance to their authority. The republic would cease to exist, and the country would have become a European dependency, the affairs of which would be administered by the six European Governments represented by the war ships in front of Rio. The commanders of these ships have threatened to land marines and troops for the occupancy of the city unless President PEIXOTO will agree to obey their order. The great city is under their guns.

The insolent conduct of these foreign powers is cause of offence to the United States. It is an affront to Brazil. It is a menace to every Government of South America. Their procedure ought not to be tolerated. It ought to be met by a united protest of all the American republics. We cannot permit Europe or any Government of Europe to obtain control of any of the independent countries of America. We do not desire to exercise any authority in Europe. We keep out of Europe's civil wars and out of the wars between European nations.

Several of the powers of Europe have repeatedly given evidence of their desire to interfere in the affairs of American countries. Thirty years ago, NAPOLEON III. sent a French army to Mexico. At this time, England is encroaching upon the territory of Venezuela. When Argentina fell into bankruptcy, the English threatened her independence; Spain has at least twice tried to recover some of her lost provinces in America; and last year we got a report from Berlin that German Government had under consideration a project for the protection of German settlers in central Brazil. These are never in any past time, however, been a demonstration of Europe against America like that which we have seen during the past few weeks in the harbor of Rio de Janeiro. The only great European Government not represented there by a naval force is Russia. The Czar does not desire to set foot in America. He sold to us, twenty-six years ago, that part of the North American continent which was in her possession. It was on the 18th of October, 1867, that Gen. ROUSSEAU raised the American flag over Alaska.

What is the object of the six European powers in concentrating this great naval force in Brazilian waters and threatening to capture the capital of the

country? They pretend to be anxious for the safety of their subjects in Rio and the preservation of the peace. This is not a proper reason for their conduct. At the time they put it out they are ready to spring at one another's throats, regardless of the world's peace, and heedless of the safety of one another's subjects.

They have carried their presumptions far enough in Brazil. All patriotic Brazilian ought to unite in defying them to land their troops on Brazilian soil, ought to form a solid wall against the entrance of Europe into their country, ought to fight, in name of America, for the maintenance of their republican independence.

We should think that in a case of this kind the rebel fleet might unite with the loyal army, and Admiral MELO join hands with President PEIXOTO.

**134. «Will Europe Interfere in Brazil?», *The Minneapolis Tribune*,
14 de outubro**

O articulista, que cita em parte o comentário do New York Herald, acusa as potências europeia de interferir nos assuntos interiores brasileiros e de procurar um pretexto para intervir militarmente. O jornal de Mineápolis censura os ministros europeus no Rio por exercerem uma forte pressão sobre Peixoto e por estarem todos do lado de Custódio de Melo.

A doutrina Monroe é outra vez citada para precisar que o que se passa no Brasil diz respeito só aos brasileiros. Assim, o jornalista do Minesota espera que o executivo do seu país manifeste com força a importância desta doutrina.

European dispatches during the past week bespeak a more or less strong sentiment on the other side in favor of a change in the government of Brazil and for the establishment of a monarchy. Heavy foreign investors in South America securities, as the Barings and Rothschild, naturally desire a form of government that will insure greater stability to stock and bond values. Rumors of foreign influence and secret diplomatic missions are afloat. Cable reports from the scene of the pending trouble corroborate those from Europe. *The New York Herald*, in commenting upon the reports of its South American correspondents, editorially says: "*The Herald's* especial news from Rio Janeiro has shown a plain disposition, if not a purpose, on the part of the representatives of European powers there to interfere in the pending struggle if a plausible warrant or pretext can be found for such action. This disposition appears both on the part of the diplomatic representatives in the capital and the naval commanders in the harbor."

Cable reports indicate that the European powers are using their influence in behalf of the insurgents and against the existing government. Foreign diplomats have persuaded President Peixoto to dismantle a number of his shore batteries on the ground that the latter excited and attracted the insurgents' fire. Melo, the leader of the insurgent fleet, promised to stop shelling the city as soon as the batteries were dismantled, but the continuance of the bombardment shows that the promise was only a perfidious ruse. The foreign legations have also coolly notified President Peixoto that he must refrain from all future attacks on the insurgent squadron. *The Herald* correspondent states: "They informed

him that, failing his compliance with these requests, orders had been given to the French and English naval commanders to land forces of their marines for the proper protection of Rio residents of French and English nationality in case the police were unable to shield them from the excesses of Peixoto's undisciplined and often mutinous soldiers; or if the city were left subject to anarchy or pillage."

Not only are the American residents alarmed at the bold attitude of the united foreign legations, but neighboring South American states are alarmed. The ministers of Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay have issued a circular letter stating that they did not participate in the diplomatic meeting at which the policy of foreign intervention was determined upon, that they wish it known that they have no part in the intervention tactics which the European powers are now employing, and that they stand on the doctrine of America for Americans. Great anxiety prevails among United States citizen in Brazil to know whether or not President Cleveland will join the ministers of the South American states in their protest against European intervention. As *The Herald* fittingly states, it is time for President Cleveland to instruct the American minister to assert himself, and time for our government to declare its intention to maintain against foreign intervention the Monroe doctrine of America to Americans.

It is the duty of President Peixoto to defend Rio against the shells of the insurgents, as it is the right of the rebels to maintain their fight upon the government in the cause, or alleged cause, of greater liberty. This is their business and their funeral. All that foreign diplomats are warranted in doing is

to look after the lives and property of their own citizens. It is not their lawful right under the form of a revolt to cloak a royalist plot to impose upon Brazil a deposed monarchy. Such a plot this government is warranted in resisting with all the force at its command. A prominent German merchant, one of the most influential in Rio, tells the correspondents at Valparaiso that the entire European diplomatic corps in Rio is in favor of Melo's cause, and their daily actions show that the testimony is true. It certainly appears to be time for the United States government to assert itself. Minister Thompson has been a silent spectator at Rio long enough. The South American ministers have spoken and want to know if the United States stands by the Monroe doctrine. President Cleveland should assure them that we stand upon that doctrine now as ever.

135. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 14 de outubro

O continente Americano não é feito para os regimes monárquicos.

Latest advices from Brazil say that the danger of a reestablished monarchy in that country is not to be despised. If Brazil, alone of all American countries, wishes this unenviable distinction she is welcome to it. But American soil is not suited to the growth of thrones, and there is something in the air of this western continent, which is deadly to the lives of kings. Any monarchy, which is established on this side of the Atlantic, will be of short duration.

136. *Oakland Tribune*, 14 de outubro

On the hole, it is not a bad idea to invoke the Monroe doctrine in Brazil just now, and to let the Brazilian fight it out. It is none of Europe's quarrel, at all events.

137. «Why Americans Are Interested in Brazil» *The Sun*, N. Y., 15 de outubro.

Mais um longo editorial que agita a bandeira da ameaça de uma intervenção armada de algumas potências europeias para favorecer o regresso da monarquia no Brasil. O jornal fala mesmo de um plano para ocupar a capital e põe em causa principalmente o ministro britânico. Menciona o protesto de alguns ministros de países sul-americanos e sublinha o facto que os Estados Unidos não irão com certeza ficar passivos no caso de um desembarque de soldados europeus no Rio de Janeiro.

Espera no entanto que tanto a Rússia como a França vão usar da sua influência para que as outras potências do Velho Continente desistam deste plano bélico que encontraria uma forte reação por parte do governo do presidente Cleveland e também dos de outras nações da América Latina.

Citizen of the United States are very deeply interested in the affairs of Brazil at this time. They do not believe that any foreign power, or any combination of foreign powers, has any right to interfere of any American republic. They also believe in that great defensive American principle which has always been recognized by our Government, mainly, the principle known as the "Monroe doctrine".

The civil war in Brazil has lasted for over a year. It has recently become of more importance than ever on account of the revolt of the Brazilian navy. At the crisis the representatives at Rio of five or six of the powers of Europe have assumed a most threatening attitude towards the Brazilian Government. They have made demands upon it that are not authorized by international law, and have backed up these demands by a pompous display of naval force, by war ships representing England, France, Germany, Italy and Portugal, while an Austrian cruiser is also on the way to Rio. The European Ministers there have united in the adoption of a policy of intimidation toward Brazil, and have ordered the commanders of their war ships to act jointly in any offensive demonstration that may be made. The British Minister at Rio, speaking in the name of four or five Governments, gave notice a few days ago that in case of any disturbance dangerous to European residents, "the united force of foreign powers" would protect them by taking possession of the capital and establishing a camp in the Palace square. Thus the republican government of Brazil would be superseded, and the united forces of the belligerent foreign intruders would be the masters of the situation in Brazil.

This is a grave situation for an American republic. The Government and the people of this country must take a solicitous interest in it.

Necessarily and properly, our Minister at Rio has stood aloof from the representatives of the intervening European powers. He has doubtless received instructions from Washington as to the course to pursue in case the threats are put into execution; and we must take it for granted that these instructions are in

accord with the traditional policy of the American Government in regard to European intervention in the domestic affairs of any country on this side of the dividing waters. We mean that policy which was established seventy years ago, during the second term of President JAMES MONROE.

The Envoys at Rio of five of the republics of South America, Argentina, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Uruguay, have signed a document which may be regarded as a protest, though it does not take the form of a protest, against the concerted manifestations of the European Ministers, under the leadership of the British Minister. They merely subscribe to a statement that they have not taken any part in the conference at which an "ultimatum" was presented to Brazil in the name of the combined European powers. But we are unable to believe that it could be sustained, in any event, by any Government of South America. Every republic of the south is in danger, from time to time, of suffering under the same kind of European interference in its affairs as that with which Brazil is threatened. There are a number of European powers which have repeatedly sought to domineer over one or another of the States of South and Central America. In past times, again and again, we have been compelled to inform these powers of the existence of the MONROE doctrine.

A dispatch from Rio printed in London last Wednesday contains the information that "startling developments may be looked for, involving the restoration of the monarchy". This would undoubtedly be the result of successful interference in Brazil affairs by what the British Minister calls "the united forces of foreign powers." Yet that is a restoration which has better not be attempted. It

cannot be accomplished until the united powers have waged to success a war against Brazil for greater than that which has been carried on there for a year past. We think that, in the event of such a struggle, Brazil's neighbors would give her their assistance. The United States would certainly not be a disinterested onlooker. We want no monarchy set up by European arms in any American country. Monarchs have not prospered, during the past hundred years, in any country between Argentina and Canada.

The very able representative of Brazil in Washington, minister MENDOZA, has been a frequent visitor at the State Department within the past fortnight. It is his judgment that a number of European powers are banded together against his country for sinister purposes, and that they will not scruple to dictate terms to the struggling young republic against which all America ought to unite remonstrance.

We do not believe that either the French republic or the Russian empire will ever take part in any such conspiracy, or will fall to make the other powers aware of their opposition to it.

America to Americans!

138. «Brazil Political Crisis», *The Minneapolis Tribune*,
15 de outubro

Depois de ter sublinhado, e com uma certa ironia, que a jovem república tem tido uma vida política muito agitada, o jornalista resume os

acontecimentos. Põe nomeadamente em evidência o que aconteceu no início desta revolta, os percursos de Floriano Peixoto e de Custódio de Melo – outrora amigos e agora grande inimigos – e quem os apoia nesta luta.

Realça o facto da revolta ter sido até agora «fragmentada e superficial» e que se gastaram «mais palavras do que munições». Acrescenta que os europeus, se tivessem possibilidade, ajudariam sem hesitar os rebeldes que estão perante um dilema. Com efeito, bombardear a cidade provocaria grandes danos também para os seus amigos; apontar unicamente para os postos governamentais também não significaria que os alvos fosse sempre atingidos.

O governo de Washington está a par da situação. É para dissuadir uma intervenção das grandes potências europeias, que mais navios americanos se estão a dirigir para a capital do Brasil, conclui o jornal de Mineápolis.

For a republic scarcely four years old Brazil has had an extensive political experience. It has had during that brief space more wars, revolutions and presidents than some nations ten times as old. The capital city is now under bombardment by an insurgent fleet, and the young republic is threatened under cloak of rebellion with a return of monarchy. This attempt of the insurgents to overturn the government receives the sympathy, if not the open support, of the European powers. Telegrams like the following recently received in London indicate what Europe desires and expects: "A telegram received here from Rio Janeiro indicates that startling development may be expected soon. Everything in Rio tends to the restoration of the monarchy. It is now virtually only a question of terms."

A recapitulation of the main facts leading to the present Brazilian situation may not in this connection be uninteresting. When the monarchy was overthrown, both Peixoto, now president, and Rear Admiral Melo, now leader of

the insurgents, were members of the emperor's cabinet and held in high confidence. When later, in 1891, President Fonseca, supported by the army, dissolved congress and proclaimed himself dictator, Melo and Peixoto were close friends and united to depose Fonseca. Melo, supported by the navy, placed Peixoto in the executive chair and Peixoto gave Melo the navy portfolio and temporarily the secretary ship of foreign affairs. But the army and navy in Brazilian affairs have always been jealous and ambitious institutions. Between Peixoto, who was both president and commander-in-chief of the army, and Melo, who was in command of the navy, there accordingly in time sprang up the traditional jealousy and enmity. To Melo's support there soon flocked all the reactionary monarchical elements, the state fights agitators, the sorehead Republicans, and the Clerical and Monarchist parties. President Peixoto, on the other hand, retained the support of the army, congress and the supreme court, the Republican party, the most influential agricultural states, and the law and order element generally. Among the foreign legations the European powers gave their sympathy and moral support to the insurgents, while the American nations sympathized with the government.

The storm broke last autumn when Admiral Vandenkolk was threatened by President Peixoto with trial by court martial for seizing the merchant vessel *Jupiter* and entering upon the treasonable attempt to capture Rio Grande. The navy thereupon thought that it was insulted by Peixoto by reason of the severe attitude of the government toward the admiral. The revolt began to gather under cover. Finally, according to a previously concocted plan, Rear Admiral Melo, on

the night of September 5 last, went from the opera on board the war vessels in the harbor, when the commanders were ashore, raised the rebel flags and at day break sent word to President Peixoto to evacuated the government within six hours.

But Peixoto did not evacuate according to the insurgent plan. When Melo tried the same scheme on Fonseca two years before, the latter promptly stepped down and out. Peixoto proposed to do no such thing. Thereupon the insurgents were in a dilemma. If they bombarded the city at large they would bring disaster to friends as well as to foes. But in attempting to bombard government works exclusively they again found their work difficult, for the shells were not always to be depended upon to explode at the exacted point desired. Consequently the rebellion of the insurgents has been a rather perfunctory and piecemeal affair, and there has been much more palaver than ammunition expended. Melo and his sorehead and imperialist crowd seem to be awaiting chiefly for something to turn up, and the European sympathizers seem to be depended upon to turn something up. If ambitious foreign meddlers dared, they undoubtedly would not hesitate long to take measures to help the insurgents out of their dilemma. All that prevents such action is the known policy of the United States to enforce the Monroe doctrine against all foreign interlopers on American soil. Were it not for their wholesome fear of this government, we would undoubtedly soon see a repetition of such maneuvers as recently disgraced civilization in Siam³².

³² Refere-se à guerra franco-siamesa de 1893. No tratado de Bangkok (3 de outubro), os siameses têm de ceder o Laos a França.

Latest cables intimate that the government is fully alive to the situation and is preparing for any overt maneuvers on the part of foreign powers. The only American war vessel now in Rio waters is the *Charleston*. But the *Newark* and *Detroit* are steaming for the Brazilian port and the *San Francisco* and *Yantic* are within easy reach, while there is strong talk in Washington of dispatching to the scene of possible action the big battleship *New York*, Minister Thompson and the commander of the *Charleston* appear to have received definite instructions from Washington within the past few days and are now taking more interest in the situation than formerly. With a bold front on the part of our government, it is hardly probable that foreign interference will make itself conspicuous in the attempt to overthrow the young republic.

139. «The Brazilian Crisis», *The Indianapolis Journal*, 15 de outubro

No Brasil, sempre existiu uma rivalidade entre a marinha e o exército, realça o editorialista, e agora trata-se de um «conflito pessoal entre o Presidente Peixoto e o contra-almirante Melo.» Como o seu colega da New York Tribune³³, entre os dois, o jornalista de Indianápolis prefere o primeiro.

Latest advices from Brazil state that a portion of the army, which has hitherto been loyal to President Peixoto's government, has joined the insurgents, and that more of the troops are likely to follow. If the movement should become

³³ CF. Texto 130.

general it would indicate a speedy end of the revolution and the triumph of Rear Admiral Melo.

The whole trouble in Brazil is largely due to the jealousy and rivalry which exist between the Brazilian army and navy. This is traditional, deep-seated and of very long standing. From the time that Brazil had a government the army and navy have been important factors in politics. For a long time the monarchy played one against the other, but finally they joined hands to overthrow the imperial Ministry, and it went down. The overthrow of the monarchy was the work of the army and navy, not of the people. The people were not in that movement at all. Neither did they have any hand in the proclamation of the republic. That also was the work of the army and navy, and from all accounts it was entirely an afterthought. The republic had hardly been established before the old jealousy between the army and navy began to show itself, and factional intrigues became the order of the day. They have continued under different phases and leaders from that time to the present. The conflict has now assumed the form of a personal struggle between President Peixoto and Rear Admiral Melo. Heretofore the former has been supported by a large majority of both houses of Congress, by the leaders and strong men of the Republican party and many old Conservatives. But if the army should unite with the navy in support of Admiral Melo, Peixoto would probably be forced to yield. This would probably be disastrous to Brazil. Circumstances have made Peixoto leader of the republican cause of Brazilian people. He is also the true representative of constitutional

government, and so far as there is any room for sympathy between the rival leaders and faction, Americans should sympathize with Peixoto.

140. «Bulldozing Brazil», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 15 de outubro

O quotidiano tem a certeza que foram alguns ministros europeus em funções no Rio – e nomeadamente os da Grã-Bretanha e da França – que «incentivaram os rebeldes de uma forma que permitiria abrir o caminho para a restauração da monarquia».

Ainda bem que uma «forte frota de cruzadores americanos se está a reunir no Brasil.» O seu objetivo é permitir que «os brasileiros possam regular os seus conflitos como bem os entendem», sem intervenção externa.

Little by little the truth in regard to the situation at Rio de Janeiro is revealed. For weeks we had nothing but stories of noisy bombardments by the rebel fleet in the harbor and terrible tales of outrages committed by PEIXOTO's soldiers in the capital. All these inventions were so manifestly the work of amateurs that in the crude form in which they originally appeared they were utterly unworthy of attention. Now, however, the purpose that was behind the canards begins to show itself. There is no longer any question that it was the wish of some of the foreign representatives to encourage the insurgents in a manner that would prepare the way for a restoration of the monarchy. This scheme having failed, the world is allowed to learn that the bombardments were only exhibitions of bad gun practice, and that the outrages attributed to PEIXOTO's soldiers were mostly imaginary.

The two representatives who seem to have been most active in promoting the insurgent cause by assuming an offensive attitude toward the actual government of Brazil are said to have been the Ministers of Great Britain and France. Mr. WYNDHAM's³⁴ only reason for pursuing such a course is that natural prejudice of the average Briton in favor of a monarchy, while M. GERARD³⁵, the French Minister, may wish to find a job for the son of the old Duke of Nemours, the Count d'Eu. Their proclamations show a purpose to find a colorable excuse for intervention on the ground that anarchy prevailed in Rio.

In view of this evident attempt at bulldozing Brazil into accepting a restoration of the monarchy it is gratifying to learn that a strong fleet of American cruiser is gathering at Brazil. There is only one policy to be pursued in this matter. The Brazilian must be allowed to settle their troubles in their own way. That is what our ships are going there for.

141. «America for Americans», *Oakland Tribune*, 16 de outubro

Os navios europeus que estão na baía do Rio só podem intervir para proteger «os interesses dos estrangeiros residentes no Brasil», mas não para impor uma solução do conflito e ainda menos para restabelecer a monarquia, nota o jornalista californiano.

Este defende o direito dos Brasileiros de resolver os seus problemas sem ingerência externa e emite algumas reservas quanto à política do

³⁴ Sir George Hugh Wyndham (1836-1916) foi ministro da Grã-Bretanha no Rio de 1888 a 1894.

³⁵ Entre 1885 e 1913, Auguste Gérard (1852-1922) chefia várias legações entre as quais a do Rio de Janeiro (1891-1893).

presidente americano Cleveland. Finalmente, o editorialista precisa que a doutrina Monroe não significa que os Estados Unidos tenham de ser «os guardiões das repúblicas da América Central e Meridional»: só devem reagir se houver interferências por parte de nações do Velho continente.

That is pretty good doctrine, America for Americans, and the republics South America should not be under the necessity of making more that on appeal to the United States to see that no foreign interference is permitted in the matter of the Brazilian troubles. So far as the protection of the interests of alien residents in Brazil goes, the foreign warships in the harbor of Rio should be permitted to intervene, for that is a right recognized in international law, but when it comes to a step that will lead the Governments of Europe, or any one of them, to an attempt at dictation to the Brazilian, right there the United States should call a halt [*sic*], for the Brazilian must and shall be permitted to settle their local differences in their own way. Nobody expects a strong foreign policy, or a strong policy of any sort, to come from the present administration at Washington, for stubbornness is not strength, but at the same time even Grover Cleveland would scarcely so far violate American traditions as to repudiate or ignore the Monroe doctrine. If he should – well, it is hardly conceivable that he should, and therefore the point is not worth discussing. At the same time it should be borne in mind that there are several interpretations of what has been called the “Monroe doctrine» and that a policy built upon it does not of necessity imply that the United States is to constitute itself the guardian of the republics of South and Central America. So long as they are permitted to settle their local differences among themselves without interference from the great powers of

Europe this nation had no more right to interfere with them than any other, and intervention even as a peacemaker would be decidedly officious unless it should be solicited.

The Brazilians are engaged in settling a dispute among themselves, the merits of which do not seem to be well understood among the outside nations, and it is on that they believe cannot be settled without resort to arms. Whatever the merits of either side of the quarrel, and whatever the outcome, it is a matter which the Brazilians are to be left to adjust among themselves, and so long as the outcome is satisfactory to the victorious party and the vanquished accept defeat it is nobody else's affair. The Brazilians are perfectly able to decide their own form of Government themselves, and whether that form be an empire or a republic, and they are the better judges of what is good for their country. But no King or Emperor of European selection must be called to an American throne. That was settled by the bullets of the firing squad at Quaretaró³⁶.

142. *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 16 de outubro

Os brasileiros têm o direito de escolher o regime que querem, mas os Estados Unidos não irão tolerar nenhuma ingerência por parte das potências europeias.

³⁶ A 19 de junho de 1867, Maximiliano I foi fuzilado pelos republicanos mexicanos em Santiago de Querétaro.

Brazil may be a monarchy or a republic just as the people of Brazil elect, and so long as they attend to the business themselves the United States will not interfere, but if any of the European power attempt to set up a monarchy or any other form of government upon the ruins of the republic, the president of the United States should promptly remind them that he proposes to enforce the Monroe doctrine.

143. *The Pittsburg Press*, 16 de outubro

It is again threatened that a battle may result from the war in Brazil unless somebody interferes quickly.

144. «South American Revolutions», *The New York Times*,
18 de outubro

O quotidiano coloca a pergunta sobre a atual crise brasileira: trata-se «só de uma revolta» ou de uma revolução? O que parece certo, na opinião do jornal, é que, na origem, não «há nenhuma queixa popular, mas ambições pessoais». Na realidade, salienta o editorialista, é muito difícil encontrar, em todas as «numerosas revoluções na América hispânica, uma que se pudesse precisamente chamar de popular». Antes pelo contrário: estas «revoluções crónicas [...] são o sinal da apatia política da grande parte do povo».

No último parágrafo, explica as dificuldades para um país tão vasto, com uma rede de transportes quase inexistente e com poucos habitantes, de ter um consciência patriótica. Reitera também o seu apoio a Peixoto e prevê anos muitos agitados e difíceis no caso da vitória dos rebeldes.

It is too soon to say whether the civil war in Brazil can be called a revolution or only a revolt. But it is not premature to say that the success of the revolt would mark the entry of Brazil upon the rough and troublesome way that has been traversed by all the other Latin-American republics. It is in most cases futile to inquire into the origin of a South American revolution, and nobody has offered any reasonable or even coherent explanation of the rising in Brazil. It seems, however, to be true that it did not originate in a popular grievance, but in personal ambitions. Revolutions of this kind have their compensations, since they do not affect the mass of the people, and, indeed, are for the most part confined to the army or navy, the control of the army being the objective point of the revolutionists, or rather an indispensable means to the control of the Treasury, which is the real objective.

So far from a condition of chronic-revolution being a sign of political activity, it is a sign of political apathy on the part of the masses of the people. In countries where population is scattered, communication slow, and the art of reading rare, there can be no politics in our sense. Governments are set up and pulled down by a junta, or group, of politicians at the capital, and the people do not know the difference between them through any amelioration or any aggravation of their lot. In the latter case there would doubtless be a popular uprising if the aggravation were very great, but it would be very difficult to select from the innumerable revolutions of Spanish American one that could accurately be called popular. This, in itself, it is a very good thing. There is not often very much bloodshed, and it is much to be hoped that the present

bombardment of Rio may not make an exception to the rule. As soon as the Government is defeated, it runs away with whatever it has been able to save, and there is peace until the next ambitious intriguer appears – the people in the meantime paying about the same amount for the support of the army as they are in the habit of paying. In other words, a South American revolution is as far away as possible from such a conflict as our own civil war, in which the whole population on each side was warmly interested; and a South American revolution is, accordingly, a much less serious affair, amounting sometimes to not much more than a “Cabinet crisis” in countries in which politics are more highly developed. The main difference is that the crisis does not occur until it is plain that the country is with the opposition, while in the revolution it is commonly necessary for the opposition to make at least a show of actual force before the administration consents to decamp.

The Times had already given the reasons that should secure the sympathy of Americans for PEIXOTO as against MELO. Brazil has been so much more steady going than the other countries to the south of us that this revolution excites unusual surprise, but it is evidently a revolution of the usual South American kind. It is possible that the institution of royalty did something to prevent revolutions. Brazil is so vast a country in area, and the population is so scattered, that it seems inevitable that patriotism should there be merely local and that there should be little Brazilian feeling. Imagine what our condition in this respect would be if we had no railroads, and if communication were as slow and precarious with us as it is with the Brazilians. Even with our advantages the

Senators of the silver States are as great marvels to us as if they were Hindus. With a people so loosely united as those of Brazil, a dynasty may serve something of the same purpose as a flag in stimulating a national against a provincial spirit, though this is of course a trifling consideration against the arguments in favor of a republic. If Dom PEDRO had been of another disposition the "revolution" by which he was dethroned would not have been, as it was, the mildest revolution in all history, but he was willing, and ever eager, to abdicate a Government that bored him, and it would be a monstrous solecism to give him a successor. If by any misfortune the rebellion should succeed, Brazil, before it could arrive at a suitable and stable Government, would have to pass, as her sister republics have passed, "through great varieties of untried being"³⁷.

145. «Will they Defy the Monroe Doctrine?»,
The Minneapolis Tribune, 18 de outubro

O articulista é muito alarmista. Com efeito, fala de uma intervenção iminente dos navios de guerra ancorados na baía do Rio de Janeiro. O objetivo é transformar o Brasil num protetorado europeu. Isso seria uma violação da doutrina Monroe e «uma ofensa para o governo dos Estados Unidos», proclama o jornal, segundo o qual «não se pode permitir que o solo americano seja o teatro da agressão e da opressão das monarquias europeia».

³⁷ Frase tirada do panfleto do filósofo, teórico político e conservador irlandês Edmund Burke (1729-1797), *Reflections on the Revolution in France*, publicado em 1790.

“There is reason to believe,” the Brazil correspondent of *The New York Herald* reports, “that the European diplomatic corps intend to carry out immediately their threat of intervention and will have forces land from the ships in the harbor.”

Rio is now under the gun of the European fleet. The European powers have concentrated a strong threaten to land their troops. What can be their object except, under the guise of restoring order, to assume a monarchical protectorate over the Brazilian republic? London dispatches a few days ago assured Europe that something revolutionary was about to transpire that would practically convert Brazil into a monarchy. It his threaten landing of European troops and the parceling out of the republic into an aggregation of European protectorates the change to which the dispatches referred?

England proposed to make Argentine a British colony and the Barings made great headway toward purchase for colonization in that republic. Germany has paternal theories regarding the protection of German interests in Brazil, and England yet threatens to carry out the Franco-Siam policy in Venezuela. Meantime every European power except Russia has its battleships in the harbor of Rio.

Should European vessels land their forces and interfere in the affairs of Brazil, there is no escape from the conclusion that such act would constitute a cause of offense to the United States government. Under the light of the Monroe doctrine, the administration can construe such act as nothing less than an offense. If Europe can without let or hindrance land troops in Brazil and menace

the security of that republic, Europe can likewise in every American republic. The act of Napoleon III in sending forces to Mexico was construed as a violation of the Monroe doctrine by this government, as so were the acts of Spain in landing forces to recover territory. So must be construed the landing of troops in Brazil. American soil cannot be permitted to be the scene of European monarchical aggression and oppression.

146. «The situation in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*,
19 de outubro

Porque é que todas as grandes potências, através de uma intervenção coordenada e amigável, não propõem aos dois antagonistas uma solução para acabar com esta guerra civil que parece não ter saída e que prejudica o país? sugere o editorialista que, como muitos dos seus colegas, continua a não perceber as verdadeiras causas deste conflito.

In spite of the spasmodic bombardment of the city of Rio Janeiro and the disabling of the gunboat *Trapani* and the cruiser *Aquidaban* by the guns of Fort Santa Cruz, the civil war in Brazil still bears a sort of farcical aspect. There has been, thus far, nothing conclusive, Admiral Melo being supreme on the water and President Peixoto nonetheless supreme on the land.

While the great powers of the world have no right to intervene by force, or to lay down the law to either of the contending parties, there is no reason why an amicable intervention should not be attempted, with a view to ending the civil war and restoring peace to Brazil. If the great powers, acting in unison and in

perfect good faith, should suggest arbitration to the antagonists, to be followed, maybe, by the submission of the questions in dispute to a *plebiscitum*, it is not at all unlikely that the proposition would be adopted, and that the war would come to an end.

Nobody has ever been able to find out exactly the cause of the civil war in Brazil, but that is not an unusual phenomenon in the wars of the South American republics. In default of any better explanation, it may be assumed that it is a fight of the outs against the ins, and that the supporters of Admiral Melo have no special cause of complaint against President Peixoto, except that the latter hold the offices from which the former are excluded. There is, it is true, an undercurrent of belief, or, rather, of suspicion that Melo is acting in the interests of the imperialist faction, but this lacks confirmation. In any event it would be very much better for Brazil if this contest could be brought to a conclusion, for the country is suffering, and there seems no reasonable chance of compensation, no matter which faction shall win.

147. «The Brazil Situation», *The Times*, 19 de outubro

Pouco acontece no conflito na baía do Rio de Janeiro, nota o jornal: a situação está bloqueada, onde nenhum dos dois antagonistas tem a possibilidade de atacar seriamente o outro. Os navios das grandes potências só podem proteger os seus compatriotas, cujos interesses «não são susceptíveis de serem prejudicados», acrescenta o editorialista de Filadélfia.

Este põe ainda em evidência dois fatores: ao nível internacional, a únicas consequências parecem ser o aumento «temporário no preço do café e

da borracha» ; a nível interno, para os brasileiros, não interessa quem vai ganhar, porque nenhum deles vai fazer muito pelo país.

The Brazilian situation does not clear. Since the revolt of the fleet under Admiral MELO, September 6, the telegraphic news from Rio has been entirely unreliable, having been edited by PEIXOTO with a view to preventing any accurate information about the real situation from reaching the outside world. It is evident that it is the typical South American revolution – a fight between the leaders of political factions for control of the offices and expenditures, and that it does not extend to any considerable extent among the masses of the Brazilian people.

Admiral MELO has control of the fleet and can shell Rio, but lacks men enough to make a successful assault on the land fortifications. PEIXOTO has some troops, but no navy, and cannot take the aggressive against MELO. The Brazilian populace are simple trying to keep out of the way of the flying shot and shells. This is the only real interest they appear to have in the contest.

This is about all that can be gathered from the conflicting accounts, and it certainly throws no light on the probable duration of the contest or its ultimate result. All the efforts of the diplomatic representatives of other powers at the Brazilian capital to bring about a truce or settlement of the dispute seem to have failed, and the war vessels of the respective powers in the harbor of Rio are confining themselves to the protection of the interests of the nationalities they represent. Both insurgents and adherents of the de facto government are

anxious to keep on good terms with the powers represented by war fleets, and the interest of the foreigners at Rio are not likely to be seriously jeopardized.

This being the case, no great loss is likely to come to anyone but finally defeated faction by allowing the belligerents to fight it out without intervention. There will be a temporary suspension to Brazilian exports and the prices of coffee and rubber may be increased for a time, but beyond this no outside interest will or can be seriously affected. As to the Brazilian themselves, it will make little difference to them which faction wins. No government evolved out of the present disturbance is likely to be of long duration or to do much for the advancement of the real interests of Brazil.

148. *Okland Tribune*, 19 de outubro

Custódio de Melo paga os seus homens com ouro !!!!

A great many different stories are told about the Brazilian revolt, their tone probably depending upon which side has immediate control of the Brazil end to the cable, but the most significant story of all is that to the effect that Admiral Melo is paying his men in gold and paying them promptly. This suggests a purse somewhere much larger than that of a Brazilian naval officer, and it is well to remember further that war is the science of financiers and the side with the heaviest bank account conquers.

149. «In Brazil», *The Weekly Times-Democrats*, 20 de outubro

O bombardeamento do Rio recomeçou, nota o jornal, não porque houve interferência das frotas ou dos ministros estrangeiros, mas porque o prazo do acordo entre Peixoto e Melo tinha acabado.

No entanto, o editorialista pergunta-se por que razão os rebeldes ficam quase sempre inativos neste conflito, que considera como «o mais tépido e estranho da história moderna». Pode ser, acrescenta, que de Melo não queira destruir a capital, que espere que os bombardeamentos efetuados provoquem uma rendição da cidade, ou que acredite na eficácia do bloqueio do porto.

The bombardment of the city of Rio, which was discontinued again for several days at the end of last and the beginning of this week, was recommenced on Tuesday, and has continued in a more or less desultory and destructive fashion since.

The renewal of the attack on the city by Admiral de Melo proves beyond dispute, what we contended for when we last wrote on the subject, that the revolutionary fleet was not being prevented from shelling the city by any coalition of foreign fleets lying in Rio waters, or by any united action of foreign ministers in Rio itself. Foreign ministers could not interfere with the Brazilian government's management of its rebellious subjects; and the entering of foreign ministers into any sort of diplomatic negotiations with the revolutionaries would be a recognition of the revolutionaries as belligerents, to which foreign nations have not yet committed themselves.

It is safe to look for last week's discontinuance of the bombardment, therefore, neither in the lack-of-ammunition theory, upon which we previously

commented, nor in the foreign-intervention theory, which is equally untenable, but in the now announced arrangement made between President Peixoto on the one hand and the revolutionary Admiral on the other, whereby the President agreed to dismount his shore batteries and to cease firing upon the rebel ships, and in return for which the insurgent fleet was to refrain from shelling the city.

The latest explanation of the discontinuance of firing is by long odds the most likely explanation which has yet been offered; and its likeliness is not detracted from but strengthened by the fact that the arrangement was abruptly terminated on Friday, and the firing recommenced, on a charge of breach of faith – Peixoto claiming that the insurgent Admiral had wantonly broken the treaty by bombarding the city without cause, and de Melo making the counter claim that Peixoto had not dismounted his shore batteries and had therefore openly violated the terms of the agreement.

Meanwhile it is still difficult to account for the inactivity of the insurgent fleet in Rio bay. It has within the past two or three days, to be sure, “captured” the fort of Villegagnon at the entrance to the harbor; but the “capture” was not much of a feat. For the fort had all along been neutral, and was insufficiently provisioned. Its surrender, therefore, under the circumstances was not a victory to be much boasted of. De Melo’s comparative inactivity appears to be due either to a disinclination on his part to destroy the city and a hope that the taste of bombardment which it has had will drive it to surrender, or to his belief that, by a rigorous blockade, he can so successfully stew the city in its own grease that it will compel Peixoto to quit and open its arms to the insurgents.

This explanation of the insurgents' lukewarm conduct of hostilities is made the more probable by the issuance this week of the revolutionary leader's highfalutin, would-be patriotic manifesto, in which he vaunts himself, *inter alia*, that:

Our only object is to save and restore peace to this oppressed country; to liberate the people, who have been subjugated and sacrificed by the iron hand of tyranny and by an inconceivable want of patriotism and reckless ambition of the chief of the government, who refuses to submit to the pressure of public opinion, which demands at his hand the restoration of peace in the disturbed province of Rio Grande do Sul and the abandonment of power.

De Melo thinks probably that plausible declarations of this sort will be a material aid to the potential damage wrought by balls and shells in helping a discontent populace to a change of allegiance.

But, however it may be, this Brazilian civil war is the most languidly and the most peculiarly conducted strife of which modern history gives an account.

150. *The Sioux-City Journal*, 20 de outubro

The United States would do well to keep as sharp an eye on Brazil as the European powers are doing, and a little bit of jealousy in its glance would do no harm.

151. «Saw Rio Shelled. The Experience of the Steamer *Galileo* in the Brazilian Harbor» *The Washington Post*, 21 de outubro

Testemunho de um médico do navio Galileo que, em setembro, esteve nos portos do Rio de Janeiro e de Santos.

New York, Oct. 20. The steamer *Galileo*, which arrived today, brings further information about the rebellion in Brazil.

Dr. C. Auty, the ship's surgeons, gave a detailed story of the occurrence at Santos and Rio de Janeiro. The *Galileo* left Santos on September 28. On that day the Brazilian government ordered all foreign merchant vessels to leave port immediately, to avoid damage from an expected engagement between the forts and shore batteries and some of Melo's vessels which were expected to arrive.

The *Republica* and *Jupiter* under Melo had been at Santos some time previously, and some fighting had taken place.

On September, 20 there was sharp firing between the government forts and shore batteries and the two rebel ships at the entrance to the harbor. The shots from the forts were well aimed and struck the *Republica* a number of times. The war ships replied, but did not damage. When the rebel boats saw they were getting the worst of it they drew out to sea. Their return was expected and the Brazilian government was prepared to receive them.

Dr. Auty said that there had been no fighting on shore. The soldiers of the guard ship, who rebelled when captured, were not shot, but were closely confined



Fig. 13 : *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 19 de outubro



Fig. 14 : *Buffalo Courier*, 20 de outubro

Duas manchetes sobre a formação do Governo provisório.

in prison. The *Galileo* left Rio on September 17, before going to Santos. Dr. Auty kept a diary of the events while the *Galileo* lay in the harbor of Rio. In it he tells, among the incidents, of the attempted seizure of a load of cattle by rebel soldiers, and the scenes of barbarity as they jabbed the beasts with their swords until a British war ship drove them away.

Dr. Auty said the rebels had launches constantly patrolling the shore, and from these marines fired at anyone they saw on land. In the nighttime they carried search lights, which they turned on shore and then fired at anyone in view.

152. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 21 de outubro

Admiral Melo proposes to set up a provisional government in Brazil. He evidently is a conservative man and doesn't believe in novelty. A provisional government is all the government Brazil has had for some time.

153. *The Daily American*, 24 de outubro

Nada se mexe no porto de Rio de Janeiro.

PRESIDENT PEIXOTO's and Admiral DE MELO's set-to in Brazil is the most unique and amusing species of warfare of which we can recall any record. It is the sea against the shore, neither one making any progress against the other or

apparently having any hope of such progress like Micawber³⁸ for something to turn up. With the capital directly under the guns of the fleet its capture is impracticable, and on the other hand the land forces, although several times as large as their naval antagonists, cannot advent a foot. Indeed it looks like a grand farce of war. There is one good feature, and that is that there is but little gore.

154. *The Pittsburgh Press*, 24 de outubro

DANA exclaims “Hands off Brazil!” but possibly the sentence contains an error in punctuation. It might be made to read: Hands off, Brazil!

155. *The Boston Globe*, 25 de outubro

Brazil is enjoying the luxury just now of two presidents. And yet, strange as it may seem, the Brazilians are not happy.

156. «The Imbroglia in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*,
26 de outubro

Trata-se de uma banal revolta de uma facção republicana contra uma outra, e não de uma tentativa de restauração monárquica por parte de Custódio de Melo, realça o jornal californiano. Segundo este, deviam ser «o governo

³⁸ Wilkins Micawber é uma personagem do romance *David Copperfield*, de Charles Dickens.

americano e a opinião pública mundial a dissuadir» qualquer interferência nos assuntos internos do Brasil.

The revolutionary conflict at Rio Janeiro has now waged with varying phases for several weeks. The rebels against the Peixoto Government have not yet succeeded in overthrowing it, though that result may be achieved at any time. It is, perhaps, difficult for Americans not particularly concerned about South American affairs to get up any great interest in the result, at least as to the personnel of the combatants and contestants. If the struggle had taken the form of an attempt to reinstate the imperial government it might have been different. As a republican nation we would naturally be inclined to view with disfavor any movement looking to the restoration of a monarch on the American continent. Somehow we have come to consider both North and South America as the heritage of free, democratic institutions. There was a rumor when the Mello uprising began that the rebellion was in the interest of the imperial family. But nothing has occurred since to warrant giving credence to the story. It may be set down as certain that the civil war is simply an uprising of one republican faction against another, after the fashion of the Spanish American States. It would not come with good grace from the American to say that such struggles tend to weaken faith in our form of government. It is not so long since we had our own unpleasantness on a gigantic scale. But the apparently trivial revolutions and rebellions which so often break out in the Latin-American republics lead to the suggestion that there is a wide difference between republican governments

which have been evolved through the course of history and those which spring into being with only paper constitutions.

This is one phase of the Brazilian imbroglio which merits special attention. We refer to the repeated accounts of foreign diplomatic interference in Rio. This, it seems to us, should be discouraged by our Government and by the public opinion of the world. There may be instances where resident representatives of foreign nations in a city where civil war is prevailing should interpose in the interest of humanity – to prevent unnecessary bloodshed and violence. But this is quite another thing from attempts of diplomatic agents to shape political events. When a nation is in the throes of civil war it should be allowed to work out its own salvation.

157. «The Situation in Brazil», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*,
26 de outubro

Depois de ter ironizado sobre o Governo Provisório que Custódio de Melo transferiu para uma pequena ilha, o jornal denuncia as notícias falsas que chegam do Brasil, como aquela que se refere a um álbum cheio de dinamite que Peixoto teria enviado ao comandante da revolta.

O jornal relativiza também o papel dos diplomatas estrangeiros neste conflito. Se tivessem feito alguma coisa, «o Departamento de Estado em Washington ter-se-ia pronunciado sobre o assunto.»

Almost every day adds to the grotesque of the so-called revolution in Brazil, but Admiral MELO evidently reads *The Inquirer*, for he has removed his

provisional government from the quarter-deck of the *Aquidabã* to a little island near the coast, that, whatever its other short-comings, is quite large enough for his provisional President at present. It is not likely, however, that in sending Captain LORENA³⁹ to Desterro MELO turned a rather fair sailor into a very poor landsman. Still, this making the revolution a fixture has some advantages. In leaving Rio with his fleet, as is reported to be his intention, MELO will not be required to carry his provisional government with him, and if any of the enterprising correspondents who have been guessing at the news from Rio want to find if they will know where to swim to.

It would be a matter of great regret, however, if there should be any serious interference with the present system of gathering news of Brazil. It allows a wide scope for the imagination, and it is done up in small, neat packages that go off like a brilliant blaze of fire-crackers. Every one of our esteemed contemporaries can get up a blaze of its own on short notice, and a number of them to it. There, for instance, is the story with the sanction of Admiral MELO himself, that President PEIXOTO tried to assassinate the revolution in Brazil by sending him an album filled with dynamite. There is nothing finer than this in melodrama or more improbable. Admiral MELO's fondness for albums must be taken for granted to make it assumable that he would receive one that came to him with the

³⁹ Frederico Guilherme de Lorena (1850-1894) Líder da Revolta Armada, presidente por alguns meses, quando a cidade de Desterro (atual Florianópolis) era sede do Governo Provisório da República dos Estados Unidos do Brasil, fuzilado a 24 de abril de 1894 pelas tropas florianistas.

“connivance” of “the tyrant PEIXOTO.” It is such foolish tales as this that utterly discredit the Brazilian revolt.

All the news that has come from Brazil so far has come through rebel and foreign sources. But there has not been one word about an uprising of the Brazilian people against PEIXOTO'S government – not one word that indicates that there is any real attempt at revolution in Brazil. A floating rebellion and a provisional government on a speck of sand are scarcely enough to set the great powers of the world by the ears or call for a violent assertion of the MONROE doctrine on the part of the United States. As a matter of course, the “diplomats” of whom we hear so much from Montevideo are not doing anything in particular or the country would have a hint of it through the State Department at Washington.

158. *Oakland Tribune*, 26 de outubro

Admiral de Melo has made a President of Brazil. It is greater to be a maker of kings than a king. Admiral de Melo is, therefore, the greatest man in the Western World today. It remains to be seen whether he is great enough to give his President government.

159. «A Warning!», *The Sun*, N. Y., 27 de outubro

Todo o artigo é dedicado à destituição, a 26 de outubro, do Contra-Almirante da marinha americana Stanton, porque este saudou cinco dias antes os navios rebeldes e recebeu Custódio de Melo.

O articulista critica duramente o oficial superior por este «erro por ignorância», pela sua «falta de bom senso e de prudência»: podia ter metido o seu país numa perigosa enrascada. Ao contrário, aprecia a reação de Stephen Cleveland porque, dessa forma, o presidente americano mandou um sinal muito forte: por um lado, aos ministros europeus no Rio, e nomeadamente ao representante da Grã Bretanha; por outro lado, também ao Presidente Peixoto, que ficou assim mais seguro do apoio norte-americano, perante a ameaça representada pelos navios estrangeiros ancorados na baía do Rio.

Com efeito, sempre segundo este jornalista, esta rápida medida tomada por Washington, demonstra claramente que os Estados Unidos querem fazer respeitar a doutrina Monroe, «o baluarte da liberdade americana». Por outras palavras, o governo americano não irá tolerar nenhuma ingerência dos europeus na política interna brasileira.

Our Government has proclaimed its policy toward Brazil. It has done so in a most impressive and suggestive manner. The policy is American. There is a note of warning in it.

The significance of the act of President CLEVELAND in relieving from duty the Rear Admiral in command of our squadron lying before Rio, will most certainly be understood by those European powers which are menacing the independence of the Brazilian republic. They cannot help seeing in this serious public act a demonstration of our friendship for that republic in its straits. They cannot help knowing that it is the manifestation of a policy in contravention of




Fig.: 15 *The Buffalo Evening News*

PROMPTLY REMOVED

**Admiral Stanton Detached from
Command of Our Fleet at Rio.**

**He Saluted the Admiral Mello, Leader
of the Brazilian Insurgents,
Without Instructions.**

NAVAL OFFICERS SURPRISED

**They Cannot See How Such a Ser-
ious Blunder Could Be Made.**

Fig. 16: *The Indianapolis Journal*

**SALUTED A
REBEL SHIP.**

**Rear Admiral Stanton Removed
From the Command of the
South Atlantic Station.**

INEXPLICABLE ACTION.

**By His Folly an Unfriendly Act to the
Brazilian Republic Was
Committed.**

HE MAY BE COURT MARTIALED

Fig. 17 : *The Buffalo Inquirer*

THE RIO INCIDENT.

**Further Action Taken by the United
States Government.**

ITS NATURE CANNOT BE LEARNED.

**Admiral Stanton's Action Still a
Source of Mystery**

TO ALL NAVAL OFFICERS.

Fig. 18 : *The Evening Star*

A 27 de outubro, o afastamento do Contra-Almirante Stanton é notícia na primeira página em vários jornais americanos.

that which they have recently attempted to execute through their presumptuous interference in the affairs of Brazil.

In so far as President CLEVELAND's act bears upon the personal fortune of Rear Admiral STANTON, it is of but slight account. But, in so far as it serves notice upon the European fleet at Rio, or upon what the British Minister there describes as "the united naval forces of foreign powers", it is of the most serious importance. While they are hostile to Brazil, we are friendly. While they have, during the past few weeks, pursued a course highly offensive to the Brazilian Government, we have, as soon as the opportunity came, taken a course which that struggling Government must regard as sympathetic and amicable. While they have repeatedly trampled upon the rights of Brazil by turning their guns toward its capital and by threatening to land troops, we have given proof positive to Brazil, that, to say the least, we will not join with these powers in any of their hostile demonstrations.

We repeat that "the united naval forces of foreign powers", aye, and the diplomatic forces of these powers, will very surely apprehend the significance of the act of President CLEVELAND in detaching Rear Admiral STANTON from the command of our squadron at Rio, because he was guilty of the folly of saluting the rebel flag and consorting with the rebel leader.

It can now be said that our policy in the case of Brazil versus the united foreign powers is determined, and that it is the right policy. We have urged its adoption. It is sure of the approval of the whole American people. We uphold Brazil's protest against European interference.

The foreign Minister at Rio, the representatives of England, Germany, Austria, Italy, France, and Portugal, have striven to induce our diplomatic representative there, Minister THOMPSON, to unite with them in carrying out their policy of intervention; and we regret to say that at one time, about ten days ago, this Minister sent to the State Department a dispatch which was of a most unsatisfactory kind. We rejoice to know that as soon as his communication reached Washington, Secretary GRESHAM, by order of the President, forwarded instructions to him that under no circumstances should he cooperate with the foreign powers acting against Brazil, or sustain in any ways the policy which had been set forth by the British Minister in conjunction with other European Ministers. We have reason for saying that these instructions were most explicit, and that Mr. THOMPSON, whatever opinion he may previously have held, has faithfully obeyed them. It has not been possible, for a long time, that any foreign powers should misunderstand the attitude of this Government toward that of Brazil; and it gives us pleasure to say that the British Minister at Rio, Mr. WINDHAM, has recently been less obtrusive than he was in the first week of this month. There are few of the European powers, even those of them which would not shrink from affronting Brazil, that would care to give offence to the Government of the United States.

The act of Rear Admiral STANTON, in saluting the rebel flag of MELO, was doubtless a blunder of ignorance; but, under the circumstances, it was a grievous blunder, for which our Government has doubtless offered its apologies. It occurred at a critical moment for Brazil, at a moment when the war ships of MELO

were bombarding the capital of the country, at a time when the constitutional authorities were in a state of alarm, when they were watching every movement of the foreign navies before the city, and when MELO had appointed one of his fellow revolutionists to the office of revolutionary President of Brazil. A national salute to the rebel flag by the commander of our South Atlantic squadron, who had just arrived at Rio from Barbados, looked like an official recognition of the rebel power, and may well have led President PEIXOTO to fear that the American Government, instead of befriending him, had taken a step in advance even of those European Governments which have been seeking his overthrow, in order that Brazil might be brought under foreign domination. No wonder that the Brazilian Minister at Washington⁴⁰ hastened to the State Department to ask for an explanation.

Rear Admiral STANTON fell into an unfortunate political blunder; and he has already been made to suffer for this blunder, under the indignation of President CLEVELAND and the rules of the navy. He is doubtless a man of courage and loyalty, but he cannot be a man of good judgment and prudence. He might have got us into a bad scrape. His act was calculated to encourage the rebels, to mislead the European diplomatists at Rio, to offend a friendly power, to put the United States in a false position. He had been for but a very few days at Rio; and he ought to have made it his duty to confer with Minister THOMPSON upon the

⁴⁰ Trata-se de Salvador de Mendonça (1841-1913) que ficou na capital americana de 1875 a 1898. Em estreito contato com o secretário de Estado americano, teve um papel importante para conseguir o apoio americano e, neste caso, a destituição de Stanton.

arrival there, in order to ascertain the attitude of his Government toward Brazil. He could not then have honored the enemy of the country to which he was sent, and to which our Minister is accredited. He deserved to be disciplined, as he has been.

His blunder has, however, given the American Government a first-rate opportunity for marking its friendship for Brazil, and for giving the foreign powers represented at Rio to understand that we do not approve of their proceedings, or of the conduct of the British Minister, who has acted as their spokesman. We apprehend that they will take warning. The MONROE doctrine is the stronghold of American freedom.

160. «Admiral Stanton's Blunder», *San Francisco Chronicle*,
27 de outubro

O jornal californiano critica sem meios termos a atitude de Stanton que podia ter provocado um grave conflito entre os Estados Unidos e o Brasil. Por enquanto, Washington reconhece o governo de Peixoto e não o provisório do Almirante de Melo, e, se a revolta vencer, a diplomacia americana entrará em contacto com o novo executivo, afirma o articulista.

A profound thinker and close observer of human affairs once remarked that the world is ruled, governed, by sympathy and ceremony. We are reminded of this saying by the curious and unexpected complication produced by the action of Rear-Admiral Stanton in exchanging visits and salutes with Admiral Melo, in command of the fleet of the Brazilian insurgents. It is said in the account

at hand that our Navy Department would not have taken any notice of the affair if the commander of our squadron in Brazilian water had confined himself to paying and receiving friendly visits. But when it was learned that our fleet had saluted the flag of the rebel Admiral, Secretary Herbert⁴¹ promptly relieved Admiral Stanton from command.

Though in itself a trivial matter of courtesy, the act really amounted to a cause of war according to the rules of international law. It was, in effect, a recognition by the commander of our fleet in those waters of the insurgent forces now in rebellion against the Government of Brazil.

Of course, a naval commander has no such power. To concede that he has would be to admit that he could, in effect, declare or at least precipitate war with a friendly nation. But the right to declare war is reserved to Congress.

To the recognition of a government set up by successful rebellion is a matter purely of diplomacy. It may that tomorrow or the next day, or a month or a year or more hence, Admiral Melo and the provision Government established by him at Desterro, may have succeeded in overthrowing the Peixoto administration and may entitled to recognition. When that time comes, if it ever does – we do not pretend to predict – President Cleveland or his Republican successor will duly treat with the new Government of Brazil. But in the

⁴¹ Hilary A. Herbert (1834-1919) é secretário da Marinha durante o segundo mandato do presidente Cleveland (1893-1897).

meantime our naval commanders must be content to take the political cue from the Executive at home.

This blunder of Admiral Stanton ought to suggest to the Navy Department the propriety of formulating a code of rules for the government of our naval officers when abroad; at least in relation to matters of such serious import as the incident under discussion.

161. «Real News from Brazil», *The Times*, Filadélfia, 27 de outubro

Perante o «ato não autorizado» do Almirante Stanton, o governo americano não podia reagir de outra maneira. Até agora, Melo só «tem um governo provisório numa ilha» mas está «sem exército» e a sua marinha não alcançou nenhum sucesso militar, antes pelo contrário. Os Estados Unidos reconhecem o governo de Peixoto que tem um ministro acreditado na capital americana.

The one piece of news from the scene of the Brazilian conflict about which there can be no question, is that Admiral STANTON, the commander of the United States squadron, has saluted the flag of Admiral Melo, the insurgent leader, and has been suspended from command for his act. Admiral STANTON himself admits the salute, and the Secretary of the Navy has announced the order of suspension.

In the absence of any reliable information as to the real situation in Rio Janeiro the act of Admiral STANTON seems an astounding exercise of power as the commander of a squadron sent to Brazilian waters merely to protect American interests. The Brazilian Republic, of which PEIXOTO is the executive

head, is the only government as yet recognized by the President of the United States. Its Minister in Washington is duly accredited; he has not been recalled or superseded by the representative of any other Brazilian Government, and so far as known no other representative has presented credentials or made any claim to recognition. Admiral MELO has only a provisional government located on an island off the Brazilian coast. He is without army and his navy appears to have made no real impression by its repeated bombardment of Rio beyond destroying a few buildings and keeping a lot of timid non-combatants in a state of chronic fright.

Under the circumstances, therefore, there was nothing for the President and his Cabinet to do but to repudiate the unauthorized act of Admiral STANTON and suspend him from command pending further investigation. The career and official record of the suspended officer have been commendable in the highest degree heretofore, but the best men make mistakes sometimes, and it must be assumed, in the light of existing knowledge, that Admiral STANTON has made a mistake in the present instance which the United States Government cannot afford to make its own by sustaining him. This government must be the last to violate its own doctrine of non-interference in the local dissensions of neighboring States.

162. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 27 de outubro

What spell could have possessed an American admiral to salute in broad daylight a man in open rebellion on the recognized de facto government of Brazil?

163. «Peixoto's New Cruisers, *New York Tribune*, 29 de outubro

O articulista, que faz comparações com a recente guerra civil no Chile, considera natural que Peixoto compre navios e que os Estados Unidos forneçam material de guerra ao governo do Rio. Peixoto tem o apoio do Parlamento, do exército, da Corte Suprema e da esmagadora maioria dos Estados. Custódio de Melo, pelo contrário, só tem a frota do seu lado e, por conseguinte, não está em condições de poder pedir o estatuto de beligerante.

The purchase of one and possibly two American steamers by the Brazilian Government has been arranged without much effort to conceal the real character of the transactions. Mr. Flint, who was Balmaceda's American agent during the Chilean civil war, has not been deterred by his bad luck in supporting the losing side on that occasion from offering his services to Peixoto as a broker. He has purchased *El Cid* and possibly *El Rio*, two of the largest and fastest steamers in the coasting trade, and will turn them over to representatives of the Brazilian Government. These vessels when supplied with batteries will make most effective naval cruisers. As a large quantity of light and heavy guns, small arms, torpedoes and ammunition of all kinds has also been purchased, there can

be no reasonable doubt that these cruisers are intended for active service against the Brazilian fleet now in revolt against the Peixoto Government. Probably these munitions of war will not be shipped directly in American waters, but transferred to the steamers at sea on in a Brazilian port. That is a matter of detail which will depend upon the action of the United States authorities.

The right of the Brazilian Government to buy both arms and ships abroad for use in suppression the rebellion is incontestable. Whether the batteries and military stores can be places on board the ships in an American harbor may be a matter of requiring careful scrutiny of international precedents and of the precise conditions of the civil strike in Brazil. If this can be done a foreign port practically becomes a base of supplies, where cruisers may be fitted out for making war upon the insurgent navy of a friendly Power. The same question arose in France, where vessels were building for the Chilean Navy. It was decided after careful deliberation that these ironclads could not be detained in French ports, although it was apparent that Balmaceda would use them against the Chilean fleet then in revolt against his Government. It was this decision that forced the revolutionists at Iquique to attack Valparaiso and to bring the war to a close as rapidly as possible. If Balmaceda could have secured these vessels a few months earlier he might have sunk the insurgent fleet and perhaps have averted his own downfall. France did not dispute his right as President, *de facto* and *de jure*, to fit out a navy in its ports.

The *Alabama* and *Itata* are not parallel cases. The vessels built and fitted in English ports as Confederate privateers were employed by insurgents for the

destruction of American commerce. In order to furnish a parallel to the *AlabMa* case Mr. Flint and the Brazilian Minister would have to act as the agents of Admiral Melo, and not of President Peixoto. The *Itata* in like manner was obtaining a cargo of arms in American waters for the use of insurgents and the United States Government was under obligations to use due diligence in preventing the conversion of an American port into a base of supplies against a friendly Government. The case has a different aspect when the Brazilian Government with Congress behind it purchases arms and ships for the suppression of naval revolt. The French precedent in the Chilean war applies closely to the present instance. The only point of difference lies in the purchase and conversion of the American merchant ships into Brazilian cruisers, whereas Balmaceda's vessels were built in Europe directly for the Chilean Navy.

Admiral Melo occupies a markedly different position from the Chilean insurgents who finally overthrew Balmaceda. They had a majority of Congress and the Northern States behind them, and lost no time in establishing a provisional government and in recruiting a powerful army. Peixoto has the Congress, the Supreme Court and the army with him, and is supported by nearly all the States of the Federal Union. Admiral Melo has the fleet with him, but otherwise lacks every semblance of civil authority and popular support. Without an army in the field, and dependent for success very largely upon his resources for bombarding and destroying the Brazilian capital, he is not in a position to demand the recognition of belligerent rights or the enforcement of neutrality laws. There are doubtless many questions which the State Department with its

confidential information from Rio will be called upon to decide before *El Cid* and *El Rio* can be allowed to leave New-York Harbor. It may be safely assumed that the Administration will make a careful investigation and exercise due diligence.

164. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 29 de outubro

The situation in Brazil seems to be about like this: The insurgents have the best of it on the water and the government forces control things on land. And both are afraid to venture upon the other's domain.

165. «The Naval Imbroglia Again», *The Washington Post*,
30 de outubro

O jornalista da capital americana, que admite não conhecer todas as subtilezas da diplomacia naval, recusa-se a criticar Stanton sem o ouvir. Para o editorialista, o mais importante é saber se o Almirante defendeu os interesses americanos no Brasil e não se agradou ao governo de Peixoto. De qualquer forma, para tentar evitar o bombardeamento da cidade, devia entrar obrigatoriamente em contacto com de Melo, sem o tratar como um pirata. Não se pode criticar um oficial superior da marinha americana que atuou num contexto muito difícil, conclui o editorialista, que também considera irrelevante a questão da saudação da bandeira.

Admiral Stanton's dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy, published in yesterday's edition of *The Post*, does not throw a favorable light upon his action, though it cannot be said, on the other hand, to aggravate the situation at all. It

leaves things practically as they were, that is to say, still awaiting explanation. For all purposes of argument or illumination, it might as well not have been sent. Those who are disposed to condemn Admiral Stanton will see no reason to change their minds. Those who prefer to suspend judgment pending his version of the incident can very properly insist that the question is still open.

We know in a general way that the mission of our warships at Rio was to protect American interest – whatever they may be – at that point. We are justified in assuming further, that the only menace to those interests resided in the insurgent fleet, and the possibility that Melo, the commanding officer thereof, might conclude to bombard the city. It is easy to imagine, therefore, that the naval representatives, not only of the United States, but of all the other foreign powers present, may have had to come in contact with Melo, and it is difficult to see how Admiral Stanton, or any other fleet commander, could have intervened in the matter without recognizing Melo in some formal and official way. Presumably, Stanton had no orders to act as a partisan, to treat Melo as an enemy and to prevent his bombarding Rio by the simple but rude process of disabling his ships. We are bound to take this for granted, since Admiral Stanton did not assume a hostile attitude at the outset, and yet, if we do take this for granted, we are equally bound to admit that he was compelled to have relations of some sort with the commander of the insurgent fleet.

Just how those relations should have been graduated and defined strikes us as a very delicate question. Of course, if Admiral Stanton expected to accomplish anything in the interest of humanity and civilization, it would have

been folly in him to approach Melo in a spirit of rebuke and reprehension to treat him as an outlay and malefactor. That would have done no good and might have done much harm. Whatever the Peixoto government may have thought or said of Melo, the fact remained that Melo controlled the emergency which Stanton had been sent to guard, and through Melo, if at all, his mission was to be achieved. He had to treat to Melo or to abandon American interests to the chance of war.

We do not pretend to say what Admiral Stanton should have done. We are not familiar with the finesse of naval etiquette in foreign waters or the jargon of official diplomacy in international imbroglios. Still less do we dream of dissecting the intricate complications of a South American wrangle. Our idea, broadly stated, is that an officer, sent abroad to accomplish it by the most direct and feasible method that presents itself, and without much reference to insignificant details of form and ceremony. Admiral Stanton's business was clearly with Melo, as the only one with power to order or forbid the shelling of Rio Janeiro, and, since he had no orders to treat him as a pirate, it is difficult to see the middle ground between that and treating him as a de facto admiral. There may be such a middle ground, but we doubt whether it was worthwhile to look for it. The same flag that Stanton saluted on the fort was flying on the *Aquidabã*, and to a man engaged in serious business the case have seemed one of tweedledum and tweedledee⁴².

⁴² Personagens fictícios do livro de Lewis Carroll, *Through the Looking Glass* (1872), muito parecidos fisicamente e que nunca se contradizem.

As we have already said, we are in no haste to condemn Admiral Stanton without a hearing. To discredit and humiliate an officer of the United States Navy for not solving at first glance every trumpety *conundrum* presented by a South American ebullition is not at all to our taste. The question of chief importance is whether Stanton was acting for our interest and dignity at Rio – not whether he was mincing and hair-splitting to the satisfaction of the alleged government of Brazil. And that is the standard by which Admiral Stanton will be eventually judge.

166. *Oakland Tribune*, 30 de outubro

There would really seem to be no objection to President Peixoto buying ships and munitions of war in this country. We have ships and munitions of war for sale, and President Peixoto represents the established Government of Brazil. So far as anybody can see the transaction is, therefore, a perfect legitimate one.

167. « A Hint to Naval Officers», *The Times*, 31 de outubro

As razões invocadas pelo almirante Stanton provam que o oficial americano com os seus atos reconheceu o movimento insurrecional de Custódio de Melo. É por isso que «foi absolutamente necessário que as suas ações fossem não só rejeitadas, mas repreendidas», afirma o editorialista. Na opinião deste, os oficiais superiores da marinha americana deviam saber que não podem interferir nos assuntos políticos.



Fig 19 : «Os nossos navios de guerra no Rio Janeiro», *The Sioux City Journal*, 31 de outubro

The removal of Admiral Stanton from the command of the squadron at Rio de Janeiro is doubtless intended to have a significance much more than merely personal or local. Why he was removed is made plain enough by his own apology. He exchanged civilities with Admiral MELO, he explains, because MELO was "the only Brazilian admiral" and his flag "the only Brazilian flag afloat". This is simply an acknowledgment that MELO represents the Government of Brazil. That is what he claims. But it is precisely what the existing government at Rio denies, and what the Government of the United States has denies, for the only Brazilian Government that has been recognized at Washington is that represented by President PEIXOTO, against whom Admiral MELO is waging war.

In other words, Admiral STANTON took it upon himself to recognize a revolutionary government which had not been recognized by the United States. Whether he was right or wrong as regards his view of the insurrectionary movement in Brazil, it was absolutely necessary that his action should be not only disavowed, but rebuked. It was necessary not merely as regards our relations with Brazil, but as regards the conduct of our naval officers generally in the presence of similar conditions.

There has arisen lately an idea that naval officers are clothed with the full authority of the United States and are authorized to make war or to enter into diplomatic engagements without awaiting instructions from home. Most of our embroilments in South America and in the Pacific Ocean have come from this unauthorized intermeddling, and it has become important to assert the principle that a naval officer's duties are military only, and that while he may be called

upon at times to exercise a wide discretion for the protection of American interests abroad, his duty is that of protection merely and not of political assertion.

In these days of telegraphy, there is less excuse than ever for an admiral's undertaking to commit his government to a foreign policy of his own devising, and we have no doubt that Admiral STANTON'S removal was intended as a warning to all officers of our navy that interference in foreign politics, even to the extent of the recognition of belligerents, is a function of the government at Washington that has not been committed to them.

168. «President Peixoto's Novel Fleet», *The Sun* (N. Y.),
1 de novembro

Todo o artigo, muito técnico, é dedicado aos navios que Peixoto quer para poder enfrentar os rebeldes. Fala-se de uma pequena frota de torpedeiros de guerra (entre os quais El Cid, o Feiseen e o Destroyer , com o apoio de três navios: o Riachuelo e o Benjamin Constant, que estão a regressar da Europa, mais um outro que estão a comprar. No entanto, pergunta-se como é que estes navios poderão enfrentar um couraçado como o Aquidabã. De qualquer forma, Peixoto vai precisar do Riachuelo, do Benjamin Constant e do Tiradentes

The effort of the Brazilian Government to extemporize a navy, with which to destroy the one that has revolted under Admiral MELO, promises some interesting results. As the recent civil war in Chile was made remarkable by the actual blowing up of a great war ship by automobile torpedoes, and also by the

use in a land battle of small caliber magazine rifles, so now we may see in service the pneumatic dynamite thrower and the submarine gun.

The rather heterogeneous squadron which President PEIXOTO proposes to collect if possible, includes, as is given out, the merchant steamship *El Cid*, carrying a METFORD-ZALINSKI aerial torpedo tube and a battery of rapid-fire guns, including two 4,7 inch: the fast steam yacht *Feisen*, fitted out as a torpedo boat, with a HOWELL torpedo, and being herself carried to Rio on the steamer *El Cid*; a Yarrow torpedo boat, bought in England and soon to come to New York as freight on a steamer; ERICSSON'S original *Destroyer*, with her submarine gun, to be withdraw for the purpose from the pending trials of torpedo nets at Newport and towed from New York to Rio; and possibly one or two other vessels.

The interesting feature about this little fleet is that it relies chiefly upon torpedo warfare, and that it includes the three forms of aerial torpedoes, aquatic torpedoes, and submarine gun. All three carry heavy charges of gun cotton or some other high explosive, to be used at varying ranges, the pneumatic tube having the longest, and the submarine gun the shortest, but all sort compared with that of an ordinary high-power ship's battery. It is further obvious that there is little other choice for the PEIXOTO government if it undertakes naval warfare. Armor-clads cannot be extemporized, nor do shipbuilders keep in stock unarmored war vessels for the possible exigencies of Governments that may suddenly find themselves plunged into hostilities. These vessels must be built to order, and require years for their construction. MELO holds the city of Rio de Janeiro under his guns, and there is no time for building a navy to meet him.

There is little hope of fitting out enough merchant vessels as ordinary war ships, even could armaments be procured for them, since it not only takes time to mount batteries securely, but a ship must be strengthened to carry and fire them, as well as to resist being sunk by the guns of such powerful fighting craft as the *Aquidabã*. It has been said that PEIXOTO can rely on the armored cruiser *Riachuelo* and the *Benjamin Constant*, to come from Europe, and on a cruiser to be furnished by ARMSTRONG & Co. If so, his problem would be easier, and he would have a much-needed backing for his new torpedo fleet. But other reports are that the *Riachuelo* will join MELO.

However this may be, there is a chance in the time at disposal before the fate of Brazil is decided one way or the other to try the virtues of torpedo warfare. Perhaps the conclusion to do this has been reached by recalling the success of BALMACEDA in resorting to it when the Chilean navy revolted against him and took the part of the Congress. At all events, it is to be tried, and in all its known forms. The first question to suggest itself, however, is how these various small unarmored vessels, assuming that they can reach Rio safely, without the need of repairs, will be able to get within torpedo range of the *Aquidabã* without being blown up or sunk by the long-range high-power guns of MELO'S squadron. The Yarrow boat, said to be already purchased, would undoubtedly be very fast; and as the gunnery practice of the Brazilians seems to be usually bad, she might, under favoring circumstances, destroy whatever vessel she selected to attack. But the *Destroyer* is no Yarrow torpedo boat in point of speed, and must get within 200 yards or a little more before her gun could be effective. It can be

imagined what the chances of her being knocked to pieces in the mean time would be. A submarine gun mounted in a ram or other ironclad vessel is quite a different thing from the same weapon in the present craft.

A similar reflection arises as to the fate of the vessel which is to carry the pneumatic gun. Such a weapon has never yet exploded a shell from the unstable platform furnished by a moving vessel, since, as will be remembered, in the recent trial of the *Vesuvius* at Port Royal all the fuses failed. But here also the principal problem is as to what will become of *El Cid* under the fire of MELO'S fleet before she gets within the much shorter range of her dynamite weapon, since she is wholly unarmored. The best possible will be done to give her coal protection and other strengthening.

One statement is that though the *Destroyer* has actually been sold to Brazil she may, after all, not be delivered at present, since she has agreed with our Government to make certain trials of her submarine gun against torpedo nets, and a large appropriation has been made by Congress for testing the gun. However that may be, the mission now desired for her might earlier test the real value of her gun; for it has never yet been fired except with a dummy projectile, and as soon as a full charge of its explosive is fired from a vessel against a target like the hull of the armor-clad, it can be known what its effective qualities are. For the same reason to use of the pneumatic gun on *El Cid* might be instructive, inasmuch as nothing more is likely to be done with it in our navy for some time to come. Its coast test by the army is first awaited. The Chief of the Ordnance Bureau has expressed the belief, in his recent report, that "The guns on board the

Vesuvius cannot be made successful," so that the actual trial of the gun to be mounted on *El Cid* with any improvements that have lately been made, would be interesting.

If PEIXOTO could rely on the *Riachuelo*, the *Benjamin Constant*, and the *Tiradentes*, which last is certainly loyal to him, they would furnish a most valuable source of aid to his proposed torpedo fleet.

169. «Brazil and the Monroe Doctrine», *The Washington Post*,
1 de novembro

Parece evidente que muitas nações europeias tenham simpatias para com a revolta, escreve o jornal. Porém, o que mais interessa é saber se isto implica uma ingerência direta nos assuntos internos da república brasileira.

São os brasileiros que devem resolver este conflito, sem intervenção por parte das potências europeias e mesmo dos Estados Unidos. Este país, sublinha o diário nova-iorquino, manifestar-se-á só se o regime republicano for posto em questão por uma tentativa de restauração do antigo regime.

O governo de Washington tem de estar atento porque é garante da aplicação da doutrina Monroe. Não pode aceitar a implantação de um regime monárquico no continente americano, declara firmemente o editorialista.

Senator Barbosa, who is supposed to speak by authority for the Brazilian insurgents, has forwarded to the *New York Herald* from Buenos Aires a reply to the recent dispatch of President Peixoto to that paper, in which he denounces Peixoto in most unmeasured terms as a betrayer of freedom and justice, whose sole purpose now is to establish a dictatorship and destroy the liberties of Brazil.

The significant classes and «all the foreigners» in Rio are in favor of the revolution.

We have no means of confirming the veracity of this statement, but it is partially corroborated by a well-founded impression that the representatives of several European countries at Rio not only favor the revolution, but are giving all the encouragement in their power to the insurgents. That this is true of American residents is much to be questioned. With regard to these Senator Barbosa's dispatch need verification, however true it may be as to other foreigners.

The point of importance that now present itself, and it is a point of the utmost importance to the United States, is whether European sympathy with the revolution means European intervention, and if intervention, in what form of for what purpose.

In this connection the opinion of Archbishop Casanova, of Guatemala, who has just arrived in New York from Rome, becomes also significant from the fact that he is known to have watched the progress of events in Brazil very closely, and the archbishop is quoted in the *Tribune* as saying that in his judgment there is a "better prospect than ever before for the restoration of the monarchy", although he does not think there will be any intervention by European powers.

It is safe enough to assume, however, that if, as Senator Barbosa says, the foreigners at Rio are favorable to the revolution, their favor it for the reason that it foreshadows, as Archbishop Casanova suggests, the overthrow of the republic,

and between the sentimental and active sympathies of people or powers thus disposed it may become difficult to draw the line.

Should these sympathies take the form of overt intervention or intervention by intrigue, on the part of any foreign power, the duty will devolve upon the United States to enter vigorous and immediate protest against any such assault upon the well-understood and well-established policy of our government. Whatever internal dissensions may disturb the peace or threaten the autonomy of Brazil, it is a matter of the Brazilian to settle among themselves without outside interference, either from across the seas or from the United States, exception only as the struggle may involve the abandonment of Republican institutions and the restoration of the monarchy under foreign influence.

It is understood that the administration while anxious to avoid all complications in the premises, and desirous only of maintaining the attitude of neutrality due to the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments, will see to it that no encroachments are made upon the time-honored doctrine, which applies to the whole western hemisphere, that foreign powers must keep their hands off and connive at no further monarchical establishments upon the soil of the new world.

It is a subject that is already engaging serious attention, and will call for prompt and decisive action, should emergencies arise calling for an assertion of the policy that Mr. Monroe enunciated and to which our government is irrevocably committed.

170. «In Brazil», *The Times Democrat*, 1 de novembro

No plano militar não está a acontecer rigorosamente nada, constata o jornal da Luisiana, e é por isso que Peixoto pensou comprar alguns navios. É só pena, acrescenta o jornal, que não tenha pensado nisso antes porque a guerra civil já teria acabado e os Brasileiros estariam agora em paz, ocupados nas suas tarefas diárias.

O jornal escreve que o presidente mandou comprar cerca de dez navios, mas vai ser preciso esperar duas ou três semanas antes que estejam todos equipados e que haja, por conseguinte um combate sério. Estas aquisições vão fazer pender a balança do lado das tropas governativas, conclui o diário da Nova Orleães.

As the Brazilian insurgents have done nothing in particular, as far as the outside world has seen, to make headway against President Peixoto whom they characterize as a tyrant and a bad man generally, it has occurred at last to President Peixoto that, to end the blockade, or perhaps it would be nearer to mark to call it the deadlock, which has existed in and about Rio for the last six weeks or two months, his side must do something.

It is a pity that this thought didn't occur to one or other of the parties long ago; for, in that case, the revolution would have been through and done with before now, and the Brazilian people would be at the present moment engaged in their usual industries instead of glaring languidly at each other from two hostile camps. However, late is better than never; and, as Peixoto appears to have bought some ships in this country, the chances are that, in this very extraordinary civil war, there may after all be some fighting before the year is over. We pointed out already that, as things stand, there cannot be any fighting

or anything else than the maintenance of the status quo; for the loyalists have no ships to battle at sea, nor the insurgents any troops with which to battle on land. A change of any kind must, therefore, be welcome to everybody – even to the Brazilians themselves.

When the report came at the end of last week that the *El Cid* and the *El Rio*, the magnificent steamer of the Morgan Line, had been purchased by or for President Peixoto, it was received with a certain amount of distrust. The ground of the distrust was the President's alleged and generally credited want of money; but the fact of the transfer of the *El Cid* from the company's charge to that of Peixoto's representatives, left no longer question but that the purchase had been effected, whencesoever the money may have come. It is certain, moreover, that Peixoto is not suffering from the pressure of the impecuniosity which his opponents have been attributing to him; for not only has he bought the *El Cid* and the *El Rio*, but he has added thereto the acquisition of the *Ericsson* submarine gunboat, the *Destroyer*, the two torpedo boats *Javelin* and *Felsen*, two French cruisers, and other vessels of less importance.

It will take time, of course, to fit out the *El Cid* and the *El Rio* as men-of-war, even although armor will not be put on them; the mere equipping of them with the intended complement of guns, which are of course not on the spot, will require two or three weeks to accomplish. There is no prospect, therefore, that any fighting can take place in this month of November, in spite of the new departure taken by Peixoto.

But loyalist stock has, if anything, an upward tendency; the possession, even if it is a possession at long range, of large and speedy men-of-war-in-posse by Peixoto, coupled particularly with the recent admitted loss of the insurgents' ammunition by the explosion route, inclines the balance of advantage for the time being to the side of the loyalists. But the balance of advantage is more speculative than it is in fact.

171. «The *El Cid* and her Dynamite Gun», *The Minneapolis Tribune*,
1 de novembro

Artigo sobre El Cid, o rápido navio a vapor que o Brasil acaba de comprar. Está a ser transformado e equipado nomeadamente com uma nova peça de artilharia ligeira, para poder enfrentar o poderoso couraçado dos insurretos, o Aquidabã.

The swift Yankee steamer *El Cid* is now the property of the Brazilian government and is being rapidly transformer into a heavily armed blockade runner. It is now no secret that President Peixoto, governor of Brazil and commander of the land proposes to rout the insurgent fleet under command of Rear Admiral Melo, if he can muster the naval forces. The agents of Brazilian government are now in the United States, purchasing naval armament and supplies wherever opportunity for desirable purchase offers. The Steamer *El Rio* another swift merchant cruiser, is also said to be looked upon with covetous eyes by the Brazilian agents.

The *El Cid*, the first purchase, is said to be swifter than anything in the insurgent fleet, and quicker in its maneuvers. What it lacks is power to cope with the formidable *Aquidabã*, the ironclad flagship of the insurgent squadron. To supply this need the new proprietors of the *El Cid* propose to arm her with the new pneumatic dynamite gun, one of which was tested the other day at Sandy Hook⁴³.

The gun tested for Brazil's use is 50 feet long, weighs 55 tons, has a 15-inch bore, is equipped with an electric motor for training, and by pneumatic force throws steel projectiles loaded with dynamite all distances required up to five miles. At the experiment made last Saturday oak logs, 13 ½ feet long and 115 inches in diameter, were used and were thrown with great accuracy a distance of two miles. The experiment proved that with the same pressure and angle of elevation the distance covered was in each case the same. Steel projectiles have been thrown by this gun five miles. The 8-inch projectile, five feet long and carrying 100 pounds of dynamite, is thrown on and one-half miles. One such projectile is considered ample to put a quietus on any vessel which receives it. One of the chief advantages claimed for the pneumatic gun is its superior accuracy. The apparatus for determining aim and range is the most modern and scientific, and it is maintained that pneumatic force can be gauged and controlled with far higher accuracy than explosive force.

⁴³ Cordão litoral no Estado de Nova Jersey.

The commander of the *El Cid* believes that his swift little blockade runner is too quick of foot to fall a victim to the heavy guns of the *Aquidabã*, and that *El Cid's* formidable dynamite gun will secure it a wide ocean berth whenever it is desirable to enter Brazil's ports with arms and supplies. The experiment will be watched with interest by the naval world.

172. «The Question of Stanton», *Lancaster Intelligencer*,
1 de novembro

Este editorialista não censura a ação de Stanton no porto do Rio: o Contra-Almirante saudou a bandeira brasileira e também os fortes ocupados pelas tropas governamentais, mas isso não implica que ele tenha reconhecido politicamente os rebeldes, realça o jornalista. Este considera que o comandante da frota americana no Rio não fez nada de repreensível: «trata-se de uma questão de etiqueta naval e de pouca importância».

Admiral Stanton's explanation to the secretary of the navy, cabled briefly from Rio Janeiro, represents that he saluted the flag of Admiral Melo as that of the only admiral in the harbor carrying the flag of Brazil; and it seems that naval authorities at Washington do not agree that Admiral Stanton should not have thus saluted the Brazilian admiral's flag, even though he and his ships were in insurrection against the constituted authorities of Brazil. They say that Admiral Stanton had either to salute Melo's flag or seize his ships as piratical; and that he could be expected to do the latter; not being able to do it, if he would.

The whole matter seems to be a question of naval etiquette and to be of little importance. Whether Admiral Stanton did or did not do the precisely right thing, he did nothing so very far off from the right as to expose him to great censure. He did not recognize or intend to recognize the side of the Brazilian squabble that Melo represented. He salutes the forts that held to the government; and he saluted the navy that carried the Brazilian flag. It was the flag that he saluted in both cases; and it does not seem that anything or anybody was particularly hurt by his salutations.

173. *The Sioux-City Journal*, 1 de novembro

Aparentemente, não há um perigo monárquico no Brasil, releva o jornal. Os Estados Unidos têm o dever de tranquilizar o governo de Rio de Janeiro no que diz respeito às ingerências das nações europeias nesta crise.

There appears to be no need for a monarchy in Brazil, although the political situation in that country is not very satisfactory. The reports of an alliance between Brazil and the United States for the purpose of preventing restoration to the monarchy may well be doubted. But it is not unlikely that the United States government does not propose to look quietly on the attitude of European government towards Brazil, and given its government assurances to this effect. They have interfered with the government of Brazil and have virtually menaced its independence. The United States will tolerate nothing of the sort.

174. *Buffalo Evening News*, 1 de novembro.

The Peixoto Administration is going to surprise Admiral Melo with a new and splendid naval force. A number of United State merchant vessels have been purchased by the Government of Brazil for use as warships. The Monroe doctrine will thus be enforced, as this purchase is a menace to foreign interference as well as to the insurgent fleet.

175. «Reciprocity and a Republic at Stake»
The Minneapolis Tribune, 2 de novembro

Não há dúvidas: trata-se de um golpe para restaurar a monarquia no Brasil e as potências europeias estão do lado dos insurretos, afirma o editorialista. Este concorda com o manifesto de Peixoto no qual o Marechal de Ferro declara já não querer proteger os residentes europeus no Brasil.

Por outro lado, reafirma o jornal, os Estados Unidos, – presentes no porto carioca com uma pequena frota de guerra que terá em breve mais um grande couraçado blindado – estão em condições e na obrigação de evitar que «a Europa invada o solo americano e que prejudique sem impedimentos as instituições republicanas».

Na opinião do autor do artigo, os europeus querem afastar Peixoto porque este assinou o tratado de reciprocidade com os Estados Unidos que impede às nações do Velho Continente de manter a sua posição dominante no plano comercial. Com um regresso da monarquia, ser-lhes-ia possível realizar o seu plano de conquista comercial da América do Sul, rica em matérias primas para as indústrias, «principal fonte mundial de açúcar, café e de produtos químicos», além de ser um futuro grande mercado.

Mas Peixoto não está só a contar com o apoio de Washington: já tomou providências para adquirir armas e navios – entre os quais o «famoso monstro

naval, o Destroyer» – , com o objetivo de vencer os rebeldes, conclui o jornalista.

It is now recognized both by the Brazilian government and by the authorities at Washington, that the insurrection in Brazil has resolved itself in a plot to reinstate the monarchy, and that European powers are scarcely less interested in the campaign than are the insurgent crowd under Melo.

Minister Thompson, the representative of the United States at Rio, corroborates all the reports sent out by correspondents to the effect that European agents are hand in glove with the insurgents and that all the moral and other support which foreign powers can secretly render will be given. The recent manifesto of President Peixoto, declaring that his government would no longer consider itself responsible for the lives and property of European residents, has intensified the animosity of foreign powers against Peixoto's government. The manifesto is somewhat unusual and unexpected, but Peixoto no doubt considered that he had ample provocation and cause. He does not propose longer to protect those who are daily plotting for his overthrow and abetting his enemies. He recognizes the European residents and diplomats as interlopers and intriguers whom it is no longer safe for him to harbor and protect, and that their constant mission is to demoralize and divide his own forces and pave the way for Melo's success.

The United States is now represented in Rio's waters by four war vessels – the *Charleston*, *Newark*, *Detroit* and *Yantic* – and the bit armored cruiser *New*

York is now ordered to proceed promptly to Brazil, to become the flagship of the American squadron. It is therefore the evident intention of the government to back the Monroe doctrine with sufficient naval force to insure its recognition by European powers in Brazilian waters. This is as it should be. It is what *The Tribune* has favored from the outset. The United States cannot afford to let Europe encroach on American soil and undermine republican institution at libitum. If European governments join with the insurgents to overthrow the Brazilian republic, it is the duty of this country to join hands with its sister republic to put down the insurgents and interlopers. The doctrine of America for Americans must be maintained. Overt action on the part of European governments is not at present expected, but it is well to be forearmed.

It turns out that the chief animus which European powers have against the Brazilian government is the fact that Peixoto signed the reciprocity treaty with the United States, whereby the commercial supremacy which Europe once possessed in Brazil is fast going to the United States. The overthrow of the republic and the reinstatement of a monarchy mean to the Europeans the overthrow of American reciprocity and American commerce in South America. Having secured the overthrow of republican government and reciprocity in Brazil, European agents will then proceed to carry the same program into the other reciprocity republics. Thus, while on its face the Brazilian insurrection appears to be exclusively a personal contest between President Peixoto and Admiral Melo, it is at bottom, as at present controlled and directed, part and parcel of the European program for commercial supremacy. South America is

recognized by Europe as the great source of raw materials for manufacture and the world's chief source of sugar, coffee and chemicals. It is further recognized that South America is soon to become one of the world's most important markets. Under reciprocity the United States has secured the whip hand over Europe on the South American continent. To undermine the governments which maintain with this country the reciprocity system is the desperate game on which Europe powers seem to have entered in order to carry out their own programs of commercial conquest.

President Peixoto recognize the situation and calls upon this country to stand by republican government and the American doctrine as expressed by President Monroe and enforced by this country for three-quarters of a century; and his petition will not fall upon deaf ears. Meantime, Peixoto is not idle. Besides the *El Cid* and her pneumatic dynamite gun, mentioned by *The Tribune* yesterday⁴⁴, he has purchased Ericsson's famous naval monster, the *Destroyer*, and also the torpedo yacht, *Friesen*, which is the swiftest torpedo yacht yet constructed. The latter has a speed of over 20 miles an hour and carries one immense torpedo gun as armament. The *Destroyer* is a speedy steel armored cruiser whose sole armament consists of a huge submarine dynamite gun, whose mission is to pierce torpedo nets and fill the holds of unwieldy battle ships with dynamite and gun cotton charges. Before many weeks pass the world will know the efficiency of the new dynamite engines of destruction, and

⁴⁴ Cf. Texto 163.

whether or not the huge floating fortress and gunpowder arms in which so many hundreds of millions have been expended are to be cast aside as old iron.

176. «The United States and Brazil», *The Indianapolis Journal*,
2 de novembro

Não houve nenhum acordo secreto entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos, declara o jornal, que critica o Ministro brasileiro em Londres, acusando-o de falar demasiado.

O editorialista explica que a doutrina Monroe não significa que os Estados Unidos têm de ter o papel de polícia na América Latina e impor o regime republicano a todos. Se, por exemplo, o Brasil escolher de regressar a um regime monárquico, depois duma vitória dos rebeldes, Washington, na medida em que não houve interferência ou intervenção por parte de nações europeias, não terá nada a dizer.

Official circles in London seem determined to believe that the government of the United States is doing a good deal of underhand scheming in connection with the Brazil revolution. A cable telegram few days ago stated, as coming from Rio de Janeiro, that a secret treaty had been entered into between the United States and Brazil pledging this government to support that of Brazil against the effort being made to establish a monarchy. This statement was promptly denied at the State Department, and the denial was cabled to London. Yesterday brought the following from London:

The Brazilian minister in this city, in an interview regarding the alleged secret treaty said to have been arranged between the United States and Brazil in view of certain eventualities, is quoted as saying:

“I received a dispatch from my government dated Rio de Janeiro yesterday making a statement similar on the one cables to the one cabled to the Associated Press. While it is possible that such a treaty, in the general conception of the word, does not exist, you can depend upon it that there is a good understanding between the two republics, and that the United States will not permit a restoration of the monarchy if it can prevent it. The American war ships have not gone to Rio de Janeiro for nothing.”

This indicates that the original information came from the Brazilian minister in London, and that he was trying to bolster it up by further statements on the same line. The second dispatch, like the first, received a prompt and flat denial at the State Department.

The Brazilian minister in London is talking too much. He, of course, represents the existing government in Brazil and is anxious to serve it to the utmost. It is his interest to decry all efforts to overthrow the government and to give the impression that it cannot be overthrown. No doubt that was his object in stating that the United States had entered into a secret treaty, or at least a tacit understanding with the Peixoto administration, pledging it support against any effort to restore the monarchy. The minister has drawn too largely on his imagination for his facts. It is doubtless true that there is a good understanding and friendly feeling between this government and that of Brazil, but that is very far from constituting a secret treaty of tacit alliance.

No doubt the minister based his statement partly on his construction of the Monroe doctrine, but he seems to have had a confused idea of it. That doctrine cannot be construed as justifying the United States in interfering to prevent the people of Brazil from establishing any kind of government they

want. The sympathies of the American people are, of course, with republican ideas and republican government everywhere, but it does not follow that this government is to become the Don Quixote of nations, going up and down the earth establishing republics. If a majority of the people of Brazil prefer a monarchy to a republic, and so declare, either by the ballot or by revolution, the United States would have no right to interfere, and there is nothing in the Monroe doctrine requiring it to do so. We recognized the republic in Brazil because it was the de facto established government, and as long as it continues such it is our duty to maintain friendly relations with it. But if the present revolution should succeed and end in the re-establishment of a monarchy by the action of with the consent of the Brazilian people, the United States government should have no just ground of interference. It is only in the event of European interference that we would have a right, under the Monroe doctrine, to protest and perhaps to interfere. The sense of that doctrine is for Americans, Brazil for Brazilians: every American state for its own people. If the people of any South American state wish to establish a monarchy this government has no right to say they shall not do so, and it would be arrogant on its part to assert such a right. But if any European power should attempt, either by diplomacy or by arms, to force a monarchy on the people of Brazil or any other South American State against their will that would be a very different case. Active interference by any European power in the affairs of Brazil might justify active interference on the part of the United States, but that is the only thing that would.

177. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 2 de novembro

There is news from Brazil and it is of a kind to give the present administration a peck of trouble. That country is said to be on the verge of dissolution, and the European powers are only waiting the opportunity to provide that government which Brazil has not been able to give herself. In such an emergency the administration at Washington would have to act promptly. The division of Brazil between the European powers could not, of course, be permitted.

178. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 2 de novembro

It is hoped that the taxpayers of Brazil may be pleased with the ten new American ships their President has bought for them. That many additional naval fighters will add greatly to the interest in their revolutions.

179. «The new Brazilian Fleet», *The Times Democrat*,
3 de novembro

A guerra civil no Brasil está parada, porque os rebeldes não têm exército e Peixoto não tem uma marinha, nota o jornal. No entanto, o Presidente tomou a iniciativa de comprar navios de guerra. E, contrariamente ao que se tem dito, deve ter dinheiro, visto que já adquiriu cinco, e que está a negociar mais três, sem esquecer o material militar para transformar El Cid e El Rio em cruzadores.

O editorialista da Luisiana – que não deixa de assinalar os pontos negativos destas aquisições – prevê por conseguinte que, dentro de um mês, o governo do Rio terá a sua disposição uma frota de pelo menos oito navios, o que vai obrigar os rebeldes a apressar-se, se quiserem ganhar.

No better illustration of the truth and significance of the proverb that “money makes the mare go” has ever been given to the world that the news of the last few days, respecting the purchase of men-of-war, and ships easy of conversion into men-of-war, by the government of Brazil.

For months the civil war in the great republic of South America had hung fire in a way in which no other civil war ever hung fire before. Masterly inactivity has been the one characteristic of the movements, if we can use the expression where there has been practically no movement, on either side. The loyalists, as we have pointed out, have had no fleet, all the men-of-war worth speaking of having gone over to the insurgents; so that they could not fight the insurgents at sea. The insurgents have had no land forces, so that they could not have conveniently fought the loyalists on land. Hence the inactivity.

The loyalists have at last, however, determined to put an end to this kind of fainéant warring. They have bought, and are buying, ships that will enable them in a short time to make head against the insurgents on the insurgents’ own element. Peixoto has been credited until now with impecuniosity. Report had it that, the trade of the two great ports of the country, Rio and Santos, having been brought nearly to a standstill, and the government deriving a large portion of its current revenue from the customs duties of those ports, Peixoto was very badly

embarrassed for funds. This alleged impecuniosity, in fact, has been held up by the opponents of his government as one of the things that must within a measurable time bring about his defeat and overthrow.

But Peixoto's reported impecuniosity must have been diametrically opposed to the truth. His present departure in the purchase of ships proves not only that he is not impecunious, but on the contrary that he is copiously supplied with money. His purchase of the two fast and powerful Morgan Liners, *El Cid* and *El Rio*, alone, must have cost him nearly \$ 1,000,000, to say nothing of the acquisition also of the *Destroyer* and the torpedo boats *Feiseen* and *Javelin*. The purchase, moreover, of the guns and other material for the conversion of the *El Cid* and *El Rio* from merchantmen into cruisers could not fail to make a large extra drain upon the presidential exchequer. For guns of the type of the dynamite gun that is to be placed on the *El Cid* are not purchased for a maravedi; and American firms do not sell goods, whether ships or guns for mere paper promises.

It is plain, therefore, that if President Peixoto was impecunious formerly, he is not impecunious now. Indeed, we see, from a dispatch published elsewhere, that he is not satisfied with the fleet which he has already purchased, but he is reaching out for more. The announcement is made from New York this morning that, through his agents, he is in negotiation for the purchase of the gunboat *Machias*, already in commission, and of the sister cruisers *Montgomery* and *Marblehead*, which will soon be ready for sea. There is no inherent improbability in Peixoto's purchase, or attempt to purchase, these vessels. They have been

built, it is true, for the United States government; but, until the government has actually accepted them, they are not the United States government's property. A contract between two parties cannot bind one of the parties thereto. The United States government having the right to reject the vessels after they are built, the contractors have, of course, the right under specified conditions of disposing of the vessels prior to acceptance.

We saw, moreover, that neither the *Machias* nor either of the sister cruisers named is altogether satisfactory in its build. They are all of very small "stability": and, no matter how much they may be relieved of above-deck weight, they will never be quite free from the danger of capsizing. It would not be surprising, therefore, in the least, if the Navy Department were to give the Columbia Iron Works carte blanche to dispose of the said vessel as they please.

In addition to the *El Cid*, the *El Rio*, the *Destroyer*, the *Feisen*, the *Javelin*, and possible enough the *Machias*, the Brazilian government have two cruisers of their own, the *Riachuelo* and the *Benjamin Constant*, which have remained true to their allegiance and are now at Toulon, France, awaiting an order from Admiral Mauritz to start for home via New York.

It is quite possible, therefore, that, before this month is over, an armed fleet, numbering eight at least, may be on its way from New York to Rio to take part in the civil war. And such a splendid addition to Peixoto's force will have the effect not only of making things move, but of compelling the insurgents to hustle if they want to win.

180. «The Brazilian Situation», *The Daily Picayune*, 3 de novembro

Neste artigo, fala-se dos navios comprados pelo Brasil, o que vai acelerar o fim do conflito. No entanto, o editorialista nota que não vai ser fácil, para esta pequena frota entrar no porto do Rio de Janeiro, porque os rebeldes têm armamento moderno e eficaz.

Por outro lado, Peixoto não vai poder contar com apoio dos Estados Unidos, que querem manter uma estrita neutralidade, sublinha o jornal,

The recent activity shown by the agents of the Brazilian Government in purchasing fast steamships in various parts of the world for use in crushing the rebellion in progress in Brazil proves that affairs in that disturbed republic are fast shaping towards some decisive action. Should President Peixoto succeed in getting his ships to Brazil, a feat which is likely to be attended with considerable difficulty, the fate of the revolution would be quickly settled one way or other.

When all the ships that have been purchased are assembled, the Government of Brazil will have but a few actual warships, supplemented by a number of merchantmen hurriedly fitted out as cruisers and armed principally with rapid-fire guns. President Peixoto claims that the cruisers *Riachuelo* and *Benjamin Constant*, now in Europe, will prove additions to his fleet; while, on the other hand, the revolutionists are equally positive that both these ships will join Admiral Melo. The latter supposition appears, from most of the reports received, to be the more likely.

On the other warship counted on by President Peixoto, the *Tiradentes*, a protected cruiser, now in Montevideo, is blockaded in that port by the heavily

armored rebel cruiser *Republica*, and the iron turret ship *Bahia* is aground at Rosario, with rebel vessels keeping close watch over her movements and prepared to prevent any attempts to float her. The Brazilian Government will, therefore, have to depend mainly on the fleet which would, unaided, have not the least show in the world against main of the ships now held by the rebel Admiral Melo, which are armed with heavy modern rifles. The rebels have, moreover, a number of excellent first-class torpedo boats, which would make it exceedingly dangerous for large vessels like the *El Cid* to attempt to enter the harbor of Rio.

When the improvised fleet sails from New York, some stirring event are likely to follow, and it would surprise no one if the Brazilian rebels should be found prepared to worry the fleet from very start. It would be unwise for President Peixoto to depend upon the aid and comfort of the United States, as he seems disposed to do. The most that this country is likely to do is to maintain strict neutrality and see that the property and lives of its citizens are protected. It is not even likely that the Government will permit the vessels purchased and now being fitted out in New York to sail south under the protection of the American flag, so as to guard them from possible attacks on the part of the insurgents. It is certain the to interest of the United States to maintain strict neutrality, and there is little doubt but that is the course that will be followed.

181. «Two Specimens of War», *The Washington Post*, 3 de novembro

O editorialista comenta a notícia da suspensão de um jornal inglês no Rio, porque este publicou um artigo onde falava da guerra civil no Brasil como de uma ópera-bufa.

Admite que os sul-americanos têm muitos defeitos; são «demasiado melindrosos, demasiado histéricos e com a uma grande falta de objetivos sérios e inteligentes». No entanto, prefere os sul-americanos que se pavoneiam, que fumegam e que se apapricam, aos ingleses que, em África, matam, saqueiam e incendeiam: «Uma guerra burlesca é preferível a uma guerra verdadeira», sublinha o jornalista da capital americana.

An English newspaper at Rio was suppressed some weeks ago for sneering at the war down there, calling it an opera bouffe and L'Admiral Suisse⁴⁵ were about evenly matched in for deafening but futile encounter. We do not know whether the act of suppression was justified. That depends. But we are quite sure that the paper's ridicule must have been irritating because of its uncomfortable fidelity to fact.

It occurs to us, however, that this Barmecide war in Brazil is at least as pretty a spectacle as the British slaughter of the half-naked and less that half-armed Matabeles in South Africa. Of course the latter affair is not open to the criticism of being bloodless. It is tragic and cruel enough to glut the appetite of the most ferocious monster. The British have as usual selected a victim who is both helpless and courageous. The wretched negroes, brave to the point of romance, but utterly unfit to cope with modern appliances of war, are butchered

⁴⁵ Trata-se de uma personagem de opereta.

by wholesale, and their pursuers, full of fire and enthusiasm, can kill away as safely as though they were working a grouse preserve in England. This is real war. This is what the enlightened Briton calls "potting niggers". And from the triumphant summit of this great work, the Englishman sneer at Brazilian bombardments and talks with cutting scorn of opera bouffe.

Perhaps it were better if the South Americans were less explosive, less given to scowling and strange oaths and other warlike demonstration. Certainly, it were better if these feverish people could grow calm and settle down into the ways of prosperity and peace. Beyond doubt they are too touchy, too hysterical, and too devoid of serious and intelligent purpose. But we are far from sure that these noisy wars and endless ebullitions with their beggarly account of corpses are less acceptable to civilization than the British style of tragedy in Africa. A sham battle is better than a real one, and we should think in self-evident that a burlesque is preferable than a butchery. It is not to be denied that the South Americans, with their endless revolutions and their trumpety outbreaks, are becoming tiresome. We could wish that they might quiet down, precipitate their sediment and keep still long enough to be skimmed and clarified. But with all their noise and nonsense, the Brazilians are at least not engaged in extermination and despoiling helpless victims. They strut while the Englishman kills. They fume and fuss and sputter while the Englishman loots and burns. They make us laugh while the Englishman makes us shudder. History will choose between them.

182. «Brazilians and Europe», *The Morning Call*, 3 de novembro

São os antigos privilegiados do regime imperial, «a camarilha de vampiros que nunca fizeram nada para o Brasil», agora exilados na Europa e que querem recuperar o antigo estatuto, que estão na origem da revolta, afirma perentório o jornal. Por outro lado, estão os Estados Unidos que, se a guerra continuar, terão de contribuir para a preservação da república no Brasil.

The cause of the rebellion in Brazil seems to be in Europe. Brazilians and the descendants of Brazilians who had figured in the imperial court of Brazil before the revolution wanted to get back. They did not like the social obscurity of a republican capital. It is not to be assumed that they are greatly interested in the general welfare of the country. They live in memory in the splendor of a period when a few hundred people played great parts on the social stage at the public's expense. Courtiers seldom become reconciled to republican simplicity. They do not like to take their chances with a crowd. When the accident of birth has caste them upon one of the illuminated spots of the earth it seems hard to go down to the common level. A little of the divine right which was supposed to protect a monarch may also be assumed to uphold his courtiers. The clique of vampires who have never done Brazil any real service is now contributing to the overthrow of the republic. A rebellion, even if not successful, is an argument against the form of government it protests against. The exiled Brazilians in Europe will divide a part of the wealth they got possession of under the empire to restore the old condition of things. While it is not the policy of the United States to form offensive or defensive alliances it is quiet probable if the war

continues that American men and money will aid in the preservation of the Brazilian republic

183. «Peixoto pushing Things», *The Boston Daily Globe*,
3 de novembro

Peixoto compra navios, e isto prova que está confiante, escreve o jornal que, no entanto, espera que os Estados Unidos possam obter uma solução negociada do conflito.

Whatever may be the faults of Pres. Peixoto of Brazil, he doesn't lack confidence in his cause. He possesses, too, that staying quality which is so essential to political leadership.

The purchase of the *Britannia* on behalf of the Peixoto government, at a cost of \$225,000, indicates that the Brazilian ruler means to have something of navy before he gets through, even if he has to buy half a dozen big steamships and provide them with casings of armor at a heavy cost.

Nevertheless, we hope most sincerely, both for the sake of Peixoto and the people of Brazil, that the United States will successfully use its good offices for securing peace with honor in that war-vexed country. In no sense does it "pay" to engage in armed strife when strife can be avoided without the loss of honor.

184. *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 3 de novembro

Os Estados Unidos têm uma boa oportunidade para se desembaraçar de velhos navios de guerra...

Now is your Uncle Samuel's chance to work off some of those war vessels that seem predisposed to turn upside down when they get into deep water. Brazil would probably be willing to pay a fair price for them and take chances.

185. «The Brazilian Conspiracy», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 4 de novembro

O quotidiano da Pensilvânia não tem a mínima dúvida: a Áustria e a Espanha estão por trás da revolta de Custódio de Melo. Com a ajuda dos «chamados diplomatas europeus» que querem «proteger o atual pirata», o objetivo é claro: restaurar a monarquia.

Por outro lado, os Estados Unidos e a Grã Bretanha são suscetíveis de «tratar de Melo como um pirata», opinião defendida pelo Philadelphia Inquirer desde o início da crise.

There never was the slightest doubt that the treason of Admiral MELO, of the Brazilian navy, and the willingness of the so-called European diplomats at Rio to protect an actual pirate by treating him as a virtual belligerent were the results of a conspiracy of the restoration of the monarchy in Brazil. Unfriendliness and even calumny were resorted to to secure the downfall of PEIXOTO'S government. The world was startled with stories of the "bad faith" of PEIXOTO and of the atrocities of his soldiers. All these tales of woe, it has since

turned out, were pure inventions, but MELO, on the other hand, received something more than the moral support of the Continental powers, although no part of Brazil sympathized with his “revolution”, not even Rio Grande do Sul, which has long since been in a state of insurrection.

It is natural that whatever financial assistance there may be behind this conspiracy should come from Austria and Spain. Both powers are friendly in a lukewarm way to the Orleanist princes out of a job and in a lesser degree to the house of Braganzas. It is not likely, therefore, that the Count and Countess D’EU will see their son on the throne of his grandfather, Dom PEDRO II, but will throw their money away on MELO’S impracticable revolt.

It only remains to be added that it is now reported that the United States and Great Britain, with their large commercial interests in Brazil, are likely to do what *The Inquirer* has always advocated, namely, to treat MELO as a pirate.

186. «Is this Neutrality?», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 4 de novembro

O editorialista californiano coloca a questão da neutralidade europeia no caso da ajuda financeira enviada a Custódio de Melo e, sobretudo, nas aquisições de navios americanos por parte de Peixoto.

There seems to be little doubt that President Peixoto of Brazil is supplying himself with ships arms and munitions of war from the United States, while at the same time Admiral Melo is receiving material aid in a variety of ways from Europe. Manifestly this is not strict neutrality, but the fact that these affairs are

carried on almost openly, or at least with but little pretense of concealment, shows the inefficiency of what we are accustomed to call, though incorrectly, international laws.

It is true that in the case of the Huntington steamer *El Cid*, she has not been bought openly by President Peixoto, and it is said that she will go to sea manned by American seamen, but it is the work of only a few minutes to haul down the American flag and hoist the Brazilian as soon as the ship gets to sea; and no one entertains any doubt whatever that she is to become a Brazilian ship of war.

Admiral Melo is not in need of ships, for he has under his control nearly the whole navy of Brazil, but he probably needs money, the sinews of war, and that is being supplied to him, it is said, from Europe, the chief source of supply being the Count d'Eu, the son-in-law of the late Emperor Dom Pedro of Brazil. If this be true the victory of Melo would mean the overthrow of the republic and the restoration of monarchy in Brazil.

The rule of neutrality, if there be said to be a rule, is this; that either belligerent may buy anything he likes from the citizen of the neutral country, but the Government of the neutral nation is bound to use due diligence to prevent the fitting out, arming and equipping of ships of war in its ports, and to forbid its territory being used as a basis for military operations.

Inasmuch as *El Cid* is certainly being fitted out as a man-of-war, it is questionable whether we are not infringing the rule of neutrality, that is, if

Admiral Melo and his followers have been recognized as belligerents, and whether they have or not President Peixoto is certainly willing by this time to concede their being belligerent in fact. The United States should be careful in this matter, as there is a strong precedent against us.

187. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 4 de novembro

The Austrian officer, whose ambition to rule Brazil is said to have led several wealthy persons in Austria to contribute large sums to aid Melo, and who will be selected to occupy the throne if by any chance the republican form of government should be successfully overthrown, is the possessor of a wonderful name. He possesses more hyphens than the most aristocratic foreign grandee⁴⁶. [...] He is the third son of the Count d'Eu of France, who married Princess Isabel, daughter of Dom Pedro the poor, old, deposed emperor who was exiled and passes his last days in France.

His mama, a very ambitious woman, wishes to put her boy on a throne and has selected Brazil for the infliction.

188. «Peixoto's Torpedo Fleet», *The New York Times*, 5 de novembro

Peixoto, com as suas aquisições, quer estar em condições de enfrentar os navios de Custódio de Melo, nota o jornal nova-iorquino que, no entanto, não

⁴⁶ Chama-se Antoine-Gaston-Clement-Marie-Louis-Philippe-Miguel-Gabriel-Rafael-Gonzaga.

subestima a poderosa força naval controlada pelos rebeldes. Mas isto faz da tentativa de Floriano algo de ainda mais atrevido e impressionante.

Brazil numerous purchases of ships at this port make it evident that President PEIXOTO will get together enough of a fleet for a notable "object lesson" in torpedo warfare. When we hear of the steamer *El Cid* being fitted out to carry a pneumatic dynamite gun, the *Feiseen* and the *Javelin* getting ready of Howell torpedoes, two Yarrow boats coming from England so as to go to Rio on the *Britannia*, and even the *Destroyer*, with her submarine weapon, purchased, it becomes clear that torpedo appliances are to be resorted to in all their known varieties.

It is easy to see, also, why this must be the main reliance of PEIXOTO in endeavoring to cope with the powerful fleet of MELO. The *Tiradentes*, which has remained loyal to him, is a little gunboat of only 800 tons, carrying four 4.7- inch guns. If it were sure, as has been reported, that the famous armor-clad *Riachuelo*, the fine new French-built cruiser *Benjamin Constant*, and a cruiser built at Elswick like the *Republica* would also support his cause, he would be very well off for a navy. But the *Riachuelo* and the *Constant*, in any case, it is now said, will not leave France before the end of November, and one report gives them to MELO. Be this as it may. Peixoto can gather as many torpedo-carrying craft as possible for an attack upon Melos squadron, hoping that if some of them are sunk or blown up others may succeed in destroying a part of the insurgent

squadron. The sinking of the *Blanco Encalada* by the torpedo vessels *Lynch* and *Condell* is well remembered⁴⁷.

Of all the torpedo appliances to be obtained from this port the most hopeful seem to be the Howell⁴⁸ automobile torpedoes. They have never been tried, like the well-known Whiteheads, in actual battle, but all that is known of them is favorable. Their accuracy is excellent, and of late their speed has also been made satisfactory, while their lightness, simplicity, and ease of manipulation make them particularly valuable for the extemporized craft in which they are to find their initial service. If, in addition, two Yarrow⁴⁹ boats are to come here by transatlantic steamer, with outfits of Whitehead⁵⁰ torpedoes, they are likely to be at least as effective a source of reliance as any in the new fleet. Yet one drawback to the success even of these torpedo craft is that Admiral MELO, besides his formidable war ships, has a much larger supply of regular torpedo boats. They include, according to one account, five Yarrow and three Thornycroft⁵¹ boats, the former making 20 knots or more and the latter 24 knots,

⁴⁷ Trata-se de uma fragata blindada, da armada chilena construída na Inglaterra. Foi o primeiro navio de guerra do mundo a ser afundado por dois torpedos de propulsão (23 de abril de 1891).

⁴⁸ O Contra Almirante John Adams Howell (1840-1918), combateu durante a Guerra Civil Americana e a Guerra Hispano-Americana. É conhecido sobretudo por ter inventado material de guerra, e nomeadamente os torpedos autodireccionais («*self-steering torpedos*»).

⁴⁹ Na altura, a empresa fundada em 1865 por Alfred Yarrow (1842-1932), era sedeadada perto de Londres. Este estaleiro situa-se na Escócia desde 1906.

⁵⁰ O engenheiro inglês Robert Whitehead (1823-1905), inventou o torpedo de propulsão (1866).

⁵¹ Empresa de construção naval fundada em 1866 por John Isaac Thornycroft (1843-1928), numa circunscrição no sul de Londres. Mudou-se para Southampton em 1908.

and all of them first-class. Add to these a number of smaller torpedo boats and it will be seen what sort of a reception the new fleet of PEIXOTO might get in torpedo warfare alone, without speaking of the big guns of the insurgent vessels. This consideration, however, only makes the present enterprise all the more bold and striking.

189. «Royalty vs. Republicanism», *The Washington Post*,
5 de novembro

Para o quotidiano, não existem dúvidas: as monarquias europeias, e nomeadamente a inglesa, nunca digeriram a queda de D. Pedro e a perda do Brasil, deixando «o espetáculo de uma série contínua de repúblicas do Estreito de Magalhães até aos Grandes Lagos». Agora, elas têm como objetivo «verificar» a força do republicanismo no Brasil. Por outras palavras, não perderam a esperança de um regresso do antigo regime.

O articulista analisa a seguir a aliança franco-russa. Não se trata, interroga-se o editorialista, de uma tentativa do Czar de enfraquecer a França, «precisamente quando os outros governos monárquicos estão a atacar insidiosamente a estabilidade do Brasil?»

Os Estados Unidos que assistiriam com «emoção e desgosto a uma queda da república em França», têm uma ligação ainda mais forte com as «suas primas do sul», sublinha o quotidiano. Este felicita o presidente pela sua rápida reação para com o Almirante Stanton; é um sinal que os Estados Unidos nunca deixariam que se «restabelecessem tronos» no continente americano.

No more important statement has been uttered of late than is contained in the dispatch from the United States minister to Brazil, and which has been made public in part of the State Department. In this communication it is asserted

that the evolution in Brazil is being fostered and abetted by royalist sympathizers, although the ambassadors of France and England are said to disclaim the entertainment of any such policy on the part of their respective government.

On the day that Dom Pedro was dethroned and sent an exile across the ocean the remarkable spectacle was presented to Europe of an unbroken series of republics from Strait of Magellan to the great lakes. To the north of us there still remained, it is true, a country over which no president rules through popular suffrage. But even in Canada the reins of monarchical power were lightly drawn and a spirit of unrest told how disturbed a Western people were becoming under the easiest of yokes.

From that day to this it has been the hope of the royal families of Europe that in some way the tide which was setting so strongly toward a government by the people might be checked. Of this there can be no question. It has been whispered in diplomatic circles, and now comes the corroborative evidence. The situation in Brazil, where the adherents of royalty are endeavoring to overturn the newly built pedestal of republicanism, is but the natural sequence of a series of events. One cannot but remember that anxious energy with which England endeavored to insert a wedge into the structure of which Washington and Jefferson laid the foundations, by active sympathy with and aid to the cause of the Confederacy. The day of the downfall of the Republic of the United States would have been a day of rejoicing, not only at the court of St. James, but at every other court in Europe. Nor can one forget the efforts of England to prevent self-

BRAZIL.

**Another Statement from the Revolu-
tionist Ruy Barbosa.**

**Denies that Mello is in Favor of a
Monarchy.**

**Regrets Stories of American Sympa-
thy with Peixoto.**

**Denounces Him as a Tyrannical
and Cruel Ruler.**

**The Rebel Fleet Said To Be Short .
Provisions.**

Fig. 20 : *The Times-Democrat*

ORIGIN OF BRAZIL'S TROUBLE

**PLOT ORIGINATED IN EUROPE TO
SET UP A MONARCHY.**

MELLO BUT A TOOL OF CONSPIRATORS.

**Son of Count d'Eu Selected for the Head
of the Government.**

MONTPENSIER AIDS THE SCHEMERS.

Fig. 21 : *The New York Times*

Duas manchetes de 5 de novembro :

a do *Times-Democrat* sobre uma declaração de Rui Barbosa ;

à do *New York Times* que acusa as monarquias europeias de estarem na origem da revolta.

government in the Hawaiian Islands, even after the people had lowered the royal standard.

While Admiral Melo is wittingly or unwittingly, serving the cause of royalty; while he is being fondly caressed by men who, if they did not instigate him to revolution, are upholding him in the act, the attention of all the world is being drawn to a remarkable drama in France. It is an unnatural alliance at best – this union between the mercurial Frenchman and the swarthy Cossack, between the President of a republic and the Czar whose autocratic hand is not stayed by even the semblance of a legislative body. What does it mean? It is possible that Russia is endeavoring to sap and undermine the greatest republic of Europe, even as the other monarchical governments are insidiously attacking the stability of Brazil?

It was Napoleon who said that someday Europe would be either all Republican or all Cossack. Which is it to be? It is not for naught that the immense hoard of gold which Russia has accumulated is today so largely distributed among the imperial banks of England, Germany, France and Austria, that the very threat of its withdrawal is a constant menace of Russia's power.

No man with American blood in his veins could view, without an emotion of regret, the downfall of the republic in France. The bond of sympathy with our cousins to the south of us is still more strong. It there is a tacit understanding among the royalists in Europe to impede by fair means or foul the march of human independence, as it is asserted there is, the promptness with which

President Cleveland expressed the displeasure of this government at the act of Admiral Stanton is a matter for general rejoicing.

The eastern horizon of the sky of time is even now faintly aglow with the dawn of the twentieth century. When that day breaks it may be to witness a great struggle of popular government against imperial domination. If, in the meantime, a new republic shall be formed to the north of us, or that great territory shall be added to our domain, the western hemisphere will be a continuous chain of free institutions, wherein the will of the people will be sovereign and supreme. The brilliancy of this spectacle will light up the plains of Europe and inflame the spirit of patriotism in every home. Before it Emperors and Czar must go down; but until this consummation is reached the Stars and Stripes⁵² must be a constant warning to those who would re-establish thrones upon our continents, and a constant signal of succor to a people who are steadily and hopefully climbing to the pinnacle of popular government.

**190. Possible Brazilian Complications», *The Daily Picayune*,
5 de novembro**

Este editorialista coloca a questão da proteção da frota, comprada pelo Governo brasileiro e preparada nos Estados Unidos. Com efeito, os navios efetuariam a viagem até ao Brasil ao abrigo da bandeira americana.

O jornalista – que atribui ao revoltosos o estatuto de beligerantes – admite que, sem isso, os navios deviam enfrentar sérios perigos. Porém, considera que se o seu país oferecer essa proteção, não respeitaria a estrita

⁵² A bandeira americana.

neutralidade que pediu às nações europeias, e que a França e a Grã Bretanha já prometeram aplicar. Seria, por conseguinte, um ato de interferência direta por parte dos Estados Unidos.

The purchase of a fleet of ships in New York by Brazilian Government, and the fitting out of the vessels as warships under the protection of the American flag, while Brazil is actually engaged in a civil strife which seriously threatens the overthrow of the existing Government, is a matter which deserves the close attention of the authorities. The Government of Brazil under President Peixoto, still the recognized Government, and, under a literal interpretation of the neutrality laws, it may be permissible to allow the fitting out of such a fleet as is described in our waters, but it is very much to be doubted whether it is good policy for the authorities at Washington to permit any foreign power to use the protection of our flag for the purpose of crushing a formidable rebellion which, with its own resources alone, it would be powerless to do.

It is also reported from the national capital that the question of permitting the Brazilian fleet which has been openly fitted out in New York to proceed to Brazil under the protection of the American flag is being considered, and that it is probable that the ships will be allowed to clear for some Brazilian ports flying the flag of the United States. It is to be hoped the Brazilian Government, and are being fitted out as warships for the special purpose of making war on the revolutionists, who are in every way entitled to be considered belligerents. For this Government to accord the protection of tis flag to these vessels, to enable them to escape possible damage at the hands of the rebels during their voyage

to Brazil, would be tantamount to openly aiding the Brazilian Government to put down a revolt with which this country has nothing whatever to do and in the settlement of which it has no direct interest.

The position for the United States to occupy in this matter is one of complete neutrality and indifference between the two contending factions. This country has demanded this of the European powers, and perfect neutrality has been promised by the representatives of Great Britain and France. In the face of such pledges exacted and accorded, it is difficult to understand how the authorities at Washington can countenance proceedings which cannot but be considered as direct acts of interference.

There is not the least reason to doubt that the Brazilian fleet, which will sail from New York in another week, will have serious dangers to encounter before it reaches Brazilian waters. The rebel Admiral, if he has any enterprise at all, will not fail to send a few of his powerful warships and torpedo boats to intercept the vessels, and the result of an action between hastily armed merchant ships with raw crews and powerful war vessel can scarcely be considered a matter of doubt.

191. *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 5 de novembro

If Melo could overhaul a few more transports the war in Brazil would soon be over. At the rate of 1,000 at a clip, Peixoto's army would not last long.

192. *The Washington Post*, 5 de novembro

We might be able to unload some of our top-heavy war vessels on Brazil.

193. «The New Brazilian Navy», *The Times-Democrats*, 7 de novembro

O articulista quer pôr os pontos nos ii desmentir o que foi escrito em certos jornais: os navios comprados pelo Brasil são, por enquanto, só cinco. Explica também que estes navios, para fazerem a viagem são declarados como comerciais e as armas que transportam como mercadoria. A tripulação, que fará a viagem num outro navio, será transferida unicamente num porto do Norte do Brasil. Com efeito, a lei proíbe à tripulação americana de ir combater para um outro país.

When the news was first published in this country that the government of Brazil was buying ships, either men-of-war or merchantmen easily convertible into men-of-war, it was largely distorted and exaggerated. Instead of having purchased the *El Cid* alone of the Southern Pacific Lines of steamships, the Brazilian agents were represented as having purchased both the *El Cid* and the *El Rio* of that line. They were represented as having bought the gunboat *Machias* and the cruiser *Marblehead* of the Unites States government, and as being in treaty of the acquisition of several more vessels either in possession of Uncle Sam or being built for him. They were represented as having bought, for torpedo boats, not only the *Feiseen*, but the *Atlanta* also of the Jay Gould estate, and the

Javelin while, as a matter of fact, they had purchased of these only the *Feisen*. With a good deal more of exaggeration in the same direction.

The amount of their actual purchases is now known; and, while it is not by any means as large as it was at first represented to be, it is disprove the reports of Peixoto's impecuniosity, and that ought to make a sensible impression on the status of the hostilities in Brazil.

The vessels which have actually been acquired by Brazil are the *El Cid*, which has already been converted and is ready to sail at any time, the *Britannia*, which will be converted immediately, the *Destroyer*, the Yarrow torpedo boat, the *Feiseen*, and probably also the *Javelin*. These are all that have been bought so far, and it is expected that they will start together next Sunday or Monday. The only trouble that has so far developed with regard to any of them respects the dynamite boat, *Destroyer*. She belonged to the Ericsson estate, and Mr. Lassoë, one of the persons interested in that estate, started some objection to allowing her to be disposed of for the intended purpose. His objection, however, has been removed and the *Destroyer* will go south with the others.

It was supposed, further, that some difficulty might arise with regard to the securing of fighting crews for the new fleet, the foreign enlistment act forbidding crews of Americans to be taken beyond the seas to fight in an alien cause. The authorities at Washington, however, to whom the question was referred, are said to have decided that there would be no breach of the act in the raison of such crews here, provided the vessels on which they were shipped were not man-of-war. In accordance with that decision the vessels will start not

as men-of-war but as merchant vessels, their armaments being declared, we suppose, to be merely cargoes; and the fighting crews will probably be shipped by other vessels and be transshipped to the new fleet in some northern Brazilian port.

It is astonishing with what celerity the powerful Morgan Liner, *El Cid*, has been converted from a merchant-man into a man-of-war, when we consider the extent of the battery she will carry. Her armament, just put in place, comprises one 15-inch dynamite gun, one 4.7-inch, two 14-pounder and eight 6-pounder rapid-fires rifles, and two 37-millimetre revolving cannon. The 6-poinders have been places below decks at the cargo ports, the dynamite gun and the rest of the armament being put in position on deck.

The movement of the new fleet will be watched with unusual interest when they reach the scene of action, not only because they are all, save the Yarrow boat, of American build, but because the pick of the basket, the *el Cid*, is a converted cruiser, and because a dynamite gun and a submarine gun are going to be used for the first time in naval warfare. Everybody will hope, therefore, that no accident may befall any of the fleet on its southward journey, and that it may find a hostile flotilla ready to receive its attack when it reaches its destination.

194. «Melo and the Monarchists», *The Boston Daily Globe*,
7 de novembro

Afinal, Custódio de Melo é só uma marioneta nas mãos de conspiradores estrangeiros «que querem instalar uma monarquia no Brasil», afirma o quotidiano de Boston, segundo o qual Peixoto, graças aos novos navios que acaba de comprar nos Estados Unidos, «em breve, irá rebentar com ele».

It is asserted that the insurgent Melo is, after all, a tool of certain conspirators abroad who desire to set up a monarchy in Brazil.

The Duke of Montpensier is said to be at the head of these schemes, and the figure selected to take the throne is a son of Count d'Eu, a scion of the house of Louis Philippe. Montpensier is a member of the Bourbon family, and other members of that house, aided by rich Brazilian monarchists, have, it is reported, been supplying Melo with funds.

But the Peixoto government promises to trump this Bourbon card by purchasing a navy in the United States, which, if it fills expectations, will soon blow Melo clean out of the water.

If the story of monarchical intrigues is true, our gunboats should all the more be ready to put an end to this rebellion and the embargo on the world's commerce by compelling Melo do "move on".

195. *The Morning Call*, 7 de novembro

As tropas de Peixoto mataram dois marinheiros ingleses, pensando que fossem dois rebeldes. O jornalista de San Francisco critica a precipitação e a falta de profissionalismo por parte dos soldados do Governo.

Some expression of regret will have to be tendered to England by Brazil for the misadventure of mistaking a party of British bluejackets for De Melo's rebels and blowing them and a powder-magazine up together. The judicious use of a marine glass would have informed Peixoto's soldiers of the difference between the two nationalities, and it was hasty work under any circumstances to explode a mine for the annihilation of a small boating party ashore to procure sand for deck-holystoning. The explanation will be forthcoming, but England may be prompted by the misadventure to take some other action. The Brazilian was is now passing into a very fierce aspect.

196. *The Washington Post*, 7 de novembro

«A venda de navios de guerra e de munições», assim como a preparação num porto americano de uma frota de guerra para o governo brasileiro é um «assunto delicado», admite o quotidiano.

New York World: It is probable that our government cannot be justly criticized for permitting Peixoto's Government, as a "friendly power", to purchase vessels and munitions of war from our citizens. It is a delicate matter, however, to allow a fleet of war vessels to be fitted out, armed, and manned in

one of our ports and to proceed thence in search of enemy. Certainly this is as far as the administration should go in exhibiting its "friendly attitude towards Peixoto's government".

197. *St-Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 de novembro

Pode-se proteger um jornalista americano no Brasil quando este país acaba de comprar alguns navios nos Estados Unidos?

When Brazil is putting so much money into the United States Uncle Sam will find it a trifle awkward to take up the cause of the American editor in Rio who may be imprisoned for publishing an unbiased reports of the revolt.

198. «Brazil», *The Morning Call*, 8 de novembro.

O jornalista californiano pergunta-se, por um lado, se e como a doutrina Monroe poderá aplicar-se ao caso do Brasil, considerando a distância entre o Rio e Washington; e, por outro lado, se a Europa «tem o direito de interferir na política interna de uma república do continente americano». O que é certo, afirma o jornalista, é que os Estados Unidos não «hesitariam em declarar uma guerra para evitar que Cuba ou as Ilhas Havai caíssem nas mãos de uma grande potência europeia.» No caso do Brasil, fariam de tudo para «prevenir tal interferência» por parte de nações do Velho continente.

It is quite probable that Brazil will enjoy the distinction of giving body to what is known as the Monroe doctrine. In a general sense that doctrine means that European nations shall not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of American

countries. It means other things as well, but it means especially this. But what the doctrine means and what measure would be taken to enforce it are two quite different things. The United States would doubtless engage in a war to prevent either Cuba or Hawaiian Islands from falling into the hands of a great European power. Would it resist with like energy a movement on the part of more European nations to set up a new government in Brazil in the interest of the former reigning family? Brazil is so far from the United States that military necessity could not be pleaded in advocacy of the right to interfere. The port of Rio Janeiro could hardly be made a base of supplies for an enemy at war with the United States. The question of interference would therefore be considered on the fundamental principle of the right of one American power to step in between another American power and the enemies of its government. The successful assertion of such right would make the United States the greatest power on earth. It would, within the range of action it might mark out for itself, become the brain and arm of all America. While there would be no assertion of authority to concern ourselves with the domestic affairs of any American country, a limit would be placed on the foreign policy any one might see fit to adopt. The people of Brazil are doubtless divided between the Government and the insurgents. The United States might see that the latter were not placed in power through the aid of one or more European Governments, but would not attempt to force any Government upon an unwilling people. An Eastern contemporary says that "Europe has no right to interfere in the internal policy of the republics of the American continent". In spite of this positive assertion it will probably be admitted that Europe has a right to do anything she can do. International law is

not based so much on the abstract principles of justice as upon the assertion of a rule of action that can be enforced. Whether or not Europe has a right to interfere with the international policy of American republics the United States as one of these republics has a right to prevent such interference. The question after all is one of power. That the people would spring to the support on an administration that takes advanced American ground is a matter upon which a more decided opinion may be expressed. The spring would be practically unanimous.

199. Americans in Brazil», *St. Paul Daily Globe*, 8 de novembro

Face às ameaças que pesam sobre um jornalista americano no Rio, o editorialista — que cita o caso do jornalista Cutting que ficou muito tempo nas prisões mexicanas na década anterior e do barco Virginius em Cuba em 1873 — lamenta a falta de iniciativa dos diplomatas americanos para defenderem os seus cidadãos e pede ao Secretário de Estado para exercer uma forte pressão sobre o governo de Peixoto.

If the provisional government of Brazil — the Peixoto government — persists in the course it has recently adopted towards foreigners, it may become necessary for the United States government to take in hand in the existing unpleasantness in that country. It is reported from Rio Janeiro, by way of London, that the editors of foreign newspapers printed there are to be either expelled from the country or imprisoned. The decrees are especially directed

against A. J. Lamoureaux⁵³, an American citizen, editor of the *News*, of Rio de Janeiro, which published what is claimed to be an unbiased account of the revolt. One of the decrees is said to empower the Brazilian government to expel of imprison during the state of siege, and provides that the action taken be communicated to the diplomatic agent of the nation interested, when convenient.

The protection of the rights of American citizen abroad is one o the first duties of the government, yet it has been to often neglected. The apparent indifference often manifested by our officials has sled to the perpetration of outrages that brought the whole nation into disrepute in every part of the world. The most insignificant powers on the globe have no hesitated to cast our citizens into prison without due process of law. The long imprisonment of Cutting in a Mexican dungeon is the most recent case in point. He was finally released⁵⁴ and due reparation made, but not until the credit of the nation had suffered greatly. The *Virginius* affair⁵⁵ was arranged by the payment of indemnity to the families

⁵³ Trata-se de Andrew Jackson Lamoureux (1850-1928), editor de *The News*, de *The British and American Mail* e correspondente da *Reuters* no Rio. Escreveu 18 artigos para a *Encyclopaedia Britannica* de 1911, entre os quais três sobre o Brasil : Baía (estado e cidade) e sobre a cidade do Belém do Pará.

⁵⁴ A. K. Cutting foi preso a 22 de junho de 1886 por causa de um artigo publicado num jornal do Texas. Condenado a um ano de trabalhos forçados e a 6600 \$ de multa, será libertado a 23 de agosto de 1886, depois de dois meses de prisão, em grande parte devido à uma forte pressão por parte governo de Washington, durante o primeiro mandato de Glover Cleveland.

⁵⁵ Este barco, já utilizado na Guerra da Secessão, é capturado a 31 de outubro de 1873 por uma corveta espanhola e levado para Santiago de Cuba, onde 53 dos 155 passageiros, entre os quais cidadãos americanos e britânicos, são executados como piratas poucos dias depois. Em

of the victims of the cruelty of the Cubans; but had the government acted more promptly, their lives might have been spared.

It may be urged against interference in the Rio affair that the editor who falls under the ban of the Brazilian government has voluntarily expatriated himself, and is therefore not entitled to the protection of this government. There is prima facie evidence, however, that, while a resident of Brazil, he is still a citizen of the United States; and as he has committed no crime he is entitled to its protection. His offense was purely a political one.

The matter will doubtless be brought to the official attention of the state department ere long. If it shall then be clearly shown that the victim of Peixoto's decree has committed no offense other than the one noted in the dispatches, Secretary Gresham will be justified in demanding that he be given his liberty, and in enforcing that demand to the last extremity.

200. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 8 de novembro.

Esta pequena nota dá uma versão um pouco diferente da morte dos dois militares britânicos e interroga-se sobre as reações do governo de Londres.

The Navy Department has received a dispatch from a naval officer at Rio de Janeiro stating that two British naval officers, a boatswain and one sailor,

dezembro, o *Virginus* e os sobreviventes são libertados. A Espanha pagará uma indemnização de 80 000 dólares.

were killed by the explosion of a large quantity of powder belonging to the insurgents. The explosion occurred on an island in the harbor. It is possible that this event may have important results. Great Britain never submits quietly to the killing of British subjects. The chances are that she will make a prompt demand of reparation in this case, and will not be at all surprising if she makes it a pretext for demanding that hostilities in Brazil shall cease in order that commerce may be resumed.

201. *St.Louis Post-Dispatch*, 8 de novembro

Nota cómica sobre as consequências positivas para a economia americana das vendas dos navios a Peixoto.

The \$400,000,000 Brazilian dollars that have flown into the United States since the banging at Rio began ought to relieve the depression a little. If the other South American republics were as enterprising and as foolish as Brazil we might presently of our financial troubles.

202. «*The Evening Post* and Brazil», *The Sun* (N. Y.), 9 de novembro

O editorialista critica, com uma certa dose de ironia, um comentário publicado dois dias antes no Evening Post da mesma cidade, no qual reclamava que o Procurador do distrito devia interessar-se pelo que se passa na fábrica Morgan Iron Works onde se está a preparar um navio para Peixoto. Segundo The Sun, visto que Melo não é considerado como beligerante por

nenhum país, qualquer americano pode vender «navios e munições de guerra ao Presidente Peixoto como fizeram há um ano atrás».

O Evening Post, no fundo, quer que os Estados Unidos reconheçam os rebeldes brasileiros como beligerantes, mas isso «seria digno de um lunático», proclama, perentório, The Sun. Este, que recusa qualquer comparação com o que se passou na recente guerra civil no Chile, afirma que, por trás de Custódio de Melo, estão os nostálgicos do antigo regime.

O editorialista conclui de forma explicita: é graças a esta atitude firme por parte do governo de Washington que as grandes potências europeias, e nomeadamente a França, a Inglaterra e a Rússia, não apoiaram de Melo, contribuindo, dessa forma, «a fortalecer a causa republicana» no maior país da América do Sul.

It is a curious conception of international law which is propounded by the *Evening Post*. On Tuesday of this week, it said: "We think it is high time for our District Attorney to turn his attention to what is going on at the Morgan Iron Works⁵⁶ and elsewhere in the preparation of a navy for President PEIXOTO." To the enquiry what the United States District Attorney has to do with the matter, the only answer furnished is that "belligerency is a fact, and not an opinion, and the bestowal of belligerent rights is merely a convenient way of declaring one's neutrality."

An undergraduate just out of his teens, who has run over a college text book on international law, ought to know that belligerency is a technical term applied after, and not before, rebel against an established Government has been recognized as a belligerent by some foreign power. It is not a fact, but the legal

⁵⁶ Fábrica de motores de vapores marinhos situada em Nova Iorque e fundada em 1838.

construction of a fact. Until such a construction has been authoritatively pronounced, a rebel has no rights which the power against which he has revolted, or any other power, is bound to respect. It in the course of his operations he inflicts the slightest damage upon the property of a foreign power, he may by that power be treated as a pirate; and when subdued, he may be subjected to martial law by the Government which he has striven to overthrow. It follows that so long as President CLEVELAND refuses to recognize MELO and his accomplices as belligerents, our citizens have as much right to sell to President PEIXOTO vessels and munitions of war as they had a year ago.

What the *Evening Post* probably means is, not that there is at present any ground for the United States District Attorney to interfere with the sale of vessels and munitions of war to the Chief Executive of Brazil, but that President CLEVELAND ought to formally recognize MELO and his followers as belligerents, and thus afford a basis for enforcing a strict neutrality between them and the Brazilian Government. To give MELO such recognition would be to abandon a fundamental principle of our foreign policy, a principle which our bitter experience during the war of the rebellion should lead us to uphold unswervingly. In this instance, moreover, there are particularly reasons for adhering firmly to that principle. There are grounds for believing that, although MELO and his coadjutors have not yet received any overt support from, or even been recognized as belligerents by, any European power, they are receiving material assistance from the partisans of the discarded dynasty. The daughter of Dom PEDRO II, the Countess of EU, can command through her marriage the

interest of the rich Orleanist prices on behalf of a movement looking to the restoration of the monarchy at Rio de Janeiro, in the person of one of her sons. If her children were deemed unavailable on account of her reactionist tendencies and her individual unpopularity, then a son of her younger sister might be put forward as a monarchist candidate. It is certain that the sympathizer with Melo on both sides of the Atlantic are to be found mainly among those who openly or secretly regret the deposition of Dom Pedro II.

From this point of view there is no analogy between the Chilean rebellion against BALMACEDA and the present rebellion in Brazil. Since the overthrow of the Spanish domination, there has never been the ghost of a monarchical party in Chile. The factions which revolted against BALMACEDA was a devotedly attached to republican principles as was the Government which it overturned. Yet, even in that case, although our rightful determination to avert the reestablishment of monarchical institutions anywhere upon this continent was not at all in question, we adhered unwaveringly to our policy of refusing to clothe rebels with the right of belligerents. The similar stand which we have taken in relation do Brazil will probably have the effect of safeguarding the republican cause in that greatest South American communities. It is due to our wise and unyielding attitude that England, as well as France and Russia, may now be relied upon to cooperate with us to protect the republican Government of Brazil against the interposition of any European power, should this eventually be brought about by the friends of the discarded dynasty. But there is, happily, very

little danger of such interposition. Our refusal to recognize the rebels under MELO as belligerents has, in all likelihood, prevented it.

The notion that our Government at this late hour should undo all it has accomplished, by clothing Melo with belligerent rights, is worthy of a lunatic. But, until such a preposterous course is taken, we beg to inform the *Evening Post* that the United States District Attorney has no occasion "to turn his attention to what is going on at the Morgan Iron Works and elsewhere in the preparation of a navy for President PEIXOTO."

**203. «Look out for the Jobbers», *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*,
9 de novembro**

O jornalista do Missouri, que criticou a administração de Harrison durante a revolução no Havai e no Chile, escreve que é preciso ter cuidado com os «intermediários», que querem aproveitar-se das crises. Pede prudência ao governo de Washington no que diz respeito à guerra civil no Brasil: «neste caso, uma atitude amigável nem sempre se pode diferenciar duma ativa colaboração», adverte o editorialista. Por outras palavras, até se saber o resultado desta luta, a estrita neutralidade devia guiar a política externa americana.

The Brazilian revolt is unlikely to raise some delicate questions which the United States Government cannot be too careful in considering. Not only is it necessary to prevent a too demonstrative sympathy with a friendly government, but the contingency must be kept in mind that the insurgents may themselves overthrow the regular government of Brazil and set up a State of their own either

by establishing their dominion over the whole territory or by a successful secession.

Probably no question can arise over the permission given to President Peixoto to fit our warships in our harbors. The insurgents are still subject to the regular Government and in the eye of international law are not supposed to have existence. Nevertheless the situation in this respect is a delicate one and a friendly attitude in such case is not always distinguishable from active cooperation. Until the result of the contest is known the wiser policy would be to keep strictly within the latter of international law and avoid even the semblance of partiality.

There is a reason to fear that jobbers will take a hand in the struggle as they did in the Chilean and Hawaiian revolutions. The experience of the Harrison administration in these two episodes should serve as a warning. The moving cause of the Hawaiian affair was the hope entertained by speculators and adventurers that money was to be made by the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a plutocratic republic, with the annexation to the United States as a probable contingency. By its hasty action the Harrison Administration came near lending the whole influence of the United States Government to a group of individuals whose disinterestedness was open to serious question. In the Chilean war the jobber was most active and the course of this government gave rise to a scandal, besides causing a feeling of resentment among the Chileans which is likely to be long lived and perhaps active in future.

We do not want a repetition of these scandals, and as the situation in Brazil is very suggestive of the presence of similar conditions it is to be hoped that the Cleveland administration will profit by the experience of its immediate predecessor.

204. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 9 de novembro

Breve nota sobre a aquisição de novos navios por parte de Peixoto, através do seu agente Charles R. Flint.

Charles R. Flint has received advices from President Peixoto, of Brazil, which will probably be followed by the purchase of more vessels. Today Mr. Flint⁵⁷ made offers for two more. Their names could not be learned, but it is probable that they are two of the quartet composed by the *Finance*, *Advance*, *Chelsea* and *City of Washington*.

Negotiations for the purchase of these vessels have been pending for some time. Mr. Flint received word from Philadelphia today from the owners of the swift steamer *Appledore* to the effect that the vessel was on the market for conversion into a fighter.

⁵⁷ Charles Ranlett Flint (1850-1934) é um homem de negócios americano que em 1893, como agente, arranjou uma frota para o governo de Peixoto.

205. *Democrats and Chronicle*, 9 de novembro

“The rapid fitting out of a fleet in the harbor of Manhattan waters for the republic of Brazil will convey a hint of those concerned of what we might do for ourselves in case of a call to prepare for the reception of an enemy.” *Brooklyn Standard Union*

206. *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 10 de novembro

The information that France and England will not interfere in the domestic broils of Brazil was not unexpected. They have more important things to think about and watch on their own side of the water, and the experience of France in Mexico has probably inspired her with a wholesome respect for the Monroe doctrine.

207. *The San Francisco Call*, 11 de novembro

É prematuro reconhecer de Melo como beligerante, afirma o quotidiano. Com efeito, não se sabe se tem ou não apoios no país e, sobretudo, se o seu objetivo não é de restabelecer a monarquia. No entanto, a melhor coisa que os Estados Unidos podiam fazer era travar os combates e «restaurar a paz.»

It is said that de Melo is asking the powers to recognize him as a belligerent, and holds out the inducement that there will be less loss of life and

property should this course be taken. His request is a trifle premature. He has bombarded the capital and the forts around it a good deal, but that is no proof that he has a strong following in the country or will win ultimately. It would be awkward to international notions of consistency were he to be recognized and then overpowered and defeated. Peixoto's Government would then be in a position to ask for explanations with something of emphasis and scorn. In another respect [??]⁵⁸ de Melo is premature. It is by no means clear that he does not mean to restore the monarchy in Brazil. The United States, having faith in republican institutions, should have no hesitation in acting slowly if monarchy is the final aim. De Melo has been told from Washington that our Government cannot recognize him. It is ticklish work to interfere, but if the United States could strike up the arms of the combatants and restore peace the world would be our debtor.

208. *The Boston Daily Globe*, 11 de novembro

The war in Brazil still goes on, and the numbers of the living and the unwounded still continue about the same from day to day.

⁵⁸ Palavra ilegível.

209. «The Crisis in Brazil», *The New York Tribune*, 12 de novembro

O quotidiano nova-iorquino também se debruça sobre o pedido para Custódio de Melo para ser considerado um beligerante. Como muitos dos seus colegas, considera correta a resposta de Washington, porque «Peixoto é o chefe do Governo Brasileiro, de jure e de facto [...] enquanto o almirante Melo é um rebelde.»

Analisa a seguir o papel do exército e da marinha que julga negativamente, porque ambos exercem uma forte pressão no plano político: «como agente de coerção, a frota é tão feroz como o exército», sublinha o jornal.

«Para garantir um progresso político», o Brasil, como os países da América Latina, nota o jornal na conclusão, precisa «de estabilidade governativa, da construção de caminhos de ferro e de educação popular». Porém, os Estados Unidos só podem ajudar a alcançar o primeiro objetivo, «dando apoio moral, quando e onde existirem as condições para tal, aos governos existentes», contra «as insurreições revolucionárias e a anarquia».

Admiral Melo's right as a belligerent have not been recognized by the United States Government. The Cleveland Administration may modify its attitude, especially as it is probable that evidence can be supplied tending to show that the insurgents cause has the support of the reactionary factions in Brazil who favor the restoration of monarchy. If we may judge from what happened in Hawaii, the President and his Secretary of State are not unwilling to render assistance to kings and princesses who are temporarily out of employment or under a cloud, so that it is possible that Admiral Melo's demand may be honored when his credentials as a monarchist are critically examined. But at present the Washington Government is unfriendly to his pretensions. It has suspended the Admiral of the American squadron in Rio for saluting the

insurgent navy, and has not interposed any opposition to the fitting out go a fleet in this harbor for President Peixoto.

The *Tribune* has not hesitated to express approval of the Administration's policy in dealing with the Brazilian complications. Admiral Melo, entirely apart from the question of reactionary intrigues in favor of the restoration of monarchy, is not supported by either house of the Brazilian Congress, nor by the Supreme Court. He is a naval officer in revolt against a constitutional Government, and can have no moral claim to recognition as a belligerent. President Peixoto vetoed a measure which had passed both branches of Congress; but when he did so he exercised his constitutional rights precisely as many American Presidents have done. He is the head of the Brazilian Government, de jure and de facto, and a majority in both house of Congress are behind him in his attempt to suppress a naval rebellion. Undoubtedly he has made grave mistakes in his administration of public affairs; presumably he is candidate for re-election, and counts upon having the support of the army; but these are matters of which the Washington Government is not called upon to take cognizance. The essential fact is that President Peixoto stands for constitutional government of Brazil, whereas Admiral Melo is a rebel.

The army is often a disturbing force in the Southern republics. It enables presidents, dictators and ruling cliques of military politicians to garrison the capitals and chief cities, and not infrequently to carry elections by force and fraud and to perpetuate their power. Unquestionably military government is one of the chief evils in these tropical countries especially as it prevents the normal

development of republican institutions and restrains the rightful liberties of the people. So long as military coercion is employed in influencing legislation and popular elections, democratic government will continue to be in greater or less degree a failure in tropical America. The only practical substitute for it is the education of the masses by which the moral forces of public opinion will be formed and brought to bear upon politics. Progress in that direction is slow and laborious, but those who are most thoroughly conversant with Brazil and the Spanish republics find much ground for encouragement in the gradual increase of intelligence and public enlightenment.

The navy, it is true, performed a useful function in Chile in supporting the Congressional cause and in accomplishing the overthrow of Balmaceda. Its success in that instance offers no warrant for the belief that politics in the Southern republics can be purified by the constant intervention of naval officers. As an agency of coercion a fleet is every whit as vicious as an army. It can never be a substitute for enlightened public opinion, without which the best constitutional system is worth little. The success of Admiral Melo, even if it may not involve the restoration of monarchy in Brazil, will inevitably array one arm of the service against the other, and increase immeasurably the difficulties of constitutional government. The new Government when established would be at the mercy of a fleet which might menace Rio with bombardment at any time.

The chief thing which the Southern countries require in order to secure political progress are stability of government, construction of railways and popular education. The United States Government can minister directly to only

one of these objects. It can neither build railways nor open schools, but it can lend moral support wherever and whenever the conditions allow it to do so, to existing Governments, and in that way tend to repress revolutionary outbreaks and political anarchy. That is the plain duty of the Cleveland Administration in the present Brazilian crisis.

210. «The Brazilian Trouble», *The Daily Picayune*, 12 de novembro

A situação militar evolui muito lentamente no Brasil, assinala o jornal que fala dos fracassos recentes de Custódio de Melo (perdeu um navio, um armazém de pólvora, e não lhe foi reconhecido o estatuto de beligerante). O chefe dos insurretos, todavia, não sofreu grandes derrotas.

A seguir, o editorialista avalia o número e a força das duas frotas, incluindo já os navios que Peixoto acaba de comprar e que estão prestes a deixar os Estados Unidos.

Apesar de tudo, o jornal da Luisiana tem de admitir que não vai ser fácil para o chefe do executivo brasileiro desalojar os rebeldes da baía do Rio de Janeiro, onde vai haver «algumas interessantes batalhas navais».

Events have moved but slowly of late in Brazil, and, if the dispatches which have reached the outside world are to be accepted as a truthful account of what has transpired, it would seem that the revolutionist have slightly lost ground. They have recently lost several powder magazines, and one of their torpedo boats has come to grief, having been sunk during an attack upon the defense of Niteroi.

Admiral Melo has also failed in his efforts to secure recognition as a belligerent. The Spanish Government, to which he applied for such recognition, has refused to accede to his request, and, more recently, the Government in Washington has also refused a similar application made through the United States Minister at Rio, although Secretary Gresham couple the refusal with the assurance that the United States desired to maintain the position of an impartial observer.

While, however, the revolutionists have failed to make progress, they have met no serious reverses. Their attempts to silence the forts in the harbor of Rio have not been successful, it is true, but at the same time they have apparently found no difficulty in securing provisions and maintaining communication with the outside world. Apparently they maintain entire control of the State of Santa Catarina, and they have also made progress in the State of Rio Grande do Sul. On the other hand, President Peixoto's agents have been actively at work organizing a naval force. The ironclad *Bahia*, which has been aground for some time, has been floated, and the *Tiradentes*, a protected cruiser, is in readiness at Montevideo to start northward as soon as the fleet being prepared in the United States is ready to proceed to Brazil.

The work of converting the steamships purchased by President Peixoto's agents in this country into warships is proceeding rapid in New York harbor, and it is thought that the fleet will be in readiness to sail by the middle of the present month. This squadron will consist of the large vessels *El Cid* and *Britannia* and three smaller vessels. These ships are now being armed. The main equipment

will consist of dynamite guns of doubtful value, torpedo and small rapid-fire and machine guns. It has been necessary to confine the armament to this class of guns because high-powered field cannon are impossible to be obtained in the United States on short notice.

With all the ships at his command gathered together, President Peixoto will have a fleet composed of the turret ship *Bahia*, the protected cruiser *Tiradentes*, the armed transports *Santos* and *Desterro*, the ships now fitting out in New York and a few small gunboats. He also counts on the ironclad *Riachuelo* and the *Benjamin Constant*, now undergoing repairs at Toulouse, France; but their loyalty is doubtful, and in any event they cannot be got ready for sea for some time. Admiral Melo has at his command five fine ironclads, four modern cruisers, several gunboats, about a dozen torpedo boats and a number of merchant steamers, some of them large and fine vessels, armed as auxiliary cruisers.

It will thus be seen that President Peixoto will have no slight task on his hands in dislodging Melo from his position before Rio de Janeiro. In any event, there are likely to be some interesting naval fights in Brazilian waters before the existing troubles are settled.



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Backed by a Squadron of Several For-
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THE BAY OF RIO DE JANEIRO.

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FEAR AND ANXIETY IN WASHINGTON



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
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