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GOLPE E QUEDA DE DEODORO NA IMPRENSA NORTE-AMERICANA



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RETO MONICO

**GOLPE E QUEDA DE DEODORO NA
IMPrensa NORTE-AMERICANA
(NOVEMBRO DE 1891)**





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
GOLPE E QUEDA DE DEODORO NA IMPRESA NORTE-AMERICANA (NOVEMBRO DE 1891)



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Apresentação

Este volume apresenta a opinião da imprensa dos Estados-Unidos sobre o golpe e a queda de Deodoro da Fonseca em novembro de 1891¹. Entre os numerosos periódicos publicados neste país, tentámos escolher os quotidianos mais importantes e que mais espaço dedicam à política estrangeira em geral e ao Brasil em particular. Os jornais americanos debruçam-se sobre a crise da jovem república com manchetes e comentários. São essencialmente estas análises que reproduzimos neste volume.

Os pontos de vista, tal como na imprensa da Europa Ocidental, variam: alguns condenam duramente o golpe liberticida do Marechal; outros tentam justificar a tentativa autoritária do primeiro Presidente da República do Brasil; outros ainda veem a mão dos nostálgicos de Dom Pedro por trás desta instabilidade institucional, e alguns diários até dão créditos aos boatos que circulam sobre a altamente improvável viagem do neto de D. Pedro II ao Brasil com o objetivo de retomar o trono. Finalmente – e este aspeto é algo que os diferencia da imprensa francófona – um número significativo de jornalistas acusam a Inglaterra de querer desestabilizar o novo regime implantado no Rio de Janeiro dois anos antes.

¹ Para uma introdução histórica, cf. MONICO, Reto. *Golpe e Queda de Deodoro na imprensa francófona*. Lisboa/Rio Grande: CLEPUL/Biblioteca Rio-Grandense, 2020, p. 9-17. (Coleção documentos, n.º 27)

Com efeito, na opinião destes analistas, defensores da doutrina Monroe, os ingleses tudo fizeram e fazem para se oporem ao Tratado comercial entre o Brasil e os Estados-Unidos promulgado a 5 de fevereiro de 1891, porque este põe em causa os seus interesses e sua hegemonia no maior país da América Latina. Por conseguinte, não são raros os artigos onde se fala, sem meios termos, do apetite do lucro, das intrigas dos ingleses «metediços» e da ingerência direta de Londres e dos seus agentes para lutar contra Deodoro da Fonseca e o regime republicano. Tal como o chileno Balmaceda, o presidente brasileiro é considerado um grande amigo de Washington.

Para enfrentarem esta hipotética ameaça das potências europeias, os periódicos republicanos sublinham a imperiosa necessidade para os Estados Unidos de terem uma frota moderna e poderosa. Censuram o Partido Democrático e os seus órgãos de imprensa, por estes combaterem os créditos militares necessários à marinha militar e também porque manifestam opiniões demasiado favoráveis aos interesses ingleses.

Encontram-se igualmente comentários que criticam o peso do militarismo – embora o achem às vezes imprescindível para manter a ordem – nas antigas colónias espanholas e portuguesas. Comparando com os povos de origem germânica, julgam, sem conseguir dissimular um certo sentimento de superioridade, que os da América Central e do Sul não têm ainda o nível educacional e cívico suficiente para viverem num regime democrático como o dos Estados Unidos. Contrariamente ao Chile, o Brasil, onde a república foi proclamada praticamente sem luta, não constitui uma exceção.

Os jornalistas americanos – que lamentam a falta de informação e a censura – tratam de outros aspetos e acontecimentos que suscitam também, como já vimos no nosso estudo sobre a imprensa francófona, a atenção dos periódicos do velho continente, nomeadamente as revoltas em alguns estados mais desenvolvidos e a eventualidade de uma divisão do país. No entanto, em relação aos seus colegas europeus, os analistas do outro lado do Atlântico não insistem tanto sobre estes perigos.

Por outro lado, e contrariamente à imprensa suíça e francesa, a crise financeira e a desastrosa política monetária do governo brasileiro são evocadas por poucos órgãos de imprensa norte-americanos. Esta fraca análise da inflação e as duras acusações à política britânica no Brasil constituem as duas grandes diferenças em relação aos comentários publicados pelos jornais francófonos de referências.

A queda do Marechal suscita um menor número de comentários, o mesmo verifica-se com a imprensa europeia. Em geral, os jornalistas americanos ficam satisfeitos com esta mudança muito rápida, que comparam com a de 15 de novembro de 1889, sem derramamento de sangue, contrariamente ao que aconteceu pouco tempo antes no Chile.

Uma parte dos analistas critica duramente Deodoro, um tirano que queria concentrar todo o poder nas suas mãos. Outros, ao contrário, defendem-no:

sublinham o facto que, abandonando o poder, o ex-Presidente evitou uma longa e sangrenta guerra civil ao seu país.

Quase todos constatam que não houve nenhum estado que fez secessão e que os filo-monárquicos não tiveram nenhum peso no desenrolar dos acontecimentos. Todos desejam um pronto regresso aos princípios constitucionais e que as relações entre os dois países continuem a progredir. Esperam vivamente que, apesar das manobras dos ingleses, o Tratado comercial de 31 de janeiro entre os Estados Unidos e o Brasil continue em vigor.

Existe muita prudência no que diz respeito a Floriano Peixoto : os editorialistas, antes de dar a sua opinião, preferem esperar para ver o que vai decidir. Finalmente, se alguns jornais pessimistas preveem uma sangrenta guerra civil, uma pequena maioria dos observadores norte-americanos consideram estes acontecimentos como uma passagem obrigatória numa fase de amadurecimento do novo regime. Estes jornalistas sabem que o processo será demorado, mas têm a certeza que, a médio e sobretudo a longo prazo, o Brasil terá um regime republicano forte e democrático, como o da grande República da América do Norte².

² Quero agradecer ao Francisco Matta pela atenta revisão dos textos em português.

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Capítulo 1

O Golpe

REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL

THE NEW REPUBLIC IN CONTROL
OF A DICTATOR.

THE CONGRESS SAID TO HAVE BEEN
DISSOLVED AND MARTIAL LAW PRO-
CLAIMED AT RIO DE JANEIRO—BAD
FINANCIAL METHODS RESPONSIBLE.

The New York Times, 5 de nov.

BRAZIL'S DICTATOR.

News of the Proclamation of Martial
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STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY BETWEEN DA
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The St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 5 de nov.

PERTURBED BRAZIL.

Martial Law Has Been
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Belief That the Trouble Is Being
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San Francisco Chronicle, 6 de nov.

CONSPIRING AGAINST FONSECA

Revolutionary Movement in Brazil En-
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The Indianapolis Journal, 7 de nov.

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THE RUMORS OF TROUBLE IN
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A Quarrel Between the President
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Appeal to the People.

The Difficulties Said to Have Been Fomented
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New American Treaty.

The Wichita Daily Eagle, 6 de nov.

MARTIAL LAW

Still Prevails in Rio.

Censorship Now Placed Over
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The Whole Trouble Caused By
Jealousy

Between President Da Fonseca
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Prominent Imperialists Confer
With the Dictator.

Dom Pedro, in Paris, Talks About
Brazilian Affairs.

He Speaks Feelingly of the Prospects
of Restoration of the Empire.

The Chincinnati Inquirer, 6 de nov.

O Golpe de Deodoro nas primeiras páginas

1. *New York Times*, 5 de novembro

Este editorial sintetiza a opinião de dois brasileiros que vivem nos Estados Unidos. O primeiro sublinha a desastrosa política financeira; o segundo fala numa restauração da monarquia.

There is a startling news again from Brazil. The Congress has been “discharged” martial law has been established, and the President of the republic has become a dictator. Meanwhile the statement made by the lead of a prominent Brazilian house in this city, which will be found in another column, is extremely interesting. He attributes the present troubles to the financial policy of the new Government the chief feature of which was an enormous issue of irredeemable paper currency, under the weight of which exchange has fallen from par (27d.) to 12 ½ d., that is to say to 46 cents to the dollar. The result was an enormous speculation the rapid and great advance in cost of all the necessaries of life, and incalculable confusion and distress. It is also stated that a prominent Brazilian in this country said only a week ago that he should not be surprised to see the Government go to pieces and a military Government set up, with a possibility of the restoration of the empire under Dom PEDRO’S eldest son³. That would be a curious ending of the career of the new republic, which was received with so hearty a welcome only two years ago.

³ Temos de ler «grandson» (neto). Os dois filhos do ex-imperador morrem em julho de 1847 e em fevereiro de 1850.

2. «Trouble in Brazil», *The Washington Post*, 5 de novembro

Brevíssimo editorial no qual se fala das divergências entre Deodoro e o Congresso e das diferenças entre as condições sociopolíticas nos Estados Unidos e nas repúblicas irmãs da América do Sul.

The Republic of Brazil, which succeeded to the Empire in November, 1889, and the constitution of which was adopted some months later, is said to be in a state of revolutionary disturbance, arising here, as was the case of Chile, out of disagreements between the Congress and the President. The details of the movement are too meager at present to permit of any clear judgment as to the seriousness of the situation, but the general hope of the people of the United States will be that first reports may be exaggerated and that the stability of the new government is not dangerously threatened.

We have been so accustomed to internal dissensions among our Republican brethren of South America that they have ceased to be surprises, and it sometimes seems that one Pan-American principle which the United States has sought in various way to promote is not easily adaptable to conditions that exist among the Spanish-speaking⁴ countries of the Southern half of the continent.

⁴ Notar-se-á que o jornalista fala como se o Brasil fosse também um país de língua castelhana.

3. «Rumored Trouble in Brazil», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 5 de novembro.

O jornalista, que tem algumas dúvidas sobre a veracidade das informações – até escreve que pode ser «uma notícia falsa espalhada por ingleses ciumentos» – não parece muito preocupado com o que está eventualmente a acontecer no Brasil: por um lado, estes golpes e revoluções são uma das características da América Latina; por outro lado, não é preciso alar-mar-se: nada vai mudar nas relações comerciais entre as duas grandes repúblicas do Novo Continente: «mesmo um ditador não vai entrar em conflito com os Estados Unidos» porque sabe «que tem pouco a ganhar e muito a perder».

It is to be hoped that the dispatch which announces the breaking out of a fresh revolution in Brazil and the establishment of a Dictatorship for that country is unfounded, or, at least, exaggerated. A similar report a few days ago was based on local riots in Rio Janeiro, which had no national importance, and the present may be nothing more serious. People who believe in the principles of self-government will be slow to credit the Dictatorship part of the story, at least unless it is confirmed by later and more authentic news.

Nevertheless, it would not be at all surprising if the all account were true. It runs in the vein of Latin-American character. There is not much difference between the Portuguese-American in Brazil and the Spanish-American in the neighboring countries, among whom it is common enough for revolution to establish republics, the Presidents of which lose no time in settling themselves up as Dictators. None of them, as yet, have succeeded in doing as well for

themselves as the two NAPOLEONS, who made themselves first Dictators and then Emperors in France; but the principle is the same, and it is to the credit of the people, not the official, that before an Empire can be established a fresh revolution overthrows the Dictator and the country becomes a republic again.

A process of this kind may be reasonably expected in Brazil. Political changes in countries like that are like the geological changes in the earth's surface, a series of elevations and depressions, often repeated several times before the mass settles into a state of quiescence. If anybody has set himself up as a Dictator of Brazil, the occurrence is unfortunate for that country, as it will retard its development and the progress of trade; but the change will not be permanent. There will be another revolution, by and by, which will restore the republic. The state of equilibrium to which the political oscillations tend is one of self-government.

The immediate interest of the United States in the matter is in its relation to the reciprocity treaty. It is too soon to express an opinion on that subject; but there seems to be no reason to apprehend serious difficulty. No unfriendly feeling toward this country has been shown by either government or the people of Brazil, and though a Dictator is an autocrat, whose movements are not to be predicted, still is no occasion to borrow trouble on the subject. Merchants will, of course, be cautious about their shipments until affairs quiet down and the policy of the new government – if there is a new government – is declared; but even a Dictator will not feel like quarreling with the United States in a matter where he has so little to gain and so much to lose by such a course.

And, after all, the whole story may be a canard sent out by jealous Englishmen. That country doesn't like the way we are making progress in Brazil

4. *The News and Observer*, 5 de novembro

The cable brings us news that the new Republic of Brazil has gone to follow the Empire it suddenly supplanted. When they told Dom Pedro that his people did not want him, the king old gentleman, though greatly mortified, took off his hat and bade them an affectionate farewell. Two years hardly elapsed and the Republic has now fallen before a revolution, martial law is proclaimed, and the whilom President has constituted himself a dictator. In those South American countries governments succeed each other rapidly.

5. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 5 de novembro

Os acontecimentos no Brasil provam que «as raças latino-americanas não se adaptam à forma de governo republicano» como o entendem os norte-americanos.

The report of another revolution in Brazil comes very unexpectedly, as there has been no intimation of impending trouble there. It is likely, however, to have some foundation, as it comes by way of London, the channel through which we get all our Brazilian news. The dispatch says that martial law has

been proclaimed at Rio Janeiro and throughout the provinces and a dictatorship declared. If this proves true it will go far to justify the belief that the Latin-American races are not adapted for republican government as we understand it.

6. *New York Times*, 6 de novembro

Breve análise, apressada e demasiado otimista, do jornalista novaiorquino que considera o golpe de Deodoro como um «acidente».

There is no definitive news of what has been going on in Brazil for the simple reason that the "Government" does not allow any to be sent. Commercial correspondents are allowed to cable only purely business matters, and are forbidden to use a cipher. That the Congress has been turned out is pretty certain, and it is pretty certain, and it is "officially" announced that President FONSECA is to call on the nation to elect new Representatives. Meanwhile, the relative steadiness of business operations is fairly conclusive that the revolution is not regarded in Brazil as much more than an incident in public affairs.

7. «The Crisis in Brazil», *New-York Tribune*, 6 de novembro

O jornalista apresenta a crise como um conflito de tipo constitucional entre Deodoro e o Parlamento e compara-a com a situação vivida no Chile. As

divergências entre os dois poderes no que diz respeito à emissão de notas é justamente apontado como um ponto central deste conflito.

Depois de ter explicado as influências exercidas pelo modelo americano, preferido ao francês durante a elaboração da nova Constituição e de ter elogiado o facto dos brasileiros terem adoptado um «sistema liberal e progressista», o editorialista afirma a sua convicção que tudo irá volver à normalidade.

The dispatches from Brazil, while vague and inconclusive, indicate a constitutional crisis analogous in some respect to that which has recently involved civil war in Chile. Various issues have arisen between the Executive Government and Congress, grounded principally upon the financial condition of the country. The President and his Ministers have made recommendations which has been rejected by the legislators. Congress has passed measures which have been vetoed by the President. Finally, an act was adopted regulating the procedure whenever a President was subjected to impeachment proceedings. When this was returned with a message of Executive disapproval it was passed over the veto. The President thereupon dissolves Congress, proclaimed martial law, put the military forces in possession of the public buildings and has now ordered a new election. The summary of the situation reveals many points of similarity between the Brazilian crisis and the recent conflict of the Executive and legislative powers in Chile.

The financial difficulties lying behind this sudden and rather obscure rupture between President Fonseca and Congress can be briefly explained. Before the revolution the paper currency of Brazil, while irredeemable in gold,

strangely enough commanded a premium in exchange owing to the enormous volume of exports for which foreign settlements had to be made. The provisional Government spared no effort at the outset to keep the paper *milreis* at par, and was successful for many months owing to the recent refunding of the national debt and other favorable conditions. The fatal mistake was made of organizing a new bank empowered to issue \$ 250,000,000 of paper. The inflation of the currency inevitably involved depreciation of the rates of exchange, increased cost of living, and a buoyant speculative movement. During the first half of this year hundreds of banks, mining companies and industrial syndicates were formed, and a large amount of capital was locked up in project of questionable value. Brazil was rapidly drifting into another Argentine crisis when Congress intervened to limit the issue of paper and thereby to restore the value of the *milreis* in foreign exchange. Differences respecting the best methods of counteracting the evil of inflation and reckless speculation have finally led up through other controversies to a constitutional crisis.

When the constitution-makers were at work a year ago there was a marked divergence of view respecting the Executive functions. Those republicans who were conversant with the French political system desired to imitate it, and to arm the legislators with full power to control the action of the Ministry. The military party, whose champion was President Fonseca, insisted upon releasing the Administration from dependence upon legislative votes. The latter view prevailed. The American system was closely followed, the

separation of the legislative and executive function being complete. Both the President in the exercise of his veto powers and Congress in enacting financial and impeachment measures have acted in conformity with their constitutional rights. The dissolution of a Congress elected for a fixed term appears to have been an unconstitutional act, explicable only upon the theory that the President has had recourse to the same vicious expedients which other military Executives have often adopted in Spanish America.

A nation which has been misgoverned for generations can only work out its salvation in fear and trembling. Brazil, while it adopted last year an enlightened and progressive scheme of republican government, entered upon the struggle from darkness into light from which few countries in Spanish America have wholly emerged. Americans, who have been most favorably impressed with the patriotism of the President and with the civic courage of the Brazilian people, will watch the constitutional conflict with eager interest and a tranquil feeling of confidence that public order will be maintained, civil war averted and the principles of progressive republicanism resolutely defended.

8. «The News from Brazil», *The Sun*, 6 de novembro

O jornalista, segundo o qual não é possível saber se Deodoro ultrapassou os seus poderes sem analisar a lei, expõe as duas respostas possíveis: o Congresso pode ser dissolvido, e, neste caso, o marechal agiu no respeito da lei; no caso contrário, da Fonseca agiu como Luís Napoleão em dezembro de 1851. Os Estados Unidos lamentariam a criação de uma ditadura

no Rio, também porque isto daria ainda mais argumentos aos «reacionários», segundo os quais o Brasil «não está ainda preparado» para viver num república e que desejam um regresso da monarquia no Brasil».

Embora ache que Deodoro utilizou um pretexto para esmagar a oposição, o articulista tem uma visão muito positiva do marechal-presidente, considerado, tal como Balmaceda, um amigo dos Estados Unidos. O marechal, diz o jornal, teve um papel importante na assinatura do tratado de comércio entre os dois países de janeiro de 1891, o que não foi do agrado dos ingleses. É por isso que a imprensa americana tem de ter todo o cuidado com as informações vindas da Londres.

De qualquer forma, desde há dois anos, o Brasil produziu «só um grande homem, a saber, o Marechal Fonseca» que tudo fez para «manter a ordem e um governo de paz». Quando ele desaparecer, o Brasil vai entrar «num período desastroso de desintegração e de anarquia», conclui o editorialista, o qual tem a certeza que o presidente, como apoio da marinha e do exército, irá organizar e ganhar as eleições.

Before deciding whether the seeming *coup d'état* at Rio Janeiro should be condemned or condoned, we should need to know whether the Brazilian Congress was proceeding within its constitutional rights when it passed the measures which provoked the executive to dissolve it. Such knowledge is not easily attainable, for we doubt whether there exists in the United States a single trustworthy copy of the Constitution⁵ under which Brazil has been governed for about a year.

⁵ No dia seguinte *The New York Tribune* afirma que eles tinham quatro exemplares da Constituição brasileira de 1891, enviada «a todos os principais jornais» americanos. Então deve ter sido o gado de *The Sun* que tinha muita fome e que comeu o texto : «*Our usually wide-awake neighbor, The Sun, expressed doubt whether exists in the United States a single trustworthy copy of the Constitution under which Brazil has been governed for about a year. In this office*

If we had before us the text of the Brazilian organic law, we could see at a glance whether the Congress was authorized to pass a bill defining the method of impeaching the President, and whether, when that bill was vetoed, it had the power to override the veto. Essential also to an impartial judgment would be the knowledge whether in Brazil, as in England and many other countries, the Congress is dissolvable at the discretion of the executive, or whether, as in the United States, it sits for a definite unbridgeable term. That the Brazilian President has the right of veto is certain, for during the present session of the Congress he has sent back, unsigned, many of its measures, and for doing this has never been accused of violating the law. We may also pronounce it highly that in Brazil, as in the United States, there is a provision of overriding the veto through a large preponderance of adverse votes in both houses of the legislature. Assuming that to be the case, we should have to fall back to the fundamental question. Is the Chilean Congress, like the British Parliament, dissolvable at the will of the executive? If it is, then the course pursued by President FONSECA could no be described as revolutionary, for it would simply result in the election of a new Congress, and the proclamation of martial law might be justified as a precaution taken to assure peace and order pending the election of a new legislature. If, on the other hand, the President had no

we have as many as four copies of the authorized text. The consular report have contained the full text as transmitted by the American Minister, and Bulletin n. 7 of the Bureau of American Republics under the title of "Brazil" reproduces the Constitution as adopted February 24, 1891. The Sun's office cat must have had a voracious appetite since the election, for these publications were undoubtedly sent to all the principal journals in the country».

constitutional right to dissolve the Brazilian Congress, which could only expire at the end of the term fixed by organic law, then he has undoubtedly been guilty of a *coup d'état* substantially identical with that accomplished in France by LOUIS NAPOLEON on Dec. 2, 1851. In the latter event not only has the legislature been extinguished, but the Constitution has been set at naught, and there is at this moment in Brazil a relapse to the state of things which existed immediately after the dethronement of Dom PEDRO II. That is to say, there remains no source of authority except the personal volition of Marshal DEODORO DA FONSECA, transformed from a constitutional President into a self-appointed dictator, who relies for his support not on the votes of the people, but on the army and navy.

If such be the right construction of the reports from Rio Janeiro, the quarrel between Brazil's executive and legislature would excite regret in the United States. The fact that republican institutions have not been made to work smoothly even for a twelvemonth will encourage the reactionists, who have always maintained that the Brazilian are no as yet fit for self-government, and that they must eventually revert to the imperialist régime. As was pointed out at the time of the overthrow of Dom PEDRO II., the Brazilian provinces had never possessed powers analogous to those of our separate States, and therefore never acquired the habit of managing their own concerns. With such traditions of dependence the danger was that a Brazilian republic would be modeled not on the federal plan, like the United States and Switzerland, but on a centralized pattern presented by France. The latter type of commonwealth,

through lodging almost overwhelming powers in the hands of the executive, offers strong temptation to suppress legislative opposition by a *coup d'état*, while, on the other hand, it leaves the spokesman of the several provinces without any means of organizing local resistance. It seems that president Fonseca has seized the first plausible pretext for crushing at one blow the opponents who have for some months been thwarting his proposal in the legislature.

It cannot, however, be denied that President FONSECA, has done much to win the sympathy of the United States. Whatever may be said of the agencies through which he originally became dictator, and of the motives which prompted him to delay the framing of a Constitution, it is certain that from the outset he has shown himself much more desirous of securing the friendship of the Washington Government than that of the British Foreign Office. To him we owe the assent of Brazil of the reciprocity treaty with his country, which unquestionably threatens the age long control of Brazilian markets by Great Britain. By this and many other indications of pro-American sympathies, President FONSECA, like the late President BALMACEDA, has excited the dislike of Englishmen, and consequently any comments on his conduct which reach us from English sources should be regarded with some suspicion.

If we are right in assuming that what has taken place in Rio Janeiro is analogous to the *coup d'état* of LOUIS NAPOLEON, and involves a suspension of the lately constructed Constitution, it follows that President FONSECA will promulgate shortly the outlines of a new organic law, under which either a

Constitutional Convention will be convoked or an ordinary Congress will be chosen. The former expedient will probably be adopted, since Marshal FONSECA would naturally wish to obtain at least a semblance of constitutional sanction for his assertion of dictatorial authority and to define beforehand the limitations of the power of Congress. So long as he retains the confidence of the army and navy – and he still seems to do – he will in all likelihood be able so to influence the elections as to assure the return of a Constitutional Convention favorable to his conception of a President's prerogatives. One thing seems evident, that the fermentation experienced in Brazil since the overthrow of the Empire has thus far produced only one strong man, to wit, Marshal FONSECA, on whose shoulders has seemed to rest the chief hope of maintaining an orderly and peaceful government. There is too much reason to fear that on his disappearance from the stage would ensue a disastrous epoch of disintegration and anarchy.

9. «Crisis in Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 6 de novembro

O que se passa no Brasil pode pôr em causa o próprio regime, sublinha o analista, que põe em relevo os muitos protestos e resistências, no Rio e nas províncias, face a este golpe. O mesmo lamenta o sucedido, porque isso põe em causa as relações comerciais americano-brasileiras e a prosperidade do Brasil que «nunca esteve em melhores condições do que agora». Deseja um rápido regresso à normalidade constitucional. Caso contrário, poder-se-á dizer que o país não está ainda pronto para viver num regime democrático, conclui o jornalista.

The crisis in Brazil threatens seriously the stability of Republican institutions in that often distracted country. Less than two years have passed in the deposition of Dom Pedro, his exile and the establishment of General da Fonseca in the presidency. Now General da Fonseca has dissolved congress, proclaimed himself dictator and declared martial law. He claims that the dissolution of congress was provoked and justified by the action of that body in passing laws contrary to the constitution, announces his intention to be guided by his constitutional obligations and insists that he has acted entirely with a view to defending the best interest of the nation. For the time being he regards a limited dictatorship essential to the maintenance of order and the preservation of a republican form of government in Brazil.

That the course of President da Fonseca is not wholly in harmony with the sentiment of his countrymen is evident from the uprising which immediately followed. It has been necessary to put Rio Janeiro in a state of siege, to bring the army in to action for the suppression of rebellion and to compose hostile demonstration even in the ranks of the soldiery. At the capital serious encounters are anticipated. In the provinces several have already taken place. The state of Rio Grande do Sul is in rebellion against da Fonseca and there is every indication of a general armed conflict. The outbreak recalls, at its exception, the circumstances which led up to the recent civil war in Chile. Whether the merits of the dispute are with the executive or the disbanded congress cannot at present be determined. But there can be little doubt that

Brazil is on the verge of a combat that threatens the very existence of the country. What the upshot will be is not yet open eve to conjecture.

The outbreak in Brazil is to be regretted for the reason that it threatens the serious interruption of our commercial relations with the populous and enterprising country. Account form the perturbed capital agree that in material prosperity Brazil was never in better condition than it is today. That the wheels of progress should be blocked so inopportunately by usurpation or revolution is the irony of fate. In the overthrow and exile of Dom Pedro the country dispensed with Monarchy in the most moderate and acceptable form it has anywhere assumed. Whether the Brazilians would not have better sustained the empire under the kindly dispensation of the dethroned ruler than to have embarked prematurely on an experiment of self government is a question which will be answered in the negative if peace, on a constitutional bases, is not soon restored.

10. «Brazil's Revolution», *The Times Democrats*, 6 de novembro

Depois de uma apresentação um pouco confusa dos factos na origem do golpe do Marechal, o jornalista faz uma comparação entre a situação do Brasil durante o reinado de D. Pedro II e aquela de tumultos e de ditadura em que vive agora. Na sua opinião, é preciso tempo e um longo período de dificuldades e de discórdia, para que o povo que passa de um império a uma república comece a tomar as suas responsabilidades.

Brazil seems to have gone into the revolution business as regularly as its sister States of South America. There has been more or less disturbances there ever since Dom Pedro was banished, and martial law has been several times necessary. It will be remembered that when Fonseca came to power, through the military uprising in Rio Janeiro, he was opposed to put constitutional government into operation at once, on the ground that the people were not prepared for it. He delayed it for more than a year, and even when the people were invited to cast their votes on the new constitution, some fourteen months ago, Fonseca expressed his doubts whether the election was not premature.

These doubts were apparently well founded, for after several minor outbreaks, a serious riot has occurred, in which a number of life have been lost and many people injured, and which is regarded as so critical that the government has deemed it necessary to enforce martial law and to have a large force of soldiers patrolling the streets. It is reported that a dictatorship will be created, and the new republic of Brazil will be as suddenly abolished as it was erected. There seem, moreover, to be some financial troubles down there, despite assurances to the contrary, the exact import of which it is impossible to give.

We hear the news with regret, for it is certainly a slur on republican government. It is impossible not to draw comparison between the government as it existed under Dom Pedro, liberal yet conservative, free from disturbances, riots and revolutions, and the so-called republic, which has drifted in a so short time into a riot and a dictatorship. The fault, however, must not be laid at the

door of republican government, but the people of Brazil must bear the responsibility. There seems to be something in the air or blood which makes stable and constitutional government difficult in South America, and it will take a long education to make the people capable of it as it has taken in Mexico. Few countries can step from an empire to a republic without years of trouble and discord

11. «Brazil's Revolution», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 6 de novembro

Surpreendido com os factos, apesar de emitir algumas reservas quanto à veracidade dos telegramas enviados da capital carioca e de Valparaíso, o jornalista californiano compara a situação do Brasil a do Chile antes da recente guerra civil. Finalmente, pensa que os povos da América Latina são como os vulcões: «ficam quietos só durante um certo tempo e depois tem de vir uma erupção».

A dispatch has been received in London from Rio Janeiro saying that Congress had been dissolved and martial law proclaimed in the city and throughout the provinces. A further dispatch announced that a dictatorship had been established in Brazil. While the exact reason of the crisis in unknown in London is asserted; has it is due to the action of the Brazilian Congress in passing a bill depriving the President of the right of veto.

This is the first that has been known of any general hostility to the Government or of any serious quarrel between the President and Congress. It had been supposed that the new republic was going along smoothly, except for

the occasional grumblings and mutterings of the adherents of Dom Pedro, who, of course, would not be satisfied with anything which the republican authorities might do. To learn that there is such intensity of hostility between the President and Congress as to lead to the proclamation of martial law and the assumption of dictatorship by anyone is certainly very astonishing.

All that can be said at this time is that if the dispatched received in London from Rio Janeiro are not more reliable than those from Valparaiso it is safe to discount the story they tell to a very large extent. It may be that this revolt is like the one which was attempted in Paraguay, which lasted only one day, but the dissolution of Congress, presumably by force, would seem to indicate a conditions of things resembling that which led to the overthrow of Balmaceda in Chile.

It seems as though revolutions in the South American countries moved in cycles. For a long time, until quite recently, there has been very little disturbances, even the deposition of Dom Pedro in Brazil being a bloodless revolution, but lately there have been wars and rumors of war on every hand. Apparently the Latin races in South America partake of the nature of the Andean volcanoes; they can remain quiescent only about so long, and then there must come an eruption.

12. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 6 de novembro

Duro ataque contra os métodos usados pelos comerciantes britânicos na América do Sul, nomeadamente no Chile e no Brasil.

When the English cannot get the trade of a country in any other manner they proceed to get up a row, in which their commercial rivals in some mysterious way manage to get the worst of it. It has been openly charged that the British traders are at the bottom on the difficulty in Chile, and it is intimated that one of these days we will hear a similar story from Brazil. The English are not able to get up a scheme of reciprocity like one put into force by Mr. Blaine⁶ and the republican administration and so they try something else. They are not going to allow the trade of South America to slip from their grasp while they know the value of a little political scheming.

13. *The Detroit Free Press*, 6 de novembro

O que se passa no Rio com a imposição da lei marcial prova que os que pensavam que o Brasil se encontrava no bom caminho estavam errados, nota o jornalista. O mesmo sugere que por trás disto tudo podem estar os nostálgicos da monarquia.

⁶ James Blaine (1830-1893), Secretário de Estado em 1881 e de 1889 a 1892, é um ardente defensor da doutrina de Monroe. Entre outubro de 1889 e abril de 1890, Blaine preside em Washington a primeira Conferência Pan-Americana.

Nobody expected that Brazil would become finally and irrevocably one in the family of republics without some friction, but it was hoped that no serious difficulty would occur until the new government was established with reasonable firmness and able to resist attempts at revolution. It looks now as if these hopes were ill founded. If it is true that a revolution is impending, and that martial law has been proclaimed, the outlook is far from pleasing. The background to which the recent monarchy was removed is not far enough in the dim distance to prevent a good many regrets which may ripen, in the case of an upheaval, into a determined effort for restoration.

14. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 6 de novembro

No Brasil, com os vetos e atos arbitrários do presidente e as tentativas do Congresso de o controlar, está-se a viver a mesma situação que no Chile antes da guerra civil.

The report of trouble in Brazil is confirmed, with added feature of serious import. Although hostilities have not begun, the country is already in a state of revolution, the controversy between the President and Congress having reached a point that admits of no compromise. In a general way the situation of affairs resembles that which preceded the war in Chile, the President resorting to arbitrary acts and vetoes, apparently with the intention of fortifying himself in power, while the Congress is trying to curb and control him. The situation is very strained, and seems to point to an early outbreak of hostilities.

15. «Revolt in Brazil», *The Wichita Daily Eagle*, 6 de novembro

Espera-se que as notícias vindas do Brasil sejam exageradas, mas se for verdade é muito perigoso que haja um ditador, mesmo se for só por algum tempo.

The reported disturbed condition of Brazil is source of regret. When the very liberal monarchial rule of Dom Pedro was thrown off and a popular government set up in its stead it was hoped that the republican sentiment of the people was strong enough and sufficiently well grounded to maintain that form of government, and it is still hoped that the reported reaction has been exaggerated and that nothing has or will occur to disturb the peaceful continuance of popular government. The sanction, even temporarily, of the assumptions of a dictator is a dangerous thing to do, affording as it will an opportunity for the gratification of the personal ambition of the one whom fortune or intrigue shall have placed in control to fasten his hold and establish himself as dictator.

16. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 6 de novembro

Afinal, o Brasil não aproveitou da mudança de regime para mostrar às outras repúblicas sul-americanas o que é um «governo progressista».

Brazil has not profited by her revolution if it has given her in exchange for a liberal emperor, governing according to constitutional lines, an

overbearing dictator, governing according to his own sweet will. The report that martial law has been proclaimed in the Brazilian capital is not reassuring to those who hoped that Brazil would give her sister South American Republics an example of free progressive government.

17. «Pan-America», *The Cincinnati Inquirer*, 6 de novembro

Os Estados Unidos estão preocupados com os acontecimentos no Rio de Janeiro, mas, avisa o editorialista, é preciso manifestar uma certa prudência depois de que aconteceu durante a guerra civil chilena, na qual Washington ajudou ostensivamente Balmaceda.

The news from Brazil is serious.

It looks very much as if the Congress had sought to repeat the performance of that of Chile, and that the President, FONSECA, in dissolving the session and establishing martial law, is emulating the role of BALMACEDA.

The United States of America have large interests in Brazil, and the Washington authorities are sadly disturbed over the situation.

A real first-class war might help President HARRISON to a re-election; but meanwhile, let us remember the decision of the United State District Court in the case of *Itata*⁷.

⁷ Trata-se de um episódio da guerra civil chilena entre Balmaceda e os congressistas. O navio *Itata*, que tinha armamentos transportados desde a Califórnia para os inimigos do ditador, foi apreendida no porto de Iquique, no norte do Chile, por navios americanos a 4 de junho de 1891, e

18. *The Sioux City Journal*, 6 de novembro

A maneira de encarar a vida política é bem diferente nos Estados Unidos em relação a um país como o Brasil.

Nobody seems to know just what is the matter with Brazil just now. A fresh revolution is on the tapis. We get rather hot up here in the United States over politics, but after it is all over we find out that we were not half so angry as we thought we were. Our way is a good deal better than the South American was, anyhow.

19. «The English in Brazil», *The Sioux City Journal*, 7 de novembro

Duríssimo ataque contra a Inglaterra, que o jornal define como o «maior ladrão das nações»: no Brasil, «com a seu característico espírito de ganância», os ingleses procuraram «dominar um país que espoliaram durante muito tempo». Agora que os Estados Unidos e o Brasil assinaram um tratado comercial, os ingleses tentaram «desfazê-lo» e, para o conseguir, a única maneira era de «destruir o governo» brasileiro.

Na opinião do editorialista, os ingleses subornaram bancos, «inflamaram» os nostálgicos do antigo regime, atuaram no Congresso, em certos jornais, controlaram os despachos. Isso obrigou o governo do Rio a reagir com força.

Por outras palavras, este jornal do Iowa acusa os ingleses de estar na origem da crise que afeta o Brasil.

teve de regressar a San Diego. O procurador federal Henry Cage recusou-se a condenar a tripulação do *Itata*: na sua opinião, o armamento era de propriedade privada e, sobretudo, os Estados Unidos tinham intervindo fora da sua jurisdição.

The conduct of the English in Brazil will open the eyes of many Americans who may not be fully aware of the deadly hostility of England to our interests. The fact now appears to be that English influence has threatened the Brazilian government with revolution and compelled it to take extreme measure for self-preservation.

The attempt of the English to assassinate the young republic has been made solely because its government is patriotic and will not cringe before English dictation. The Brazilian people asserted themselves when they made a commercial treaty with the United States, giving the latter advantages which are accorded to no other nation, in return for favors in the American market which neither England nor any other nation on the globe can give to Brazil. The people of Brazil acted in their own interests in making a reciprocity arrangement with the United States. It was their right to do so. It was their own affair, not the affair of England.

But with characteristic greed England sought to dominate the country she had so long fleeced. As soon as the reciprocity arrangement was negotiated, the English brought immense pressure to prevent its promulgation and execution. They bribed newspapers; they bribed officials; they filled the air with clamor; they employed every means to cajole and browbeat the merchants and bankers. But all these expedients failed. The treaty was put into effect.

The operation of the reciprocity arrangement has been successful beyond all anticipation. The United States, which had been the greatest consumer of coffee, the chief Brazilian staple, has immensely increased its

purchases, while on the other hand millions of dollars' worth of commodities which Brazil had previously been compelled to pay exorbitant prices for in England have been secured from the United States. It transpires that many of the English houses and their agents in Brazil have been forced to buy stocks in the United States instead of in England.

American merchants and manufacturers have been rapidly making arrangements to improve the advantages which the reciprocity arrangement provided. Not only have they greatly increased their sales of agricultural products and wares, but they have been moving to established agencies in Brazil, while capital is being enlisted to provide great steamship lines to make quick direct connection between the ports of Brazil and the United States.

Having failed to prevent the promulgation of the arrangement and seeing how rapidly its advantages were creating commerce between the United States and Brazil, the English realized that their long-time monopoly in the Brazilian market was doomed forever, unless they could quickly destroy the treaty. Their only way to destroy it, as they found, was to destroy the government. They set about to do this. They laid hold of every disaffected element in the country. They had unlimited funds, or "boodle", as it is called. They incited the old aristocratic or imperial classes, who have been awaiting a chance for conspiracy ever since the deposition of the emperor, Dom Pedro. And it is easy to see what a powerful influence could be brought to bear by united and persistent agitation promoted by the large number of English agents and branch houses scattered over Brazil.

It was a formidable force which the Brazilian Tories and copperheads, inspired and directed by the English, were able to marshal. They had their representative in congress as well as in that portion of press which they were able to subsidize or otherwise to control. And the interference from the cable dispatches is that this conspiracy against the government was so serious and bad so nearly reached a revolutionary culmination that the government was forced to bestir itself and to put forth a strong hand.

It all shows to what desperate measures the English will resort to maintain their heartless grip on any market. It is of a piece with their conduct in forcing China at the cannon's mouth to submit to the restoration of the opium trade. They would deluge Brazil in blood before they would permit its market to pass under the commercial supremacy of the United States. There is something terrible in the savagery of English greed.

Nor is there anything new in English unscrupulousness of methods in trying to hold the Brazilian market. The experience of Brazil is the experience of every other country in which England has had or has tried to get lodgment. India has been lacerated by the lion's claws. Egypt has felt the same fearful clutch. We in this country know what it is to deal with this greater robber of nations

Having in the last third of a century wrenched the grasp of English monopoly from our own throat, we are now trying to establish American supremacy in all American markets. We began with Brazil, whose interests were identical with our own, and which has so long been merciless plundered

by England. It is a grand stake which the United States under the policy of James G. Blaine is playing for – the markets of western hemisphere. How grand the stake is vividly shown by the desperation with which the English resist.

But if American are true to themselves the markets of American are theirs and England can be driven to the wall.

20. «The Usurpation in Brazil», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 7 de novembro

O jornal do Illinois não acredita que haja uma manobra dos monárquicos por trás dos recentes acontecimentos em terras brasileiras. Trata-se, salienta o editorialista, de um golpe do Deodoro: este quer mais poder e, sobretudo, um legislativo mais dócil.

The Chicago Tribune lamenta o sucedido e por duas razões: por um lado, isso vai interferir nas relações comerciais entre os Estado Unidos e o Brasil, poucos meses depois da assinatura do acordo bilateral; por outro lado, vai levar água aos moinhos dos monárquicos. Estes vão sublinhar que o Brasil viveu um longo período de prosperidade durante o reino de D. Pedro II e, também, que o facto de haver um só soberano protege o país «da maquinação de aventureiros ambiciosos».

No fundo, o editorialista lamenta que isso «apareça como um falhanço da forma republicana de governo». Em conclusão, «o português do Brasil não parece ser muito diferente dos espanhóis dos outros Estados» da América Latina.

It is sudden and surprising news which comes from the young republic of Brazil. After making such an apparently auspicious start in the direction of

republican government a dictator has seized the government, martial law has been established, Congress has been dissolved, the President, da Fonseca, has proclaimed himself dictator, and there are serious outcroppings of revolution in consequence in many localities. When last year a constitutional convention was called and this year a representative Congress was assembled the hope was held out with great confidence that the republic was established on a stable basis. The Brazilians themselves boasted its permanency. They called the attention to the fact that there had been no trouble in their country since the separation from Portugal and they vaunted themselves as Portuguese rather than Spaniards, and hence that they were not as impetuous and hot-blooded or as much addicted to revolutions as the latter. But now, only one year [*sic!*] from the time they threw off the monarchical form of government, their military President proclaims himself dictator, dissolves the Congress, enforces martial law and the country is on verge of civil war, because the Congress, which rightly should have been a check upon absolutism, has refused to submit to certain personal and absolute prerogatives claimed by the President. It is asserted on one hand that the deplorable situation of unhappy Brazil is the outcome of Dom Pedro's plottings for a restoration of the monarchy, but this way may well be doubted, since the old ex-Emperor is incapacitated both physically and mentally from engaging such desperate venture.

A telegram says:

Northern Brazil is decidedly in favor of an empire, and only in Central Brazil is the republic popular. This may lead to Dom Pedro's grand-son

becoming chief of State under a regency of three prominent representing the Northern, Southern and Central provinces, and insuring the unity of Brazil

It is much more likely that the President, finding he cannot exercise absolute power with a Congress opposed to it and under a republican form of government, has seized the reins of government, having the army and navy on his side, and will retain the dictatorship until a Congress has been organized which will be subservient enough not to oppose his ambitions and not to interfere with his exercise of personal power, which would be as far as possible from the republican idea. In that case dictatorship means revolution and civil strife and must end in serious disaster.

The situation is a deplorable one in double sense. It is unfortunate that Brazil is confronted with the prospects of civil war just at the time when the way had been cleared for a great reciprocal trade with this country to the mutual benefit of both countries, and the future appeared bright and prosperous. Again, it is setting a bad example and hurts the principle of a republican form of government in those countries which are rapidly moving forwards to secure it. It will be argued by the occupants of thrones that the monarchical form of government alone secure peace, order, and prosperity, that the people are the happiest when their interests are guarded by a personal sovereign, and that absolute power protects them from the schemes of ambitious adventurers within and from the invasions of enemies without the nation. They will point to Brazil and, comparing its present distracted condition with its long and prosperous experience during the reign of Dom

Pedro II, will strengthen their argument. The people of the United States will deeply deplore the unhappy situation which has been forced upon the Brazilians and this attempt of da Fonseca to play the role of Balmaceda. They will deplore the interference with trade, for it would be more profitable to supply that country with flour than with powder, but still more will they deplore what now looks like a failure of republican form of government in the largest, richest, and most powerful of the South American States. The Portuguese of Brazil do not seem to differ essentially from the Spaniards of other States.

21. Political Agitation in Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 7 de novembro

Este editorial justifica todas as medidas tomadas pelo Marechal para bloquear as tentativas de restauração monárquicas: até acha que «não se trata de uma ditadura» e acusa os congressistas de ter agido de modo a facilitar os planos dos nostálgicos de D. Pedro II.

No entanto, o ponto central deste artigo é a acusação feita aos agentes dos comerciantes ingleses, descontentes com o tratado americano-brasileiro assinado em fevereiro, «de ter atizados os jovens membros do Congresso contra o presidente». Sabemos o que estes «metediços fizeram no Chile para inculcar hostilidade contra os Estados Unidos», afirma o jornal. Por conseguinte, insta o governo de Washington «de apoiar moralmente o Presidente Fonseca» contra «os deputados reacionários e os mexeriqueiros britânicos».

The reasons are given for the very serious differences between the Brazilian congress and President Fonseca. One is that the agents of British merchants and others who are dissatisfied with the treaty of reciprocity with the United States have stirred the young members of congress against the president. These members have been persuaded that reciprocity will be an injury to Brazil and that the policy should be stopped by cutting off some of the President's powers and opposing his policy. Another reason given for the Congressional action calling the President's integrity and patriotism in question is that there is a plot for a restoration of monarchy and that the great powers given to Congress under the constitution have been employed to further the plan of royalists. The claim of member of Congress that there is objection to the President because he is a military man seems to be frivolous, as Congress elected him to presidency with full knowledge.

A dispatch from Rio Janeiro yesterday stated that President Fonseca, upon the advice of ministers, has issued a decree assuming full control of the government until disorders cease and lawmakers learn to keep in progress with the Republican ideas. The decree disclaims any intention of continuing in supreme control after quiet is restored. A new election for representative in Congress has been ordered of January. This does not look like a dictatorship. If there be any serious movement to restore the monarchy President Fonseca has done well to resist it at the outset. Since the overthrow of Dom Pedro the President has shown that he is devoted do republican ideas. If congressmen have taken advantages of republican institutions to overthrow the Republic,

the President is fully justify in sending them home. Some riots have occurred, but have been promptly put down by the military forces. The loyalty of the army to the President is a guaranty of stability during the present crisis. The President is fully justified in employing it to preserve public order until the republic is firmly established.

Many years may elapse before the people learn to appreciate republican institutions and to protect the. The Brazilians are perhaps better fitted for the experiment than other South American states, but it was too to expect that immediate success could be achieved without the development of dangerous reactionary tendencies. So far, the firmness and foresight of the men who overthrow the monarchy have saved the government from all dangers, and we believe that these men can still be relied on. The friendship displayed by them toward the United States ha undoubtedly angered all representatives of British interests, as the trade of Brazil has been turned toward the Unites States by the treaty of reciprocity. It will be the duty of our government to give to President Fonseca all the moral support that can be justly extended in his contest with reactionary representatives and British mischief-makers. These meddlers have shown too clearly what they can do in Chile to instill hostility against the United States, to permit any observing person to question their disposition to make trouble in Brazil. Great Britain is making a tremendous effort to nullify the good results of the Congress of American nations and the policy of reciprocity adopted by the Fifty-first Congress. But she must not succeed.

22. Uncertainty in Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 7 de novembro

Depois de ter aprovado as « firmes resoluções» tomadas por Deodoro, o jornal resume o manifesto – «acusação mordaz» contra o Congresso – publicado pelo ditador e recorda que, no Brasil, os monarquistas ainda não perderam as esperanças de voltar ao poder. O editorial afirma que o Marechal não vai poder dominar o país pela força durante muito tempo; porém, não vai ser menos difícil para ele controlar esta situação perturbada com uma oposição «perigosamente ativa» e, ao mesmo tempo, preparar o restabelecimento das regras constitucionais.

Dispatches from Rio Janeiro, forwarded under government surveillance, report the restoration of order in that city. It is evident from the tenor of the news thus far received that the magnitude of the Brazilian crisis has not been exaggerated. Whether President Fonseca is conspiring against the life of the republic or is honestly intent on its preservation he has acted with great vigor and stern resolution. His manifesto to the people is an incisive arraignment of the congressional party. If based on facts, his action will be justifiable. To have adopted a less radical course, unless the situation has been misrepresented, would have been to invite disorder and surrender the country to reaction and anarchy. Coupled with the dissolution of congress are rumors of a movement for the restoration of the empire. That the imperialists will not be slow to take advantage of divisions in the republican ranks is to be expected. There are still many advocates of monarchy in Brazil. They recall with regret the many admirable qualities of Dom Pedro, who, if left to his own devices, would

probably never have been dethroned. In view of the causes which led to Dom Pedro downfall, the rumor that Count d'Eu, his son in law, is to be installed as ruler of a new monarchy, would seem to be misleading. To the unpopularity of d'Eu more than to any other cause Dom Pedro owed his overthrow.

Whether the Brazilians will submit to a dictatorship is at present uncertain. Up to date da Fonseca holds the reins of power with an iron hand. In the revolution of 1889 he exhibited courage, shrewdness and remarkable fertility of resource. Upon his ability to convince the public of the honesty of his intentions will depend success or failure in the hazardous movement which now enlists his energies. His program, if carried out, ought to meet the needs of the people. He assumes full responsibility for the dissolution of congress, and announces that he will suppress all anarchy and disorder at whatever cost. Still more reassuring are his guarantee of free elections, a constitutional government and respect for pecuniary engagements, acquired rights, legal acts and contracts. The courts are to continue to sit as usual and the cause of justice will be uninterrupted. There will be no alteration of existing laws, except in cases where they are opposed to the common good and the safety of the government. In conclusion President da Fonseca promises that the new congress will be convened as soon as the arrangements can properly be made.

To maintain his authority, and uphold the responsibilities he has undertaken, will tax severely the ability of Brazil's aggressive executives. With premonitions of civil war already heard in the provinces and a state of siege

necessary in the capital, it is apparent that the opposition to him is dangerously active. For him, to undertake to dominate indefinitely the country over which he was called to rule in the excitement of the revolutionary transition would almost certainly lead to his defeat. But the task of composing present disturbances and restoring constitutional government promises to be hardly less onerous than would be the maintenance of an enduring absolutism in the midst of a fickle and contentious people.

23. «The Trouble in Brazil», *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 7 de novembro

O últimos acontecimentos no Brasil – com o conflito entre o Congresso e Deodoro e com o golpe deste – fazem pensar o que ocorreu recentemente no Chile, nota o jornal da Pensilvânia que, como outros diários do seu país, vê uma provocação inglesa por trás de tudo isto. Com efeito, escreve o editorialista, os britânicos têm ciúmes da política dos Estados Unidos no subcontinente que, com o tratado assinado em fevereiro, irá tirar à Inglaterra a melhor parte do comércio com o Brasil.

É por essa razão que o governo americano tem de ter os olhos bem abertos e controlar o que fazem os ingleses. Estes, para atingir os seus objetivos, e, neste caso, para frustrar este tratado, vão fazer de tudo: até não vão hesitar em recorrer a uma revolução.

As nearly as can be ascertained from news reports that have been sent under the scrutiny of an official censorship, the disturbances in Brazil is the outcome of a quarrel between the President and the Congress. It is quite probable that their respective powers are not very well defined, and as nothing

is said about the Supreme Court – to which, in this country, the questions at issue would be referred – it is probable either that if such body exists, it does not have the power to deal with such questions authoritatively or that neither party is willing to submit to its decision.

In this state of affairs the straight way out the dilemma is the shortest. The President controls the power of the State. He commands the army and the navy, and so long as they are loyal to him he can have his way. He appears to have complete control of them thus far, and this gives him power to dissolve the Congress and order a new election; he, in the meantime, governing the country arbitrarily and being, therefore, a Dictator. Whether he will continue his dictatorship after a new Congress has convened, and especially whether he will use his power to re-elect himself or install a President in his interest, remains to be seen. Matters have not yet developed far enough to give much information on this point.

At present the situation in Brazil appears to be very similar to that in Chile at the outbreak of the revolution. BALMACEDA tyrannized over the Chilean Congress just as DA FONSECA did over that of Brazil; but in Chile a portion of the navy sided with the Congress, a large portion of the inhabitants of the country joined its forces and the result was that the Congressionalists were not only able to declare war, but to defeat BALMACEDA and his adherents. There will be no war in Brazil if the whole army and navy remain faithful to DA FONSECA, as they are reported to be now.

It is not at all improbable that the whole trouble has been stirred up by the English in Brazil; and if so, we may expect them to do all they can to turn it to the disadvantage of the United States. They are intensely jealous of this country, and the success of Mr. BLAINE'S reciprocity policy has enraged them. They see that it will take from England the cream of the Brazilian trade and give it to the United States, and as they have immense interests and immense influence in that country, they will leave no stone unturned to defeat the purpose of the reciprocity treaty. They will not be likely to stop at revolution if they think it necessary for the accomplishment of their design.

The thing to be done, then, is to watch the English, and we may trust our government to do that. It will be kept fully informed, and will use what means it has to defend American interests and maintain American rights in Brazil. Several vessels of the White Squadron are now on the way to that country, and will be kept where they can soon be ordered to its ports, if need be. Our government will not be aggressive, but there is no reason to fear that it will be caught napping.

24. *The Record-Union*, 7 de novembro

O jornal californiano não se quer pronunciar antes de ter todos os detalhes, mas não pensa que o marechal queira «derrubar a constituição». Cita também um relato que põe em causa a responsabilidade de «agentes ingleses» nas desordens que imperam no Brasil, mas quer ter mais informações antes de dar a sua opinião.

The accounts of the difficulty in Brazil are not sufficiently clear to enable a positive judgment to be formed regarding the equities of the case. President Fonseca appears to have dissolved Congress because it refused to pass financial measures of his proposing and passed others over his veto. This was, of course, dictatorial, and the proclamation of martial law that followed was in the line of the initial proceeding. The army and the navy appear to have sided with the President, and there has been some rioting and some bloodshed, but no such uprising and conflicts as would amount to a revolution. It is not probable that Fonseca is seeking to overthrow the Constitution; indeed, he announces his determination to make it respected. One account fastens the responsibility for the disturbed conditions of the country upon English agents, who are bitterly opposed to Fonseca for concluding the treaty of reciprocity with the United States. These agents have, it is charged, been diligent in stirring Congress up to antagonism to the President. Until further details are at hand it would be well to deserve judgment concerning all these matters. Our hope should be that the new republic may withstand this first shock, and that the Brazilians may prove capable of self-government.

25. «The Coup d'État in Brazil», *The Baltimore Sun*, 7 de novembro

Tal como Balmaceda, o Marechal-presidente não tinha nenhum direito de agir contra o Congresso: atuou de maneira arbitrária, anticonstitucional, substituindo «um governo legal por uma anarquia temperada pela sua vontade ditatorial». O golpe de da Fonseca, escreve o

jornal, «põe em dúvida a pureza das suas motivações na revolução de 15 de novembro de 1889»

O diário de Baltimore, na opinião do qual o perigo monárquico é uma desculpa inventada pelo «usurpador», lamenta que, «depois de apenas seis meses de regime constitucional, a república tenha de enfrentar um dura prova». E tudo isto, conclui o editorial, vai dificultar ainda mais o comércio norte-americano no Brasil.

By a decree of President Deodoro da Fonseca, the Brazilian Congress was, on the 3rd of the present month, dissolved and sent about its business and a date fixed for the election of a new Congress. This, it appears, was an unconstitutional act, inasmuch as the fundamental law gives the Congress legal term. Under the empire the Congress could be dissolved by an imperial decree, but under the constitution of the republic Congress has as much right to shorten the term of the President as the President has to shorten the term of the Congress. The Brazilians people have now to do one of three things – to elect a new Congress, as they have been unconstitutionally ordered to do, to submit to da Fonseca as dictator, or stick to the present Congress and, like the Chileans, destroy the dictator. It is assumed that they will pursue the least inconvenient course, which is to do as they are told. The reason officially given for the *coup d'état*, is that the Congress was misconducting itself, and that the imperialists were abusing the liberty given them by the republic for its overthrow. Usurpers are always able to invent such arguments. The point upon which outsiders will fix their attention is this: That the President has destroyed a co-ordinate branch of the government, taking upon himself powers he did not rightly possess. Congress was the best judge – certainly as good as a judge as

he – of the interests of Brazil. Da Fonseca no more than Balmaceda had the right to undertake to run the government without a Congress or in defiance of its votes. What he has substituted for legal government, therefore, is anarchy tempered by his dictatorial will. He is more arbitrary, evidently as respects the representatives of the people than the Emperor Dom Pedro ever was. The latter at least observed the limits of his authority as defined in the Brazilian constitution.

In view of the dictator's high-handed course people will now begin to doubt the purity of his motives in bringing about the revolution of November 15, 1889, when Dom Pedro was deposed and exiled. It will be noted that the provisional government put off the election of a Congress to frame a constitution on unconscionable length of time. It was elected only fourteen months ago, and the session now broken up began only last May. After barely six months of constitutional existence, therefore, the republic is again thrown in the crucible. The people of the United States cannot but deplore the disorder and confusion into which affairs are thrown by the dictator's act. Our trade with Brazil cannot prosper under the new conditions. In yesterday's *Sun* a correspondent writing from Brazil showed what difficulty our trade encountered under conditions of peace and quiet, but the difficulty cannot but be increased by civil war or the apprehension of civil war. Our merchants will not care to venture their wares in ports where riots, broils and conflicts of authority are to be expected.

26. «In South America», *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 7 de novembro

Na América do Sul, os agentes ingleses estão a trabalhar para comprometer o prestígio e os interesses dos Estados Unidos. É tão grande a sua hostilidade em relação ao recente tratado americano-brasileiros e aos interesses norte-americanos, que «preferem meter o Brasil na guerra civil do que ver o desenvolvimento de normais relações comerciais entre as duas repúblicas », acusa o quotidiano do Nebraska.

Este evoca a doutrina de Monroe, o eventual perigo monárquico, mas insiste sobretudo na necessidade do continente americano estar unido e militarmente preparado face a uma ameaça vinda do Velho Continente. É por isso que ataca o Partido Democrata que, na sua opinião, está a travar os indispensáveis projetos para fortalecer a marinha americana.

The latest dispatches from South America exhibit the source of the milk in the cocoanut. The story about the aid rendered Balmaceda by Minister Egan and the officers of the United States navy stationed on the coast during the late civil war are concocted by English residents and importers who are desiring the head off Mr. Blaine and the new policy of reciprocity which is bound to diminish British trade and increase the prestige of the United States with her sister republics.

The Chilean who accept these stories are in sympathy with the English policy. So far the junta has given no expression to this hostility further than its cavalier response to the president's communication in reference to the killing of American sailors in the streets of Valparaiso.

The dispatches from Brazil tell the same story. From the moment of the ratification of the reciprocity treaty between the United States and Brazil by President Fonseca, British agents, it is alleged have been hard at work trying to engineer a revolution. They are desperate enough in their hostility to American interests to plunge Brazil into bloody civil war rather than to see fair trade relations between the two republics.

As to the probability of their raising a serious disturbance the dispatches are contradictory. One set of dispatches are to the effect that the conservatives, consisting of the nobility and aristocracy, that desire the restoration of the empire so that they may regain their lost privileges, have combined with the radicals for whom Fonseca is not democratic enough, in about the same way the imperialists and legitimists of France colloqued with the socialists and Boulangists to overthrow the French republic.

They say the trouble is serious and may end in recalling of the family of Dom Pedro to the throne in the person of his grandson, and by the help of the European governments. Another set deny that there is any serious danger and claim that Fonseca will be able to handle the uprising if one is attempted.

Taking these rumors for what they may be worth, it is evident that there is a combination against the integrity of the South American republics among the powers in Europe, and that the Monroe doctrine is liable to be put to a crucial test one of these days and the American republics will have to stand together or see South America divided and destroyed by the greedy plunderers across the sea.

All of which goes to show that we need warships of the most scientific construction and need them right away, for the time may be at hand when Europe tired of supporting her 3,000,000 armed men in idleness, in profound peace may conclude to enter upon a career of conquest and plunder on the western continent. Singly no government on the western hemisphere can withstand these robbers, if they conclude to conquer and divide the spoils of the new world, except the United States. But if the idea of the Pan-American congress be carried out, and the American republics enter into a defensive alliance for mutual protection not a single imperial highwayman of Europe will ever get a foothold in South and Central America.

The Monroe doctrine saved Mexican independence after Europa had agreed to turn the great country over of the tender mercies of imperial France and Austria. But we were in condition to fight them all at the time, as we had the strongest navy afloat. Today owing to the obstruction of succeeding democrat houses at Washington of every attempt to recruit our navy and bring it up the highest state of efficiency according to the modern standard, we are comparatively defenseless against European raids on American ports.

It remains to be seen if the democratic house that will assemble next month will keep up this policy of obstruction. If it does the time may arrive before another presidential election when events in South America may change the spirit of our dreams and make it mighty unpleasant for the anti-American party.

It is a very sinister omen that today almost every democratic newspaper of influence in the United States has declared against this government in its friendly policy toward its sister republics. They scoff at the reciprocity treaty already negotiated and clamor against the policy of reciprocity. They echo and re-echo the charges of the British agents in South America against the United States, and do everything in their power to break the good feeling between those republics and our own. How long will the people stand this sort of thing?

27. *The Fort Worth Gazette*, 7 de novembro

Os distúrbios no Brasil têm um caráter filo-monárquico, sublinha o jornal. O diário texano, que dá uma boa imagem do antigo monarca, é extremamente negativo em relação aos povos latino-americanos: na sua opinião, estes nunca estarão aptos para viver num regime democrático.

The expulsion of Dom Pedro from Brazil has not wiped out the loyalty of his friends, who are trying to get up a revolution in favor of royalty – for that is what the troubles in that country mean. Dom Pedro was a good man and a wise and progressive ruler. The worst thing to be said against him was that he was a king. The people of Brazil had nothing to complaint of, except that they were rules by a monarch in the name of a king, while their neighbors were ruled by tyrants in the name of the people. So, being restless and dissatisfied, and oppressed by the peace that Dom Pedro had given them, and longing for trouble, they rose and “threw off their monarch, that their mob might reign.” The present movement is probably a reaction of feeling in the minds of the

fickle Latin-American, who are, have been, and ever will be, unfit of self-government.

28. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 7 de novembro

A cada general um revolução, que serve de ventoinha para acalmar estes povos de sangue quente.

The so-called revolution in Brazil is only a pleasant little diversion necessary as a vent for the superabundant vivacity of a warm-blooded people. In the South American Republics there are as many revolutions in posse as there are generals in esse.

29. «Brazilian Troubles», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 7 de novembro

Também o San Francisco Chronicle parece privilegiar a tese de um manobra dos monárquicos brasileiros.

There seem to be the beginning of serious trouble in Brazil and it will be observed that the situation is in some respects analogous to that in Chile under Balmaceda. The Brazilian Congress some time ago passed a law fixing a process for impeachment of the President. Da Fonseca, the President, vetoed the bill, and his veto was overridden by Congress. As soon as this action was made known to da Fonseca he became very much excited, dissolved the

Congress, and proclaimed martial law in Rio Janeiro and the other States of the republic.

Such is, in brief, the account cabled by the correspondent of the *New York Herald*, and if it be correct it would show that the President has been guilty of very hand-handed proceedings. It is even asserted, though the assertion is open to question at this time, that da Fonseca has proclaimed himself dictator, and that he has the army and navy solidly at his back.

Ever since the information to the republic there has been, as was natural, a leaven of imperialism left in Brazil which has been working, though in a very quiet and undemonstrative way. The virtues of the exiled-Emperor have been extolled, and public notice has been directed to him by occasional appeals to Congress to allow him to return and spend his few remaining days in his beloved Brazil, not as a public official at any kind, but simply as a private citizen.

It is possible that under this present trouble, which is on the surface only a struggle between the executive and legislative branches of the Government, there may be concealed an imperialist move. At all events, if the imperialist faction has any positive strength it cannot fail to seize the opportunity which this difficult presents, either in a forcible or in a persuasive manner. It certainly will not be a matter of surprise if the whole affaire turns out to be a scheme to overthrow the republic and to restore imperialism in Brazil.

No mesmo número do jornal californiano encontra-se esta pequena nota sobre a pretensa responsabilidade inglesa nos recentes acontecimentos brasileiros:

We prefer to wait for corroboration before accepting the story of the editor of *United States do Brazil* that the English are at the bottom of the new revolution in that country. The Brazilians, so far as our observation goes, seem to be perfectly capable of getting up a revolution without outside inspiration.

30. *The Sunday Herald*, 8 de novembro

O primeiro comentário fala da instabilidade política na América Latina, onde as pessoas são «muito nervosas e emotivas». O Brasil não constitui uma exceção.

O segundo, citando a famosa frase que Napoleão teria dito⁸, explica porque os ingleses estão «diligentemente a fomentar o conflito civil no Brasil»: não olham a meios para favorecer o próprio comércio. Hoje em dia, só «a Rússia na Ásia e os Estados Unidos no hemisfério ocidental ameaçam a influência e o império comercial ingleses».

There is a state of siege declared in the Federal Capital of Brazil, the erstwhile imperial City of Rio Janeiro. A state of siege means that civil law has been suspended and that martial law has taken its place. Martial law is simply the will of the commander. The commander in this case is General da Fonseca, President of the Republic. The very unpleasant state of affairs should surprise

⁸ «A Inglaterra é uma nação de merceeiros».

no one who is at all acquainted with the South American character. Our South-American brethren are a very nervous and excitable people and the governments they set up are amongst the most instable of the earth. The fact is that the only stable government they have in the so-called republics south of us are those in which the presidents are virtually dictators. Such is the Mexican Government under Diaz. He rules his country more absolutely than any European monarch, save only the Czar. The consequence is that, Diaz being an able and enlightened man, Mexico under his rule is more peaceful, prosperous and progressive than at any other period in her history since she shook off the yoke of Spain. The same thing holds good in all the Central and South American countries. Brazil, unfortunately, is not given promise of being any better adapted to republican institutions than the Spanish-American countries.

* * *

It is intimated that England is sedulously fomenting civil strife in Brazil. That is easy to understand. The reciprocity treaty entered between the United States and Brazil is inimical to England's interests in precisely the same proportion that is favorable to this country. England, «that nation of shopkeepers,» as Napoleon styled it, never foregoes an opportunity to extend her trade willingly nor loosens her grip on trade once gained. Her history during the 300 years which have elapsed since the destruction of the Spanish armada, has been one of constant unceasingly aggression with one object only

in view, the extension of trade. She has been active in every quarter of the globe where profit was to be gained. She has antagonized in turn every enterprising people in the world and has in turn got the upper hand of all save two, Russia and the United States. Spain, Portugal, France and Holland have been driven in turn from their trading settlements and colonies in America, Asia, Africa, and the islands of the sea that the sphere of English influence might be extended and English increased. Russia in Asia and the United States in the Western Hemisphere now threaten English influence and imperial England trade. Hence her hatred of the one and opposition do the other.

31. «The Dictatorship in Brazil», *The Washington Post*, 8 de novembro

Deodoro é agora um tirano e os argumentos avançados para autojustificar o golpe não têm fundamento num regime republicano, sublinha, sem rodeios este editorial, segundo o qual «o comércio e a prosperidade do país vão ficar fortemente prejudicados».

President da Fonseca's course in the present Brazilian crisis shows how little the republican system is understood in South America. A genuine republic is founded upon a constitution which defines and determines the power and limitations of the co-ordinate branches of the government which it establishes. The constitution of Brazil assigns to the Congress which it creates a fixed legal term. Yet the President, for reasons altogether outside of the constitution, has taken at upon him to shorten that term and to dissolve the

body. It does not seem to have had as much right to abridge his term of office as he to shorten that of Congress.

The reason which he gives of his course is that the legislation of Congress did not please him; that the legislative body and the executive were always at variance, and that the Imperialists were ready to take advantage of this state of confusion. But tyrants have ever been quick to invent reasons for their usurpations, and da Fonseca's arbitrary conduct throws suspicion on his patriotism from the beginning.

He alleges that he accepts a temporary dictatorship at the request of the army and navy, and, according to some accounts, with the sanction of the senate. But in a constitutional government, all these things would be without warrant, and therefore, void. He has directed an election for a new congress to be held in January; but if that congress should not be subservient to his will, he has already made a precedent for dissolving it, and he may thus proceed till he finds one sufficiently submissive – a method wholly incompatible with any just idea of a free government.

What the people of Brazil will do remains to be seen. They may fight for the constitution, as the Chilian's Congressionists did. They may yield obedience to the dictator, backed as he is by the army and navy. Or they may elect another Congress, which, considering that there is now a Congress in existence with an unexpired term, would seem a way into deeper confusion. From whatever standpoint the situation is viewed outlook shows trouble ahead,

and the prospect cannot fail to exercise an injurious affect upon the trade and prosperity of the country.

32. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 8 de novembro

Fonseca organizou o golpe para evitar uma tomada do poder por parte dos nostálgicos do antigo regime.

Later advices from Brazil indicate that everything is quiet and the revolution, what there may have been of it, nipped in the bud. It is acknowledged that it was an attempt to overthrow Fonseca for the purpose of paving the way to the re-establishment of the empire. Fonseca availed himself of the power to dissolve the congress and order a new election, when congress transcended its constitutional power in overriding his veto for the purpose of impeaching him and removing him from office.

33. *New-York Tribune*, 8 de novembro

As coisas não são como os «anglomaníacos» queriam que fossem, ironiza o jornal: os Estados Unidos não têm de julgar o que aconteceu no Rio. As relações diplomáticas com o governo do Marechal irão manter-se até ele ficar no poder e assegurar, entre outros, a aplicação do tratado entre os dois países.

The Anglomaniacs among us who have been harassed by the success of the reciprocity policy are now abusing President Fonseca to their hearts'

content and wondering whether the State Department will recognize the military dictatorship. They will probably come to their senses in a few days and admit that it is not the function of American diplomacy to interfere in any way with the domestic affairs in South American countries. President Fonseca was legally elected and now represents the only de facto Government in Brazil. The State Department will naturally continue its relations with him as though nothing had happened. To question the validity of his action in suspending the sessions of Congress would be to interfere most unwarrantably in Brazilian affairs and to court reprisals in the form of abrogation of the reciprocity treaty. The State Department adhered to the traditions and practice of international law in continuing diplomatic relations with Balmaceda so long as he remained in power. The same rule will apply to Brazil in present crises.

34. *The Sioux City Journal*, 8 de novembro

Os ingleses fora do Brasil !

What Brazil ought to do is to drive a lot of English disturbers out of the country. They have conspired to injure Brazil, and that country can get along better without their presence.

35. «Poor old Brazil», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 8 de novembro

Pequena revista de imprensa sobre o golpe de Estado no Rio.

The Kansas City Star. Brazil is also having domestic trouble. In borrowing ideas from the United States the South American have evidently overlooked the free schools.

The Kansas City Times. Brazil is again under martial rule. The country is as volcanic politically as was Kansas when the Alliance swooped down like a wolf on the fold.

Buffalo Express. There is evidently a bitter context going on between parties in Brazil and the rival British and American interests are playing an important part of it. President Fonseca's previous success and the service he has done his country lead to the hope that he will triumph

The Detroit Free Press. If it is true that a revolution is impending and that martial law has been proclaimed the outlook is far from pleasing. The background to which the recent monarchy has been removed is not far enough in the dim distance to prevent a good many regrets which may ripen, in the case of an upheaval, into a determined effort for restoration.

The Philadelphia Enquirer. If anybody has set himself up as a dictator in Brazil,, the occurrence is unfortunate for that country, as it will retard its development and the progress of trade; but the change will not be permanent. There will be another revolution by and by which will restore the republic. The state of equilibrium to which the political oscillations tend is one of self-government.

The Minneapolis Journal. Fonseca assumed at first, the functions of a dictator and man on horseback, which, under the circumstances, he had to do. He has, as executive of the Brazilian Republic, shown himself a capable and public-spirited man. The revolution reported to have broken out may be the work of discontented imperialists promoting opposition to the government on account its commercial policy with this country. So long, however, as Fonseca controls the army and navy no mob can effect any serious trouble.

The Philadelphia Record. When the editor of a Democratic newspaper was one day telegraphed to by the proprietor to bring out his sheet next day as a republican organ he wired back: "It's a sharp curse, but I'll take it". The Brazilians see to have taken their curse with equal facility; but, then, there is no reason to be surprised at anything that may happen in a South American republic.

The Washington Post. We have been so accustomed to internal dissensions among our republican brethren of South America that they have ceased to be surprises, and it sometimes seems that the Pan-American principle which the United States has sought in various way to promote is not easily adaptable to the conditions that exist among the Spanish-speaking countries of the southern half of the continent.

Cincinnati Commercial-Gazette. The success of da Fonseca would prove a distinct setback to the spread of republicanism and the republican form of government. What Brazil needs just now is the instant discovery of a man of the people, a man such as Lincoln was, who will be able to grasp the situation and save to his country and his people a deadly deferment of that liberty of thoughts and action which means so much for civilization in this, the last decade of the century.

The Philadelphia Press. Brazil has been under a military government since the abdication of Dom Pedro and the declaration of martial law, with the dissolution of the Congress yesterday, is a change in name rather than in fact. The only circumstance which renders the action now taken of serious import is the financial condition of Brazil. Both as a nation and a community Brazil is heavily in debt, and the aggregate of English investments in the public and private securities of Brazil was placed several years ago in a British consular report at \$750,000,000

36. «Brazil and Latin-America», *New-York Tribune*, 9 de novembro

O jornal nova-iorquino fala das qualidades, mas sobretudo dos defeitos da colonização espanhola e portuguesa, como a corrupção e o militarismo. Contrariamente aos povos de origem anglo-saxónica, os de origem latina não ficam chocados com a supremacia dos militares na vida política, necessários para esmagar as revoltas e para dirigir «uma população ignorante e depravada».

É sobretudo por isso que os dirigentes republicanos brasileiros têm dificuldade em governar: o Império deixou uma população ignorante que não respeita a lei. Esta falta de civismo e de uma forte opinião pública trava consideravelmente o desenvolvimento das ideias democráticas, lamenta o editorialista.

The southern half of this continent bears the impress of the virtues and vices of Spanish and Portuguese conquest following the discoveries of Columbus. The gold-hunters in the West Indies and the Conquistadores in Mexico and Peru were ruthless in their dealings with the natives and deserved the fiery denunciations of Las Casas, the noblest figure of the early history of Spanish America. The Anglo-Saxons found at Jamestown and at Plymouth an Indian population, and in the centuries of their progress swept it westward and corralled the remnant of it in reservations. In Spanish America the native stock was left in possession of its coasts and forests, and races of mixed blood were created which were capable of making social and political progress. In Brazil the Indian population suffered from Portuguese slave-raiding for a long period and Africans were brought in to take its place; but in dealing with the mixed creole races the conquering class has not been swayed by the same race

affinities and antipathies influencing the English in the West Indies and the Anglo-Saxon in the United States.

These are facts which are to be deliberately weighed before Brazil is condemned by superficial critics as essentially unrepudican in tolerating the dictatorship of Fonseca. Chile, it is true, has overthrown a President who undertook to rule it without the consent of Congress; but it is not only the most advanced Spanish-American country in civilization and political enlightenment, but It has also been singularly free in its history from republican cabals and disturbances. In this respect it stood almost alone in South America at the outbreak of the recent war. Uruguay, Paraguay and the Argentine had been for long periods under the sway of military dictators. Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Central America have had a succession of military rulers, and many of them have exercised supreme powers of long or short terms. In Venezuela the supremacy of Guzman Blanco has only recently ended after a period of thirty years. In Mexico President Diaz represents strong military, albeit, enlightened and progressive government. If Brazil has reverted in the third years of the republic to a dictatorship more dependent upon the army than the Provisional Government established by bayonets, it has had recourse to expedients familiar to all students of Latin-American civilization.

If Latin-American civilization has had its virtues it has also had its vices. Official corruption and irresponsible power have always tainted Spanish administration methods, and are conspicuous traits in Latin America. Dependence upon military force and contempt for civilians in public life have

been characteristic features of the Political history of Spanish America. In the early days of colonization and conquest military adventurers were always complaining of the disturbances and intrigues caused by lawyers and Indian-reforming monks. Cortez in Mexico, Pizarro in Peru, and the Governors of Hispaniola, Panama and Cartagena repeatedly besought the Home Governments to recall the lawyers and to allow the soldiers to rule the new possession without the interference from civilians. The same jealousy of lawyers and legislators has been shown in nearly every Spanish-American country since the independence. The Presidents ordinarily have been generals; the military garrisons have supported them; and when lawyers and civilians have harassed them in National Legislatures there have been usurpations of power, military dictatorships and suspension of constitutional law.

If military supremacy does not shock the sensibilities of Latin-Americans, as it does those of Anglo-Saxon blood, it is because they recognize the necessity of having a strong government which will be prompt and decisive in suppression revolt and firm in ruling an ignorance and depraved population. Guzman Blanco's supremacy in Venezuela, while indefensible on republican grounds and deplorably corrupt restored peace to a country distracted and paralyzed by civil war. As Latin-Americans state the case, military rule, while incompatible with free institutions, is often necessary when native and mixed races can be governed only with a strong arm and civil strife be repressed. Republican government in Brazil is responsible for the maintenance of public order under adverse conditions of ignorance and lawlessness. If the burdens

are heavy it is because the Empire, with its superficial veneering of enlightenment and progress, left the mass of the population unfit for self-government. The forces of public opinion and civil courage cannot be organized without counter-impulses and reactionary intrigues. Democratic progress will be retarded there as it has been elsewhere in Spanish America by prevailing conditions of ignorance. But the Latin-American world moves in Brazil as well as in Chile. Republicanism in the end will accomplish its perfect work.

37. «A Race with a Taint», *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 9 de novembro

A esmagadora maioria deste povo multirracial não tem a mínima ideia do que é uma votação e até alguns querem o regresso da monarquia no Brasil, nota o jornal do Utah que não esquece um dos objetivos dos Estados Unidos: a dominação, embora «com meios pacíficos», dos países da América Central e Meridional.

The situation in Brazil has bad look. There seems to be something lacking in the Latin race in this country which makes it impossible for them to be a wisely self-governing people. Mexico has doing well since the days of JUAREZ, but that man was nearly full Indian, and he fixed matters so that while Congress has a great deal to say and to do in Mexico, still the President is nearly a sovereign and does about as he has a mind to. Again, JUAREZ ousted entirely the priesthood of Mexico from political control; he prescribed the status of the church and reduced it to a legitimate purpose – to look after the

souls of men – and the loafing, ignorant and licentious branch of priesthood that had been living in petty offices through plundering the people, he sent out to be cooks, dishwashers and hostlers.

Chile has been a stable Government for years up to last year; but Chile is a country where the boys have to get in kindling at night and build fires when it is cold in the morning; have to look after the stock and have to work for a living – they cannot liver on the spontaneous fruits of the country.

In Brazil there is an awful jumble of races, with the Portuguese predominant. They ought to be level-headed enough to govern themselves, but it seems there is a class that believes that a republic is a failure and that it would be better for them to have a king than a president. We can understand this because, in point of fact, not one out of ten of the men in Brazil ought to be given permission to cast a ballot, because they have no conception of government, at least no conception of free government or the restraints that ought to be upon men when they are given the privilege to rule themselves.

Certainly there is not man who loves his country in the United States that does not hope that the trouble with Chile will be amicably settled, that there may be no break in the steadily increasing influence which our country will have upon the countries to the South of us until, through peaceable means, the men of the United States will really dominate all those countries.

38. *The Record-Union*, 9 de novembro

Pequeno comentário, que menciona a chegada do neto de D. Pedro, muito favorável ao marechal que «tem qualidades de estadista».

Fonseca is evidently able do cope with the Brazilian malcontents. He has thus far manifested statesmanlike qualities that indicate capacity to preserve the liberties of the new republic. The anticipated arrival at Rio of a grandson of Dom Pedro will give the monarchists some hope of reviving monarchical sympathies, but it is unlikely that he young man will be disposed to lead an open revolution. Fonseca has called a new Congress to meet in January. He would hardly have done so had he ambition to be dictator. As for the young Prince who is coming to Brazil the President has the power to prevent his landing, and he may exercise it, but he will probably trust to the loyalty of the people to the new free Government and not kindle sympathy for the Prince by any harsh measures.

39. *Democrat and Chronicle*, 9 de novembro

O neto de D. Pedro estaria de partida para o Rio. Isso podia justificar o golpe de Deodoro!

A cable to *The New York Herald* from Rio Janeiro says that Dom Pedro's favorite grandson, Prince Pedro Augusto, is expected to reach the Brazilian capital on a corvette of the Austrian navy in a few days. Prince Augusto is an

officer of the Austrian navy. He was born near Rio in March, 1866, and was always highly regarded by the Brazilians. The news of his proposed visit to Brazil is considered as full justification of the prompt action taken by President Fonseca to protect the republic against the reactionary tendencies that have developed.

40. «Sent a Fleet to Rio Janeiro», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 10 de novembro

Os Estados Unidos têm de enviar uma «frota poderosa» até ao Rio para apoiar a república brasileira ameaçada e proteger dessa forma também os seus interesses, sublinha o jornal que parece acreditar numa viagem do neto D. Pedro ao Brasil. A Áustria não pode repetir no Brasil o que fez no México com Maximiliano nos anos 60 do século XIX !

The hurry of the Navy Department to prepare our warships for active service, rendered necessary to continue work on Sunday. The State Department may have some advices from Chile that would account for the urgency in equipping vessels; but the report through general news agencies indicate a settlement of all difficulties by peaceful means.

It is quite probable that a fleet will be needed in Brazilian waters. The dispatch of a fleet to Rio Janeiro would be a friendly act on the part of our government. The conspiracy against the Brazilian republic is largely a conspiracy against the Unites States and the increase of our trade with Brazil under the reciprocity treaty. If Prince Augusto is really to visit Rio in an

Austrian man-of-war, President Fonseca should have the moral support of an American fleet.

Our government is bound by its traditions to resist foreign interference with the republics of South America, and the time has arrived for action. A fleet sent to Rio would become, and it could, if necessary, go around to Chile in a short time.

A republic has been peacefully organized in Brazil, and will stand if foreign intrigue is kept down. The President took matters in his own hand, to prevent an overthrow of the republic, by the use of the powers granted to Congress under the republic. At present, Brazil is tranquil, but a change may come if a claimant of the throne appears under the protection of Austrian flag. Brazil doesn't want war with Austria and cannot deal successfully with the difficult questions which may arise without some one to lean upon. Prince Augusto might be obliged to go, unless the Austrian representative at Rio consent as favor to the Brazilian government.

European monarchies are not inclined to forego opportunities to encourage the king business in Western Hemisphere. Austria furnished a king for Mexico when the people of the United States were too busy with the rebellion to protect our sister republic. As soon as we were through with the business in hand, the French troops supporting Maximilian were withdrawn from Mexico upon the demand of our government and be reason of an overwhelming public sentiment in France. The capture and execution of Maximilian followed. Austria cannot accomplish much with one war ship, but

Brazil may be placed in a position of defying Austria at a time when the royalists are plotting against the republic. In view of all the circumstances, we hope that our government will send a powerful fleet to Rio to protect our own interests and the interest of free government in the Western Hemisphere.

41. «Turbulent Brazil», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 10 de novembro

Uma eventual declaração de independência por parte do Rio Grande do Sul, «uma das maiores e mais ricas províncias do país», pode levar à guerra civil e, talvez, a uma restauração da monarquia.

Reports of insurrection in the province of Rio Grande do Sul against the dictatorship of da Fonseca foreshadow a protraction of the internal disturbances in Brazil. While they are received with reserve by the representatives of the Brazilian government abroad, their verification would furnish good round for apprehension. Rio Grande do Sul is one of the largest and most prosperous provinces in the country. It lies in the extreme south, contains 111,000 square miles, and is bounded by the Atlantic on the east, Uruguay on the southwest and the Argentine confederation on the northwest. The soil is fertile and has great resources in minerals, timber and pasturage. The people, of German descent, rank among the most vigorous and aggressive in South America. Declaration of independence on their part, if it has taken place, will lead inevitably to a civil war and complicate still further the affairs

of a distracted nation. Prolongation of the turbulence which afflicts Dom Pedro's former subjects may yet prepare the way for restoration of the empire.

42. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 10 de novembro

A «fraqueza da constituição» explica uma parte da crise política brasileira, sublinha o jornal que denuncia também a ingerência inglesa.

There seems to be a considerable amount of genuine political trouble in Brazil. President DA FONSECA has dissolved congress and declared himself dictator again, and the gravest apprehension exists in a financial and commercial circles. A period of dissension would be very bad thing for the new republic, which was just beginning to gain respect of the foreign powers. The weakness in the constitution, to which scholars called attention, at the time of its adoption, seems to be partially responsible of the present unsatisfactory state of affaires, but it is more than suspected that John Bull has at least one of his paws in the pie.

43. *The Fort Worth Gazette*, 10 de novembro

There are rumors of a serious difficulty in Brazil. The congress of that country has taken power of veto from the president, an action which he claims to be unconstitutional, and it is said that there is a possibility if not a

probability of his placing the country under martial law, declaring himself dictator

44. «Our South-American Relations», *The Baltimore Sun*, 11 de novembro

Depois de ter feito um relato da independência do Brasil, diferente em relação à dos outros países sul-americanos, e de ter mencionado a queda de D. Pedro, o jornal lamenta que «os poderes limitados de um presidente constitucional tenham sido substituídos por os de um autoproclamado ditador» e receia a ameaça de uma guerra civil.

A segunda parte do editorial denuncia as condições favoráveis que o comércio das potências europeias têm no Brasil. Por conseguinte, os meios económicos e políticos norte-americanos devem mobilizar-se para que os seus produtos possam também livremente circular no mercado do subcontinente.

The recent troubles which have affected and are still affecting some of our South American neighbors are naturally viewed with interest and should awaken a feeling of sympathy on the part of the people of the United States. To a certain extent the South American republics have had experiences similar to our own and have trodden in our own footsteps. The example of the United States has been to the most of them an encouragement and, in some degree, a model. Like ourselves they were originally colonies of European States, and, like ourselves, were constrained to throw off the yoke of dependence upon the mother country and to proclaim and by force of arms establish their own independence. With the solitary exception of Brazil, copying after the example

of the United States, they adopted from the outset a republican form of the government. Several of them endeavored even to reproduce the federal feature, so prominent in our own system, to the extent, at least, of giving to subordinate political divisions, State or provinces, separate powers of local government and administration.

The exceptional experience of Brazil and the existence of monarchical institutions in that country until recently, were more the result of accident than design. It so happened that the flight of the Portuguese royal family upon the French occupation of Portugal under Napoleon, first to Bahia and then to Rio de Janeiro, had the effect, temporarily, of reversing the previous relations of Brazil to the mother country. With the Portuguese King and court established on this side of the Atlantic, Brazil became the seat of government, and Portugal, politically speaking, the dependency. When subsequently the King and court returned to Lisbon, and a political separation followed, the crown prince of Portugal, who remained behind, became, as the choice of the Brazilian people, the first constitutional ruler of the new state under the title of Dom Pedro I. As he himself was finally compelled to abdicate, so his son and successor, Dom Pedro II, after a long and apparently prosperous and happy reign, has been forced by a sudden, popular and almost bloodless revolution, to do likewise – leaving, however, no heir to succeed him upon the throne. With the abdication and departure of the Emperor Pedro II and his family the throne was abolished and a republic form of government substituted.

To the friend of Brazil and of popular institutions the recent news from that country is, however, disquieting. As has happened in so many of the South American States, the limited powers of a constitutional President have been substituted by those of a self-constituted dictator. The new republic of Brazil is threatened with a repetition of the recent experience of the order republic of Chile, where the ambition of Balmaceda to become dictator gave rise to a disastrous civil war.

As we have said, it is but natural that the people of the United States should profoundly sympathize with those of the South American republics and should seek to cultivate friendly relations with them. Nearly three-quarters of a century ago this feeling of sympathy found expressions in the famous Monroe doctrine, which was but the popular protest against the reputed designs of the holy alliance to extend the field of its operations to this hemisphere and to assist Spain in reducing to subjection her revolted colonies. More recently the Pan-American Conference, whether wisely planned or judiciously carried out or not, was another manifestation of the same feeling and in the same direction. But it is not merely by bonds of sentiment and sympathy that the great republic of North America is and should be united to her sister republics of the southern continent. There are the closest ties of mutual and reciprocal interest between them, which ought to draw them together in the closest relations of friendship and of commerce. They are our natural customers and should furnish a market for our goods, as their products should find a natural market here. It is not flattering to American commercial enterprise nor

creditable to American diplomacy and statesmanship that Europe generally, Great Britain and Germany in particular, should enjoy trade with South America upon more favorable terms and to a vastly greater extent than the United States. American merchants and manufacturers should unite their efforts to those of the government to remove whatever obstacle exist in the way on the introduction of American goods and the development and extension of American commerce with these South American States, our natural, and with the exception of Mexico and Canada, our nearest neighbors, and whose markets lie invitingly open, almost at our very doors.

45. «The War Cloud», *The Detroit Free Press*, 11 de novembro

Editorial que comenta os perigos para a paz no mundo, no Chile, entre a Rússia e a Turquia, entre a França e Marrocos. Depois do golpe de Deodoro, que, na opinião do jornal, não tem qualquer justificação, a guerra civil também ameaça o Brasil.

If the peace of all nations can be maintained until existing complications and troubles are adjusted it will speak volumes for higher civilization, as well as the diplomacy, of the age. Chile had no sooner thrown off the arbitrary rule of Balmaceda than she saucily courted trouble with the greatest nation on earth, and as saucily attempted to justify the wanton slaughter of the United States marines. The present condition of affairs in Brazil is much such as recently existed in Chile. Fonseca gives a paradoxical explanation for his assumption of authority in dissolving Congress and proclaiming himself

dictator. He says that his course was taken with a view to thwarting the efforts of those who sought to overthrow republican institutions and restore the monarchy. It is an untenable theory of government that liberty can be preserved by tyrannical methods. The congressional party does not take kindly to his assertion of sovereign power. The dispatches state that some sections have declared for the establishment of local government and in the general feeling of discontent appears the evidence of a grave crisis which may eventuate in revolution. The transition from an empire to a republic, it will be remembered, was as sudden as unexpected. By a single stroke of state Dom Pedro was deposed, and the people found themselves members of a republic without going through the usual evolution of government leading up to such a result. The doubtless desired a republic, but it remains to be seen whether they have had that training and experience which will enable them to peacefully maintain it. [...]

46. «The Most Important Duty of Congress», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 11 de novembro

A revolta no Rio Grande do Sul é mais um exemplo que deve convencer o deputados americanos a votar novos créditos para a marinha. Com efeito, os Estados Unidos precisam ter uma frota poderosa para poder defender, sempre e em qualquer lugar do mundo, os seus interesses.

The revolution which is now threatened by the action of the Province of Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, portending as it does all the horrors of civil strife,

once more emphasizes the necessity of expediting the construction of our battleships and so increasing our naval strength that we may be able to protect American interests at any time and in any place. With the cruisers we already have and those which are nearly ready, reinforced by six our eight powerful battleships instead of the three which the last Congress authorized to be built, there would be no question as to the protection of our interest, not only in Latin America, but at home. It is only by the possession of such a navy that this government can expect to take a commanding position and make itself respected. Naval strength is what has made England so formidable a power. If in the great wars of the past she had not possessed such a powerful navy she would not have been what she is today. We must preserve our rights and we cannot tell at what time we may have to fight for them [...]

47. «Brazil and Chile», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 11 de novembro

Depois de ter acusado «os agentes britânicos de estarem a fazer no Brasil as mesmas maldades que fizeram no Chile», como o seu colega de Chicago, também este editorialista insiste sobre a necessidade absoluta para os Estados Unidos de terem uma poderosa frota de guerra. Esta, por enquanto, nem sequer estaria em condições de enfrentar uma potência europeia de segundo plano, lamenta o diário de Rochester.

All the disquieting reports from Brazil come by way of London. It is apparent that British agents are playing the mischief there as in Chile. Were it

not for British hostility to Minister Egan⁹ and to the commercial advancement of the United States in Chile, there would be no trouble today with the Chileans. The British minister at Santiago is not suspected nor molested, although the captain of a British war ship carried out of the country nearly a million dollars in silver taken from the public Treasury by Balmaceda. The Chilean fear and respect England because she has a powerful navy. They have yet to be taught that the navy of the United States is now equal to enforcing respect for our flag. There is a probability that at least eleven ships of our navy will soon visit Chilean waters for the purpose of showing that we are not helpless, or disposed to pucker an insult.

In view of the present emergency, Congress will not be justified in any neglect to strengthen the navy. Addition should be made as rapidly as possible to our armor-clad vessels. A few good vessels are now on the stocks, but when all are completed our navy will no be in condition to meet any first, or even second, rate power of Europe.

48. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 11 de novembro

Nestes dois comentários, o jornal do Nebraska utiliza os recentes acontecimentos em terras brasileiras para fazer polêmica com a imprensa do Partido Democrata, acusada de defender os interesses comerciais britânicos, e para refletir sobre a Guerra Civil do seu país.

⁹ Patrick Egan (1841-1919) foi ministro dos Estados Unidos em Santiago de 1889 a 1893.

The democratic anti-reciprocity organs are already removing President Fonseca from office as a bloody tyrant, because he dissolved his congress, ordered a new election and is at present «dictator.» But his real offense against these editors is that he signed the reciprocity treaty and opened the ports of Brazil to American production to the detriment of British trade. Anything that interferes with British trade is a personal affront to a democratic editor. In the meantime probably the people of Brazil will manage their own domestic affairs.

[...]

The provinces are taking advantage of the troubled state of affairs at the capital of Brazil and are dropping away lone after other from the central government. President Fonseca seems to be in no position to whip them back into line at present, and they will probably stay out until they get ready to return. These provinces are doing just what some of our southern states¹⁰ thought they had a right to do prior to the little constitutional argument of thirty years ago. Unless the movement among these dissatisfied provinces is checked it will be extremely difficult to reorganize the government on any strong and permanent basis.

The folly of an attempt to build up a real nation without insisting upon all the responsibilities of a full partnership from every one of the states seems likely to be demonstrated in near future in Brazil. If the republic drops to pieces and becomes a mass of independent and quarrelsome states we will have an

¹⁰ O segundo comentário é publicado também dois dias depois.

excellent picture of the conditions that might have prevailed in North America had the purpose of the secessionists been carried out and the principle of state sovereignty been triumphant.

49. Brazil's Trouble», *The Fort Worth Gazette*, 11 de novembro

O jornal texano, comentando a entrevista de D. Pedro II na qual o ex-monarca se declarava pronto a regressar ao país se os brasileiros lho pedissem, escreve que o Brasil vai ser durante anos «um foco de sedição, de intriga e de turbulências políticas». Por conseguinte, não é para ser governado por um homem «fraco e decrépito», «à beira da morte».

The Republic of Brazil, that sprung into existence so unexpectedly about two years ago, has already regenerated into a dictatorship, the condition usual in Spanish-American countries. The supporters of the imperial regime have been working to overthrow the republican system, it seems, and bring about a restoration of kingly rule. Whether they succeed or not, there is bound to be an unsettled condition of affairs at that country for years, or until the old friends and retainers of the ex-emperor shall have passed away. Poor old Dom Pedro, feeble and decrepit with age, and tottering on the verge of the grave, says that if it is the will of the Brazilians to restore the monarchy, he will venture to cross the ocean and ascend the throne once more to do what he can for his beloved people. Good old man! He means well of course. But he would better stick to his prayers and his rosaries. Brazil is no place for him now, even though he were called to take up the scepter once more. That land is sure to be for years a

hotbed of sedition, intrigue and political turbulence with which none but the hardiest and ablest can contend.

50. The Revolution in Brazil», *The Indianapolis Journal*, 12 de novembro

A primeira parte deste longo editorial fala da falta de educação e de espírito republicano no povo brasileiro em 1889. A queda dos Bragança foi um «golpe de uma camarilha», sem participação popular e que não encontrou nenhuma oposição. Por conseguinte, escreve o jornalista, não é nada surpreendente que, depois desta mudança rápida, «sem esforços nem sacrifícios», haja instabilidade e que os monárquicos tentem retomar o poder.

Na segunda, debruça-se sobre a influência e lugar ocupado pelos ingleses e pelos alemães no Brasil. Segundo o jornal de Indianápolis, os dois países ficaram prejudicados pelo acordo americano-brasileiro de fevereiro. É por isso – e também porque detestam o regime republicano – que agora fazem tudo o que estiver ao seu alcance para derrubar o governo de Deodoro. Com a eventual mudança de executivo, este acordo comercial ficaria caduco: as duas potências europeias poderiam desse modo conservar a sua grande influência no antiga colônia portuguesa.

The situation in Brazil presents some curious and interesting features. Making due allowance for the meagerness of the news and for the fact that it is probably subject to local censorship, it is evident that Brazil is in a state of revolution, the result of which cannot be foretold with any degree of accuracy. The main facts, so far as they can be gleaned from confused dispatches, are that Marshal da Fonseca, the first President of the republic, has assumed dictatorial powers, martial law has been declared throughout the country, and

three provinces, if not more, have seceded to strict supervision, it is probable that the situation is much more serious than they indicate, but they reveal enough to prove that the country is in a state of revolution, the end of which cannot be foreseen.

In view of all the circumstances this is not surprising. The overthrow of the empire in Brazil and the establishment of a republic was simply a sudden popular freak. There was no evidence of any strong conviction on the part of the people in favor of a change, and certainly no indication that they were educated in the principles of republican government. The change was accomplished in a few hours, and appeared more like the bold stroke of a clique or faction than the deliberate and conscientious action of the people. It was not according to the nature of things that a new form of government born so suddenly and, as it were, so easily, should be enduring. It lacked the consecration of great efforts and sacrifices, the sacred baptism of blood and fire.

It was inevitable that the establishment of a republic in such hasty and impromptu fashion should be followed by immediate scheming for the restoration of the empire. Dom Pedro, the exiled Emperor, left friends and relatives behind him who were not likely to submit quietly to the new order of things, and it would not be difficult for them to excite disaffection towards the republic among a people so little educated in republican ideas as are the Brazilians. Moreover, the new government was likely to play into their hands by assuming powers and exercising authority to which it had no right. In South

American states the first idea of a man elected President of a republic seems to be to clothe himself with extraordinary power, and either prolong his term of office or name his successor. The ruling classes are naturally monarchists or dictatorists, and it will take a long time to educate them into republican ideas. It is not surprising, therefore, that the sudden birth of the Brazilian republic should be followed by a reaction towards monarchism among the adherents of the late Emperor, and by a general movement towards secession among the provinces. The dispatches state that three provinces have declared their independence of the central government, viz.: The provinces of Rio Grande do Sul, Pernambuco and Para. The latter is one of the most important provinces in Brazil. Each of these provinces has taken steps for the formation of an independent provisional government, and it will take a strong hand to bring them back. Whether their secession is the interest of the restoration of the monarchy, or whether they wish to become independent states, does not appear; but that does not matter so far as the present government is concerned. In either case the movement means the overthrow of the republic.

There is another feature of the case which, when the facts come out, will probably be found to figure prominently in the present movement. This is foreign influence. British and German influences predominate in Brazil, and there are two reasons why they should wish the restoration of the monarchy; first, their natural hostility to republican government; and, second, their desire to retain control of Brazilian trade. The new reciprocity arrangement between the United States and Brazil is a deadly blow at European trade and supremacy

in that country. It places the United States on the footing of the most favored nation, and compels England and Germany to take back seats. They will fight long and hard before they will submit to this. English and German interests in Brazil are very large. The citizens of those countries residing there are wealthy, shrewd and enterprising. They will stop at nothing to carry their ends and prevent the United States from getting control of Brazilian trade. The quickest and easiest way to accomplish this is to bring about the overthrow of the republic. Our reciprocity arrangement is made with the present government, and the overthrow of the government would, for the present at least, end reciprocity. The arrangement might possibly be renewed with a new government, but that would be doubtful. At all events, the restoration of the monarchy would give England and Germany a chance to maintain the supremacy which is now about to slip from their grasp. There is every reason to believe that the English and German residents in Brazil are scheming to this end, and it is highly probable that the diplomatic and consular representatives of both countries are secretly working in the same direction. When fuller reports of the movement are received it will doubtless be found that the foreign resident in Brazil are a unit against the present government, and if civil war ensues the English and Germans will be found fighting in the rank of the revolutionists. Thus many influences conspire against the republic.

51. «The Braking up of Brazil», *The New-York Times*, 12 de novembro

Existe um grande descontentamento na capital, nomeadamente por causa das manipulações monetárias do ditador para favorecer os seus interesses. O editorialista fala das características de quatro estados rebeldes que podem entrar em secessão. Isso, na sua opinião, vai muito mais além de uma forte oposição ao governo central: trata-se de uma «revolta contra o próprio Brasil».

Este país é enorme, com pouquíssimas infraestruturas, com uma fraca densidade demográfica, que o tornam muito difícil de governar. Falta um símbolo unificador, como era antigamente a casa de Bragança. Agora, se a Bahía, Pernambuco, o Pará e o Rio Grande do Sul se tornarem independentes, sublinha o jornal, assistiríamos à «completa dissolução do Brasil».

The Government of the United States of Brazil has endured for almost exactly two years, for it was on the 15th of November, 1889, that Dom PEDRO was dethroned by what had the appearance rather of a riot than of a revolution. It could not fairly be said that he was the victim of a popular uprising, for, although the abolition of slavery without compensation was doubtless very extensively resented throughout the empire, the “revolution” was confined to the capital itself, and was the result, in large parte, of a military cabal, directed rather against the son-in-law of Dom PEDRO than against the amiable monarch. On the other hand, the revolt against the republic that has succeeded the Imperial Government is evidently and unmistakably the result of a widespread popular discontent. It appears to be true that four States – Pará, Pernambuco, Bahia, and Rio Grande do Sul – either have seceded or are upon the point of

secession from the republic. These four States are so distant from each other that it is plain no local or sectional cause can have operated upon them all. Pará is almost northernmost and Rio Grande do Sul quite the southernmost of the States of a country of magnificent distances, and these extremities are more than 2,000 miles apart, while Pernambuco occupies the easternmost point of South America and is separated by some hundred of miles from Bahia. The seceding States are so far separated than no two of them are at all in touch with each other.

It is equally significant that these four States are, with the exception of the capital itself, the most commercial, civilized, and modern of all the States of Brazil. They are all on the coast, and Bahia and Pernambuco are in as intimate communication with the outer world as the conditions of Brazilian life permit. Para is the chief seat of the rubber industry, and it was by reason of the great burdens imposed upon this industry by the Imperial Government that Pará became a center of disaffection to that Government. In Bahia are several of the few cotton factories the Brazilians have had the enterprise to establish, while Pará, Bahia, and Pernambuco, with Rio, are the principal ports of Brazil. Of its five naval arsenals, one is at Pará, one at Pernambuco, and one at Bahia. Rio Grande do Sul is the seat of the industry of "jerked beef", which plays so important a part in the internal trade of South America, and it is also the State most largely peopled by European colonists. It is easy to see, therefore, that the defection of these four States would result in the complete break-up of Brazil, and that they are far more important to it than the statement of their

population would show, although this is serious enough, since of the fourteen millions that are somewhat loosely estimated to inhabit Brazil, these four states contain over 4,400,000, or nearly a third.

The statement of the case indicates that any effort to coerce these provinces back into allegiance to the Central Government would be perfectly futile. Brazil, it is to be remembered, is in much the same situation in which America colonies were at the time of the Revolution. That is to say, of its vast expanse, all that is necessary to be taken into political account is a thin fringe of population along the seaboard, while the interior is very largely even unexplored and is populated by what CARLYLE¹¹ somewhere scornfully summarizes as an “unknown fraction of profligate niggers and mulattoes”, and even more largely of savage Indians. If Massachusetts, New-York, Maryland, and South Carolina had seceded from the Union two years after its formation, the situation would have been much like that now presented in Brazil. It would have been impossible for Federal Government to coerce these States, which were among its chief sources of revenue and of support. The extract given in our news columns from Rio newspapers show that much discontent with the Government of FONSECA is felt at the capital itself. This discontent appears to have arisen mainly from the practice, to which South American dictators are so much addicted, of manipulating the currency of the country in their own interests. How far it is identical with the discontent in the seceding States we have no means of judging. Evidently, however, the secession means more than

¹¹ Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), escritor, histórico e satirista britânico da era vitoriana.

a mere discontent with the existing Administration, and is a revolt against the Republic of Brazil itself.

A country so extensive, so little settled, of so diverse interests, and so ill furnished with modern means of communication as Brazil, is, plainly enough, a country difficult to be kept politically together. The great distances are far greater because the country is so backward. A century ago there was more local and sectional jealousy in the United States than there is now, when it is settled and civilized from ocean to ocean, and when San Francisco is as near New-York, for purposes of travel, as Boston then was to Washington, and far nearer, as respects the transmission of intelligence, than New-York then was to Philadelphia. To keep together such a tract of land as Brazil there must be some concrete symbol of authority and patriotism. Such a symbol has been furnished to Russia for century by the existence of the Czar. Such a symbol was furnished to Brazil by the rule of the House of Braganza until the dethronement of the Emperor. The present situation brings the political wisdom of that act more than ever into question, creditable to the Brazilian people as was the absence of vindictiveness with which it was performed.

52. «Monkeying with Reciprocity», *New-York Tribune*, 12 de novembro

O editoralista critica a imprensa democrata, favorável ao comércio livre, e defende as vantagens do tratado assinado em fevereiro publicando os

dados estatísticos das exportações americanas para o Brasil. Estas aumentaram depois da entrada em vigor do tratado comercial em abril.

The Democratic press stands in wholesome dread of the success of the Reciprocity policy. This is evident from its frantic efforts to prove that nothing has been gained by the passage of the Aldrich amendment and the diplomatic action of the State Department in negotiating commercial agreements with Brazil, the Spanish West Indies and San Domingo. One of these journals tries to prove that in the export of most of the articles admitted to Brazil free of duty, or with reduced duty “there has been no increase at all, and that as to those articles of which the export has increased, the export to other countries with which we have no Reciprocity agreement has increased in much greater measure”. This leads that Free-Trade organ to conclude that Reciprocity is something “deadly”.

There is a very simple test by which the value to Reciprocity may be determined. The treaty went into effect on April 1, 1891. If its provisions were beneficial to the American export trade the return of the Bureau of Statistics for corresponding months of 1890 and 1891 would show a marked increase. This is precisely what the returns do show. The following is a comparison by months: [...] ¹²

¹² Compara a seguir os dados das exportações americanas para o Brasil de abril a agosto para os dois anos. Segundo estas estatísticas, as exportações dos Estados Unidos aumentaram de mais de 1,1 milhão de dólares num total de 5,3 milhões.

During the same period, there was a very large increase in the export of Brazil to the United States, The Reciprocity policy being mutually advantageous to both countries. That the increase of \$ 1, 169,592 in five months was directly to be attributed to the commercial agreement we demonstrated a few days ago by printing a classified table of export, in which the gains were distributed among articles either in the free or the reduced schedules, and the losses among those not covered by diplomatic action. The only exception was cottons, in which there was a slight loss notwithstanding the advantage of 25 percent. All other exports favored by the commercial agreement were increased. Until our Free-Trade adversaries succeed in proving the incorrectness of these official returns, they will do well to cease monkeying with other and inclusive statistic. The gain of \$1,169,592 in five months is a fact which proves incontestably that Reciprocity is enlarging the foreign demand for American exports.

Why these Free-Trade advocates should attempt to establish the "deadliness" of the Reciprocity polity that the country would be more prosperous if its ports were opened more freely to foreign importations. But when Reciprocity with its limited application to non-competing products performs that function, they describe it as "a deadly policy". Brazil had enlarged its free list and taken 29 percent from the duties on various classes of exports; and the United States in return offers so large a measure of unrestricted trade in July, 1891, out of a total importation of \$ 4,068,872 only \$668 was dutiable. These conditions the Democratic press pronounces "deadly", although it is

advocating at all times Free Trade and lower duties on import. If commercial union and less restricted trade in non-competing products of different zones be of no advantage to the United States, as it loudly asserts, how “deadly” would be its own policy of un restricted trade in all products!

Na mesma data, o jornal de Nova Iorque publica um pequeno comentário. É preciso ter muito cuidado com as informações vindas de Valparaíso, via Londres, porque contém muitas mentiras, devidas «à ignorância e aos preconceitos ingleses em relação às instituições republicanas brasileiras», avisa o diário da metrópole norte-americana.

The news from Brazil about revolts in Para and in the southern provinces is to be received with extreme caution and reserve. It comes mainly by way of England, Valparaiso being one of the centers of collection. Its preparation and diffusion resemble the primitive methods of making sugar in Brazil, by which the juice is extracted and clarified through the pressure of large masses of mud. Some truth may work its way through the dense layers of prejudice and ignorance existing in England respecting the new Republican institutions, but the percentage is so small that prudent observer will refrain from analyzing the London dispatches.

53. «The Brazilian Trouble», *The Washington Post*, 12 de novembro

Editorial consagrado às províncias que se revoltaram contra Fonseca. Da reação do Marechal vai depender o futuro do Brasil: se responder com a

força militar, o país vai viver, e durante muito tempo, num clima de guerra civil, prevê o jornal da capital americana.

Notwithstanding the assurances given elsewhere that the dissolution of the Brazilian Congress and the dictatorship of Fonseca would not interrupt the quietude and prosperity of the country, but was intended to re-establish the republic on surer foundations, the latest news from Brazil indicates great dissatisfaction among the people, and announces the secession and hostile independence of three or more important States. Affairs seem already to have got into such a condition that the outlook is a long and bloody civil war, which will probably end in the overthrow of Fonseca's dictatorship and the establishment of a number of separate republics, like those which have arisen in South Africa.

The first province to revolt against the dictatorship of Fonseca was that of Rio Grande do Sul, lying in the extreme south. The local government refused to acquiesce in Fonseca's dictatorship and declared the independence of the province. It contains about 111,000 square miles, is generally fertile, has great resources tin minerals, timber, and pasturage, and two of its cities have a large import and export trade. The province is largely colonized by Germans; it has an available military force of 50,000 citizen soldiers, all of German origin, and it is believed that this force will be thoroughly effective for purpose of resistance and defense.

The second province to revolt was Para in the extreme north. It has an area of 412,467 square miles and a population of 343,511. The city of Para is the

great rubber exporting port of the world. Pernambuco and Bahia are also in revolt. Fonseca will have to move rapidly if he wishes to suppress these various attempts at the establishment of separate governments.

At present the dictator has everything but time and the people in his favor. He has an army of over 26,000 men, and his naval forces comprise 5,790 officers and men. His navy consists of some thirty ships of different classes, but all of them effective against mere insurgents in the defenseless coast town. Whether the show of resistance to his authority, which has been made, will cause him to hesitate remains to be seen, but, if it does not, there will be an end, not only for the present, but for a considerable period in the future, of the peace and prosperity of Brazil.

**54. «The Threatened Dismemberment of Brazil»,
The Chicago Daily Tribune, 12 de novembro**

Também este editorial estuda as revoltas em algumas províncias e nomeadamente sobre a do Rio Grande Sul. Isto constitui um sério problema para o ditador que, escreve o jornal, arrisca-se acabar como Balmaceda. O editorialista, segundo o qual uma guerra civil parece inevitável, lamenta o facto do Brasil não ter assinado o plano de arbitragem proposto pela conferencia pan-americana que, «talvez, podia ter impedido» este conflito.

The unfortunate Republic of Brazil is threatened with fresh calamities. Closely following the dissolution of Congress and the assumption of dictatorship by da Fonseca, the important southern province of Rio Grande do

Sul has not only refused this act of usurpation but had declared the independence and set up a miniature republic of his own, to the Presidency of which it has elected Silvereo Martinez [*sic*], a citizen of great influence. Reports also come from the northern provinces of Pernambuco, showing great discontent, and there are rumors of a disquieted feeling in all the States which bodes little good to republic. As the outcome of the action of Rio Grande do Sul, it is confronted already with the dismal prospect of civil war, for, having the army at his back, it is not likely that the dictator will submit to the course which this province has taken.

Later advices say there is no longer attempt to deny that the Province of Pernambuco has joined the Province of Rio Grande do Sul in declaring its independence. Great excitement prevails at Rio de Janeiro and throughout Brazil. It is reported here tonight that Marshal da Fonseca has been informed that he is suffering from a disease which must soon cause his death and that he has announced his willingness to resign the reins of power. The German population of Rio Grande do Sul is reported to be organizing into armed bodies of men on the plan of the Dutch settlers of South Africa and to be determined to defend the independence of their new State.

Rio Grande do Sul is the sixth largest province in Brazil, the other five being Ceara, Pernambuco, Bahia, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and San Paulo. It has an area of 91,335 square miles, a population of 564,527, and is situated at the extreme southeastern point of Brazil, bordering on the frontier of Uruguay. It has a coast line of 4000 miles, but not many ports of importance, owing to the

difficulty of navigation in their harbors. Nevertheless it has a considerable commerce and promises to become one of the most prosperous of all the Brazilian provinces. It has valuable coal mines, important fisheries, raises large herds of cattle and handsome crops of wheat, which is made into flour in its own mills. The Italian colonists produce 25,000 pipes of wine annually. Wool is grown and cloth manufactured, and fine cashmere from its merinos are sold in Rio Janeiro.

The dispatches state that this province is largely colonized by Germans and maintains an army of 50,000 men of German origin. The statement, however, is not altogether correct. A German colony of 126 persons was organized at Sao Leopoldo by Pedro I. in 1824, which has increased since that time to over 40,000. The dispatch therefore must refer rather to the entire German population than to the number in the army, though it is not improbable that a liberal element of Germans or German descendants are to be found in the ranks, and that to this extent it will be found superior to the native forces when it is called into action. Out of this colony forty-three others have sprung in this province, the members of which are largely engaged in agricultural pursuits, the principal one of which is in the cultivation of tobacco. Their whole number, however, does not reach 50,000.

It will be seen from this general stretch that in military strength and resources Rio Grande do Sul is in a position to make serious trouble for the dictator. If the revolution breaks out in other provinces, as now appears likely, it is not impossible that he may meet with a fate akin to that of Balmaceda, so

far at least as defeat is concerned. The situation, indeed, is a deplorable one, but there appears to be no other solution of the problem than by the stern and bloody arbitrament of civil war. From this point of view there will be universal regret that Secretary Blaine's plan of arbitration, as adopted unanimously by the Pan-American conference, has not been ratified by Brazil. Only two States – Bolivia and Ecuador, neither of them of much importance – have thus far ratified the treaty of arbitration. By the provisions of that treaty all controversies or differences would have been submitted to arbitration and this unhappy conflict which now menaces Brazil perhaps might have been prevented. As it is now, the future of this great country cannot be foreseen. Personal ambitions threaten its peace and republican system, has received a most serious hurt in the most important nation of South America, thereby setting an example to the smaller republics which is fraught with danger.

55. «A Restless Continent», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 12 de novembro

Este artigo – que contém uma série de lugares comuns – quer explicar porque, na América do Sul, não é possível implantar uma república como aquela dos Estados Unidos. A única solução para que «estes impetuosos sul-americanos» possam progredir é muito simples, segundo o jornal de Chicago: estas «cabeças-quentes» deveriam cada vez mais, e a vários níveis, ter contactos com o «povo comedido dos Estados Unidos».

South America now appears in turmoil from Brazil to Chile and from the straits of Magellan to the Caribbean sea. Chile has but recently concluded her bloody civil war and is now all eager to seek a whipping from the United States. In Uruguay there are ominous signs of coming trouble and the Argentine is prostrate after her financial debauch of a year ago. But, two years since, Brazil overthrew her monarchical form of government and entered the sisterhood of republics with a great flourish of trumpets. The short-lived republic now threatens to fly to pieces before it has been fairly unified under the republican system. If there are any other nations in South America that are not fighting or about to fight it is simply because they are already exhausted with warfare or are so near the equator that their citizens are too debilitated to cut on another's throats.

One naturally seeks the meaning of this evident failure of democratic government to take root in South America. Upon a little examination the reason appears to be very plain and simple. The Spanish-American hybrids of South America are not fitted to either enjoy or utilize the privilege of a government by the people. They are not republican by nature, disposition or inheritance. They are despots from an inheritance of centuries. It has therefore come to pass that none but a despotic government can stand in South America.

The Indian native or peon of South America is indolent, and without ambition or education. The privileges of the citizen are therefore useless when once placed in his hand. The Spanish-Americans are descendants of the Spanish buccaneers of three centuries ago and of the native inhabitants of the

land. They are overbearing, domineering, vindictive and brave. Is easy to see that a republic like our own is an inherent impossibility in South America.

What these Spanish-Indian-Portuguese people will make of themselves and their countries it is difficult to tell. It will take years before they can grasp the essential meaning of a democratic government. In the meantime revolutions, assassinations and intrigues will probably be the order of the day. Close connections, financially, commercially and socially with the temperate people of the United States will do much to educate these South American hotspurs. In this lies their salvation.

56. «Affairs in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 12 de novembro

Não podemos julgar as repúblicas sul-americanas como se fossem a república dos Estados Unidos, afirma o editorialista. Por exemplo, os povos do subcontinente não têm a mínima noção do que são os direitos constitucionais ou a legalidade. O jornalista sugere aos brasileiros para eles «não correrem atrás da sombra da liberdade» e de considerar o essencial: uma ditadura provisória é «imensamente preferível» à anarquia.

We are, perhaps, too apt to think that because Brazil has adopted a republican form of government the people of Brazil must look at political matter as we do, and they may be reached by the same appeals, influenced by the same arguments and affected by the same considerations.

The mistake is not an unnatural one, but still it is a mistake. It will not do to leave out of the question the radical difference in temperament between the

Latin and the Anglo-Saxon races any more than to ignore our century of education in the principle of liberty and the study of self-government. The personal equation is an element that must enter into all calculations and computations, and any result which omits it must be erroneous.

This is suggested by a recent dispatch which says that two of the Brazilian provinces have revolted because da Fonseca has proclaimed himself dictator. We can see at once that in this country if a President should dissolve Congress, put himself at the head of the army and navy and declare himself supreme, the whole country would ablaze in the twinkling of an eye, not because of any fear of an overthrow of the republican form of the government, but on account of the gross invasion of the legal and constitutional rights of the people.

It is hardly possible that such a sentiment can be general in Brazil, for the people there, for the most part, have no acquaintance with any such thing as legal or constitutional rights. If the province of Rio Grande do Sul and Grande Para have revolted and declared their independence it must be the work of the political opponents of President da Fonseca who are jealous of him and aspire to rival his authority.

The Brazilian would do better to avoid running after the shadow of liberty and pay more attention to the substance. They should bear in mind that liberty, except under the reign of law and constituted authority, is certain to degenerate into license, and that as between anarchy and the temporary rule of a dictator the latter is vastly preferable.

57. *The Record-Union*, 12 de novembro

O diário californiano vê um início da solução da crise que vive o «infeliz Brasil»: a saída de Deodoro da cena política.

The news from Brazil is now unsatisfactory. Disquiet is increasing, States are threatening to secede and President Fonseca is being driven to adopt dictatorial measures to preserve the public peace and his own position. It begins to look as if the revolution was already on foot, and that a bitter civil war is almost unavoidable. The nation, we very much fear, will very soon be spoken of as "unhappy Brazil". If the revolution is declared, it is not improbable that Fonseca will resign to restore order, and will ask that his successor be chosen. If that action will save the Republic, the incumbent of the office ought to be patriotic enough to step down and out, and as he is a brave man and a devoted lover of republican institutions, we entertain the belief that he will put his personality out of the case.

58. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 12 de novembro

Prudência, antes de interpretar as informações vindas da América do Sul.

The dispatches yesterday morning from Brazil were unanimously against the dictator, Fonseca. But there are so many fake dispatches from South America that it is prudent to wait before forming a very decided opinion

as to the situation. It is pretty evident that the story that Fonseca is working for the restoration of Dom Pedro or one of his family is not true.

59. *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 12 de novembro

O povo brasileiro não está maduro para viver num regime democrático.

Things do not look good in Brazil. Perhaps an election can save the country, but it seems to lack all coherence between the different States; and the whole country betrays such a state of affairs as existed in Mexico from the time of the gaining of the independence of that country up to the final settlement after MAXIMILIAN'S death. We fear those people are not capable of self-government.

60. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 12 de novembro

Quando os militares estão no poder, a guerra está sempre por perto.

War is said to be "likely" in Brazil. Certainly, war is likely wherever there are generals without a vent for their vivacity. Military rule is a constant temptation to battle and murder and sudden death.

61. «South America», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 12 de novembro

*Outra revista de imprensa do diário de Chicago*¹³.

The Omaha Daily Bee (Nebraska):

There is a well-grounded suspicion that the little Brazilian difficulty is largely due to English interference.

St. Louis Globe-Democrat (Missuri):

Poor Brazil ! If she keeps on production convulsions and "crises" she will soon drop to the low plans occupied by Salvador and Chile.

[...]

The Philadelphia Enquirer (Pensilvânia) :

If is not at all improbable that the whole trouble has been stirred up by English in Brazil; and if so we may expect them to do all they can to turn it to the disadvantage of the United States. They are intensely jealous of this country, and the success of Mr. Blaine's reciprocity policy has enraged them.

¹³ Para cada jornal, acrescentámos o nome do estado entre parêntesis, cada vez que nos pareceu necessário.

The Recorder (Nova Iorque):

It is a shock to the faith of the world in the progress of government toward liberty to find the people of Brazil still willing to submit to a dictatorship. Any attempt to reestablish monarchy on Americana soil cannot meet with permanent success. The spirit of the age and the increasing enlightenment of the masses are against it.

The Salt Lake Tribune (Utah):

As again there is a revolution reported in Brazil, another in Salvador, old Mexico has just put down one, there is panic and prostration in Argentina, and out of all the trouble and contention it is not impossible at all that at any time our country may be involved in trouble which will put into use every ship that she has on the sea and make a demand for more.

New York Tribune:

The southern half of this continent bears the impress of the virtues and vices of Spanish and Portuguese conquest following the discoveries of Columbus. Democratic progress will be retarded there as it has been elsewhere in Spanish America by prevailing conditions of ignorance. But the Latin-American world moves in Brazil as well as in Chile. Republicanism in the end will accomplish its perfect work.

[...]

St. Paul Pioneer-Press (Minnesota)

We make a great mistake whenever we permit ourselves to be deceived, through our devotion to republican principles, by these kaleidoscopic changes in the governments south of us, or allow ourselves to shoos sides by reason of the titular allegiance or opposition of different parties to the forms of a republic. With the possible exception of the Argentine, there is not a single State in South America where the name "republic" is not so completely a misnomer as to be ridiculous.

The Commercial Advertiser (Nova Iorque):

The President of the Republic of Brazil is relying upon the military arm of the government to sustain him. The standing army of that country is but 12.000 men, and would, of course, be futile in the event of any uprising of the people where there is a population of 14,000,000. A president who is obliged to depend upon the military for support is leaning upon a weak reed at best; but particularly is this true of Fonseca, who has proved himself but little less of a monarchist than was the late Emperor Dom Pedro.

Democrat and Chronicle (Nova Iorque):

It will be the duty of our government to give to President Fonseca all the moral support that can be justly extended in his contest which reactionary representatives and British mischief-makers. These meddlers have shown too

clearly what they can do in Chile to instill hostility against the United States to permit any observing person to question their disposition do make trouble in Brazil. Great Britain is making a tremendous effort to nullify the good result of American nations and the policy of reciprocity adopted by the Fifty-first Congress. But she must not succeed.

The News and Courier (Carolina do Sul)

If the people of Brazil choose to overthrow the present government, even if they should foolishly reestablish for a while the monarchy, that is their business and not ours. Our policy should be not to countenance any man of set of men calling themselves a President and Cabinet in enforcing on a free people, whose representatives have been contemptuously dispersed à la Cromwell, any form of government to which they are opposed, whether it be called a monarchy or a republic. The real right to be secured is the right of the people to govern themselves, and that right is often in as great peril under a republican government as it could be under a monarchy.

62. «Sent a Fleet to Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 13 de novembro

Uma frota americana tem de estar nas águas territoriais do Brasil para apoiar o governo do Rio contra as eventuais interferências das potências europeias.

A cable dispatch from Lisbon states that Portugal has decided to send war ships to Brazil to protect Portuguese interests. The fears of the Portuguese government may have been excited by the wild rumors published in London, or Portugal may have some part in the apparent conspiracy for a restoration of the monarchy. Whether Portugal be involved or not, the presence of Portuguese ships will encourage the enemies of the republic and friends of Prince Augusto, who confidently expected to reach Brazil in an Austrian man-of-war.

In view of the decision of the Portuguese government there is more need than ever of the presence of powerful fleet of our war ships in Brazilian waters. The government of Brazil should have the moral support of an American fleet as against any effort toward European interference in the affairs of that country.

63. «The Situation in Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 13 de novembro

Comentário muito favorável ao Marechal-ditador que teve de reagir para defender a república dos ataques dos nostálgicos do antigo regime. O editorialista, que desvaloriza as notícias de revoltas nas províncias, censura também alguns órgãos de imprensa norte-americanos que põem em dúvida as medidas tomadas por Deodoro da Fonseca.

There is undoubtedly some excitement in portion of Brazil, but so far the highly colored reports of revolts and secession of states, cables from London, have not been confirmed. Royalists and a few disgruntled Republicans would

undoubtedly like to throw the country into a state of anarchy, and British agents are encouraging them. But President Fonseca is conducting the affairs of the state with a firm hand, and doing nothing except to head off the schemes of the reactionary leaders. It is the opinion of Minister Mendonça, in Washington, that there is no disturbance in any state that requires Federal interference, the governors being capable of dealing with all outbreaks.

We are sorry to see some American newspapers cast doubts upon the good intentions of President Fonseca. They have formed judgments from insufficient evidence, and should recall to mind the fact that Brazil was but recently a monarchy and that the new constitution has made the most sweeping changes, some of them calculated to arouse antagonism. All of these constitutional provisions are in the direction of larger liberty. Church and State have been divorced, secular schools have been established and freedom of worship declared. Capital punishment has been abolished and the freedom of the press established. This constitution, devoted to liberty, was drawn under the eye of the President, and we cannot believe that he intends more than to preserve the new form of government from the attacks of those who have taken advantage of the liberal guaranties to overthrow it. It is natural to expect that the opponents of secular education and voluntary support of religious establishments, the holders of the titles and emoluments received from the monarchy, will oppose the republic. The meeting of Congress gave them the opportunity. Some earnest Republicans may have been led into opposition by unwarranted suspicious of the intentions of the President. We believe the

Republic of Brazil will live in spite of all machinations against it. It is founded well. All of the essential doctrines of liberty have been adopted at once. Although the masses are not sufficiently educated to fully appreciate their liberties, the present danger is not from the masses, but from the classes which flourished at public expense under the monarchy.

All of the South American republics have had ups and downs, but the principle of liberty has never been wholly obscured in any state, however rude and turbulent the masses of the people.

64. «Brazil in the Throes», *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 13 de novembro

Tal como Napoleão III em 1851, Deodoro está a ter o papel do déspota. Isso vai provocar a separação de vários estados, graves turbulências e sérios problemas financeiros no Brasil, mas também em Londres e até nos Estados Unidos, receia o editorialista, que não deixa de mencionar a crise argentina de 1890.

The news continues to look badly from Brazil, notwithstanding the assurances that everything is all right, and that FONSECA'S government is solid. The truth is that FONSECA undertook to dissolve the Congress of Brazil, although the Constitution of Brazil directly says that Congress shall be the sole judge of its sessions shall close. That is, FONSECA is playing the part of a despot, and when any man in these modern days, in the face of the constitution of his country, assumes sovereign powers, trusting to the army to support him, while

he may succeed, it is childish to say in the inception of the business that he is on safe ground, and that there is going to be no trouble.

LOUIS NAPOLEON played the role and succeeded, but he did it because France had not yet recovered from the exhaustion of the First NAPOLEON'S wars, and because the government he overthrew was so weak that the French nation had lost all respect for it. But in a country like Brazil, filled with people of a low grade of intelligence, and still of fierce passions, while this despot may eventually triumph, the promises is that State after State will withdraw its fealty to the central government, and that a long period of turbulence will succeed. The greater danger is that amid that turbulence the debts of Brazil will go to protest, and there will be another such an excitement and panic in London as there was last year over the Argentine matter; that London bankers in anxiety to accumulate more money will be forces to unload more and more American securities, and that he hubbub in Brazil will eventually result in the disturbance of the finances in our own country, which will put off expansion for another year of two and keep the banking capital of the country in a panicky state.

65. «The Situation in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 13 de novembro

O editorialista não acredita nas mensagens alarmantes de Londres que têm a tendência de exagerar qualquer dificuldade interna da política brasileira. Os despachos de Nova Iorque também não parecem merecer muita

confiança. De qualquer forma, nada será resolvido com a saída do Marechal: com efeito, o Brasil está numa fase de transição de instabilidade que terminará só quando o povo estiver maduro para perceber o que significa um regime democrático.

If we read the London dispatches from Rio Janeiro we must conclude that Brazil is in a state of revolt and that civil war is imminent; but if we confine ourselves to the New York dispatches we must believe that there is no serious opposition to the dictatorship of da Fonseca, and that the reports from the distant provinces are exaggerated.

It is true that the dictator may have succeeded in keeping the people of Rio Janeiro ignorant of what is going on in Rio Grande do Sul, by a rigid censorship of the press and a complete surveillance of mail and telegraph lines, but it is equally true that the London dispatches are quite as likely to be unreliable as those which have been sent from Chile. Great Britain is apt to do scant justice to a republic when any internal dissension occurs, and to regard any uprising as a conclusive proof of the inherent weakness of a republican form of government.

Probably it will be discovered that the opposition to da Fonseca proceeds chiefly from a dissatisfied element which is jealous of him and his authority. It is very likely that it is only a phase of the ceaseless trouble between the outs and ins, and the retirement of da Fonseca would not improve matters of all. His successor, whoever he should be, would have to go through a similar

experience in all likelihood, and so it must continue to be until the people of Brazil learn what government by the people really means.

66. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 13 de novembro

A ditadura do Marechal será provavelmente derrubada, mas não vai haver nenhuma restauração monárquica no Brasil.

Although it is probable that the dictatorship of DA FONSECA will be overthrow in Brazil, it is hardly possible that the hopes of re-establishing the Empire, said to be harbored by certain European monarchs, will be realized. The Brazilian revolution represented the culmination of an educational process toward free self-government under the liberal and constitutional rule of DOM PEDRO and it is not likely that the people there will consent to go backward. Such a step is far less probable in this hemisphere, where the atmosphere of freedom prevails, than in Europe, where the surroundings are inimical to free government. DA FONSECA may go, but Republican government will surely survive in Brazil

67. «Brazil Civil War», *The Baltimore Sun*, 14 de novembro

O diário de Baltimore afirma que a situação é muito grave no Rio Grande do Sul, na Bahia, no Pará, em Minas Gerais e em São Paulo. Dessa forma, desmente tanto as informações dadas tanto pelo governo de Washington, quanto aquelas do ministro brasileiro na capital americana. Segundo estas duas fontes, as notícias, de origem inglesa e francesa, sobre os

distúrbios e revoltas em alguns estados, eram exageradas com o claro objetivos de poder especular nas bolsas europeias.

Na segunda parte, o editorialista denuncia os métodos repressivos usados na capital carioca pelo Marechal-presidente que, além disso, manipula, tal como fazia Balmaceda, as informações.

Brazil, it seems, has a veritable civil war in progress, owing to the indisposition of liberty-loving States of the new federative republic to put up with da Fonseca's violation of the constitution. Definite facts, reported from different sections of the republic, indicate a movement which may have important results. At first efforts were made of our State Department to ignore the actual situation or turn it to political account. The foreign press, it was suggested by the bureau of American republics – a Pan-American appendage to the State Department – were trying to throw obstacles in the way of Mr. Blaine's reciprocity business by disseminating alarming reports. They were trying to hobble our growing commerce. Our trade with Brazil, it was said, has greatly increased under reciprocity to the great distress of European traders, though the fact is, we believe, that Brazil's trade with European countries has increased to even a greater extent. The Brazilian legation, on the other hand, put forth the theory that the reports of internal troubles in Brazil were exaggerated in the foreign press with the object of depressing Brazilian securities. Stock-jobbing, in this view, was the true motive of the London and Paris journals in publishing accounts of alleged secessions and other abnormal political events. Both theories – that of our State Department and that of the

Brazilian legation – fall to the ground, however, when confronted with the facts presented in yesterday's *Sun*.

The gravity of the situation is now confessed. In Rio Grande do Sul, São Paulo, Los Catilinos [*sic!*], Minas-Gerais, Para and Bahia there are said to be rising against the dictator, some of the States here named being important States. Men and arms are being collected, and military and naval men are trying to organize a force to support the cause of what they call "the national party". The dictator's garrison at San Gabriel and Bage, in Rio Grande do Sul, are said to have gone over to the rebels, and at other points detachments of the army and navy are said to have fraternized with the people. A force of 5,000, embracing infantry, cavalry and artillery, and one gunboat are reported to be at the command of the rebel leaders in the south. These leaders, it is said, are Viscount Pelotas, Baron Juguy and Generals Astrogildo and Tavares.

At Rio, where the dictator has the larger part of the army and navy assembled, quiet prevails. A great deal is made of this fact in the official dispatches, but in view of the means adopted to secure quiet it is not surprising that it exists. Martial law has been proclaimed. Opposition to the dictator is a crime. A commission has been appointed to try all insurgents that fall into his hands. To secure a full complement of men for his war-ship the Rio government is seizing unlucky citizens and impressing them. A press-gang is scouring the city, and persons without "a pull" are forcibly conveyed aboard the war-ships in the harbor. Violent proceedings like these at Rio suggest, of course, that peace and quiet are less prevalent at other places where the government is not in

overpowering force. They suggest that the disease this violence is intended to cure must be, after all, of a formidable character. Evidently, if the dispatches are to be trusted, the da Fonseca government is in great straits, and is resorting to all sorts of expedients to maintain its authority. Some credence is perhaps to be given to the official dispatches inspired by da Fonseca himself for foreign consumption, but how much it is impossible to say. South America's dictators attach extreme importance to the judicious cooking of dispatches. Balmaceda understood the art and practice it with marvelous success. Even our State Department, we must believe, was taken in by his cunning. Da Fonseca being an apt pupil, we are not in a position to say just how much credit is to be given just now to Brazilian official dispatches.

68. *The News and Observer*, 14 de novembro

A secessão de quatro ricos estados pode ser fatal para a jovem República.

On the 15th of November, 1889, the Emperor of Brazil was dethroned and escorted out of his Empire. The government of Brazil was changed in on day from monarchy to a Republic but after such a brief existence the life of the Republic is now threatened. Four of the Brazilian States have seceded, and these, with the exception of the capital, are the most commercial, civilized and modern in their tendency of their growth. They are situated on the coast, and two of them gave intimate and valuable connections with the outer world. They

contain nearly a third of the population of Brazil, and the better class of the population. But geographically these four States are wide apart. No two of them are contiguous, and in a military sense would experience difficulties in uniting their armies, but their influence in other respects would render their continued defection seriously embarrassing, and probably fatal to Republicanism in Brazil.

69. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 14 de novembro

Mesmo as fontes oficiais admitem que se está a passar algo de «inquietante» no Rio Grande do Sul. Num país tão vasto, sem uma rede de transporte, existe um perigo de fragmentação.

According to London dispatches there is fighting galore in Brazil all along the line. According to Rio Janeiro dispatches things are quiet in Brazil as in a farmer's alliance hall in Nebraska since the election.

However, they to admit that in Rio Grande do Sul there is an uneasy feeling that may culminate in an insurrection later. It is a sort of secession movement in a remote province. Brazil is so big and her means of communication between her extremities are so difficult that there will always be danger of her great empire breaking into smaller fragments for convenience of administration. If she had a net work of railroads like that of the United States no difficulty would be experienced in forming a compact government of the United States of Brazil.

70. *The New-York Times*, 14 de novembro

O editorialista de Nova Iorque queixa-se da censura telegráfica: uma forte presença naval norte-americana nas costas atlânticas da América do Sul teria pelo menos a vantagem de enviar informações dignas de confiança...

Whatever may be the truth about the situation in Brazil, it is plain that it is very much more serious than the official dispatches admit. The Government is itself responsible for the suppression of information, having taken possession of the telegraphs, and this is a fact from which only unfavorable conclusion can be drawn. If it were not afraid of the truth it would put no embargo on telegraphed correspondence. No importance whatever is to be attaches to the denials that Brazilian representatives abroad are instructed to make. We may be very well assured that the government of DA FONSECA is in a desperate case. It is quite possible that the need for a strong American naval force is more pressing at present on the Atlantic than on the Pacific coast of South America. Such a force would at least secure us trustworthy reports of what is going on, and the need of such reports is urgent and increasing.

71. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 14 de novembro

Não se sabe o que se passa exatamente porque os despachos dão informações diametralmente opostas. Passa-se alguma coisa, mas as fontes de origem inglesa retratam tudo de forma pessimista.

There is a bewildering conflict in the news from Brazil. One dispatch represents the country as shaken from center to circumference by a revolution, and another says there is only a little dissatisfaction which will soon be appeased. The only thing that seems certain is that something is going on, and that English, as usual when American republic is concerned, are trying to make it appear worth than it really is.

72. *Democrat and Chronicle*, 14 de novembro

Sobre a hipotética intervenção das potências europeias no Brasil.

The rumor in circulation that some of the European powers will aid the Braganza family to regain control in Brazil is said to have gained credence in that country, but it has found news believers in the United States. Such a project would have almost as much concern for us as it would have for Brazil because our well-known purpose to prevent Old World interference in the affaires of the nations of this continent. — *St-Louis Globe Democrat*.

73. *The Cincinnati Inquirer*, 14 de novembro

FONSECA, Dictator of Brazil, has muzzled the local press; but we are still at liberty to cast asparagus¹⁴ upon him up here.

¹⁴ O mesmo que «*to cast aspersion*» (difamar).

74. «Brazil», *The Sun*, 15 de novembro

Apesar de algumas pequenas reservas quanto às medidas ditatoriais tomadas por Deodoro, este editorial é favorável ao Marechal-presidente, amigo dos Estados Unidos e um dos principais protagonistas do acordo bilateral assinado em fevereiro, escreve o articulista.

O editorial ainda dedica-se sobre a revoltas em alguns Estados e, nomeadamente, na do Rio Grande do Sul, há muito tempo «um espinho no pé do governo central». O sucesso da revolta deste Estado depende da atitude dos colonos alemães e se os rebeldes conseguirem obter a adesão de uma boa parte das tropas estacionadas no Rio Grande do Sul, realça o editorialista de Nova Iorque. Este considera que as outras províncias rebeldes têm fracas possibilidades de sucesso.

For two reasons it is still difficult to obtain a definite idea of the causes and consequences of the revolution which has taken place at Rio Janeiro. In the first place, all telegrams are subjected to a rigorous censorship by order of Marshal FONSECA, who is now virtually dictator. In the second place, such news as will leak out in spite of all precautions, comes to us mainly through English or Chilean channels, and must, therefore, be viewed with some distrust because the disposition of the present Brazilian executive to cultivate the friendship of United States has given offence alike in London and in Valparaiso.

There has been in this respect a striking change in the attitude of the Rio Janeiro Government since the overthrow of the empire. Under Dom PEDRO II. The commerce of Brazil was as completely monopolized by England as in the foreign trade of Chile, and it not naturally follows that the foreign policy of the

country was largely swayed by British influence. President FONSECA, on the other hand, has from the outset shown a desire to open the markets of Brazil to Americans, and in other international concerns to lean upon our republic rather than upon Great Britain. Thus he has assented to a treaty of partial reciprocity; he has favored the arbitration scheme put forth by the Pan-American Congress; he has taken measures to secure a large appropriation for the purpose of exhibiting Brazilian products at the Columbus World's Fair, and he has also spared no pains to increase the means of steam communication between his country and our own. Such proceedings are by no means calculated to gain the good will of Englishmen, who would undoubtedly view with satisfaction FONSECA'S removal from power.

While, however, the recognition of the Brazilian President's endeavors to acquire the friendship of American would incline as to regard him with sympathy, it must be acknowledged that his acts in the recent crisis have been of an arbitrary character. There now seems to be no doubt that in dissolving the Brazilian Congress he assumed to exercise a power with which he was not invested by the Constitution. He is, in other words, chargeable with a *coup d'état* analogous to that which CROMWELL executed in ejecting the Rump Parliament, and of which other examples were given by the first NAPOLEON on the 18th Brumaire, and by his nephew on the 2nd of December, 1851. Of those three revolutionary acts historians have been generally disposed to condone the first two and to condemn the last. We need much ampler light than we possess in the events preceding the dissolution of the Brazilian Congress in

order to decide in which class of state-strokes President FONSECA'S performance should be placed. It is alleged that the Congress has shown itself as inefficient, obstructive, and factious as was the Rump Parliament, and that experience had proved the maintenance of harmonious and fruitful relations between it and the Executive to be impossible. That is the plea made on behalf of President FONSECA, but we have yet to hear the other side. That the Executive does not shrink from invoking the judgment of the electors seem evident from the announcement that a new Congress will speedily be convoked, and that this body, beside discharging the function of ordinary legislation, will receive the powers of constitutional revision.

There have been rumors of open opposition in several provinces to President FONSECA'S assertion of dictatorship authority, but these reports have not yet been confirmed except in the case of Rio Grande do Sul. This province has long been a thorn in the side of the Rio Janeiro Government. In the early part of this century many of its inhabitants evinced sympathy with the rebellion of the Banda Oriental, which was subsequently transformed in conjunction with the Spanish colony of Montevideo into the republic of Uruguay. Then again, during the minority of Dom PEDRO II., Rio Grande do Sul, relying on its remoteness from the capital and the weakness of the central Government, and stirred to disaffection also through intrigues of Uruguay and of the Argentine Republic, organized a formidable insurrection which was not entirely subdued for many years. On the deposition of Dom PEDRO, trouble was again expected in the province and averted only by the summary banishment

of certain influential citizens and by the dispatch thither of a large part of the Brazilian regular army. The success of the present uprising will depend partly on the extent to which the troops stationed in the principal towns have been won over, and partly on the feeling entertained for President FONSECA by the Germans, who in that province constitute a large and powerful element of the population. Even if the relatively vigorous inhabitants of Rio Grande do Sul should manage to carry out their project of secession and to form an independent State, it does not follow that resistance to President FONSECA would be equally persistent and effective in such provinces as Bahia, Pernambuco, and Para. The natives of those relatively tropical regions are of a much less energetic character and could scarcely stand out against the Brazilian executive, so long as this could rely on their support of the populous and rich central provinces of Rio Janeiro and São Paulo.

Whatever may be the outcome of the existing complications, it is reasonable that we, as Americans, should be loath to condemn too hastily a man who has shown himself our friend, and should view with regret the triumph of any political party opposed to the furtherance of intimate commercial relations with this country and pledged to restore the former supremacy of Great Britain in the markets of Brazil

75. «Revolt against Fonseca», *New-York Tribune*, 15 de novembro

Editorial quase exclusivamente consagrado ao Rio Grande do Sul onde rebentou uma «séria revolta» contra o governo de Deodoro. Esta província é

muito rica, com uma grande atividade comercial, «apesar da pouca profundidade da águas nos seus portos». Existe também um forte contrabando do qual tira igualmente proveito o Uruguai.

O jornalista – que considera como um teste para da Fonseca a sua capacidade de «restaurar a sua autoridade neste Estado em revolta» – está convencido que o Rio Grande do Sul iria perder muito com a independência desejada por Silveira Martins. Seria muito mais vantajoso para ele ficar na Federação.

As the southernmost Province of Brazil was the last to accept the overthrow of the Empire, two years ago, as final, so is it the first to offer resistance to Fonseca's dictatorship. In November, 1889, the military commander of Rio Grande do Sul, Viscount Pelotas, promptly supported the revolutionary movement and undertook to reorganize the government of the Province; but one of his generals, Astrogildo, abandoned his post and another on the Uruguayan frontier showed signs of disaffection. The arrest of Senator Martins at Santa Catarina, the most powerful political leader of the Province, and his temporary banishment created a strong feeling of resentment among his partisans, which has never been allayed. The establishment of the Republic was recognized after several weeks of vacillation, but the new institutions have been less popular there than in other States. The dictatorship has naturally revived former prejudices and the influence of Martins, an eloquent and courageous, but reckless, leader, and a bitter personal enemy of Fonseca, has been strongly exerted. Viscount Pelotas and General Astrogildo have joined him in opposition to the National Government, and have carried with them a

portion of the garrison of several coast towns. As this frontier Province is the base of the military establishment of Brazil, the revolt is a serious one.

As Rio Grande do Sul lies in the South Temperate Zone its productions and interests are markedly different from those of the tropical belt. The lofty sierras of the coffee zone are reduced to gentry sloping hills on the southern seaboard, and the country is a rolling prairie offering rich pasturage for cattle and sheep. The State exceed in area New-York, Pennsylvania and New-England, and is available for wheat-farming, stock-raising and vine-culture on a large scale. Its temperate climate has attracted a large European immigration movement, mainly from German and Italy. It has an increasing foreign and coastwise commerce, notwithstanding the shallowness of its ports, and it also has a contraband trade with Uruguay which Imperial and Republican Administrations alike have been able to suppress. The Montevideo Government has planned its railways system with a view to tapping the Brazilian frontier at three points. With this transportations facilities and with water transit from the Plate, Uruguayan merchants have largely supplied the interior and border towns with imports, and this contraband trade has been mutually advantageous. Rio Grande do Sul as a hotbed of illicit commerce is naturally disaffected under any system of national administration, since smuggling operations on the frontier are inevitably brought under restraint for the interest of Federation revenue.

While it is impossible that a daring political leader like Martins, smarting under a sense of resentment caused by his arbitrary arrest, seriously

contemplate the permanent separation of Rio Grande do Sul with its population of 1,000,000 from Brazil, it is not probable that he will have popular support. The Province is the natural granary, stockyard and vineyard of the tropical republic, and its material interests are bound up with those of the Northern States. As an independent nation it could not hope to rival the Plate countries in their exports of jerked beef and flour to Brazil: while as a member of the Federal system it would continue to have marked advantages in coastwise trade. Secession would carry it finally into the Uruguayan system, and involve enormous commercial sacrifices. Fonseca's ability to restore his authority over the revolting State will be a test of his strength throughout Brazil. If he falls there, he will be menaced with insurrection elsewhere. Whether he succeeds or fails, republican government alone is possible in Brazil, and the integrity of the Federal system is likely to be maintained unimpaired.

76. *The Sunday Herald*, 15 de novembro

O Brasil é um país muito complexo e com muitas diferenças entre as várias províncias. Uma separação «em vários Estados mais homogêneos e compactos não seria talvez uma má ideia».

Brazil at present constituted is an unwieldy country, mad up of vast provinces of the most diverse and even conflicting interests. Owing to the lack of means of quick communication and intimate intercourse between the people of the various centers of population and civilization, it will take a long time to

weld the people into a compact nation. From the same causes the work of enlightening the lower classes and developing the material resources of the country will be painfully slow. So that, on the whole, perhaps it would be no bad thing for the people if the present country were divided up into several more homogeneous and compact independent States, each of which would develop its own resources and improve its civilization rapidly.

77. *The Pittsburgh Dispatch*, 15 de novembro

Reciprocity with Brazil does not involve any duty on the part of the United States to swear that a military dictatorship is a true Republican Government.

[...]

Brazilian officials are vigorously denying the existence of any trouble in Brazil. With the memory of the Chilean reports before us, this leads us to the conclusion that the Brazilian officials are doing their best to earn their salaries in the service, not of Brazil, but of Fonseca.

78. *The Detroit Free Press*, 15 de novembro

O regresso da monarquia é preferível à ditadura de Deodoro da Fonseca.

It looks as if Fonseca had assumed control of Brazil for fear somebody else would do so if he did not. It was not the ex-Emperor Pedro of whom he was afraid, but left Pedro, so to speak, the Prince Pedro Augusto, the grandson of the retired emperor. Unless rumor is very much at fault Fonseca's fears are well founded. The people are evidently sick of him and it is not at all unlikely that they are beginning to look on a restoration of the monarchy as preferable to a continuance of his dictatorship.

79. «Inflation and Wild-Cat Banking in Brasil», *The Indianapolis Journal*, 16 de novembro

As verdadeiras causas do que se passa agora no Brasil têm a ver com a sua situação financeira: a gigantesca dívida do país, os privilégios dados a muitos bancos que podem emitir notas sem ter reservas de ouro, a perda de valor da moeda, a especulação sem limites, a inflação. O jornalista fala da origem desta profunda crise que remonta à 1888, logo depois da Abolição, quando o Estado facilitou os empréstimos aos antigos proprietários de escravos.

Este sistema de empréstimos aos latifundiários e a emissão de notas sem limites, «levaram o Brasil à beira da revolução» afirma o editorialista, segundo o qual o objetivo do golpe pode ter sido de manter esta política inflacionista.

There is a reason to believe that the political agitation now going on in Brazil is an outgrowth of the financial situation, and that its real object is to renew and prolong the policy of currency inflation, which has already brought the country to the verge of bankruptcy. Brazil has a very large national debt,

and her annual interest charge amount to considerably more than one-quarter of her revenue. But this is not the worst feature in her financial situation. The inflated condition of her currency, and the universal disturbance of values caused thereby, are evils of the first magnitude, and undoubtedly have much to do with the present disturbances.

Brazil is cursed by a system of wildcat banking, which owes its origin to a curious chain of circumstances. The law abolishing slavery in Brazil, which was passed in 1888, made no compensation to the owners of the slaves, their property rights in them being simply wiped out. As a sort of compensation for this the Parliament passed a law providing that the government should loan money to the planters at a fixed rate of interest upon the security of their lands. This was the beginning of a vicious system of banking, which has resulted in a vast inflation of the currency, followed by a corresponding depreciation, and in a stimulating speculation of all kinds to a dangerous degree. Between June 28 and Oct. 14, 1889, contracts were made with several banks to loan the ex-slave-owners about \$96,000,000, for one half of which the government became security. This scheme was akin to that now advocated by Farmers' Alliance in this country, in that it was a government loan to the landowners of the country for the avowed purpose of benefiting the agricultural interest. At first the paper issues of the banks were based on a gold reserve, but they soon got beyond that, and for some time past they have been putting out paper money that is practically irredeemable. Now banks have been created with special privileges, which are authorized to lend money on real-estate mortgages, to engage in

agricultural and industrial enterprises, undertake public and private contracts, and participate in trading operations of all kinds. The state agree to allow this banks to import all their material free of duty, to grant them the preference in giving out railroad and other contracts and concessions, and to grant them land without payment for founding colonies, and industrial establishments. Thus, while inflating the currency by its system for "agricultural credits", and plunging the country into a quagmire of speculation and debt, the government was also building a set of banks which combined the worst feature of the wild-cat system with the most offensive features of an odious monopoly. The persistent attempt to favor the agricultural interest at the expense of all others, and even of the national credit, excited jealousy of the commercial classes until they were almost ready to take up arms against the system. In fact, the hostility to the banks did cause popular outbreaks in two or three of the provinces more than a year ago. In on instance the population attacked the bank building, and the troops who were called out to disperse them joined the mob and assisted in deposing the Governor.

The extent to which the inflation policy has been carried may be inferred from the fact that the paper currency has been increased from 180,000 *contos* to 24,000,000 *contos*, and the *milreis*, whose value is 27 pence, is now worth only 13 pence. This enormous depreciation has, of course, been accompanied by a universal disturbance of values and heavy losses to all classes, except, perhaps, the speculators. The real dictator of Brazil today is not da Fonseca, but Mr. Mayrinck, president of the Bank of the Republic. He it is who has been

directing the business of issuing paper money and making agricultural loans, and he is now demanding authority for a further increase. The Congress has shown a disposition to call a halt in the inflation policy, and it will not be at all surprising if it turns out that da Fonseca's object in seizing power is to renew and continue that policy. Certain it is that a currency inflation and the agricultural loan policy together have brought Brazil to the verge of revolution.

80. «The Problems of Fee Government in Brazil»,
The Brooklyn Daily Eagle, 16 de novembro

Este editorial dá uma outra explicação para as medidas ditatoriais tomadas por Deodoro. Para que uma república possa funcionar, o povo deve ter autocontrole e, sobretudo, ter a consciência do que significa viver neste tipo de regime. O povo brasileiro não tem os conhecimentos, nem a paciência, nem as capacidades para tal.

É por isso, argumenta o jornalista, que da Fonseca, «dotado de muitas qualidades para as altas funções que ocupa», fez o golpe: para proteger os seus compatriotas das suas fraquezas e da sua loucura e evitar uma fragmentação do país. Por outras palavras, o Marechal, com a sua «vasta cultura», a sua coragem e as suas «intuições republicanas» tomou as decisões certas para proteger o povo, «que ainda ignora o alfabeto da liberdade».

The political disorder in Brazil is proof that one of the primary requisites of free and stable government is the ability of the people to control themselves. A nation may be profoundly stirred by a passion for liberty and yet be utterly unfitted to enjoy it. It is the proud boast of the Anglo Saxon race that they pre-eminently combine all the qualities essential to the establishment and

perpetuity of free institutions. England, with all her litter of royalty and class distinctions, is more truly republican than republican France. The ministry at Paris almost daily commit arbitrary acts that no English ministry would dare to perpetrate. Under the title of a republic, the French government retains a large share of the former spirit of imperialism. The freedom which the Frenchman possesses is a very different thing from that which is recognized as freedom by the English speaking race.

The enforced abdication of Dom Pedro and the institution of the forms of a republic in Brazil did no more than attest the desire of the people for a republican form of government. The measure of their ability to comprehend what real republicanism is and of their qualifications to conduct the experiment to a successful issues may be judged by the conditions which now prevail there. Such conditions indicate a radical defect in the people themselves. Their character has been formed under traditions totally foreign to those which have made their impress on Anglo-Saxon character. They have been uninstructed in the principles of true liberty, and now that they have a chance to establish in they find themselves lacking in the skill and patience necessary to lay even the foundation stones.

The president of the Brazilian republic, da Fonseca, is a man gifted with many qualifications for his high office. His instincts are republican, his culture is broad and thorough, his courage is unquestioned and his honesty above suspicion. But he is dealing with a people who are ignorant of the very alphabet of liberty. It is not to be supposed that the mere attempt to deprive him of his

right of veto has been the sole cause of his alleged assumption dictatorial power. His apprehensions were less aroused by the attempt than by what the attempt signified. Some of the dispatches from Rio do not hesitate to accuse him of an ambition to be something more than a constitutional president. The accusation is not necessary to explain his action. It his sagacity enabled him to detect the symptoms of threatened disintegration and chaos in the proceeding congress he would adopt precisely the course he has taken. The revolutionary outbreaks in the various provinces show how much the sectional idea prevails over the national idea. They may betray the germs of a republican spirit, but they also betray the difficulties that must attend the effort to bring that spirit under the discipline essential to federal concert and harmony.

Until the "true inwardness" of the Brazilian situation has been further exposed it would be premature to assail the motives of President Fonseca. If at present his conduct seems to be dictated by an unlawful ambition, it may later appear to be but the resolute and energetic policy of a statesman zealous to preserve his countrymen from the consequences of their own weakness and folly. Our own nation has too recently suffered the agonies of attempted secession to judge harshly the man whose course is explicable on the theory that the elements with which he is dealing menace nothing less than national disruption.

81. «Sensational Foreign News», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 16 de novembro

Duro ataque contra várias agências telegráficas situadas em Londres.

A rumor comes from London of the arrest of several members of the Russian nobility for conspiring to secure a representative Assembly in Russia. There may not be a particle of truth in the report, as we do not see how anything could be gained by a conspiracy. A representative Assembly is something that can only be granted by the Czar, and the request for such a body should not render the petitioners liable to arrest. Sensational newsmongers can invent anything concerning Russia, with the certainty that the falsity of their statements will not be discovered for a long time, because of the strict press and news censorship in Russia. Moreover, one or two mushroom new agencies have sprung up in London and make use of all the canards that are furnished. These agencies sent out the most sensational dispatches from the United States, from Chile and Brazil.

A London dispatch concerning alleged turbulence in Brazil, says: "The older agencies having reflected only the so-called «official» version of the trouble in Brazil, has caused other and independent agencies to be employed in spreading broadcast the real trouble about the dictatorship." These "independent" agencies are too independent, and to all appearance have no connection whatever with sources of reliable information, but employ the inventive genius of sensational writers. The London correspondent of the *New*

York Tribune and *Times* uttered a bitter complaint against these agencies a few weeks ago, because they published the most outrageous misrepresentations of our government in London and sent nothing but lies about Chile and the United States.

It is probable that the news of a conspiracy in Russia by nobles to secure a representative Assembly is without foundation, and is for the purpose of annoying Russia and affecting her credit.

82. *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 16 de novembro

Se rebentar uma guerra civil, o Brasil vai ter mais despesas e menos receitas, não podendo dessa forma pagar os juros da sua enorme dívida. Será suficiente dois ou três grandes bancos entrarem em falência em Londres para provocar «uma onda de pânico monetária mundial», como foi o caso em 1890 com a Argentina e o Banco Baring, adverte o jornal do estado do Utah.

Things have a bad look in Brazil, and the probabilities of a general war are good. It will be a pitiful thing in that country, but the commercial world is interested everywhere. Because of a great war there would be a great smashing of finances. The obligations due From Brazil in London, which are very great, would not met, and there might be renewed exactly what happened a year ago when the BARING Brothers went down under the Argentine strain. Brazil has not been speculating as Argentine did; moreover, she has more exports, her coffee and sugar exports are about enough to support the Government in time of peace; but with a great civil war on hand the exports would be shut off, the

expenses would greatly increase, and there might be a train of misfortunes started that would involve in difficulty great financial houses in foreign countries. And just at this time it would need but the failure of two or three great banking houses in London to precipitate a panic money all around the world.

83. *The Sioux City Journal*, 16 de novembro

American railroad securities are becoming more popular in England as the shakiness of South American investments is better realized. The trouble in Brazil, where the English trade have extensive investments, has caused intense anxiety.

84. «Affairs in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 17 de novembro

O regresso de D. Pedro e mesmo da monarquia não parece totalmente improvável, mas muito difícil de concretizar.

A Paris dispatch says that according to an official communication sent to the press the leaders of the Brazilian colony in that city have received a declaration to the effect that Dom Pedro, seeing events in Brazil tending to dismember the country, is ready to return if the nation desires his presence, in order to render a final service to the union, integrity and greatness of the country to which he is so deeply attached.

It is not beyond the bounds of possibility that such a thing may happen. President da Fonseca seems at the present time to be well fortified in his dictatorship, but no one can tell to what extent the hostility to his assumption of supreme power may develop. He has the means of communication under his control, so that it is almost impossible to form a correct judgment of the importance of the revolt in the province of Rio Grande do Sul or elsewhere. If civil war should break out in earnest the republic would certainly be in peril among contending forces, and the recall of Dom Pedro might be possible.

We imagine, however, that even if public sentiment should demand the recall of Dom Pedro as the means of settling the troubles and stopping a civil war, he would not be made Emperor again, unless, possibly, an elective monarch for life. Brazil has not a very clear idea of what a republican form of government means, but names are things, sometimes, and it is questionable whether the people of Brazil would be willing to reconvert the Government into a monarchy even with Dom Pedro as Emperor.

There are the remains at least of an Imperialist party in Brazil, and its members would be very glad to see the old Emperor on his throne again, with the succession insured to his descendants; but this is probably impracticable. The question of succession was one of the things that led to the dethronement of Dom Pedro and the change in the form of government, and it is not likely that any party in Brazil would be strong enough to undo the work of the revolution in that respect and re-establish the imperial dynasty. The most that could be expected would be to seat Dom Pedro as President of the republic, or,

perhaps, monarch for life under stringent constitutional restrictions, and that could come about only in the event of a hopelessly chaotic condition of affairs under the present form of government.

85. «Dom Pedro Willing», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 17 de novembro

Os jornais europeus, nomeadamente os ingleses, contam muitas mentiras a propósito to Brasil, com o objetivo de prejudicar a jovem república e de favorecer o regresso da monarquia. Mas, no fundo, é a rivalidade comercial com os Estados Unidos que explica a atitude inglesa.

The willingness expressed by Dom Pedro, ex-Emperor of Brazil, to return to that country and resume the government gives additional color to the conclusions of President Fonseca that the Imperialists were plotting through Congress to overthrow the Republic. The eagerness of European news agencies to magnify rumors of trouble and to injure the credit of the present government, shows that there is an organized effort to bring about a reaction which will restore the monarchy and check the growing tendency of Brazilian to enlarge their trade with the United States.

The secret of the lying about Brazil in British newspapers is commercial rivalry with the United States. The same kind of lying has been indulged in regard to Chile. Every effort has been made to stir up strife between Chile and the United States, at one time there were prospects of a serious difference.

86. *The Detroit Free Press*, 17 de novembro

Depois de ter lamentado a falta de informações fidedignas, o jornal constata que, no Brasil, só os brancos e uma pequena percentagem de indígenas estão preparados para o autogoverno.

To ascertain the exact state of affairs in Brazil seems as much of a puzzle as to learn how Secretary Blaine's health is. A very great deal depends on who sends the alleged information. Late dispatches state that junta of Rio Grande do Sul has issued a proclamation protesting against the acts of Fonseca, calling for the election of a president and soliciting other states to raise troops for a concerted revolutionary movement. The navy is reported as divided between the opposing interest while Fonseca claims 20,000 and the junta 30,000 troops ready to take the field. Outside of the whites and a small percentage of educated natives, the people of Brazil seem incapable of rational self-government.

87. «Patriotism and Personal Ambition», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 18 de novembro

As repúblicas da América Latina, escreve o editorialista, ainda estão muito longe de ter um sistema político com dirigentes que tenham «frieza de temperamento, capacidade de julgamento», sentido prático e modéstia no exercício das funções, como é o caso dos políticos americanos.

«Fonseca parece não ter aprendido nada da terrível lição dada pela queda de Balmaceda no Chile», lamenta o jornalista que considera Deodoro

como um «autocrata», com mais prerrogativas do que as permitidas ao antigo imperador.

News which comes for the past year has been reaching us from Colombia, Chile, Mexico, and recently from Brazil indicates that the system of government by the people in Central and South America is yet in an experimental stage. The rapid changes which came through necessity, or were the evolutions of desire for novelty in government practice, were simply volcanic ebullitions in some cases of conditions more forceful in disturbance than placating in remedial elements. The revolution which ejected from the imperial throne of Brazil and forced into exile the mildest and admittedly the most benevolent monarch of this century came with a suddenness as surprising as the absence of bloodshed in its accomplishment. While Dom Pedro were sadly traversing the Atlantic ocean on his enforced journey to Portugal conditions were arising in Brazil that rendered its transfer from monarchy to republicanism somewhat like the calm that precedes Vesuvius' belching of ashes and lava. Slumbering under the exterior that presented to the world a picture of contentment was a rebellious force begotten of false ambition that now seeks to declare itself in revolutionary remonstrance. President Fonseca has assumed the unwelcome character of a dictator with same lack of excuse in the line of duty which sounded the death knell of Balmaceda's ambition in Chile. Constitutional government is the only cornerstone on which a republic can be erected with hope for permanency. Hysterical disturbances resulting from one man's desire to control

circumstances and manipulate power, whether they be aided by a numerous following or supported by the arm of a diminutive and determined class, tend only to that total disruption which makes a nation pitiable and evokes more sympathy than philosophical comment.

Because Chile defeated Peru in a war which determined the possession of the guano beds – a factor that painfully entered into Mr. Blane's campaign in 1884 – she appears to have developed a spirit of belligerency that is rather incompatible with her resources. The new government's evident condoning of the faults which have thrown Chile into hostile relations with the United States is a matter that (though we hope such an event is indefinitely remote) may add to the ensanguined pages of western hemisphere history. Da Fonseca of Brazil does not seem to have learned the terrible lesson taught by the downfall of Chile's dictator. The fact that he has been reduced to the necessity, self recognized, of taking into his own hands all the powers of government makes him much more of an autocrat than Dom Pedro was ever permitted to be. What the outcome will be difficult to prophesy. There is, however, in the kaleidoscopic conditions now existing the lesson that popular government can only maintain supremacy and secure prolongation through those elements which give to elected rulers that coolness of temper, discernment in judgment, practicability in the application of functional powers, and modest exercise of those abilities in statesmanship which made a collection of struggling colonies to United States of America – the exemplary nation in the world. Until Chile, Peru, Brazil and other quarrelsome countries that are our neighbors on this

hemisphere realize the fact that the gratification of personal ambition is but a fly speak on the mirror of progress, reform will be as remote within their boundaries as peace, unfortunately, seems to be at his time.

88. «Brazilian Trouble», *The Record-Union*, 18 de novembro

Comentário favorável a Fonseca que tinha o direito de dissolver o Parlamento e de declarar a lei marcial, escreve o diário californiano que parece dar mais confiança aos despachos oficiais do que aos das províncias. O jornalista constata também que não há tentativas de secessão, nem vontade de voltar à monarquia. Por isso, se Deodoro for destituído, o Brasil não irá abandonar a «forma republicana de governo».

The reports from Brazil are very conflicting. This much, however, we are warranted in believing, that a revolution is afoot that has made such progress that the Government is suffering annoyance, but is not in danger of being overthrown. While the Government dispatches assure us that all is tranquility, save in one State, those from the provinces as emphatically assert that all is disorder. Since the latter dispatches come from widely separate States, but are practically uniform in the statement that an armed revolution exists, we must conclude, therefore, that the Government is concealing the truth in its official dispatches.

The hope must be entertained that the revolution will be suppressed. Fonseca, we are told, has declared himself "Dictator". But this is inaccurate. He has dissolved the Congress and ordered elections for a new one, but it is

constitutional provided that the President may exercise that power. He has declared martial law, but only in districts where the civil authority is prostrate. The civil Government in the States that are quiet has not been superseded; the courts still sit, and national and State officials discharge their duties as usual under the law where revolt has not been manifest.

The chief disturbed section is that of Rio Grande do Sul. There, it is admitted, there is a serious trouble, but it is nowhere or by any person claimed that there is any secession of States or any attempt of desire by people to overthrow the republic and re-establish the rule of imperialism. If, therefore, by any chance President Fonseca is ousted it does not follow that Brazil abandons a republican form of government.

89. *The Sioux City Journal*, 18 de novembro

Os jornais ingleses são uma cambada de mentirosos.

The American press is forced to take notice of the phenomenal lying of the English newspapers. For outright, deliberate, wholesale lying no other papers on earth compare with them. The alleged "news" which they are printing from Chile and Brazil is a series of lies. The London *Times* excels in the tournament of champion liars. It excels the high water mark of its lying in the Parnell case.

90. *The Fort Worth Gazette*, 18 de novembro

Breve comentário irônico

There is trouble in Brazil. Only a province is in arms against the government, with 20,000 well-armed men in the field. No trouble at all – only a little disturbance.

91. *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, 18 de novembro

Revolution or no revolution, there seems to be no interruption to the tide of commerce with Brazil.

92. «The situation in Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 19 de novembro

A «enérgica e rápida ação» do Marechal justifica-se perante o perigo de uma restauração monárquica, «organizada por agentes europeus».

The republic of Brazil has been generous to Dom Pedro, and has suffered because of its generosity. All of the ex-Emperor property was restored to him and it has apparently been employed to undermine the republic. News also comes from Brazil that priests are using their influence for a restoration of monarchy, because the republic separated church and state and cut off church support from the public treasury. It may be safely assumed, however, that the

entire movement for restoration was set on foot by European agents, who are interested in restoring the commercial and other relations which existed before the fall of the empire. All of the lying dispatches by way of London are part of the conspiracy against the republic.

Events have justified the prompt and energetic action of President Fonseca in nipping the reaction in the bud. He is well prepared to resist a restoration, and should have the support of all who oppose European interference in South America affairs. It would be a great calamity for the noble effort in behalf of free government in Brazil to fail now.

93. *San Francisco Chronicle*, 19 de novembro

A censura praticada pelo regime é um fracasso, pois só faz aumentar a suspeita e a desconfiança do próprio regime no mundo.

Dispatches from Brazil continue to be vague and unsatisfactory, the usual revolutionary expedient of South American countries of trying to suppress intelligence being resorted to with great success. Just what advantage can be derived by the Government preventing the outside world learning the cause and extent of the trouble it would be difficult to state. If the object is to convey the impression that there is no trouble it miscarries badly, for nothing is so calculated in these days to arouse suspicion and increase alarm as a wholesale attempt to stop circulation of news.

94. *The Detroit Free Press*, 19 de novembro

Being only two years old Brazil may be considered the baby of all American republics. Its resemblance to a baby is heightened by its proclivity for spasms. [*Chicago Times*]

95. *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 19 de novembro

“Brazil is tranquil” “Brazil is rent by revolution” So the dispatches run from day to day. You read your paper and you take your choice.

96. *The Wichita Daily Eagle*, 19 e 20 de novembro

Words, words, words. Fonseca's freedom is more irksome than the heaviest despotism, the harm less old Dom Pedro even dreamt of.

97. *The News and Observer*, 20 de novembro

The revolution in Brazil is probably more serious than was at first contemplated. The great province of Rio Grande do Sul is under a junta, and preparations have been made to defend the country, and maintain the independence of the new State. Indeed it is contemplated to unite the State with Uruguay.

98. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 20 de novembro

Instead of resulting in the crushing of republican government in Brazil, as has been intimated, it is probable that the revolution in Brazil will establish a new Republic. DA FONSECA'S assumption of dictatorial powers promises merely to divide Brazil in two republics, and it is to be hoped that in time there will be no room in either of them for a dictator.

99. *The Salt Lake Tribune*, 21 de novembro

Segundo o jornal do Utah, a causa principal da instabilidade dos países da América do Sul é de tipo racial e só quando os Anglo-Saxónicos dominarem toda esta parte do globo é que isso vai poder mudar!

It looks as if the whole of South America is in a period of transition. Chile has just concluded a successful revolution and is hardly quieted down. Brazil, the biggest of all the nations of that division of the globe, is in the throes of a *coup d'état*, wherein a dictator is trying to establish his personal rule, with a chance for the dismemberment of the country. Paraguay has never recovered from the Lopez ravaging wars. Venezuela is hardly out of her troubles. Ecuador has an insurrection every time the people vote. And now, following the financial upheaval and chasm, Buenos Aires appears about to begin the turbulent dance, with the inciting aid of Paraguay. It is a fiery, ruthless and reckless folk that live in those lands, a race of mixed blood, much of it about as

bad as human blood can be; a race that is impetuous but not strong-headed, and that has no discretion. The men would rather fight than submit to a majority rule when that majority is not their way; and so there is always peril when the forms of a popular government are gone through with. It is to be hoped that a time will come when all this shall be changed; but we have misgivings that this time will never be till the Anglo-Saxon dominates all those lands.

100. *The Sioux City Journal*, 21 de novembro

Chile and Brazil have been torn by revolution, but they are incomparably better off than the Argentine Republic, which as yet had had no revolution. An era of cheap money is more than ten-fold worse for a country than a revolution and war, as the unhappy situation of the Argentine Republic indicates.

101. *The Wichita Daily Eagle*, 21 de novembro

The next time Fonseca will not be so ready to take a ready-made revolution simply because it is on the bargain-counter.

102. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 21 de novembro

Whatever may happen in Brazil one thing cannot come – a king or an emperor. The Americas have got through with that sort of thing in government.

Capítulo 2

A Queda

A REVOLUTION IN ONE DAY

Dictator Fonseca of Brazil Resigns
in Favor of Another.

TRIUMPH OF THE OPPOSITION

The Sioux-City Journal

BRAZIL.

RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT DA
FONSECA.

He Recognizes that the Country Does
Not Want Him, and Steps Down and
Out—Who His Successor Will Be.

The Times Democrats

THE PEOPLE RISE.

Brazil's Republic Released From the
Grasp of the Dictator.

A SUDDEN REVOLT TERMINATES THE
POWER OF FONSECA.

Vice-President Peixoto Placed at the Head
of the Government—Congress Called
Upon to Reassemble and Re-Establish
the Authority of the Constitution—How
It Was Done.

The St. Louis Post-Dispatch

THE SITUATION IN BRAZIL

Success of the Revolution Fully
Confirmed.

IT WAS A BLOODLESS VICTORY

Official Advices to Minister Mendonca
Regarding the Resignation of Pres-
ident Fonseca—The Vice-Presi-
dent Will Convene Congress.

Democrats and Chronicle

A derrota de Deodoro nas primeiras páginas (24 de novembro)

1. «Military rule in Brazil», *New-York Tribune*, 22 de novembro

O golpe, afirma o jornal nova-iorquino, foi imposto a Deodoro pelo Clube Militar, que contava com a colaboração das autoridades militares nos vinte estados. No entanto, no Rio Grande do Sul, os oficiais, «com ciúmes dos colegas do Rio», fizeram uma «revolução no estado»: agora lutam contra a ditadura de Fonseca. Visto que o Brasil não tem uma rede de transportes, é muito difícil para o poder central dum país tão grande controlar todo o território e esmagar este tipo de revolta.

The highly centralized system of administration in Brazil provided means for securing the downfall of the Empire. It was only necessary to supplant twenty Provincial Presidents and obtain control of as many military garrisons in order to complete the work of the revolutionists in Rio de Janeiro. There was a smaller Fonseca in nearly every provincial capital, ready to act promptly and to take the initiative in transferring power from the Imperial authority to new hands, precisely as the greater Fonseca had done in the national capital. The Military Club had been in existence long enough to bring all the leading officers of the army into harmonious relations, and to impress them with consciousness of their power. The overthrow of the throne by a few battalions of ill-disciplined troops, was followed by a series of co-ordinate military revolts in the Provinces. Republican agitators supplied enthusiasm, but the army carried the entrenchments of the Empire without firing a gun.

The facility with which the revolutionists accomplished their work two years ago was a menace to the security of the republic. The power of the army,

which had been exerted in the first instance with overwhelming effect, was brought to bear a second time upon National Congress and the constitutional system. The details of the establishment of the dictatorship have not been published, but it seems altogether probable that President Fonseca was forced to make a stand against the legislators by the attitude of the army. Without doubt the officers of the Military Club during the last year have watched the proceedings of the politicians and lawmakers with cynical contempt. In their own estimation they were the only patriots. The revolution was their work in the beginning, and republican government could be brought under military control at that time. The lawyers in Congress seemed to be putting on unnecessary airs, and acting as though they had really political authority. When their assumption of power became offensive to the master-politicians of the Military Club, they advised the dictatorship, carried the President along with them, and closed the doors of Congress.

This restoration of the supremacy of the army was accomplished without resistance in Rio de Janeiro. The leaders counted without doubt upon the support of the military garrison in all provincial capitals. The coup d'état of November, 1889, would have been a failure if the army officers throughout Brazil has not acted in concert establishing twenty Provisional Governments outside the national capital. The success of the dictatorship in like manner depended upon the co-operation of the military authorities in the seaboard States. In Rio Grande do Sul the army was strong, inasmuch as it was a frontier Province, where smuggling operations required the presence of a large force.

The officers there seem to have been jealous of the ascendancy of their colleagues at Rio de Janeiro. Instead of supporting the dictatorship, they have antagonized it, effected a military revolution in the State, and are now under arms against Fonseca. Practically, it is a provincial military movement against the garrison in control of the capital. The army was united two yea ago, but now is now divided.

Military government is not an unmixed evil in country like Uruguay, the Argentine and Mexico, where there are railways available for rapid transportation of troops. In such instances revolutionary movements are easily suppressed and public order is resolutely maintained. In a country of vast territorial extent end few railways military government cannot be strong enough to accomplish these supreme purposes, and hence the evil tendencies of irresponsible power predominate. In the presence instance, while the restoration of monarchy is not favored in any quarter, the army has suspended the operation of the Constitution and has divided in two camps. If there were coast railway from Para to Rio Grande do Sul, strong and effective military government would be practicable. As the construction of such a railway cannot be hoped for, at least in several generations, the standing army will be a source of weakness rather than strength. If it were mustered out of service and a efficient national guard were organized in the States, the chances of counter-revolution and civil war would be diminished; but under prevailing conditions of public ignorance this would be a hazardous experiment. Republicanism will

ultimately triumph because no other form of government is possible in Brazil; but a transition period of confusion and uncertainty will intervene.

2. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 22 de novembro

If poor old DOM PEDRO is wise he will reject the advise to sail for Brazil. Unless the signs are deceptive that country at present is not a safe place for either an Emperor o a dictator.

3. «The British in Brazil», *Democrat and Chronicle*, 23 de novembro

Mais um texto que estigmatiza a atitude dos ingleses no Brasil

Captain Gustavus Cromwell, agent for two years of the Brazilian Steamship Company in Para, Brazil, gives to the *New York Herald* an account of his observations of British efforts to embarrass American trade with Brazil and discredit the republic.

Captain Crowell believes that the present trouble in Brazil is largely owing to British efforts to defeat the objects of the reciprocity treaty. He gives instances of British interference to prevent the purchase of American goods.

4. *The Cincinnati Inquirer*, 23 de novembro

Fonseca, of Brazil, seems sorely in need of help. Why not call PAT EGAN over from Chile?

5. The Trouble in Brazil», *The Times Democrats*, 24 de novembro

Por causa das informações contraditórias vindas do governo e da oposição, é impossível saber quantos estavam a favor ou contra Deodoro, afirma o jornal da Luisiana, que se alegra com a demissão do Marechal. O jornal condena claramente as usurpações de poder e a «estúpida ambição» do ex-Presidente que quis «seguir cegamente os desastrosos passos» de Balmaceda.

It is sincerely to be hoped that the dispatch which reached the United States yesterday, stating simply and without details that da Fonseca has resigned the Presidency of the Brazilian republic, is true.

His Presidency, everybody knows, has been an undisguised dictatorship for the last month or more. For, in October, finding it impossible to have things go on in the way he wanted in the face of an antagonist Congress, and made the startling announcement that he intended to carry on the government without its assistance.

How far acceptance of Fonseca's assumption of the dictatorship or how far revolution against it, has advanced throughout the republic, it has been and is next impossible to say. The statements coming with apparent authority both

from the "loyal" and from the revolutionary sides have been so conflicting as to be absolutely contradictory; and the result has been, outside the republic itself, to puzzle and confuse everybody as to the real situation of affairs.

From the government side came the report but a de you two there was absolutely not a trace of insurrection against Fonseca's rule in any part of the country outside of the one southern province of Rio Grande do Sul; and that, even in that one province, the disaffection was of so insignificant dimensions that the government forces would, according to the homely saying, knock it into a cocked hat, as soon as they arrived on the scene. The Brazilian minister at Washington naturally leaned toward this view of the case; his advices from his government were to the effect that the trouble was strictly local and limited, and he scouted the idea that his government would deceive him.

Reports from revolutionary or anti-Fonseca sources were of diametrically opposite character. According to them, not only was the insurrection general throughout Rio Grande do Sul, but it had spread also to and throughout the important provinces of Para, Pernambuco, Bahia and Rio Janeiro. Battles had been fought both on land and at sea in which the insurgent forces had won signal (and impossible) victories; and, at last, having nothing more to conquer in the south, they had started to beard the lion in his den – to attack the dictator in his stronghold at the capital. They were marching 50,000 strong from Rio Grande do Sul, although on the most liberal computation that

flourishing province contains certainly not more than 80,000 population – man women and children all told !¹⁵

The resignation of Fonseca would be the happiest conceivable solution of the trouble. The President had, all along, from the date of deposition of Dom Pedro, been inclined toward dictatorial ways; and as the head of provisional government, he interposed so long an interval between that abdication and the holding of a general election that suspicion of his usurpatory intentions was not only general but natural. Yet with the fortune and the fate of his neighbor, Balmaceda, under his eyes, it was hardly to be credited that Fonseca would blindly follow in his disastrous footsteps. The common-sense idea of what the position of a President of a free republic means has evidently not yet dawned upon most of these Central and Southern American gentry. They appear to look upon their elevation to the Presidency in the light of an invitation extended to them by the people to assume absolute power and to give themselves all the airs of irresponsible and irremovable despots.

Fonseca's resignation would be a tardy recognition on his part of the fatal mistake he had made, as well as a happy termination of the trouble that his stupid ambition has brought on his country. But the report of his resignation needs confirmation.

¹⁵ Em 1872, a população do Rio Grande do Sul era de cerca 430 000 habitantes ; em 1900, de 1.149.000.

6. «The Brazilian Dictatorship», *The Fort Worth Gazette*, 24 de novembro

Duro ataque à ditadura de da Fonseca, tirano usurpador que só queria o legislativo para tomar nota dos seus decretos. Espera que os brasileiros, que mandaram embora «o suave e bondoso Dom Pedro», sejam «determinados» e façam a mesma coisa com «este governante sem classe» que os chilenos fizeram com Balmaceda.

It is impossible amidst a cloud of lying and contradictory dispatches to learn even approximately the extent and character of the revolt in Brazil. The indications are that it is growing in strength and that it will terminate as did the Chilean insurrection.

There is a striking resemblance between the dictatorship of da Fonseca and that of Balmaceda. The Brazilian president elected by the congress to the chief magistracy, became dissatisfied with the legislative wing of the government, which refused to do his bidding, and ordered the dissolution by a stretch of tyrannical power quite common in that latitude. This was done under the plea of necessity, the public good, a consideration always very dear to the heart of an autocrat. This is the plea of the czar for banishing the Jews from Russia. A new election was ordered by the dictator, who felt that with the aid of the army and navy he could have returned by the people representatives who would be sufficiently truculent to obey his commands and respect his wishes.

That, in brief, appears to be the cause of the revolt in the new republic. It is the attempt of one man in Chile to over-ride the will and authority of the

legislature, to arrogate supreme authority, and defy public opinion and the constitutional rights of a body chosen by the people to make laws for them. Da Fonseca's notion of a republic is that of every tyrant. The law-making power is no more than a ministerial body to record his decrees, and give form and expressions of his wishes. When it refuses, the mask is thrown off and the tyrant comes forth clad in the garb of a dictator, with his mouth full of fine phrases about the welfare of his people, whose sacred cause he has resolved to champion, and for whom he is pining to lay down his life!

It the dictator, da Fonseca, is right, the people of Brazil are not fit for self-government. But the fact that they resent the dictatorship, and seem as determined as the Chileans were to overthrow it, is a strong argument in their favor. If the people could be satisfied with one-man power, they would never have banished the gentle and kindly Dom Pedro. Having discarded him who gave them a government that was republican in everything but name, they will not long endure the worse than monarchical proclivities and usurpations of an upstart ruler

7. «The Revolution in Brazil», *The Minneapolis Tribune*, 24 de novembro

Editorial muito pessimista que prevê uma guerra civil como no Chile para uma «república rasgada em farrapos». Dá duas razões para explicar este «colapso»: a falta de educação do povo e a vontade de um «déspota» de querer concentrar todos os poderes na sua pessoa.

Brazilian matters appear to have gone from bad to worse till today finds the new republic torn to tatters. A number of the most important provinces have revolted from central government and there appears to be little prospect that they can reestablish the republic.

The collapse of Republicanism in Brazil must be attributed to two ever present causes underlying all the turbulent revolutions which impede the progress of civilization in South America. In the first place, the Brazilian people are uneducated and not fitted for a government in which self-control and the rule of an intelligent majority must play the principal part.

The second cause of the Brazilian revolution was directly traceable to the desire of a despot to make himself supreme. Like the unfortunate Balmaceda, the president, Fonseca, wished to guide the destinies of the republic without the meddlesome interference of the legislative body elected by the people. The men who have loved the good old Dom Pedro, but have drive him forth because they wished to role themselves, naturally objected to the situation of a second-rate tyrant in his place. So again revolted and half a dozen embryo of republics now exist in the place of the great empire of Brazil.

The mild but firm paternalism of Dom Pedro was better fitted to advance the happiness of his turbulent people that was the republic whose essential principles the Brazilians have failed to grasp. There is no prospect however that this mild old despot will return. In fact, everything points to a repetition of the sanguinary Chilean strife.

8. «Fonseca's Downfall», *New-York Tribune*, 24 de novembro

Analisando a queda de Deodoro, o jornal nova-iorquino nota que o ditador foi abandonado pelo exército que cedeu à pressão da «população». O articulista tem muita confiança no futuro do país. O que o Brasil está agora a viver são as mesmas e inevitáveis peripécias que aconteceram e acontecem nas outras repúblicas do subcontinente.

The news of a revolution in the Brazilian capital against President da Fonseca is generally credited in London and is probably true. The movement against him apparently became so formidable that he abandoned the struggle and surrendered his post do Vice-President Peixoto. If the news be fully confirmed it will be evident that the army has deserted him under pressure from the populace, which had grown weary of a military dictatorship out of accord with the constitutional movement of the last year. It is still uncertain whether the Vice-President's authority will be recognized by the new body of revolutionists in the capital, and by the governments of the coast States. Apparently he is the constitutional head of the Government after the President has relinquished his office. If he agrees to convoke Congress at an early date, the present crisis may pass as suddenly as it arose. The country will then settle down very much as Argentine did after President Celman's resignation¹⁶ and the assumption of office by his constitutional successor. It will have like the

¹⁶ Miguel Ángel Juárez Celman (1841-1909) é presidente da Argentina de 1886 a 1890. A 6 de agosto de 1890 renuncia ao seu cargo.

Argentina grave financial disorders to counteract, but the situation of Brazil in this respect is not desperate by any means.

The revolt against the Empire two years ago was unforeseen, and the Republican leaders were largely unprepared for the emergency. Their work was done with thoroughness and efficiency, and an admirable devised Constitution was enacted in the course of the first year. While the credit of the country has suffered from financial administration of a speculative order a large increase in immigration and an enormous development of business have shown that republican institutions are promoting the industrial progress in Brazil. Unfortunate as the recent break between General da Fonseca and Congress has been, there is no reason of despairing of the future of the new Republic. The military dictatorship, the revolt of Rio Grande do Sul and the revolt of the masses in the capital against the Government have been paralleled many times in the republican annals of Spanish America. The Brazil experience is not exceptional. The principle of republican government are not carried into practice in that quarter of the world without many relapses into anarchy and revolution. But as there has been progress everywhere else, so will there be an advance in the arts and morals of self-government in Brazil. Slowly, laboriously, but surely the little heave of the first patriotic uprising against the Empire will leaven the whole lump of Portuguese conservatism.

9. «President Fonseca Resigns», *The Washington Post*, 24 de novembro

Este editorial explica em poucas palavras como as causas evocadas para justificar o golpe de Deodoro – nomeadamente o perigo monárquico e as manobras dos negociantes ingleses – não tinham fundamento nenhum.

Depois de ter constatado que o povo da capital se revoltou e que a marinha o apoia e que a ditadura acabou, deseja que se encontre rapidamente uma solução pacífica para salvaguardar a república.

The only reason heretofore given in justification of Fonseca's usurpation of absolute power in Brazil have been that there was a conspiracy to overthrow the republic. The logic of the event, according to this view, was that, as there were some parties who designed to destroy the republic, he must be beforehand with them and destroy himself. It is only stating this reasoning in another way to say that it was for the alleged purpose of preserving the republic that he dissolved the congress and trampled upon the liberties, laws and constitutional of his country.

Quite in keeping with this extraordinary reasoning have been the instructions of the minister of foreign affairs of the Brazilian legations in Europe and in this country, which were, in effect, to deny every report and to pertinaciously assert the continued prevalence of peace, contentment, prosperity and success. According to these instructions the dictatorship was to be accounted for by the danger of a restoration of the monarchy, and by the jealousy of English traders who were unscrupulously using that ubiquitous and

influential substance known as English gold. It did not appear to disturb the Brazilian foreign office in the least that there had been no imperialist plotting, and that no imperialist had been arrested. Nor did it seem to be of any consequence that British traders could have no interest in promoting revolution such as is alleged to have been anticipated. These reasons were addressed to the credulity, not to the understanding, of other nations.

At last, however, light is dawning upon the obscurity of the situation, and news is at hand that has evidently not been concocted in the interest of British merchants or of imperialist conspirators or for stock-jobbing purpose. It reaches us direct and authentic sources, without filtration through the London news bureaus, that Rio Janeiro, the capital city, is in open insurrection; that the navy is in full sympathy with the insurgents; that Gen. Fonseca has issued a manifesto announcing his resignation of the Presidency in favor of Floriano Peixoto; that the autocracy is at an end, and that a new government is in course of formation.

In the absence of further information it is impossible to forecast the outcome, but as President Fonseca is said to have resigned in order to avert a civil war, it is to be hoped that the way is open for a pacific adjustment of existing difficulties and that the safety to the republic will shortly be assured.

10. «Affairs in Brazil», *The Detroit Free Press*, 24 de novembro

Deodoro, que foi muito ativo, diz o artigo, em promulgar as novas leis da jovem república entre 1889 e 1891, saiu da cena entregando o poder ao general Peixoto. Foi uma mudança rápida, sem derramamento de sangue, como a de novembro de 1889.

O jornal de Detroit, que não exclui o regresso de D. Pedro, espera que tudo volte à normalidade constitucional.

The latest dispatches from the capital of Brazil record another outbreak which deposed the dictator, Deodoro da Fonseca, as speedily as did the bloodless revolution which overthrow the imperial government, exiled Dom Pedro II, and proclaimed a republic. Fonseca was the chief of the provisional government and a most active spirit in promulgating the liberal laws which made Brazil a confederation of states, did away with ecclesiastic interference in governmental affairs, gave equal civil and political rights to resident foreigners as well as natives, and had many other provisions which go to make up the privileges enjoyed under a republican form of government.

The Minister of Finance in the new republic was Dr. Rui Barbosa, who was still in office when Fonseca assumed the position of generalissimo at the request of the officers of the army and navy, he thus becoming commander of both. Last August Dr. Barbosa was ousted and his successor as Minister of Finance was Gen. Floriano Peixoto, the man in whose favor Fonseca is said to have resigned. Peixoto has not cut much of a figure in Brazil, still less in the world at large, but he is evidently in favor with the short-term dictator. This

fact would scarcely endear him to the revolutionists, and as Fonseca seems to have had no good right or title to the authority which he seeks to transfer, Peixoto can do no more than succeed to unwarranted pretensions.

It took Brazil but a day to span the wide difference between an empire and a republic. Fonseca practically reversed the operation by announcing himself dictator, presuming upon his position at the head of the armed forces of the country. If the spirit of liberty still prevails in the country, to the extent of demanding the re-establishment of the republic, the course to be pursued is plain. The same uprising that put an end to Fonseca's rule can speedily dispose of Peixoto's pretensions, if he have any, and to proceed at once, in pursuance of constitutional provisions, to elect a President, re-establish Congress and proceed in the administration of public affairs as though no usurpation had intervened. It would no be a matter of great surprise should Dom Pedro be recalled, for he had endeared himself to many of the people and it was the crown princess Dona Isabel, rather than he, who aroused the successful revolution.

11. *The Sun*, 24 de novembro

As últimas revoluções no Brasil tiveram todas um rápido sucesso, nota o jornalista que compara o Brasil à França: o que acontece nas duas capitais tem uma importância ao nível nacional. No entanto, a frequência destas revoluções só prova uma coisa, escreve o jornal de Nova Iorque: «são feitas por uma pequena minoria que manipula a massa das pessoas».

The recent revolutions in Brazil have been so sudden and so successful, in fact almost instantaneous in their whirling effects, as to seem magical and like the revolting scenes in a melodrama to the slow-moving, conservative imagination of the Anglo-Saxons. Dom PEDRO was deposed in little more than a day and the empire superseded by a nominal republic, and now a revolution that arise at Rio de Janeiro in the morning results in the resignation of FONSECA, the new, self-constituted dictator, before nightfall.

Only in France have such abrupt changes before been effected by means apparently so spontaneous and insufficient, and possibly for somewhat similar reasons. For to compare lesser things with greater, Rio is to Brazil what Paris is to France, the practical center of both authority and population, and what elsewhere would be only a local comparatively harmless mob may develop in a few hours such control of the army or the navy, and such influenced with statesmen of eminence as to prove itself irresistible. It is often said that a successful revolution is the surest expression of the popular will, but great masses move slowly, and the brevity and frequency of these South American revolutions prove nothing more certainly that that they are really the work of an extremely small minority who can manipulate or throttle even the mass of the people at their pleasure.

12. *The Record-Union*, 24 de novembro

Os novos governantes não vão mudar o sistema político: o Brasil vai continuar a ser uma República Federativa.

We cannot believe that it will be the destiny of Brazil to be dismembered and to resolve in several minor republics. The worst news concerning the disturbances there agree that all the discontented look to the preservation to the federal condition, and that, outside the machinations of a few led-time royalists, the movers in the current troubles are striving for ends within a republican system. This is evidence of an appreciation of free government and a federation of States that we had begun to fear did not exist. The resignation of Fonseca testifies to a patriotic desire to prevent unnecessary bloodshed. The revolutionists, now reported triumphant, have practically won without the horrors of war, and they appear to be as devoted to the republic as was the deposed Government.

13. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 24 de novembro

The revolution in Brazil which has been foreshadowed for some time past has broken out in Rio de Janeiro. President Fonseca has resigned in favor of one Peixotte [*sic!*], thought just why he should attempt to name his successor does not appear. Perhaps the people will take the matter into their own hands. It is possible that the removal of Fonseca may avert further trouble, though it must be admitted the prospect for stable government is not at all encouraging.

14. *Democrat and Chronicle*, 24 de novembro

President Fonseca, of Brazil, has retired, giving place to the vice-president of the republic. There seems to be no immediate danger of restoration of the monarchy.

15. «The News from Brazil», *The Sun*, 25 de novembro

Este longo comentário saúda a atitude de Deodoro, que pediu a demissão para evitar uma guerra civil no seu país. Podia ter resistido, mas entregou o poder ao vice-presidente Peixoto, respeitando dessa forma a constituição, escreve o jornalista, segundo o qual as relações bilaterais entre o Brasil e os Estados Unidos não vão ser alteradas.

On the heels of a report that Marshall DA FONSECA had ordered a new general election comes the announcement that, in consequence of a revolt in Rio Janeiro headed by naval officers, he has resigned the post of President in favor of Vice-President PEIXOTO, upon whom under the Brazilian Constitution the executive authority would naturally devolve. This is of course a victory for the adherents of the recently dissolved Congress, which will doubtless be speedily convoked and reinstated in its constitutional functions by the new President.

The bloodless character of this revolution reflects credit upon the temper of Brazilian people, especially when we compare it with the scenes witnessed of late in Chile. It would have been well for BALMACEDA had he shown FONSECA'S

unwillingness to plunge the country into fratricidal strife. The latter's courage is indisputable, and there is no reason to believe that his hold upon officers and soldiers of the regular army had been seriously shaken. There is no evidence that they took any part in the movement organized against the dictator by the navy. Had, therefore, the Marshal chosen to summon the troops to his support, he would probably have been able to suppress forthwith the uprising in the Brazilian capital and to retain control of at least the central the central provinces for a considerable period. But he is a man not only advanced in years, but the victim of an enfeebling and seemingly mortal disease. Moreover, from the moment that the navy revolted his position became worse than BALMACEDA'A, because, owing to Brazil possessing a far greater area than Chile, and at the same time a relatively undeveloped railroad system, the dispatch of large bodies of troops by land would be still more impracticable. Without the command of the sea the suppression of the rebellion in Rio Grande do Sul would be out of question, and it would be equally impossible to avert similar insurrections in Bahia, Pernambuco, and Para. As we have often pointed out, it was the joint action of the Brazilian army and navy which rendered the movement against Dom PEDRO II. Irresistible, and so long as both arms of the service remained faithful to FONSECA the maintenance of his authority over the greater part of the country could be reasonably be expected. Having lost the navy, the utmost he could look for would be a prolongation of anarchy and the gradual disintegration of Brazil into half a dozen separate republics. No such result could be wished for by a patriot, and even his opponents have acknowledged that FONSECA is not lacking in patriotism.

That FONSECA sincerely desired to avert the secession of Rio Grande and other provinces, and to hasten the reestablishment of order throughout Brazil is indicated by his choice of successor. The soldiers were waiting in their barracks to hear from him, and he might have put forward any general officer who could rely upon their good will, however unsatisfactory he might be to the Congress party. By designing Gen. PEIXOTO, who distinguished himself in the war against Paraguay, and who is regarded with affection and respect in the army, he prevented the soldiers from taking into their own hands the selection of a chief magistrate, and at the same time gave the friends of constitutional government all the guarantees they could fairly require. For on their theory that the Brazilian Constitution is still in force, PEIXOTO, having been duly elected Vice-President, is the man whom executive authority must needs pass upon FONSECA'S death, resignation or disability. Moreover, since FONSECA'S dissolution of the Congress and assumption of a virtual dictatorship, the Vice-President has maintained a studiously neutral attitude. To do this in Rio Janeiro under the eye of the usurper would naturally be regarded as implying disapproval for the *coup d'état*. At all events, it cannot be disputed that in Brazil at this moment the executive authority is in the hands in which it legally belongs, and if President PEIXOTO recalls FONSECA'S decree directing a new general election and proceeds to bring together immediately the disbanded Congress, the reversion of a lawful state of things will be complete. If the constitutional régime, reestablished in both its legislative and executive departments, is not recognized by the leader of the rebellion of Rio Grande do Sul, it will be

manifest that their uprising was prompted rather by selfish than by patriotic motives.

What will be the effect of FONSECA'S resignation on the relations of Brazil to the United States? There is no doubt that FONSECA was a firm friend of this country, and the many proofs given to his wish to gain our good will made him an object of peculiar aversion to the representatives of England commercial and financial interests. His feeling was shared, however, by almost all Brazilian republicans as contradistinguished from those who favor a restoration of imperialist régime. It is not the latter, but the former, who both in province of Rio Grande and now in the capital itself have organized successful resistance to FONSECA'S *coup d'état*. Nor is there any reason to think that the pro-American sympathies of his fellow republicans are distasteful to the new President PEIXOTO. He was FONSECA'S Minister of War during the period between the deposition of Dom PEDRO II. and the inauguration of a constitutional government, when he was made Vice-President. Had he disliked the arrangements for partial reciprocity with the United States, his opinion would have had much weight and would doubtless have been signified by protests. We are probably therefore justified in hoping that he change of executive in Brazil will not prove detrimental to the good understanding between that country and our own.

16. «Another Dictator's Downfall», *The Baltimore Sun*, 25 de novembro

O jornalista de Baltimore, que resume os acontecimentos dos últimos dois anos da história brasileira, espera agora um regresso do Brasil, se Peixoto o permitir, à lei e à ordem constitucionais.

General da Fonseca's compulsory surrender of dictatorial power puts the Brazilian republic, it may be assumed, again upon its legs. Vice-President Floriano Peixoto in becoming head of the State does so, apparently, in pursuance of the Brazilian constitution, and not as the inheritor of da Fonseca's role of dictator. The dictator deposition, in a word, brings back the reign of law and order, with industry and commerce, their natural concomitants. The decrees of the ex-dictator, calling for the election of a new Congress in February and a meeting in May, will probably be annulled, and the Congress da Fonseca dispersed will be recalled to the national capital. Thus the constitutional history of the young republic will be resumed, and the prosperity of its people will be worked out under free institutions.

On November 15, 1889, General da Fonseca headed a rebellion of the troops stationed at Rio, and, being successful, deposed the Emperor Dom Pedro and sent him into exile. A military dictatorship, with exigencies of its own, was substituted for the nerveless rule of an aged constitutional monarch. By successive decrees General da Fonseca declared Brazil a republic, of which he was provisional President, and converted the twenty provinces of the empire into so many distinct states united by a federative compact. On June 22, 1890,

the draft of a new constitution was proclaimed, modeled roughly upon that of the United States. This constitution, it was decreed, was to be ratified by a Congress to be elected in September, 1890. As General da Fonseca looked closely to the elections, the Congress chosen at the appointed date was eminently favorable to the government. It sanctioned its past acts, and on February 24, 1891, ratified, with unimportant modifications, the constitution proposed by the military dictator. On the following day the Congress elected da Fonseca President. The vote was somewhat significant, inasmuch as the dictator, in a Congress consisting largely of his own creatures, had a majority of but 23 out of a total some 240 votes. Evidently the General had not become the universal favorite "as the great liberator". Gen. Floriano Peixoto's majority for Vice-President was four times as large.

With da Fonseca's inauguration as constitutional President, on February 26, 1891, began the new era of freedom for the Brazilians under republican government. Everything went smoothly at the capital for a time. Last month, however, the Congress began to object to the President's excessive use of the veto power and undertook to restrict it. As the constitution giving him the veto was made valid by the vote of the Congress, it was assumed, would suffice to amend that fundamental law. Da Fonseca, however, apprehending a serious curtailment of his functions, dissolved the Congress, as an Emperor might have done, and ordered new elections, at the same time resuming his role of dictator. This was clearly an unconstitutional act, and being performed in defiance of a Congress having the powers of a constitutional assembly, it was resented

throughout the country. Armed uprisings occurred in Rio Grande do Sul and other States, having for their object the deposition of da Fonseca. At length no Monday last there was a rising, supported by the navy, in Rio Janeiro itself. The result, as already stated, is the downfall of da Fonseca and the restoration of the republic. The new President is a man of ability, and animated, it is hoped, by sincere respect for republican institutions. It is in his power to correct by orderly administration the bad traditions of his predecessor's regime.

17. «Republics Want no Dictators», *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, 25 de novembro

O que aconteceu no Chile e agora no Brasil, prova que o que importa é o interesse geral e não a ambição e «auto-glorificação» de uma pessoa. Por outras palavras, afirma o editorialista, fica demonstrado que «uma nação que quer autogovernar-se» repele a ditadura. Este princípio constitui um «muro de diamante contra o qual reis, potentados e ditadores irão partir o cérebro». E quanto a Floriano Peixoto, é preciso esperar e ver como é que ele quer exercer o poder, conclui o diário americano.

Facts become forces as events form history. Occurrences in Brazil making parallels to recent mutations in Chile's governmental factors are but the welcome proof of progress in the line of popular selection to which *The Eagle* had occasion to refer a few days ago. When education invades a hide bound and dynastically dominated region the trend of thought is directed toward the securing of those things that shall prove most beneficial to the masses. It was this element that forced Dom Pedro from his throne in bloodless

triumph over monarchical ideas, and the same element of desire for advancement has, with equal absence of sanguinary results, ejected from power President da Fonseca. When the spirit of a generation rises to the contemplation of best methods to bring out beneficial conditions it becomes as fixed in its republicanism of thought as the north star is in the sky. Victory following a struggle, warlike or peaceful, is not readily relinquished because the ambition of one man makes it possible for him to imagine conditions of self glorification which do not exist.

To succeed an emperor with a dictator was an experiment that proved both costly and humiliating to da Fonseca. The dissolution of congress – the law making power created by the people for expression of their desires and for remedial treatment of common evils – was an act in itself the remotest extreme of the idea that create the republic. Supplement this Cromwellian proceeding with the proclaimed assumption of dictatorship tended only to make less secure from disturbing the principles on which the existing government was founded. The lesson of Balmaceda's experience in Chile was, apparently not well learned. The horrors of civil war evidently did not present to da Fonseca's mind a picture of gory repulsive. Patriotism was buried beneath the hearthstone of personal ambition. Love of country faded in the self created halo of self love. And the result in Brazil, divested of the massacres, savage brutality and terrible deeds of Balmaceda's soldiers, has been almost the same.

There is, however, this difference; Balmaceda had the courage to face the consequences which his rash desire for power invoked and evoked, while da

Fonseca averted disaster to himself by resigning his office. This act meets a demand that might have made itself as forceful in presentation as was that of the congressional party in Chile. It is safe to believe, therefore, that when Vice-President Peixoto seized the administrative reins he will profit from the experiences of his late immediate superior. Whether the reports be true that the disturbances which led to the present situation were the outcome of royalist conspiracies, the demonstration has been made that dictatorial dominance is something foreign to the wishes of a nation that desires to be governed by its own people. The enlarging of this principle becomes mountainous in opposition to monarchy. Its healthy ruggedness is an adamant wall against which kings, potentates and dictators can easily dash out their brains. It is saving in its permanence, though it may chance to be somewhat destructive in its infancy. While its hand of government wears the fur glove of toleration, it can put on the mailed covering of rebuke when the occasion demands it. This is what it wore when it remonstrated with da Fonseca for his temerity in destroying the bulwark of constitutional liberty, and Brazil is likely to keep it on until President Peixoto has been thoroughly tested.

18. «More Trouble in Brazil», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 25 de novembro

A recente mudança no Rio é uma questão interna entre republicanos: os monarquistas não tiveram nenhum papel nisso, realça o jornal californiano, preocupado com o estado de grande incerteza e com a falta de uma autoridade verdadeiramente respeitada no Brasil. É este tipo de situação

«muito crítica» que favorece o trabalho dos conspiradores, afirma o jornal, na opinião do qual, vistas as circunstâncias e apesar de tudo, «é melhor ter um mau governo do que não ter nenhum».

Whether President da Fonseca of the Brazilian republic was a patriot or a traitor in his seizure of the reins of government may never be definitely ascertained, for he has yielded to the opposition which his arbitrary action aroused and has resigned his dictatorship and his Presidency. In so doing he named Floriano Peixoto as his successor, but the dispatches significantly say that he will not be permitted to act as chief executive even temporarily unless he is in sympathy with the revolutionary movement.

This recent episode seems to be a sort of family quarrel among the republicans. At least there is no evidence of any move on the part of the imperialists. Rio Janeiro has resented da Fonseca's assumption of the supreme power and has forced him to step down and out, but there is nothing to indicate that the imperialists have controlled the movements of the opposition or have had anything to do with it. This would seem to indicate that the sentiment in favor of Dom Pedro's restoration to power is very slight, for had it possessed any strength it would have taken advantage of dissension in the republican ranks to advocate the cause of the deposed Emperor.

The provinces of Para and Rio Grande do Sul, which were the first to oppose the dictatorship of da Fonseca, have not yet been heard from, but it is more than likely that they will be well pleased with his abdication. Their

principal grievance was that da Fonseca had overridden the Constitution and the laws, and they should be gratified at his downfall.

What makes the situation in Brazil alarming is the element of uncertainty which prevails. There has been as yet none of that cruel, sanguinary civil war which afflicted Chile so grievously, but there is no established head to the Government and no authority which is generally respected. That is the kind of situation which pleases conspirators and suits malcontents. They may chance upon a lucky turn of the wheel at any moment which will raise them from their state of nothingness to one of great importance.

It is for this reason that a bad government is better than none. Even a tyrant has lucid intervals, and a despot does not condemn his subjects to universal slaughter. Brazil is in a very critical condition just now, the strength of her republicanism being put to a sever test and its adaptability to the needs of the people being subject to question.

19. *Asheville Daily Citizen*, 25 de novembro

Fonseca não tinha escolha: teve de se retirar; por outro lado, D. Pedro pode ficar descansado: não voltará a pisar a terra brasileira.

There seems to be no doubt that da Fonseca has resigned the presidency of Brazil and that if he had not done so he would have been hurled from power by civil war. This was made plain to him, together with the fact that he had but

a small following and must inevitably lose in the end. And so Brazil turns over again politically; but the exiled king, strain his ears as he may, hears no call for the restoration of the monarchy. Brazil will fight it out on the line of a nominal republic at last.

20. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 25 e 27 de novembro

Há uma única maneira para evitar estes golpes militares a repetição: respeitar a constituição.

The resignation of da Fonseca, e dictator of Brazil, in the face of a revolt in his own capital leaves the republic for a time without an official head. The obvious way out of the difficulty is the reassembling of the congress that he dispersed by force of arms. If the United States of Brazil is level headed enough to adopt this American method of adherence to constitutional forms it will show a strength and steadiness that will put an end to the plots of would be dictators for many years to come.

21. *The Cincinnati Inquirer*, 25 de novembro

Fonseca, the Brazil Dictator, parts both his hair and his whiskers in the middle. It's no wonder that his subjects are making life miserable for him.

22. *The Wichita Daily Eagle, 25 de novembro*

Fonseca, very sensibly, set aside whatever ambitious he might have and resigned. This is a much more discreet course, if not so valorous as Balmaceda's which was to hold on and suicide.

23. *Daily Nebraska State Journal, 26 de novembro*

Os métodos dos chilenos depois da guerra civil...

The Chilean government moves on different lines from that of the sister republic, Brazil. The adherents of the late dictator Balmaceda are to be indicted and pushed to the wall, probably executed so far as they can be caught, and their property confiscated and no amnesty is for the present in sight. This is a racial characteristic of the Chileans indicating that with all his enterprise and shrewdness in business, the Chilean is vindictive and bloodthirsty

24. *The News and Observer, 26 de novembro*

President Fonseca, who attempted to play the role of dictator in Brazil, has been forced to resign, as recently announced by our telegraphic news, and from this quick deposition of a man who appears to have disregarded the voice of the people, we hop it may be safely inferred that the Republic of Brazil is on a permanent foundation.

25. *The Indianapolis Journal*, 26 de novembro

A New Yorker who has recently returned from Brazil says there is an intense feeling of hostility to British capital and British interference in Brazilian affairs, and corresponding desire that the people of this country will come to their commercial relief. "What Brazil wants now more than anything else", says this gentleman, "is that American capitalists should go there and draw on the United States for all needed supplies for the Brazilian market".

26. *The Sioux City Journal*, 26 de novembro

The Brazilians made pretty short work of Dictator Fonseca. The counterrevolution lasted less than a month. There was no bloodshed. Brazil got out of the scrape with luckily. Now let them settle down to republican ways.

27. «Brazil satisfied», *San Francisco Chronicle*, 27 de novembro

Artigo muito otimista sobre o futuro do Brasil republicano e que dá uma boa imagem do brasileiro, nomeadamente comparando-o com o chileno.

Recent accounts indicate that the people of Brazil are satisfied with the present condition of affairs, and that the cause of the uprising was a disinclination to allow da Fonseca to put himself into supreme authority. President Peixoto, his successor, has issued a call for the reassembling on

December 18th of Congress which Fonseca dissolved, and every one seems to be satisfied with his course. Rio Janeiro is quiet and business has been generally resumed.

In the province of Rio Grande do Sul the abdication of da Fonseca has been received with general satisfaction, and has put an end to the revolutionary movement there. It is probable that the calling of Congress will be sufficient to allay all trouble for the present, and that matters will resume their normal condition of quiet either under Peixoto or some other chief magistrate.

Those who know the Brazilians speak of them as being naturally peaceful, quiet self-restrained and conservative. They are not nearly so excitable and pugnacious as the Chileans, but very much prefer to live in peace at home and abroad if they can. This difference in temperament is evinced by the events of the last few weeks. The *coup d'état* of Fonseca did not create a civil war. It stirred up a powerful opposition, and when da Fonseca saw this he resigned and peace was restored at once. The successful party have not hungered or thirsted for the blood of the deposed dictator, as the Chilean did for Balmaceda's. They have been satisfied with the downfall of the would-be dictator, without beginning a reign of terror and bloodshed.

The restoration of peace and tranquility is a good sign for the permanence and stability of the republic. It shuts out Dom Pedro and the imperial party, and goes far to show that Brazil is capable of self-government as a republic.

28. *The Record-Union, 27 de novembro*

Agora ver-se-á se os ingleses têm ou não muita influencia no parlamento brasileiro. O diário californiano receia uma abrogação do tratado comercial entre os dois países.

The news from Brazil is gratifying. The new President is satisfactory to the people, martial law no longer prevails, quiet is restored, and Congress is about to reassemble. We shall now very soon ascertain if this body is really so dominated by English influence – as it charged – as to work the abrogation of the reciprocity treaty with the United States. There are grave reasons to fear that such will be the action taken.

29. *The Fort Worth Gazette, 27 de novembro*

Many persons look upon Brazil as a small affair and think a revolution there could be easily encompassed. It is true that the population is comparatively small, being only about 12,000,000 all told, but in territory it is about equal to the all Europe, or about 200,00 square miles larger than the United States. Brazil has few railroads and poor telegraph service, so that it sometimes takes months to communicate with remote states or provinces.

30. *The St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, 27 de novembro

President Peixoto of Brazil, like his predecessor, is a soldier, but seems to be able to adjust himself to the standpoint of the citizen and statesmen.

31. *The Wichita Daily Eagle*, 27 de novembro

Dom Pedro should send Fonseca a circular setting forth the salubrity of the continental climate on deposed rulers.

32. «Fonseca's Fall», *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, 27 de novembro

Outra revista de imprensa do quotidiano do Illinois.

St. Louis Globe Democrat (Missouri) :

Fonseca's fate ought to be a striking object lesson to would-be dictators in South America. My it ever be so with tyrants.

The Kansas City Journal (Missouri) :

Fonseca is pretty likely to follow Balmaceda to the grave, even if de does not emulate the example of that unhappy man and kill himself.

The Columbus Journal (Nebraska):

Since Fonseca is out of a job he will probably devote his attention to the manufacture of car-axles in Rio Janeiro and he may run for Congress later on.

The Cincinnati Times-Star (Ohio):

Perhaps by his promptness in resigning President Fonseca of Brazil may escape a bayonet or a file of riflemen. But he would be wise to leave Brazil by the next steamer.

Daily Milwaukee News (Wisconsin):

Yesterday Fonseca was President of Brazil. Today Peixoto is the Chief Executive. Nobody can tell who will have the job tomorrow. The people of that country have no respect for the old saw that advises against swapping horses in crossing a stream.

Milwaukee Sentinel:

If it is true that Fonseca has resigned the Presidency of the Brazilian Republic that will be the end of the trouble. The popular sentiment is altogether for a republic after the form of our own, and there is no possibility of a dictatorship if Fonseca has failed.

The Pittsburg Dispatch (Pensilvânia) :

The apparently authentic announcement of the forced resignation of Dictator Fonseca furnishes another strong proof that would-do imitators of Caesar and Napoleon cannot flourish anywhere on the American continent. Neither the location nor the era is congenial.

The Kansas City Times (Missouri)

Dictator Fonseca's power must have been of the ropes of sand variety and is fancied realm but a dream, for it took the people of Rio Janeiro less than twelve hours to break the one and dissipate the other. If, however, he laid up treasures in Europe while in power he need not worry about his downfall.

The Sun (Nova Iorque):

It is often said that a successful revolution is the surest expression of the popular will, but great masses move slowly, and the brevity and frequency of these South American revolutions prove nothing more certainly than that they are really the work of an extremely small minority who can manipulate or throttle even the mass of the people at their pleasure.

New York Tribune:

Brazil's experience is not exceptional. The principle of republican government are not carried into practice in that quarter of the world without

many relapses into anarchy and revolution. But as there has been progress everywhere else, so will there be an advance in the arts and morals of self-government in Brazil. Slowly, laboriously, but surely the little leaven of the first patriotic uprising against the empire will leaven the whole lump of Portuguese conservatism.

Public Ledger (Pensilvânia):

Such wretched travesties of republican government as these which the Brazilians have had imposed upon them by the military club in Rio Janeiro that deposed Dom Pedro would seem to be sufficient to disgust them with the very name of republic. It was the military club of which Fonseca was the chief that brought about the whole of this catalogue of evils. They are his work done merely to gratify his own personal ambition – his lust for power. There is no patriotism in it.

33. «In Brazil», *The Times Democrats*, 28 de novembro

Ainda bem que Fonseca teve «o bom senso» de se demitir e de evitar, dessa forma, uma «desastrosa guerra civil» para o Brasil, sublinha o quotidiano da Luisiana. Este acentua o facto que este «bom senso» faltou ao marechal, quando decidiu suspender o Parlamento, que queria contrariar a sua desastrosa política financeira num país que já tem uma dívida pública considerável.

It is extremely fortunate for the republic of Brazil that her dictator, Fonseca, had the good sense to bow to the pressure brought to bear upon him by his fellows-citizen at the very commencement of what but a week ago threatened to be a long-continued and disastrous civil war. Presumably that "good sense" which we are charitable enough to attribute to him had a considerable fillip administered to it by the very prompt and decisive action adopted by the population of the capital last Monday, when they presented to him the alternative of stepping down voluntarily within twenty-four hours, or of being pulled down unceremoniously.

Anyway, when he dissolved the Congress last month and announced his intention of "playing a lone hand" in the government of the country, he was certainly not suffering from an undue access of "good sense". This will be evident by a single glance at the circumstances under which he executed his coup d'état. For, section 1, chapter 1, article 16 of the Constitution of Brazil provides that Congress alone shall have the power to deliberate on the prorogation or extension of the session, and that each Legislature shall last for three years. Now, as Congress had not sat for one year, let alone three years, it is plain that Fonseca had precisely the same right to send it packing because it refused to accede to certain lines of policy insisted on by his Excellency, that Mr. Benjamin Harrison would have to dissolve the Fifty-second Congress in the month of January, 1892, on the ground that it contains too many Democrats members, or that it discovered a disposition to inaugurate Democratic policies.

Da Fonseca showed his further want of “good sense” in the action which he adopted to give full effect to the coup d’etat. The Constitution confers on the Executive, in addition to other powers, the power of either directly or indirectly, through his responsible ministers, declaring a state of siege at any point of the national territory, in case of foreign aggression or serious internal disturbances. In virtue of this power, the dictator, in a true dictator’s spirit, positively had the gall to declare a state of siege at all the points in the republic of which he had any suspicion, for the purpose of preventing the people from protesting against the unlawful dissolution of their Congress!

The policy, we may here mention, which da Fonseca insisted that Congress should carry out, and which the Congress flatly refused to agree to, was in connection with finance. Already there was as much as \$ 225,000,000 of paper currency in circulation throughout the country; and Fonseca and his Finance Minister not only wanted the Congress to authorize the increase of this paper currency by an extra \$ 75,000,000 – the whole to amount to \$ 300,000,000 – but they insisted also that the Executive Department of the government should be allowed at the same time to dissipate the metallic backing of the paper notes, which lay in the treasury. The President and his Finance Minister has some sort of hazy or crazy idea that, whenever, these paper notes amounting to \$ 300,000,000 came in for redemption, as one day they were bound to do, some impalpable fund which they were pleased to refer to as “the credit of State” would be sufficient to guarantee their conversion.

Such was the frantic policy of finance which Fonseca sought to crowd down the throat of the Brazilian Congress; and which the representatives were intelligent, honest and patriotic enough to resort to insurrection rather than allow. It would have been equivalent to adding \$300,000,000 at one fell sweep to the nation's debt, and for no other purpose than to allow the administration to continue in its blundering financial course.

The debt of Brazil is large enough as it is, considering its population and its resources. The total debt, foreign and internal, amounts to \$600,000,000; the population is 14,000,000, and the yearly revenue is \$75,000,000. Had Fonseca had his way he would have added to that debt four times the total amount of the annual revenue of the country; and he would have increased the per capita debt, which now stands at about \$43, by over 12 per cent.

A civil war, as long-continued as that in Chile, would hardly have been more disastrous than that from a financial point of view; for it has just been published that Chile's previous debt of \$115,000,000 has been increased by \$73,000,000 through increased by \$73,000,000 through the misfortunes brought by Balmaceda's despotic course.

All is well, however, that ends well; and everybody will be pleased to know for certain that Dictator Fonseca has stepped down, and that he has been replaced in the person of the late Vice-President, Floriano Peixoto, by a citizen who in his presidential capacity promises to be guided solely by the Constitution, as well in its spirit as in its letter.

34. *The Wichita Daily Eagle*, 28 de novembro

Fonseca's successor is doing well. He has succeeded in holding down the presidency for a week almost.

35. *The News and Observer*, 29 de novembro

As derrotas de Balmaceda no Chile e de Deodoro no Brasil foram uma vitória do povo e das instituições republicanas.

Affairs in Brazil are again moving smoothly. The resignation of Fonseca was received with "wild enthusiasm" and the course of the new President Peixoto, gives great satisfaction. The Junta's force in some parts of the Republic will remain under arms until Congress assembles.

The triumph of the people in Chile and Brazil is an advanced step in favor of the permanency of Republican institutions in South American countries, and will teach a wholesome lesson to those who would play the role of usurpers.

*Sic semper tyrannis*¹⁷.

¹⁷ Os tiranos serão sempre destronados.

36. *Daily Nebraska State Journal*, 29 de novembro

O jornal californiano está muito satisfeito com Peixoto, sobretudo porque este quer manter as mesmas relações com os Estados Unidos e nomeadamente o tratado de reciprocidade promulgado a 5 de fevereiro.

It is cheering to know that Acting President Peixoto, who has succeeded Dictator Fonseca in charge of affairs in Brazil, announces that all engagements will be kept with the United States. This means that the efforts of the English traders to bring about the abrogation of the reciprocal treaty with this country are likely to prove abortive. Peixoto stands an excellent chance of reelection, and so much enthusiasm is being shown for the republic under his administration that it is not unreasonable to hope for along era of peace and prosperity. It is certain that the revolution has not improved the chances of the accession of the family of Dom Pedro to the throne. Brazil seems determined to give the republic a fair trial, and that ought to secure its permanence.

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Résumé en français

Dans ce deuxième livre consacré aux péripéties qui ont mené à la démission de Deodoro de Fonseca en novembre 1891 au Brésil, nous présentons le point de vue de vingt-six journaux américains. La presse étatsunienne, comme celle du Vieux Continent, publie des télégrammes, des titres en première page, mais surtout des commentaires sur ce qui se passe du 3 novembre au 23 novembre dans le plus grand pays d'Amérique du Sud.

Nous avons sélectionné ces analyses journalistiques, souvent des éditoriaux, ainsi que de brefs commentaires, parfois ironiques. Généralement précédés d'une brève introduction en portugais, ils sont retranscrits en respectant l'ordre chronologique.

Les opinions de ces organes de presse sont très variées. Certains critiquent ouvertement le coup de force du Maréchal, la fermeture du Parlement brésilien et la proclamation de l'état de siège ; d'autres justifient ces mesures liberticides ; d'autres encore voient la main des nostalgiques de l'ancien régime derrière cette instabilité constitutionnelle. Certains même semblent croire en un improbable voyage au Brésil du petit-fils de D. Pedro II dans le but de reconquérir le trône perdu en novembre 1889.

Enfin, un nombre non négligeable de journalistes pointe un doigt accusateur contre les Anglais. À leurs yeux, ceux-ci, irrités par le traité

commercial entre Washington et Rio de Janeiro signé le 31 janvier, font tout ce qui est en leur pouvoir pour empêcher son application. Ne manquent donc pas les articles où l'on parle de la volonté hégémonique de John Bull, de son avidité et de son goût illimité du profit. On accuse également Londres et ses agents de vouloir déstabiliser la jeune république, d'intriguer contre da Fonseca, considéré, à l'instar du Chilien Balmaceda, un ami des États-Unis.

Ces défenseurs de la doctrine Monroe estiment donc que leur pays doit être prêt militairement si des puissances européennes devaient s'intéresser de trop près aux événements brésiliens. Ils censurent également le Parti Démocrate et ses organes de presse, trop anglophiles à leurs avis, défavorables au renforcement des crédits destinés à la marine militaire.

Dans la presse américaine, on juge excessif le poids du militarisme dans les anciennes colonies espagnoles et portugaises, même si l'on admet sa nécessité pour assurer l'ordre public. Ces observateurs sont convaincus que les peuples latino-américains, contrairement à ceux d'origine germanique, sont bien loin de posséder un niveau d'éducation et de civisme suffisant pour comprendre ce que signifie vivre dans un régime démocratique. Le Brésil, où la république a été proclamée un peu trop facilement, ne représente pas une exception.

Ces éditorialistes, qui dénoncent sans ambages le manque d'information et la censure officielle, abordent également d'autres aspects: les révoltes dans certains états, et notamment au Rio Grande do Sul, et l'éventualité d'un

éclatement du Brésil. Toutefois, les journaux américains insistent beaucoup moins sur ces dangers que leurs collègues du Vieux Continent.

Par ailleurs, la crise financière et la politique monétaire catastrophique de l'exécutif brésilien ne se trouvent pas au centre de l'attention des éditorialistes de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique. Cette analyse lacunaire de l'inflation galopante ainsi que les attaques violentes contre la politique britannique au Brésil constituent les deux principales différences par rapport aux commentaires écrits par les grands quotidiens francophones.

Comme dans la presse européenne, on trouve moins d'articles sur la sortie de scène du Maréchal que sur son coup d'État du 3 novembre. La plupart des éditorialistes étatsuniens sont visiblement satisfaits de ce changement rapide, sans effusion de sang, contrairement à ce qui s'est passé lors de la défaite de Balmaceda. Ils mettent en parallèle la chute de Deodoro avec celle de D. Pedro le 15 novembre 1889.

Si une partie des journaux critique impitoyablement da Fonseca et son dessein d'avoir voulu garder tout le pouvoir, d'autres, au contraire, le défendent : suivant leur point de vue, en présentant sa démission, l'ancien Président a évité une longue et sanglante guerre civile à son pays.

Une écrasante majorité de ces commentateurs doit constater que, d'une part, aucun état n'a proclamé son indépendance et que, d'autre part, les partisans de l'ancien régime n'ont joué aucun rôle dans les événements. Tous

souhaitent un retour à un régime constitutionnel et espèrent que, malgré les manœuvres des Anglais, le Traité promulgué le 5 février puisse continuer à promouvoir et à améliorer les relations entre le Brésil et les États-Unis.

En ce qui concerne le nouveau président, Floriano Peixoto, les éditorialistes sont plutôt prudents : ils veulent attendre ses décisions et le juger sur pièce. Relevons enfin que si quelques journaux se montrent particulièrement pessimistes en parlant du caractère inévitable d'une guerre civile, la majorité des observateurs considère cette crise comme inéluctable. Elle fait partie, en quelque sorte, d'un long processus d'apprentissage de la jeune république sur la voie de sa construction. Ces journalistes sont convaincus que, à moyen et surtout à long terme, le Brésil connaîtra un régime républicain fort et démocratique, semblable à celui de la grande République d'Amérique du Nord.



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REVOLUTION IN BRAZIL.

CONGRESS DISSOLVED AND A DICTATORSHIP CREATED.

The Young South American Republic Under Martial Law—The Revolution Said to Have Been Caused by a Quarrel Between President da Fonseca and Congress—Public Order Said to Have Been Maintained—The News in London and Washington.

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT.

Brazil Again Thrown Into a State of Unrest.

MARTIAL LAW PROCLAIMED AT RIO JANEIRO.

IS BRAZIL IN REVOLUTION?

RUMORS OF MARTIAL LAW AND A DICTATORSHIP IN THE REPUBLIC

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The Brazilian Crisis Is Now Charged to English Intrigues.

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President Fonseca Gives His Reasons for the Coup d'Etat.

THE NEWS OFFICIALLY CONFIRMED

FONSECA HAS RESIGNED.

HIS VICE-PRESIDENT SUCCEEDS HIM.

Fonseca Had Indignantly Rejected the Demands for His Resignation, but Changed His Mind.

FONSECA STEPS DOWN

A Decisive Victory for the Rebels.

The Dictator Nominates His Successor.

A Choice Not Likely to Be Approved by the People of Brazil.



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